Talk:Baruch Spinoza/Archive 3

Archive 1

Archive 2

Archive 3

Archive 4

Benedict versus Baruch

Who took it upon himself to change spinoza's name to Baruch? During his entire adult life, he chose to be known as Benedict rather than Baruch or Benito. As a result, he has been known under this name in English ever since. Changing it is rather disrespectful to Spinoza himself. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 69.141.126.250 (talk) 01:39, 9 August 2012 (UTC)

I completely agree 212.174.131.15 (talk) 07:46, 16 November 2012 (UTC)3210king

infinitely many attributes v. infinite attributes

The section on Spinoza's philosophy says that he thinks God has infinitely many attributes. He only says that God has infinite attributes. Although this might appear to be the same Spinoza's understanding of infinity makes the two significantly different. The difference may appear unimportant but its a strongly contested part of scholarship on Spinoza what exactly he meant by infinite attributes. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 89.241.65.10 (talk) 20:49, 18 March 2009 (UTC)

Spinoza scholars sometimes disagree about stuff. But this is the first time I've heard about any controversy about the term "infinitely many attributes". As a writer, I see little difference between the terms "infinitely many attributes" and "infinite attributes"; can anybody explain what is the difference between the terms or why this difference might be important? My understanding is that Spinoza believed that God, or Nature, had infinite attributes, but that as humans, we can only perceive two: thought and extension. I've ALWAYS wondered what the other possible attributes are (if Spinoza's right and they exist) but I'll always be baffled about this. Tomwsulcer (talk) 22:37, 31 July 2009 (UTC)tomwsulcer

I will be quite honest in that I do not myself see the distinction between these two. However, it is important to understand that Spinoza did not have a very good understanding of the infinite. When he speaks of God having an infinite amount of attributes he must really have in mind something more like 'God has all the attributes'. Otherwise his philosophy would have many problems. If Spinoza meant 'infinite' in the same way we now understand it then it could surely be the case that God could have an infinite amount of attributes, but not ALL the attributes. This would open up the door for the possibility of more than one substance being able to exist. Something which Spinoza explicitly denies. Therefore, when Spinoza says God has an infinite amount of attributes he is essentially meaning to say that God has all the attributes. Diehl1am (talk) 07:05, 25 February 2010 (UTC)

I guess maybe there could be one way to think about each of those terms. Possibly 'infinitely many attributes' refers to the fact that God has an infinite number of attributes (for example: extension, thought, etc...on to infinity). It refers strictly to the quantity of different attributes that God has. On the other hand, 'infinite attributes' may refer to the fact that each attribute that God possesses, he possesses an infinite amount of that tribute (for example: infinite extension). It refers strictly to the quantity of each attribute that God has. However, both of these terms, while different, apply to God.Diehl1am (talk) 02:52, 27 February 2010 (UTC)

When Spinoza uses the term "infinite" he means "without bounds", "there is no more", "there could not possibly be more", "you can't count them". Yes, I know about infinite positive numbers that don't include negative numbers. Since negative numbers are "more numbers" and you are putting a limit on positive numbers (greater than zero), all positive numbers is not the kind of "infinite" Spinoza is talking about.

Spinoza talks about one thing only being limited by another thing of the same attribute. The same applies to attributes. If you say there is a limit to the number of attributes you are placing a limit on God - and then this wouldn't be God you were talking about. It is clear, taking Spinoza's arguments in context, that there has to be infinite attributes meaning "a number that can't be counted", "there are no others", and "there could be no others".--Blake McBride (talk) 03:49, 26 April 2012 (UTC)

Hegel Quote

"You are either a Spinozist or not a philosopher at all."

This quote stems from a period when "Spinozist" essentially meant what we mean by "atheist" and/or "agnostic". What Hegel is saying is that you can't be a philosopher and a believer in religious dogmas. What Spinoza did was make atheism/agnosticism intellectually grounded and respectable.

I think the quote is misleading as it stands.Ekwos (talk) 21:50, 21 June 2009 (UTC)

I support this point of view; for centuries, to be accused of "Spinozism" was not to be thought of as accepting the finer points of doctrine of Spinoza's philosophy, but was to be accused, through genteel code, of religious unbelief. It is hard to believe that Hegel meant all "real" philosophers accepted Spinoza's conclusion that all existence was of one substance. The commenter above me is correct to assume Hegel was admitting debt to Spinoza in making it conceivable (if not "respectable" as he says -- many people thought that to be charged with Spinozism was a horrible fate) that philosophers might reject religious dogmas. The quotation is certainly ambiguous, though. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 71.192.174.243 (talk) 21:55, 5 October 2009 (UTC)

Why do readers always have to guess what Hegel means?Lestrade (talk) 20:20, 22 April 2010 (UTC)Lestrade

If only Schopenhauer were alive to provide a witty reply to that. Ekwos (talk) 03:55, 30 October 2010 (UTC)

I would like to weigh in with some logic here. Philosophy started as a Naturalistic enterprise before it became a commentator on science, or nature, in the analytic way. So, by Hegel's time, philosophy was analytic, not in today's meaning of that word, but you know what I mean. To be a philosopher you had to have a neutral attitude about religion and science. Since Spinoza equated God and Nature he was being extremely neutral and therefore a proper philosopher. So, logic tells me to take Spinoza at his word and to take Hegel at his word. We understand what Spinoza meant and what Hegel meant. [{User:blighcapn}] — Preceding unsigned comment added by Blighcapn (talk • contribs) 21:16, 24 January 2012 (UTC)

LENS MAKER

I recall reading somewhere that Spinoza was not only a lens maker, but the "go-to-guy" for the best lenses in Europe. Can't remember the reference. It's not in Rebecca Goldstein's "Betraying Spinoza." An excellent work.PeterT2 (talk) 22:15, 5 November 2009 (UTC)

It is possible that some academics cannot accept the notion that an important philosopher earned his living as a lens grinder. After all, philosophy is now considered to be a profession. Yet it is undeniable that he died of lung illness, most likely aggravated by glass dust. But it is claimed now that he only ground lenses for his scientific experiments. How did he support himself? He didn't. It is now said that he was supported by grants from friends, sponsors, and admirers. How could a great philosopher have been a lowly lens grinder? That demeans the profession and frightens off prospective young philosophy majors.Lestrade (talk) 03:42, 20 October 2011 (UTC)Lestrade

Actually, I've read that spinoza's lens-grinding was more of an occasional research project and not actually his profession - an ahistorical rumor that became common wisdom. Likewise, he caught chronic tuberculosis from his mother and suffered from it all his life - extremely unlikely "glass dust" had anything to do it. If I come across the source I will edit the entry. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 69.141.126.250 (talk) 01:28, 9 August 2012 (UTC)

Might is right?

Lestrade,

You are referring to the following passage in Note I, which refers to rights of animals or beasts as opposed to rights of man:

"Nay, as everyone's right is defined by his virtue, or power, men have far greater rights over beasts then beasts have over men."

How such a statement, in this specific context, translates into a general philosophical principle, without any qualifications, that simply "Might is right," is beyond me. Note also that he is first referring to "virtue", then to "power." Are you saying that for Spinoza virtue and power are one and the same? If not, than the short passage above, in this specific narrow context, certainly does not translate into a broad and unqualified generic philosophical principle that "Might is right." warshy^talk 04:02, 19 December 2010 (UTC)

You ask: "Are you saying that for Spinoza virtue and power are one and the same?" For my answer, I refer you to Ethics, Part 4, Definition 8. There, Spinoza wrote: ""By virtue and power I mean the same thing." This is clearly a statement that virtue means power. However, I don't expect my answer to have any effect because you probably have an idea of Spinoza that cannot be changed by my reference. In Part 4, Proposition 37, Note 1, Spinoza plainly said: "the right of any person is limited by his virtue or power…." This means "might is right." He wrote, in his Political Treatise, Chapter 2, § 8, "each has as much right as he has power." This claim has nothing to do with the difference between man and animals. Spinoza's equation of right with might has nothing to do with specific contexts. It is a general declaration. Might is right. You can read it here. So, the question is "Are the editors and readers of Wikipedia interested in Spinoza's own words or are we interested in some image and interpretation of Spinoza that corresponds to our own presuppositions and prejudices?" From my past experience with Wikipedia, I think that I know the answer. Therefore, I ask permission to withdraw from this discussion. Please edit the article in any way that you want.Lestrade (talk) 15:55, 20 December 2010 (UTC)Lestrade

Dear Lestrade,

Thank you very much for your thoughtfull response to my inquiry. I find your answer most enlightening. I was not aware of the details you point out in this response, and I promise I will study them carefully. But even before I study the subject again, following your leads above, and hopefully do enlight myself on an aspect of Spinoza's philosophy I was not aware of, let me guarantee to you that your interpretation above makes sense, and I think you are right in the edit you made. I mean, just on the merits of your analysis, I think your edit is correct and warranted, and I will not change. Not until I feel I have studied the subject and have completely understood your enlightening point from within Spinoza's philosophy itself! That is because your question above:

So, the question is "Are the editors and readers of Wikipedia interested in Spinoza's own words or are we interested in some image and interpretation of Spinoza that corresponds to our own presuppositions and prejudices?"

is very good question in my opinion, and I, for one, already completely agree with you on this point. Namely, I am interested ONLY in "Spinoza's own words" and their proper interpretation. Nothing else matters to me on this subject and on this page. That is why I asked you the question to begin with, and I repeat here that I am most grateful to you for enlightening me on the subject.

Please allow me to make one more comment too: I believe your possibly unusual/new view of Spinoza's philosophy comes from your apparent acquaintance with Schopenauer's philosophy and writings. You had already made one previous edit on this page based on that, and it was another view of Spinoza's philosophy that was not very praiseful of it, overall. I learned from that previous edit, I changed the place in the page where it was located, but otherwise I left intact, as I hope you have noticed. I believe this new point is most interesting again, and very important again to truly understanding Spinoza's philosophy. Thank you very much again, and I promise to come back to you here on this page, with a more 'philosophical' assessment of the whole issue, once I have studied it properly, and once I have, hopefully, better understood Spinoza's own words and views on the subject matter. Sincerely, warshy^talk 17:19, 20 December 2010 (UTC)

Warshy, I mistakenly thought that you were merely being contrary. Instead, it seems that you are sincere and dedicated to understanding Spinoza's Ethics. If you search on Google Books for "Ethica + Spinoza" you will be able to download his book in Latin. The two passages that pertain to our discussion are as follows: (1) Per virtutem et potentiam idem intelligo [By virtue and power I understand the same thing] (Ethics, 4, Definition 8); and (2) uniuscujusque jus virtute seu potential uniuscujusque definitur [each individual's right is defined by each individual's virtue or power] (Ethics, 4, Proposition 37, Note 1). If you are really convinced that Spinoza would never have asserted that "might is right," then, by all means, delete it from the article. I personally feel that he agreed with that judgment as is indicated by his very words. By the way, by noting that Spinoza equated God with Nature [Deus sive Natura], it seems to me that Spinoza can be better understood if the reader mentally substitutes the word "Nature" whenever he comes across the word "God." By so doing, the whole discussion of Substance, self–causation, necessity, etc., in Part 1 can be understood more easily. Lestrade (talk) 22:17, 30 December 2010 (UTC)Lestrade

Dear Lestrade,

I think you're point is really fundamental for a better understanding of the Ethics, and you have just pulled a card I did not know you had, and which I don't have: You know Latin! Wow! I still owed you a thorough study of the passages in English, as we discussed above, and I haven't finished my work on that yet. But now it is going to take me even longer, since I am going to download the Latin text as you indicate, and my final response will only come to you here once I have finished restudying the whole issue IN LATIN! I just wrote below today that the studying of Spinoza's Ethics in Latin is not something I believe I'll be able to accomplish in this incarnation. But who knows, maybe with your guidance and help, I will be able to make good progress on this task in the years to come! Thank you very much again for sharing your knowledge with me here! warshy^talk 22:56, 30 December 2010 (UTC)

I assume that the above user lestrade is the source of the Schopenhauer quotes, the contention that Spinoza isn't an ethicist, etc? Unfortunately, my dear lestrade, you have rather badly interpreted the connection between right, virtue, and power. Everything has right consistent with its virtue (or, unique quality), which is the same as its power (or, potential), but Spinoza quite clearly refers his definition of potential/unique quality back to 2.7, where he clarifies that the potentia he is taking about is not the "power" of a wrestler or a guy with a gun, but the power or potential which, by it's exercise, constitutes the essence of the entity. Thus for a sheep or a lion, the entity has ius to anything it can seize that fulfills its natural appetites; but since man has more powers/potential than a beast and therefore a different essence as well, the ius of man is limited to what is consistent with the human virtues (intellect, and everything that flows from it) described in part 4. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 69.141.126.250 (talk) 04:01, 9 August 2012 (UTC)

It seems, then, that I have rather badly interpreted the connection between right, virtue, and power. You see, I based my rather bad interpretation on passages such as this one from his published work entitled Tractatus Theologico–Politicus: "Whatever every man, when he is considered as solely under the dominion of Nature, believes to be to his advantage, whether under the guidance of sound reason or under passion’s sway, he may by sovereign natural right seek and get for himself by any means, by force, deceit, entreaty, or in any other way he best can, and he may consequently regard as his enemy anyone who tries to hinder him from getting what he wants." (Chapter 16, Samuel Shirley translation) If my interpretation of these clear words is bad, then I have to assume that your interpretation is good. I will have to ignore Spinoza’s words, clear as the noon–day sun, and, in their place, be mindful that "since man has more powers/potential than a beast and therefore a different essence as well, the ius of man is limited to what is consistent with the human virtues (intellect, and everything that flows from it) described in part 4."Lestrade (talk) 20:43, 9 August 2012 (UTC)Lestrade

I'm at the beach so my Shirley copy is several states away, but even in the 19th century translation I can see that you have quoted verrrry stingily. For the passage goes on to make a point directly opposite to the one which you are driving at:

And this is not to be wondered at; for nature is not comprised within the narrow limits of the laws of reason, which are of service to man only and are meant for his sole guidance in conduct, but embraces an infinity of other matters which have respect to the eternal order of creation at large, in which man is a mere atom. By the necessity of nature, for instance, every individual thing is constituted to exist, and to act in a certain determined manner, so that whatever appears to us evil or absurd, does so because we know things partially only, and are ignorant of the order and concatenation of nature at large; and because we would direct all in conformity with. our reason, although that which our reason calls evil is not, evil as regards the order and rule of nature generally, but only as regards the law of our proper nature. That it is advantageous for man to live according to the laws and special precepts of reason which, as has been said, are only intended to be useful to him, cannot be questioned. (Etc.)

... so, to summarize: everything in nature has a potentia that makes it uniquely what it is, and whatever is in the bounds of that potentia is its "right", whether the entity in question is a quark, a tree, or a human. If a human is without reason - i.e., solely guided by appetite - then like a fox or a lion, what he can get by force or fraud is his ius. But most humans do have reason, which gives them a quite different potentia, and thus a different set of laws that set out their ius. (As an aside... TTP is a work of critical commentary on the Bible and Biblical scholarship, so as a result Spinoza is frequently showing his philosophical positions under an aspect that shows them to be compatible with Scripture. The vocabulary he uses for this context isn't always compatible with the vocabulary he uses in the Ethics. On this specific point, he recapitulates the argument from Ethics in detail, but the emphasis on dominion of nature versus dominion of reason is largely to show how his doctrine lines up with Romans.) 69.141.126.250 (talk) 03:37, 11 August 2012 (UTC)

Very good discourse on Spinoza by the anonymous IP above. I've taken out my Elwes' version of the TTP and the passage Lestrade chose to quote is on pp. 201-202. But I am really surprised that Lestrade chose actually to quote from the TTP on this matter, and a small quote out of context for that matter, as the anon IP person already pointed out, and not from the Ethics, on which the original discusssion above was based. But since I completely agree with the anon IP from the outset, as should be clear from the original discussion above, and as he seems to understand the Ethics much better than I do, I have a simple ignorant question for him to begin with: from all my extensive and detailed study of the TTP, and from my attempts at reading and understanding some of the Ethics, I don't think I have ever come across this English (?) term you are using - "ius." Please explain to me in your very good and clear discourse what is "ius," and where you are taking it from if you can. Thanks. warshy^talk 21:58, 11 August 2012 (UTC)

Let me also, in passing, while I am at it, add this fantastic, incredible quote from page 202 of the Elwes' version to which the anon IP is referring above: "This we need not wonder at, for nature is not bounded by the laws of human reason, which aims only at man's true benefit and preservation; her limits are infinitely wider, and have reference to the eternal order of nature, wherein man is but a speck; it is by the necessity of this alone [the eternal order of nature] that all individuals are conditioned for living and acting in a particular way." And the paragraph ends: "in reality that which [human] reason considers evil, is not evil in respect to the order and laws of nature as a whole, but only in respect to the laws of our [human] reason." warshy^talk 22:12, 11 August 2012 (UTC)

Hi warshy, thanks for your kind words! Latin (and several related languages) do not distinguish so strictly as English between the concepts of right as in "Bill of rights", right as in "correct, appropriate", and "the law" - they have one concept, ius (as in "iustitia,", i.e. justice), that combines all three ideas. Saying "an entity has a right to do whatever it has the power to do" can mean something slightly different depending on whether the right in question is like "the right to bear arms" or "that's not wrong, it's right!" So in order to not prejudge the sense in which Spinoza intends "ius", I have left it untranslated. -- I've done the same thing with "potentia" - clearly if we say (in English) "He has great potential" and "he has great power," those mean very different (almost opposed) things, but in Latin it is the same concept. I think Spinoza makes virtus, potentia, and ius very clear in his Ethics, but I wanted to make a point that didn't depend on the exact sense in which you take them... 69.141.126.250 (talk) 23:29, 11 August 2012 (UTC)

Hello anon IP (you may perhaps want to create your own name/User ID on WP so we can address you less awkwardly, even though addressing someone online, on the cyber/electronic world is also not the same as addressing someone you can see with your eyes or get to know in person). Thanks for the explanation and for the short lesson in Latin semantics. There was never any doubt in my mind, as I believe I also already tried to point out several times in this page, that such a bold and negative, twisted interpretation of Spinoza's Ethics as Lestrade is trying to make (no doubt, following Schopenhauer's own negative views of Spinoza's philosophy) has to be based on the twisting of some basic concepts for Spinoza in the original Latin discourse itself. As for the sentence you quote above ("an entity has a right to do whatever it has the power to do"), where does it appear in the Ethics, and how (in what form) was it written by Spinoza in Latin? Thanks again for sharing your wisdom here, albeit anonymously. warshy^talk 00:52, 12 August 2012 (UTC)

Warshy, you can just call me 69.141 for now. :-) I think that editors' having identities has warped WP beyond recognition... no criticism of you for going by a handle, ofc, it's just something I choose not to do. Just to take the "give a man a fish" approach, there is a copy of Spinoza Opera in Latin online: http://users.telenet.be/rwmeijer/spinoza/works.htm ... I use this rather than the critical edition, which I am too poor to afford. :( Even if you don't speak Latin, it should be easy to find the passages for comparison. The specific passages you are looking for are rendered thus, in English and Latin (4.p37.s1):

Nay, as everyone's right is defined by his virtue, or power, men have far greater rights over beasts than beasts have over men.

Imo quia uniuscuiusque ius virtute seu potentia uniuscuiusque definitur, longe maius homines in bruta, quam haec in homines ius habent.

This, however, is a side note in a tangent on whether e.g. men are allowed to eat meat. I tried to pick out a few propositions and definitions that would make the line of argument concerning virtue, essence, and reason (the essence of the human) clear, but Ethics is so tightly argued, I was getting to the point of quoting the whole book. Let's just content ourselves by saying the argument breaks down loosely as follows; in Part III Spinoza sets down a number of psychological concepts in line with his broader argument about the relationship between virtue, pleasure, and the essence of an entity (i.e., that pleasure preserves our core essence through the exercise of the powers that constitute this core essence, and in different variations on this theme), in Part IV he argues *that* for humans the core essence in question is rationality/reason/knowledge (especially in the sequence 4.p30-p37, with p37.s2 having notes to many of the earlier references preliminary to his concept of virtue), and in Part V he explains *what* reason, knowledge of god, and true human happiness consist in. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 69.141.126.250 (talk) 14:34, 12 August 2012 (UTC)

I know that this talk page is not supposed to be a forum, but my comments were meant for the purpose of improving the article. Spinoza clearly and succinctly wrote in Ethics, Part IV , Prop. 37, Scholium 1, a defense of the slaughtering of sentient, sensitive animals. "[S]ince the right of any person is limited by his virtue or power, men possess a far greater right over brutes than brutes possess over men. I by no means deny that brutes feel, but I do deny that on this account it is unlawful for us to consult our own profit by using them for our own pleasure and treating them as is most convenient for us, inasmuch as they do not agree in nature with us, and their affects are different from our own." This is a manifest statement that might is right, that rational humans have the lawful right to kill irrational animals merely because humans have the power to do so. His final words contradict his whole philosophy in that God is Nature and everything in Nature is divine, including sentient bunnies, kittens, and lambs. Their affects [feelings] are, therefore not so "different from our own." How can it be a bold, negative, and twisted interpretation to note that Spinoza wrote the literal words: Each one’s right is defined by each one’s virtue or power, that is, the right of any person is limited by his virtue or power [uniuscujusque jus virtute seu potentia uniuscujusque definitur]?Lestrade (talk) 14:44, 12 August 2012 (UTC)Lestrade

If virtue = power, why then not simply say that "virtue is right?" Yes, 69.141, my first argument above was that this wole passage and quote (and hence Lestrade's wrong conclusion) related to the relationship between humans and animals, and to the rights of humans to slaughter other animals and eat them. warshy^talk 15:12, 12 August 2012 (UTC)

Okay, now the teeth come out! Lestrade, protecting animals for their own sake is not necessarily a desideratum of an ethical theory. (It's a conclusion you want to derive rather than a premise you want to assume.) You can talk about defenseless bunnies all you like, but the fact remains that only a few very idiosyncratic moral theories grant non-human animals independent ethical dignity. Spinoza's position on animals is the same e.g. Kant's - animals lack the essential quality that makes an entity worthy of ethical concern, and their treatment is ethically relevant only if it cultivates praise-worthy emotions. (For Kant, not hurting animals primes us to not hurt humans; for Spinoza, indifference to animals primes us to not project the human ethical order onto God in its entirety.) Not killing humans is resonant with reason, the distinctive virtue or power of man, because reason protects and nurtures reason wherever it finds it; quoting that passage is fine, Lestrade, but quoting it as though Spinoza means "if you have a cattle prod, you can kill a cow" (i.e., "might makes right") is silly. That this is perverting your understanding of Spinoza is most clear when you say that this "contradicts his whole philosophy that everything in nature is divine" - to know God, you must understand that it is divine for comets to smash into moons, for volcanoes to rain fiery ash down on forests, for hawks to swoop in on mice. For me to smash in your face, or to set fire to your house, or kidnap and eat one of your children would be very wrong! But understanding the mode of rational mind in god is quite different from understanding the god's other modes, including mind or emotion without understanding. 69.141.126.250 (talk) 17:05, 12 August 2012 (UTC)

So, I think our conversation is very healthy, and should continue, but at the same time we should try to work towards an appropriate edit of the section and leave Spinoza-study for its own sake to its proper place. The current objectionable paragraph is thus:

However, Schopenhauer contended that Spinoza's book is the opposite of ethics. "...[I]t is precisely ethics on which all pantheism is wrecked. If the world is a theophany, then everything that man does, and indeed every animal does, is equally divine; nothing can be censurable and nothing can be more praiseworthy than anything else."[74] According to Schopenhauer, Spinoza's "teaching amounts to saying; 'The world is because it is; and it is as it is because it is so.'...Yet the deification of the world...did not admit of any true ethics; moreover, it was in flagrant contradiction with the physical evils and moral wickedness of this world."[75]

As far as I'm concerned, this paragraph is (a) merely a comment on Spinoza's reception in later philosophy, not on Spinoza's ethics, (b) a far more lengthy quote than what we have for the key episodes in the reception of Spinoza (e.g., the Atheismusstreit), (c) is not even from Schopenhauer's major works, and further (d) it would require far more words to establish what Schopenhauer meant and that it was an accurate account of Spinoza's ethics than the point deserves. Further, (e) I take the claim that these Schopenhauer quotations are WP-worthy with respect to Spinoza's ethics to be original research by Lestrade, rather than a clear fact about Spinoza or the consensus of mainstream Spinoza scholars. Therefore, I propose to delete the paragraph. However, if any interested observers would like to cooperate with me, I would be willing to craft a replacement paragraph stating that Spinoza's ethical theory is unusual in that it attempts to start from definitions of virtue, right, etc. that are good for all entities and then derive from these the corresponding human ethical categories, rather than assuming the human categories ad hoc, and that this poses special challenges to his philosophy. I might combine this with the point that one of Spinoza's goals was to free people from the trap of applying human ethical categories to the natural world, that they might better understand both nature and ethics as a part of nature.69.141.126.250 (talk) 20:15, 12 August 2012 (UTC)

@19.141 - I certainly agree with you in all your points and suggestions above, and I am also willing to cooperate with you in crafting this replacement paragraph you talk about. warshy^talk 21:45, 12 August 2012 (UTC)

(1.) "If virtue = power, why then not simply say that virtue is right?" [warshy] The words power and right may not be synonymous to all readers. Power may be one thing and virtue may be something else. Virtue originally meant manliness. In time, it came to mean, for some, power to produce effects, that is, potency or efficacy. Right means just [Latin: jus or ius] or good.

(2.) "[O]nly a few very idiosyncratic moral theories grant non-human animals independent ethical dignity." [69.141.126.560] The quantity of theories does not relate to their quality. A few theories may be correct and many may be incorrect. The theories that consider right conduct toward animals may be called idiosyncratic by you but may not be called idiosyncratic by someone else, for example, the two million members of People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals [PETA]. What is the criterion?

(3.) "Not killing humans is resonant [sic] with reason…." [69.141.126.560] If rational Herbert Clutter had killed the rational home invaders Hickock and Smith in order to save himself and his family, would he have been considered to be unreasonable?

(4.)"[R]eason protects and nurtures reason wherever it finds it." [69.141.126.560] Does this statement apply to such actions as rational SS soldiers executing rational civilians during the Ardeatine massacre and numerous other crimes of a similar nature?

(5.) "For me to smash in your face, or to set fire to your house, or kidnap and eat one of your children would be very wrong!" [69.141.126.560] But you are a mode of God [Nature] and I am a mode of God [Nature] and "everything which takes place takes place by the laws alone of the infinite nature of God [Nature], and follows…from the necessity of His [Its] essence." (Ethics, Part I, Prop. 15, Scholium) How could any act of God [Nature] be wrong?

(6.)"[U]nderstanding the mode of rational mind in god is quite different from understanding the god's other modes, including mind or emotion without understanding." [69.141.126.560] There is no mind without understanding. Understanding is a necessary attribute of mind.

Some academic authors who conclude that Spinoza’s doctrine expressed the thought that might is right include Robert J. McShea in his 1968 The Political Philosophy of Spinoza (Columbia UP, page 139) and Steven Barbone and Lee Rice in their 2000 Introduction and Notes to Spinoza's Political Treatise, ( Hackett, page 19). Others are Leo Strauss Liberalism Ancient and Modern, "Preface to Spinoza’s Critique of Religion," page 242 "Spinoza’s God is simply beyond good and evil. God’s might is his right and therefore the power of every being is as such its right; Spinoza lifts Machiavellianism to theological heights." Also José Faur, in his 1992 In the Shadow of History (State U of NY Press, page 169), "Spinoza sided with the pagan principle that might is right. Spinoza postulated that might—in his language power—is the source of all right."

If Spinoza’s concept wasn’t signified by the words might is right, then he chose a pickwickian way to express himself.Lestrade (talk) 00:29, 13 August 2012 (UTC)Lestrade

At the point where you are talking about PETA's membership, I'm close to the point where I can stop taking you seriously as someone who wants to create an accurate, informative article about Spinoza, and assume you're one of those people who has an agenda that you try to force on every article that crosses your path. To respond to your specific points in reverse order:

Pickwickian: yes, the whole point of "Ethics, geometrically demonstrated" is to make an ethical argument based on metaphysical premises with the same degree of acuity and certainty as geometrical arguments (e.g., Euclid's Elements). That means that Spinoza does not have the liberty of blathering on about anything that suits his fancy but sounds vaguely profound, and we his readers do not have the liberty of picking up his book in the middle without consulting the earlier steps where he defines and refines his terms. You would probably think "Foundations of Mathematical Analysis" was mendacious, too.

Academic authors: given the selectivity with which you have quoted Spinoza, I see no need to make a trip to the library to verify that you are being honest about them. Let me just add that the young Strauss was a famously good scholar of early modern thought, but that in his late period (when he wrote all of the current prefaces to the English editions of his work) he adopted a very unique position on the differences between classical and early modern thought, which is generally deprecated by other historians and indeed runs counter to much of his own earlier research.

(6) - I think conception is the necessary attribute of mind. Spinoza may say somewhere that animals only perceive without conceiving, but I hope you understand my point: having a sympathetic nervous system may be regarded by Schopenhauer and Peter Singer as the sole criterion of ethical value, but not by Spinoza.

(5) - An act of nature is wrong if it goes against the virtue of the entity that performs it. Humans are unique in being able to fail to live up to their natural virtue, due to emotional impediments. (This is Spinoza's claim: if you want to argue that the claim is inconsistent, go post an essay on your blog, WP isn't the place.)

(4) - Totally irrelevant, unless you're trolling. More making your point, fewer Nazis, please. (3) - You seem to be under the misapprehension that Spinoza thinks that humans are always and everywhere perfectly rational. (2) - I'm sorry, "it's okay to eat meat" is not such a shocking or controversial claim that it deserves to be mentioned in an article on a serious philosopher, no matter how many naked sit-ins PETA has.69.141.126.250 (talk) 02:45, 13 August 2012 (UTC)

Very good remark about Leo Strauss' later 'introductions,' since I believe he is really the only one who may be considered a 'serious Spinoza scholar' among Lestrade's sources. I stand by my simple and elegant solution to this whole misunderstanding of Spinoza's Latin discourse and indeed of the basic geometric principles he carefully sets up at the outset of the Ethics: "Virtue is right." warshy^talk 14:34, 13 August 2012 (UTC)

If virtue is the same as power or might, then saying "virtue is right" may be equivalent to saying "might is right."Lestrade (talk) 02:00, 14 August 2012 (UTC)Lestrade

"May be equivalent?" On such fundamental ethical principles? No way! Even if the Latin word 'potentia' may have two different, almost opposed meanings sometimes, depending on the context as 69.141 already explained; when you translate fundamental ethical principles you have to be very careful, lest you completely disfigure and misinterpret one of the most carefully crafted pieces of philosophical discourse ever articulated. Nay, lest you simply thrash it and turn it into a useless piece of nothing, simple ethical garbage, as you have been doing. In English, and we are talking here about the very fundaments of ethics, "virtue" and "power" are two very different, nay dialectically opposed concepts. I have no doubt that Spinoza had virtue in mind, not power, when articulating his carefully crafted principles. warshy^talk 16:21, 14 August 2012 (UTC)

We can strengthen your claim considerably! If X is the same as Y, then "X is Z" is equivalent (not "may be" equivalent) to "Y is Z" (if we take equivalence in the truth-functional sense of course!) However, since the premise is false (virtue is not the same as "power or might", at least not in the colloquial sense where we say "Might makes right" or "How the mighty have fallen" or "the full might of the Roman Empire"), your conclusion does not follow, either possibly or unconditionally. If you say "ah, but I mean 'might' in the sense of ability, potential, and the in-built striving of an entity towards its constitutive essence", then maybe you have a leg to stand on, but then why not just say "power" or "potential", since in English we use "might" to distinguish pick out the sense of "power" which applies to describe athletes, brawlers, and tank columns? I'm going to remove the Schopenhauer paragraph now - I think we have 2 versus 1 of the interested parties. Lestrade, warshy, if either of you would like us to add in some informative comment on the unusual metaphysical scope of Spinoza's ethical concepts, let's discuss that here first. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 69.141.126.250 (talk) 16:04, 14 August 2012 (UTC)

The Posen Foundation’s Summer Seminar’s theme, two years ago, was "Varieties of Jewish Secularism and Secularization." It was given at Graduate Theological Union in Berkeley, CA on June 20-30, 2010. The seminar contained a contribution by Daniel Adam Doneson , Woodrow Wilson Department of Politics, University of Virginia. It was titled "Spinoza, Secularism and Modern Constitutionalism." You can see it here. Professor Donelson wrote the words: "Spinoza famously teaches that might is right." According to our findings. however, this academic was certainly wrong in making this statement. It is Wikipedia's duty to correct such academic, professorial errors by producing articles that consist of contributions by totally unbiased, unprejudiced editors. Lestrade (talk) 14:30, 21 August 2012 (UTC)Lestrade

And then, this North-American political science "expert" on Spinoza's 'Ethics' (he is reading only the TTP, of course, as it pertains to his specialty field of "political science") says:

I propose to unravel the perplexities of Spinoza’s argument, both historically and philosophically for the light they shed on the question of secularizations–Jewish and Christian–in the context of the origins of Modern Democracy and Constitutionalism.

I'd like to say where he takes his basic allegation ("famously?") from to begin with, but I don't think that his "unraveling of the perplexities of Spinoza's argument" will add much to a clear understanding of Spinoza's 'Ethics', both in the Ethics and even in the TTP. warshy^talk 18:16, 21 August 2012 (UTC)

Well that's certainly putting "this North-American political science 'expert' on Spinoza's 'Ethics' " in his place.Lestrade (talk) 21:16, 21 August 2012 (UTC)Lestrade

Hm, interesting conference. Seems the sister of one of my old friends gave one of the talks there! Small world. I cannot say anything pro or con Mr. Doneson's understanding of Spinoza, but anyone who knows anything either about the UVa politics department, or about the implicit meaning of throwing together Hobbes, Locke, Montesquieu, and Spinoza into a nutritious stew of secularization-liberalism-constitutionalism, will know where he got his "famous" assertion. Among Straussians, all of the obiter dicta of Strauss are famous, and as Lestrade has already demonstrated, in his late period Strauss made precisely this claim. By the way, as a general rule you won't find ground-breaking work on Spinoza at conferences on Jewish ethnic identity. Nor will you find ground-breaking work on Hobbes at conferences on English cooking, or ground-breaking work on Schopenhauer and a convention of poodle-fanciers. 71.235.239.9 (talk) 22:13, 21 August 2012 (UTC)

I assume that it is meant to be a disparagement to suggest that Jewish Secularism has common characteristics with cooking and pet shows. We are not trying to break ground here. It is merely a question of whether Spinoza considered might to be the essence of right.Lestrade (talk) 23:19, 22 August 2012 (UTC)Lestrade

No. Spinoza considered Virtue to be the essence of Right. warshy^talk 13:37, 23 August 2012 (UTC)

Right. I intend no disparagement of the study of Jewish secularism, or of poodle-fanciers. My point was merely that those three subjects have nothing in common with each other, or with a fourth subject, modern philosophy. Let's follow Spinoza's own interpretative principles and go with his words, when possible, rather than with statements in an abstract for a paper presented at a conference in an unrelated field. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 71.235.239.9 (talk) 15:25, 23 August 2012 (UTC)

The article’s subsection "Ethical philosophy" contains the following words: "Spinoza held good and evil to be relative concepts, claiming that nothing is intrinsically good or bad except relative to a particularity. Things that had classically been seen as good or evil, Spinoza argued, were simply good or bad for humans." This relativity of good and evil doesn’t seem to be in accordance with the absolutely categorical assertion that virtue is right. The former presents Spinoza as an ethical relativist while the latter presents him as an ethical absolutist.Lestrade (talk) 22:27, 23 August 2012 (UTC)Lestrade

Lestrade, may I suggest with deepest possible delicacy that if have no interest in Spinoza or in reading Spinoza, then you shouldn't concern yourself so much with this article? You cannot try to edit a WP article when your primary knowledge of the subject is gleaned from that self-same article, or from googling a few phrases to find article abstracts. For Spinoza, "right" and "good" are two separate concepts, that have little to do with each other. It's a basic move in his ethical theory. "X is good" does not imply "X is right," nor does "X is right" imply "X is good". Spinoza thinks that it's crucial that we have a conception of right (ius) that is separate from our conception of value. This way you can acknowledge that something seems good to you (i.e., is good for you, or is good for people you care about) without immediately concluding that it must be right, as well. This protects us both from ethical self-dealing (tailoring our beliefs about right and wrong to suit our own benefit) and from ethical anthropomorphism (trying to project ideas about right and wrong that apply only to rational men onto natural disasters ["acts of god"], animals, and children). Does that seem clear to you? 64.134.44.158 (talk) 19:16, 24 August 2012 (UTC)

Dear Fellow mode–of–substance, it is true that "right" and "good" are two separate concepts. That’s probably why they are designated by different words. I was merely trying to indicate that the article presents Spinoza as an ethical relativist and the statement "virtue is right" presents him as an ethical absolutist.

Because "In the mind there is no absolute or free will [Ethics, 2, 48]," you must think as you do and I must think as I do. I admit that your following words are unintelligible to me: "Spinoza thinks that it's crucial that we have a conception of right (ius) that is separate from our conception of value. This way you can acknowledge that something seems good to you (i.e., is good for you, or is good for people you care about) without immediately concluding that it must be right, as well. This protects us both from ethical self-dealing (tailoring our beliefs about right and wrong to suit our own benefit) and from ethical anthropomorphism (trying to project ideas about right and wrong that apply only to rational men onto natural disasters ['acts of god'], animals, and children)." Spinoza’s own words, though, are very intelligible to me, especially when he wrote, "in the state of nature everyone thinks solely of his own advantage, and according to his disposition, with reference only to his individual advantage, decides what is good or bad, being bound by no law to anyone besides himself [Ethics, 4, 37,2]." He claimed that reasonable people would forego their natural right in order to live in a secure society. Not everyone, though, can be reasonable and oppose their natural tendency.Lestrade (talk) 02:34, 25 August 2012 (UTC)Lestrade

I'm happy to expound Spinoza, insofar as the immutable dictates of deus siue natura give me the "might" to do so, but if you are actually trying to ask me a question, and hoping in good faith for an answer, you need to stick to one topic and stop changing the subject. Do you want to know why Spinoza thinks that the concept "good/bonum" is observer-relative and the concept "right/ius" is observer-neutral? Or do you want to discuss Spinoza's contractarianism? Or do you want to discuss the substantive rationalism of Spinoza's ethics? I think that I can try to answer a specific question about any of these; and, if my answer does not suit you, you can challenge me with a more specific, narrower question on the same topic that picks out what you find problematic about my original answer. But if I reply to one question, and you say "yes, but..." and then raise different, larger question instead of trying to get to the bottom of the first question, we'll never get anywhere. 128.36.214.151 (talk) 04:47, 25 August 2012 (UTC)

Thanks for your offer but we really shouldn't be asking questions and expecting expounded answers because this is not a forum. It is difficult, but we should be limiting the discussion to thoughts that improve the article. With regard to my changing subjects and sticking to topics, it never occurred to me that I was being such a vagabond.Lestrade (talk) 12:03, 25 August 2012 (UTC)Lestgrade

I completely agree: not a forum. Thus I would prefer not to engage in free-form discussion of Spinoza with you. If you feel that your understanding of Spinoza is inadequate, maybe you can spend the rest of the afternoon reading his Ethics with an eye to understanding (rather than merely to scoring rhetorical points on WP). If you really want to be helpful, you should probably familiarize yourself with Spinoza's contemporaries and immediate predecessors as well. (De Cive and Descartes' book on the passions are probably the most immediately relevant, given your apparent interests.) If, when you think you have a better grasp on Spinoza, you have ideas for how to improve the accuracy or acuity of the article, then we can discuss those suggestions. 208.46.240.4 (talk) 16:40, 25 August 2012 (UTC)

Spinoza and the Ontological argument

I've been looking at Ontological argument and it mentions Descartes, of course, but it does not make any mention of Spinoza. I don't know of any sources that would analyze Spinoza's thought as related to the Ontological argument, but he was surely aware of the problem, as he begins his Ethics metaphysical thinking from Descartes himself. His relationship to Descartes is referred to in most of the works that study his thought. His whole argument in the Ethics, one would assume, is an attempt to improve on Descartes' ontological thinking, it would seem to me. And yet, there is no mention of such a possible link between Spinoza and the Ontological argument currently on WP. I was just wondering if anybody here would know of a work where the relationship is possibly mentioned, or better, analyzed? warshy^talk 15:31, 11 November 2011 (UTC)

You might try this Also, the book The Ontological Argument, edited by Alvin Plantinga (Anchor Books, 1965) has a few pages on Spinoza and the argument. It mostly reproduces Proposition 11 from the first part of Ethics. In his introduction, Plantinga wrote that Spinoza "supposes God to be a being such that, if He exists at all, He exists by His very nature, not deriving His existence from anything external to Himself. God, thus conceived, cannot fail to exist and cannot be thought of as coming into existence or ever ceasing." Spinoza’s definition of God as substance is alien to the traditional idea of God as having a likeness to humans. If the word "Nature" is substituted everywhere for "God," then his philosophy begins to make sense.Lestrade (talk) 03:00, 14 August 2012 (UTC)Lestrade

I removed what seems like trivia

This bit:

Spinoza is also a (somewhat minor) character in the 1632 Ring Of Fire book series by Eric Flint. His parents are killed while he was still an infant in the story, and he was adopted by one of the main characters. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 92.15.123.40 (talk) 17:53, 15 February 2012 (UTC)

42-foot lens in the 1600's?

This appears under the "Lens Grinding and Optics" header, but seems extremely unlikely to this admittedly lay astronomer. Maybe a lens for a telescope with a 42-foot focal length? — Preceding unsigned comment added by Peter Delmonte (talk • contribs) 21:39, 22 August 2012 (UTC)

Gratitude and appreciation

Wikipedia readers owe a debt of gratitude to user Mrcrumplar for deleting the short list of a few of Spinoza’s main positions. According to Mrcrumplar, the list is badly written, disjointed, and adds little to the article. To a naïve reader, this may sound like a mere subjective, personal opinion that is being forced onto readers who may be seriously interested in some important points of the philosophy. But, on mature reflection, it is easily realized that these five points are of no interest and deserve to be erased. The points were as follows: (1) the natural world is infinite (2) good and evil are related to human pleasure and pain (3) everything done by humans and other animals is excellent and divine (4) all rights are derived from the State, and (5) animals can be used in any way by people for the benefit of the human race, according to a rational consideration of the benefit as well as the animal's status in nature. Anyone who has studied Spinoza’s works would immediately be convinced that these five claims, though succinctly epitomizing his thoughts, have no place in the article. The article, rightly, has room for such statements of value such as "his portrait was featured prominently on the Dutch 1000-guilder banknote, legal tender until the euro was introduced in 2002." Also, valuable article space is rightly taken up by the news that "The 2008 play 'New Jerusalem,' by David Ives, is based on the cherem (ban, shunning, ostracism, expulsion or excommunication) issued against Spinoza by the Talmud Torah congregation in Amsterdam in 1656, and events leading to it." Lestrade (talk) 16:27, 22 September 2012 (UTC)Lestrade

Requested move

The following discussion is an archived discussion of a requested move. Please do not modify it. Subsequent comments should be made in a new section on the talk page. Editors desiring to contest the closing decision should consider a move review. No further edits should be made to this section.

The result of the move request was: not moved. DrKiernan (talk) 12:33, 10 November 2012 (UTC)

---

Baruch Spinoza → Benedict de Spinoza – Spinoza went by Benedict, not Baruch. See his signatures to letters. We have no evidence that we went by his Hebrew name in public life. Omphaloscope talk 01:18, 2 November 2012 (UTC)

• Neutral - the above argument is reasonable, though wouldn't his signatures be Benedito or Benedictus?, and supported by quality sources eg "Ethics (Penguin Classics) by Benedict de Spinoza". But weakened by 21,600x to 31,700x for "Baruch Spinoza" in English GB since 1990. In ictu oculi (talk) 03:53, 2 November 2012 (UTC)
• Neutral - At this point, after a couple of hours of research, I can see that the Spanish, Portuguese, French, Italian, and German Wikipedias, all still use Baruch Spinoza as the main title. So does the Nadler article in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosphy. I'd be interest to know how the Britannica is presenting the subject. The problem with Spinoza, as always, is that we really know very little about the man himself. The TTP was published anonymously, and the other works posthumously. The main article here, by the way, to this day doesn't even mention the names of his 'friends,' who published the works posthumously. The Ethics title page of the Latin edition does not have a name. The TTP title page seems to have the name added in handwriting later as "Benedito de Spinoza." The Elwes English translation does say "Benedict de Spinoza." I don't know to what signatures you are referring. In the Elwes edition, most letters are unsigned, and a few seem to be signed "B. De S." (They were strongly edited by the publishers anyhow.) I am still unable to find out if the original manuscripts from which the Latin Opera Posthuma was printed are still in existence or can be seen or studied. It seems to me at this point that the answer to this question is no. My impression is that the Portuguese/Spanish preposition "de" added to the last name was also a posthumous invention/addition, and that the most straightforward form of the name by which say, Leibniz or Oldenburg may have known him, was simply Benedict Spinoza, but obviously I cannot prove that. (Interestingly enough, in this case, the Russian Wikipedia has it right, in my view.) Since his works were all published in Latin either without a name or with the name Benedictus de Spinoza added to it, I don't know when they figured out that the Hebrew name must have been Baruch. Maybe his posthumous grammar to the Hebrew language would bear some evidence for it, but I don't know. Trying to understand and fathom Spinoza's philosophy, especiallly the Ethics (geomatrically demonstrated) is hard enough. About the man himself, I am afraid we will always remain mostly in the dark... warshy^talk 23:13, 2 November 2012 (UTC)
• Oppose It doesn't matter how he was referred to in his public life; it matters how he's referred to now. And that's pretty clearly Baruch. IIO already cited the Google Books statistics, but Baruch also wins the general Google matchup (823,000 to 112,000) and the Google Scholar matchup (9,180 to 2,290). In both cases, there were some instances of "Benedict Spinoza" without the de, but not enough that Baruch wasn't still dominant. --BDD (talk) 17:26, 3 November 2012 (UTC)
• Oppose, per this ngram. Latin is "Benedictus de Spinoza", while the fully anglicized form is "Benedict Spinoza." The proposed form we can do without. Kauffner (talk) 11:58, 4 November 2012 (UTC)
• Oppose: commonly known as Baruch Spinoza in the relevant literature. --RJFF (talk) 21:02, 6 November 2012 (UTC)

The above discussion is preserved as an archive of a requested move. Please do not modify it. Subsequent comments should be made in a new section on this talk page or in a move review. No further edits should be made to this section.

Transliteration of "cherem"

The Hebrew word should be transliterated "kherem". This conforms with the transliteration rules from Hebrew (distinguish Hebrew khet from chaph, which is unemphasized caph) and it gives a better idea of how it should be pronounced (far from English "ch" but all the more difficult to pronounce for English speakers). — Preceding unsigned comment added by 192.117.155.190 (talk) 07:25, 10 March 2013 (UTC)

Call to copy-edit and revise current page, due to overall poor quality.

I'm commenting to all specially interested parties, in particular those who have toiled in producing this page on Spinoza, or those who plan to continue to do so. As it stands, not only are there myriad clerical mistakes (e.g. unintentionally repeated words), but the syntax and development of the page in general (and of the latter sections in particular) is of a rudimentary, sometimes paratactical, sometimes adolescent, and poorly conceived nature. For example, there are non sequitur sentences lodged inside paragraphs whose information has already been stated in a more relevant passage or section. Furthermore, such sentences (in most cases) seem to add nothing to those sections and passages to which they presently belong. It seems to me, also, that the general quality of the writing (both in form and content) is weaker than should be expected of a wikipedia page about the life and work of one of the most important thinkers in history. The issues I've elaborated might not only dissuade those who are coming to their first encounter with Spinoza through this page (which, no doubt, is no small ratio), but it also reflects poorly on what should be, ostensibly, the community of people actively invested in scholarship on Spinoza's life and work (even if it happens to be the case that it is, in fact, not this community that is responsible). We need to do Spinoza justice. His Latin is careful, precise, economic, beautiful, implacable and un-substitutable—let us aspire to the same standard in English. Take this for what you will. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 24.246.16.57 (talk) 03:51, 31 October 2013 (UTC)

I, for one, completely agree with you. I have so far in life concentrated more on reading Spinoza's work itself, than on reading the available scholarship on him and on his work. In order to achieve the high-minded goals you propose what is needed is much more reading of the latter. The bar you set is pretty high, as I said, and no easy feat to accomplish, I think. But the goal is worthy and correct, and you are welcome to start the hard work anytime. Enjoy your reading on Spinoza the man and his work! warshy^¥¥ 13:20, 31 October 2013 (UTC)

No objections. It needs to be reworked entirely and carefully. Please log in and go on. The philosophy section is much too short (I would appreciate an integration of an unspecified main article called "Philosophy of Spinoza", there might be additional articles for certain main works of Spinoza like "Ethica" and "Tractatus Theologico-Politicus") and the Jaspers quotation is definitely in the wrong place! Platonykiss (talk) 12:42, 3 January 2014 (UTC)

rewriting of sentence as sourced attributed opinion

Towards the beginning, the article says: "Spinoza wrote the last indisputable Latin masterpiece and one in which the refined conceptions of medieval philosophy are finally turned against themselves and destroyed entirely." This is a subjective and very disputable statement. However it is a quote, and the reference is already provided at the bottom of the article. Perhaps the paragraph in which the above line appears should be re-written to present the line as a quote,as an opinion which has been expressed about Spinoza, rather than presenting it as if it is a fact. Applesandpears3 (talk) 21:22, 22 January 2014 (UTC)

I agree that it could be rewritten as suggested, with the opinion attributed to the author as a quote. You can do it yourself. warshy ^(¥¥) 02:06, 23 January 2014 (UTC)

Plagiarism and Leibniz

An IP removed the assertion that Leibniz plagiarised Spinozas Ethics. While the statement is sourced, the claim is of such an exceptional nature that it requires an exceptional source and certainly one that is better than a book entitled Spinoza in 90 minutes. --Saddhiyama (talk) 20:59, 5 March 2013 (UTC)

I agree. A statement of "plagiarism" of Spinoza by Leibniz is indeed serious, and it seems anachronistic if not far-fetched. I've never heard of it and the title also struck me as non-serious. If alternative sources cannot be found that support the exceptional claim then the text would have to be edited to attribute it to this single source, maybe only in a footnote, IMO. warshy^talk 01:53, 6 March 2013 (UTC)

I thought that Wikipedia accepts anything as long as it has appeared in a published form. It is not for the Wikipedia editors to judge the value of anything. That would make the article depend on the personal opinions of the Wikipedia editors. If there is a published book that claims that Leibniz plagiarized Spinoza, then that is acceptable for inclusion in the article, regardless of the opinion of any particular Wikipedia editor. Who is to say what is an "exceptional" source and what is not an "exceptional" source? Maybe to A it is exceptional but to B it is not exceptional. If it has been published, then it is acceptable. Publishing is the magic ticket to a Wikipedia article. It is the people who decide whether a source has been worthy of publishing who determine the value of a source. Is it worthy of publishing? If so, it is worthy of inclusion in article. Wikipedia editors (who may not be able to write anything that is worthy of publishing) can claim that a source is exceptional, serious, or anachronistic. That, however, is merely their opinion. What counts is whether it has been published.Lestrade (talk) 03:50, 6 March 2013 (UTC)Lestrade

Sorry, but you have it wrong. I suggest you read up on Wikipedia:Verifiability (or at least the link I provided in my OP) and the relevant articles linked there regarding sourcing and reliable sources. --Saddhiyama (talk) 10:18, 6 March 2013 (UTC)

I have removed the sentence. Anyone able to find a stronger source is welcome to reintroduce it. --Saddhiyama (talk) 11:04, 7 March 2013 (UTC)

The claim most likely stems from the fact that a young Leibniz did correspond with an older Spinoza through letters (many of which have not survived). At one point in time, they actually met face-to-face. From a metaphysical perspective, their systems are very similar at face value - however, when you get your hands dirty, they are fundamentally very different. Long story short: it is joked about that Leibniz borrowed from Spinoza, but not substantiated by any evidence that I have seen. Spinoza's metaphysics were far more universal and top-down, while Leibniz's were bottom-up and dealt very explicitly with particulars. To be even more specific, one could say that Leibniz did not agree with Spinoza's determinism and did not think Spinoza appropriately accounted for particulars. Furthermore, Leibniz was a courtly man and basically concealed his philosophical interest in the controversial Spinoza by talking to him about lenses (if I recall correctly, that is how their correspondence began). --Jennifer Lost the War (talk) 17:03, 26 March 2014 (UTC)

He Lived Quietly

I have now twice removed this phrase (one that Spinoza himself would have abhorred!). Living quietly is impossible to define and, even if we could, how would we know? Enough to describe what we do know and what it was he worked at. Enough hair-splitting already.Gavelboy (talk) 15:23, 8 August 2013 (UTC)

Well, the problem is that we really don't know for sure that much about Spinoza the man. If we say "he worked" this may give the impression that he really earned his bread from this labor. But we really don't know if that is case. He did apparently do work related to lense grinding, but he also worked on philosophy, supposedly, or we wouldn't be talking about him here, correct? How much he "worked" on one or the other and how he "earned his living" we really have not much certain knowledge about... warshy^¥¥ 18:08, 8 August 2013 (UTC)

Agreed re "he worked". Good point. I've changed that. I just don't like the twee expression "quiet life". It's nonsense if taken literally (we don't know how quiet his life was.. for all we know he was an amateur percussionist) and more generally, I doubt whether a man with so many ideas enjoyed a quiet time. We just do not know. Gavelboy (talk) 22:39, 8 August 2013 (UTC)

As far as I know from my own studies, he was indeed a "quiet" man in that he was very humble, polite, and - in essence - practiced what he preached. He very much embodied the ethic philosophy he put forth in his Ethics. He turned down several offers to teach at universities (not only due to censorship, which he absolutely hated and thought counter to any free society, but also due to personal reasons) and gave up his family's fortune to his sister (albeit after winning the court case when she sued over the principle of the matter). He did do a great deal of lens grinding, to the point that astronomers would seek them out even after his death, but a great deal of his income came from charity. Despite the jokes in some philosophy departments that Spinoza was anti-social, there is nothing further from the truth. Spinoza could certainly be cheeky, as evidenced in some of his digressions in his Ethics, Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, and the many letters (especially between him and Boyle), but he had a wide circle of contacts all throughout Europe - especially after his Principles of Cartesian Philosophy hit the scene. He scrimped and saved, he lived modestly, focused primarily on his work, and kept a small (but close) circle of friends and colleagues that supported him throughout his lifetime. Long story short, I do not think it totally inappropriate to say "he lived quietly," which mostly refers to the general consensus that he was modest, did not make himself a public figure (unlike other Early Modern philosophers such as Leibniz, a courtly man), and was known to embody and practice his ethical prescriptions - even though he could be very outspoken at times. Jennifer Lost the War (talk) 19:22, 11 April 2014 (UTC)

You write that "He very much embodied the ethic philosophy he put forth in his Ethics." You also added that Spinoza "… was known to embody and practice his ethical prescriptions…." However, Spinoza’s book, entitled Ethics, contains no ethics. According to Spinoza, there is no good or evil. As a result, for Spinoza, there cannot be any ethics. Refer to Ethics, Part IV, Proposition 37, Scholium 2. There, he wrote: "…there is in the state of nature nothing which by universal consent is pronounced good or bad; for in the state of nature everyone thinks solely of his own advantage, and according to his disposition, with reference only to his individual advantage, decides what is good or bad, being bound by no law to anyone besides himself."Lestrade (talk) 00:39, 12 April 2014 (UTC)Lestrade

The entire final act of his Ethics deals directly with ethical prescriptions. While the title of the work is a bit misleading because he dedicates more time to metaphysics and epistemology than ethics, to say that the book "contains no ethics" is pretty silly when Spinoza makes very clear prescriptions for a good life and a proper way to conduct oneself in the world, which he argues contains universal and objective notions. Spinoza was not a relativist and I can provide plenty of direct quotations to the contrary if you so wish. He creates a whole system upon which his ethical ideas are based. Furthermore, your quote is absolutely cherry-picked and shows a lack of understanding for the academic atmosphere. Note how he is speaking of "the state of nature" in your quotation; he is not referring to reality, but rather to an earthly situation where there is no definite good or evil due to political or social instability, and thus a lack of agreement about abstract matters due to earthly divisions. In what you are quoting, you neglect that he is dealing with the "state of nature" as it was understood in a Hobbesian sense. I also find it incredibly odd that you would quote P.IV, Proposition 37 of all things to tell me that Spinoza proposed a relativistic ethical theory. The proposition reads (according to the Elwes translation, since I don't want to pull out Shirley at the wee hours of the morning): "The good which every man, who follows after virtue, desires for himself he will also desire for other men, and so much the more, in proportion as he has a greater knowledge of God." He is referring to a "good" which is evident to all human beings, and a virtue which is in line with this prescribed good that virtuous people will attempt to proliferate. How is that not ethics, how is that relativistic? What he is very clearly saying in your quotation is that, when there is no stability, there can be no flourishing of virtue since everyone is only out for themselves. This is another point that permeates the entire work that you are clearly ignoring. When there are no laws (e.g., no stability) then, again, no one is attempting to seek the good and are instead seeking their own personal, selfish, material advantages. This is made very clear early on in the Ethics when he discusses conatus and how it is mislead by material, bodily desires and needs. Jennifer Lost the War (talk) 09:25, 15 April 2014 (UTC)

Since, according to 1, 29, "… all things are conditioned to exist and operate in a particular manner by the necessity of the divine nature [naturæ]," it was necessary for you to disagree with me, as it is necessary for me to reply. (1) "The entire final act of his Ethics deals directly with ethical prescriptions." I thought that Part V was a description of reason’s ability to control passion. (2) "…Spinoza makes very clear prescriptions for a good life and a proper way to conduct oneself in the world…" How can there be any prescriptions in a world that is totally determined by its own nature? (3) "…shows a lack of understanding for the academic atmosphere." True. I am not in a college or university classroom (4) "Note how he is speaking of ‘the state of nature’ in your quotation; he is not referring to reality, but rather to an earthly situation where there is no definite good or evil due to political or social instability, and thus a lack of agreement about abstract matters due to earthly divisions." Are there two "goods"; one in artificial society and another outside of civilization? (5) "…he is dealing with the ‘state of nature’ as it was understood in a Hobbesian sense." Aren’t Hobbes’s uncivilized nature and Spinoza’s civilized Holland both mere modes in one underlying Substance (called Nature or God)? (6) "He is referring to a ‘good’ which is evident to all human beings, and a virtue which is in line with this prescribed good that virtuous people will attempt to proliferate." This is another example of the two "goods," one for people in places like Holland and the other for savages. These two states are not always different, as in the case of the Brothers de Witt and also the knife attack on Spinoza himself. (7) "When there are no laws (e.g., no stability) then, again, no one is attempting to seek the good and are [sic] instead seeking their own personal, selfish, material advantages. This is made very clear early on in the Ethics when he discusses conatus and how it is mislead [sic] by material, bodily desires and needs." But, for the natural man who is feeling his conatus, his own personal needs are, to him, the "goods." Again, we have two kinds of "good," natural (uncivilized) and artificial (civilized).Lestrade (talk) 00:05, 16 April 2014 (UTC)Lestrade

As for your first point, Spinoza's deterministic system essentially demands that the best we can do in terms of a good life is to use the natural faculty of reason in order to control passions and live a life wherein the mind steers itself away from frivolities and towards a state of blessedness and, for a lack of better terms, more productive causes. So, instead of seeking sex, or fame, or drugs, a person will pursue honest politics, intense academic and scientific studies, and good deeds towards their fellow man. While you are correct that, in the big picture view, humans are completely determined, what Spinoza offers in consolation is the notion that - because of the ability for human beings to, at the very least, direct their energies - they ought to know how to control their passions and endeavor towards something more productive. As for the "state of nature" issue, you are right that I was not entirely clear there. I am not positing that Spinoza believed in two concepts of "good," one inside and the other outside of societal structures. What I was trying to point out in the aforementioned scholium was that people are unable to ignore passions - ultimately transient things - in a "state of nature" because they are too busy trying to stay alive. Without a stable society, humans have to prioritize bodily needs and cannot help but be persuaded by passions. When your checklist for things to do each day is to not die, you cannot hope to attain blessedness or virtue by the demands of internecine warfare within the state of nature (remember Hobbes). In his Tractatus Theologico-Politicus and his unfinished Tractatus Politicus, he expands more on this. Simply put: if person A does not trust person B, a social contract cannot be established and paranoia sets in. I found the scholium quotation of yours to be completely out-of-context and I argue that Spinoza indeed had an idea of how the universe worked which was not subjective to each person or society, and an idea of how humans ought to align themselves with order of things to not only best understand God (or whatever term you wish to use, I do not want to discuss that point here) and flourish as a species. Hobbes' state of nature was always a thought experiment to prove his point that no one wants to live in such a state, which is why (as even the ancients observed) human beings naturally ally themselves and form social, political, military, and economic entities since they know the alternative is incredibly undesirable. Remember that the state of nature is a thought experiment, and that Spinoza got a taste of reckless passions after de Witt was killed by an angry mob. Ultimately, you are correct to criticize my point in that I unintentionally divided the good into "civilized" and "uncivilized." If it makes my point any clearer, what I was trying to say is that Spinoza describes qualitative experiences that are caused externally or by extended (physical) predispositions - anger, lust, jealousy, and so forth - which are detrimental to one's conduct because it is not acting "freely" (a term I use with a grain of salt since Spinoza is still, in the big picture, a determinist). A person ought to temper such passions according to their needs (since one man may have a disposition towards anger, lust, jealous, drunkenness, and so on compared to others) in order to focus their attention on rational agency and the higher degrees of knowledge (specifically the third type of knowledge). If this does not make my notions any clearer, I can go on. I apologize for jumping down your throat earlier, as your quotation brought back awful memories of reading Dialectic of Enlightenment, but that is another story. Jennifer Lost the War (talk) 21:40, 15 April 2014 (UTC)

In looking back over your posts, I thought about three of your comments: (1) "…to say that the book ‘contains no ethics’ is pretty silly…." (2) "…your quote is absolutely cherry-picked and shows a lack of understanding for the academic atmosphere." and (3) "I…find it incredibly odd that you would quote P.IV, Proposition 37 of all things to tell me that Spinoza proposed a relativistic ethical theory." It might be of interest to note that 178 years ago, Schopenhauer, in his On the Will in Nature, wanted to communicate the not-so-silly thought that Spinoza’s Ethics contains no ethics. In the chapter entitled "Reference to Ethics," Schopenhauer wrote: "The only metaphysic which really and immediately supports ethics is that one which is itself primarily ethical and constituted out of the material of ethics, namely the will. Therefore I had a far greater right to call my metaphysic Ethics than Spinoza, with whom the word sounds almost like irony, and whose Ethics might be said to bear the name like lucus a non lucendo since it is only by means of sophistry that he has been able to tack his morality on to a system, from which it would never logically proceed. In general, moreover, he flatly disavows it with revolting assurance." [Here, Schopenhauer added the following un-cherry-picked footnote: "For instance, Ethics, Part IV, Proposition 37, Scholium 2."] The Latin words lucus a non lucendo are from Quintilian, Institutes of Oratory, Chapter 6, Section 34, in which he wrote: "But are we also to admit the derivation of certain words from their opposite, and accept lucus a non lucendo, since a grove is dark with shade …?" Just as it is incredibly odd that the word grove is derived from the word light because a dark grove has no light, Spinoza’s book is called Ethics because it has no ethics.Lestrade (talk) 17:06, 24 April 2014 (UTC)Lestrade

Schopenhauer may very well have been writing so specifically on Spinoza in response to Hegel, who most famously quipped that "you are either a Spinozist or not a philosopher at all." Remember that Schopenhauer and Hegel had quite the spat back then; however that does not make Schopenhauer's criticism completely invalid. In that quote, I think Schopenhauer has a bone to pick with Spinoza's heavy use of determinism and, if I'm correct sees the determinism of Spinoza's system and the sliver of ethical prescriptions within the book itself as undoing any attempts to warrant the title. However, that's the best can do since I'm not entirely sure what your point is other than that Spinoza's Ethics have no ethics, in which case we should just agree to disagree on the matter. I don't deny that the title of the book is rather misleading, but I don't see how Schopenhauer's comments are an unbridled authority on the matter, except that he reinforces your stance. At this point we have strayed very far from the initial topic. Jennifer Lost the War (talk) 15:55, 28 April 2014 (UTC)

As an aside from this discussion, I found the recent additions talking about Spinoza's generally inoffensive character to be interesting. However, perhaps his relation to others in the time period might be amended in the future. Void waterbear (talk) 04:02, 17 July 2014 (UTC)

Questions to the IP user that just edited/removed some sentences

To the IP 178.167.129.23, who just edited the article removing "meaningless sentences":

I believe you may have weeded out some garbage and some original research opinions about Spinoza's philosophy in your editing, but there are two sentences that were removed that could be maybe worked and and reinserted back somewhere in the article. Maybe. These are the sentences:

As a youth he first subscribed to Descartes's dualistic belief that body and mind are two separate substances, but later changed his view and asserted that they were not separate, being a single entity.

and

Spinoza's mathematical and logical approach to metaphysics, and therefore ethics, concluded that emotion is formed from inadequate understanding.

What do you think? Thank you for considering these sentences and their possible adequacy to the page. warshy ^(¥¥) 17:06, 26 August 2014 (UTC)

Immortality

These two papers seem to conclude Spinoza was a believer in immortality [1], [2] I would like to add a line or two about this. If anyone objects let me know. Goblin Face (talk) 00:43, 13 November 2014 (UTC)

These seem to be RS definitely, and they also look pretty interesting. A reference to them would certainly add to the current understanding of Spinoza's philosophy in the article, in my view. Thanks for finding these and linking them here. warshy ^(¥¥) 15:35, 13 November 2014 (UTC)

Another Requested Move - contest of previous one

First and foremost, please excuse me and correct me if I am using the wrong format. I admit I am new.

I know that this is going against the consensus of the previous posters, and probably pointless in the aggregate considering it, but I feel that I ought to nipick here. In all of his letters, he referred to himself Benedict de Spinoza (this is by Samuel Shirley's translations; although Edwin Curley's translation for Penguin is a bit more romantic, I feel that Samuel Shirley's translations for Hackett are much more direct translations). He never used his Jewish name in his correspondence with other academics. Although I cannot speak for a man who has been dead for centuries, he was sharply critical of Judaism in the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus. His opposition to Jewish authorities before, during, and after his cherem show a lifelong struggle against Jewish ideas and cultures. Although Zionism was not an idea at the time, one could strongly argue that the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus held (what we would call today) anti-Zionist ideas which strongly criticized the ideal of the Jewish state. If I recall correctly, in Samuel Shirley's preface to the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, Shirley direct addresses how critical Spinoza is of Jewish ideas and how he deliberately wrote it in a language he knew the Jews would not read - Dutch. At the time (the late 1660s), the Jewish state state as presented in the Bible was being used as a template - for what in the modern era would call - statehood. Again, if I recall correctly, Spinoza was directly responding to Hobbes, who used the Jewish state and - in particular - its religious cohesion (remember, Hobbes was writing in response to religious strife between Protestants and Catholics), but Spinoza countered and argued for a secular state based on the Dutch model. Furthermore, Spinoza's deliberate decision to oppose and abandon his Jewish community in favor of developing and putting forth his own philosophical and political beliefs (the latter being closer to Dutch political ideas) makes it very clear that he wanted to leave behind his Jewish identity. To continue to apply that name seems wrong to me, even if he is more often known by Baruch. If you read Jonathan Israel's works on Spinoza, you get a pretty good idea of who published Spinoza's secret and posthumous works - and they tend to be his close colleagues. Jennifer Lost the War (talk) 7:18, 13 September 2013 (UTC)

While you make valid points, spinoza's ideals as presented in Tractatus Theologico-Politicus were not actually contradictory to modern Zionism which was not a religious belief but in actuality a secular calling of return to jews in the diaspora to uplift them from the antisemitism they had and do face in the diaspora. Zionism by far and large is following many of his beliefs in concerns to a modern secular identity. His main refutations against Jewish ideals were in concerns to religion but not the culture. At best you can declare him as a Jewish philosopher who at the time was attacked like Maimonides for his unorthodox philosophies but now is revered by orthodox and secular Jews alike. User:Palestinewillbefree (talk) 12:47, 7,13 2014 (UTC)

This ought to be settled by some agreed-upon criterion. I have never seen him referred to as "Baruch", and if neither his given name nor his academic identity (for which he is even notable enough to include in the encyclopaedia) is "Baruch", then I don't think he should be entered under "Baruch". I got here from a different philosophy article, but if I were to search for him or refer to him in conversation, I would certainly use "Benedict de Spinoza" as his name. I want to know the history of the name "Baruch" being applied to him, because this smells revisionist to me. Again, I think we should establish a criterion for making the decision, and proceed from there. So: "given several names for an intellectual figure, which should be their canonical title?" — Preceding unsigned comment added by 67.180.195.252 (talk) 02:26, 9 August 2014 (UTC)

This criterion exists, at the Article Title page: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Article_titles#Neutrality_in_article_titles The article should be moved to the more neutral and scholastically valid name: Benedict de Spinoza. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 24.5.78.159 (talk) 03:41, 5 June 2015 (UTC)

External links modified

Hello fellow Wikipedians,

I have just added archive links to 2 external links on Baruch Spinoza. Please take a moment to review my edit. If necessary, add {{cbignore}} after the link to keep me from modifying it. Alternatively, you can add {{nobots|deny=InternetArchiveBot}} to keep me off the page altogether. I made the following changes:

• Added archive http://web.archive.org/web/20121120221603/http://cral.ehess.fr/index.php?/membres/doctorants/membres-associes/964-vinciguerra to http://cral.ehess.fr/index.php?/membres/doctorants/membres-associes/964-vinciguerra
• Added archive http://web.archive.org/web/20070207080902/http://www.euronet.nl:80/~advaya/randomnotes.htm to http://www.euronet.nl/~advaya/randomnotes.htm

When you have finished reviewing my changes, please set the checked parameter below to true to let others know.

Y An editor has reviewed this edit and fixed any errors that were found.

• If you have discovered URLs which were erroneously considered dead by the bot, you can report them with this tool.
• If you found an error with any archives or the URLs themselves, you can fix them with this tool.

Cheers.—^{cyberbot II}_{Talk to my owner:Online} 07:33, 27 February 2016 (UTC)

Baruch Spinoza, not Benedict de Spinoza?

I would like some justification for this. He never deeply identified with his jewish heritage and more importantly never published or corresponded under that name. Why not "Bento", his given name, or Benedict(us), the same by which he has been referred to in learned discourse for hundreds of years? — Preceding unsigned comment added by 24.5.78.159 (talk) 08:46, 26 May 2015 (UTC)

See Wikipedia:Naming conventions (people): "The name used most often to refer to a person in reliable sources is generally the one that should be used as the article title, even if it is not their "real" name ... If people published under one or more pen names and/or their own name, the best known of these names is chosen." Mahhon (talk) 02:27, 29 May 2015 (UTC)

By those criteria, "Benedict de Spinoza" should be used. I don't want to pollute the talk page by splintering this topic, however, since it is already very well addressed above. From all I've seen about this, the name of the article should be changed. I would also refer people here to the section on neutrality of naming. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Article_titles#Neutrality_in_article_titles — Preceding unsigned comment added by 24.5.78.159 (talk) 03:38, 5 June 2015 (UTC)

If the criterion is "The name used most often to refer to a person in reliable sources...", then the article should be titled simply "Spinoza". Likewise, the articles about other philosophers like Socrates have single name titles. There is no other famous person known by the name of Spinoza. Historically, Spinoza was sometimes referred to as "Benedict(us) de Spinoza". Using the name "Baruch de Spinoza" is only a recent phenomenon. Baruch is the Hebrew translation of Benedict(us). Hebrew language was not spoken or used as a secular language since about 400 CE until recently. So IMO, the article's title should either be "Spinoza" or "Benedict de Spinoza".87.212.145.228 (talk) 22:10, 24 January 2016 (UTC)

87.X.X.X has a good point. Both in popular writing and scholarly writing, the name "Spinoza" without any personal name is overwhelmingly the most common. It is more than 10 times as common as all other variants put together. I can't see how the naming rules allow anything else. Zero^talk 00:28, 25 January 2016 (UTC)

I completely agree. So who is going to be the bold editor to make this change? Bricology (talk) 06:46, 15 March 2016 (UTC)

The article emphatically should not be titled simply "Spinoza", for the same reason that the article Sigmund Freud should not be titled simply "Freud". If someone shifts the article to such an inappropriate title, I will revert promptly. FreeKnowledgeCreator (talk) 06:48, 15 March 2016 (UTC)