User:RekonDog/Battlespace

Battlespace is a military parlance commonly used in a unified military strategy (e.g. the United States Department of Defense) to integrate and combine armed forces for theater of war. It must be understood to successfully utilize force projection, force protection, and mission accomplishment to achieve military goals.

It mainly defines the environments, factors, and conditions of a region that are subject to hostile threats; in terms of aerial, information, ground, naval, or space warfare, enemy and friendly forces, infrastructure, weather, terrain, the electromagnetic spectrum within the assigned operational task areas. The battlespace are not fixed geographically in size nor suited in any position; it may evolve and change over time depending on the environment, the mission, and the actions by friendly and opposing forces.

Since battlespace is conceptual—it isn't assigned by any from any higher echelon of command and control; the joint task force commanderss ascertain their own battlespace concept based on the responsibility of their actions during missions, as well as the enemies. Military operations may merge into joint operations rather than take place in separate battlespaces under the domain of individual armed services that are in the theater. The commander takes certain considerations in conducting battle at every level of command; his capabilities and limitations of his forces, and their role in rear, close, distant,and deep operational areas.

Concept

Battlespace Awareness

Battlespace Awareness (BA), is a practice of military philosophy that is used as a valuable asset by joint -component and -force commanders, to predict courses of action before employing troops into a prescribed area of operation (AO). It utilizes the intelligence preparation asset to assist the commander in being 'aware' of recent, current, and near term events in his battlespace. It is based around its knowledge and understanding obtained by the a Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) system. It is another methodical concept used to gain information about the operational area—the environment, factors, and conditions, including the status of friendly and adversary forces, neutrals and noncombatants, weather and terrain—that enables timely, relevant, comprehensive and accurate assessments. It has became an effective concept for conventional and unconventional operations in successfully projecting, or protecting, a military force, and/or complete its mission.

Battlespace Digitization

Battlespace Digitization is designed to improve military operational effectiveness by integrating weapons platforms, sensor networks, ubiquitous command and control (UC2), intelligence, and network-centric operations. This military doctrine reflects that in the future, military operations will be merged into joint operations rather than take place in separate battlespaces under the domain of individual armed services.

Battlespace Intelligence Preparation

Intelligence Preparation

Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (IPB) is an analytical methodology employed to reduce uncertainties concerning the enemy, environment, and terrain for all types of operations. Intelligence preparation of the battlespace builds an extensive database for each potential area in which a unit may be required to operate. The database is then analyzed in detail to determine the impact of the enemy, environment and terrain on operations and presents it in graphic form. Intelligence preparation of the battlespace is a continuing process.

Joint Intelligence Preparation

Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (JIPB) is the analytical process used by joint intelligence organizations to produce intelligence assessments, estimates and other intelligence products in support of the joint force commander's decision making process. It is a continuous process that includes defining the total battlespace environment; describing the battlespace's effects; evaluating the adversary; and determining and describing adversary potential courses of action. The process is used to analyze the aerial, terrestrial, maritime/littoral, spatial, electromagnetic, cyberspace, and human dimensions of the environment and to determine an opponent's capabilities to operate in each. JPIB products are used by the joint force and component command staffs in preparing their estimates and are also applied during the analysis and selection of friendly courses of action.

Battlespace Control Measures

Maneuver Control

The military science of lateral advantage are maneuver control measures, which are the basic preliminary steps in effective clearance, and hasty referencing, of maneuvering friendly forces on the battlefield. Maneuvering forces are greatly effected by obtainable fire support coordinating measures (FSCM); e.g., artillery, naval gunfire support (NGFS), and close air support (CAS).

---

Forward Line of Own Troops

The 'Forward Line of Own Troops', or FLOT, are the battlefield-planning baselines that indicates the most forward and present positions of friendly forces in any kind of military operation at a specific time. It may or may not correspond with the forward edge of battle area (FEBA).

Forward Edge of Battle Area

The 'Forward Edge of Battle Area', or FEBA, are the foremost limits of the series of areas in which ground combat elements are deployed, excluding the areas in which the covering or screening forces are operating, designated to coordinate fire support, the positioning of forces, or the maneuver of units.

a military term used by American and British/Commonwealth military forces and other members of the NATO, referring to the front lines in a conflict. The FEBA may or may not correspond to the forward line of own troops (FLOT).

It is defined by the U.S. Department of Defense and NATO as:

"The foremost limits of a series of areas in which ground combat units are deployed, excluding the areas in which the covering or screening forces are operating, designated to coordinate fire support, the positioning of forces, or the maneuver of units."

Fire Support Coordination Measure

Coordinated Fire Line

The Coordinated Fire Line (CFL) is a line beyond which only apply to conventional surface-to-surface fire support elements (FSE) may be delivered within an assigned area (i.e. an independent forward operating base (FOB) [i.e. establishing headquarters]), in which it requires no further coordination, or movement. The CFL are primarily placed just beyond the last point on the ground where friendly forces can accurately locate and use fire support coordinating measures (FSCM) within the FEBA/FLOT.

Free-fire zones (or "No Fire Areas" [NFA]) are to protect forces beyond the FEBA/FLOT, and, therefore, beyond the CFL, such as Combat Observation Lazing Teams (COLT) and scouts.

If units cannot accurately track forces beyond the FEBA/FLOT (i.e., to establish NFAs), push the CFL beyond the point these assets would reasonably locate.

It is doubtful that the Fire Support Coordination Line (FSCL) will be shallow enough to facilitate close air support (CAS) attacks for the brigade or task force.

Therefore, the units owning the ground must clear all CAS missions, regardless whether long or short of the CFL.

Units should establish NFAs on all forces forward of the CFL. Send these NFAs to higher, lower, and adjacent unit headquarters.

Establish NFAs on assets short of the CFL if those assets are not task-organized to the force in whose zone or sector they are positioned.

Fire Support Coordination Line

The 'Fire Support Coordination Line', or FSLC, is the line established by the appropriate ground commander to insure coordination of fire that is not under his control but may affect current tactical operations. Most of the "coordinated attacks" are inside the FSCL. The FSLC is used to coordinate fires of air, ground or sea weapon systems using any type of ammunition against surface targets. The fire support coordination line should follow well-defined terrain features. The FSCL is based on and measured from the FLOT. Initially, the FSCL is nearly always found at least 25-kilometers from the FLOT when operating with ground forces, however, the FSCL should be placed as close to the FLOT as operational and safety considerations permit, about ten to fifteen kilometers.

Historically, it is the lineal descendant of the "no bomb line". Before the advent of accurate navigation aids and the current air-ground operations system, easily recognizable terrain features were used to separate the Army and Air Force portions of the battlefield. Given the problems of communications, coordination, and response time, rigid separation of Army and Air Force fires was the only way to attack targets while protecting troops.

The establishment of the fire support coordination line must be coordinated with the appropriate tactical air commander and other supporting elements. Supporting elements may attack targets forward of the fire support coordination line without prior coordination with the ground force commander, provided the attack will not produce adverse surface effects on, or to the rear of, the line. Attacks against surface targets behind this line must be coordinated with the appropriate ground force commander.

A fire support coordination line (FSCL) may be established by corps within its area of operation to support its concept of the operation. The FSCL is used to coordinate fires of air, ground, or sea weapon systems using any type of ammunition against surface targets. The location of the FSCL must be coordinated with the appropriate tactical air commander and other supporting elements. The purpose of this permissive fire control measure is to allow the corps and its subordinate and supporting units (such as the Air Force) to expeditiously attack targets of opportunity beyond the FSCL. The attack of targets beyond the FSCL by Army assets should be coordinated with supporting tactical air. This coordination is defined as informing and/or consulting with supporting tactical air. However, the inability to effect this coordination will not preclude the attack of targets beyond the FSCL. The interface within the FS cell between the various fire support representatives provides an excellent means of initially coordinating the attack of targets in this area. The FSCL is denoted by a solid line.

Ground forces use a variety of control measures, most of limited interest to the tactical aircrew involved in air-to-ground operations. Each ground maneuver unit establishes FLOT and FEBA lines to determine unit deployment. The FLOT encompasses all of the unit's people. Accordingly, the FLOT is likely to extend well beyond the location of the main body of friendly troops to incorporate screening or covering forces. On the other hand, the FEBA depicts the forward limits of the main battle area and specifically excludes the screening or covering force.

Battlespace Shaping

Battlespace Shaping is a concept involved in the practice of maneuver warfare that are used for shaping a situation on the battlefield, gaining the military advantage for the commander. It forecasts th elimination of the enemy's capability by fighting in a coherent manner before deploying determine sized forces.

Areas of Responsibility

Combatant commanders of the Unified Command Plan (UCP) are assigned areas of responsibility, areas where they have the authority to plan and conduct operations. Combatant commanders may designate theaters of war, theaters of operation, combat zones, and communications zones. Joint force commanders may define additional operational areas or joint areas to assist in the coordination and execution of joint operations. The size of these areas and the types of forces used depend on the scope, nature, and projected duration of the operation.

Combatant commanders and other joint force commanders use the following organization of the battlespace at the operational level of war. Combatant commanders are assigned an area of responsibility in the Unified Command Plan.

• Theater of war, the area of aerial, terrestrial, and naval/littoral that is, or may become, directly involved in the manner of combat; either defined defined by the National Command Authority or a combatant commander, This area doesn't normally encompass the combatant commander’s entire area of responsibility.

• Theater of operations, a sub-area within a theater of war defined by the force commander required to conduct or support specific operations. Different theaters of operations within the same theater of war will normally be geographically separate and focused on different enemy forces. Theaters of operations are usually of significant size, allowing for operations over extended periods of time.

• Combat zone, areas required by combat forces for the conduct of operations.

• Communication zone, the rear part of the theater of war or theater of operations (behind but contiguous to the combat zone) that contains lines of communications, establishments for supply or evacuation, and other agencies required for the immediate support and maintenance of the field forces. The Marine Corps component commander will normally focus his efforts to deploy, support, and sustain his forces, particularly the MAGTF, in the communications zone. He will normally locate his headquarters close to the joint force commander, who usually establishes his headquarters in the communications zone.

Understanding the joint battlespace at the operational level of war in which forces will operate is an important step in setting the conditions for their success. Force commanders must understand the relationship between the Area of Operation (AO), Area of Interest, and Area of Influence. By analyzing his AO in terms of his area of influence and area of interest, a force commander determines whether his assigned AO is appropriate. This analysis may include the forces’ capabilities to conduct actions across the warfighting functions.

A diagram of the battlespace; contiguous is shown with relation to noncontiguous areas of responsibilities.

Area of Operation

The Areas of Operation, or AOs, are areas commanders define their operational area. It is also known as close battlespace. The force commanders focus on establishing command and control in this area; which encompasses all aspects of fire support—naval gunfire, air and artillery superiority—in order to provide his ground forces the support they need. Also, the commander sets up force protection and supportive arms, such as logistics or reinforcements.

The commander can choose to organize his AO so that his subordinates have contiguous or noncontiguous AOs:

• Contiguous AO—In a contiguous AO, all the subordinate commands' share one or more common boundary within supporting distance of one another in the battlespace. A commander may establish their battlespace in a reflection of linear operations, where there is a continiuty and contiguous array of units across the area of operation (AO).

• Noncontiguous—A noncontiguous Area of Operation is one where one or more subordinate AOs do not share a common boundary. The commander establishes noncontiguous AOs when a more likely situation is one where the task force conducts non-linear operations within a noncontiguous battlespace and within an operational framework with noncontiguous deep, close, and rear areas.

Operation Restore Hope in Somalia during 1992–1993, is an example of a battlefield framework with noncontiguous areas. The Marine Air-Ground Task Forces’s (MAGTF) rear area was centered around the separate sites of the embassy compound, port, and airfield in the city of Mogadishu, while its close area was widely scattered around the towns and villages of the interior that were occupied by the MAGTF. The MAGTF’s deep area included the rest of the country and particularly those population and relief centers not under the joint force commander's supervision.

Areas of Influence

In the Areas of Influence, the force commander assigns his subordinate units to conduct missions in- and out- of this area. Communication is key, either for reconnaissance to report intelligence or fire support for ground forces.

The distant battlespace is useful to the force commander as a tool in assigning subordinate areas of operations and in focusing intelligence collection and information operations to shape the battlespace to facilitate future operations. Today’s area of influence may be tomorrow’s AO.

Area of Influence

The Areas of Influence are that areas that are of interest to the force commander; the location of friendly and enemy forces, and the capabilities that may be an advantage, the infrastructure, and key terrain that concern the commander.

The size of the area of interest normally exceeds the commander’s operational reach.

While the area of interest includes the AO and area of influence, the area of interest may stretch far beyond the other parts of his battlespace.

It may also have areas of interest around airbases in other countries neighboring the MEF’s AO.

Notes

Further reading

• Blackmore, T. (2005). War X: Human Extensions in Battlespace. University of Toronto Press. ISBN 0-8020-8791-4
• Owens, W. (2002). Dominant Battlespace Knowledge. University Press of the Pacific. ISBN 1-4102-0413-8

External links

• http://www.jargondatabase.com/Jargon.aspx?id=435 Military Jargon Database
• http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/service_pubs/mcdp10.pdf Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 1-0: Marine Corps Operations'
• http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/dod/gansler.htm Achieving Dominant Battlespace Awareness
• http://www.dodccrp.org/events/8th_ICCRTS/pdf/005.pdf Joint Synthetic Battlespace: Cornerstone for Predictive Battlespace Awareness
• http://www.dodccrp.org/events/1999_CCRTS/pdf_files/track_1/062beaut.pdf Battlespace Digitization - Coping With Uncertainty In The Command Process
• http://ftp.rta.nato.int/public//PubFulltext/RTO/MP/RTO-MP-049/MP-049-06.pdf Challenges for Joint Battlespace Digitization (JBD)

See also

• Network-centric warfare
• weapons platform
• sensor network
• command and control
• intelligence
• Fog of war
• C4ISTAR

[[Category:Command and control]] [[Category:Military strategy]] [[Category:Military terminology]] [[es:Espacio de batalla]] [[zh:戰場]]