User:Pusf.smbd/Crimean consensus

«Crimean consensus» — feeling of solidarity and unity in the Russian society observed after the 2014 annexation of Crimea. The support of the Russian president Vladimir Putin has risen and 'round the flag' effect was observed in the Russian population. 83-89% of Russians supported the annexation of Crimea as of March 2017, depending to the wording of the question. According to various political analysts the effect of "Crimean consesus" ended in 2018.

Crimean consesnus Крымский консенсус
Rally in support of "the acession of Crimea to Russia", March 2014
Begins	February 2014
Ends	2018

A pro-Putin rally in Russia in support of the Crimean annexation, March 2014

Effect

The annexation of Crimea has caused a rallying effect and a surge in patriotic sentiment in Russia. The Russian population began to perceive their country as a “great power” again, as writes psychologist Anastasia Nikolskaya and economist Mikhail Dmitriev.

According to sociologist Alexei Levinson, in the narrative of Russia’s “return” to greatness, the previous 25 years of Russian history are seen as a "disease", and the annexation of Crimea "heals the trauma" of the fall of the Soviet Union, returning the situation to normal, to the return of the geopolitical confrontation with the United States as in the days of the Cold War.

As a result of this effect, pro-annexation and pro-Putin rallies have starting occuring in all big Russian cities, receiving considerable attention on Russian state TV and official approval from the government. Particularly in Moscow on 2 March 2014, an estimated 27 thousand people rallied in support of the Russian government's decision to intervene in Ukraine.

Russian population

Trust in the Russian state media has increased, and the absolute majority of the Russian population praised and supported Putin and both his domestic and foreign political actions.

The “Crimean Consensus” affected all social strata and remained resistant to the external and internal "destructive" factors involving Russia, such as sanctions, falling oil prices, Ruble devaluation and declining incomes. At the same time, there was a shift in priorities, basic materialistic demands increased(which was partly due to the fall in income during the 2015-2016 crisis) and the demand for political and civil liberties and the rule of law decreased.

Russian elite

As political scientist Alexander Shatilov writes, most of the Russian ruling elite took the annexation of Crimea as a “given”, and some even sincerely supported it - especially those in the “patriotic” part of it, but also some moderate or even systemically liberal representatives of the elite supported the annexation. Others who opposed annexation still saw Crimea as a part of Russia, including Alexey Navalny.

Representatives of the creative elite who supported the annexation signed a petition on the website of the Ministry of Culture “Cultural figures of Russia are in support of the President’s position on Ukraine and Crimea”:

В дни, когда решается судьба Крыма и наших соотечественников, деятели культуры России не могут быть равнодушными наблюдателями с холодным сердцем. Наша общая история и общие корни, наша культура и её духовные истоки, наши фундаментальные ценности и язык объединили нас навсегда. Мы хотим, чтобы общность наших народов и наших культур имела прочное будущее. Вот почему мы твёрдо заявляем о поддержке позиции президента Российской Федерации по Украине и Крыму.

In the days when the fate of Crimea and our compatriots is being decided, Russian cultural figures cannot be indifferent observers with cold hearts. Our common history and common roots, our culture and its spiritual origins, our fundamental values and language have united us forever. We want the community of our peoples and our cultures to have a strong future. That is why we firmly declare our support for the position of the President of the Russian Federation on Ukraine and Crimea.

Some of them considered the annexation of Crimea to be “the restoration of historical justice” and hoped for a continuation, others condemned the Euromaidan, and others feared radical far-right forces coming to power in Ukraine.

Another part of the creative elite condemned the annexation and signed the appeal “Against the war, against the self-isolation of Russia, against the restoration of totalitarianism”. Among the famous signatories are human rights activists (Lyudmila Alekseeva, Svetlana Gannushkina, Sergei Kovalev), writers (Andrei Bitov, Vladimir Voinovich, Viktor Erofeev), filmmakers (Mikhail Efremov, Eldar Ryazanov, Natalya Fateeva, Liya Akhedzhakova), musicians (Andrei Makarevich, Veronika Dolina, Elena Kamburova) and others.

According to Shatilov, subsequently the realization of the impossibility of reaching any agreements with the West on the Crimean issue and the broader geopolitical context led to the fact that the more pro-Western parts of the Russian elite switched to “defensive” positions.

Sociology

The annexation of Crimea has left a big effect in the Russian society. Levada polling center has conducted various sociological surveys and questionaries among Russians regarding the Crimean annexation and people's support in the government. The results are as noted below.

Question	Period		Source
Crimea should be...	March 2014, %	August 2014, %
a part of Russia	64	73
a part of Ukraine	14	4
an independent state	11	15
No answer/difficult to say	10	8

Period		Question			Source
Year	Month	Things go in the right direction, %	Things go in the wrong direction, %	No answer/difficult to say, %
2017	May	56	28	16
	April
2016	May	49	33	18
2015	May	60	23	17
2014	May	60	23	17
	April	58	26	16
	21-24 March	60	26	15
	7-10 March	51	30	18
	February	47	37	16
	January	43	41	17
2013	May	40	40	20
2003	May	35	51	14
1993	March	22	48	30

As of March 2017, 83-89% of Russians supported the annexation of Crimea by Russia (depending on the wording of the question), while 8-13% did not support it. And although the question of whether the annexation of Crimea brought more benefit or harm gives a less clear result (64% versus 19), no more than 12% are ready to return the peninsula to Ukraine, and 83% are categorically against it.

The deputy head of Levada Center Denis Volkov says that even some of those who consider the decision to annex Crimea to be a mistake are against returning it to Ukraine. Some motivate their opinion by the fact that it would be dishonest towards the Crimeans; “blocks the possibility of any talk about the return of Crimea to Ukraine” and the fact that it would be a “loss of face” or a “concession to external pressures”.

The share of people who consider the annexation of Crimea a “problem”, “shame”, “failure of foreign policy” or “mistake”, ranges from 5 to 20% of the population, depending on the wording of the question. This share is relatively higher among opposition supporters, Moscow residents, and people focused on expanding contacts outside Russia. But even in these groups opponents of the annexation of Crimea are a minority, according to Volkova. Opponents usually justify their position by the fact that the annexation of Crimea led to an increase in budget expenditures and a deterioration in relations with developed countries, or that it started to “transform Russia into a rogue country”.

March of Peace in Moscow against the Crimean annexation, showing slogan "Occupation of Crimea is a shame of Russia". March 2014

The end of Crimean consesnus

According to Nikolskaya and Dmitriev, by the presidential elections of March 18, 2018, signs of erosion of the “Crimean Consensus” became clearly visible. The results of sociological studies of that time showed a rise in anti-establishment sentiment, a demand for change, social justice and a peaceful foreign policy, and a surge in civic activity. At the same time, a gap has emerged between the demands of the elites and the population.

Levinson notes that during the World Football Championship that took place in June-July 2018, “fraternization suddenly began on the streets of Russian cities with foreigners who had come to the World Cup. Polls have recorded a sharp warming of attitudes towards America and the West.” At the same time, it was announced that the retirement age in Russia would be raised and, according to Levinson, the pension reform, “the responsibility for which [Putin], hesitating, nevertheless took upon himself, ruined everything” - thus the “Crimean Consensus” approached end.

Volkov believes that “the first shifts in public opinion appeared by the end of 2015, as the confrontation with the West weakened,” and “the announcement of the pension reform dealt a serious blow to the image of the Russian government. The effect of this decision is not limited to a simple drop in ratings; in parallel with this, the structure of support for the regime began to change, and strong differentiation appeared in the views of various segments of the population.”

Sociologist Konstantin Gaaze believes that the single voting day on September 9, 2018 demonstrated the completion of the “Crimean Consensus.” At this time, protests took place against the pension reform, and voters voted en masse for candidates from the Communist Party of the Russian Federation and the Liberal Democratic Party.

According to Aaron Schwartzbaum of the Institute for Foreign Policy Research, by January 2019, the “Crimean Consensus” was completely over: Putin’s approval rating fell from 80% in the spring of 2018 to 60-65% (and had previously fallen even stronger); Putin's trust rating fell by 15-20%, to 35% (and stopped falling). At the same time, Putin continued to be seen as being outside of politics, but United Russia is as unpopular as he is popular. At the last election for governor of the Primorsky Territory, the candidate from United Russia had problems with his election, which is why repeat elections were held, where the current governor was elected as an independent candidate.

Leading researcher at MGIMO E. G. Popkova and SRSTU professor K. V. Vodenko consider one of the markers of the collapse of the “Crimean Consensus” to be an increase in distrust in the authorities: for example, in May 2019, 63% of respondents said that, in their opinion, the number of people dissatisfied with the authorities has increased , while 51% said the number of people satisfied with the authorities had fallen.

По мнению Никольской и Дмитриева, к прошедшим 18 марта 2018 года президентским выборам стали явно видны признаки эрозии «Крымского консенсуса». Результаты социологических исследований того времени показывали рост настроений против истеблишмента, запрос на перемены, социальную справедливость и мирную внешнюю политику, всплеск гражданской активности. В то же самое время наметился разрыв между запросами элит и населения.

Левинсон отмечает, что на происходившем в июне-июле 2018 года чемпионате мира по футболу «на улицах российских городов вдруг началось братание с приехавшими на чемпионат мира иностранцами. Опросы зафиксировали резкое потепление отношения к Америке и Западу». В то же время было объявлено о повышении в России пенсионного возраста и, по мнению Левинсона, пенсионная реформа, «ответственность за которую [Путин], сомневаясь, все-таки взял на себя, все испортила» — таким образом «Крымский консенсус» подошёл к концу.

Волков считает, что «первые подвижки в общественном мнении появились уже к концу 2015-го — по мере ослабления конфронтации с Западом», а «серьезный удар по имиджу российской власти нанесло анонсирование пенсионной реформы. Эффект этого решения не исчерпывается простым падением рейтингов, параллельно этому начала меняться структура поддержки режима, проявилась сильная дифференциация во взглядах различных слоев населения».

Социолог Константин Гаазе считает, что единый день голосования 9 сентября 2018 года продемонстрировал завершение «Крымского консенсуса». В это время прошли протесты против пенсионной реформы, а избиратели массово голосовали за кандидатов от КПРФ и ЛДПР.

По мнению Аарона Шварцбаума (English: Aaron Schwartzbaum) из Института исследований внешней политики, к январю 2019 года «Крымский консенсус» полностью завершился: рейтинг одобрения деятельности Путина упал с 80 % весной 2018 года до 60-65 % (а ранее падал ещё сильнее); рейтинг доверия Путина упал на 15-20 %, до 35 % (и падение прекратилось). В то же время Путин продолжил смотреться как находящийся вне политики, но «Единая Россия» также непопулярна, как он популярен. На прошедших выборах губернатора Приморского края у кандидата от «Единой России» возникли проблемы с избранием, из-за чего были проведены повторные выборы, где действующий губернатор избрался как независимый кандидат.

Ведущий научный сотрудник МГИМО Е. Г. Попкова и профессор ЮРГТУ К. В. Воденко считают одним из маркеров распада «Крымского консенсуса» рост недоверия к властям: так, в мае 2019 года 63 % опрошенных заявили, что по их мнению число недовольных властями выросло, а 51 % заявил, что число довольных властями упало.

See also

• Социологические опросы в России во время вторжения на Украину