User:Lingzhi/Bengaltimeline

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  • July 1938 In July of 1938 a committee was established to sketch out a plan for the A[1]
  • August 1938 Meanwhile, heavy rain fell in Rajshahi on 24 August, which added to the flood water draining from the Bogra and Dinajpur districts in the upstream and caused all of northern Bengal to be flooded[2]
  • August 1938 He knew nothing of August 16th[1]
  • September 1938 Once the rupee had followed the pound sterling off the gold standard in September 193 I, massive outflows of treasure from Bengal began[3]
  • September 1938 The pace of these preparations was accelerated after the Munich Crisis of September 1938 , at which time, "additional food stocks were being purchased, details of transport and storage policy were under discussion, and legislation to implement for control was being drafted[1]
  • January 1939 5 million tons inJanuary 1939 [4]
  • January 1939 Even in the pre-famine period (January 1939 to January 1943 ) about 6 84 per cent[5]
  • January 1939 Even in the pre-famine period (January 1939 to January 1943 ) the proportion of families suffering economic deterioration and desti tution was much higher than the proportion who had improved their position[6]
  • January 1939 Similar changes which had occurred during the so-called normal pre-famine period (from January 1939 to January 1943 ) are shown in table 7[6]
  • January 1939 4 has been prepared from data given in table 7(A-3) which shows the estimated total number of families under each family occupation in January 1939 and in January 1943 in rural Bengal[6]
  • January 1939 Estimated number of families in lakhs in rural Bengal by family occupation in january 1939 , and change in economic condition between January 1939 and January 1943 [6]
  • January 1939 1939 ) between January 1939[6]
  • January 1939 (7)?(10) of the table show that during the so-called normal period (January 1939 to January 1943 ) the proportion of families suffering economic deterioration and destitution was much higher than the proportion who had improved their position[6]
  • January 1939 5 shows relative changes in the pre-famine (January 1939 ?January 1943 ) and in the famine (January 1943 ?May 1944 ) periods[6]
  • January 1939 The proportion (in percentage form) of families in each category of 'improvement', 'no-change', 'deterioration', 'destitution', and 'not clear' in the pre-famine period (January 1939 ?January 1943 ) are shown in col[6]
  • January 1939 (3) as of change in economic January 1939 ? January 1943 ? percentage the two periods condition January 1943 May 1944 of col[6]
  • January 1939 To put the matter very briefly, economic deterioration, on the whole, had set in definitely even in the pre-famine period (January 1939 ?January 1943 ) ; a comparatively small number of families were improving their economic position while a far large number were suffering economic deterioration or destitution[6]
  • January 1939 in January, 1939 [6]
  • January 1939 Weighted percentage of families under different occupations in weighted percentage of families under respective occupations occupational groups as in January 1939[6]
  • January 1939 Number of families surveyed under different occupations in January *N> ?*2>[6]
  • January 1939 as in January 1939[6]
  • January 1939 While the Agro-Economic Research Centre for East India (1960) gives wage data in Birbhum from January 1939 to December 1941 , and again from January 1946 , the data for the intermediate period are not presented[7]
  • January 1939 in January 1939 (before the famine), January 1943 (immediately preceding the famine—in fact, in terms of our phase structure towards the end of Phase I of the famine), and in May 1944 (after the famine)[7]
  • January 1939 Data from the study by Mahalanobis, Mukherjea and Ghosh ( 1946 ) can be used to construct transition matrices in the pre-famine period (January 1939 to January 1943 ) as well as during the famine (January 1943 to May 1944 ), and these are presented in the Appendix (Tables 9 and 10)[7]
  • January 1939 Despite a high rate of destitution during 1939 -43 as well as 1943 -44, the number of families dependent on husking paddy showed a net increase by a little over 66% between January 1939 and May 1944 [7]
  • January 1939 January 1939 January 1943 January 1939 January 1943 and January 1943 and May 1944 and January 1943 and May 1944 Peasant cultivation[7]
  • January 1939 Using the study by Mahalanobis, Mukherjea and Ghosh ( 1946 ), it is possible to construct occu pational 'transition matrices' in the immediate pre-famine period (between January 1939 and January 1943 ) and in the famine period (between January 1943 and May 1944 )[7]
  • June 1939 Sadeque, 'The Co-operative Credit Movement and Interest Rate in India', TBCJ, XXV(2) ( 1939 ): 22; see also Annual Report on the Working of Cooperative Societies in the Presidency of Bengal for the Year Ending 30 June 1937, Summary of General Progress, TBCJ, XXV(1) ( 1939 ): 54–5[2]
  • August 1939 It 60mpnses lnvhland es sown in April or thereabouts, and harvested in August and September- AHOthGr crop of minor importance is also grown between the aman and the auscomm1
  • August 1939 ~ebase period is the week ending 19th August 1939 IARIHDD8-001362
  • August 1939 The price of rice was up 33% in September 1940 and 69% in September 1941 on its August 1939 level and in early March 1942 the index stood at 59[3]
  • August 1939 Out of fourteen states and British territories in that region, the nine largest states, including the great majority of this region's territory, had declared famines according to the Indian Famine Code in August of 1939 , and one declared a scarcity[8]
  • August 1939 He also held a meeting of well-to-do people on 10 August 1939 to solicit charitable support, and they donated more than 17,000 rupees on the spot[8]
  • September 1939 It 60mpnses lnvhland es sown in April or thereabouts, and harvested in August and September- AHOthGr crop of minor importance is also grown between the aman and the auscomm1
  • September 1939 On the 8th September 1939 , the Central Govel'llment dolegated to the Provincial Governments powers under the Defence of India Rules to control the prices of certain nec~sBaries of IifeIARIHDD8-001362
  • September 1939 1939 SeptemberIARIHDD8-001362
  • September 1939 In2002, fromSeptember 16to27, the Antwerp Institute for Tropical Medicine will organise the programme in Antwerp, Belgium[9]
  • September 1939 Plans were afoot immediately after the declaration of war on 1 September 1939 to declare Bengal a 'frontline' province (De 1996)[10]
  • September 1939 The period under consideration in the pages to follow, September 1939 - September 1946 , is a period that represents an unparalleled epoch of turmoil, upheaval and misfortune in modern Bengal[1]
  • September 1939 As I will detail in Chapter One, from September of 1939 the exigencies of Britain's war against Axis powers were central to how the colony would be governed[1]
  • September 1939 Britain's second Ministry of Food was thus established almost immediately upon the declaration of war against Germany on September 3rd, 1939 [1]
  • October 1939 I, October 1959, pp[11]
  • October 1939 In October, riding the wave of discontent, the Congress High Command decided to withdraw its ministers from the seven provinces that it controlled since the 1937 provincial elections, to protest unrepresentative involvement in Britain's war[1]
  • November 1939 23 In November I958, the descendant of a Brahman who had at one point supported Saltanat Singh[11]
  • November 1939 In November, 1939 a strike involving more than 11,000 workers at the Hukumchand Jute Mill in the northern suburbs of Calcutta drew quick response from the Indian Jute Mills Association (IJMA)[1]
  • December 1939 The Bihar Central Advisory Committee on Price Control meeting on 18th December 1939 , emphasised "the need of some form of inter-provincial control"1 and this opinion was communicated to the Government of India as early as the 8th January 1940 comlast
  • December 1939 It consists mainly of lowland ricos whlch are'sown 1n'Ma'y and J mm, and mature in November and Decembercomm1
  • December 1939 The Bihar Central Advisory Committee on Price Control meeting on 18th December 1939 , emphasised "the need of some form of inter-provincial control"1 and this opinion was communicated to the Govern- ment of India as early as the 8th January 1940 hussain_minute
  • December 1939 The Bihar Central Advisory Committee on Pr~ce Control meeting on 18th December 1939 , emphasised "the need of some form of inter-provincial control"l and this opinion was communicated to the Government oi India as early 3IARIHDD8-001362
  • December 1939 178 Quote from a campaign speech printed in Amrita Bazar Patrika, December 16, 1936[1]
  • January 1940 The Bihar Central Advisory Committee on Price Control meeting on 18th December 1939 , emphasised "the need of some form of inter-provincial control"1 and this opinion was communicated to the Government of India as early as the 8th January 1940 comlast
  • January 1940 The Bihar Central Advisory Committee on Price Control meeting on 18th December 1939 , emphasised "the need of some form of inter-provincial control"1 and this opinion was communicated to the Govern- ment of India as early as the 8th January 1940 hussain_minute
  • January 1940 52 The conception index becomes positive in January 1974 (indicating fewer-than-average conceptions) and stays positive until August 1975[12]
  • January 1940 However, the suggestion from Figure 8 that the fall-off in conceptions dates from before January 1974 is strengthened because the conception index represents deviations from the average monthly numbers of conceptions based on births occurring in 1966-69 (see footnote 49)[12]
  • January 1940 When the sirens sounded again for the second test of civil preparedness on January 30th, however, there was again "opposition[1]
  • January 1940 Ration books, which had been printed in advance, were distributed and the rationing of sugar, butter, ham and bacon began in early January of 1940 [1]
  • January 1940 By January 1940 , however, prices had risen so much in Bombay that the provincial government opened low priced grain shops for the poor[8]
  • March 1940 have already achieved eradication and passed into the pre-maintenance phase by March, 1975[12]
  • March 1940 Meat was included in March and tea, margarine and cooking fats, in July[1]
  • March 1940 Roy, 'Agricultural labour and economic transition in colonial India: lessons from wage data', paper presented at the Economic History Seminar, Yale University, 30 March 2005; Ortega Osona, 'Attenuation of mortality fluctuations'[13]
  • April 1940 Board of Commissioners in Behar and Benares, April I8I9, Middleton to Bd[11]
  • June 1940 183 In June of 1940 the All-India Muslim League Working Committee passed a resolution barring Muslims from participating in war[1]
  • July 1940 Till July nothing effective was doneIARIHDD8-001362
  • July 1940 Meat was included in March and tea, margarine and cooking fats, in July[1]
  • August 1940 52 The conception index becomes positive in January 1974 (indicating fewer-than-average conceptions) and stays positive until August 1975[12]
  • August 1940 By mid-August, yearly, many were, again, borrowing against imminent starvation[1]
  • August 1940 As urged in a secret note prepared by the Intelligence Bureau in August 1940 , "a country's danger does not commence with the first sound of the iron-shod tread of the armed invaders[1]
  • September 1940 The price of rice was up 33% in September 1940 and 69% in September 1941 on its August 1939 level and in early March 1942 the index stood at 59[3]
  • September 1940 Bengal, was appointed judge in Ghazipur in September I795[11]
  • September 1940 Due to dislocations in commodity markets as a result of war, meanwhile, by September of 1940 the price of rice had risen 33% in a single year[1]
  • October 1940 The result was the recruitment of a number of 'special categories' of medical officers, which included, among other things, the recruitment of European doctors in India and Britain (October 1940 ), the transfer of assistant-surgeons in the IMD to the IMS under the emergency commissioning scheme (June 1941 ), the introduction of medical graduates in state-managed and company-managed railways(October 1941 ),theemployment of specialists on special terms(January 1942 ),the introduction of women medical practitioners (January 1942 ) and the transfer of civilian antimalaria officers to military duty(February 1942 )[14]
  • October 1940 101 In October, 1940 , Mihirlal Chatterjee, member of the All India Village Association issued an appeal to the provincial government in the Amrita Bazar Patrika:[1]
  • November 1940 would hold its first "black-out" exercise in Calcutta on November 6th, plunging the city into darkness in preparation for attacks from the enemies of Britain, at this time Germany, who might, "imminently" begin bombing the Second City of British Empire[1]
  • December 1940 The Bihar Central Advisory Committee on Price Control meeting on 18th December 1939 , emphasised "the need of some form of inter-provincial control"1 and this opinion was communicated to the Government of India as early as the 8th January 1940 comlast
  • December 1940 The Bihar Central Advisory Committee on Price Control meeting on 18th December 1939 , emphasised "the need of some form of inter-provincial control"1 and this opinion was communicated to the Govern- ment of India as early as the 8th January 1940 hussain_minute
  • December 1940 It is true thup' thl~ imports into Bengal tlurhlg the first seven months of 1941 were higher than normal owing to the poor aman crop reaped in December 1940 IARIHDD8-001362
  • December 1940 XLV (March 2007) mates— in December 1941 , at the height of the crisis, than in December 1940 , before the blockade began (Joseph Brojek, Samuel Wells, and Ancel Keys 1946 )ogradac_article_pub_063
  • December 1940 In December 1940 there was a much reduced aman[15]
  • December 1940 It must be concluded that the statistical basis of estimates of production is so bad that the Bengal Government was not in a position to say with any confidence whether the December 1942 crop was 11 o/ above the December 1940 crop or 20 % below it[15]
  • December 1940 The very poor crop of December 1940 meant that the people ran out of rice earlier than usual and started eating the crop of December 1941 as soon as it was harvested[15]
  • December 1940 XIII, December, 1940 [11]
  • December 1940 On December 30th 1940 , in an industrial suburb of colonial Calcutta, an imitation Nazi aircraft circled low over a small formation of native huts erected in the shadows of the sprawling jute and cotton mills that line the banks of the river Hooghly[1]
  • December 1940 1 Amrita Bazar Patrika, "Air Raid Precaution," 24 December 1940[1]
  • December 1940 An evaluation of the treatment of dock laborers during the December bombings will go some way towards testing this rhetoric[1]
  • December 1940 XLV (March 2007) classic famine diseases in temperate climates in December 1941 , at the height of the crisis, than in December 1940 , before the blockade began (Joseph Brojek, Samuel Wells, and Ancel Keys 1946 )[16]
  • December 1940 Indeed, the numbers succumbing to typhoid fever, typhus, and dysentery—the classic famine diseases in temperate climates—were fewer in December 1941 , at the height of the crisis, than in December 1940 , before the blockade began[17]
  • December 1940 While all of these data, as noted above, are suspect, it was clear that the partial failure of the aman harvest of December 1940 reduced overall rice availability well below the necessary level (to an estimated three-quarters of the normal level) even with limited imports from Burma[8]
  • January 1941 But the quantity in' stock "3 during January to March—April is not 'carry-over'; it represents the actual re year of consumption is not rigidly fixedcomlast
  • January 1941 The crop assembled in January is certainly available for early consumption, but if consumed prematurely will leave a deficit at the end of the year of consumption, unless the crop produced is more than the requirement of 12 months and will, therefore,comlast
  • January 1941 The aman crop which was assembled in January 1941 was 5-178 million tons (adjusted figures by addition of 20 per cent to the Director of Agriculture's figure)-—the shortest crop for fifteen years and with bore and aus, supplemented by 323,000 tons imports, and after deduc- tion of seed requirements, gave 7,472,000 tons of rice, for the consumption of 60-3 million people, which was the population of Bengal at that timecomlast
  • January 1941 An indication of the rate at which paddy' and rice move intov the markets of Bengal during different months of the year" is given by the following account of movements into the Calcutta market:—~~ ' "Fifty per cent of the total annual arrivals of paddy as well as rice were ' received in the four months, January to Aprilcomm1
  • January 1941 Incomings of paddy were heaviest in January and February, amounting to 28 per cent of the annual total arrivals in the market, while receipts of rice were highest in February and March, being also 28 per centcomm1
  • January 1941 The aman crop is harvested from November to December, and may be said to be assembled by V the beginning of January; the bore crop is harvested by March-April, and the ' ' aus crop in August-Septemberhussain_minute
  • January 1941 The year of production may be regarded as - from January to Decemberhussain_minute
  • January 1941 But the quantity in' stock "3 during January to March—April is not 'carry-over'; it represents the actual re year of consumption is not rigidly fixedhussain_minute
  • January 1941 The crop assembled in January is certainly available for early consumption, but if consumed prematurely will leave a deficit at the end of the year of consumption, unless the crop produced is more than the requirement of 12 months and will, therefore,hussain_minute
  • January 1941 The aman crop which was assembled in January 1941 was 5-178 million tons (adjusted figures by addition of 20 per cent to the Director of Agriculture's figure)-—the shortest crop for fifteen years and with bore and aus, supplemented by 323,000 tons imports, and after deduc- tion of seed requirements, gave 7,472,000 tons of rice, for the consumption of 60-3 million people, which was the population of Bengal at that timehussain_minute
  • January 1941 The representative frOID the United ProviuC'AS pointed out that 110lmally the price of wheat rose only in January or February and never in July or AugustIARIHDD8-001362
  • January 1941 'The lil'~t ail' mids on Hallgooll took pla(le on the 23rd January 1\)42IARIHDD8-001362
  • January 1941 In January 1941 , the wholesale price of coarse rice at Oalcut~a was EsIARIHDD8-001362
  • January 1941 0£ wheat to India and at the end of January 1043, the statutory maXImum prICes for wheat which had been imposed in December 1941 , were withdrawnIARIHDD8-001362
  • January 1941 wfp January 29, 2006ogradac_article_pub_063
  • January 1941 Gandhi was already warning of rice shortage in January 1941 review_Structural_Violence2
  • January 1941 For most historical famines, however, establishing excess mortality with any precision is 17 Compare Stephanie Strom, "Poor Nations Complain Not All Charity Reaches Victims," New York Times, January 29, 2006[16]
  • February 1941 Incomings of paddy were heaviest in January and February, amounting to 28 per cent of the annual total arrivals in the market, while receipts of rice were highest in February and March, being also 28 per centcomm1
  • February 1941 The representative frOm the United Provinces pointed out that normally the price of wheat rose only in January or February and never in July or AugustIARIHDD8-001362
  • February 1941 As noted above, the DCS could not supply the grain needs of the devastated parts of Midnapore, and the Revenue Department provided most of the grain to come into the district between February and May: most of this was distributed gratuitously[18]
  • February 1941 In this context, in February of 1941 , the Essential Services Maintenance Ordinance was authorized by the Government of India[1]
  • February 1941 Churchill telegraphed his regional Commander in Chief, Archibald Wavell, on the 10th of February:[1]
  • February 1941 By the 21st of February defeat was certain, if not yet admitted[1]
  • February 1941 In this context, nineteen representatives of the Government of India, together with thirty-one representatives of provinces and princely states, met in Delhi on February 6th to assess the situation[1]
  • March 1941 But the quantity in' stock "3 during January to March—April is not 'carry-over'; it represents the actual re year of consumption is not rigidly fixedcomlast
  • March 1941 Incomings of paddy were heaviest in January and February, amounting to 28 per cent of the annual total arrivals in the market, while receipts of rice were highest in February and March, being also 28 per centcomm1
  • March 1941 After March, arrivals diminish gradually, the months of least activity being July and Augustcomm1
  • March 1941 But the quantity in' stock "3 during January to March—April is not 'carry-over'; it represents the actual re year of consumption is not rigidly fixedhussain_minute
  • March 1941 Normally the amtm crop would come into consumption, let us say, from March-April 1941 hussain_minute
  • March 1941 In the Central Provinees, which is normally a surplus province but which had had a succession of poor crops, the s(Jramble appears to have occurred earlier than elsewhere, and in March 1!}42, in order t,) ("')HRt'!'VO the rElFiOnrMS of the provinceIARIHDD8-001362
  • March 1941 This crop would llormally have come into use from March-April, but as the previcus crop Wt;lS very short and had been consumed by the end of the year 1941 , the ne'\\ crop was drawn upon most probably from aIARIHDD8-001362
  • March 1941 XLV (March 2007) 17 The tendency for agencies originally founded as vehicles for famine relief to reinvent themselves as bureaucracies is exemplified by Oxfam, which began as a Quaker-inspired committee to relieve famine in Greece in 1941 –42, and by Concern International, formed during the Biafran war–famine of 1968ogradac_article_pub_063


  • March 1941 The corre- sponding census population in rural Bengal in March 1941 was 47-i85 millions[5]
  • March 1941 (1979), "Death and Population in India: The Demographic Revolution" parer presented at the Association of Asian Studies Convention, Los Angeles, March[19]
  • March 1941 "168 Conditions only deteriorated further before Japan moved into a largely deserted and decimated city after Allied surrender on March 7th[1]
  • April 1941 The aman crop is harvested from November to December, and may be said to be assembled by V the beginning of January; the bore crop is harvested by March-April, and the ' ' aus crop in August-Septembercomlast
  • April 1941 the year of consumption will be, ' approximately, let us say, from March-April to March-April next yearcomlast
  • April 1941 But the quantity in' stock "3 during January to March—April is not 'carry-over'; it represents the actual re year of consumption is not rigidly fixedcomlast
  • April 1941 Normally the amtm crop would come into consumption, let us say, from March-April 1941 comlast
  • April 1941 An indication of the rate at which paddy' and rice move intov the markets of Bengal during different months of the year" is given by the following account of movements into the Calcutta market:—~~ ' "Fifty per cent of the total annual arrivals of paddy as well as rice were ' received in the four months, January to Aprilcomm1
  • April 1941 The aman crop is harvested from November to December, and may be said to be assembled by V the beginning of January; the bore crop is harvested by March-April, and the ' ' aus crop in August-Septemberhussain_minute
  • April 1941 the year of consumption will be, ' approximately, let us say, from March-April to March-April next yearhussain_minute
  • April 1941 But the quantity in' stock "3 during January to March—April is not 'carry-over'; it represents the actual re year of consumption is not rigidly fixedhussain_minute
  • April 1941 Normally the amtm crop would come into consumption, let us say, from March-April 1941 hussain_minute
  • April 1941 Ou the 231'(1 of that month the J upanooe occupied the Andamuns, and on tha 5th und (ith April the first ellomy bombs fell in Oeylon and on the Mst coast of In,tiaIARIHDD8-001362
  • April 1941 rp nse too~ place after April 1941 , and the price was somewha~ IARIHDD8-001362
  • April 1941 Normally the aman crop would come into consumption, let us say, from Marcb-April 1941 IARIHDD8-001362
  • April 1941 This crop would llormally have come into use from March-April, but as the previcus crop Wt;lS very short and had been consumed by the end of the year 1941 , the ne'\\ crop was drawn upon most probably from aIARIHDD8-001362
  • April 1941 The data given by Chen and Chowdhury are organized in 12-month periods running from May to April (see the notes to Table 8) [12]
  • April 1941 May 1974 to April 1975) the rate is 167[12]
  • April 1941 The field work was carried out in April-May 1941 , and a compre- hensive report was submitted to the Government in July 1941 , but it was not published owing to wartimne restrictions[5]
  • April 1941 Calcutta radio programme preferences-April-May, 1941 [5]
  • April 1941 Radio programme preference-Calcutta, April-May, 1941 [5]
  • April 1941 War broadcast reactions: Calcutta sample, April-May, 1941 [5]
  • April 1941 Number and proportion of families selling paddy land in full between April 1943 and April 1941 by groups of families owning different amounts of paddy land before the famine (in january 1943 ) families owning 0?2 acres, 2?5 acres and above 5 acres of paddy land tcolatasls number of families selling paddy land in full families surveyed[6]
  • June 1941 between June and SeptemberIARIHDD8-001362
  • June 1941 On the 22nd June Germany inva,ded Russiai on the 25th July the JoIARIHDD8-001362
  • June 1941 The sharp increase by nearly 50 points in the index numbers Lor the prices' of wheat and cotton goods, which took place between June and SeptemIARIHDD8-001362
  • June 1941 The markets were in this condition when, in June, the Government of Bengal decided to jutervene und issued an order fixing, with effect from 'lst July, ma-ximulU pl'ic:es lor mcdi11ll1 and course rice in the Calcutta marketIARIHDD8-001362
  • June 1941 small-pox epidemic was not brought under control unti~ June 11344IARIHDD8-001362
  • June 1941 June 122·3 163 148 142·9 143IARIHDD8-001362
  • June 1941 The result was the recruitment of a number of 'special categories' of medical officers, which included, among other things, the recruitment of European doctors in India and Britain (October 1940 ), the transfer of assistant-surgeons in the IMD to the IMS under the emergency commissioning scheme (June 1941 ), the introduction of medical graduates in state-managed and company-managed railways(October 1941 ),theemployment of specialists on special terms(January 1942 ),the introduction of women medical practitioners (January 1942 ) and the transfer of civilian antimalaria officers to military duty(February 1942 )[14]
  • June 1941 Chen, 'Sex differentials in mortality in rural Bangladesh', Population and Development Review, 6, 2 (June, 1980); and Alamgir, op[12]
  • June 1941 Basak, Secretary to GoB, AID, to Collector, Faridpur, 7 June 1941 [2]
  • June 1941 : " A statistical report on the rupee census " published in the report on currency and finance, 1940 -41, by Reserve Bank of India, June 1941 , pp[5]
  • July 1941 After March, arrivals diminish gradually, the months of least activity being July and Augustcomm1
  • July 1941 On the 22nd June Germany invaded Russia on the 25th July the JoIARIHDD8-001362
  • July 1941 pauesEI assets in the British Empire were frozen; on the 28th July the Japanes() landec1 in Indo·ChinaIARIHDD8-001362
  • July 1941 The representative frOID the United ProviuC'AS pointed out that 110lmally the price of wheat rose only in January or February and never in July or AugustIARIHDD8-001362
  • July 1941 9£ JulyIARIHDD8-001362
  • July 1941 7 p~r ma~nd in July: of that yearIARIHDD8-001362
  • July 1941 The markets were in this condition when, in June, the Government of Bengal decided to jutervene und issued an order fixing, with effect from 'lst July, ma-ximulU pl'ic:es lor mcdi11ll1 and course rice in the Calcutta marketIARIHDD8-001362
  • July 1941 been agreed upon ItR ,l ,mi'buble price in the COUl·se of discussions which had taken pltwe several weoks earlier, but prices had risen rapidly, particularly betweell May awl ,TUlltl, wit,h the effect thnt the rates fixed under the 0rU()r proved to be well below the market prices prevailing on the 1st JulyIARIHDD8-001362
  • July 1941 On the 16th July the Govern-· ment pl'ohibited nIl exportfl of rioe alld pndc1y from the province except unc1er permitIARIHDD8-001362
  • July 1941 In July 1941 Japanese assets in the Empire were frozen[15]
  • July 1941 On 28th July Japan invaded Indo-China[15]
  • July 1941 13/41, fortnightly report from the Commissioner, Chittagong Division, to the Chief Secretary, 21 July 1941 [10]
  • July 1941 The field work was carried out in April-May 1941 , and a compre- hensive report was submitted to the Government in July 1941 , but it was not published owing to wartimne restrictions[5]
  • July 1941 In May, 9000 workers at Baranagar jute mills went on strike, and in July 12,000 workers at the Anglo Indian Jute Mills followed suit[1]
  • July 1941 Rumors of a massive export of rice (even after exports had been banned in July) spread quickly[1]
  • July 1941 Agricultural Wages and the Price of Rice in Bangladesh, 1972-76 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 Jun-72 Dec-72 Jul-73 Jan-74 Aug-74 Mar-75 Sep-75 Apr-76 July 1972 = 100 AGR WAGE RICE PRICE[17]
  • August 1941 The aman crop is harvested from November to December, and may be said to be assembled by V the beginning of January; the bore crop is harvested by March-April, and the ' ' aus crop in August-Septembercomlast
  • August 1941 After March, arrivals diminish gradually, the months of least activity being July and Augustcomm1
  • August 1941 The aman crop is harvested from November to December, and may be said to be assembled by V the beginning of January; the bore crop is harvested by March-April, and the ' ' aus crop in August-Septemberhussain_minute
  • August 1941 The representative frOID the United ProviuC'AS pointed out that 110lmally the price of wheat rose only in January or February and never in July or AugustIARIHDD8-001362
  • August 1941 s smce producers had dIsposed of 80 to 90 per cent of their produce 'tnel durmg Jul~ and August no exports from the province wore observed"IARIHDD8-001362
  • August 1941 32-34, August: 1293-1304[19]
  • August 1941 183 In the Government of Bengal's "War Diary" for August-October 1941 , it is noted: "Muslim reaction to campaign in Iran were undoubtedly uneasy[1]
  • August 1941 217, indicates that the price index for rice, pegged at 100 for the week ending August 19th, 1939 , reached 172 in December of 1941 [1]
  • September 1941 : Rnd ort the 25th September the Gerrotins were in the OrimeaIARIHDD8-001362
  • September 1941 good rain in September and October which promised, deceptively as it turned outIARIHDD8-001362
  • September 1941 The price of rice was up 33% in September 1940 and 69% in September 1941 on its August 1939 level and in early March 1942 the index stood at 59[3]
  • September 1941 Demography Thesis, London School of Economics, September, 1989[19]
  • September 1941 36, 4th September: 1448-1450[19]
  • September 1941 A year later, in September of 1941 , the price of rice had risen another 36%,104 and distress deepened for many in rural Bengal who had lived on a razor's edge of subsistence for years past[1]
  • September 1941 185 Fazlul Huq's letter to Liaquat Ali Khan, September 8, 1941 [1]
  • September 1941 On September 11th 1941 , Suhrawardy held a meeting on the Maidan condemning Huq's letter[1]
  • September 1941 16th of September[1]
  • October 1941 In the Third Price Control Conference of the official representatives of the Centre, Provinces and States, held at Delhi in October 1941 , the President (Sir Bamaswami Mudaliar) stated "the Government of India Wished to keep inter-provincial trade as free as possible, but if the control was applicable within a particular area he saw no objection to it"comlast
  • October 1941 ' It is clear from the above that by October 1941 , difficulties had arisen, and barriers were considered dangerous, and need for a central controlling agency, was evrdentcomlast
  • October 1941 In the Third Price Control Conference of the official representatives of the Centre, Provinces and States, held at Delhi in October 1941 , the President (Sir Bamaswami Mudaliar) stated "the Government of India Wished to keep inter-provincial trade as free as possible, but if the control was applicable within ahussain_minute
  • October 1941 ' It is clear from the above that by October 1941 , difficulties had arisen, and barriers were considered dangerous, and need for a central controlling agency, was evrdenthussain_minute
  • October 1941 When the Third Price Control Conference met on the 16th and ,17th October 1941 , the aIARIHDD8-001362
  • October 1941 good rain in September and October which promised, deceptively as it turned outIARIHDD8-001362
  • October 1941 In the Third Price Control Conference of the official representatives of the Centre, Provinces and States, held at Delhi in October 1941 , the Pre~ideut (Sir Ramaswami Mudaliar) sta~ed "the Government of Inelia witOued to keep inter-provincial trade as free as possible, but if the control was applicable within a particular area he saw no objection to it"IARIHDD8-001362
  • October 1941 It is clear fro;m the above that by October 1941 , difficulties had arisen, and barriers were considered dangerous, and need for a central controlling agency r was eVIdentIARIHDD8-001362
  • October 1941 The result was the recruitment of a number of 'special categories' of medical officers, which included, among other things, the recruitment of European doctors in India and Britain (October 1940 ), the transfer of assistant-surgeons in the IMD to the IMS under the emergency commissioning scheme (June 1941 ), the introduction of medical graduates in state-managed and company-managed railways(October 1941 ),theemployment of specialists on special terms(January 1942 ),the introduction of women medical practitioners (January 1942 ) and the transfer of civilian antimalaria officers to military duty(February 1942 )[14]
  • October 1941 , fortnightly report from the Commissioner, Chittagong Division, to the Chief Secretary, second half of October 1941 , first half of November 1941 , first half of December 1941 [10]
  • October 1941 Caldwell, 'Famine in Africa', Paper presented to the Seminar on Mortality and Society in sub-Saharan Africa, held by the International Union for the Scientific Study of Population, Yaounde, October 1987, p[12]
  • October 1941 41, 11 October: 1609-23[19]
  • October 1941 In its report for October 1936, the committee noted that rationing was necessary "not merely [to] prevent people from buying more than the prescribed amount, but also to make certain that the prescribed amount is distributed to them[1]
  • October 1941 183 In the Government of Bengal's "War Diary" for August-October 1941 , it is noted: "Muslim reaction to campaign in Iran were undoubtedly uneasy[1]
  • October 1941 The third relates to survivors of an air crash high in the Andes in October 1972; in order to live, they made a conscious decision to consume flesh from the corpses of their dead friends[17]
  • October 1941 In the wake of the October Revolution, its cities fared worst at first[17]
  • October 1941 The whole population was re-registered in October 1941 , in order to minimize ration card fraud[17]
  • November 1941 The aman crop is harvested from November to December, and may be said to be assembled by V the beginning of January; the bore crop is harvested by March-April, and the ' ' aus crop in August-Septembercomlast
  • November 1941 in the case of paddy, and from September to November in respect of rice"comm1
  • November 1941 The aman crop is harvested from November to December, and may be said to be assembled by V the beginning of January; the bore crop is harvested by March-April, and the ' ' aus crop in August-Septemberhussain_minute
  • November 1941 'ownl'ds the end of November 1941 IARIHDD8-001362
  • November 1941 Churchill's order for a scorched earth policy in November 1941 , to make sure that areas of Bengal exposed to a Japanese invasion would be empty of provisions for enemy troops and boats for access, was a key trigger for the famine: rice and boat "denial", in which boats as well as grain stocks were often burned, confi scated or dumped in water, with radios confi scatedreview_Structural_Violence2
  • November 1941 On 29 November 1941 the central government conferred, by notification, concurrent powers on the provincial governments under the Defence of India Rules (DIR) to restrict/prohibit the movement of food grains and also to requisition both food grains and any other commodity they considered necessary[10]
  • November 1941 , 29 November 1941 ; BL, OIOC, IOR, Mss[10]
  • November 1941 , fortnightly report from the Commissioner, Chittagong Division, to the Chief Secretary, second half of October 1941 , first half of November 1941 , first half of December 1941 [10]
  • November 1941 On November 1st, 1941 it was thus announced: "His Excellency the Governor of Bengal [Sir John Arthur Herbert] has, in the exercise of the powers conferred by the Civic Guard Ordinance, 1940 , made certain rules for the Civic Guard organization in Bengal[1]
  • November 1941 In November of 1941 , when approached by "frantic" Australian generals, Churchill pointedly declined to reinforce the Southeast Asia defenses, citing the urgency of war in the Middle East[1]
  • November 1941 On the 29th of November no-confidence motions were advanced against both ministers[1]
  • November 1941 Late in November a ship arrived at the Kidderpore docks in Calcutta and began loading large quantities of rice bound for Ceylon and Mauritius[1]
  • December 1941 The aman crop reaped in December 1941 was a good onecomm-92ff
  • December 1941 ln-E Bengal, as we have seen, the aman crop, which is the most important, is harvested by the end of Decembercomm1
  • December 1941 The aman crop reaped in December 1941 was a good onecomm100-150
  • December 1941 By December HJ39 prices hadIARIHDD8-001362
  • December 1941 The Government of India, therefore, decided that' interverition waF; necessary and, a:Uer a preliminat1 warning, issued lin Order on the 5th December fixing the maximum wholesale price of wheat at R;IARIHDD8-001362
  • December 1941 ed by the Oentt'al Government on the 5th December 1941 IARIHDD8-001362
  • December 1941 'rhe steps taken by the Government of India ,towards solving these problems were as follows: At the tlnQ of December 1941 a Wheat Oommissioner forIARIHDD8-001362
  • December 1941 By the b!:lginlling or 1042, the wu,r in the East hud taken tt dangerous tUlll for India, Wur with J apun hurl broken out on the 8th December 1941 IARIHDD8-001362
  • December 1941 It is true thup' thl~ imports into Bengal tlurhlg the first seven months of 1941 were higher than normal owing to the poor aman crop reaped in December 1940 IARIHDD8-001362
  • December 1941 0£ wheat to India and at the end of January 1043, the statutory maXImum prICes for wheat which had been imposed in December 1941 , were withdrawnIARIHDD8-001362
  • December 1941 At the end ot December 1941 , a Wheat Commissioner for lndia WAS appointed, and on the 30th April 1942 , the Wheat Control Order was notifiedIARIHDD8-001362
  • December 1941 The aman crop' reaped in December 1941 was a good oneIARIHDD8-001362
  • December 1941 Dece'mberIARIHDD8-001362
  • December 1941 XLV (March 2007) mates— in December 1941 , at the height of the crisis, than in December 1940 , before the blockade began (Joseph Brojek, Samuel Wells, and Ancel Keys 1946 )ogradac_article_pub_063
  • December 1941 For example, by the summer of 1943 value of a haircut in units of rice had fallen to less than a fifth of what it was in December 1941 __lecturenotesfamine
  • December 1941 December 1941 crop[15]
  • December 1941 In December 1941 the rice crop was well above average, but prices started high and rose throughout the following year[15]
  • December 1941 On 8th December war broke out[15]
  • December 1941 As Bengal had had a good December 1941 crop, some surplus rice was exported to the other areas of India which had been hit by the loss of the Burma rice[15]
  • December 1941 "While in September 1942 the [agricultural] wage rate stood where it was in December 1941[15]
  • December 1941 The very poor crop of December 1940 meant that the people ran out of rice earlier than usual and started eating the crop of December 1941 as soon as it was harvested[15]
  • December 1941 Sen says that even if this were so, which he denies, the December 1941 crop was so big that the trade would have restored their stocks to the normal carry-over levels by the beginning of 1943 [15]
  • December 1941 In July 1943 it was a mere one-fourth of the December 1941 level[20]
  • December 1941 The arrival of Japanese armed forces in Burma, the bombing of Pearl Harbour on 7 December 1941 , the capture of Rangoon on 23 December 1941 and their dominance in the Bay of Bengal converted Bengal into a 'frontline province'[10]
  • December 1941 When the Japanese armed forces invaded Burma in December 1941 , the supply of Burma rice stopped abruptly, halting another channel of rice supply to Bengal from a neighbouring province[10]
  • December 1941 Even though the revenue commissioner of Chittagong reported to the revenue department in Calcutta on 9 December 1942 that the price of rice had almost doubled compared to December 1941 , the mandarins at the Writers' Buildings did nothing to check the disastrous upward trend in the price of this essential food grain[10]
  • December 1941 , fortnightly report from the Commissioner, Chittagong Division, to the Chief Secretary, second half of October 1941 , first half of November 1941 , first half of December 1941 [10]
  • December 1941 "13 The result of the discussions held within this subcommittee was the establishment of the Food (Defense Plans) Department in December of the same year[1]
  • December 1941 Differential access to non-rationed foods created some discontent, however, and so a "points-rationing" system was introduced in December of 1941 for the purchase of items like canned fish, dried fruits, rice, and biscuits that did not necessarily comprise an "essential" diet in Britain[1]
  • December 1941 "39 On December 10th of 1941 , however, a system of pay was introduced and recruitment picked up[1]
  • December 1941 Attitudes and priorities, both administrative and popular, underwent a radical change when Japan attacked Pearl Harbor on December 7th, 1941 [1]
  • December 1941 On December 18th, 1941 Calcutta and its suburbs were declared a 'dangerous area,' and despite all calls to stand-to, residents of Calcutta began to flee the colonial city in numbers[1]
  • December 1941 By December of 1941 , however, Malaya was defended by only ninety antiquated "Brewster Buffalo" aircraft, rejected for service in Europe[1]
  • December 1941 156 Force Z steamed from Singapore on the afternoon of December 8th and, without air support, engaged the Japanese naval force off the northern coast of Malaya[1]
  • December 1941 Singapore itself had been under attack since the 8th of December, and many of its European residents had already been evacuated[1]
  • December 1941 When Japan began bombing Rangoon in the last week of December chaos broke out immediately[1]
  • December 1941 Evacuation began in December, with tens of thousands of Indian residents of Burma crossing the hill tracks from Rangoon to the Bay of Bengal, where they could board coastal ships bound for Calcutta and Chittagong on the far eastern coast of Bengal[1]
  • December 1941 "1 By December of 1941 , the price of rice had risen by nearly 75% since the beginning of the war[1]
  • December 1941 217, indicates that the price index for rice, pegged at 100 for the week ending August 19th, 1939 , reached 172 in December of 1941 [1]
  • December 1941 " They were housed outside the hospital in army tents, and held throughout the cold December night "without adequate clothing or blankets[1]
  • December 1941 In the days following the December 5th air raid, both the central and sub-area offices of the Post Raid Information Service were swamped with relatives of dock workers who had gone "missing" during the attack[1]
  • December 1941 An air raid alert over the docks on the 16th of December left the Captain of the Port Area Fire Service in a state of consternation[1]
  • December 1941 XLV (March 2007) classic famine diseases in temperate cli mates?in December 1941 , at the height of the crisis, than in December 1940 , before the blockade began (Joseph Brojek, Samuel Wells, and Ancel Keys 1946 )[16]
  • December 1941 Scientist Elena Kochina, who also survived the blockade, noted in her diary the widespread presence of dystrophy on 10 December 1941 , but a month later could still claim that there were no infectious diseases[17]
  • December 1941 Indeed, the numbers succumbing to typhoid fever, typhus, and dysentery—the classic famine diseases in temperate climates—were fewer in December 1941 , at the height of the crisis, than in December 1940 , before the blockade began[17]
  • December 1941 Correction 5: The question of 'carry-over' of old rice The figures presented so far take no account of the 'carry over' of stock from before the December harvest of the previous year[7]
  • December 1941 While the Agro-Economic Research Centre for East India (1960) gives wage data in Birbhum from January 1939 to December 1941 , and again from January 1946 , the data for the intermediate period are not presented[7]
  • December 1941 2 quality) for December 1941 as 100, the indices of both prices and of the exchange rate for labour against rice are given in Table 4[7]
  • December 1941 While in September 1942 the wage stood where it was in December 1941 and the price of rice stood only a little higher, a sudden upsurge of the rice price subsequently occurred, without a matching movement of the wage rate[7]
  • December 1941 December 0-14 100 0-37 100 100[7]
  • December 1941 by summer the value of a haircut in units of rice had dropped to less than a fifth of what it was in December 1941 [7]
  • December 1941 December 100 100 100 100 100[7]
  • December 1941 The Japanese campaigns that began with Pearl Harbor in December 1941 concluded with their conquest of Southeast Asia in the first months of 1942 [8]
  • January 1942 Nothing was available {or the last two or three months of the consumption year 1941 —42,(January-- February-March 1942 )comlast
  • January 1942 —The aman crop assembled by January 1942 was 8-876 million tons the highest since 1937comlast
  • January 1942 This crop would normally have come into use from March—April, but as the previous crop was very short and had been consumed by the end of the year 1941 , the new crop was drawn upon most probably from about the beginning of January 1942 ; It would have sufficed for twelve months, icomlast
  • January 1942 , till the end of December 1942 , and possibly even beyond that period with some efiort, but during this year" various unforeseen factors adversely affected the position: (i) A quantity of rice was exported (187,500 tons in the year, of which 184,618- tons were exported between January and July 1942 )comlast
  • January 1942 —The aman crop assembled by January 1942 was 8-876 million tons the highest since 1937hussain_minute
  • January 1942 This crop would normally have come into use from March—April, but as the previous crop was very short and had been consumed by the end of the year 1941 , the new crop was drawn upon most probably from about the beginning of January 1942 ; It would have sufficed for twelve months, ihussain_minute
  • January 1942 , till the end of December 1942 , and possibly even beyond that period with some efiort, but during this year" various unforeseen factors adversely affected the position: (i) A quantity of rice was exported (187,500 tons in the year, of which 184,618- tons were exported between January and July 1942 )hussain_minute
  • January 1942 From about the middle of January 1942 , acu:te local scarcity was suddenly and simultaneously experienced in many important wheat consuming areasIARIHDD8-001362
  • January 1942 January IARIHDD8-001362
  • January 1942 There wore :further rnids in JanuaryIARIHDD8-001362
  • January 1942 In January 1942 , the price was EsIARIHDD8-001362
  • January 1942 me into operation on the 9th January, and the monthly requirements were assessed at 3 lakh maunds of rice (11,021 tons) and 4·5 lakh maunds of paddy (16,532 tons)IARIHDD8-001362
  • January 1942 As a letter sent out to District Officers on the 9th January said, the agents appointed by Government were unlikely to obtain the quantities of grain which Government required, unless competitive buying was prevented as far as possibleIARIHDD8-001362
  • January 1942 The quantity purchased between the 10th January and the 17th February was only about 2,200 tonsIARIHDD8-001362
  • January 1942 Early in January the Beugal Governnlent appointe~ a ]'oodgrains Pur· chaIARIHDD8-001362
  • January 1942 the llosing months of 1942 and in January and February 19~3, arrivals of :vhe!lR Into Bengal were much below requirements and were causmg great anxIetyIARIHDD8-001362
  • January 1942 -The aman crop assembled by January 1942 was 8·876 million tonsthe higbest since 19~7IARIHDD8-001362
  • January 1942 bout the beginning of January 1942 IARIHDD8-001362
  • January 1942 (i) A quantity of rice was exported (187,500 tons in the year, of which 184,618 tons were exported between January and July le4~)IARIHDD8-001362
  • January 1942 Procurement operations in December and January had not been SllccessfuL Another attempt was made on the 9th of January but abandoned on the 17th of FebruaryIARIHDD8-001362
  • January 1942 Figure 1 describes the variation in rice prices across Bengal between January 1942 and Augustogradac_article_pub_063
  • January 1942 But how much was actually harvested? How much was destroyed in the virulent Brown Stain plant disease that ravaged Bengal during these years? How much was destroyed or confi scated in the "rice denial" policy that started in January-February 1942 ?review_Structural_Violence2
  • January 1942 Phase I: January, 1942 to March, 1943 , Phase II: March, 1943 to November, 1943 , and Phase III: November, 1943 to most of 1944 __lecturenotesfamine
  • January 1942 The result was the recruitment of a number of 'special categories' of medical officers, which included, among other things, the recruitment of European doctors in India and Britain (October 1940 ), the transfer of assistant-surgeons in the IMD to the IMS under the emergency commissioning scheme (June 1941 ), the introduction of medical graduates in state-managed and company-managed railways(October 1941 ),theemployment of specialists on special terms(January 1942 ),the introduction of women medical practitioners (January 1942 ) and the transfer of civilian antimalaria officers to military duty(February 1942 )[14]
  • January 1942 There were air raids on Rangoon on 23rd January 1942 and on 7th March Rangoon fell[15]
  • January 1942 "The increase in the rice price in Phase I [January 1942 to March 1943 ] was[15]
  • January 1942 6 War Office Papers, WO 193/137, "Secretary of State to Government of India, Defence Dept", 30 January 1942 [21]
  • January 1942 Magh 1348, corresponds to January 1942 by the Gregorian calendar[1]
  • January 1942 146 On January 1st, 1942 the Mayor of Calcutta issued an appeal, calling on laborers to remain at their posts, but the exodus continued[1]
  • January 1942 The first refugees landed in Calcutta on January 19th of 1942 [1]
  • January 1942 Radical Bengali nationalist Subhash Chandra Bose, jailed for his uncompromising insistence on self-rule in India, had escaped confinement in January[1]
  • January 1942 The export from Bengal of 45,000 tons of rice in January of 1942 represented a quadrupling of exports for the same month in the previous year,3 and rice continued to leave the province in record numbers[1]
  • January 1942 In January, 4,400 thousand workers of the Hastings Jute Mills went on strike, and in February 15,000 workers of the Andrew Yule Mills walked out, demanding "dearness allowances" and preferential access to rice[1]
  • January 1942 Early in January, while food still remained a subsidiary directorate under the Labor Department, a Foodgrains Purchasing Officer (F[1]
  • January 1942 26 Janayuddha, January 20, 1942 "Garhi Garhi Atta Pacharer Chesta"[1]
  • January 1942 Sarkar, also in charge of the newly minted Food Department, visited Calcutta in early January to inaugurate a canteen system for the middle-class public, which, he said, had "been so badly hit by food shortages, high prices, disruption of the family, and, lastly, the[1]
  • January 1942 28 The Statesman, January 7, 1942 , "Cheap Meals for Citizens"[1]
  • January 1942 29 The Statesman, January 10, 1942 "No Supplies"[1]
  • January 1942 30 The Statesman, January 11, 1942 "Letter to the Editor"[1]
  • January 1942 31 The Statesman, January 24, 1942 "Calcutta's Street Beggars"[1]
  • January 1942 32 The Statesman, January 22, 1942 "Beggar Problem in Calcutta: Government Action"[1]
  • January 1942 On or about the 8th of January, Amery - convinced by Linlithgow's repeated entreaties - sent a memorandum to the Minister of War Transport in London, Lord Leathers, outlining Linlithgow's request for imports[1]
  • January 1942 In a subsequent letter to the Viceroy on the 12th of January, Gandhi reiterated his argument that Government heavy-handedness, not Congress instigation, had precipitated the uprising, and added that as a "helpless witness to what is going on in the country, including the privations of the poor millions owing to the universal scarcity stalking the land,"56 he was morally compelled to fast in solidarity with the masses[1]
  • January 1942 The War Cabinet met a again on January 12th, and while reaffirming its own view that Gandhi should continue to be held in detention even if he starved to death, deferred to the urgency of the Viceroy's insistence on jurisdiction[1]
  • January 1942 61 Kenyan shillings per kilo between January[22]
  • January 1942 January, so they have the advantage of controlling for[22]
  • January 1942 Figure 1 describes the variation in rice prices across Bengal between January 1942 and August[16]
  • January 1942 In France, ice-covered rivers were the most spectacular aspect of the 'big winter' of 1708-09, while in mid-January 1740 one could walk across Ireland's biggest lack for miles – an unprecedented feat[17]
  • January 1942 The number of births recorded there dropped from 4,229 in January and 2,883 in February to a monthly average of only 86 in the last four months of the year[17]
  • January 1942 105 to 125 percent between January 1942 and January 1944 [23]
  • January 1942 January 121 93 108 114 108 95 108[7]
  • January 1942 January 100 100 100 100 100[7]
  • January 1942 ' jf) As it happens, even the request for permission to import 600,000 tons of wheat was turned down in London on 16 January, only a small part of it being met[7]
  • January 1942 56 The partial crop failure in 1940 - 1941 had already depleted most reserves, Husain argues, and most people began eating the rice crop of 1941 -42 in January 1942 , rather than in April as was customary[8]
  • January 1942 Japan took over Burma in an intense campaign that began in mid-January and ended with the conquest of Rangoon and northern Burma by mid-May 1942 [8]
  • January 1942 In the Indian Ocean alone from January 1942 to May 1943 , the Axis powers sank 230 British and Allied merchant ships totaling 873,000 tons, in other words, a substantial boat every other day[8]
  • February 1942 Nothing was available {or the last two or three months of the consumption year 1941 —42,(January-- February-March 1942 )comlast
  • February 1942 The Fourth Price Control Conference met on 6th/i'th February 1942 comlast
  • February 1942 When the Fourth Price Control Conference met in February 1942 , the invasion of Burma had already begun and the dangers were becoming more obviouscomm-92ff
  • February 1942 The Fourth Price Control Conference met on 6th/i'th February 1942 hussain_minute
  • February 1942 "ly in February 1942 IARIHDD8-001362
  • February 1942 February 62 22 +40 28 60 -32IARIHDD8-001362
  • February 1942 The immediate result was a resumption of the upward movement in prices which, sj)arting in February, 1942 , had gained momentum in May, and had been temporarily arrested during: September and OctoberIARIHDD8-001362
  • February 1942 The agents were not successful in purchasing the quantities required and the system was abandoned on the 17th FebruaryIARIHDD8-001362
  • February 1942 The quantity purchased between the 10th January and the 17th February was only about 2,200 tonsIARIHDD8-001362
  • February 1942 He bought only about 3,000 tons tietween the 18th February and the 11th MarchIARIHDD8-001362
  • February 1942 the llosing months of 1942 and in January and February 19~3, arrivals of :vhe!lR Into Bengal were much below requirements and were causmg great anxIetyIARIHDD8-001362
  • February 1942 ryFebruary- March 1942 )IARIHDD8-001362
  • February 1942 21 The Fourth Price Control Conference met on 6th/7th February 1942 IARIHDD8-001362
  • February 1942 Procurement operations in December and January had not been SllccessfuL Another attempt was made on the 9th of January but abandoned on the 17th of FebruaryIARIHDD8-001362
  • February 1942 But how much was actually harvested? How much was destroyed in the virulent Brown Stain plant disease that ravaged Bengal during these years? How much was destroyed or confi scated in the "rice denial" policy that started in January-February 1942 ?review_Structural_Violence2
  • February 1942 The result was the recruitment of a number of 'special categories' of medical officers, which included, among other things, the recruitment of European doctors in India and Britain (October 1940 ), the transfer of assistant-surgeons in the IMD to the IMS under the emergency commissioning scheme (June 1941 ), the introduction of medical graduates in state-managed and company-managed railways(October 1941 ),theemployment of specialists on special terms(January 1942 ),the introduction of women medical practitioners (January 1942 ) and the transfer of civilian antimalaria officers to military duty(February 1942 )[14]
  • February 1942 Scarcity was also declared in Karmala, Madha, Pandharpur, Sangola andMalsiras talukas ofSholapur district from 9February 1942 whichwasextended totheSholapur taluka from 18January 1943 (the declarations were only withdrawn in January 1944 )[14]
  • February 1942 On l5th February Singapore fell[15]
  • February 1942 Fazlul Huq said in an Assembly debate on 15 February 1942 that he and his cabinet colleagues were aware of the hardships caused by the scheme[10]
  • February 1942 From February 1942 onwards, British offi cials in India became fearful of a possible Japanese attack from Burma and initiated a withdrawal of government offi ces from the coastal and eastern areas of Bengal[21]
  • February 1942 160 Surrender came on the afternoon of February 15th, 1942 [1]
  • February 1942 In February exports increased again to 60,000 tons, in March to 61,000 tons, and in April, 66,000 tons were exported[1]
  • February 1942 Calcutta Corporation workers, whose strike in March of 1940 for wartime "dearness allowances" had ended in police firings and minimal wage concessions, again threatened a strike for access to subsidized foodstuffs in February 1942 [1]
  • February 1942 In January, 4,400 thousand workers of the Hastings Jute Mills went on strike, and in February 15,000 workers of the Andrew Yule Mills walked out, demanding "dearness allowances" and preferential access to rice[1]
  • February 1942 "34 The aman crop, harvested between the end of November and the beginning of February, for this reason, was desperately anticipated in the "starvation" months of August, September, October and November[1]
  • February 1942 24 Janayuddha, February 17, 1942 "Banglar Grame Grame Khanna-Samasya"[1]
  • February 1942 27 Janayuddha, February 3, 1942 "Pach Hajar Mon Koyla Aday"[1]
  • February 1942 In a third and final correspondence to Linlithgow before beginning his fast, Gandhi again cited the "privations of the millions due to India-wide scarcity," and the administrative injustice leading to the same, as grounds for carrying out a "fast according to capacity" beginning on February 9th[1]
  • February 1942 After the flurry of activity leading up to the fast, Gandhi's hunger-strike began on the 10th of February with little fanfare[1]
  • February 1942 The number of births recorded there dropped from 4,229 in January and 2,883 in February to a monthly average of only 86 in the last four months of the year[17]
  • February 1942 In February, however, the nawab announced that estimated rice production in 1942 /3 (6[23]
  • February 1942 Beginning with descriptions of'hunger marches organised by communists' on 28 December 1942 , a selection of the reports include: 'people having to go without food' (10 February); 'indications of distress among local people' (27 February) ; 'acute distress prevails' (26 March) : 'crime against property increasing, and paddy looting cases have become frequent' (28 March) ; 'major economic catas trophe apprehended' (27 April); 'economic conditions approach a crisis' (13 May);[7]
  • February 1942 February 112 93 108 127 108 95 108[7]
  • February 1942 February 100 100 100 100 100[7]
  • March 1942 Nothing was available {or the last two or three months of the consumption year 1941 —42,(January-- February-March 1942 )comlast
  • March 1942 This crop would normally have come into use from March—April, but as the previous crop was very short and had been consumed by the end of the year 1941 , the new crop was drawn upon most probably from about the beginning of January 1942 ; It would have sufficed for twelve months, icomlast
  • March 1942 In March 1942 , the Central ProvinceS, JP after a scramble for rice, had stopped export of foodgrains to places outside the 7 provincecomlast
  • March 1942 By the end of December 1942 distress had already appeared and by March 1948 yndespread famine was anticipated by district oflicialscomm-92ff
  • March 1942 This crop would normally have come into use from March—April, but as the previous crop was very short and had been consumed by the end of the year 1941 , the new crop was drawn upon most probably from about the beginning of January 1942 ; It would have sufficed for twelve months, ihussain_minute
  • March 1942 In March 1942 , the Central ProvinceS, JP after a scramble for rice, had stopped export of foodgrains to places outside the 7 provincehussain_minute
  • March 1942 March 60 31 +29 41 6IARIHDD8-001362
  • March 1942 He bought only about 3,000 tons tietween the 18th February and the 11th MarchIARIHDD8-001362
  • March 1942 )413 tl10 total stocks of rice held by the Uhmnbe,r and the employer!:!' orgunirMttiol1s COlllleetod with tho Ohamber exceeded two weeks' supply only once aIld that WHt:i in the month 01 MarchIARIHDD8-001362
  • March 1942 ryFebruary- March 1942 )IARIHDD8-001362
  • March 1942 In March 1942 , the Central Pl'Ovinees, after a scramble for rice, had stopped export of foodgrains to places outside the provinceIARIHDD8-001362
  • March 1942 By the beginning of March stocks were down to such a low level in Calcutta that it looked as if the city must starve within a fortnight unless large supplies arrived quicklyIARIHDD8-001362
  • March 1942 Price control was abrogated on the 11th of March and then the Food Purchase Officer was able to obtain 17,000 tons from 12th to 31st MarchIARIHDD8-001362
  • March 1942 Early in March the Government of India started their 'rescue plan' which was to obtain 60,000 tons within three weeks to a month, but sucgeeded in obtaining only half the required quantityIARIHDD8-001362
  • March 1942 XLV (March 2007)ogradac_article_pub_063
  • March 1942 XLV (March 2007) 1 BACK-TO-BACK HARVEST SHORTFALLSogradac_article_pub_063
  • March 1942 Furthermore, Burma fell to the Japanese in March 1942 which cut off rice imports from there__lecturenotesfamine
  • March 1942 In March 1942 , therefore, the Indian Government's Labour Department set up Provincial Labour Supply Committees in these provinces, which were responsible for regularizing employment levels[9]
  • March 1942 Amery, Secretary of State for India, Government of Britain, 31 March 1942 , LIWSIIII 242, Oriental and India Office Collections, British Library, London, UK[14]
  • March 1942 The Japanese occupation of Burma in March 1942 cut off this supply, but more importantly had a vastly disproportionate effect on food prices in a disorderly market[3]
  • March 1942 The price of rice was up 33% in September 1940 and 69% in September 1941 on its August 1939 level and in early March 1942 the index stood at 59[3]
  • March 1942 50 The fall of Burma did cut off Burmese supplies and diverted the demand from its rice markets in southern India and Ceylon on to Bengal, but the scale of these shifts was puny by comparison to the price-hike set off by speculative tendencies in the rice market after March 1942 [3]
  • March 1942 There were air raids on Rangoon on 23rd January 1942 and on 7th March Rangoon fell[15]
  • March 1942 From October 1942 he exercised an overall control of the relief operation, visiting and touring the affected area once a fortnight until March, when he relinquished his extra role as additional commissioner, Presidency and Burdwan divisions (Kar 1983; B[18]
  • March 1942 It was also March when, perhaps coincidentally, N[18]
  • March 1942 Rangoon fell to Japan in March 1942 [24]
  • March 1942 On the 28th March, 1942 , I submitted to a high official in the Government of India a definite scheme for the survey of paddy 12 Report, p[25]
  • March 1942 In February exports increased again to 60,000 tons, in March to 61,000 tons, and in April, 66,000 tons were exported[1]
  • March 1942 Calcutta Corporation workers, whose strike in March of 1940 for wartime "dearness allowances" had ended in police firings and minimal wage concessions, again threatened a strike for access to subsidized foodstuffs in February 1942 [1]
  • March 1942 12 On March 3rd of 1942 , the Government of India, fully cognizant of mounting difficulties, advised the Bengal Chamber of Commerce that "industrial concerns should adopt the practice of making themselves responsible for feeding their employees[1]
  • March 1942 Beginning in March this appeal was broadened to include the general public and ordinary citizens were also advised by the A[1]
  • March 1942 Sir Stanford Cripps, sanctioned by the House of Commons in London, arrived in Delhi in March to attempt to broker a political solution to the impasse between India and Britain[1]
  • March 1942 A grand charity ball was announced to take place at Viceroy's House in New Delhi during the visit of Sir Stafford Cripps in March 1942 [1]
  • March 1942 Sometime toward the end of March, Governor Herbert was instructed through central government channels to begin a scorched earth campaign in the province[1]
  • March 1942 83 Harijan, March 22, 1942 , p[1]
  • March 1942 In the March 22nd edition of 1942 , sub-titled "Scorched Earth," Gandhi reminded his readers, "India is not fighting[1]
  • March 1942 His appointment as emissary to negotiate a political settlement in March of 1942 was further evidence of a lack of parliamentary confidence in Churchill's own imperial acumen[1]
  • March 1942 10 Fearful as ever of how defeat would be received in India, a news black-out was imposed towards the end of March[1]
  • March 1942 Rangoon, the Burmese capital, had fallen to Japanese forces in March 1942 , and in the following months fears grew that the Japanese would soon invade Bengal[13]
  • March 1942 At the height of the Great Leap Forward famine during the summer of 1960, 'eight of Shantung's twelve rivers had no water in them, and for forty days in March and June, it was possible to wade across the lower reaches of the Yellow River'[17]
  • March 1942 From the end of March to the middle of April, 300,000 persons worked daily cleaning up the city[17]
  • March 1942 the Burmese capital, had fallen to Japanese forces in March 1942 , and in the following months fears grew that the Japanese, even though already militarily overstretched, would soon invade Bengal[17]
  • March 1942 Rangoon had fallen to the Japanese in March 1942 [26]
  • March 1942 By March/April the situation was already critical both in coastal Midnapur, where a tsunami had struck in October, and in eastern Bengal[26]
  • March 1942 Relief works began, albeit on a small scale, in Dacca in March, and food rations were supplied to government employees at controlled prices[26]
  • March 1942 The Burmese capital Rangoon had fallen to Japanese forces in March 1942 [23]
  • March 1942 "72 In March the nawab revealed that Bengal was also short of other essential foodstuffs, "namely wheat, dal [dried legumes], mustard, sugar, and salt[23]
  • March 1942 "92 Prices then settled briefly, but the removal of price controls and the Nawab of Dacca's declaration of a food shortage (see above) caused them to take off again in March[23]
  • March 1942 In late March the price reached Rs[23]
  • March 1942 Beginning with descriptions of'hunger marches organised by communists' on 28 December 1942 , a selection of the reports include: 'people having to go without food' (10 February); 'indications of distress among local people' (27 February) ; 'acute distress prevails' (26 March) : 'crime against property increasing, and paddy looting cases have become frequent' (28 March) ; 'major economic catas trophe apprehended' (27 April); 'economic conditions approach a crisis' (13 May);[7]
  • March 1942 March 121 100 108 152 108 95 108[7]
  • March 1942 March 100 100 100 100 100[7]
  • March 1942 Third, speculative withdrawal and panic purchase of rice stocks were encouraged by administrative chaos, § especially the inept handling of three procurement schemes, tried and hurriedly abandoned between December and March, ending with the sudden abolition of price control in the wholesale market on 11 March[7]
  • April 1942 This crop would normally have come into use from March—April, but as the previous crop was very short and had been consumed by the end of the year 1941 , the new crop was drawn upon most probably from about the beginning of January 1942 ; It would have sufficed for twelve months, icomlast
  • April 1942 When the Food Production Conference met in April 1942 thew-4 question of barriers came up for a good deal of discussioncomlast
  • April 1942 In April 1942 , the Government of India convened a conference for examining the problems of food production, and the question of the arrangements necessary for the maintenance of the distribution of supplies between provinces and states was discussed at this ionferencecomm-92ff
  • April 1942 This crop would normally have come into use from March—April, but as the previous crop was very short and had been consumed by the end of the year 1941 , the new crop was drawn upon most probably from about the beginning of January 1942 ; It would have sufficed for twelve months, ihussain_minute
  • April 1942 When the Food Production Conference met in April 1942 thew-4 question of barriers came up for a good deal of discussionhussain_minute
  • April 1942 till the end of April 1942 , that the Wheat Control Order was issued regulating the rajl-borne movernent of wheat from producing provinoes to consuming areasIARIHDD8-001362
  • April 1942 By April 1942 , however, the price had reMhed the same level as m Apnl 1941 IARIHDD8-001362
  • April 1942 April IARIHDD8-001362
  • April 1942 At the end ot December 1941 , a Wheat Commissioner for lndia WAS appointed, and on the 30th April 1942 , the Wheat Control Order was notifiedIARIHDD8-001362
  • April 1942 The latest completed figures for any district were those of April 194IARIHDD8-001362
  • April 1942 WD:en the Food Production Conference meil in April 1942 the question of bamers came up for Q good deal of discussionIARIHDD8-001362
  • April 1942 titled the 'weekly epidemiological telegrams', was introduced in April 1942 to keep an eye on the progress of these diseases in eastern India[14]
  • April 1942 " The telegram, dated 24 April 1942 , declared that 'The Directors of Public Health send, in their weekly telegrams, only the total figures for their respective provinces for each of the diseases cholera, smallpox and plague; but, in view of the continuous flow of evacuees from Burma, the Directors of Public Health in Bengal and Assam are supplying, at our request, figures for districts in order to enable usto keep a watch on the progress of the epidemics[14]
  • April 1942 19 Note from the office of the Public Health Commissioner, Government oflndia to the Department of Education, Health and Lands, Government of India, 25 April 1942 , Education, Health and Lands Department File44-1 0/42-H, National Archives, India[14]
  • April 1942 The 'denial policy', which was put in place in April 1942 , coupled with the October cyclone, reduced the direct entitlement to food-grains of many peasant labourers[3]
  • April 1942 On 5th and 6th April Ceylon and Eastern India were bombed[15]
  • April 1942 From April, in districts unaffected by natural disaster and despite the decision not to "declare" a famine, the usual techniquescash for loans, doles, and payment for test relief-were employed, but not on the scale required by the Famine Code[18]
  • April 1942 14 BL, OIOC, IOR, R/3/2/27, 1941 –42, Note on Conference Held at the Government House, 14 April 1942 , Defence of Eastern Bengal and Calcutta—Plans and Proposals[10]
  • April 1942 5, 'Army Proposal of 23 April 1942 Submitted to Chief Civil Defence Commissioner, Bengal'; Famine Enquiry Commission ( 1944 : 26–27 and 171); Mss[10]
  • April 1942 Local inflation started in south-eastern Bengal in April 1942 , the month of the introduction of evacuation and boat denial policy and it increased in the following months[24]
  • April 1942 – (2013): "The Imperial Roots of Hunger" in Farms, Feasts, Famines, Himal, 17 April[21]
  • April 1942 In February exports increased again to 60,000 tons, in March to 61,000 tons, and in April, 66,000 tons were exported[1]
  • April 1942 On April 24th the Bengal National Chamber of Commerce sent a memorandum to the Government of Bengal protesting the[1]
  • April 1942 On April 2nd, after plans for "rice denial" had been leaked in the press, Governor Herbert stood before the Bengal Legislative Assembly and confirmed Government's intention to remove all "surplus" stocks of grain from the coastal region[1]
  • April 1942 66 "Army Proposal of 23 April submitted to Chief Civil Defense Commissioner, Bengal" in Pinnell Papers, p[1]
  • April 1942 85 Harijan, April 19, 1942 , p[1]
  • April 1942 The Fifth Price Control Conference was held in April, only two months after the Fourth Price Control Conference had failed to stem the rise of prices[1]
  • April 1942 After the failure of the Cripps Mission in April, the Secretary of State for India, Leo Amery and Viceroy Linlithgow, along with the War Cabinet in London, waited apprehensively for Congress's next move[1]
  • April 1942 A meeting of the War Cabinet was held in London, and at length it was agreed that in lieu of the 600,000 tons of grains requested by the Viceroy, a maximum of 130,000 tons might be made available by the end of April[1]
  • April 1942 per bag between August 1980 and April 1983, the coefficient of[22]
  • April 1942 In April 1942 , the Japanese sank several merchantmen in the Bay of Bengal, as well as a destroyer, and they bombed Calcutta in December 1942 [13]
  • April 1942 From the end of March to the middle of April, 300,000 persons worked daily cleaning up the city[17]
  • April 1942 In April 1942 the Japanese sank a destroyer and several merchantmen in the Bay of Bengal, and they bombed Calcutta in December 1942 [17]
  • April 1942 By March/April the situation was already critical both in coastal Midnapur, where a tsunami had struck in October, and in eastern Bengal[26]
  • April 1942 In early April rice cost Rs[23]
  • April 1942 93 At the end of April Fazlul Huq challenged his successor to bring down the price of rice, since "if it was the fault of his [i[23]
  • April 1942 Beginning with descriptions of'hunger marches organised by communists' on 28 December 1942 , a selection of the reports include: 'people having to go without food' (10 February); 'indications of distress among local people' (27 February) ; 'acute distress prevails' (26 March) : 'crime against property increasing, and paddy looting cases have become frequent' (28 March) ; 'major economic catas trophe apprehended' (27 April); 'economic conditions approach a crisis' (13 May);[7]
  • April 1942 April 109 88 113 145 88 88 88[7]
  • April 1942 April 100 100 100 100 100[7]
  • April 1942 56 The partial crop failure in 1940 - 1941 had already depleted most reserves, Husain argues, and most people began eating the rice crop of 1941 -42 in January 1942 , rather than in April as was customary[8]
  • June 1942 The Government 0! Dew—When the price of rice rose steeply in May and June 1942 ', the Government of Bengal endeavoured to bring the situation under control by the prohibition of exports and by fixing statutory maximum pricescomm-92ff
  • June 1942 The Government of BengaL—When the price of rice rose steeply in May and June 1942 , the Government of Bengal endeavoured to bring the situation under-control by the prohibition of exports and by fixing statutory maximum pricescomm100-150
  • June 1942 & imp~e:ment followed, and during May and June, bhe· price of wheat! rIARIHDD8-001362
  • June 1942 On the 1st June 1942 , exports of paddy and rice to places out,side the province were prohibited except under permit, and in September 1942 an official purchasing agency was set up to undertake all buying for exportIARIHDD8-001362
  • June 1942 In June 1942 the line was adjusted so as not to interfere with the free movement of boatsIARIHDD8-001362
  • June 1942 JuneIARIHDD8-001362
  • June 1942 June J942, and the Provincial Government issued an Order fixing m~lximuru prices with effect from the 1st JulyIARIHDD8-001362
  • June 1942 -When the price of rice rose steeply in May and June 1942 , the Government of Bengal endeavoured to bring the situation under control by' the prohibition of exports aIARIHDD8-001362
  • June 1942 June • 152'3 207 214 166-5 212IARIHDD8-001362
  • June 1942 In June 1942 , the Bengal Government[27]
  • June 1942 In June 1942 , the Bengal Government issued an order fixing maximum prices for rice[27]
  • June 1942 Laithwaite, Private Secretary to the Viceroy of India, 12 June 1942 , LIWS/l/866, Oriental and India Office Collections, British Library, London, UK[9]
  • June 1942 Singh, Deputy Commissioner, Santhal Parganas, Government of Bihar, to the Commissioner, Bhagalpur Division, Government of Bihar, 5June 1942 , War Series Files 29(45)/ 1942 , Bihar State Archives, Patna, Bihar, India[9]
  • June 1942 KGokhale, Commissioner, BhagalpurDivision, Government of Bihar, 5 June 19~2, War Series Files 29(45)/ 1942 , Bihar State Archives, Patna, Bihar, India[9]
  • June 1942 Lee, Commissioner, Chota Nagpur Division, Government of Bihar, 8 June 1942 , War Series Files 29 (45)/ 1942 , Bihar State Archives, Patna, Bihar, India[9]
  • June 1942 The result was the recruitment of a number of 'special categories' of medical officers, which included, among other things, the recruitment of European doctors in India and Britain (October 1940 ), the transfer of assistant-surgeons in the IMD to the IMS under the emergency commissioning scheme (June 1941 ), the introduction of medical graduates in state-managed and company-managed railways(October 1941 ),theemployment of specialists on special terms(January 1942 ),the introduction of women medical practitioners (January 1942 ) and the transfer of civilian antimalaria officers to military duty(February 1942 )[14]
  • June 1942 20 Note from the office of the Public Health Commissioner, Government of India, 9 June 1942 , Education, Health and Lands Department File 44-10/42-H, National Archives, India[14]
  • June 1942 An attempt by the government to put a ceiling on the maximum price of rice in June 1942 proved abortive since it had no control over supplies: a ban on rice exports from the province in July 1942 was rather more effective[3]
  • June 1942 However, if one refers to the original source, one gets a very different story, that a very small quantity of rice was moved from a surplus area to a deficit area, in a year with a record crop, and that this was done in May and June 1942 , well before the cyclone[15]
  • June 1942 1 June 1942 3027 0 0 1649 0 14 4098[15]
  • June 1942 In June it fixed a maximum price for rice on the Calcutta market, but prices had already exceeded this level by the time it was implemented on lst July[15]
  • June 1942 Even though test relief works were started in the second half of June 1942 in several areas in Tippera and Noakhali districts, the standard rates of wages were now too low to meet the minimum needs of subsistence[10]
  • June 1942 file 4C-8/42: Deputy Director, Debt conciliation, Burdwan Div, to Assistant Secy to GoB, CCRI dept, 14 June 1942 [2]
  • June 1942 Another modification came in June 1942 when it became apparent to Pinnell that the so called "inner boat route[24]
  • June 1942 The Public Health Commissioner for India in his report for 1943 and 1944 gave the recorded numbers of deaths of "destitutes" in Calcutta - "those persons who died and whose bodies were disposed of by public arrangement" - as follows: 3,000 deaths between June 1942 and May 1943 ; and 19,000 deaths between June 1943 and May 1944 [19]
  • June 1942 Hoarding, with official sanction, now began on a large scale, and by June the price of rice had risen an additional 30%[1]
  • June 1942 71 WBSA, Hone Confidential, "War Diary for May-June 1942 ," file W-77/42[1]
  • June 1942 81 WBSA, Home Confidential, "War Diary for May-June 1942 ," file W-77/42[1]
  • June 1942 88 WBSA, Home Political, "War Diary: May-June 1942 ," file W-77/42[1]
  • June 1942 89 WBSA, Home Political, "War Diary: May-June 1942 ," file W-77/42[1]
  • June 1942 Huq himself noted that although denial purchases were to have ceased in June, they continued well after that date[1]
  • June 1942 famine --1693-4 and July 1708 to June 1710 --on the[22]
  • June 1942 At the height of the Great Leap Forward famine during the summer of 1960, 'eight of Shantung's twelve rivers had no water in them, and for forty days in March and June, it was possible to wade across the lower reaches of the Yellow River'[17]
  • June 1942 They range from references to thirty inches of rain at Hong Kong over five days in June 1959 to a hurricane in July 1960 that ruined 777,000 mu (or about 130,000 acres) of crops in Shandung province; from accounts of drought in northern China which in 1960 resulted in eight of the twelve main rivers being dry for part of the year and, for the first time in living memory, it being possible to wade across the Yellow River[17]
  • June 1942 Starvation and exchange entitlements 37 'bands of people moving about in search of rice' (12 June) ; 'deaths in streets' (12 June) ; 'town filled with thousands of beggars who are starving' (17 July); 'passing through the most acute stage of distress' (10 August); 'deaths still occurring' (9 September); 'disposal of dead bodies [7]
  • June 1942 As far as fish is concerned, after an early decline it seems to recover in the middle of Phase I (June-September 1942 ) then to slump again[7]
  • June 1942 The temporary recovery was partly due to seasonal factors in the catching of fish [see June-September prices for other years, in Agro-Economic Research Centre for East India (1960), p[7]
  • June 1942 June 98 89 169 160 88 131 88[7]
  • June 1942 June 119 110 140 92 118[7]
  • June 1942 The summer of 1942 , however, was worse: the monsoon faded after early June, and drought ruined the district's kharif crops and prevented the sowing of rabi crops[8]
  • July 1942 , till the end of December 1942 , and possibly even beyond that period with some efiort, but during this year" various unforeseen factors adversely affected the position: (i) A quantity of rice was exported (187,500 tons in the year, of which 184,618- tons were exported between January and July 1942 )comlast
  • July 1942 , till the end of December 1942 , and possibly even beyond that period with some efiort, but during this year" various unforeseen factors adversely affected the position: (i) A quantity of rice was exported (187,500 tons in the year, of which 184,618- tons were exported between January and July 1942 )hussain_minute
  • July 1942 con~e1'en(le on JulyIARIHDD8-001362
  • July 1942 In t,he beginning of 1942 , prices of rice began to rise in Calcutta and, as we shull see later, the Government of Bengal decided to fix maximum prices with effect Lrom the 1st July 1942 IARIHDD8-001362
  • July 1942 July 1942 IARIHDD8-001362
  • July 1942 PurchAsos Oll 0, smail Roale ('ontinued for some tIme lOllg€'r and finally cenr::;t'd ill July when dirl:'ctions to !ibi~ effect were issuedIARIHDD8-001362
  • July 1942 A sharp ris~ oc~rred towards the end 01: May and in July the price was RaIARIHDD8-001362
  • July 1942 Between July (lJ::!IARIHDD8-001362
  • July 1942 JulyIARIHDD8-001362
  • July 1942 Government in July, the exact dnte being th"l~tlJIARIHDD8-001362
  • July 1942 In ,July and AugusIARIHDD8-001362
  • July 1942 8 per maund by July 1942 , even though there was no question at that time of the province being short of riceIARIHDD8-001362
  • July 1942 In July 1942 , a Civil Supplies Commissioner for rice and othor commodiities was appointedIARIHDD8-001362
  • July 1942 June J942, and the Provincial Government issued an Order fixing m~lximuru prices with effect from the 1st JulyIARIHDD8-001362
  • July 1942 s in Bengal, however, -had been affected and prices were well above the maxima prescribed by Government in JulyIARIHDD8-001362
  • July 1942 Experience during the months of July and August hRd shown, first, that reliance could not be placed on the trade to bring supplies to Oalcutta at prices considered reasonable by Government; secondly, th'1t the use of "denial" stocks had helped; and thirdly, that the absence of adequate supplies had made it impossible to enforce maximum pricesIARIHDD8-001362
  • July 1942 (i) A quantity of rice was exported (187,500 tons in the year, of which 184,618 tons were exported between January and July le4~)IARIHDD8-001362
  • July 1942 An attempt by the government to put a ceiling on the maximum price of rice in June 1942 proved abortive since it had no control over supplies: a ban on rice exports from the province in July 1942 was rather more effective[3]
  • July 1942 "At this point [July 1942 ] the stocks of denial[15]
  • July 1942 In June it fixed a maximum price for rice on the Calcutta market, but prices had already exceeded this level by the time it was implemented on lst July[15]
  • July 1942 The Government reacted by stopping exports, except under permit, from l6th July, and by seizing and distributing stocks[15]
  • July 1942 No price was available for July 1942 , therefore we resorted to interpolation[12]
  • July 1942 However, it does not seem that this took place before July-August 1942 when the time for aush plantation was over and time for preparing fields for aman also passed[24]
  • July 1942 Conference held at Government House, 3 July 1942 , in NAB, Rev dept (Land), "B[24]
  • July 1942 Between July and October 1942 I wrote several letters to Bengal ofi'icials urging to the best of my ability the immediate taking up of a rice census in the province but to no avail[25]
  • July 1942 The signs of famine became visible about July 1942 , and its worst effects in the form of epidemics continued until December, 1944 [19]
  • July 1942 No quotation was available for July 1942 [19]
  • July 1942 In Bengal there are three season of rice paddy production: the boro crop planted in the winter and harvested in spring, the aus crop, planted in early spring and harvested in July or August, and the aman crop, planted in late spring and harvested in the winter months[1]
  • July 1942 As late as the first week of July, in fact, a secret conference on the administration of denial policy was held and the question of "evasion" was addressed[1]
  • July 1942 92 Linlithgow adopted this terminology to refer to the July 10th resolution[1]
  • July 1942 Though the All-India Congress Working Committee's resolutions of July 14th and August 8th are most often cited as the signal events that led to the "Open Rebellion" of 1942 , the strategies of the colonial state were, in fact, forged in reference to an earlier resolution - that of July 10th, the "denial resolution[1]
  • July 1942 On the 10th of July the Working Committee met at Wardha, and on the same day passed a resolution that was subsequently published in the nationalist media[1]
  • July 1942 The War Cabinet convened on the 13th of July[1]
  • July 1942 "100 Linlithgow, in response, noted the "regrettable spirit of defeatism" that had gripped the country, and again argued that a militant response to the July 10th resolution would only inflame Nationalist sentiment and play into Gandhi's hands[1]
  • July 1942 Amery deferred to Linlithgow for the time being, but the July 10th resolution would remain central to the colonial response to Congress agitation[1]
  • July 1942 On the 14th of July the "general resolution" came out[1]
  • July 1942 In a telegram to Linlithgow on the 16th of July Amery adopted a dismissive attitude toward this "main resolution," while again pressing his concerns about the earlier, "denial resolution[1]
  • July 1942 " It might be the case, Amery wrote, that the main resolution would necessitate no immediate action, but that of July 10th, he again insisted, could easily be understood to be in direct breach of Defense of India Rules 38 (1) (a), dealing with acts "prejudicial" to the authority of His Majesty's Government[1]
  • July 1942 "102 Linlithgow again argued for restraint, finding some encouragement in the "conciliatory" tone of the July 14th resolution, however "blatantly hypocritical" its demands[1]
  • July 1942 103 He also saw a possibility that the July14th resolution could be used to drive a wedge between religious communities, thus isolating Congress in its claims[1]
  • July 1942 105 Linlithgow to Herbert, July 16, 1942 [1]
  • July 1942 Consulting with his own legal council, the Viceroy confirmed Amery's opinion that the Defense of India Rules could be invoked against Gandhi and the Working Committee in response to both resolutions (that of July 10th and that of July 14th[1]
  • July 1942 "109 As such, the resolution of July 10th fell foul not only of the Defense of India Rules, but also of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, which gave the colonial government grounds to declare the Congress as a whole, not merely the Working Committee, an unlawful association,[1]
  • July 1942 The resolution of July 10th was thus central to the three-staged plan that Linlithgow developed to deal with the "open rebellion," and the proposed resistance to "denial" that this resolution suggested, central to the brutality with which the "Quit India" movement would be dealt[1]
  • July 1942 110 This plan is outlined in: Government of India, Home Department to Secretary of State, July 24, 1942 [1]
  • July 1942 115 Azad calls the July 14th resolution a "first draft" of the August 8th resolution, Ibid, p[1]
  • July 1942 "114 The terms of the resolution were similar to those put forward in the July 14th resolution115 and the nature of the movement that would follow if Congress demands were not met, remained vague[1]
  • July 1942 A statutory ceiling on rice and paddy prices was established on July 1st, and exports from the province were proscribed later in the month, but prices were already moving too fast for government to keep step[1]
  • July 1942 The controlled price announced on July 1st was already below prevailing market rates, which drew protests from stockists who would be operating at a loss for recent purchases if they sold their stocks[1]
  • July 1942 Pinnell, was appointed Director of Civil Supplies and large purchases were made on government account from Birbhum district, north of Calcutta, at prices well above the price ceiling fixed by Government in July[1]
  • July 1942 With prices failing to stabilize even after controls were announced in July and Japan within striking distance, anxieties proliferated[1]
  • July 1942 Appointed to the Executive Council in July 1942 , he was the long- time Chairman and Senior Partner of Bird & Co[1]
  • July 1942 The Communist Party, legalized in July of 1942 by the Government of India for their support of the war effort, was the only organization that seems to have even noticed, or at least taken seriously, Gandhi's warnings - even as developments in Bengal were reaching a critical stage[1]
  • July 1942 famine --1693-4 and July 1708 to June 1710 --on the[22]
  • July 1942 Rice prices, July 1942 –Dec[13]
  • July 1942 Bengal rice prices, July 1942 -Dec[17]
  • July 1942 Rice Prices July 1942 -Dec[17]
  • July 1942 They range from references to thirty inches of rain at Hong Kong over five days in June 1959 to a hurricane in July 1960 that ruined 777,000 mu (or about 130,000 acres) of crops in Shandung province; from accounts of drought in northern China which in 1960 resulted in eight of the twelve main rivers being dry for part of the year and, for the first time in living memory, it being possible to wade across the Yellow River[17]
  • July 1942 Between 1950 and 1988 (a period for which data are available for nearly all Chinese weather stations), July 1959 was the hottest July in Zheng Zhou (Henan), Chong Qing (Sichuan), and Wuhan (Hebei); August 1959 was the wettest August in Cheng Du (Sichuan) and in Lan Zhou (Gansu); while August 1960 saw hardly any rain in AnQing (Anhui), and likewise for Gui Yang (Guizhou) in July-August 1959[17]
  • July 1942 Starvation and exchange entitlements 37 'bands of people moving about in search of rice' (12 June) ; 'deaths in streets' (12 June) ; 'town filled with thousands of beggars who are starving' (17 July); 'passing through the most acute stage of distress' (10 August); 'deaths still occurring' (9 September); 'disposal of dead bodies [7]
  • July 1942 July 92 82 165 150 82 124 82[7]
  • July 1942 July 130 130 180 100 138[7]
  • July 1942 Madras and the central government agreed to provide substantial supplies for Travancore, but could not do so: from July 1942 to April 1943 the state received only 88,000 tons of the 300,000 tons promised[8]
  • August 1942 By August, however, it had reached and passed it and a flourishing bl8IARIHDD8-001362
  • August 1942 In August 1942 tIARIHDD8-001362
  • August 1942 In August 1942 , ill iI lctte,r addl'csRcd to th · Chamber, the Governllll:'nt of Bengnl c1escribed their attitude to the scheme in th" following termR:IARIHDD8-001362
  • August 1942 We have described already how during AugustSeptember, 1942 , when supplies disappeared from the market in Calcutta, stocks ()f "denial" rice were moved in and distributedIARIHDD8-001362
  • August 1942 August, 1942 13IARIHDD8-001362
  • August 1942 Experience during the months of July and August hRd shown, first, that reliance could not be placed on the trade to bring supplies to Oalcutta at prices considered reasonable by Government; secondly, th'1t the use of "denial" stocks had helped; and thirdly, that the absence of adequate supplies had made it impossible to enforce maximum pricesIARIHDD8-001362
  • August 1942 The anxiety about the lack of rain had been relieved in August, and by the end of September and the beginning of Oct;ober an average aman crop seemed assuredIARIHDD8-001362
  • August 1942 Finally, reference must be made to the political disturbances which started in August 1942 IARIHDD8-001362
  • August 1942 Week ending 19th AugustIARIHDD8-001362
  • August 1942 Figure 1 describes the variation in rice prices across Bengal between January 1942 and Augustogradac_article_pub_063
  • August 1942 Bengal's elected Chief Minister Abul Kasem Fazlul Huq complained strongly about the effects of this policy and the dangers of famine in August 1942 review_Structural_Violence2
  • August 1942 And yet, most studies dealing with the nature of the conflict in India have tended to concentrate on specific aspects, namely, the main battles, the strategies of Subhash Chandra Bose and the organization of the Indian National Army, the 'Quit India' movement of August 1942 , and the famine in Bengal[9]
  • August 1942 The price of rice was up 33% in September 1940 and 69% in September 1941 on its August 1939 level and in early March 1942 the index stood at 59[3]
  • August 1942 55 From August 1942 government employees and industrial workers were being provided rice at subsidized prices[3]
  • August 1942 Pinnell, who was director of the DCS from August 1942 to April 1943 and prepared much of the Government of Bengal's submission to the FIC; (2) those records of the FIC preserved in the Nanavati Papers; (3) the recordso f the Bengal Relief Committee; (4) the CPI newspaper, People'sW ar; (5) the nationalist newspaper, Amrit Bazaar Patrika; and (6) the papers, memoirs, and recollections of officials[18]
  • August 1942 The three tidal waves that smashed the seawalls of Midnapore on the night of October 16/17, 1942 , flooding much of Contai and Tamluk subdivisions with sea water, ravaged a society already disrupted by the Quit India movement that flared after the arrest of the Congress leaders in August 1942 [18]
  • August 1942 "Report of the Struggle for Independence in Bengal (August and September 1942 )[18]
  • August 1942 District Officer'Cs hronicleo f Events of Disturbanceus pont heA ll-India CongresCs ommitteeR'se solutiono f 8th August, 1942 , and the Arrest of CongresLs eadersT hereafterA[18]
  • August 1942 Martyn felt that the central government gave too much importance to the mill area complex in Greater Calcutta, and were ill advised in comparing the situation of acute food crisis in Bengal with civil unrest that followed the August uprising in Sialkot in western India[10]
  • August 1942 Under orders from the chief minister's office, the government paid approximately Rs 2,854,424 and Rs 5,311,258 in compensation for the confiscated boats from 15 August to 15 September 1942 [10]
  • August 1942 By August 1942 the price had more than doubled, and by December it was roughly three times its normal level[12]
  • August 1942 These weather conditions were very unusual; rather thanending in late August or early September, an additional 15-25 inches of rain fellthrough November, causing a massive release of disease spores at the exact timethat rice plants were most susceptible to infection [1][28]
  • August 1942 However, it does not seem that this took place before July-August 1942 when the time for aush plantation was over and time for preparing fields for aman also passed[24]
  • August 1942 Pinnell, ICS, Bengal's first civil supplies director (a former district officer and secretary to two Governors), was largely responsible for the Government's food policies in the crucial period from August 1942 through April 1943 ; he then resigned[19]
  • August 1942 As early as August 1942 , Bengal's then chief minister, A K Fazlul Huq, had warned of approaching famine because of the government's scorched-earth policy in eastern and coastal Bengal, but he was deposed by the governor, John Herbert, for his refusal to toe the line on this and other issues (Huq 1944 : 15-16)[21]
  • August 1942 )7 Linlithgow had repeatedly and urgently warned Amery that infl ationary financing of the war effort was causing the Indian economy to collapse, and in August 1942 his emissary had informed the war cabinet in London of the possibility of famine in India arising from inflation alone (Mansergh II: 590)[21]
  • August 1942 8 However, as early as August 2nd of 1942 , the Chief Minister of Bengal, Fazlul Huq, had informed the colonial administration, that "at the present moment we are faced with a rice famine in Bengal[1]
  • August 1942 9 Letter from Fazlul Huq to Governor Jack Herbert, August 2, 1942 , reprinted in: Shila Sen, p[1]
  • August 1942 Policies that directly led to famine - and were understood as promising the same - were, in fact, central to the stand-off between the Indian National Congress and the Government of India, which led to the arrest of the national leadership in August of 1942 , and the widespread violence of the "Quit India" movement that ensued[1]
  • August 1942 27 In his letter of August 2nd, 1942 to Governor Herbert, Fazlul Huq writes: "The Joint Secretary says that when he was arranging to carry out your orders, you grew impatient and gave him definite directions to arrange for removal of excess rice from three districts within 24 hours[1]
  • August 1942 In Bengal there are three season of rice paddy production: the boro crop planted in the winter and harvested in spring, the aus crop, planted in early spring and harvested in July or August, and the aman crop, planted in late spring and harvested in the winter months[1]
  • August 1942 "34 The aman crop, harvested between the end of November and the beginning of February, for this reason, was desperately anticipated in the "starvation" months of August, September, October and November[1]
  • August 1942 " The District Magistrate, in a secret memo to the Joint Secretary, estimated that if this pace could be maintained through August all "surplus" rice would be cleared by the end of the summer[1]
  • August 1942 61 Huq's letter to Herbert of August 2nd, 1942 [1]
  • August 1942 Though the All-India Congress Working Committee's resolutions of July 14th and August 8th are most often cited as the signal events that led to the "Open Rebellion" of 1942 , the strategies of the colonial state were, in fact, forged in reference to an earlier resolution - that of July 10th, the "denial resolution[1]
  • August 1942 A meeting was scheduled for August 7th[1]
  • August 1942 107 In his long and angry letter to Sir John Herbert of August 2nd, 1942 , Huq listed these, and several other grievances, as ample evidence that, under Provincial Autonomy "Ministers had been given [only] a mockery of authority, and the steel frame of the Imperial Services still remain[ed] in tact[1]
  • August 1942 107 Huq points out in his letter of August 2nd, 1942 that not even 5% of appointments to the A[1]
  • August 1942 108 Huq to Herbert, August 2nd, 1942 [1]
  • August 1942 110 Secretary of State Amery brought Linlithgow's plan of action before the War Cabinet in London on the 5th of August and won approval for the three-staged plan the next day[1]
  • August 1942 The course of action that government would take against Congress during the 'Quit India' movement was thus established even before the Working Committee had convened to issue their much more famous August 8th declaration[1]
  • August 1942 115 Azad calls the July 14th resolution a "first draft" of the August 8th resolution, Ibid, p[1]
  • August 1942 The 'Quit India' resolution was passed in Bombay by the All-India Congress Working Committee on the night of August 8th, 1942 [1]
  • August 1942 Of the August 8th resolution historian Sumit Sarkar too has argued, "far from ruling out further negotiations, the whole thing may conceivably have been an exercise in brinkmanship and a bargaining counter which was followed by an explosion only because the British had decided on a policy of wholesale repression[1]
  • August 1942 By the 15th of August things had spiraled out of control to the extent that Linlithgow had authorized the military, in aid of civil power, to begin machine-gunning saboteurs from the air[1]
  • August 1942 On the 31st of August Linlithgow telegraphed Winston Churchill and confided, "I am engaged[1]
  • August 1942 Student demonstrations began on August 10th in both cities, and picked up momentum in the following days[1]
  • August 1942 124 By August official stocks of rice in Calcutta were exceedingly low, and Government began worrying in earnest about feeding labor in war- production factories[1]
  • August 1942 The Bengal National Chamber of Commerce, representing all the major jute mills, the Paper Makers Association, the Engineering Association, the Tramways, and other industries in the province, initiated its "Chambers Foodstuff Scheme" in late August 1942 [1]
  • August 1942 central government notified employers in August that expenditures on foodstuffs for "essential" employees could be written off against the E[1]
  • August 1942 Even before Gandhi was arrested on August 9, 1942 , plans for what course of action to take if he chose to go on a hunger-strike were being urgently discussed in Delhi and London[1]
  • August 1942 On August 2nd the Viceroy relayed to the Secretary of State his intention to follow the officially codified "cat and mouse" procedure,50 releasing Gandhi if his health declined enough that he was in danger of dying on Government hands, then re-arresting him if he survived[1]
  • August 1942 In this correspondence Gandhi focused on the lack of evidence linking the Congress Resolution of August 8th to the violence that had swept the country since the arrest of Congress leaders the following day[1]
  • August 1942 70 Again he blamed Government's excessively belligerent posture of the previous August, when Congress leaders were preemptively arrested[1]
  • August 1942 The heavy-handedness of the government in August 1942 , Gandhi argued, was an analogous case in point[1]
  • August 1942 Again he strained to associate the violence with the Congress Working Committee and its August Resolution[1]
  • August 1942 He urged Gandhi to "face the facts," accept responsibility for the "sad campaign of violence and crime" that had swept the country, and disown the August Resolution,[1]
  • August 1942 The August resolution had made no mention of violence, and had, in fact, been only meant as an opening salvo to negotiations[1]
  • August 1942 " In his letter of August 2nd, 1942 , Huq had detailed at length, the extent to which he believed the Governor had abrogated his authority on a number of fronts, including both rice and boat "denials," but had received no reply[1]
  • August 1942 3 The Statesman, "Discussion on Holiday," August 16, 1942[1]
  • August 1942 per bag between August 1980 and April 1983, the coefficient of[22]
  • August 1942 Figure 1 describes the variation in rice prices across Bengal between January 1942 and August[16]
  • August 1942 Between 1950 and 1988 (a period for which data are available for nearly all Chinese weather stations), July 1959 was the hottest July in Zheng Zhou (Henan), Chong Qing (Sichuan), and Wuhan (Hebei); August 1959 was the wettest August in Cheng Du (Sichuan) and in Lan Zhou (Gansu); while August 1960 saw hardly any rain in AnQing (Anhui), and likewise for Gui Yang (Guizhou) in July-August 1959[17]
  • August 1942 Starvation and exchange entitlements 37 'bands of people moving about in search of rice' (12 June) ; 'deaths in streets' (12 June) ; 'town filled with thousands of beggars who are starving' (17 July); 'passing through the most acute stage of distress' (10 August); 'deaths still occurring' (9 September); 'disposal of dead bodies [7]
  • August 1942 The official policy was based on the firm conviction that 'the maintenance of essential food supplies to the industrial area of Calcutta must be ranked on a very high priority among their [the government's] war time obligations', and as early as August 1942 the Bengal government had explained to the Bengal Chamber of Commerce that as far as Calcutta was concerned the government Table 1[7]
  • August 1942 f The 'Bengal Chamber of Commerce Foodstuffs Scheme', guaranteeing essential items of food to the grain shops of industrial concerns connected with the Chamber, came into existence with the government's help in August 1942 ; it covered 620,000 employees by December of that year[7]
  • August 1942 August 83 94 165 129 74 110 74[7]
  • August 1942 August 137 150 160 109 117[7]
  • August 1942 Herbert's suspicion that the Indian National Congress Party sought to create famine and use it for their political objectives reflected the Party's open attempt to disrupt the British war effort in the "Quit India" campaign of August 1942 [8]
  • August 1942 The disease usually appeared first in the mature aus crop in August and September, and this infestation "must have provided the necessary multiple foci for spread and infection of the later aman varieties[8]
  • September 1942 But, even as late as September 1942 , when the Sixth Price Control Conference considered the rice situation as it had already developed in several provinces, ideas regarding arrangements for the control of the movement of rice supplies across provincial and state frontiers had not crystallized into a concrete plancomm-92ff
  • September 1942 In the absence of control- over supplies, price control failed, but by September 1942 , supplies and prices appeared to have reached a state of equili- briumcomm-92ff
  • September 1942 In the absence of control over' supplies, price control failed, but by September 1942 , supplies and prices appeared to have reached a state of equili- briumcomm100-150
  • September 1942 On the 1st June 1942 , exports of paddy and rice to places out,side the province were prohibited except under permit, and in September 1942 an official purchasing agency was set up to undertake all buying for exportIARIHDD8-001362
  • September 1942 d September the marke,t was very unsettled, but by the middle of- IAppendix TVIARIHDD8-001362
  • September 1942 Sept'ember the price had steadied itself and ill October stood at ItsIARIHDD8-001362
  • September 1942 We have described already how during AugustSeptember, 1942 , when supplies disappeared from the market in Calcutta, stocks ()f "denial" rice were moved in and distributedIARIHDD8-001362
  • September 1942 One hundred such shops were opened, but with the improvement in supply towards the end of 'September and the beginning of October, t,he deIARIHDD8-001362
  • September 1942 The immediate result was a resumption of the upward movement in prices which, sj)arting in February, 1942 , had gained momentum in May, and had been temporarily arrested during: September and OctoberIARIHDD8-001362
  • September 1942 lized purchasEt of foodgrains emerged in September 1942 , und was considered (It the Sixth Price Control Conference which met in that monthIARIHDD8-001362
  • September 1942 This Order failed in its purpose but by the middle of September prices had steadiedIARIHDD8-001362
  • September 1942 exports into a Government monopoly of exports, and in September an official organization was set up in the principal surplus areas to undertake all buying: for export outside the provinceIARIHDD8-001362
  • September 1942 We think that at this stage, that is, in September, Government should have organized an adequate procurement machinery with the object of maintaining supplies for Oalcutta, the 'heaviest deficit area in the province, and should have undertaken, cett~inly in Oalcutta, rigIARIHDD8-001362
  • September 1942 Larger supplies in the hands of Government would have enabled the system of contrQ1led shops, which came into existence in September, to be expanded, and this might have paved the way for the introduction of rat,iolling at a later dateIARIHDD8-001362
  • September 1942 by September and their scope and purpose clearly explained to the people, public confidence would have improved; ~he scope for speculative buying would have been curtailed, and competitive buying for the provision of supplies for Calcutta would have been greatly reducedIARIHDD8-001362
  • September 1942 Indeed, in view of wha~ followed, it is now clear that September was a critical month in the development of the familieIARIHDD8-001362
  • September 1942 The Government of Bengal favoured central control and in September 1942 were considering a scheme for "making the whole of Assam, Bengal, Bihar, and Orissa into one producing region", within which there should be "no restriction on the movement of rice except in gravest emergency or when possibilities of centralized control have broken down"IARIHDD8-001362
  • September 1942 The Government of India also at this time favoured the control of rice on a regional basis, and the Sixth Price Control Conference held in Delhi in September 1942 recommended that the primary responsibility for distribution within each region should be vested in the I{egional Price and Control Board, operating either through itIARIHDD8-001362
  • September 1942 By September and October 1942 , priCeS had steadied themselves, and supplies and prices appeared to have reached a state of equilibriumIARIHDD8-001362
  • September 1942 The anxiety about the lack of rain had been relieved in August, and by the end of September and the beginning of Oct;ober an average aman crop seemed assuredIARIHDD8-001362
  • September 1942 Weare confident that if an efficient procuremenp orglUlization had been developed about September 1942 , the crisis which began towards the end Qf 1942 , would not have taken such a grave formIARIHDD8-001362
  • September 1942 In the absence of control over supplies, price control failed, but by September 1942 , supplies and prices appeared to have reached a state of equilibrium IARIHDD8-001362
  • September 1942 The Transfer of Power Documents, Volume III: Reassertion of Authority, Gandhi's Fast and the Succession to the Viceroyalty, 21 September 1942 –12 June 1943 ogradac_article_pub_063
  • September 1942 The price of rice was up 33% in September 1940 and 69% in September 1941 on its August 1939 level and in early March 1942 the index stood at 59[3]
  • September 1942 "While in September 1942 the [agricultural] wage rate stood where it was in December 1941[15]
  • September 1942 In addition, from September 1942 to October 1943 the trade was trying to get the Bengal Government to import more[15]
  • September 1942 "as far back as September 1942 , the European Group in the central Assembly had warned[15]
  • September 1942 At the same time, good rain in September and October improved expectations for the December crop[15]
  • September 1942 "Report of the Struggle for Independence in Bengal (August and September 1942 )[18]
  • September 1942 Under orders from the chief minister's office, the government paid approximately Rs 2,854,424 and Rs 5,311,258 in compensation for the confiscated boats from 15 August to 15 September 1942 [10]
  • September 1942 The data used by Amartya Sen (1997: 44) demonstrate that while the price of food grains rose sharply from September 1942 to December 1943 , the money wages of the unskilled labourers increased only marginally in this period[10]
  • September 1942 LXIII:1, 15 September[10]
  • September 1942 These weather conditions were very unusual; rather thanending in late August or early September, an additional 15-25 inches of rain fellthrough November, causing a massive release of disease spores at the exact timethat rice plants were most susceptible to infection [1][28]
  • September 1942 18 A report published in September 1942 , regarding the crop prospects for Natore of Rajshahi district, revealed that 'total destruction' of aman was feared if the water hyacinth was not removed quickly from several thousand bighas of paddy land in beel areas and many village fields[2]
  • September 1942 "34 The aman crop, harvested between the end of November and the beginning of February, for this reason, was desperately anticipated in the "starvation" months of August, September, October and November[1]
  • September 1942 In Calcutta alone, by the beginning of September, 20 protesters had been killed by the police, with at total of 229 reported injured, including 74 police[1]
  • September 1942 In its first issue of Biplabi the Tamluk Congress Committee reported the attack and attempted sinking of a boat trying to carry rice away from the Danipur rice mill by a group of villagers on September 9th[1]
  • September 1942 132 On September 14th, in Dinajpur, north Bengal, a crowd of as many as 10,000 villagers armed with lathis and other weapons, attacked government buildings and looted hoards of rice and paddy from stockists in the countryside[1]
  • September 1942 On September 8th, 1942 the Collective Fines Ordinance (Ordinance Number XX of 1942 ) was executed for the first time[1]
  • September 1942 In September a secret memorandum was sent out by the central government to all provincial Governors outlining general guidelines for "economic warfare" against all corporate anti-government entities[1]
  • September 1942 In the last week of September massive demonstrations against colonial rule rocked Midnapur[1]
  • September 1942 The Transfer of Power Documents, Volume HI: Reassertion of Authority, Gandhi's Fast and the Succession to the Viceroyalty, 21 September 1942 -12 June 1943 [16]
  • September 1942 Starvation and exchange entitlements 37 'bands of people moving about in search of rice' (12 June) ; 'deaths in streets' (12 June) ; 'town filled with thousands of beggars who are starving' (17 July); 'passing through the most acute stage of distress' (10 August); 'deaths still occurring' (9 September); 'disposal of dead bodies [7]
  • September 1942 a problem' (27 September) ; 'supplies arriving but no hope of saving those who are starving' (25 October)[7]
  • September 1942 In addition, 'controlled shops' were started in Calcutta in August and September 1942 , supplemented in 1943 by a scheme of'approved markets' by which government stocks were made available to selected private shops for sale to the public[7]
  • September 1942 the log books of the Sriniketan farm and the Sriniketan dairy, are still available for certain parts of the period, and using these it has been possible to obtain the local daily wage rate for male unskilled labour from September 1942 to January 1944 [7]
  • September 1942 While in September 1942 the wage stood where it was in December 1941 and the price of rice stood only a little higher, a sudden upsurge of the rice price subsequently occurred, without a matching movement of the wage rate[7]
  • September 1942 September 0-16 114 0-37 100 88[7]
  • September 1942 As far as fish is concerned, after an early decline it seems to recover in the middle of Phase I (June-September 1942 ) then to slump again[7]
  • September 1942 The temporary recovery was partly due to seasonal factors in the catching of fish [see June-September prices for other years, in Agro-Economic Research Centre for East India (1960), p[7]
  • September 1942 September 130 125 197 145 88 131 88[7]
  • September 1942 September 133 150 180 113 135[7]
  • September 1942 The disease usually appeared first in the mature aus crop in August and September, and this infestation "must have provided the necessary multiple foci for spread and infection of the later aman varieties[8]
  • October 1942 Is it too much to say that this so-called 'surplus' was completely wiped out by the cyclone of October 1942 in the districts of Midnapore and the 24-Parganascomlast
  • October 1942 ' '" (iii) The disastrous cyclone of October 1942 destroyed large stocks of rice in important surplus districts in Bengal, rim, Midnapore and the 24-Parganascomlast
  • October 1942 Is it too much to say that this so-called 'surplus' was completely wiped out by the cyclone of October 1942 in the districts of Midnapore and the 24-Parganashussain_minute
  • October 1942 ' '" (iii) The disastrous cyclone of October 1942 destroyed large stocks of rice in important surplus districts in Bengal, rim, Midnapore and the 24-Parganashussain_minute
  • October 1942 Sept'ember the price had steadied itself and ill October stood at ItsIARIHDD8-001362
  • October 1942 One hundred such shops were opened, but with the improvement in supply towards the end of 'September and the beginning of October, t,he deIARIHDD8-001362
  • October 1942 OctoberIARIHDD8-001362
  • October 1942 The immediate result was a resumption of the upward movement in prices which, sj)arting in February, 1942 , had gained momentum in May, and had been temporarily arrested during: September and OctoberIARIHDD8-001362
  • October 1942 On the 7th October 1942 , the Government of India addressed a letter to the provinoes outlining a scheme of co-ordinated purchases of foodgrains in surplus provinces in order to meet the requirements of the Defence ServIe6s and deficit provincesIARIHDD8-001362
  • October 1942 From October 1942 to March 1944 , RsIARIHDD8-001362
  • October 1942 he judicious use of "denial" stocks, thirdly, good rain in Eeptember and October, and fourthly, the decision not to enforce price controlIARIHDD8-001362
  • October 1942 By September and October 1942 , priCeS had steadied themselves, and supplies and prices appeared to have reached a state of equilibriumIARIHDD8-001362
  • October 1942 The anxiety about the lack of rain had been relieved in August, and by the end of September and the beginning of Oct;ober an average aman crop seemed assuredIARIHDD8-001362
  • October 1942 According to figures supplied by the Government of Bengal, some 110,000,000 free meals were provided; this includes meals supplied aTter the :\fidnapore cyclone in October 1942 IARIHDD8-001362
  • October 1942 Is it too much to say that this so-called 'surplus' was completely wiped OU'" by the -eyelone of October 1942 in the c1istrictIARIHDD8-001362
  • October 1942 (iii) The disastrous cyclone of October 1942 des'troyed large stooks of rice in important surplus districts in Bengal, t1izIARIHDD8-001362
  • October 1942 s from October 1942 to December 1943 IARIHDD8-001362
  • October 1942 It will be seen from the figures that between October 1942 and June 1943 expenditure onIARIHDD8-001362
  • October 1942 October to December 1942IARIHDD8-001362
  • October 1942 In mid- October 1942 , much of coastal west Bengal, including important rice-growing areas, was hit by a cyclone that resulted in considerable loss of life and the destruction of standing crops, livestock, and paddy storesogradac_article_pub_063
  • October 1942 Famine Relief Blocked Bengal was hit by a terrible cyclone in October 1942 – just after the Quit India Movement had started the previous monthreview_Structural_Violence2
  • October 1942 How much was destroyed in the terrible cyclone of 16 October 1942 ? How much was later bought up by the army? And how much was actually being stockpiled by merchants, speculating on the spectacular price rises? Obviously, these fi gures were not recorded, and in their absence, the fi gures that Sen relies on for rice production are those in the Famine Inquiry Report, calculated from estimates about cropland multiplied by fi gures for yield per acrereview_Structural_Violence2
  • October 1942 In October 1942 there was a major cyclone in Bengal which was followed by torrential rainfall causing serious damage to the Winter crop__lecturenotesfamine
  • October 1942 The result was the recruitment of a number of 'special categories' of medical officers, which included, among other things, the recruitment of European doctors in India and Britain (October 1940 ), the transfer of assistant-surgeons in the IMD to the IMS under the emergency commissioning scheme (June 1941 ), the introduction of medical graduates in state-managed and company-managed railways(October 1941 ),theemployment of specialists on special terms(January 1942 ),the introduction of women medical practitioners (January 1942 ) and the transfer of civilian antimalaria officers to military duty(February 1942 )[14]
  • October 1942 51 The cyclone of October 1942 caused crop damage in coastal areas but, more importantly, aggravated the tendency to speculative buying and panic hoarding[3]
  • October 1942 The 'denial policy', which was put in place in April 1942 , coupled with the October cyclone, reduced the direct entitlement to food-grains of many peasant labourers[3]
  • October 1942 On October l6th 1942 a cyclone accompanied by torrential rains hit West Bengal, causing wind and rain damage and flooding[15]
  • October 1942 From October 1942 , when the cyclone struck, it rose much faster (See Figure 3)[15]
  • October 1942 At the same time, good rain in September and October improved expectations for the December crop[15]
  • October 1942 On October l6th there was a cyclone[15]
  • October 1942 In mid- October 1942 , the coastal subdivisions of the districts of Midnapore and 24-Parganas were devastated by a cyclone, and for the next six months or so the Revenue Department concentrated on these districts[18]
  • October 1942 Relief Activity and Estimated Rice Prices, Bengal, October 1942 -December 1943 [18]
  • October 1942 There were two stages in the relationship between the departments: the first lasted from the Midnapore cyclone of October 1942 until L[18]
  • October 1942 74,274,128 were spent by government on direct relief between October 1942 and March 1944 , excluding losses on grain sold below cost (GBR 1944 :14)[18]
  • October 1942 The three tidal waves that smashed the seawalls of Midnapore on the night of October 16/17, 1942 , flooding much of Contai and Tamluk subdivisions with sea water, ravaged a society already disrupted by the Quit India movement that flared after the arrest of the Congress leaders in August 1942 [18]
  • October 1942 From October 1942 he exercised an overall control of the relief operation, visiting and touring the affected area once a fortnight until March, when he relinquished his extra role as additional commissioner, Presidency and Burdwan divisions (Kar 1983; B[18]
  • October 1942 Thus, from mid-October 1942 to at least mid-March 1943 -five months-people who had survived the tidal wave and cyclone but had lost crops and stores were under severe pressure, especially those in villages away from the few roads that traversed the region[18]
  • October 1942 Government Grain Supply and Relief Expenditures in Midnapore, October 1942 -December 1943 [18]
  • October 1942 From October 1942 to February 1943 the prices used were the lowest in the district (or in the case of the province, the lowest in Calcutta)[18]
  • October 1942 Government Grain Supply and Relief Expenditure in Dacca, October 1942 -December 1943 [18]
  • October 1942 Government Grain Supply and Relief Expenditures in Faridpur, October 1942 -December 1943 [18]
  • October 1942 Although the figure does not include food requisitioned or purchased by officers within their districts, it reflects the provincial effort, which can be divided into three periods: from October 1942 to March 1943 when little grain was sent to the districts; from April to August 1943 when the DCS sent grain purchased outside the province to the districts; and from September to December 1943 when grain, especially from the Punjab, began to flow in response to pressure from the Government of India[18]
  • October 1942 Government Grain Supply and Relief Expenditure in the Districts of Bengal, October 1942 -December 1943 [18]
  • October 1942 From the Midnapore cyclone of October 1942 to the winding down of the relief operations in 1944 , the government of Bengal was shot through with conflict between the governor and the chief minister, among ministers, and between ministers and their department heads (Nanavati 1944 :449)[18]
  • October 1942 "Report of the Struggle for Independence in Bengal (October, November, and December 1942 )[18]
  • October 1942 Gordon, Inspector-General of Police, Bengal, October 27 and November 2[18]
  • October 1942 Midnapore's demand for extra supply of rice dated back to October 1942 , when the district was affected by a devastating cyclone[10]
  • October 1942 The expected outturn of Aus (autumn) paddy was about 4-62 crores of maunds (1'69 million tons) according to the official estimate issued by the Bengal Director of Agriculture on the 3rd October, 1942 [25]
  • October 1942 On the 5th October the Director of Agriculture issued the first official forecast of the winter rice crop in Bengal in which he gave the area as 16,103,200 acres and the reported outturn as 78%, but added that he expected 'a lO-anna outturn for the province as a whole'[25]
  • October 1942 We thus find that since October 1942 the ofiicial estimates clearly indicated a large deficit; and yet we know that the position was not considered serious by Government[25]
  • October 1942 Between July and October 1942 I wrote several letters to Bengal ofi'icials urging to the best of my ability the immediate taking up of a rice census in the province but to no avail[25]
  • October 1942 * Moreover, a cyclone accompanied by torrential rains and tidal waves in October 1942 caused major crop losses - especially in Midnapore district[19]
  • October 1942 Monthly sanctioned money on three relief heads Bengal October 1942 -March 1944 sanctioned money(Rs)[19]
  • October 1942 6 provides district-wise data on CDRs during the main twelve month period of elevated mortality, CBRs during 1944 , changes (proportional) in the harvest price of, and cultivated area under, (winter) rice in 1942 -43, and also statistics on gratuitous relief during the period October 1942 -March 1944 [19]
  • October 1942 A senior official of the agriculture department, who was entrusted with distributing limited relief after the cyclone in October 1942 , explained to the Famine Commission why the operations could not be extended to provide famine relief to all of Bengal, as per the famine manual[21]
  • October 1942 Writing in 1982, Greenough argues that the Bengal Famine could said to have begun in October of 1942 , in the wake of a devastating cyclone which decimated the district of Midnapur, south- west of Calcutta[1]
  • October 1942 "34 The aman crop, harvested between the end of November and the beginning of February, for this reason, was desperately anticipated in the "starvation" months of August, September, October and November[1]
  • October 1942 On October 16th a strong wind was blowing and untimely rains were falling in Calcutta[1]
  • October 1942 5 million people were killed, displaced or dispossessed by the October cyclone[1]
  • October 1942 On October 28th, even before the Midnapur cyclone had been reported, the American Economic Warfare Board sent a communiqué to the Indian Government expressing deep concern about the "critical" food situation in India[1]
  • October 1942 156 See, for instance, the Communist Party's weekly, Janayuddha, October 28, 1942 , "Sara Banglay Khadda Sanket" (trans[1]
  • October 1942 156 In fact; every indicator outlined in the Bengal Famine Code, by October 1942 , had already been met[1]
  • October 1942 III, Lumley to Linlithgow, October 22nd, 1942 [1]
  • October 1942 In mid October 1942 , much of coastal west Bengal, including important rice-growing areas, was hit by a cyclone that resulted in considerable loss of life and the destruction of standing crops, livestock, and paddy stores[16]
  • October 1942 Second, parts of coastal west Bengal, including important rice-growing areas, was hit by a major tsunami on October 16th 1942 , resulting in significant loss of life and the destruction of standing crops, livestock, and paddy stores[17]
  • October 1942 By March/April the situation was already critical both in coastal Midnapur, where a tsunami had struck in October, and in eastern Bengal[26]
  • October 1942 A good case in point is the devastating cyclone that struck Midnapore (now Medinipur or Midnapur) in the west of the province on 16 October 1942 , news of which took nearly a fortnight to reach a senior minister in the Bengal government[23]
  • October 1942 17 The weather was not propitious, with much more rain than normal in the west of the province in October and November[23]
  • October 1942 This was largely the result of a cyclone in October, followed by torrential rain in some parts of Bengal and a subsequent fungus disease[7]
  • October 1942 a problem' (27 September) ; 'supplies arriving but no hope of saving those who are starving' (25 October)[7]
  • October 1942 October 0-25 179 0-37 100 56[7]
  • October 1942 October 99 80 126 92 56 84 56[7]
  • October 1942 October 147 140 180 95 122[7]
  • October 1942 29 Blyn argues that the Midnapur cyclone of October 1942 and the floods it caused reduced the Bengal rice harvest by one-third, twice the decline that Sen asserted took place (and Sen questions Blyn's estimate), and he also proposed large alterations in the official harvest statistics that Sen does not address[8]
  • October 1942 Sen and Greenough, for example, mention that in 1942 Bengal experienced a series of natural disasters: a massive cyclone in mid-October, followed by flooding and a plant disease, yet they insist that the harvest was not low enough to cause a famine[8]
  • October 1942 These weather conditions in October also provided "more favorable conditions for spore release and infection than the corresponding month in other years[8]
  • October 1942 "36 October was the month of the cyclone and other storms that preceded and followed it, whose winds would have spread the spores widely[8]
  • October 1942 Orissa Province, which bordered Bengal, had declining harvests from 1938 - 1942 , and then had large areas devastated by the Midnapur cyclone of October 1942 , another cyclone the following month, and subsequent flooding[8]
  • November 1942 and bv the export of 185,0(10 tons which was allowed to take place during 1942 ? ' There was definite shortage during November-Decembercomlast
  • November 1942 "The evidence presented by these contemporary documents leaves no room for doubt that the upheaval in the Bengal markets towards the end of 1942 , was due to the fact that in November and December of that year, that is, before the bulk of the aman crop had been reaped, unusual purchases were being made bypersons who were convinced, quite correctly, that the yield of the aman crop would be so short and stocks in hand so low, that a crisis in supply was inevitable and was'fast approaching"comlast
  • November 1942 , November~ December 1942 comlast
  • November 1942 We return d t ' prepare our report" _ e 0 Delhi on November 2nd to At the beginning of the inquiry we decided to hear witnessescomm1
  • November 1942 and bv the export of 185,0(10 tons which was allowed to take place during 1942 ? ' There was definite shortage during November-Decemberhussain_minute
  • November 1942 "The evidence presented by these contemporary documents leaves no room for doubt that the upheaval in the Bengal markets towards the end of 1942 , was due to the fact that in November and December of that year, that is, before the bulk of the aman crop had been reaped, unusual purchases were being made bypersons who were convinced, quite correctly, that the yield of the aman crop would be so short and stocks in hand so low, that a crisis in supply was inevitable and was'fast approaching"hussain_minute
  • November 1942 , November~ December 1942 hussain_minute
  • November 1942 Further, in November' 1942 , speci!tl sanction was given for an increase in the number of boats in the· nrea rIm'jng the reaping of the rice harveRtIARIHDD8-001362
  • November 1942 The following :figures show the effect of the boat denial poliey at the end; of November 1942 :(IARIHDD8-001362
  • November 1942 November was, however, marked by another violent movement Whl('IARIHDD8-001362
  • November 1942 November" 7,996IARIHDD8-001362
  • November 1942 whea~, anu ill November 1942 , the WheeIARIHDD8-001362
  • November 1942 The rise appears to have been due princ:pally to heavy buying, entirely l111co-ordinated and to a large extent manifestly speculative, which began about the middle of November, and seems to have reached its peaiS: in the first week of this month (December 1942 )"IARIHDD8-001362
  • November 1942 18th November 1942 7 8 0IARIHDD8-001362
  • November 1942 orary documents leaves no room for doubt that the upheaval in the Bengal markets towards the eud of 1942 , was due ~o the fact tha~ in November and December of that year, that is, before the bulk of the aman crop had been reaped, unusual purch!tses ""ere being made by persons who were convinced, quite correctly, that the yield q_f thE> aman crop would be so short and stocks in hand so low, that a crisis ill supply was inevitable and was fast approachingIARIHDD8-001362
  • November 1942 Reports received at the time by the Bihar Government showed that a large number of buyers from Bengal were advancin;:; money OIl standing crops at the end of November in the borc1ering districts of Bihar, and officers in these districts reported great uneasiness and impending trouble in consequenceIARIHDD8-001362
  • November 1942 On the 21st November the Government of India informed the Provincial Governments that they had decided to initiate a scheme whereby wheat would be purcnased by a Central organization through selected agents, and the produce assigned to importing centresIARIHDD8-001362
  • November 1942 Between November 1942 and the end of May 1943 , over two crores of rupees (RsIARIHDD8-001362
  • November 1942 November and in December? In considering this question, it is useful to compare the course or events iu Bengal and Madras during the months following the fall of BurmaIARIHDD8-001362
  • November 1942 In November 19MI no figures :tor total deaths in 5 districts later than December 1942 were available in the office of the Director of PublilJ HealthIARIHDD8-001362
  • November 1942 QU() tons w~ich was allowflil to take T>lace during 1949? TherE' was defimte shortag~ dunng November-DecE'mberIARIHDD8-001362
  • November 1942 "The evidence presented by these contemporary documents leaves no room for doubt that the upheaval in tbe Bengal markets towards the end of 1942 , was due to the fact that in November and December of that year, that is, before the bulk of the G,1nan crop had been reaped, unusual purchases were being made by persons who were convinced, quite correctly, that the yiela of the oman crop would be so short and stocks in hand so low, that a crisis in supply was inevitable and was fast approaching"IARIHDD8-001362
  • November 1942 , November· Deeember 1942 IARIHDD8-001362
  • November 1942 It suggests that, given the disruption of traffic due to wartime restrictions, markets became more segmented during the famine, but only marginally so, apart from brief intervals in November 1942 and March 1943 ogradac_article_pub_063
  • November 1942 Moreover, the aus (summer) rice crop of 1942 was poor and there were rumours in November 1942 that a mysterious disease had struck the aman (winter) crop, which normally accounted for three quarters of total rice outputogradac_article_pub_063
  • November 1942 November 1942 , Home Political File (Internal) 3/84/ 1942 , National Archives, India[9]
  • November 1942 The wholesale price of rice jumped from between Rs 9 and 10 per maund in mid-November 1942 to between Rs 13 and 14 in mid- December, and then rocketed to Rs[3]
  • November 1942 In fact, while the price index of rice rose to 221 by November the wage rate actually fell in absolute terms against the usual seasonal pattern" (1977 p43)[15]
  • November 1942 Prices doubled in the country areas between l8th November and 7th December[15]
  • November 1942 "Report of the Struggle for Independence in Bengal (October, November, and December 1942 )[18]
  • November 1942 Gordon, Inspector-General of Police, Bengal, October 27 and November 2[18]
  • November 1942 60 He was echoing the view of the director-general of food supplies, who warned the central government in November 1942 of very serious consequences if they did not respond to the danger of a famine[10]
  • November 1942 As a result the main aman rice harvest of November-December 1942 was a partial failure[12]
  • November 1942 These weather conditions were very unusual; rather thanending in late August or early September, an additional 15-25 inches of rain fellthrough November, causing a massive release of disease spores at the exact timethat rice plants were most susceptible to infection [1][28]
  • November 1942 In November 1942 a severe cyclone interrupted the traffic between Kolkata and Madras[24]
  • November 1942 In a further modification, in November 1942 , special sanction was given for an increase in the number of boats in the area during the reaping of the winter rice harvest[24]
  • November 1942 "34 The aman crop, harvested between the end of November and the beginning of February, for this reason, was desperately anticipated in the "starvation" months of August, September, October and November[1]
  • November 1942 Mookerjee's resignation from the Assembly in November 1942 [1]
  • November 1942 and November 1984, the coefficient of variation across[22]
  • November 1942 It suggests that, given the disruption of traffic due to wartime restrictions, markets became more segmented during the famine, but only marginally so, apart from brief intervals in November 1942 and March 1943 [16]
  • November 1942 Moreover, the aus (summer) rice crop of 1942 was poor and there were rumours in November 1942 that a mysterious disease had struck the aman (winter) crop, which normally accounted for three quarters of total rice output[16]
  • November 1942 4 Third, there were rumours from western Bengal in November 1942 that a fungus had struck the autumn-winter aman crop, which normally accounted for three quarters of total rice output[17]
  • November 1942 Thus, as early as November 1942 it reveals Linlithgow, conveying his very serious worries about 'the food situation' to Amery, after receiving 'most urgent representations' from the Governor of Bengal, Sir John Herbert[17]
  • November 1942 31 British Library (India Office Library), Mss EurF125/11, Linlithgow to Amery, November 30th 1942 , December 22nd 1942 [17]
  • November 1942 17 The weather was not propitious, with much more rain than normal in the west of the province in October and November[23]
  • November 1942 10 (10 rupees) per maund in November 1942 to double that five months later[23]
  • November 1942 While considerable shortages persisted in some areas, the new crop began to appear in bazaars in the interior in late November and was being sold at about Rs[23]
  • November 1942 In fact, while the price index of rice rose to 221 by November, the wage rate actually fell in absolute terms— against the usual seasonal pattern:):—and the index of the exchange rate declined to 38[7]
  • November 1942 The counter-seasonal decline in money wages in November 1942 and the low level of real wages through the winter harvesting period and post-harvest months may reflect some decline in employ ment[7]
  • November 1942 November 0-31 221 0-31 84 38[7]
  • November 1942 November 79 71 102 69 45 68 45[7]
  • November 1942 November 154 170 180 110 117[7]
  • November 1942 Padmanabhan noted that these favorable conditions prevailed through the month of November in 1942 and concluded that "it is probable that an unprecedented spore release occurred continuously during November 1942 , thus providing one of the most essential conditions for the development of an epiphytotic[8]
  • December 1942 and bv the export of 185,0(10 tons which was allowed to take place during 1942 ? ' There was definite shortage during November-Decembercomlast
  • December 1942 , till the end of December 1942 , and possibly even beyond that period with some efiort, but during this year" various unforeseen factors adversely affected the position: (i) A quantity of rice was exported (187,500 tons in the year, of which 184,618- tons were exported between January and July 1942 )comlast
  • December 1942 This view is supported by the fact that reports of distress were made early in December (Appendix VI), and by the end of the month hunger—marches had: startedcomlast
  • December 1942 "The evidence presented by these contemporary documents leaves no room for doubt that the upheaval in the Bengal markets towards the end of 1942 , was due to the fact that in November and December of that year, that is, before the bulk of the aman crop had been reaped, unusual purchases were being made bypersons who were convinced, quite correctly, that the yield of the aman crop would be so short and stocks in hand so low, that a crisis in supply was inevitable and was'fast approaching"comlast
  • December 1942 , November~ December 1942 comlast
  • December 1942 The Food Department which was established in December 1942 set out on the task of disentangling the food tangles , ' The Second All-India Food Conference was held on the 24th-26th February, 1943 , The Secretary of the Food Department once again preached the gospel of 'equality of sacrifice'comlast
  • December 1942 By the end of December 1942 distress had already appeared and by March 1948 yndespread famine was anticipated by district oflicialscomm-92ff
  • December 1942 By the end of December 1942 distress had already appeared and by March 1943 widespread famine was anticipated by district officialscomm100-150
  • December 1942 and bv the export of 185,0(10 tons which was allowed to take place during 1942 ? ' There was definite shortage during November-Decemberhussain_minute
  • December 1942 , till the end of December 1942 , and possibly even beyond that period with some efiort, but during this year" various unforeseen factors adversely affected the position: (i) A quantity of rice was exported (187,500 tons in the year, of which 184,618- tons were exported between January and July 1942 )hussain_minute
  • December 1942 This view is supported by the fact that reports of distress were made early in December (Appendix VI), and by the end of the month hunger—marches had: startedhussain_minute
  • December 1942 "The evidence presented by these contemporary documents leaves no room for doubt that the upheaval in the Bengal markets towards the end of 1942 , was due to the fact that in November and December of that year, that is, before the bulk of the aman crop had been reaped, unusual purchases were being made bypersons who were convinced, quite correctly, that the yield of the aman crop would be so short and stocks in hand so low, that a crisis in supply was inevitable and was'fast approaching"hussain_minute
  • December 1942 , November~ December 1942 hussain_minute
  • December 1942 The Food Department which was established in December 1942 set out on the task of disentangling the food tangles , ' The Second All-India Food Conference was held on the 24th-26th February, 1943 , The Secretary of the Food Department once again preached the gospel of 'equality of sacrifice'hussain_minute
  • December 1942 'while by December 1942 the number had riRen to 620,000, and the total numher ,of persons served, including dependants, to approximately one million IARIHDD8-001362
  • December 1942 The rise appears to have been due princ:pally to heavy buying, entirely l111co-ordinated and to a large extent manifestly speculative, which began about the middle of November, and seems to have reached its peaiS: in the first week of this month (December 1942 )"IARIHDD8-001362
  • December 1942 A review of the conditions prevailing in the markets of Bengal early in December 1942 is eontained in a note'prepared at that tiIARIHDD8-001362
  • December 1942 orary documents leaves no room for doubt that the upheaval in the Bengal markets towards the eud of 1942 , was due ~o the fact tha~ in November and December of that year, that is, before the bulk of the aman crop had been reaped, unusual purch!tses ""ere being made by persons who were convinced, quite correctly, that the yield q_f thE> aman crop would be so short and stocks in hand so low, that a crisis ill supply was inevitable and was fast approachingIARIHDD8-001362
  • December 1942 23rd, 24th, and 28th December 1942 IARIHDD8-001362
  • December 1942 Finally, on the 27th December, it was decided to requisition stocks in the city and to distribute them through controlled shops and "ap'proved" marketsIARIHDD8-001362
  • December 1942 ke procurement operations on a more extensive scale than had been contemplailed in DecemberIARIHDD8-001362
  • December 1942 This was much more than what had been purchased betw~en the 22nd' December 1942 and the 17tliIARIHDD8-001362
  • December 1942 At the end ot December 1941 , a Wheat Commissioner for lndia WAS appointed, and on the 30th April 1942 , the Wheat Control Order was notifiedIARIHDD8-001362
  • December 1942 A separate Food Department was established at the Centre on the 2nd December 1942 , and on the 14th of that month the first Food Conference me-6IARIHDD8-001362
  • December 1942 The figures for rice and millets represented the quantities to be moved between the Is~ December 1942 and the 30th November 1943 , while the corresponding period for wheat and gram was the 1st April 1943 to the 31st March 1944 IARIHDD8-001362
  • December 1942 Tbe crisis in Bengnl which culminated in the famine began by the end of December 1942 IARIHDD8-001362
  • December 1942 bJ ]raders, £01' the }\oodgrains Control Order was not brought into force till DecemberIARIHDD8-001362
  • December 1942 November and in December? In considering this question, it is useful to compare the course or events iu Bengal and Madras during the months following the fall of BurmaIARIHDD8-001362
  • December 1942 happened towards the end of December 1942 IARIHDD8-001362
  • December 1942 taken by the Bengal Government towards the end of December 1942 and ill January-February 1943 IARIHDD8-001362
  • December 1942 But we have no doubt that the:y were on right lines when, at the end of December 1942 , they started making purchases through District Officers IARIHDD8-001362
  • December 1942 Rere we' would merely recall the at,tittIde of the Bengal Government themselves at i,he Food Conference held in December 1942 as proof of their recognition ot thls factIARIHDD8-001362
  • December 1942 By the end of December 1942 distress had already appeared and by March 1943 widespread famine was anticipated by district officialsIARIHDD8-001362
  • December 1942 In November 19MI no figures :tor total deaths in 5 districts later than December 1942 were available in the office of the Director of PublilJ HealthIARIHDD8-001362
  • December 1942 During the period December 1942 to October 1943 , the purchases made by these officers amounted to 721,000 tons, and during the ten months from November 1943 to August 1944 , to 700,000 --tonsIARIHDD8-001362
  • December 1942 end of December 1942 , and, possibly even beyond that period with' some effort, but during this year varlOUS unforeseen factors adversely affected the position:IARIHDD8-001362
  • December 1942 This view is supported by the fact that reports of distress were made earlj' in December (Appendix VI), and by tbe end of the month hunger-marches h~i startedIARIHDD8-001362
  • December 1942 "The evidence presented by these contemporary documents leaves no room for doubt that the upheaval in tbe Bengal markets towards the end of 1942 , was due to the fact that in November and December of that year, that is, before the bulk of the G,1nan crop had been reaped, unusual purchases were being made by persons who were convinced, quite correctly, that the yiela of the oman crop would be so short and stocks in hand so low, that a crisis in supply was inevitable and was fast approaching"IARIHDD8-001362
  • December 1942 The Food Department which was established in December 1942 set oull on the task, of disentangling the food tanglesIARIHDD8-001362
  • December 1942 Procurement operations in December and January had not been SllccessfuL Another attempt was made on the 9th of January but abandoned on the 17th of FebruaryIARIHDD8-001362
  • December 1942 DecemberIARIHDD8-001362
  • December 1942 The Foodgrains Control Order came into force on the 15th December 1942 IARIHDD8-001362
  • December 1942 11th December 1942 IARIHDD8-001362
  • December 1942 28th December 1942 IARIHDD8-001362
  • December 1942 October to December 1942IARIHDD8-001362
  • December 1942 October to December 1942 82,000 50,000 January to March 1943 4,60,000 3,03,500 50,000 April to June 1943 • 10,05,500 5,00,000 3,00,000 July to September 1943 1,05,000 2,95,000 October to December 1943 1,10,000 6,60,000IARIHDD8-001362
  • December 1942 The wholesale price of rice jumped from between Rs 9 and 10 per maund in mid-November 1942 to between Rs 13 and 14 in mid- December, and then rocketed to Rs[3]
  • December 1942 Attempts on the part of the government to buy at controlled prices between December 1942 and March 1943 failed to make any significant dent into the hoards of rural grain merchants, so a policy of procurement at free market prices was resumed from March 1943 which contributed to the steep rise of prices in rural areas[3]
  • December 1942 This was due to the poor December 1942 crop, and to the fact that there was a reduced carry-over of supplies from previous years, resulting in at least a second-degree shortage, with insufficient rice available to keep the population healthy, no matter how it was distributed[15]
  • December 1942 The grain trade generally made the same assessment, both because of their knowledge of stock levels, and because they thought that the Department of Agriculture had overestimated the December 1942 crop[15]
  • December 1942 Speculative withdrawal and panic purchases were encouraged by administrative chaos (especially between December 1942 and March 1943 , but also up to November)[15]
  • December 1942 "While in September 1942 the [agricultural] wage rate stood where it was in December 1941[15]
  • December 1942 talks of "speculative withdrawal" especially between December 1942 and March 1943 , but also up to November[15]
  • December 1942 On the contrary, traders imported all they could as soon as they saw that the December 1942 crop had failed[15]
  • December 1942 s statement that there were panic purchases between December 1942 and March 1943 and that there was panic hoarding from March to November 1943 [15]
  • December 1942 There may have been increased retentions by farmers out of the December 1942 crop[15]
  • December 1942 The key information for dealing with the famine was the estimate of the December 1942 crop[15]
  • December 1942 It must be concluded that the statistical basis of estimates of production is so bad that the Bengal Government was not in a position to say with any confidence whether the December 1942 crop was 11 o/ above the December 1940 crop or 20 % below it[15]
  • December 1942 As early as December 1942 , after the cyclone and before the aman[15]
  • December 1942 In fact, the document stated, as early as 9th December 1942 , that there was both cyclone damage in certain areas and an indifferent crop in Bengal generally[15]
  • December 1942 At the same time, good rain in September and October improved expectations for the December crop[15]
  • December 1942 Prices doubled in the country areas between l8th November and 7th December[15]
  • December 1942 In December 1942 the Civil Supplies Department of Bengal saw the shortage as mainly psychological (FIC p33)[15]
  • December 1942 In December too, at the India Food Conference it was considered uncertain whether Bengal needed supplies -it had experienced poor crops before and yet had imported relatively small quantities[15]
  • December 1942 The very poor December 1942 crop meant that people switched early to survival rations, but had to come onto the market for supplies at varying stages through the year[15]
  • December 1942 -expectation of time before the next harvest (with a three-week delay, as in December[15]
  • December 1942 If, however, one accepts the overwhelming evidence that the Bengal rice crop of December 1942 was 30% below normal, an amount equivalent to 25% of the marketed surplus of India as a whole (See Famine Inquiry Commission 1945 a,b, Goswami 1990) these facts are explained[15]
  • December 1942 Sen and Pinnell had agreed that from December 1942 the Revenue Department would receive 75,000 maunds of rice a month[18]
  • December 1942 Davies of the Friends Ambulance Unit, who had been in Midnapore since December 1942 : "The selection of deserving cases has been too restricted whilst the quantity of food per head has never been anything more than mere sustenance[18]
  • December 1942 "Report of the Struggle for Independence in Bengal (October, November, and December 1942 )[18]
  • December 1942 5 kilograms) of rice in December 1942 it shot up to a range of Rs 80 to Rs 105 in November 1943 [Sen 1981][20]
  • December 1942 On the other hand there was an inexcusable failure to note the price of rice in both these districts in December 1942 [10]
  • December 1942 Bell Papers, 30 December 1942 , letter written to the Inspector General of Police, Bengal, G[10]
  • December 1942 Even though the revenue commissioner of Chittagong reported to the revenue department in Calcutta on 9 December 1942 that the price of rice had almost doubled compared to December 1941 , the mandarins at the Writers' Buildings did nothing to check the disastrous upward trend in the price of this essential food grain[10]
  • December 1942 The Order was enforced for the first time as late as 15 December 1942 , by which time the famine was in full swing in parts of the countryside[10]
  • December 1942 72 The government's obduracy as late as December 1942 to draw up a realistic estimate of the shortage of food grains in Bengal was responsible for the relatively empty godowns in the distribution centres[10]
  • December 1942 As a result the main aman rice harvest of November-December 1942 was a partial failure[12]
  • December 1942 By August 1942 the price had more than doubled, and by December it was roughly three times its normal level[12]
  • December 1942 The death peak in December 1942 was similar to that of other non-famine years (e[12]
  • December 1942 Rahman, Sundarbane Ekbasar [One Year in the Sundarbans], The Azad, 18 and 22 December 1936[2]
  • December 1942 In the second ofi'icial forecast issued in December 1942 the expected outturn was given as 5,380,600 tons representing a shortage of over two million tons or 272% on last year's production and a shortage of 9-1 lakhs or nearly one million tons on the ten-year average[25]
  • December 1942 It is not surprising, therefore, that in spite of the alarming nature of the official rice forecast the Government of Bengal took no notice of it, and even so late as December 1942 did not make any attempt to secure additional supply from outside the province and thought price control to be entirely unnecessary[25]
  • December 1942 During the period between 1st December 1942 and 31st October 1943 Orissa exported about 10,000 tons of rice[19]
  • December 1942 "Mance to Anderson", 29 December 1942 [21]
  • December 1942 42 Numbers from second half of December, 1942 [1]
  • December 1942 164 The Statesman, December 13, 1942 "Rice Scarcity"[1]
  • December 1942 On December 3rd, 1942 the Viceroy cabled the Secretary of State to relay a "serious deterioration in the food situation in India[1]
  • December 1942 On December 12th "an acute scarcity of rice" was reported to be prevailing in Burdwan, just north of the city[1]
  • December 1942 164 On December 15th, at a meeting of the Calcutta Corporation, "deep concern over the soaring prices of foodstuffs was expressed," and a[1]
  • December 1942 165 The Statesman, December 15, 1942 "Food Shortage in Calcutta"[1]
  • December 1942 166 The Statesman, December 17, 1942 "Rise in Price of Rice"[1]
  • December 1942 167 The Statesman, December 19, 1942 "Employers in Conference"[1]
  • December 1942 169 The Statesman, December 21, 1942[1]
  • December 1942 170 The Statesman, December 13, 1942 "Rice Position"[1]
  • December 1942 174 It was reported in The Statesman December 22, 1942 that "many lights" were not extinguished and that police would take "drastic measures" in the future to deal with non-compliance to "black-outs[1]
  • December 1942 176 The Statesman, December 22, 1942 "Calcutta's First Raid"[1]
  • December 1942 In December of 1942 , Linlithgow found Calcutta "in very good trim[1]
  • December 1942 On December 20th Air Raid sirens began to sound throughout the city and industrial areas, but residents of the city had become inured to false alarms, and largely went about their business unperturbed[1]
  • December 1942 183 The Statesman, December, 22, 1942 "Viceroy's Message to Calcutta"[1]
  • December 1942 186 The Statesman, December 27, 1942 "Remedy Needed"[1]
  • December 1942 Linlithgow, however, congratulated the citizens of Calcutta for their steadiness and fortitude: "Well done Calcutta!"183 On the 23rd of December a press release was issued from Delhi commending the fact that there had been "no evacuation" from the city[1]
  • December 1942 In some sense, it could be argued, the air-raids on Calcutta in December of 1942 were among the most devastating of World War II, and can be implicated in the death of as many as 3 million residents of Bengal[1]
  • December 1942 The fourth Japanese bombing, on December 24th, had been the heaviest until that point, and panic ensued[1]
  • December 1942 The exodus only picked up pace when more bombings followed in the last week of December[1]
  • December 1942 On December 27th an order was issued giving agents of the Directorate of Civil Supplies, in conjunction with police and A[1]
  • December 1942 1 The Statesman, "Control of Stores in Calcutta," December 31, 1942[1]
  • December 1942 "6 In its Report on Bengal, the Famine Enquiry Commission, couching its language in diplomatic terms, concurred: "On the 27th December, the Government of Bengal, in order to maintain the distributions of supplies in Calcutta, were reluctantly compelled to requisition stocks from wholesale dealers and from that moment the ordinary trade machinery could not be relied upon to feed Calcutta[1]
  • December 1942 to Secretary of State, December 9, 1942[1]
  • December 1942 of India Food Dept, December 15, 1942 (emphasis mine)[1]
  • December 1942 Linlithgow sent several more telegrams, pleading the case, noting that the Food Conference held in Delhi on the 14th and 15th of December had revealed that the situation was even worse than he had originally thought[1]
  • December 1942 In December of 1942 British and Indian troops under Commander-in-Chief, Archibald Wavell, had launched a campaign to regain an Allied foothold in Burma, mounting an attack on the Arakan[1]
  • December 1942 " To make matters still more complicated, in his own analysis based on Intelligence Branch files eminent historian Suranjan Das notes that in December of 1942 , at a time when traffic through the port was less than it was a year later,14 there were 60,000 dock laborers in Kidderpore[1]
  • December 1942 Although the air raids of December 1942 had entailed profound socio-political impacts, those impacts were somewhat removed from the actual material damage inflicted[1]
  • December 1942 In April 1942 , the Japanese sank several merchantmen in the Bay of Bengal, as well as a destroyer, and they bombed Calcutta in December 1942 [13]
  • December 1942 In April 1942 the Japanese sank a destroyer and several merchantmen in the Bay of Bengal, and they bombed Calcutta in December 1942 [17]
  • December 1942 The rest of India, Suhrawardy said, was gradually realizing Bengal's parlous state, but the omens were not so good: in the seven months beginning in December 1942 the rest of India had sent Bengal only a paltry 44,000 tons[17]
  • December 1942 31 British Library (India Office Library), Mss EurF125/11, Linlithgow to Amery, November 30th 1942 , December 22nd 1942 [17]
  • December 1942 Later he would bitterly regret not forcefully making the point at the first All-India Food Conference in December 1942 'that there was definitely going to be a shortage in Bengal'[17]
  • December 1942 Concern for the city's 'priority classes' accounted for the forcible requisition of rice from mills and warehouses in and around the city in late December 1942 [26]
  • December 1942 In early December a memorandum from Delhi informed the secretary of state in London of an impending crisis owing to a combination of the loss of Burmese rice, natural disasters and an indifferent rice crop in Bengal[26]
  • December 1942 Concern for Calcutta's 'priority classes' accounted for the forcible requisition of rice from mills and warehouses in and around the city in late December 1942 [26]
  • December 1942 In the following months the Japanese air force sank a destroyer and several merchantmen in the Bay of Bengal, and engaged in the sporadic bombing of Bengali cities; an air raid on Calcutta in December 1942 caused considerable panic and the displacement to the countryside of thousands of civilians[23]
  • December 1942 "4 Concern for the city's "priority classes" accounted for the forcible requisition of rice from mills and warehouses in and around the city in late December 1942 [23]
  • December 1942 18 In early December 1942 a memorandum from the Delhi government's Food Department informed the secre[23]
  • December 1942 19 Memorandum from the Delhi government's Food Department, 9 December 1942 (published in Mansergh 1971: 357)[23]
  • December 1942 The "basic plan" devised in Delhi in late 1942 envisaged Bengal obtaining 370,000 tons of rice—about four percent of its annual requirements—from the rest of India in the year beginning December 1942 , whereas in the seven months starting in December 1942 it actually received 44,000 tons[23]
  • December 1942 , 414 (23 December 1942 )[23]
  • December 1942 14 per maund on 11 December 1942 , rose to Rs[7]
  • December 1942 Beginning with descriptions of'hunger marches organised by communists' on 28 December 1942 , a selection of the reports include: 'people having to go without food' (10 February); 'indications of distress among local people' (27 February) ; 'acute distress prevails' (26 March) : 'crime against property increasing, and paddy looting cases have become frequent' (28 March) ; 'major economic catas trophe apprehended' (27 April); 'economic conditions approach a crisis' (13 May);[7]
  • December 1942 f The 'Bengal Chamber of Commerce Foodstuffs Scheme', guaranteeing essential items of food to the grain shops of industrial concerns connected with the Chamber, came into existence with the government's help in August 1942 ; it covered 620,000 employees by December of that year[7]
  • December 1942 The Government helped to feed Calcutta through three successive schemes of procurement at controlled prices between December 1942 and March 1943 , but since they did not prove to be very successful, free purchase at market prices was resumed in the districts from March 1943 , leading to very sharp rises in the price of rice in the districts[7]
  • December 1942 But is this explanation really supported by the facts—even by data to be found in the body of the Report of the Famine Inquiry Commission itself? First consider what the Commission calls the 'current supply' for a given year, obtained by adding the winter crop of the preceding year (harvested in December, and usually sold in the follow ing three months) to the spring and autumn crops of the year in question, plus net imports[7]
  • December 1942 While in September 1942 the wage stood where it was in December 1941 and the price of rice stood only a little higher, a sudden upsurge of the rice price subsequently occurred, without a matching movement of the wage rate[7]
  • December 1942 December 0-25 179 0-44 119 66[7]
  • December 1942 December 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 1942[7]
  • December 1942 December 125 95 134 85 66 84 56[7]
  • December 1942 December 170 170 180 100 106[7]
  • December 1942 Third, speculative withdrawal and panic purchase of rice stocks were encouraged by administrative chaos, § especially the inept handling of three procurement schemes, tried and hurriedly abandoned between December and March, ending with the sudden abolition of price control in the wholesale market on 11 March[7]
  • December 1942 An estimate of'shortage of rice' was made in December 1942 , taking full note of'loss of Burma rice, floods in Sind, cyclones in rice growing areas of Bengal and Orissa and an indifferent rice crop generally in Bengal'[7]
  • December 1942 Huseyn Shameed Suhrawardy, a Bengal politician who served as Civil Supplies Minister in the Bengal provincial government during the famine, remembered the warning at the Delhi Food Conference in December 1942 that because crops had failed for two seasons in a row in Bengal, a serious famine was impending[8]
  • December 1942 The Japanese campaigns that began with Pearl Harbor in December 1941 concluded with their conquest of Southeast Asia in the first months of 1942 [8]
  • December 1942 Finally, in December 1942 the Cochin Dewar and his government decided that the only solution to the famine conditions was to impose monopoly procurement on producers in the villages[8]
  • December 1942 86 In December 1942 the Governor of Bombay warned the Viceroy that unless Bombay obtained food in the next week, he would have to start moving people out of the city into the countryside to survive[8]
  • December 1942 By December 1942 famine was declared throughout the district[8]
  • January 1943 If there was an accumulated surplus, it had disappeared b 1941 , and 1943 opened with nothing more than the aman crop of 1942 , assembled : by January, 1943 comlast
  • January 1943 Actually consumed by this population from 1st January to , 15thJune,atthssamerate comlast
  • January 1943 5'4 Estimated aman crop assembled in January 1943 comlast
  • January 1943 —Therefore, it may be assumed, with considerable justification, that 6-024 million tons aman crop, assembled by January 1943 , came into consump- tion almost immediately, if not even earlier during the harvest, icomlast
  • January 1943 The aman rice crop available for consumption from January, to September 1943 (when the cue crop becomes available), Was approximately 5-5 million tons (adjusted figures with 20 per cent increase over Director of Agricul- ture's estimates)comlast
  • January 1943 Wheat, January comlast
  • January 1943 In January and February 1948, the Provin- ' cial Government endeavoured unsuccessfully to obtain control of supplies and to regulate prices by_ means of procurement operationscomm-92ff
  • January 1943 ' The situation in January 1943 Gcomm1
  • January 1943 l to January 19 147 162 201 216 217 217 218 219 225 234comm1
  • January 1943 "the people and the government", "the situation in January 1943 "comm1
  • January 1943 In January and February 1943 , the Provin- cial Government endeavoured unsuccessfully to obtain control of supplies and to regulate prices by means of procurement operationscomm100-150
  • January 1943 , half the actual number of deaths') one would expect that any real fall in the death-rate in January would be offset by the greater accuracy of registration, and that the result would have been a rise in recorded mortalitycomm100-150
  • January 1943 If there was an accumulated surplus, it had disappeared b 1941 , and 1943 opened with nothing more than the aman crop of 1942 , assembled : by January, 1943 hussain_minute
  • January 1943 Actually consumed by this population from 1st January to , 15thJune,atthssamerate hussain_minute
  • January 1943 5'4 Estimated aman crop assembled in January 1943 hussain_minute
  • January 1943 —Therefore, it may be assumed, with considerable justification, that 6-024 million tons aman crop, assembled by January 1943 , came into consump- tion almost immediately, if not even earlier during the harvest, ihussain_minute
  • January 1943 The aman rice crop available for consumption from January, to September 1943 (when the cue crop becomes available), Was approximately 5-5 million tons (adjusted figures with 20 per cent increase over Director of Agricul- ture's estimates)hussain_minute
  • January 1943 Wheat, January hussain_minute
  • January 1943 The situation in January 1943 S5IARIHDD8-001362
  • January 1943 An indication, of the rate at which paddy and rioe move into the markets of Bengal during different months o£ the year' is given by the following account of movements into the Calcutta market:" Fifty per ceut of the total annual arrivals of paddy'as well at rice were' teceived in the foul' months, January to' AprilIARIHDD8-001362
  • January 1943 Incomings of paddy were heaviest in January and February, amounting to 28 per cent of the annual total arrivals in the market, while reoeipts of rice were highest in February and' MsIARIHDD8-001362
  • January 1943 III January 1943 , an additional relaxation was introducedIARIHDD8-001362
  • January 1943 In January 1943 , the price IARIHDD8-001362
  • January 1943 This scheme was abandoned on the Qth January,IARIHDD8-001362
  • January 1943 On the 4th January 1943 , the price of coarse rice had dropped to RsIARIHDD8-001362
  • January 1943 On the 20th January, the price had moved ~p to RsIARIHDD8-001362
  • January 1943 1 These show that the net receipts into Calc\ltta during January aHd February 1943 were approximately 7,000 tons in each of these two monthsIARIHDD8-001362
  • January 1943 January · · · · 10 6 0 11 12 0 13 4 0 12 4: 0 9 8 0 February · · · · 12 8 0 13 8 0 13 8 0 13 2 0 12 0 0 MarchIARIHDD8-001362
  • January 1943 the 2nd January 1943 , the Provincial Governments were addressed by the Government of India on the subjectIARIHDD8-001362
  • January 1943 On the 27th January, the Government of InaIARIHDD8-001362
  • January 1943 et arnvl1ls durIng the two months of January and February ltrnountecl it aIARIHDD8-001362
  • January 1943 It was not, however, until the 31st January 194IARIHDD8-001362
  • January 1943 Prices rose rapidly and by January 1943 had reached levels never before known in BengalIARIHDD8-001362
  • January 1943 taken by the Bengal Government towards the end of December 1942 and ill January-February 1943 IARIHDD8-001362
  • January 1943 On the 9th JanuaryIARIHDD8-001362
  • January 1943 It has al~o been said that some of those employed in January and February 1943 made large private purchases and large profits on such purchases aft-er Governme-nt de(·ided on de-controlIARIHDD8-001362
  • January 1943 We cEm' understand why the Government of Bengal in January 1943 l at a time when,' liijtle eXperience of the technique IARIHDD8-001362
  • January 1943 We believe that if after deciding in January 1943 to increase the scale of these purchases, they had strengthened the official purchasing agency by the substitution of special procurement officers for District Officers, fixed ceiling prices withiu which purchases would be made, and made it clear that they would not hesitate to requisition from large producers as well as from traders, better results would have been obtainedIARIHDD8-001362
  • January 1943 But by January 1943 the danger of famine was already imIr}inentIARIHDD8-001362
  • January 1943 In January 1943 the aman crop had just been reapedIARIHDD8-001362
  • January 1943 which we have to t\sk ourselves is this: was it possible, at the beginning of January 1943 , in the con· ditions then existing in Bengal, for the Government to undertake a scheme of nrocurement as outlined in the previous paragraph, without precipitating a breakdown of the administration? We think this would have been possible provided:IARIHDD8-001362
  • January 1943 "ever, whether in January this opposition was veryIARIHDD8-001362
  • January 1943 The situation which developed in January and February 1943 , demanded an intensification of control measuresIARIHDD8-001362
  • January 1943 In January and February 1943 , the Provincial Government endeavoured unsuccessfully to obtain control of supplies and to regulate prices by means of procurement operationsIARIHDD8-001362
  • January 1943 , half the actunl mmiber of deaths) one would expect that any real fall in the death-rate in January would be offset by the greater accuracy of registration, and thai) the result would have been a rise in recorded morfnIityIARIHDD8-001362
  • January 1943 The aman crop is harvested from November to December, and may be said to be assembled by the begiiming Or January; the boro orop is harvested by March-April, and the aU8 crop in August-SeptemberIARIHDD8-001362
  • January 1943 v be regarded as from January to DecemberIARIHDD8-001362
  • January 1943 uring January to March-April is not 'carry-over'; it represents the actual requirem, entIARIHDD8-001362
  • January 1943 The ct'?P assembled in J:anuary is ceF~amly avaIlable for elU'ly consumption, but 1£ consumed prematurely will teave a deficit at, the eud of the year of consumption, unless the crop proouoed is more than the requirement of 12 months and will, therefore :qteet the additional requiremen~ ul> ~ theIARIHDD8-001362
  • January 1943 tion from 1st January to 15th June, at the same rateIARIHDD8-001362
  • January 1943 Estimated aman crop assembled in ,January 1943 6'0 IARIHDD8-001362
  • January 1943 -Therefore, it lllay be assullled, with considerable justification, that 6·024 million tons aman crop, assembled by January 1943 , came into consump· tion almost immediately, if not even Mrlier during the harvest, iIARIHDD8-001362
  • January 1943 The aman rice crop available for consumption from January to September 1943 (when the aU8 crop becomes available), was appl'Oxirnately 5·5 million tons (adjusted figures with 20 per cent increase over Director of Agriculture's estimates)IARIHDD8-001362
  • January 1943 I~ must also be remembered that if rice and wheat had come into :Bengal during May-July 1943 in the same trickle at which they were coming from January too April 1943 , the distress wouldIARIHDD8-001362
  • January 1943 According to the returns received, total stooks in Caloutta at the end of January 1943 were 3·84 !akh maunds of rice and 0·80 Iakh maunds of paddy, or roughly 16,000 tons ofrice and paddy in terms ofrice, a quantity which would oover the requirements of Caloutta for about three weeksIARIHDD8-001362
  • January 1943 JanuaryIARIHDD8-001362
  • January 1943 January February March TotalIARIHDD8-001362
  • January 1943 January 7,000IARIHDD8-001362
  • January 1943 January February MarchIARIHDD8-001362
  • January 1943 10th January 1943 IARIHDD8-001362
  • January 1943 January to March 1943 ·IARIHDD8-001362
  • January 1943 October to December 1942 82,000 50,000 January to March 1943 4,60,000 3,03,500 50,000 April to June 1943 • 10,05,500 5,00,000 3,00,000 July to September 1943 1,05,000 2,95,000 October to December 1943 1,10,000 6,60,000IARIHDD8-001362
  • January 1943 In January, 1943 the Viceroy in India wrote to the Secretary of State for India in London: 'Mindful of our difficulties about food I told him [the Premier of Bengal] that he simply must produce some more rice out of Bengal for Ceylon [now Sri Lanka] even if Bengal itself went short! He was by no means unsympathetic, and it is possible that I may in the result screw a little out of them'__lecturenotesfamine
  • January 1943 ber 1942 and January 1943 , the Bengal Government[27]
  • January 1943 In Decem? ber 1942 and January 1943 , the Bengal Government undertook two procurement schemes in an attempt to "break" the Calcutta market[27]
  • January 1943 Senior officials had been aware of this problem, and as Theodore Gregory, the Permanent Economic Adviser to the Government of India had noted in January 1943 , it was going to be impossible to arrange comprehensive rationing schemes even for theentire urban population[14]
  • January 1943 Scarcity was also declared in Karmala, Madha, Pandharpur, Sangola andMalsiras talukas ofSholapur district from 9February 1942 whichwasextended totheSholapur taluka from 18January 1943 (the declarations were only withdrawn in January 1944 )[14]
  • January 1943 As late as 14 January 1943 the revenue secretary to the provincial government asserted in a circular to district officers that the rise in prices had 'placed greatly increased purchasing in the hands of the agriculturalists [3]
  • January 1943 "The increase in the rice price in Phase I [January 1942 to March 1943 ] was[15]
  • January 1943 supplies in any of the periods, January to March 1943 , March to June 1943 or June to December 1943 [15]
  • January 1943 It started in January 1943 in Chittagong, and soon after in Tipperah, Faridipur and Dacca[15]
  • January 1943 In spite of embargoes preventing anyone but the Government agents exporting from the district, only 2,200 tons were purchased between 10th and l7th January, and the scheme was abandoned (FIC p36)[15]
  • January 1943 In January 1943 the collector reported that the "economic conditions in Sadar [i[18]
  • January 1943 Dacca, January 5[18]
  • January 1943 Calcutta, January 4[18]
  • January 1943 Dacca, January 1 1[18]
  • January 1943 Calcutta, January 27[18]
  • January 1943 Greenough (1982) reports that in Calcutta the price of coarse rice (wholesale) rose from 11 rupees four annas (one anna is one-sixteenth of a rupee) in January 4, 1943 to its peak 34 rupees eight annas in August 23, 1943 [20]
  • January 1943 two-thirds were in that state before January 1943 , tal effect on the entitlement of the rural poor[20]
  • January 1943 One such report was seen as early as 10 January 1943 [10]
  • January 1943 The government registered the maximum number of destitutes between January 1943 to May 1944 [10]
  • January 1943 The jobs in which the male members of the families were employed in January 1943 changed by the end of 1944 in a very large number of cases, and the principal earners had either become destitute or were dead[10]
  • January 1943 By the end of January 1943 the total stock of food grains in Calcutta stood at 384,000 maunds of rice and 84,000 maunds of paddy, the total accounting for some three weeks' requirement for Calcutta[10]
  • January 1943 In a memorandum to the central government, Amery noted on 16 January 1943 : 'The shortages, serious as they are, would not, from the statistical standpoint, bear a catastrophic proportion of the Indian cereal crop of 60/70 million tons[10]
  • January 1943 73 Amery to Linlithgow, telegram, 16 January 1943 , in TOP, Vol[10]
  • January 1943 Modern Review, (Calcutta) ( 1943 ), January–June[10]
  • January 1943 The monthly data on births suggest that the famine reduced the absolute number of conceptions much more during the normal 'peak' conception season (January- March) than during the period when conceptions were usually at a minimum[12]
  • January 1943 conceptions dates from around January of 1974, and perhaps a little earlier (see Dyson[29]
  • January 1943 of the 1974-75 famine provided by Alamgir which starts with the period January-March of[29]
  • January 1943 Land Sales in Bengal between January 1943 and April 1944 by Size-class of Ownership Holding[30]
  • January 1943 The aman, or winter rice, was sown between April and June and reaped between November and January[2]
  • January 1943 The boro variety grew mostly in marshes and was planted between January and March for harvesting by May[2]
  • January 1943 On the other hand, districts composed of laterite or heavy clay, mostly found in western Bengal, took a longer time to dry after the rains had subsided and were not 'safe to enter until the middle of January'[2]
  • January 1943 In January 1943 , an additional relaxation was introduced[24]
  • January 1943 The aman crop available for consumption duringJanuary-September of this year was 5-5 million ton, but the actual requirement was of the order of 7[4]
  • January 1943 2 January 1943 [25]
  • January 1943 Even in the pre-famine period (January 1939 to January 1943 ) about 6 84 per cent[5]
  • January 1943 0 lakhs in January 1943 [6]
  • January 1943 3 lakhs of destitutes between January 1943 and May 1944 [6]
  • January 1943 Compared to the number of destitutes in January 1943 the largest proportion had come during the famine period from younger age groups[6]
  • January 1943 Even in the pre-famine period (January 1939 to January 1943 ) the proportion of families suffering economic deterioration and desti tution was much higher than the proportion who had improved their position[6]
  • January 1943 During the famine period (January 1943 to May 1944 ) the whole process was greatly accelerated but the general nature of changes remained much the same[6]
  • January 1943 -_ classification January 1943 plough paddy land plough paddy land" (in lakhs) cattle in acres cattle[6]
  • January 1943 Number and proportion of families living on charity in January 1943 and in May 1944 [6]
  • January 1943 destitute families living on charity number surveyed percentage of total number of families total total in change between total in net total in change between total in net number January January 1943 May increase January January 1943 May increase of 1943 and May 1944 1944 between 1943 and May 1944 1944 between class families Jan[6]
  • January 1943 (12) of the table that there was an appreciable increase in the proportion of destitute families in all classes of subdivisions between January 1943 and May 1944 [6]
  • January 1943 The parallel grading in January 1943 and May 1944 probably indicates that by the beginning of 1943 adverse conditions created by war had already affected the different areas broadly in the same pattern as in 1944 [6]
  • January 1943 Number and proportion of destitute persons living on charity in January 1943 and in May 1944 and change between January 1943 and May 1944 [6]
  • January 1943 persons total in change between total net total in change between total net class surveyed January January 1943 in May increase January January 1943 in May increase 1943 and 1944 between 1943 and 1944 between May 1944 Jan[6]
  • January 1943 1 there was an appreciable increase in the proportion of destitute persons in all classes of subdivisions between January 1943 and May 1944 [6]
  • January 1943 2 that the proportions of destitute families and persons in January 1943 were in broad agreement with the present classification[6]
  • January 1943 This is corroborated by the fact that the propor tion of destitute persons in January 1943 , as estimated by the present sample survey, was 1[6]
  • January 1943 3 gives the estimated number of destitute families and persons in January 1943 and May 1944 [6]
  • January 1943 Estimated number (in lakhs) of destitute families and persons in rural Bengal in January 1943 and May 1944 [6]
  • January 1943 3 lakhs of destitute persons between January 1943 and May 1944 [6]
  • January 1943 4 gives the esti mates of destitute persons in January 1943 and May 1944 and the new destitutes created by the famine in the intervening period by age and sex[6]
  • January 1943 Estimated number (in lakhs) of destitute persons in rural Bengal by age and sex in january 1943 and in may 1944 and the number of new destitutes between January 1943 and May 1944 [6]
  • January 1943 January 1943 May 1944[6]
  • January 1943 The number of destitute families and persons in the subdivisions surveyed living on charity in May 1944 and classified by family occupation in January 1943 is given in table 3[6]
  • January 1943 Because of the manner in which this table has been formed, the number of families and persons given in each occu pational class (except, of course, in the group living on charity) actually show the number of new destitutes, that is, the number of families or persons who became destitute between January 1943 and May 1944 [6]
  • January 1943 as in January 1943[6]
  • January 1943 living on charity in January 1943[6]
  • January 1943 6 which gives the proportional distribution by occupations of rural families living in January 1943 based on the present sample and corresponding proportions of families, turned destitute between January 1943 and May 1944 in each occupational group[6]
  • January 1943 in January 1943[6]
  • January 1943 living on charity in January 1943 2 -58 total 100 -00[6]
  • January 1943 67% of all families included in the survey had 'agriculture' as their occupation in January 1943 , while the percentage share of destitutes in May 1944 contributed by the 'agriculture' group was 7[6]
  • January 1943 CONDITION OF PARENTS & EARNERS persons living on charity in May 1944 with occupations in January 1943 number surveyed[6]
  • January 1943 4 Compared to the number of destitutes in January 1943 the largest proportion had come from the younger age-groups during the famine period of January 1943 and May 1944 [6]
  • January 1943 Esti mated number of destitute persons in lakhs by age and sex under each class of incidence in January 1943 and May 1944 , and the new destitutes created by the famine during the above period is given in table 3[6]
  • January 1943 Estimates of destitutes by sex and age in January 1943 and May 1944 have been derived from the proportional distribution within the sample of the des titutes surveyed[6]
  • January 1943 Estimated number (in lakhs) of destitute persons in each class of incidence by sex and age in January 1943 and May 1944 and the new destitutes created between January 1943 and May 1944 [6]
  • January 1943 January 1943 ?May 1944[6]
  • January 1943 1 gives the number of and proportion of families in the sample suffering change of family occupation during the period January 1943 to April 1944 [6]
  • January 1943 Number of families in the sample surveyed by occupations as in January 1943 and in May 1944 , and number and proportion of change of occupation during the period[6]
  • January 1943 occupational groups January 1943 & May 1944 (1)[6]
  • January 1943 2 shows the actual number of families surveyed together with the family occupation as in both January 1943 and May 1944 [6]
  • January 1943 For example, 4875 families were in the group 'agriculture' in January 1943 [6]
  • January 1943 5 gives the estimated total number (in lakhs) of families in each occupational group which had retained or changed their occupation between January 1943 and April 1944 classified under the three categories ; (a) improvement, (b) deterioration, and (c) ambiguous[6]
  • January 1943 0-03 6-61 111 4-85 1-45 2-46 5-22 Weights used are the estimated total number of families in January 1943 in the classes 220[6]
  • January 1943 Estimated number (in lakhs) of families in different occupatioal as in January 1943 and as in May 1944 in rural Bengal[6]
  • January 1943 estimated number (in lakhs) of families in occupational groups occupational groups as in January 1943[6]
  • January 1943 Estimated total number (in lakhs) of families in rural Bengal by family occupations as in January 1943 , and the change between January 1943 and may 1944 classified under 'improvement', 'deterioration', or 'ambiguous'[6]
  • January 1943 January 1943 & May 1944[6]
  • January 1943 Rules adopted to determine economic deterioration The method adopted to interpret the nature of shift of families from one occupation to another between January 1943 and May 1944 is given below[6]
  • January 1943 Cumulative percentage of subdivisions surveyed by percentage of families owning no paddy land or below 2 acres in January 1943 [6]
  • January 1943 in January 1943 Class A Class B Class C total (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)[6]
  • January 1943 (3) and (4) it is seen that already in January 1943 , before the famine, the proportion of subdivisions having higher percentages of poorer families was heavier in Class(A), the "most severely affected" area, than in the other two[6]
  • January 1943 This shows that conditions in January 1943 were already pretty bad[6]
  • January 1943 Cumulative percentage of subdivisions surveyed by mean acreage of paddy land owned per family in January 1943 [6]
  • January 1943 (2) of the table shows that in January 1943 only in 5 out of 13, or 41% of the sub divisions in Class (A), the paddy land owned was above 1[6]
  • January 1943 (b) Estimated number of families as shown in col(4) are derived from the total number of families (102 -4 lakhs in January 1943 ) and the proportion of families in each acreage group as shown in col[6]
  • January 1943 (3) of the table that in rural Bengal in January 1943 more than one-third (36[6]
  • January 1943 (5), have been derived from the proportions of each subdivision and class of incidence with the total number of families in each subdivision and class in January 1943 used as weights[6]
  • January 1943 (6), is based on the total number of families in January 1943 of Col[6]
  • January 1943 in January 1943 table 5[6]
  • January 1943 in January 1943 )[6]
  • January 1943 Number and proportion of families surveyed owning paddy land in Aprdl 1943 by family occupations before the famine in January 1943 [6]
  • January 1943 occupational groups number of families percentage of before the famine in included in survey families owning January 1943 *-*-? paddy land[6]
  • January 1943 Number and proportion of families mortgaging or selling paddy land (in full and in part) between April 1943 and April 1944 by family occupations before the famine in January 1943 [6]
  • January 1943 famine in January 1943 selling paddy land mortgaging selling paddy land mortgaging total r-*-v paddy ,-*--, paddy[6]
  • January 1943 Estimated acreage of paddy land (in lakhs) transferred between April 1943 and March 1944 by occupational groups as in January 1943 [6]
  • January 1943 land transferred in lakhs percentage occupational groups of acres between of bought as in January 1943 April 1943 & April 1944 to sold bought sold difference[6]
  • January 1943 (2) it is seen that the increase in the number of destitute families between January 1943 and May 1944 was 1[6]
  • January 1943 4) which had existed in different areas in January 1943 [6]
  • January 1943 Index numbers of destitution and economic deterioration between January 1943 and May 1944 by occupational groups as in January 1943 occupational groups[6]
  • January 1943 January 1943 tution deteriora- sale of paddy land mortgage net loss families total t[6]
  • January 1943 Changes in economic conditions in rural Bengal during the famine period of January 1943 to May 1944 have been already dis cussed in Chapters 3 and 4[6]
  • January 1943 Similar changes which had occurred during the so-called normal pre-famine period (from January 1939 to January 1943 ) are shown in table 7[6]
  • January 1943 4 has been prepared from data given in table 7(A-3) which shows the estimated total number of families under each family occupation in January 1939 and in January 1943 in rural Bengal[6]
  • January 1943 Estimated number of families in lakhs in rural Bengal by family occupation in january 1939 , and change in economic condition between January 1939 and January 1943 [6]
  • January 1943 January Januarv 1939 & January 1943 1939[6]
  • January 1943 percentage of families in January[6]
  • January 1943 & January 1943[6]
  • January 1943 (7)?(10) of the table show that during the so-called normal period (January 1939 to January 1943 ) the proportion of families suffering economic deterioration and destitution was much higher than the proportion who had improved their position[6]
  • January 1943 5 shows relative changes in the pre-famine (January 1939 ?January 1943 ) and in the famine (January 1943 ?May 1944 ) periods[6]
  • January 1943 The proportion (in percentage form) of families in each category of 'improvement', 'no-change', 'deterioration', 'destitution', and 'not clear' in the pre-famine period (January 1939 ?January 1943 ) are shown in col[6]
  • January 1943 (2) and corresponding percentages of families for changes which occurred during the famine period (January 1943 ?May 1944 ) in col[6]
  • January 1943 (3) as of change in economic January 1939 ? January 1943 ? percentage the two periods condition January 1943 May 1944 of col[6]
  • January 1943 To put the matter very briefly, economic deterioration, on the whole, had set in definitely even in the pre-famine period (January 1939 ?January 1943 ) ; a comparatively small number of families were improving their economic position while a far large number were suffering economic deterioration or destitution[6]
  • January 1943 During the famine period (January 1943 ?May 1944 ) the whole process was greatly accelerated but the general nature of changes remained much the same[6]
  • January 1943 Relative proportion of net loss of plough cattle and families losing PLOUGH CATTLE COMPLETELY BETWEEN APRIL 1943 AND APRIL 1944 TO THE PROPORTION OF total plough cattle and famil?es owning plough cattle under occupational groups as in January 1943 [6]
  • January 1943 Fairly heavy rains during the three monsoon months of July, August and September, and some further rains in December and January, are generally considered to be necessary for good harvests in most parts of India[19]
  • January 1943 The number of deaths recorded by this survey for the period January to December 1943 , and the number of people recorded as alive as of January 1943 , may both have been influenced by their method of collection, which was called the "genealogical method"; see Greenough (1982), p[19]
  • January 1943 about 70 markets including Calcutta) but only from January to August of 1943 (see Appendix D)[19]
  • January 1943 3 presents district-wise percentage rises in deaths for the six half yearly sub-periods between January 1943 and December 1945 [19]
  • January 1943 3 Inter-district variation in mortality rise in the period between January 1943 and December 1945 Bengal[19]
  • January 1943 4 Rank correlation coefficients (Spearman) matrix for the districts in terms of proportional mortality increases in the six half-yearly sub-periods between January 1943 and December 1945 [19]
  • January 1943 In Malda the maximum malaria deaths occurred in January of 1943 whereas the highest MI happened nearly one year later (see Figures 6[19]
  • January 1943 Column (iv) gives average daily labour attendance on relief works during the main period of relief provision (January-September 1973) expressed as a per cent of the 1971 district census population totals[19]
  • January 1943 An average of just over six per cent of the state's entire population were attending scarcity relief labour works during the period January- September 1973 (although the resumption of monsoon rains meant that this relief provision was sharply curtailed by October)[19]
  • January 1943 Lobour relief provision during January-September 1973 averaged aver ten per cent of the population[19]
  • January 1943 1943 January 9[19]
  • January 1943 2 Linlithgow Collection: 2336, "Governor of Bengal to Viceroy", 2 January 1943 [21]
  • January 1943 4 million by January 1st of 1943 [1]
  • January 1943 When the rural procurement scheme got underway in January of 1943 , there were again disagreements between the Governor and the Bengal Ministry about agency appointments[1]
  • January 1943 In January of 1943 , less than one year after "denial," with the essential aman crop again making its way to the market, agents and purchasers employed by the government,[1]
  • January 1943 The Rajshahi scheme had ended, but even then, in Chittagong the Collector began "requisitioning hard" from cultivators towards the middle of January, and "this caused strong local resentment -[1]
  • January 1943 By January 1943 , Calcutta was filling up with "beggars[1]
  • January 1943 31 A Press Note on the topic was released in the middle of January by the Government of Bengal explaining that government had every good intention to round up the "beggars" and place them in detention, but were facing certain administrative obstacles[1]
  • January 1943 On the 24th of January an editorial in The Statesman read, "there seem more beggars than ever in the city's streets and dirtier than ever; many are more importunate in plying their calling[1]
  • January 1943 However, that Calcutta was filling up with "beggars" by January 1943 , and that their plaintive moans were increasingly going unheard, was a clear indication to many of the city's residents that durbhikkho was well underway[1]
  • January 1943 11/4 per maund on January 4th, 1943 and at Rs[1]
  • January 1943 In January of 1943 , Huq had sent another letter to the Governor protesting the appointment of A[1]
  • January 1943 160 Huq to Herbert, January 9, 1943 [1]
  • January 1943 Towards the end of July details of the scheme to round up Calcutta's "beggars" (which had been in the works since at least January81) were finalized[1]
  • January 1943 The Bengal Steamer Khalasis Bill of 1943 , brought before the Legislative Assembly in January, called for the recognition of khalasis directly by companies, which would afford them the protection of "priority" status[1]
  • January 1943 The War Cabinet met on the 11th of January 1943 , and rejected the Viceroy's bid[1]
  • January 1943 India Ravaged [Being an Account of Atrocities Committed under the British Aegis, Over the Whole Sub-Continent of India in the Latter Part of 1942 ] (Place and Publisher Unknown, January 1943 )[1]
  • January 1943 ) of rice costing about 5 rupees on the eve of the crisis, cost 9 rupees in January 1943 , 21 rupees in April, and 30 rupees in July (Maharatna 1996)[16]
  • January 1943 One of the most interesting tables in the Mahalanobis survey—reproduced below, with minor alterations, as table 5—implies that the occupational status of 400,000 families dependent on 'agriculture' or 'agriculture and labour' (about 8 per cent of the total) deteriorated between January 1943 and May 1944 , in the sense that they were forced to shift from their former occupation (for example, farmer) to an inferior one (for example, labourer)[13]
  • January 1943 When the New Statesman & Nation first raised the spectre of famine in India in January 1943 , the Economist responded with a concise statement of British wartime priorities: 'The best way to end the famine is speedy victory and, however hard the decision, food ships must come second to victory ships'[13]
  • January 1943 University College, Dublin Date submitted 16 May 2007 Revised version submitted 21 November 2007 Accepted 23 January 2008[13]
  • January 1943 61 Kenyan shillings per kilo between January and November 1984, the coefficient of variation across eighteen markets trebled from 0[17]
  • January 1943 ) of rice costing about 5 rupees on the eve of the crisis, cost 9 rupees in January 1943 , 21 rupees in April, and 30 rupees in July[17]
  • January 1943 There were demands for rationing in Calcutta and other urban centres as early as January 1943 , and in mid-February the Bengal legislature debated a demand for supplementary funding that included provision under the heading 'Famine' for relief measures in the cyclone-affected areas[17]
  • January 1943 7 million families out of a total of over ten million deteriorated between January 1943 and May 1944 , in the sense that they were forced to shift from their former occupation (e[17]
  • January 1943 31 And yet, in January 1943 , despite accumulating evidence of a poor harvest in Bengal, we see Linlithgow insisting to Chief Minister Fazl-ul Huq that 'he simply must produce more rice out of Bengal for Ceylon even if Bengal itself went short!' and hoping that he might 'screw a little out of them'[17]
  • January 1943 6 Statesman (Calcutta), January 28th; February 19th; March 10th; March 28th; April 3rd; April 5th; May 13th 1943 [17]
  • January 1943 Lord Linlithgow to Leo Amery, 26 January 1943[23]
  • January 1943 Only in January 1943 was the real scale of the damage revealed, because of fears that news of the calamity would play into the hands of the Japanese[23]
  • January 1943 17 "Rice Position in Bengal," Statesman, 3 January 1943 ; "Rice and Dal Prices in Calcutta: Government Order," Statesman, 4 January 1943 [23]
  • January 1943 In January 1943 a committee appointed by Calcutta's municipal council suggested the need for food rationing[23]
  • January 1943 20 "Food Rationing: Corporation Committee's Suggestions," Statesman, 28 January 1943 ; "Measures for Food Rationing," Statesman, 2 February 1943 [23]
  • January 1943 33 "Rice Position in Bengal: Minister's Appeal," Statesman, 3 January 1943 [23]
  • January 1943 On 28 January he repeated a statement from the Indian government that "there is no famine and no widespread prevalence of acute shortage[23]
  • January 1943 At the end of January 1943 it had resisted demands to divert food and ships to India: "Clearly, the best way to end the famine is speedy victory, and, however hard the decision, food ships must come second to victory ships[23]
  • January 1943 53 "Food for India," The Economist, 30 January 1943 , p[23]
  • January 1943 In early January 1943 its agriculture and industries minister, the Nawab Bahadur of Dacca, sought to reassure consumers by claiming that although the 1942 aman crop was less than the previous year's, it was no worse than that of 1940 [23]
  • January 1943 6, which summarizes market price data for a range of food items (meat, vegetables, fruit, fish109) as reported in the Statesman between January 1943 and March 1944 , confirms that price rises in Bengal were by no means confined to rice[23]
  • January 1943 rate of December-January of the tripling of rice prices that was to follow before the next peak in May-June[7]
  • January 1943 January 0-27 193 0-50 135 70[7]
  • January 1943 January 116 88 132 85 61 65 52[7]
  • January 1943 January 228 150 180 66 79[7]
  • January 1943 in January 1939 (before the famine), January 1943 (immediately preceding the famine—in fact, in terms of our phase structure towards the end of Phase I of the famine), and in May 1944 (after the famine)[7]
  • January 1943 Data from the study by Mahalanobis, Mukherjea and Ghosh ( 1946 ) can be used to construct transition matrices in the pre-famine period (January 1939 to January 1943 ) as well as during the famine (January 1943 to May 1944 ), and these are presented in the Appendix (Tables 9 and 10)[7]
  • January 1943 January 1939 January 1943 January 1939 January 1943 and January 1943 and May 1944 and January 1943 and May 1944 Peasant cultivation[7]
  • January 1943 1 January 1943 1 January[7]
  • January 1943 (%) 1 January 1943 during 1943 '[7]
  • January 1943 ÎÎ See the Secretary of State's telegram to the Viceroy on 16 January 1943 , Document no[7]
  • January 1943 On 26 January the Viceroy wrote to the Secretary of State for India: 'Mindful of our difficulties about food I told him [the Premier of Bengal] that he simply must produce some more rice out of Bengal for Ceylon even if Bengal itself went short ! He was by no means unsympathetic, and it is possible that I may in the result screw a little out of them[7]
  • January 1943 Using the study by Mahalanobis, Mukherjea and Ghosh ( 1946 ), it is possible to construct occu pational 'transition matrices' in the immediate pre-famine period (between January 1939 and January 1943 ) and in the famine period (between January 1943 and May 1944 )[7]
  • January 1943 In January 1943 the government required permits for grain to be transported, but merchants tried to evade this[8]
  • January 1943 In the Indian Ocean alone from January 1942 to May 1943 , the Axis powers sank 230 British and Allied merchant ships totaling 873,000 tons, in other words, a substantial boat every other day[8]
  • February 1943 February comlast
  • February 1943 The Food Department which was established in December 1942 set out on the task of disentangling the food tangles , ' The Second All-India Food Conference was held on the 24th-26th February, 1943 , The Secretary of the Food Department once again preached the gospel of 'equality of sacrifice'comlast
  • February 1943 The situation which developed in Jpnuary and February 1948, demanded an intensification of control measurescomm-92ff
  • February 1943 In January and February 1948, the Provin- ' cial Government endeavoured unsuccessfully to obtain control of supplies and to regulate prices by_ means of procurement operationscomm-92ff
  • February 1943 Sarker, the Food Member, resigned in February 1943 , and His Excellency the Viceroy, Lord Linlithgow, held the food portfolio without a Member to assist him until Maycomm-92ff
  • February 1943 In January and February 1943 , the Provin- cial Government endeavoured unsuccessfully to obtain control of supplies and to regulate prices by means of procurement operationscomm100-150
  • February 1943 R, Sarker, the Food Member, resigned in February 1943 , and His Excellency the Viceroy, Lord Linlithgow, held the food portfolio Without a Member to assist- him until Maycomm100-150
  • February 1943 February hussain_minute
  • February 1943 The Food Department which was established in December 1942 set out on the task of disentangling the food tangles , ' The Second All-India Food Conference was held on the 24th-26th February, 1943 , The Secretary of the Food Department once again preached the gospel of 'equality of sacrifice'hussain_minute
  • February 1943 February or MarchIARIHDD8-001362
  • February 1943 Incomings of paddy were heaviest in January and February, amounting to 28 per cent of the annual total arrivals in the market, while reoeipts of rice were highest in February and' MsIARIHDD8-001362
  • February 1943 12/8/-, on the 3rd February to l{sIARIHDD8-001362
  • February 1943 13/2/-, on the 17th February to BsIARIHDD8-001362
  • February 1943 1 These show that the net receipts into Calc\ltta during January aHd February 1943 were approximately 7,000 tons in each of these two monthsIARIHDD8-001362
  • February 1943 February 1943 unde'r three different systems of procurementIARIHDD8-001362
  • February 1943 January · · · · 10 6 0 11 12 0 13 4 0 12 4: 0 9 8 0 February · · · · 12 8 0 13 8 0 13 8 0 13 2 0 12 0 0 MarchIARIHDD8-001362
  • February 1943 et arnvl1ls durIng the two months of January and February ltrnountecl it aIARIHDD8-001362
  • February 1943 gong famine became imminent in February and MarchIARIHDD8-001362
  • February 1943 taken by the Bengal Government towards the end of December 1942 and ill January-February 1943 IARIHDD8-001362
  • February 1943 It was abandoned on the 17th FebruaryIARIHDD8-001362
  • February 1943 It has al~o been said that some of those employed in January and February 1943 made large private purchases and large profits on such purchases aft-er Governme-nt de(·ided on de-controlIARIHDD8-001362
  • February 1943 The situation which developed in January and February 1943 , demanded an intensification of control measuresIARIHDD8-001362
  • February 1943 In January and February 1943 , the Provincial Government endeavoured unsuccessfully to obtain control of supplies and to regulate prices by means of procurement operationsIARIHDD8-001362
  • February 1943 R Sarker, the Food Member, resigned' in February 1943 , and His Excellency the Viceroy, Lord Linlithgow, held the food portfolio without a Member to assist himIARIHDD8-001362
  • February 1943 The Seaond All-India Food Conference was held on the 24th-26th February, 1943 IARIHDD8-001362
  • February 1943 (In TonFebruaryIARIHDD8-001362
  • February 1943 January February March TotalIARIHDD8-001362
  • February 1943 January February MarchIARIHDD8-001362
  • February 1943 Arrivals in Calcutta contInued to exceed the Incre~eIn storage accommodation till FebruaryIARIHDD8-001362
  • February 1943 At the beginning of February, the stocks stored lIARIHDD8-001362
  • February 1943 26th February 1943 IARIHDD8-001362
  • February 1943 25th February 1943 IARIHDD8-001362
  • February 1943 ~Oth February 1943 -Price of rice IncreasingIARIHDD8-001362
  • February 1943 27th February 1943 IARIHDD8-001362
  • February 1943 All are in agreement that this famine is a textbook example of a man-made famine, in line with Amartya's Sen's main thesis in Poverty and Famine (1983), and that the government's lifting of price controls in February 1943 , while buying all possible stocks for the army, was the famine's immediate triggerreview_Structural_Violence2
  • February 1943 (a) Winter crop which is sown in the month of May and harvested in November, (b) Autumn crop which is sown in April and harvested in August, and (c) Spring crop which is sown in November and harvested in February__lecturenotesfamine
  • February 1943 successful and this method was abandoned in February[27]
  • February 1943 February 1943 [27]
  • February 1943 The schemes were un- successful and this method was abandoned in February 1943 [27]
  • February 1943 of Greater Calcutta although an officer had been ap? pointed to prepare a scheme of food distribution in February 1943 [27]
  • February 1943 39 Most secret Weekly Intelligence Summaries (India Internal), 19 February 1943 ,27 August 1943 ,22 October 1943 , 12 January 1945 and 22 June 1945 , LIWS1I1I506, Oriental and India Office Collections, British Library, London, UK[14]
  • February 1943 The Famine Commission argued that, both because of the need for normal stocks and because the rice is not palatable for some months after harvest, it was not normal to start eating the December crop until February or March[15]
  • February 1943 A Food Grains Purchasing Officer was then allowed to buy direct from the trade, but he managed to get only 3000 tons between l8th February and llth March (FIC pp 36-8)[15]
  • February 1943 The first allotment arrived a month late, and then on February 13, 1943 , the DCS, overwhelmed by the failure of its procurement schemes and the problem of feeding Calcutta, explained that since it could not supply any more rice the Revenue Department should buy it directly[18]
  • February 1943 From October 1942 to February 1943 the prices used were the lowest in the district (or in the case of the province, the lowest in Calcutta)[18]
  • February 1943 How far were the food needs of Faridpur actually met prior to July 1943 ? On the basis of its experience in the previous year, the DCS had decided in February that "Faridpur will have to be carefully studied and its real demand met promptly from Government purchases [18]
  • February 1943 Calcutta, February 1[18]
  • February 1943 The official reports from Chittagong also clearly warned the provincial government as early as 25 February 1943 that starvation was already spreading not only in the villages, but also in the towns of Chittagong and even Tippera[10]
  • February 1943 On 27 February 1943 the revenue commissioner wrote that it was 'immediately necessary to start test [relief ] works' as well as gratuitous relief work in these districts[10]
  • February 1943 In February 1943 Pinnell reported to the Second Food Conference in Delhi that there was 20 per cent failure of rice crops in Bengal, with the possibility of crop diseases more serious than the ones that were detected after the onslaught of the cyclone and floods[10]
  • February 1943 Until February 1943 the prices relate to Ballam, No[12]
  • February 1943 Also, in both famines the conception index reached a maximum in February of the second year (i[12]
  • February 1943 In the third final forecast issued on the 13th February, 1943 , the outturn was given as 5,020,100 tons which fell short by 2,376,300 tons (321%) on the preceding season's crop and by 1,270,500 tons (202%) on the ten-year average[25]
  • February 1943 The situation had, however, deteriorated so much by February 1943 that the same Government officially announced a large shortage of rice in a statement made before the Legislative Assembly, evidently on the basis of the already available ofiicial estimate as no fresh information he'd been collected[25]
  • February 1943 31 14 0 February [25]
  • February 1943 Until February 1943 the prices are for Ballam No[19]
  • February 1943 5-7, February: 283-294[19]
  • February 1943 3 Amery Papers: AMEL 1/6/14 File I, "Viceroy to Secretary of State for India", 21 February 1943 [21]
  • February 1943 Recognizing the insufficiency of imports promised, on February 3rd, 1943 the Viceroy wrote to all provincial Governors detailing the gravity of food situation in India[1]
  • February 1943 Gandhi started his fast on 10th February and refused to conduct it under his own arrangements outside the Palace[1]
  • February 1943 February 19, 1943 49[1]
  • February 1943 III, Linlithgow to Amery, February 11, 1943 [1]
  • February 1943 117 Leaders Conference: An authentic account of the Leaders Conference held at New Delhi on 19th and 20th February 1943 in respect of Mahatma Gandhi's fast[1]
  • February 1943 On the 21st of February Gandhi suffered what the Surgeon-General termed a seizure, and his "pulse became nearly imperceptible[1]
  • February 1943 Gandhi, February 23, 1943 [1]
  • February 1943 On February 16th, the day before Food Member Nalini Sarkar resigned from the Executive Council, the Government of India sent provincial authorities a memorandum ordering them to fix strict targets for procurement of foodgrains[1]
  • February 1943 On the 16th of February the Viceroy informed his Secretary of State that a "tiresome" and "school-boyish" quarrel had erupted between the Chief Minister of Bengal, Fazlul Huq, and Provincial Governor, Jack Herbert[1]
  • February 1943 Instead, on the 12th of February, Huq allowed S[1]
  • February 1943 Leaders Conference: an Authentic Account of the Leaders Conference Held At New Delhi On 19th And 20th February 1943 In Respect of Mahatma Gandhi's Fast[1]
  • February 1943 There were demands for rationing in Calcutta and other urban centres as early as January 1943 , and in mid-February the Bengal legislature debated a demand for supplementary funding that included provision under the heading 'Famine' for relief measures in the cyclone-affected areas[17]
  • February 1943 6 Statesman (Calcutta), January 28th; February 19th; March 10th; March 28th; April 3rd; April 5th; May 13th 1943 [17]
  • February 1943 8 Capital (Calcutta financial weekly), 25th February, 4th March 1943 ; Statesman, May 14th 1943 (report of press conference presided over by Suhrawardy)[17]
  • February 1943 4th February[17]
  • February 1943 Although the authorities in London and New Delhi expected political leaders in Bengal to argue the case for adequacy, the weak coalition government that ruled until late March 1943 was hardly reassuring: in February it announced that estimated rice production in 1942 /3 (6[26]
  • February 1943 20 "Food Rationing: Corporation Committee's Suggestions," Statesman, 28 January 1943 ; "Measures for Food Rationing," Statesman, 2 February 1943 [23]
  • February 1943 37 According to his colleague Henry Braund, in February 1943 Pinnell had "openly asserted" before a conference on the food situation in Delhi that "there was a twenty per cent failure of the rice crop in Bengal, with crop disease even more disastrous than the [Midnapore] cyclone[23]
  • February 1943 61 Capital (Calcutta financial weekly), 25 February, 4 March 1943 [23]
  • February 1943 Some believed that the true situation was even worse than implied by the Nawab Bahadur of Dacca's declaration in February 1943 , and that some of the aman crop (the main crop, harvested in November and December) in west Bengal rotted only after it had been harvested, but against this there is the assessment of the leading merchant and Muslim League politician, Mirza Isphahani, that the shortage in[23]
  • February 1943 February 0-25 179 0-50 135 75[7]
  • February 1943 February 168 95 142 98 66 71 56[7]
  • February 1943 February 218 150 180 69 83[7]
  • March 1943 March comlast
  • March 1943 A turning point in the history of the Bengal famine occurred on the 11th March 1943 comm-92ff
  • March 1943 but only did this not take lace, but on the 11th March there was a strikin change incomm-92ff
  • March 1943 From March onward the anxieties of local ofl'icers increased and they left the Provincial Government in no_ doubt about the seriousness of the situationcomm-92ff
  • March 1943 The decision in favour of "dc-control" in March 1943 was a mistakecomm-92ff
  • March 1943 The change in the Ministry in March-April 1948comm-92ff
  • March 1943 The Government of India must share with the Bengal Government respon- sibility for the decision to de-control in March 1943 comm-92ff
  • March 1943 By March the position had so deteriorated that some mea- sure of external assistance wascomm-92ff
  • March 1943 The situation in March 1943 comm1
  • March 1943 "the situation in March 19-13", "external assistance", "free trade"comm1
  • March 1943 By the end of December 1942 distress had already appeared and by March 1943 widespread famine was anticipated by district officialscomm100-150
  • March 1943 The decision in favour of "dc-control" in March 1943 was a mistakecomm100-150
  • March 1943 The change in the Ministry in March~April 1943 comm100-150
  • March 1943 The Government of India must share with the'Bengal Government respon- sibility for the decision to de-control in March 1943 comm100-150
  • March 1943 By March the position had so deteriorated that some mea- sure of external assistance was indispensable if a disaster was to be avoidedcomm100-150
  • March 1943 In Bengal, March and April are normally, the months of highest pre- valencecomm100-150
  • March 1943 March hussain_minute
  • March 1943 The situation in March 1943 89tIARIHDD8-001362
  • March 1943 tion in March 1943 ", "externnl -assistance", "free trade", "distribution of supplies" and "famine relief"IARIHDD8-001362
  • March 1943 February or MarchIARIHDD8-001362
  • March 1943 After March, ~rrlvals diminish graclually, the month!'; of least activity being July and August m the case of paddy, und from Septembe-r to November in respect of rice"IARIHDD8-001362
  • March 1943 March " IARIHDD8-001362
  • March 1943 15 per maund on the 3rd MarchIARIHDD8-001362
  • March 1943 The decision was taken to abrogate any vestige of price control, and it was announced publicly on the 11th March in the following terms:" No Price Control in Wholesale Rice and Paddy Markets" "To clear up misapprehensions which are still impeding the tio,,: of paddy and rice into the markets, the Bellgal Governmellt declare categoncally that ~hel'e is and will be no statutory maximum pricEl for wholesale ~ansactions in paddy and riceIARIHDD8-001362
  • March 1943 15 on the 3rd March to RsIARIHDD8-001362
  • March 1943 3rd March 1943 15 0 0IARIHDD8-001362
  • March 1943 January · · · · 10 6 0 11 12 0 13 4 0 12 4: 0 9 8 0 February · · · · 12 8 0 13 8 0 13 8 0 13 2 0 12 0 0 MarchIARIHDD8-001362
  • March 1943 shortage of rice became acute early in March 1943 IARIHDD8-001362
  • March 1943 supplies and the position reached by March 1943 IARIHDD8-001362
  • March 1943 We have described at the end of Ohapter VI the emergency which arose in Oalcutta early in March 1943 , when the Government of Bengal decided on "de-control" in order to' increase the flow of supplies within BengalIARIHDD8-001362
  • March 1943 'he subjec~ was discussed a~ a mee~ing held in Oa!cutta on the 10~h Marc:h 1943 and subsequent days, attended by :tlhe representaliv§s of Bengal, Bihar, Orissa, Assam, and the Eastern ~tatesIARIHDD8-001362
  • March 1943 'rhe Bihar Govermnent uwilltuilled that market conditions in Bihar had rapidly deteriorated since the beginning of March, and that, until cIARIHDD8-001362
  • March 1943 By the end of April, stocks of rice in Calcutta were again running low, and there was reason to fear that, by the middle of May when the supplies from Orissa woulll cease, Calcutta would, be back again in the same state t1tS it was in :M;archIARIHDD8-001362
  • March 1943 We have seen that on the 11th March, 1IARIHDD8-001362
  • March 1943 " Most of the embm'goes referred to in tho !mnOlll1Ct'lll(\llt of t,hc 11 th March ~Nere l'cmovcn within it few weeks illlrl C'XIH?l'imwc 'prover} that, the opel'ationR of Government ns buyer nIARIHDD8-001362
  • March 1943 rrived in Oalcutta by rail or river steamer from Bengal disl'ricts during the months March to July, 1943 IARIHDD8-001362
  • March 1943 March 13,388IARIHDD8-001362
  • March 1943 lIence the pressure on the supply position whicl led to the de~lsl~n to de-contr~l prices of ri~e early in MarchIARIHDD8-001362
  • March 1943 the report on which was completed by the middl(l of March, provided for the full rationing in Calcutta :ll1d the surrounding industrial area, of foodgrains, pulses, sugar, kerosene oil, salt, nnd ml1stIARIHDD8-001362
  • March 1943 gong famine became imminent in February and MarchIARIHDD8-001362
  • March 1943 The shortage of supplies developed rapidly in Greater Calcut,ta and became acute in March 1943 IARIHDD8-001362
  • March 1943 "all-party Government" before and after the change of Ministry in MarchIARIHDD8-001362
  • March 1943 As we have explained in Section C of Chapter VI and Section C of lhapter VII, two inter-related measures-"De-control" and a ";Rescue Plan",' ere undertaken in March, 1943 , in an endeavour to increase the flow of supplies IARIHDD8-001362
  • March 1943 Early in March the developing crisis came to a head n Calcutta, During the two previous months, the Government of Bengal had ried to keep supplies moving without allowing prices to rise, and had failedIARIHDD8-001362
  • March 1943 On the 3rd March 1943 , the price of coarse rice in Calcutta was RsIARIHDD8-001362
  • March 1943 Indeed in the conditions of scarcity, fear, and greed prevailing in Bengal by the middle of March 1943 , it would have been necessary to "fiood" the markets not for a week or two but for a considerable period; without ~his it was impossible to spread among producers, traders, and consumers the idea that a fall in price was imminentIARIHDD8-001362
  • March 1943 It seems to us that the position by March had so deterior!1te~ thaIARIHDD8-001362
  • March 1943 We think, therefore, that the correct course in March was for tlie Government of India to have announced that they would, provide, month by -month, first, the full quantity of wheat required by Greater Calcutta and secondly, a certain quantity of riceIARIHDD8-001362
  • March 1943 \Ve have described the dilemma with which the Government of Bengal were faced early in March 1943 IARIHDD8-001362
  • March 1943 A turning point in the history of the Bengal famine occurred on the 11th March 1943 IARIHDD8-001362
  • March 1943 lth March there was a striking change in the direction of the policy of Governmenli and a retreat from control heganIARIHDD8-001362
  • March 1943 From March onward the anxieties of local officers increased and they left the Provincial Government in no doubt about the seriousness of the situationIARIHDD8-001362
  • March 1943 By the end of December 1942 distress had already appeared and by March 1943 widespread famine was anticipated by district officialsIARIHDD8-001362
  • March 1943 The decision in favour of "de-control" in March 1943 was a mistakeIARIHDD8-001362
  • March 1943 The change in the Ministry in March-April J943IARIHDD8-001362
  • March 1943 The Government of India must share with the Bengal Government responRibilitv for the decision to de-control in March 1943 IARIHDD8-001362
  • March 1943 By March the position had so deteriorated that some measure of external assist,ance was indispensable if a disaster was to be avoidedIARIHDD8-001362
  • March 1943 n in July and reached it!) peak in October-Novem- ber: In Bengal, March and April are normally the months of highes~ pre: wIARIHDD8-001362
  • March 1943 The aman crop is harvested from November to December, and may be said to be assembled by the beginning Or January; the boro orop is harvested by March-April, and the aU8 crop in August-SeptemberIARIHDD8-001362
  • March 1943 ~he Basic Plan had not started functioning as, by March 1943 when the need of Beng~l became acute, the Government of India's arrangements for supply of foodgrain were not completeIARIHDD8-001362
  • March 1943 About the end of March 1943 the Ministry went oui; of officeIARIHDD8-001362
  • March 1943 January to March 1943 ·IARIHDD8-001362
  • March 1943 October to December 1942 82,000 50,000 January to March 1943 4,60,000 3,03,500 50,000 April to June 1943 • 10,05,500 5,00,000 3,00,000 July to September 1943 1,05,000 2,95,000 October to December 1943 1,10,000 6,60,000IARIHDD8-001362
  • March 1943 It suggests that, given the disruption of traffic due to wartime restrictions, markets became more segmented during the famine, but only marginally so, apart from brief intervals in November 1942 and March 1943 ogradac_article_pub_063
  • March 1943 XLV (March 2007)ogradac_article_pub_063
  • March 1943 XLV (March 2007) 3 ESTIMATED DEATH TOLLS FROM SELECTED FAMINESogradac_article_pub_063
  • March 1943 XLV (March 2007) ther study; in the meantime, Kueh claims that a simple weather index can account for 72 percent of the yield shortfall in 1960 and 107 percent of the shortfall in 1961 (Kueh 1984; see also Kueh 1995)ogradac_article_pub_063
  • March 1943 XLV (March 2007) cialogradac_article_pub_063
  • March 1943 Fazlul Huq was forced to resign in March 1943 by governor John Herbert, for raising police rape as an issue and for publicly admitting there was a famine when offi cial policy denied thisreview_Structural_Violence2
  • March 1943 Offi cials in the department of civil supplies in Bengal were being instructed in March 1943 to insist in public that there were suffi cient food stocks in the province, when they knew this was not truereview_Structural_Violence2
  • March 1943 March June Sept[27]
  • March 1943 On March 11 it was publicly announced that "there is and will be no statutory maximum price for wholesale transactions[27]
  • March 1943 Rutherford, Governor, Government of Bihar to Linlithgow, Viceroy, 5 March 1943 , 25May 1943 and 12July 1943 , Rl3/1/23, Oriental and India Office Collections, British Library, London, UK[9]
  • March 1943 In Bengal the most critical period of deaths from starvation lasted from March 1943 to November 1943 [3]
  • March 1943 21 by mid-March 1943 and to over Rs 30 by mid-May[3]
  • March 1943 Attempts on the part of the government to buy at controlled prices between December 1942 and March 1943 failed to make any significant dent into the hoards of rural grain merchants, so a policy of procurement at free market prices was resumed from March 1943 which contributed to the steep rise of prices in rural areas[3]
  • March 1943 The government was reluctant to declare an emergency until March 1973[15]
  • March 1943 By March 1943 there was hunger throughout Bengal, and[15]
  • March 1943 A further 28,000 tons was imported in March, which, again, had no effect[15]
  • March 1943 Impoverishment of occupational groups not directly affected (from March 1943 on)[15]
  • March 1943 Speculative withdrawal and panic purchases were encouraged by administrative chaos (especially between December 1942 and March 1943 , but also up to November)[15]
  • March 1943 winter crop and by vigorous speculation and panic hoarding" from March to November 1943 [15]
  • March 1943 "The increase in the rice price in Phase I [January 1942 to March 1943 ] was[15]
  • March 1943 talks of "speculative withdrawal" especially between December 1942 and March 1943 , but also up to November[15]
  • March 1943 There was also "vigorous speculation" from March to November 1943 (1977 p50; 1981 p76)[15]
  • March 1943 s statement that there were panic purchases between December 1942 and March 1943 and that there was panic hoarding from March to November 1943 [15]
  • March 1943 supplies in any of the periods, January to March 1943 , March to June 1943 or June to December 1943 [15]
  • March 1943 The Famine Commission argued that, both because of the need for normal stocks and because the rice is not palatable for some months after harvest, it was not normal to start eating the December crop until February or March[15]
  • March 1943 A Food Grains Purchasing Officer was then allowed to buy direct from the trade, but he managed to get only 3000 tons between l8th February and llth March (FIC pp 36-8)[15]
  • March 1943 l2th and 3lst March, but only 18,000 tons up to the end of August (FIC p39)[15]
  • March 1943 On 10th March it was proposed that 60,000 tons should be obtained from neighbouring states[15]
  • March 1943 It would seem particularly grave because they had seen the fate of the farmers who had sold their stocks to cash in on the high prices of March, and had not been able to buy back the food they needed to live on at the higher prices of May and June[15]
  • March 1943 By March 1943 P[18]
  • March 1943 Presumably, Sen shared his views, and for a short time in March it was possible that an integrated administrative structure would confront the coming famine[18]
  • March 1943 On March 11, Banerjee was offered the portfolio of Civil Supplies to add to that of Revenue[18]
  • March 1943 Pinnell instructed collectors on March 25 that they were to moderate the market by selling the grain under their control to the trade slightly under the current price or sell it for local consumption to make up an actual shortage or meet the needs of the poor through cheap-price shops (DCS 1943 b)[18]
  • March 1943 Sen had taken in his February/March 1943 tour notes that "famine was in the offing and that its character would be overwhelming" (Nanavati 1944 :445) and his warning to collectors on June 11 that famine was imminent (GBR 1944 :17- 18)[18]
  • March 1943 Because of the political power of the supporters of the first viewpoint it dominated government activity during the famine; moreover, the possibility of an integrated administration was lost in March 1943 ; and when in September a relief commissioner was appointed for the province, it was too late and his coordinating power was directed at the districts rather than at the secretariat[18]
  • March 1943 This was clearly the case until March: it seems more likely that from April to August the political dominance of those holding the first view of the appropriate response to the famine stifled any response from the Revenue Department other than the limited application of the Famine Manual measures[18]
  • March 1943 Thus, from mid-October 1942 to at least mid-March 1943 -five months-people who had survived the tidal wave and cyclone but had lost crops and stores were under severe pressure, especially those in villages away from the few roads that traversed the region[18]
  • March 1943 From mid-March until early June 1943 the district, although still short of food, had a respite during which the relief system functioned more smoothly[18]
  • March 1943 Khan in March, he lost little time in touring the district[18]
  • March 1943 From March to August, the prices were those in cheap-grain shops, weighted according to the proportionate supply of rice, wheat, and millet[18]
  • March 1943 Bell was unable to penetrate the isolated areas of Midnapore because communications remained difficult, but his diary suggests that in those tbanas that he visited most were securing more food than they had from October to March (Bell 1943 :Apr[18]
  • March 1943 Although grain was sent from Calcutta and Dinajpur to Dacca beginning in March, the supply was variable and capable of feeding only a small proportion of the population until late in the year[18]
  • March 1943 For example, on March 24, 1943 , the collector requested Rs[18]
  • March 1943 Although the figure does not include food requisitioned or purchased by officers within their districts, it reflects the provincial effort, which can be divided into three periods: from October 1942 to March 1943 when little grain was sent to the districts; from April to August 1943 when the DCS sent grain purchased outside the province to the districts; and from September to December 1943 when grain, especially from the Punjab, began to flow in response to pressure from the Government of India[18]
  • March 1943 Until March 1943 most of the funds were directed to the cyclone-affected districts, but subsequently there was a sharp rise in spending across the province as collectors pointed to the distress in their districts[18]
  • March 1943 From March to August 1943 the grain was divided between the market and the cheap-grain shops, with most going to the former[18]
  • March 1943 The proportions that went to cheap-grain shops and the trade during the March-to-August period reflected the competition for grain between the poor and those able to afford the higher price[18]
  • March 1943 During the March-to-August 1943 period, when it became obvious that there was not enough grain available in the markets of Bengal to feed those most vulnerable to high prices, the administration could have opted to place all the imported grain in the districts in cheap-grain shops[18]
  • March 1943 The confiscation or destruction of stocks of rice and other food items, cattle, boats, cycles and bullock carts compounded the food crisis in Bengal from 1 May 1942 to 30 March 1943 , even as the bureaucracy had, by the end of 1942 , slowly started to admit that the outbreak of a famine was a serious possibility in the province (Gupta 1986: 170–71)[10]
  • March 1943 Even though the first reports of severe distress were conveyed to the officials in Delhi in March 1943 , the officials in the civil supplies department in Calcutta were merely informed that there had been only isolated incidence of famine until then[10]
  • March 1943 The officials in Delhi also ignored censorship reports from East Bengal released by the provincial government from March 1943 that warned of an impending famine[10]
  • March 1943 Even in March 1943 the official classes and most British businessmen tended to dismiss any report in the newspapers or even those released by the government on hoarding as exaggerations[10]
  • March 1943 The monthly data on births suggest that the famine reduced the absolute number of conceptions much more during the normal 'peak' conception season (January- March) than during the period when conceptions were usually at a minimum[12]
  • March 1943 de Waal, 'Famine mortality: a case study of Darfur, Sudan 1984-5', Population Studies, 43, 1 (March 1989), pp[12]
  • March 1943 Dhaka, March 2010[2]
  • March 1943 The boro variety grew mostly in marshes and was planted between January and March for harvesting by May[2]
  • March 1943 25 In other bazaars, such as those at Barisal and Nimtali, most of the export trade took place between November and March[2]
  • March 1943 APAC, MSS EUR F125/163, 20 March 1943 [2]
  • March 1943 L Braund on events from March 1943 to the end of 1943 in relation to the food situation in Bengal (Calcutta), p[2]
  • March 1943 L Braund on Events From March 1943 to the End of 1943 in Relation to the Food Situation in Bengal (Calcutta: Govt of India)[2]
  • March 1943 X, Kansai Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, 31 March 2000[2]
  • March 1943 If by its own admission the Bengal famine was unique in the history of Indian famines in the sense that the price rise in the Calcutta market was 1oo per cent between March and May ( 1943 ) even though the deficit in food grains supplies was only five per cent, 27 Ibid, pp[4]
  • March 1943 To study this point, families were classified by the amount of paddy land owned before the famine in March 1943 [6]
  • March 1943 "^ According to the Government of Orissa, the free trade experiment in Bengal - introduced in March 1943 - "was undoubtedly the greatest factor in causing high prices, hoarding, and unavailability of food grains to consumers in the latter part of 1 9 4 3 " Serious distress, accompanied by some starvation deaths, was reported to have affected four coastal districts, namely Balassore, Cuttack, Puri and Ganjam[19]
  • March 1943 3 Justice Henry B L Braund of Bengal's department of civil supplies said he had been told "this shortage is a thing entirely of your own imagination" by the Government of India in March 1943 [21]
  • March 1943 "The clue to Gandhi's fast," they declared at the Fourth International in March, 1943 , "is to be found in one of the passages of his letters to the Viceroy[1]
  • March 1943 3, March 1943 , pp[1]
  • March 1943 126 Janayuddha, March 3, 1943 [1]
  • March 1943 On March 3rd, 1943 Gandhi broke his fast[1]
  • March 1943 On the 11th of March, therefore, the Government of Bengal took another drastic step and decided to abrogate price control entirely[1]
  • March 1943 22/0 per maund on March 29th[1]
  • March 1943 "166 The budget session in the Bengal Legislative Assembly, however, had begun by early March and the acrimony between Huq and Herbert was complicating an already excruciating process[1]
  • March 1943 169 Huq to Herbert, March 26, 1943 [1]
  • March 1943 In the last week of March 1943 , Japan launched daily air raids on the 24 Parganas just south of Calcutta[1]
  • March 1943 173 Janayuddha, March 31, 1943[1]
  • March 1943 By March of 1943 the Government of Bengal had been able to acquire less than 15% of its target of 1[1]
  • March 1943 As Food Commissioner since March of 1943 , Braund had intimate knowledge of the food supply and distribution system in Bengal[1]
  • March 1943 It suggests that, given the disruption of traffic due to wartime restrictions, markets became more segmented during the famine, but only marginally so, apart from brief intervals in November 1942 and March 1943 [16]
  • March 1943 XLV (March 2007) Figure 4[16]
  • March 1943 XLV (March 2007) The same points apply to many NGOs today (de Waal 1997; Paul Seabright 2002)[16]
  • March 1943 XLV (March 2007) rural one (Robert C[16]
  • March 1943 XLV (March 2007) transition, scarcely yet underway, unfolds in such vulnerable economies[16]
  • March 1943 XLV (March 2007) New York: Wiley[16]
  • March 1943 10 Time Magazine, 22 March 1943 [http://www[13]
  • March 1943 35 These range from references to 30 inches of rain in Hong Kong over five days in June 1959 to a hurricane in July 1960 that ruined 777,000 mu (or about 130,000 acres) of crops in Shandong Province; from people wading across theYellow River in March and June 1960, to more typhoons than in any year in the previous half-century; and from infestations of locusts to the following briefing to military students by a US China expert:[13]
  • March 1943 The refusal of the coalition led by Fazlul Huq's Krishak Praja (Peasants' People's Party) to accept this view had been a factor in its dismissal by the provincial governor in late March 1943 [13]
  • March 1943 and 4 March 1943 [13]
  • March 1943 1943 that market supplies were one-fifth below normal; or the subsequent memorandum submitted to the Cabinet on 5 March 1943 , stating that Bengal 'as a whole' was suffering from a 'serious shortage', and that 'unless the available supply could somehow be spread over till the next crop, famine was to be expected in certain areas' (both are mentioned in BL, OIOC, MS Eur[13]
  • March 1943 Supporters of the Fazlul Huq coalition, which fell in March 1943 , stressed the precarious food supply situation, but the more pro-British Muslim League-led administration which replaced it, and particularly its influential Minister for Civil Supplies,[13]
  • March 1943 113 It shows that by March 1943 Bengali officials were reporting a shortage of rice so serious that if 'the available supply could not somehow be spread over till the next crop, famine was to be expected in certain areas'[13]
  • March 1943 Cormac Ó Gráda, Dublin, March 2008[17]
  • March 1943 These measures produced long queues rather than more rice, and in March 1943 the government put an end to price controls in order to secure supplies for the city[17]
  • March 1943 In another debate in March one deputy demanded that Bengal be declared a 'deficit province', while another reckoned that the 'estimated production' of rice was 23 per cent short of needs and that the 'shiploads of wheat' promised some months earlier had never materialized[17]
  • March 1943 In late March a correspondent for the Calcutta Statesman newspaper reported that a 'large proportion' of the[17]
  • March 1943 His offers of large rewards to informers came to nought; on an inspection of the Calcutta Rice Mills in March 1943 he found that stocks were 'very negligible'; and he insisted if merchants outside Calcutta had been holding on to rice, officials on the spot 'would have known about them'[17]
  • March 1943 4 Statesman (Calcutta), March 28th 1943 [17]
  • March 1943 6 Statesman (Calcutta), January 28th; February 19th; March 10th; March 28th; April 3rd; April 5th; May 13th 1943 [17]
  • March 1943 8 Capital (Calcutta financial weekly), 25th February, 4th March 1943 ; Statesman, May 14th 1943 (report of press conference presided over by Suhrawardy)[17]
  • March 1943 As a result, by March 1710 its debt had risen from almost nothing in Easter 1708 to over two million livres two years later, a sum considerably more than the city's entire annual revenue on the eve of the famine[17]
  • March 1943 82 Time Magazine, October 26th 1942 ; March 22nd 1943 [17]
  • March 1943 Although the authorities in London and New Delhi expected political leaders in Bengal to argue the case for adequacy, the weak coalition government that ruled until late March 1943 was hardly reassuring: in February it announced that estimated rice production in 1942 /3 (6[26]
  • March 1943 16 Here I would disagree with later claims by the Statesman's editor that it had been sounding the alarm bells since March 1943 [23]
  • March 1943 20 By March–April the situation was already critical both in coastal sections of Midnapur in western Bengal, where the cyclone had struck, and in eastern Bengal[23]
  • March 1943 Relief works began, albeit on a small scale, in villages near Dacca in March, and food rations were supplied to government employees at controlled prices[23]
  • March 1943 21 "Rationing of Rice: Chittagong Measure," ABP, 2 April 1943 ; "In the Cyclone Area," Statesman, 28 March 1943 ; Sen 1981: 55; Greenough 1982: 98–99[23]
  • March 1943 " The combined effect of the cyclone and the crop failure—the result of crop disease—was a shortfall of two million tons, as admitted in private by the central government in mid-March[23]
  • March 1943 " Yet Braund admitted that when he arrived in Calcutta in March 1943 "the conviction of shortage had not spread to the official classes and most business men[23]
  • March 1943 " But Braund also conceded that even in March some brave officials—and he named two—were predicting famine[23]
  • March 1943 61 Capital (Calcutta financial weekly), 25 February, 4 March 1943 [23]
  • March 1943 Although the authorities in London and New Delhi expected political leaders in Bengal to argue the case for adequacy of food supplies, the weak coalition government that ruled until late March[23]
  • March 1943 87 Fazlul Huq was more willing to collaborate with Hindu politicians, and not trusted by the colonial authorities, who connived in the collapse of his weakening coalition in late March 1943 and its replacement by a more pliant Muslim League administration, headed by Khawaja Nazimuddin[23]
  • March 1943 This appears to be the main reason why rice prices rose so dramatically in the lean months before the main (1974-75) winter harvest; rice prices more than doubled between March and October of 1974, leading to a devastating contraction in command over food amongst those with little endowment to fall back on[31]
  • March 1943 21 by 12 March 1943 , and above Rs[7]
  • March 1943 Phase I : from the beginning of 1942 to March 1943 ; Phase II: from March 1943 to November 1943 ; Phase III: from November 1943 through most of 1944 [7]
  • March 1943 The Government helped to feed Calcutta through three successive schemes of procurement at controlled prices between December 1942 and March 1943 , but since they did not prove to be very successful, free purchase at market prices was resumed in the districts from March 1943 , leading to very sharp rises in the price of rice in the districts[7]
  • March 1943 Since wages earned are typically spent subsequently, and the main peak period of earning is around December, the exchange rates have been calculated with the wage in each financial year (ending in March) being related to the price of the calendar year ending in the following December, except for 1943 -44, where the wage of the first six months of the financial year t Husain's scepticism regarding carry-over was directed towards arguing that the absolute shortage in 1943 was larger than the Commission thought[7]
  • March 1943 March 0-38 271 0-44 119 44[7]
  • March 1943 March 111 74 94 69 44 46 37[7]
  • March 1943 March 219 150 180 68 82[7]
  • March 1943 § Including a change of Ministry in Bengal between March and April 1943 [7]
  • March 1943 Later in the spring, when the famine was about to reveal itself fully, the Viceroy sent the cheerful news to the Secretary of State on 18 March, that 'the food situation in India generally is at present much improved'[7]
  • March 1943 Using that perspective "extended exchange entitlement" relations, covering both inter- family and intra-family distributions, have been explored in an integrated structure in my paper, "Women, Technology and Sexual Divisions" (UNCTAD/TT/79, March 5, 1985)[32]
  • March 1943 45 A table in Sen's chapter shows that the prices of rice peaked in March-November 1943 ; Sen, Poverty and Famines, p[8]
  • April 1943 Early in April, as we saw, the Bengal Government told the Government of India that "the barriers will have to be broken despite the risks and the pent up~forces that will thus be let loosecomm-92ff
  • April 1943 We have already expressed the view that the propaganda policy followed during April and May 1943 by the Bengal Government with the support of the Central Government was misguided and that it would have been better to warn the people fully of the danger of faminecomm-92ff
  • April 1943 em concussions as onslnva'rrons I" famine were bound up with the unfortunate propaganda policy of "No Shortage" which, followed during the months April to June with the support of the Govern- ment of India, was unjustified when the danger of famine was plainly apparentcomm-92ff
  • April 1943 The change in the Ministry in March-April 1948comm-92ff
  • April 1943 In Bengal, the new Ministry took office towards the end of April and Sir Thomas Rutherford became Governor in September 1943 , replacing the late Sir John Herbert, then suffering from the illness of which he subsequently diedcomm-92ff
  • April 1943 prices April 193 I comm1
  • April 1943 oxxsm concnusrons AND osssnvsrrons 105 famine were bound up with the unfortunate propaganda policy of "No Shortage" which, followed during the months April to June with the support of the Govern- ment of India, was unjustified when the danger of famine was plainly apparentcomm100-150
  • April 1943 The change in the Ministry in March~April 1943 comm100-150
  • April 1943 April and'Sir Thomas Rutherford became Governor in September 1948, replacing the latc""" Sir John Herbert, then suffering from the illness of which he subsequently diedcomm100-150
  • April 1943 In Bengal, March and April are normally, the months of highest pre- valencecomm100-150
  • April 1943 from April 193I,IARIHDD8-001362
  • April 1943 It comprises highlllnd types sown in April or thereabouts, and harvested in August and SeptemberIARIHDD8-001362
  • April 1943 An indication, of the rate at which paddy and rioe move into the markets of Bengal during different months o£ the year' is given by the following account of movements into the Calcutta market:" Fifty per ceut of the total annual arrivals of paddy'as well at rice were' teceived in the foul' months, January to' AprilIARIHDD8-001362
  • April 1943 Obviously, the removal of so large a number of boatsth"' rt wel'e st111 16,655 boats in the "reception" areas on the 1st April 1943 must have had a considerable restricting effect on the movements of foodgrains,IARIHDD8-001362
  • April 1943 t, April to the end of August amounted to only about 18,000 tonsIARIHDD8-001362
  • April 1943 The figures for rice and millets represented the quantities to be moved between the Is~ December 1942 and the 30th November 1943 , while the corresponding period for wheat and gram was the 1st April 1943 to the 31st March 1944 IARIHDD8-001362
  • April 1943 By the end of April, stocks of rice in Calcutta were again running low, and there was reason to fear that, by the middle of May when the supplies from Orissa woulll cease, Calcutta would, be back again in the same state t1tS it was in :M;archIARIHDD8-001362
  • April 1943 By the beginning of April the Bengal Government were reaching the 'Conclusion that the B'lS'ic Plan could not help themIARIHDD8-001362
  • April 1943 In a letter addressed to the Central Government early in April 1943 , the Provincial Government, while 'expressing their great a;ppreciiaiiion of the measures taken by the Government of India to enable th"IARIHDD8-001362
  • April 1943 Towards the end of April 1943 , the Government of India, were als( beginning to doubt whether the Bnsic Plan would solve the Bengal problem The Plan had ('IARIHDD8-001362
  • April 1943 Orne into operation from the m~ddle of April and from thai date surplus province:>IARIHDD8-001362
  • April 1943 rl'he llit\1/Xtioll W,lS diRcusscd during the last few lays of April in Calcutta at !l nl(·'~ti1Ig between the representutives of the Government or India and the Bengul Cldv('lllmeutIARIHDD8-001362
  • April 1943 " Again, early in April, District Officers were instructed to impress UJlon Rtcwki-lnlti':'I'R, cultivutors, :111(1 1he public generally that, peace-time Rt,oClrS connot he maintninc! l llllder tho stl'CSS of war, IIlHl 1IARIHDD8-001362
  • April 1943 2, This was the situoJion when, at the end of April nnd early in Muy, the representntiveA of the Government of India and the Government of Bengal conferred in Oalcutta nnd the decision was taken to introduce free trade in the Eastern HegionIARIHDD8-001362
  • April 1943 April 13,824IARIHDD8-001362
  • April 1943 As re,gnrdR sllppli(ols of rice for distribution through employers' shops, in April 1943 the price charged to the omployer was fixed aIARIHDD8-001362
  • April 1943 In April oIARIHDD8-001362
  • April 1943 In April a scheme for supplying a ration of rice to tbe poor in Ghittago~g town was institutedIARIHDD8-001362
  • April 1943 qpened in April and were attended by large numbers of \V:)UlenIARIHDD8-001362
  • April 1943 April 1943 IARIHDD8-001362
  • April 1943 Such a campaign was undertaken la~er towards the end 9f April and during May 1943 IARIHDD8-001362
  • April 1943 The supply position was for a time easier but by the end of April the IARIHDD8-001362
  • April 1943 Early in April, as Woo saw, the Henaal Goverll1llent told the Governmellt at India that ··the barders will have to b~ broken despite the l'lsks and the pent up forces the,t wJl tnus be let looseIARIHDD8-001362
  • April 1943 We have already expressed the view that the propaganda policy follnwed during April and May 1943 by the Bengal Government with the SllPPOr:S of tbp Cential Go;-ernment was misguided and that it would have been better to W3m the people fully of the danger of famineIARIHDD8-001362
  • April 1943 famine were bound up with the unfortunate propaganda policy of "No Shortage" which, -followed during the months April to June with the support of the Government of India, was unjustified when the danger of famine was plainly apparentIARIHDD8-001362
  • April 1943 The change in the Ministry in March-April J943IARIHDD8-001362
  • April 1943 In Bengal, the new Ministry took office towards the end of April and Sk Thomas Rutherford became Governor in September 1943 , replacing the late Sir John Herbert, then suffering from the illness of which he subsequently diedIARIHDD8-001362
  • April 1943 n in July and reached it!) peak in October-Novem- ber: In Bengal, March and April are normally the months of highes~ pre: wIARIHDD8-001362
  • April 1943 The aman crop is harvested from November to December, and may be said to be assembled by the begiiming Or January; the boro orop is harvested by March-April, and the aU8 crop in August-SeptemberIARIHDD8-001362
  • April 1943 Ordinarily the year of consumption will be, :approximately, leu us say, from March-April to March-April next yearIARIHDD8-001362
  • April 1943 uring January to March-April is not 'carry-over'; it represents the actual requirem, entIARIHDD8-001362
  • April 1943 April 1,5,827 IARIHDD8-001362
  • April 1943 The preliminary figures of the first Basi? Plan were issued on the 13tb April 1~43IARIHDD8-001362
  • April 1943 By the end of April the stocks of r:ce in C~lcutta were again, running low and reports of distress in the dlstncts dearly indicated famineIARIHDD8-001362
  • April 1943 By April it was clear to everybody, includin~ the Government of India, thati the Basic Plan would non fundlonIARIHDD8-001362
  • April 1943 Coalition Min,istry, was ,sworn in on the 23rd of AprilIARIHDD8-001362
  • April 1943 The situation had become grave and menacing by the end of AprilIARIHDD8-001362
  • April 1943 I~ must also be remembered that if rice and wheat had come into :Bengal during May-July 1943 in the same trickle at which they were coming from January too April 1943 , the distress wouldIARIHDD8-001362
  • April 1943 April May June TotalIARIHDD8-001362
  • April 1943 AprilIARIHDD8-001362
  • April 1943 April 25,446IARIHDD8-001362
  • April 1943 April, May June TotalIARIHDD8-001362
  • April 1943 2200 April 1943 IARIHDD8-001362
  • April 1943 27th April 1943 IARIHDD8-001362
  • April 1943 2nd April 1943 IARIHDD8-001362
  • April 1943 April to June 1943 •IARIHDD8-001362
  • April 1943 October to December 1942 82,000 50,000 January to March 1943 4,60,000 3,03,500 50,000 April to June 1943 • 10,05,500 5,00,000 3,00,000 July to September 1943 1,05,000 2,95,000 October to December 1943 1,10,000 6,60,000IARIHDD8-001362
  • April 1943 74 pula per bag between August 1980 and April 1983, the standard deviation fell from 0ogradac_article_pub_063
  • April 1943 On the other hand, treering analysis suggests that at Huashan (in Shaanxi province, central China) rainfall in April–July 1960 was probably lower than in all years, or almost all years, between 1600 and 1988ogradac_article_pub_063
  • April 1943 (a) Winter crop which is sown in the month of May and harvested in November, (b) Autumn crop which is sown in April and harvested in August, and (c) Spring crop which is sown in November and harvested in February__lecturenotesfamine
  • April 1943 Blair,ChiefSecretary,Government ofBengal, 15April 1943 ,WarSeriesFiles50(TV)1 1942 , Bihar State Archives, Patna, India[14]
  • April 1943 But when international relief was called forward in April, it took until November for bulk food shipments to begin to arrive[15]
  • April 1943 In April and May there was a propaganda drive to persuade speculators and hoarders to release their stocks, with no apparent effect[15]
  • April 1943 In April and May there was "a propaganda drive for the purpose of convincing the people that the supply position did not justify the high prices prevailing"[15]
  • April 1943 Pinnell, who was director of the DCS from August 1942 to April 1943 and prepared much of the Government of Bengal's submission to the FIC; (2) those records of the FIC preserved in the Nanavati Papers; (3) the recordso f the Bengal Relief Committee; (4) the CPI newspaper, People'sW ar; (5) the nationalist newspaper, Amrit Bazaar Patrika; and (6) the papers, memoirs, and recollections of officials[18]
  • April 1943 At first most of this grain was consumed in Calcutta, but from April 1943 some of the grain was sent to the districts, and this amount increased sharply from September[18]
  • April 1943 Pinnell's resignation as director of civil supplies in April 1943 ; the second began with H[18]
  • April 1943 Suhrawardy's appointment as minister for civil supplies on April 24 in the predominantly Muslim League ministry of Khwaja Sir Nazimuddin[18]
  • April 1943 From April 1943 the Revenue Department, while continuing to fund relief in districts affected by natural disaster, began to sanction expenditures in other districts[18]
  • April 1943 The dominance of the DCS was reinforced in late April 1943 when H[18]
  • April 1943 This was clearly the case until March: it seems more likely that from April to August the political dominance of those holding the first view of the appropriate response to the famine stifled any response from the Revenue Department other than the limited application of the Famine Manual measures[18]
  • April 1943 It is clear from the figure that until April 1943 the district did not receive anywhere near the target figure of 73,000-75,000 maunds per month[18]
  • April 1943 His tour diary for April outlines the context in which test and gratuitous relief provisions operated (Bell 1943 :Apr[18]
  • April 1943 By late April 1943 the SDO of Narayanganj had set up several stores in Narayanganj town, selling rice at Rs[18]
  • April 1943 What appears to be the most significant factor in the failure of relief was the neglect of support for the buying power of the poor in the district from April to August 1943 (see fig[18]
  • April 1943 Although the figure does not include food requisitioned or purchased by officers within their districts, it reflects the provincial effort, which can be divided into three periods: from October 1942 to March 1943 when little grain was sent to the districts; from April to August 1943 when the DCS sent grain purchased outside the province to the districts; and from September to December 1943 when grain, especially from the Punjab, began to flow in response to pressure from the Government of India[18]
  • April 1943 Between April 1943 and April 1944 about 9,25,000 families sold their lands[20]
  • April 1943 A joint memorandum released by the district officials in Bengal on 9 April 1943 stated that villagers, cultivators, traders and jotedars (tenure-holders) had all predicted very serious shortage of rice and other goods[10]
  • April 1943 G-IV (28)/43, 13 April 1943 [10]
  • April 1943 acres) owned groups in April 1943 bought sold net change in April 1944 Agriculture 11,479 174 306 -132 11,347 (62[30]
  • April 1943 (3): Number of families owning plough cattle in April 1943 Col[30]
  • April 1943 (5): Number of plough cattle owned in April 1943 Col[30]
  • April 1943 The aman, or winter rice, was sown between April and June and reaped between November and January[2]
  • April 1943 Uddin, Ashraf and Neil Lundberg, 'Cenozoic History of the Himalayan-Bengal System: Sand Composition in the Bengal Basin, Bangladesh', Geological Society of America Bulletin, 110(4) (April 1998)[2]
  • April 1943 *A larger version of this essay was delivered as the GoldenJubilee Lecture of the Asiatic Society of Bangladesh in April 2001oo[4]
  • April 1943 During the period April 1943 to April 1944 , 9[6]
  • April 1943 7 below gives the estimated total number of plough cattle and the total acreage of paddy land in rural Bengal in April 1943 as calculated from the mean number of plough cattle and mean acreage of paddy land owned per family in the sample (with appropriate weightage in accordance with the stratification by the Industries Department classification)[6]
  • April 1943 Estimated total number (in lakhs8) of plough cattle and paddy land (in lakhs of acres) in rural Bengal in April 1943 obtained from the survey with weightage based on Industries Department classification[6]
  • April 1943 Industries total number mean value per family in ApriU943 estimates in lakhs in April 194* Department of families in ,?-?*-_?^ ,_ [6]
  • April 1943 (5) it is seen that the total number of plough cattle in rural Bengal in April 1943 was about 79 lakhs[6]
  • April 1943 (6) the total area of paddy land in rural Bengal is found to be about 187 lakhs of acres in April 1943 according to the sample survey[6]
  • April 1943 8% ; the estimated value of the percentage of families selling paddy land between April 1943 and April 1944 is 9[6]
  • April 1943 4) or a margin of error of 3% ; and the estimated value of the percentage of families mortgaging paddy land between April 1943 and April 1944 is 6[6]
  • April 1943 AFTER-EFFECTS OF THE BENGAL FAMINE OF 1943 here are sales and mortgages of paddy land during the period April 1943 to March 1944 (that is, the whole of the Bengali year 1350)[6]
  • April 1943 Land sale and mortgage during the famine period (April 1943 ?April 1944 ; 1350 Bengali era) 5[6]
  • April 1943 gives the estimated number of families who were forced to sell paddy land during the famine between April 1943 and April 1944 [6]
  • April 1943 Number, proportion and estimated total number in lakhs of families selling paddy land between April 1943 and April 1944 (1350 Bengal year) sample surveyed[6]
  • April 1943 ween April 1943[6]
  • April 1943 April 1943 & April 1944[6]
  • April 1943 6 gives the estimated number of families mortgaging paddy land during the famine period of April 1943 --April 1944 [6]
  • April 1943 Number, proportion and estimated total number (in lakhs) of families mortgaging paddy land (with and without sale) between April 1943 and April 1944 (1350 Bengali Year)[6]
  • April 1943 between April 1943 & April 1944[6]
  • April 1943 land between April[6]
  • April 1943 The extent of land sales and mortgages during the famine period of April 1943 ?April 1944 can be summed up as follows : (1) 9[6]
  • April 1943 Number and proportion of families selling paddy land in full between April 1943 and April 1941 by groups of families owning different amounts of paddy land before the famine (in january 1943 ) families owning 0?2 acres, 2?5 acres and above 5 acres of paddy land tcolatasls number of families selling paddy land in full families surveyed[6]
  • April 1943 11 gives the proportion of families (in the sample) owning paddy land in April 1943 by family occupation before the famine (i[6]
  • April 1943 Number and proportion of families mortgaging or selling paddy land (in full and in part) between April 1943 and April 1944 by family occupations before the famine in January 1943 [6]
  • April 1943 13 which gives the total acreage bought and sold by the agricultural groups between April 1943 and April 1944 [6]
  • April 1943 Estimated acreage of paddy land (in lakhs) transferred between April 1943 and March 1944 by occupational groups as in January 1943 [6]
  • April 1943 land transferred in lakhs percentage occupational groups of acres between of bought as in January 1943 April 1943 & April 1944 to sold bought sold difference[6]
  • April 1943 Estimated total number of plough cattle in rural Bengal in April 1943 [6]
  • April 1943 2 incidates the position of plough cattle,, after the famine, based on estimates of the net loss sustained between April 1943 and April 1944 (that is, during the Bengali year 1350)[6]
  • April 1943 Number, proportion and the estimated number (in lakhs ) of plough cattle in April 1944 and the net loss between April 1943 and April 1944 [6]
  • April 1943 ^_-?-, (April April 1943 April 1944 net loss class April April net 1943 ,-*-s ?-*-? ,- -, (i)[6]
  • April 1943 April April 1943 & April 1944[6]
  • April 1943 in April 1943 & April 1944[6]
  • April 1943 4 gives the proportion and estimated total number of families which owned plough cattle before the famine in April 1943 and after the famine in April 1944 [6]
  • April 1943 Number, proportion and estimated number (in lakhs) of families owning plough cattle in April 1943 and April 1944 [6]
  • April 1943 1944 April 1943[6]
  • April 1943 11 lakhs of families which had owned plough cattle in April 1943 ) had lost all the cattle they had[6]
  • April 1943 (2) The estimated net loss of plough cattle in Bengal was from ten to eleven lakhs (about 13%) during the famine period between April 1943 and April 1944 [6]
  • April 1943 Such distribution among different agricultural groups as in April 1943 is shown in Table 6[6]
  • April 1943 Number and proportion of plough cattle and area of paddy land owned per family in April 1943 in different occupational groups in sample surveyed plough cattle paddy land average per family share of paddy occupational groups ,-*-?-*-- -[6]
  • April 1943 Number and proportion of plough cattle lost between April 1943 and Aprdl 1944 by occupational groups owned in[6]
  • April 1943 April 1943 and April 1944[6]
  • April 1943 7 which gives the mean number of of plough cattle owned per family in April 1943 and in April 1944 shows how the famine affected the cattle position in each occupational group[6]
  • April 1943 Number of plough cattle owned per family in April 1943 and in April 1944 by occupational groups[6]
  • April 1943 ,-'-> April 1943 and[6]
  • April 1943 8 which shows the proportion of families in the sample owning plough cattle before and after the famine in April 1943 and April 1944 [6]
  • April 1943 Number and proportion of families owning plough cattle in April 1943 and April 1944 in each occupational group[6]
  • April 1943 number of families surveyed percentage of families owning plough cattle losing all owning plough cattle losing all plough cattle ,-A-? plough r--*--> between April 1943 & AprAil pril cattle April April April 1944 to families occupational 1943 1944 between 1943 1944 in April 1943 gtrootuapl s April 1943 ,-^-,[6]
  • April 1943 percentage to total families index of change owning selling between April mortgaging in April 1943 & April 1944 between[6]
  • April 1943 -, April 1943 & in full in part[6]
  • April 1943 1943 April 1943[6]
  • April 1943 Pinnell, ICS, Bengal's first civil supplies director (a former district officer and secretary to two Governors), was largely responsible for the Government's food policies in the crucial period from August 1942 through April 1943 ; he then resigned[19]
  • April 1943 170 Janayuddha, April 7, 1943 (translation mine)[1]
  • April 1943 171 Janayuddha, April 7, 1943 (translation mine)[1]
  • April 1943 172 Janayuddha, April 7, 1943[1]
  • April 1943 174 Janayuddha, April 21, 1943[1]
  • April 1943 177 The Statesman, "River Transport," April 23, 1943 [1]
  • April 1943 "176 On April 23rd it was announced that all restrictions on river transport throughout the Bengal delta were to be removed in order to accelerate the movement of rice into Calcutta from the countryside[1]
  • April 1943 On the 13th of April he called Nazimuddin to form a Ministry, which in composition was entirely antithetical to the promise of an all-parties coalition that he had made to Fazlul Huq[1]
  • April 1943 In the 11 days that followed, a Ministry consisting largely of the Muslim League, the Bengal Legislative Scheduled Caste Party and the European Group was formed and ushered into office on the 24th of April[1]
  • April 1943 Mookerjee's Views," April 27, 1943 [1]
  • April 1943 191 The Statesman, "Bengal's Food Supply," April 9, 1943[1]
  • April 1943 12 The Statesman, "The Arakan Campaign," April 6, 1943[1]
  • April 1943 On April 6th The Statesman published an editorial critical of the "officially created news-famine" on the Arakan campaign[1]
  • April 1943 In April of 1943 , after the earlier air-raids on Calcutta, a Defense Circular was sent to all Provincial Governments and Chief Commissioners outlining the official protocol for reporting on raids[1]
  • April 1943 74 pula per bag between August 1980 and April 1983, the standard deviation fell from 0[16]
  • April 1943 ) of rice costing about 5 rupees on the eve of the crisis, cost 9 rupees in January 1943 , 21 rupees in April, and 30 rupees in July (Maharatna 1996)[16]
  • April 1943 1 This is a revised version of the Tawney Lecture delivered at the Economic History Society conference hosted by the University of Exeter, 1 April 2007[13]
  • April 1943 1961, 21 April 1961, 13 Oct[13]
  • April 1943 Suhrawardy of the Muslim League, Minister for Civil Supplies from April 1943 onwards, held that the problem was 'psychological'[13]
  • April 1943 The 'glut' (emphasis in the original) warned of by a senior government official in April 1943 , whereby the 'large imports from outside' in the presence of 'adequate internal stocks' would result in 'a steep fall in prices' for which hoarders would have only themselves to blame, just never materialized[13]
  • April 1943 Pinnell, 23 April 1943 (in Gupta, 'Food situation', p[13]
  • April 1943 Leonard Pinnell, Director of Civil Supplies in Bengal until April 1943 , was a key witness to much of this[13]
  • April 1943 The tension proved too much for Pinnell, who suffered a nervous breakdown in April 1943 and resigned[13]
  • April 1943 In the same city in April and May 1570 'one could do nothing but answer the door to these peasants who hammered on the doors in the town'[17]
  • April 1943 74 pula per bag between August 1980 and April 1983, the coefficient of variation across eighteen markets fell from 0[17]
  • April 1943 ) of rice costing about 5 rupees on the eve of the crisis, cost 9 rupees in January 1943 , 21 rupees in April, and 30 rupees in July[17]
  • April 1943 By early April public employees were receiving rationed food in Dacca and the authorities were promising to provide rationed food for the poor in isolated Chittagong, where the threat of invasion was greatest[17]
  • April 1943 League and Minister for Civil Supplies in Bengal from April 1943 on, based his policy during the following crucial few months on the premise that there was enough food in the province and that his responsibility was to allocate it equitably[17]
  • April 1943 Supporters of the Fazl ul- Huq coalition, which fell in April 1943 , stressed the precarious food supply situation, but the more pro-British administration led by the Muslim League which replaced it, and particularly the influential H[17]
  • April 1943 The 'glut' predicted by a government official in April 1943 , whereby the 'large imports from outside' in the presence of 'adequate internal stocks' would result in 'a steep fall in prices' which only hoarders would have themselves to blame, just never materialized[17]
  • April 1943 By mid- October the Statesman, which had supported the Muslim League ministry and Suhrawardy since April, was berating politicians in London, Delhi, and Calcutta for their 'disgraceful' record of 'false or ignorant prophecy', noting how they had 'proclaimed that food-shortage in India and Bengal was practically non-existent'[17]
  • April 1943 Leonard Pinnell, Director of Civil Supplies in Bengal until April 1943 , was a key witness to the unfolding famine[17]
  • April 1943 6 Statesman (Calcutta), January 28th; February 19th; March 10th; March 28th; April 3rd; April 5th; May 13th 1943 [17]
  • April 1943 21 Gupta 1997: 1938 (Wood to Braund, April 23rd 1943 )[17]
  • April 1943 In Venice in April 1570 noblemen were buying flour in public warehouses and then selling it as bread at a markup of over one hundred per cent[17]
  • April 1943 As members of the Muslim League government that took over in early April intensified their attacks on hoarders and speculators, opposition spokesmen blamed the authorities for 'clouding issues on the assumption that there are hoards of foodstuffs in the rural areas of Bengal which, if made available, will solve the problem'[26]
  • April 1943 In the first week of April 1943 , 39 cases of profiteering were detected: eighteen related to sugar, nine to kerosene, eight to coal, two to salt and two to atta[26]
  • April 1943 In the last week of April the Ministry of Civil Supplies proceeded against 82 people for profiteering and hoarding; 29 cases related to sugar and 27 to coal[26]
  • April 1943 20 By March–April the situation was already critical both in coastal sections of Midnapur in western Bengal, where the cyclone had struck, and in eastern Bengal[23]
  • April 1943 In early April a deputation from Chittagong, next to Japanese-occupied Burma, prompted an assurance from a senior official that rice and paddy supplies would be provided "immediately" and food rationing introduced there shortly[23]
  • April 1943 21 "Rationing of Rice: Chittagong Measure," ABP, 2 April 1943 ; "In the Cyclone Area," Statesman, 28 March 1943 ; Sen 1981: 55; Greenough 1982: 98–99[23]
  • April 1943 A key witness and actor in the early stages was Leonard Pinnell, Director of Civil Supplies in Bengal until April 1943 [23]
  • April 1943 In a memorandum dated April 9 and forwarded to Delhi by the Bengal government, local officials reported that "the villagers, cultivators, traders, and jotedars [a Hindi word signifying rich peasants who often combined commercial farming and moneylending] were all predicting shortage[23]
  • April 1943 As ministers and their supporters intensified their attacks on hoarders and speculators—in mid-April the Statesman called for tougher action against "the hoarder and speculator," and suggested special courts to bring the "evilly disposed" to book, while in mid- May a senior politician referred to them as "national enemies"76— opposition spokesmen blamed the authorities for "clouding issues on the assumption that there are hoards of foodstuffs in the rural areas of Bengal which, if made available, will solve the problem[23]
  • April 1943 76 Statesman, 15 April 1943 ; "Sir A[23]
  • April 1943 93 "Rice Price in Districts," Statesman, 14 April 1943 [23]
  • April 1943 Thus, in the week ending 7 April 1943 thirty-nine cases of profiteering were detected; eighteen related to sugar, nine to kerosene, eight to coal, two to salt, and two to atta[23]
  • April 1943 During the week ending 28 April, the Ministry of Civil Supplies proceeded against eighty-two people for profiteering and hoarding; twenty-nine cases related to sugar, and twenty-seven to[23]
  • April 1943 126 "Bengal's Food Supply," Statesman, 9 April 1943 , "Action against Hoarders," 10 April 1943 [23]
  • April 1943 As regards Bengal I gathered that the local administration did not begin to realise that the [rice] crop had been a failure until about April[23]
  • April 1943 Starvation and exchange entitlements 43 (April-September) has been related to the price in that calendar year[7]
  • April 1943 April 0-52 371 0-50 135 36[7]
  • April 1943 April 108 59 68 60 32 34 27[7]
  • April 1943 § Including a change of Ministry in Bengal between March and April 1943 [7]
  • April 1943 In April 1943 , for example, the British Governor of Bengal, Sir John Herbert, wrote to Viceroy Linlithgow about the food situation in Bengal, describing difficulties of trade, profiteering and rumors of hoarding[8]
  • April 1943 Madras and the central government agreed to provide substantial supplies for Travancore, but could not do so: from July 1942 to April 1943 the state received only 88,000 tons of the 300,000 tons promised[8]
  • April 1943 88 The provincial government established relief works relatively slowly, starting only in April 1943 [8]
  • June 1943 The results of the "anti-hoarding" campaign or the "food drive" which was undertaken in Bengal in June 1943 (excluding Calcutta, Howrah and a few other areas) supports this conclusioncomlast
  • June 1943 Total requirement of this population f torn? 16th June to 31'st December in terms ofcomlast
  • June 1943 Actually consumed by this population from 1st January to , 15thJune,atthssamerate comlast
  • June 1943 Stocks'on 16th June, 1943 (at 25 per cent excess of those actually discovered) comlast
  • June 1943 Total consumed by the remaining population (6-5 million) up to 15th June 1943 , at the above ratecomlast
  • June 1943 0'44 Total consumed and in stock on 16th June 1943 comlast
  • June 1943 J > 33,000 ,, June comlast
  • June 1943 Up to June 1948 such a declara- tion would have been inconsistent with the existing propaganda policy by which an attempt was being made to allay fears of shortage and create confidencecomm-92ff
  • June 1943 Towards the end of June famine was present in many parts of Bengalcomm-92ff
  • June 1943 It was not, however, until 11th June that the Govern- ment called for detailed information about the areas afiected, the numbers involved and the nature of the relief requiredcomm-92ff
  • June 1943 the Government did not call for a report on the situation in the districts until June, and detailed instructions relating to relief were not issued till Augustcomm-92ff
  • June 1943 em concussions as onslnva'rrons I" famine were bound up with the unfortunate propaganda policy of "No Shortage" which, followed during the months April to June with the support of the Govern- ment of India, was unjustified when the danger of famine was plainly apparentcomm-92ff
  • June 1943 In Ma and June, 1943 , the death rate began to rise in the districts of Bangpur, ymensingh, Bakarganj, Chittagong, Ncakhali, and Tipperahcomm-92ff
  • June 1943 The most striking increase was in Chittagong and the neighbouring district of Noakhali, where, after a steep rise in May, the number of deaths was twice the quinquennial average in June, and B to 4 times the average in Julycomm-92ff
  • June 1943 In May and June it became clearly evident in the districts of Chittagong and Noakhali, situated on the eastern border of the province, and a steep rise in mortality occurred in these districtscomm1
  • June 1943 The province receives its rainfall from the south west monsoon current and by far the greater part of it falls between the months of June and Octobercomm1
  • June 1943 ' While reports of distress in various districts were received from Commis- sioners and Collectors from the early months of 1943 , the Provincial Government ' did not call for a report on the situation in the districts until June, and detailed i instructions relating to relief were not issued till Augustcomm100-150
  • June 1943 oxxsm concnusrons AND osssnvsrrons 105 famine were bound up with the unfortunate propaganda policy of "No Shortage" which, followed during the months April to June with the support of the Govern- ment of India, was unjustified when the danger of famine was plainly apparentcomm100-150
  • June 1943 'In May and June, 1943 , the death rate began to rise in the districts of Rangpur, Mymerisingh, Bakarganj, Chittagong, Noakhali, and Tipperahcomm100-150
  • June 1943 The most striking increase was in Chittagong and the neighbouring district of Noakhali, where, after a steep rise in May, the number of deaths was twice the quinquennial average in June, and 3 to 4 times the average in Julycomm100-150
  • June 1943 widespread epidemic, beginning in June, occurred during the latter half of 1943 comm100-150
  • June 1943 The results of the "anti-hoarding" campaign or the "food drive" which was undertaken in Bengal in June 1943 (excluding Calcutta, Howrah and a few other areas) supports this conclusionhussain_minute
  • June 1943 Total requirement of this population f torn? 16th June to 31'st December in terms ofhussain_minute
  • June 1943 Actually consumed by this population from 1st January to , 15thJune,atthssamerate hussain_minute
  • June 1943 Stocks'on 16th June, 1943 (at 25 per cent excess of those actually discovered) hussain_minute
  • June 1943 Total consumed by the remaining population (6-5 million) up to 15th June 1943 , at the above ratehussain_minute
  • June 1943 0'44 Total consumed and in stock on 16th June 1943 hussain_minute
  • June 1943 J > 33,000 ,, June hussain_minute
  • June 1943 In May and June it became clearly evident in the districts of Ohittagong and Noakhali, sit)IARIHDD8-001362
  • June 1943 The province receives its rainfall from the south west monsoon cunent and by far the greater part of it falls between the months of June and OctoberIARIHDD8-001362
  • June 1943 It consists mainly of lowland rices which are sown in May and ,JuneIARIHDD8-001362
  • June 1943 Finally, in June 1943 all restrictions were removedIARIHDD8-001362
  • June 1943 ln June raill was needed in most parts of the province, the monsoon having peen late in es~abljshillg itself; and, although rain was more plentiful in July, still more was neededIARIHDD8-001362
  • June 1943 11th June 1943 IARIHDD8-001362
  • June 1943 28th June 1943 IARIHDD8-001362
  • June 1943 however, had cMsed by tbe ano of June, !'I,S by tIARIHDD8-001362
  • June 1943 The Bihar Government in, a letter to t,ho Oentral Government dated the 4th June 1943 , denied emphatically that they hnc1 ll1acecl any obstruct,ion whatsoever in the way of free trade; nor were tIARIHDD8-001362
  • June 1943 They decided to introduce with effect from the 15th June free trading conditions t,hroughout India with the exception of the region comprising the Punjab a,nd Sind, and certain other areas in North-West In(HI)IARIHDD8-001362
  • June 1943 7th June 1943IARIHDD8-001362
  • June 1943 Tn the first week of June, 1943 the Government of BengaIARIHDD8-001362
  • June 1943 III June it was cOlll:lidcl'eJIARIHDD8-001362
  • June 1943 June to the 31At, De(IClYlhcl' ]\)4f1IARIHDD8-001362
  • June 1943 JuneIARIHDD8-001362
  • June 1943 June 13,483IARIHDD8-001362
  • June 1943 In Bengal the food drive ill June, providing ns it (lid J01' the requisitioning of stoch in eX :e"R of 300 maunds, was the first step towards the reversal of the poliu;}' uj' t:e-contI'OlIARIHDD8-001362
  • June 1943 ~owards the end of June, however, it was decided in regard to rice to addIIARIHDD8-001362
  • June 1943 At the beginuing of June a confidential circular was issued to Collectors indicatiug that famine might have to be declared and requesting them to report to Government 011 the position in their districtsIARIHDD8-001362
  • June 1943 In June 1943 , the Governlllent of India were approached for financial help to meet the obligations of reliefIARIHDD8-001362
  • June 1943 We now come to the beginning of 1943 , and in the course of the following sections we shall consider what was done and should have been done to prevent or mitigate the famine which' began in June and reached its height in the second half of the yearIARIHDD8-001362
  • June 1943 They pomted to the negatm~ results of the "Food Drive" in June 1943 as evidence against the view thaIARIHDD8-001362
  • June 1943 t the organization which was subsequently created in June, (which we described in paragraph a of ChaIARIHDD8-001362
  • June 1943 Up to June 1943 such a declara· tion would have been inconsistent with the existing propaganda policy by which an attempt was being made to allay fears of shortage and create confidenceIARIHDD8-001362
  • June 1943 Towards the end of June famine was present in many parts of BengalIARIHDD8-001362
  • June 1943 It was not, however, until 11th June that the Government called ror detailed info:rmation about the areas affected, the numbers involved and the nature of the relief requiredIARIHDD8-001362
  • June 1943 oners and Coll~tors from the early months of 1943 , the Provincial Go'VernmelIt dId not call for a, report on ~he situation in the districts until June Rnd detailed illstructions relating to relief were not issued ~ill AugustIARIHDD8-001362
  • June 1943 famine were bound up with the unfortunate propaganda policy of "No Shortage" which, -followed during the months April to June with the support of the Government of India, was unjustified when the danger of famine was plainly apparentIARIHDD8-001362
  • June 1943 In May and June, 1943 , the death rate began to rise in the districts of Rangpur, Mymensingh, Bakarganj, Chittagong, Noakhali, and TipperahIARIHDD8-001362
  • June 1943 The most striking increase was in Chittagong and the neighbouring district of Noakhali, where, after a steep rise in May, the number of deaths was twice the quinquennial average in June, and 3 to 4 times the average in JulyIARIHDD8-001362
  • June 1943 The results of the "anti-hoarding" campaign or the "food drive" which was Wldertaken in Bengal in June HI43 (excluding Calcutta, Howrah and a few other areas) supports 'this conclusionIARIHDD8-001362
  • June 1943 Total 1'equire:nent of this population from 16th June to 31st Dec€'rober in terms of rice at 3 seers pcr oapita per week1 • 4'4, tonli"IARIHDD8-001362
  • June 1943 tion from 1st January to 15th June, at the same rateIARIHDD8-001362
  • June 1943 Stocks on 16th June, 1943 (at 25 per cent excess of thos6 aotually discovered)IARIHDD8-001362
  • June 1943 ining popuhtion (6' 5 million) up to 15th June 1943 , at the above raIARIHDD8-001362
  • June 1943 Total consumed and in stock on 16th June 1943 5'4,IARIHDD8-001362
  • June 1943 April May June TotalIARIHDD8-001362
  • June 1943 June 36,792IARIHDD8-001362
  • June 1943 April, May June TotalIARIHDD8-001362
  • June 1943 12th June 1943 IARIHDD8-001362
  • June 1943 28th June 1943 IARIHDD8-001362
  • June 1943 , dated the 16th June 1943 that a sum of &SIARIHDD8-001362
  • June 1943 27 only on 16th June 1943 for meet~the requirements of the Sub-Divisional Officer, ContaiIARIHDD8-001362
  • June 1943 10 lakhs in the latter part of June as it is most· unlikely that the aIARIHDD8-001362
  • June 1943 s drawn on 16th June 1943 could have been spent on gratuitous relief in cash within a short period of a week or so specially in view of the faIARIHDD8-001362
  • June 1943 ct that a very large number of people were being engaged in test relief work throughout the month of JuneIARIHDD8-001362
  • June 1943 It will be seen from the figures that between October 1942 and June 1943 expenditure onIARIHDD8-001362
  • June 1943 April to June 1943 •IARIHDD8-001362
  • June 1943 October to December 1942 82,000 50,000 January to March 1943 4,60,000 3,03,500 50,000 April to June 1943 • 10,05,500 5,00,000 3,00,000 July to September 1943 1,05,000 2,95,000 October to December 1943 1,10,000 6,60,000IARIHDD8-001362
  • June 1943 The Transfer of Power Documents, Volume III: Reassertion of Authority, Gandhi's Fast and the Succession to the Viceroyalty, 21 September 1942 –12 June 1943 ogradac_article_pub_063
  • June 1943 " In June, the Central Govern?[27]
  • June 1943 Rowlands Report which was issued early in June[27]
  • June 1943 March June Sept[27]
  • June 1943 " In June, the Central Govern? ment reversed its previous position and decided to introduce free trading conditions throughout India[27]
  • June 1943 " This question was more thoroughly explored in the Rowlands Report which was issued early in June[27]
  • June 1943 33 Most secret Weekly Intelligence Summaries (lndiaInternal), 18June 1943 , LIWSII I 1433, Oriental and India Office Collections, British Library, London, UK[14]
  • June 1943 In June and July a further 90,000 tons were imported, again with no effect on prices[15]
  • June 1943 In June 1943 there was a house-to-house search for secret stockpiles, but it was found that there was very little in stock, not enough to last to the November harvest[15]
  • June 1943 For a brief period in June and July, Bihar and Orissa permitted exports to Bengal (after much pressure from the Indian Government), but they stopped these when their own prices rose sharply[15]
  • June 1943 supplies in any of the periods, January to March 1943 , March to June 1943 or June to December 1943 [15]
  • June 1943 1 June 1943 609 0 0 2390 100 17 4138[15]
  • June 1943 During June and July there was free trade between Bengal, Bihar and Orissa[15]
  • June 1943 In June 1943 there was the Food Drive which aimed at locating surplus stocks and "to[15]
  • June 1943 It would seem particularly grave because they had seen the fate of the farmers who had sold their stocks to cash in on the high prices of March, and had not been able to buy back the food they needed to live on at the higher prices of May and June[15]
  • June 1943 5 Famine was not declared, according to the Revenue Department, because until June its strategy was based on the belief that grain would become available through the central government and this dictated a policy of "creating confidence[18]
  • June 1943 " After June it was not confident that the central government would supply either the grain or the funds to meet the "extraordinary obligations for relief[18]
  • June 1943 7 Suhrawardy also exerted greater influence on policy and executive action than his predecessors as he attacked the problem of supply with "anti-shortage propaganda"8 and the June "food drives[18]
  • June 1943 In this situation, where the DCS considered that it alone had the answers to the food crisis, the appointment between June and August 1943 of officers to liaise between the departments did not produce a coordinated distribution of food and funds[18]
  • June 1943 From mid-March until early June 1943 the district, although still short of food, had a respite during which the relief system functioned more smoothly[18]
  • June 1943 Beginning in June 1943 the situation in Midnapore deteriorated rapidly[18]
  • June 1943 2), so that on June 8 the {sfn|Brennan|1988|p=}}
  • June 1943 In June the shortage of rice in the division was reported as "serious"; by July a new dimension was added to the crisis when rain damaged the aus crop in the low-lying areas of the district, pushing up prices again[18]
  • June 1943 As the funds sanctioned in late June became exhausted over the early weeks of July, people whose livelihoods had vanished or whose wages were insufficient found they had also lost their entitlement to relief[18]
  • June 1943 NSSO Report (1998): Indebtedness of Rural Households as on June 30, 1991, Debt and Investment Survey, NSS Forty-Eighth Round, National Sample Survey Organisation, Department of Statistics, Government of India, New Delhi[20]
  • June 1943 The first gruel kitchen was started in Chittagong on 29 May 1943 , while on 11 June of the same year the revenue commissioner sent the first report of starvation deaths throughout the district[10]
  • June 1943 On 28 June he sent another report saying that there were eleven deaths in the streets of Chittagong town[10]
  • June 1943 41 Not until June 1943 did the district officials, from the divisional commissioner to the respective district collectors, display any interest in preparing any report on the level of distress in the areas worst affected by the famine[10]
  • June 1943 Modern Review, (Calcutta) ( 1943 ), January–June[10]
  • June 1943 Murray, 'Somali food shelters in the Ogaden and their impact on health', The Lancet (June 1976), pp [12]
  • June 1943 The aman, or winter rice, was sown between April and June and reaped between November and January[2]
  • June 1943 2), 12 June 1937; BLCP, 48th session, 1936, vol[2]
  • June 1943 When finally all restrictions were removed in June 1943 , it was too late[24]
  • June 1943 In this case out of I3I fields recorded as having aus (monsoon) rice by investigator B on August 10th, 1943 , no fewer than I23 had been shown as having rice also by inves- tigator A during the earlier survey on June 28th, 1943 [5]
  • June 1943 For example, total mortality from fevers (including malaria) was 45 per cent higher during June-August 1943 compared with the corresponding average for 1937-41[19]
  • June 1943 The Public Health Commissioner for India in his report for 1943 and 1944 gave the recorded numbers of deaths of "destitutes" in Calcutta - "those persons who died and whose bodies were disposed of by public arrangement" - as follows: 3,000 deaths between June 1942 and May 1943 ; and 19,000 deaths between June 1943 and May 1944 [19]
  • June 1943 3) The year to which the data on price and area relate ends on 30th June[19]
  • June 1943 (1987), "Demographic Responses to food shortages in the Sahel", paper presented at the Expert Consultation on Population and Agriculture and Rural Development, FAO, Rome, June-July[19]
  • June 1943 22, 3 June: 1229-1236[19]
  • June 1943 It was in this context that the Government of Bengal launched its province-wide Food Drive in June of 1943 [1]
  • June 1943 24 WBSA, Home Political, "Fortnightly Report for 2nd Half of June, 1943 ," file W- 39/ 1943[1]
  • June 1943 31 WBSA Home Political, "Fortnightly Report for 2nd Half of June, 1943 ," file W-39/ 1943[1]
  • June 1943 42 WBSA, Home Political, "Fortnightly Report for the 2nd Half of June, 1943 ," file w-39/ 1943[1]
  • June 1943 Public suspicion only escalated further when it was announced on the 17th of June that Field-Marshall Archibald Wavell, then Commander- in-Chief of Armed Forces in Asia, had been selected to replace Linlithgow as the next Viceroy and Governor-General of India[1]
  • June 1943 53 WBSA, Home Political, "Fortnightly Report for the 2nd Half of June, 1943 ," file w-39/ 1943[1]
  • June 1943 Cholera, epidemic since June, is again on the increase; there were 140 cases and 74 deaths during the seven days ending on August 21[1]
  • June 1943 In Midnapur town he found a small family who had abandoned their village in June[1]
  • June 1943 harvest year) and June in year t+1 (before prices are affected[22]
  • June 1943 prices in Finland between September in year t and June in year[22]
  • June 1943 ten per cent higher in June than in the previous September,[22]
  • June 1943 The Transfer of Power Documents, Volume HI: Reassertion of Authority, Gandhi's Fast and the Succession to the Viceroyalty, 21 September 1942 -12 June 1943 [16]
  • June 1943 35 These range from references to 30 inches of rain in Hong Kong over five days in June 1959 to a hurricane in July 1960 that ruined 777,000 mu (or about 130,000 acres) of crops in Shandong Province; from people wading across theYellow River in March and June 1960, to more typhoons than in any year in the previous half-century; and from infestations of locusts to the following briefing to military students by a US China expert:[13]
  • June 1943 The most telling direct evidence against the claim that speculators held back a disproportionate share of the 1942 /3 harvest is the outcome of Suhrawardy's high-profile campaign against 'hidden' hoards in June–July 1943 [13]
  • June 1943 See also ABP, 6 June 1943 , p[13]
  • June 1943 IV: 'The Bengal famine and the viceroyalty, 15 June 1943 –31 August 1944 ' (1973)[13]
  • June 1943 The most telling direct evidence against the claim that speculators held back a disproportionate share of the 1942 /3 harvest was the disappointing outcome of Suhrawardy's 'food drive' of June-July 1943 [17]
  • June 1943 Its origins lay in rainfall 'of biblical proportions' that struck on June 26 1995 and produced 23 inches of rain in ten days[17]
  • June 1943 The first drive, which excluded the twin cities of Calcutta and Howrah, began on 7 June[26]
  • June 1943 An earlier version of this essay was presented in June 2010 at a conference at the University of Melbourne organized by Stephen Wheatcroft[23]
  • June 1943 12 "Food Situation in Bengal," Statesman, 14 May 1943 ; "Bengal Food Drive (editorial)," Statesman, 9 June 1943 ; Greenough 1982: 122[23]
  • June 1943 24 "Appalling Condition of Calcutta's Dustbins," Statesman, 3 June 1943 ; "Calcutta's Dust Bins," 24 June 1943 [23]
  • June 1943 On 8 June 1943 Herbert warned of an irreconcilable conflict between Bengal's needs and those of her neighbors[23]
  • June 1943 343 (3 June 1943 ); vol[23]
  • June 1943 In notes presented to the Famine Inquiry Commission Pinnell commented on the non- declaration of famine, claiming that before June 1943 non- declaration was based on the need to maintain morale and the conviction that large-scale imports would soon materialize[23]
  • June 1943 103 ABP, June 5, 1943 [23]
  • June 1943 The "food drives" of June and August 1943 followed from the hoarding hypothesis[23]
  • June 1943 drag out the hoards," and his officials held that the food drive was responsible for reported falls in the price of rice in a "number" of districts in early June[23]
  • June 1943 110 ABP, 6 June 1943 , p[23]
  • June 1943 111 "Food Committees for Bengal Villages," Statesman, 18 June 1943 [23]
  • June 1943 112 ABP, 30 May 1943 ; "Food Committees for Bengal Villages," Statesman, 18 June 1943 ; ABP, 18 June 1943 [23]
  • June 1943 113 Statesman, 6 June 1943 [23]
  • June 1943 116 ABP, 24 June 1943 [23]
  • June 1943 117 ABP, 7 July 1943 (editorial); 22 June 1943 ; 14 July 1943 ("in practically all places and districts deficits had been reported")[23]
  • June 1943 118 ABP, 25 June 1943 ; "Food Situation Criticized," Statesman, 13 July 1943 [23]
  • June 1943 119 "Food Conference in Calcutta," Statesman, 27 June 1943 [23]
  • June 1943 The total number of prosecutions in June came to 174, of which forty-eight related to sugar, thirty-two to coal, and thirty-four each to oil and kerosene[23]
  • June 1943 134 APB, 15 June 1943 (statement from Bengal Provincial Students' Federation)[23]
  • June 1943 The negative results of the "Food Drive" in June 1943 further embarrassed the Government[23]
  • June 1943 The beginning of the rise in deaths can be pinpointed clearly from the ICDDRB data at around June 1974,[31]
  • June 1943 rate of December-January of the tripling of rice prices that was to follow before the next peak in May-June[7]
  • June 1943 June 0-72 514 0-50 135 26[7]
  • June 1943 June 78 50 49 48 23 39 19[7]
  • June 1943 June 435 220 240 51 55[7]
  • June 1943 Next, the Bengal government conducted "food drives" in June and July 1943 to expose large holdings in the countryside and Calcutta, using house-to-house searches to uncover reserves and requisition especially large hoards[8]
  • June 1943 101 Report of the Grow More Food Enquiry Committee, Government of India, June 1952[8]
  • July 1943 Similarly the Calcutta Food census in July 1943 discovered stocks of the order of 31,000 tons, which is just one month's rice consumption of that citycomlast
  • July 1943 } 100,324 ,, Julycomlast
  • July 1943 Indeed, by the middle of July prices had risen very steeply in the Eastern Region outside Bengal, and had reached a level which was placing food beyond the reach of the poorer sections of the populationcomm-92ff
  • July 1943 ernment of Bengal stated in July that they were prepared to deal with the arrival -of 120 or even 500 wagons of foodgrains daily, and also "to appoint a Transport Officer and a Transport Department who will do the work of receiving goods, handling them herecomm-92ff
  • July 1943 The Bengal Government should, in July or thereabouts, have under- taken the task of setting up the organization needed to deal with the arrival of foodgrams in Calcutta under the Basic Plan and their despateh to the districts, and, if local resources were inadequate, impressed on the Government of India their need for assistancecomm-92ff
  • July 1943 The most striking increase was in Chittagong and the neighbouring district of Noakhali, where, after a steep rise in May, the number of deaths was twice the quinquennial average in June, and B to 4 times the average in Julycomm-92ff
  • July 1943 In July the reported death-rate was above the average in all districts except Hooghly, Jessore, and Maldacomm-92ff
  • July 1943 Ill IOI'IAHTI ported in Bengal from July 1948 to 11m I I / 4~ioall I comm-92ff
  • July 1943 By July most of rural Bengal was involved, the death rate in almost all districts being in excess of the normalcomm1
  • July 1943 The Bengal Government should, in July or thereabouts, have under- taken the task of setting up the organization needed to deal with the arrival of ioodgrains in Calcutta under the Basic Plan and their despatch to the districts, and, if local resources were inadequate, impressed on the Government of India their need for assistancecomm100-150
  • July 1943 From July to December 1943 , 1,304,323 deaths were recorded as against an average of 626,048 in the previous quinquennium, re- presenting an increase in mortality of 1083 per centcomm100-150
  • July 1943 The death rate during the year from July 1943 to June 1944 reached '37-6 per millscomm100-150
  • July 1943 The most striking increase was in Chittagong and the neighbouring district of Noakhali, where, after a steep rise in May, the number of deaths was twice the quinquennial average in June, and 3 to 4 times the average in Julycomm100-150
  • July 1943 In July the reported death-rate, was above the average in all districts except Hooghly, Jessore, and Maldacomm100-150
  • July 1943 There was a considerable excess mortality from malaria and cholera as early as July, 1943 comm100-150
  • July 1943 From July to December 1943 , 479,039 deaths from malaria were re- corded, an excess of 266,208 deaths (125-1 per cent) over the quinquennial avpragecomm100-150
  • July 1943 The epidemic began in July and reached, its peak in October—Novem- bercomm100-150
  • July 1943 Similarly the Calcutta Food census in July 1943 discovered stocks of the order of 31,000 tons, which is just one month's rice consumption of that cityhussain_minute
  • July 1943 } 100,324 ,, Julyhussain_minute
  • July 1943 By July most of rl1ralBengal was invo1ved, the death rate in almost all d;stricts being in excess of the normalIARIHDD8-001362
  • July 1943 After March, ~rrlvals diminish graclually, the month!'; of least activity being July and August m the case of paddy, und from Septembe-r to November in respect of rice"IARIHDD8-001362
  • July 1943 ln June raill was needed in most parts of the province, the monsoon having peen late in es~abljshillg itself; and, although rain was more plentiful in July, still more was neededIARIHDD8-001362
  • July 1943 1t would it be in July 1943 ~IARIHDD8-001362
  • July 1943 Thall' conference· met on the 7th JulyIARIHDD8-001362
  • July 1943 On the '9th July 1943 , the Government of India il:lsuetl illStI'Lll:(iolll:l to tho effect that first, Bengal should not be isolated by tho l'e-imIOsi! ion of provineial bll1'l'iers until the revisecl Basic Plan based OIl the l'oassessC'cl iLl'llTCS had been drawn up IARIHDD8-001362
  • July 1943 On the 15th July these instructions were modifiecT nnd it was :laid down that first, free trade contracts for export from one province to another wonI'd be valid provided the date of such contracts was not l(1ter than the 8th ,July 1943 , and secondly, no free trade contracts requiring export from one province to another, which had been executed between the 9th July and 31st ,July, would be v(llid unless approved by the (lppropri(lte authority in' th~ ,pl'Ovil1C'e in which the purchase had been madeIARIHDD8-001362
  • July 1943 Although, as a result of an agreement, with the Bibnr (}overnmentJ ill 'regnrc1 to the movement of £ooc1grains contracted for export during {;he free trade period, the embnrgo ronnel Bihar W(LR re-imposed with cfEed from iho !'lIst July 1943 , formnl orders restoring to the Governments of AI'lRamIARIHDD8-001362
  • July 1943 Tn prnctice, it hlld ceased to operate from the middle of JulyIARIHDD8-001362
  • July 1943 7th July 1943 30 8 0IARIHDD8-001362
  • July 1943 8/12/-to Rs, 9/4/-a maund, whereas during the 'week ending July 12th, it rose to RsIARIHDD8-001362
  • July 1943 The revised Pltm was announced by the Government of India on the 27th July ~~43IARIHDD8-001362
  • July 1943 T~e original Plan provided for the delivery of the following quantities of rice to BOilgal between July 1943 and November 1943 :-IARIHDD8-001362
  • July 1943 July 43,300IARIHDD8-001362
  • July 1943 rrived in Oalcutta by rail or river steamer from Bengal disl'ricts during the months March to July, 1943 IARIHDD8-001362
  • July 1943 July 7,914IARIHDD8-001362
  • July 1943 In the first week of July it w; decided that a food drive in Calcutta and Howrah shonld be undertakenIARIHDD8-001362
  • July 1943 received about the middle of July, showed the situation to be graveIARIHDD8-001362
  • July 1943 to the Capital, from July and August onwards, haIARIHDD8-001362
  • July 1943 Some were secured by local purchase and requisitioning and in July, during the free trade period, 50,000 maunds were purchased in AssamIARIHDD8-001362
  • July 1943 peak in July and AugustIARIHDD8-001362
  • July 1943 Indeed, by the middle of July prices had risen very steeply in the Eastern Region outside Bengal, andIARIHDD8-001362
  • July 1943 The Government of Bengal stated in July that they were prepared to deal witll the Rrrival of 120 or even 500 wagons of foodgrains daily, and also "to appoin't a Transport Officer ,and a Transport Department who will do the work of receiving !roods, handling them hereIARIHDD8-001362
  • July 1943 From July to December 1943 , 1,304,323 dea~hs were recorded as against an average of 626,048 in the previous quinquennlUm, representing an increase in mortality of 108'3 per centIARIHDD8-001362
  • July 1943 The most striking increase was in Chittagong and the neighbouring district of Noakhali, where, after a steep rise in May, the number of deaths was twice the quinquennial average in June, and 3 to 4 times the average in JulyIARIHDD8-001362
  • July 1943 In July th(' reported death-rate was above the average in all districiis except Hooghly, IARIHDD8-001362
  • July 1943 s reponed in Bengal from July 1943 to June 1944 IARIHDD8-001362
  • July 1943 considerable excess, n:tvrtality from malaria and cholera as early as July, 1943 , The diffC!rence between death from simple starvation and death occurring in a starved indivi· :dual who is suffering from disease is of meoIARIHDD8-001362
  • July 1943 'From July to December 1943 , 479,039 deaths from malariaIARIHDD8-001362
  • July 1943 n in July and reached it!) peak in October-Novem- ber: In Bengal, March and April are normally the months of highes~ pre: wIARIHDD8-001362
  • July 1943 The total numberof deaths :from cholera reported from July 1943 to June 1944 was 218,269, thai! is, 309·7 per cent in excess of the quinquennial average for , 1938 -42IARIHDD8-001362
  • July 1943 The number of vaccination", against small-pox and inoculations against cholera carried out monthly from July 1943 to May 1944 is shown belowIARIHDD8-001362
  • July 1943 July 114,167 721,615IARIHDD8-001362
  • July 1943 l for July-DIARIHDD8-001362
  • July 1943 strength of all grades of the medical services in July 1943 was 425 against; aIARIHDD8-001362
  • July 1943 Similarly the Calcutta Food oensus in July 1943 discovered stooks of the order of 31,000 t01l3, which is justIARIHDD8-001362
  • July 1943 I~ must also be remembered that if rice and wheat had come into :Bengal during May-July 1943 in the same trickle at which they were coming from January too April 1943 , the distress wouldIARIHDD8-001362
  • July 1943 ,July August September TotalIARIHDD8-001362
  • July 1943 July August September TotalIARIHDD8-001362
  • July 1943 10th July 1943 IARIHDD8-001362
  • July 1943 22n:d July 1943 IARIHDD8-001362
  • July 1943 26tl1 July 1943 IARIHDD8-001362
  • July 1943 11th July 1943 IARIHDD8-001362
  • July 1943 , dated the 8th July 1943 and the last portion of your MemoIARIHDD8-001362
  • July 1943 July 1943 regarding the distribution of gratuitous reliefand maintenance loansIARIHDD8-001362
  • July 1943 94-Misc•• ilated the 10th July 1943 , to the Collector of Midnapore was admittedly somewhat UDhappily worded, but it should be interpreted in its historical backgroundIARIHDD8-001362
  • July 1943 between July and December 1943 , 23 lakhs were spent on Agricultural Loans in MidnIARIHDD8-001362
  • July 1943 July to September 1943IARIHDD8-001362
  • July 1943 October to December 1942 82,000 50,000 January to March 1943 4,60,000 3,03,500 50,000 April to June 1943 • 10,05,500 5,00,000 3,00,000 July to September 1943 1,05,000 2,95,000 October to December 1943 1,10,000 6,60,000IARIHDD8-001362
  • July 1943 Change the people, the place, and the time, but the issue remains the same: millions of people dead for political ends" (cited in The Ukranian Weekly, LXX(28), July 14, 2002)ogradac_article_pub_063
  • July 1943 On the other hand, treering analysis suggests that at Huashan (in Shaanxi province, central China) rainfall in April–July 1960 was probably lower than in all years, or almost all years, between 1600 and 1988ogradac_article_pub_063
  • July 1943 conceived by Das in July-August of 1943 when hundreds of hungry destitutes entered the city of Calcutta in search of foodsummary_Das_good2
  • July 1943 Biswas and Amitabha Basu (both trained by Das) which was titled 'In the Absence of Masters, Anthropology Can Only Perish' in the English daily The Asian Age (3 July 1996)summary_Das_good2
  • July 1943 the plan was abandoned early in July[27]
  • July 1943 This step was taken without consulting the provinces and states and aroused such a storm of protest that the plan was abandoned early in July[27]
  • July 1943 Rutherford, Governor, Government of Bihar to Linlithgow, Viceroy, 5 March 1943 , 25May 1943 and 12July 1943 , Rl3/1/23, Oriental and India Office Collections, British Library, London, UK[9]
  • July 1943 Scarcity relief works-in the form of stone quarries, metal breaking units, tank and road building schemes- were started to tackle the situation and by the end of July 1943 it was reported that more than 90 000 labourers were involved[14]
  • July 1943 Rutherford, Governor, Government of Bihar, to Linlithgow, Viceroy, India, 12July 1943 , Rl311 123, Oriental and India Office Collections, British Library, London, UK[14]
  • July 1943 from July to November, the famine was in full spate[15]
  • July 1943 In June and July a further 90,000 tons were imported, again with no effect on prices[15]
  • July 1943 For a brief period in June and July, Bihar and Orissa permitted exports to Bengal (after much pressure from the Indian Government), but they stopped these when their own prices rose sharply[15]
  • July 1943 The sources are agreed that the Bengal Government made much the same assessment as Sen of food availability (until, in July or August, when the famine was reaching its peak, they started to realize that there was a major shortage)[15]
  • July 1943 During June and July there was free trade between Bengal, Bihar and Orissa[15]
  • July 1943 During July 1943 all provision for relief was slashed, ostensibly because agricultural operations were demanding labor (FIC 1945 :69)[18]
  • July 1943 My Hon'ble Minister did not appear to be aware of the position even then and in the Conference of Collectors held in July H[18]
  • July 1943 Despite the floods in West Bengal in July and August 1943 and the bottleneck in Calcutta in October, the main source of grain for relief was the government[18]
  • July 1943 From July starving people streamed into Calcutta, increasing the pressure on the government by their presence and also by the reactions of the citizens (Greenough 1982:127, 226-27), the press (Stephens 1966:187-92), and, more important, the military[18]
  • July 1943 Apart from one crucial period (July 1943 ), pressure for economy was not an intrusive factor in the relief process[18]
  • July 1943 By mid-July 1943 Bell saw little rice in wayside shops; the staple diet of the people with whom he spoke on his tours was dal and vegetables (Bell 1943 )[18]
  • July 1943 Although there had never been sufficient support for Midnapore, the crucial period was from July to October 1943 , when the reduction in food supplies and funds was followed by the imposition of the gruel kitchen system without either enough transition time or enough food[18]
  • July 1943 In June the shortage of rice in the division was reported as "serious"; by July a new dimension was added to the crisis when rain damaged the aus crop in the low-lying areas of the district, pushing up prices again[18]
  • July 1943 Faced with escalating rural distress in July 1943 , the collector ordered his subordinates to organize twenty soup kitchens in each of the four subdivisions (GBR 1944 :33, 35)[18]
  • July 1943 Distribution of gratuitous relief should also be continued up to July 1943 " (GBR 1944 :26)[18]
  • July 1943 How far were the food needs of Faridpur actually met prior to July 1943 ? On the basis of its experience in the previous year, the DCS had decided in February that "Faridpur will have to be carefully studied and its real demand met promptly from Government purchases [18]
  • July 1943 Between January and July 1943 , a maximum of 135,000 maunds of grain was sent by the government to Faridpur-enough to provide a pound of grain a day for about two and a half percent of the population (DCS 1944 b:44; DCS 1944 c: 10- 19; DCS 1944 d:30)[18]
  • July 1943 By July 1943 famine stalked the south-especially Madaripur subdivision (GBR 1944 :33-35)[18]
  • July 1943 These figures point to the value of the relief that was given to the northern subdivisions before July 1943 [18]
  • July 1943 In mid-July 1943 Faridpur neared a crisis[18]
  • July 1943 Then a fear of financial bankruptcy resulted in a very small allocation to the districts in July 1943 [18]
  • July 1943 There was, first, the competitive structure built into the provision of grain and relief in the districts, and second, the shortfall in the purchasing power provided by the state to those weakest in the economic system-a shortfall of crucial significance in July 1943 [18]
  • July 1943 In July 1943 these two factors-the direction of grain supplies away from the destitute and the insufficiency of support for the purchasing power of the poorcombined to create a major crisis[18]
  • July 1943 From figure 5 it is evident that an increase in the quantity of grain brought by the government into the districts occurred in July[18]
  • July 1943 As the funds sanctioned in late June became exhausted over the early weeks of July, people whose livelihoods had vanished or whose wages were insufficient found they had also lost their entitlement to relief[18]
  • July 1943 This limitation partly explains the tragic disruption of relief funds in July 1943 during the aus harvest[18]
  • July 1943 In July 1943 it was a mere one-fourth of the December 1941 level[20]
  • July 1943 In July 1943 Pinnell admitted to Taraknath Mukherjee, the minister, that there was no question of saving the lives of a vast majority of destitutes in Bengal[10]
  • July 1943 Sen pointed out in his speech in a special motion of the Assembly on 12 July 1943 that the rationing system envisaged by the officials and Suhrawardy was inherently flawed[10]
  • July 1943 LXV, Sixteenth Session, 12 July[10]
  • July 1943 50 Circumstances came to a head with the severe monsoon flooding of July to September 1974, which destroyed much of both the minor aus rice crop (harvested in July-August) and the main aman harvest[12]
  • July 1943 in the Matlab area of Bangladesh the 1974-75 famine ran from July of 1974[29]
  • July 1943 It grew after the first showers of spring and was harvested in July or August[2]
  • July 1943 Nusha Yamina Choudhury, Alak Paul and Bimal Kanti Paul, 'Impact of Coastal Embankment on the Flash Flood in Bangladesh', Applied Geography, 24(3) ( July 2004)[2]
  • July 1943 In July 1943 the East India Railways was also breached at several points by the bursting of the banks of the Damodar river[24]
  • July 1943 Fairly heavy rains during the three monsoon months of July, August and September, and some further rains in December and January, are generally considered to be necessary for good harvests in most parts of India[19]
  • July 1943 Indeed, the period July 1943 to June 1944 was the most severe in terms of both increased deaths and reduced births[19]
  • July 1943 However, fortunately, a monthly series of provincial average prices of coarse rice from July 1943 until October 1944 has been found in the personal papers of L[19]
  • July 1943 The correlation coefficient between monthly absolute rises and proportional rises in registered deaths during July 1943 -Jùne 1944 is positive and very high (0[19]
  • July 1943 The main famine mortality peak was roughly of 12 months duration: July 1943 to June 1944 [19]
  • July 1943 Jan-Jun Jul-Dec July, 1943 -[19]
  • July 1943 The main famine death peak in most of Bengal's districts seems to have lasted from about July 1943 to about June 1944 (see Table 6[19]
  • July 1943 Group A fverv severelv affected): those experiencing more than 150 per cent rise in mortality during the period July 1943 to June 1944 : Midnapore, Howrah, Murshidabad, Dacca and Tippera; Group B (severelv affected): districts experiencing 100-150 284[19]
  • July 1943 1 illustrates the regional distribution of deaths during the peak mortality period from July 1943 to June 1944 [19]
  • July 1943 It may be noted that the same four-fold classification as used above in terms of percentage rise in mortality during July-December 1943 as compared to the corresponding period during 1938 -42 was employed in an official memorandum submitted to the Famine Inquiry Commission by the Department of Public Health and local Self-Government (Medical) of the Government of Bengal[19]
  • July 1943 1 The Regional Pattern of Percentage Rises in Deaths During July 1943 to June 1944 , Districts of Bengal[19]
  • July 1943 Vo Rise in Deaths July 1943 - June 1944 above 150[19]
  • July 1943 It is of interest to examine the direction and strength of correlations of those variables which might be thought to have a causal relation with Xi (the percentage rise in deaths during July 1943 -June 1944 )[19]
  • July 1943 X,: percentage rise in deaths during July 1943 -June 1944 over the average of 1940 and 1941 ; X^: ratio of price of rice in 1942 - 43 to average 1938 -40; X,: percentage change in area under rice cultivation in 1942 -43 compared with 1938 -40; X : government grant on gratuitous relief during Oct[19]
  • July 1943 We have also estimated the correlations of percentage rise in deaths during July- December 1943 with X 4 , Xj, Xg and X?; they are respectively 0[19]
  • July 1943 ** It may be noted that the absolute (rather than proportional) rises in death rates during July 1943 -June 1944 have also been found to have significant positive correlations with both X 4 (0[19]
  • July 1943 However, district-level proportional rises in deaths during July 1943 - June 1944 are very strongly (r= 0[19]
  • July 1943 7 the correlation coefficient between the percentage rise in deaths during the period July 1943 -June 1944 , and the percentage decline in births in 1944 across the districts, is found to be 0[19]
  • July 1943 The maximum MI occurred in October of 1943 , while the main famine mortality peak was roughly of 1 2 months duration; July 1943 to June 1944 [19]
  • July 1943 (1987), "Demographic Responses to food shortages in the Sahel", paper presented at the Expert Consultation on Population and Agriculture and Rural Development, FAO, Rome, June-July[19]
  • July 1943 (1991), "The Demography of the Bengal fzunine of 1943 -44: a detailed study" paper presented at the Society for the Social History of Medicine Conference on "Famine and Disease", Christ's College, Cambridge, July[19]
  • July 1943 Nor did the commission seek testimonies from anyone who had since left India – such as Linlithgow himself, an expert in Indian agriculture who had presided over the start of the famine and who, in July 1943 , had estimated a death toll of up to one and a half million (Moon 1973: 32-34)[21]
  • July 1943 A lecture given by a senior official of the Indian government to army commanders in July 1943 also evinces a comprehensive grasp of the several war- related factors, such as inflation and the excessive export of commodities, which had led to the famine[21]
  • July 1943 Although the commission knew that rice exports from India had continued until July 1943 , it did not publish that information[21]
  • July 1943 11 So although there may not have been enough rice in Bengal, there certainly was enough wheat in the British empire to send the half million tonnes of famine relief that Linlithgow had demanded in July 1943 [21]
  • July 1943 5 MT 59/631, "With Sir William Croft's Compliments: India's Foodgrains Supply", 19 July 1943 [21]
  • July 1943 7 WO 208/810, "Address by the Financial Adviser, Military Finance at the Army Commanders' Conference", 9 July 1943 [21]
  • July 1943 55 Masik Basumati, "Khadya Samasya" Ashar, 1350 (July 1943 ) (translation mine)[1]
  • July 1943 On July 2nd Bengal Governor, John Herbert, sent an apologetic letter to the Viceroy to convey some inconvenient news[1]
  • July 1943 63 The Statesman, "Indian Food Situation," July 15, 1943[1]
  • July 1943 On July 14th, Secretary of State Leopold Amery, made a statement in front of the House of Commons on the food situation in India - it was the first of many to come[1]
  • July 1943 The Bengal Legislative Assembly also met in July for its first session since Nazimuddin's ministry had been sworn in[1]
  • July 1943 64 The Statesman, "Bengal Assembly Meets," July 6, 1943[1]
  • July 1943 68 The Statesman, "Food Shop Opened," July 3, 1943[1]
  • July 1943 Huq's Criticism," July 21, 1943[1]
  • July 1943 70 The Statesman, "Food debate in Bengal Assembly," July 15, 1943[1]
  • July 1943 A censure motion was brought to the floor of the Assembly on July 14th, condemning the Ministry's response to the crisis and demanding that "Bengal should be declared a famine area[1]
  • July 1943 In The Statesman, it was reported on July 22nd that people were now dying in[1]
  • July 1943 71 The Statesman, "Intolerable," July 22, 1943[1]
  • July 1943 IV, Herbert to Linlithgow, July 21, 1943 [1]
  • July 1943 75 Arani, 24 Ashar, 1350 (July 7, 1943 ) (translation mine)[1]
  • July 1943 " "A glimpse of the mortality figures [attributed] to epidemic disease from July 1943 ," the Bengal Health Association later suggested, "will reveal how fatal it was to withdraw the staff from their legitimate task for that period[1]
  • July 1943 82 The Statesman, "Vagrancy Ordinance in Calcutta," July 31, 1943[1]
  • July 1943 Towards the end of July details of the scheme to round up Calcutta's "beggars" (which had been in the works since at least January81) were finalized[1]
  • July 1943 On July 30th, Governor Herbert promulgated the Bengal Vagrancy Ordinance of 1943 [1]
  • July 1943 On July 10th Nehru gave a speech unequivocally rejecting the May 16th plan, asserting that the Indian National Congress would not agree to mandatory groupings[1]
  • July 1943 The Muslim League, bitterly disillusioned with both Congress and Britain, convened a three day meeting at the end of July[1]
  • July 1943 disposals between July and November[22]
  • July 1943 Change the people, the place, and the time, but the issue remains the same: mil lions of people dead for political ends" (cited in The Ukranian Weekly, LXX(28), July 14, 2002)[16]
  • July 1943 ) of rice costing about 5 rupees on the eve of the crisis, cost 9 rupees in January 1943 , 21 rupees in April, and 30 rupees in July (Maharatna 1996)[16]
  • July 1943 22 Clearly the Chinese leadership ignored evidence of unfolding disaster at the Lushan Party conference of July 1959, and blamed the messenger in the person of Defence Minister Peng Dehuai[13]
  • July 1943 35 These range from references to 30 inches of rain in Hong Kong over five days in June 1959 to a hurricane in July 1960 that ruined 777,000 mu (or about 130,000 acres) of crops in Shandong Province; from people wading across theYellow River in March and June 1960, to more typhoons than in any year in the previous half-century; and from infestations of locusts to the following briefing to military students by a US China expert:[13]
  • July 1943 322; Time Magazine, reports posted on 6 July 1959, 24 Aug[13]
  • July 1943 As late as July 1943 , when famine deaths were already commonplace, Leo Amery, Secretary of State for India, informed fellow members of the House of Commons that there was 'no overall shortage of foodgrains', and that the 'present difficult situation' was due to 'maldistribution'[13]
  • July 1943 390, 1 July 1943 , col[13]
  • July 1943 391, 14 July 1943 , col[13]
  • July 1943 75 In mid-July 1943 , Bengal Governor Sir John Herbert—hitherto a strong propagandist for the 'sufficiency' position—pleaded with Linlithgow:[13]
  • July 1943 The most telling direct evidence against the claim that speculators held back a disproportionate share of the 1942 /3 harvest is the outcome of Suhrawardy's high-profile campaign against 'hidden' hoards in June–July 1943 [13]
  • July 1943 In July 1943 , Herbert confirmed that hoarding was a secondary concern, and that government-supplied food kitchens were being forced to close because of lack of rice[13]
  • July 1943 1b describes the coefficient of variation in the wholesale price of medium quality rice across Bangladesh between July 1972 and the end of 1975: the spike in late 1974 reflects the balkanisation of markets at the height of the crisis[17]
  • July 1943 ) of rice costing about 5 rupees on the eve of the crisis, cost 9 rupees in January 1943 , 21 rupees in April, and 30 rupees in July[17]
  • July 1943 The immigration into Calcutta prompted the creation of a system of government-funded soup kitchens, the first of which was opened in early July[17]
  • July 1943 The most telling direct evidence against the claim that speculators held back a disproportionate share of the 1942 /3 harvest was the disappointing outcome of Suhrawardy's 'food drive' of June-July 1943 [17]
  • July 1943 As late as July 1943 , when famine deaths were already commonplace and starving country people[17]
  • July 1943 Herbert—hitherto a strong supporter of the 'sufficiency' position— began to sound the alarm in early July[17]
  • July 1943 By mid-July he was demanding food imports as a matter of extreme urgency, no matter 'how unpalatable this demand must be to H[17]
  • July 1943 Amery, now also convinced that disaster was looming, took Linlithgow's plea seriously and argued the case at a meeting of the war cabinet on 31st July[17]
  • July 1943 22 Statesman, July 13th 1943 [17]
  • July 1943 Only on July 28th 1943 did the authorities announce a plan to assist privately-run gruel kitchens, which the government would supply at subsidized rates[17]
  • July 1943 'On development, demography and climate change: the end of the world as we know it?', Lecture given at the XXVth Conference of the International Union for the Scientific Study of Population, Tours, 18 July[17]
  • July 1943 4, The Elephant and Partition: Ireland and India (July/[26]
  • July 1943 In early July the government opened its first food shop in Calcutta, selling rice at a subsidised price to the very poor[26]
  • July 1943 Suhrawardy, warned Delhi in early July that the province was 'in the grip of a very great famine', representatives of other Indian provinces ignored him and applauded instead the claim that 'the only reason why people are starving in Bengal is that there is hoarding'[26]
  • July 1943 In late July the viceroy, Lord Linlithgow, changed his tune and demanded food imports as a matter of extreme urgency, no matter 'how unpalatable this demand must be to HUG'[26]
  • July 1943 Histoiy IRELAND July/August 2010 39[26]
  • July 1943 9 "Bengal Assembly Meets," Statesman, 6 July 1943 (reporting a speech by Huq in the provincial assembly)[23]
  • July 1943 "25 In early July the government opened its first food shop in Calcutta, selling rice at 6 annas26 per seer (about 2 lbs[23]
  • July 1943 28 Classic symptoms of famine, such as the sales of girls and women, mass migrations into the towns and cities, and the consumption of "unedibles and meat from dead cows,"29 were widespread by July[23]
  • July 1943 27 "Food Shop Opened," Statesman, 2 July 1943 [23]
  • July 1943 28 "Crime Increase in City," Statesman, 11 July 1943 [23]
  • July 1943 " At the beginning of July Amery was still holding to the mantra that there was "no overall shortage of foodgrains," while conceding that the "plans elaborated by the Food Department of the Government of India earlier in the year [had] been less successful than was hoped[23]
  • July 1943 " And although Suhrawardy warned his audience at an important official conference about food supply in Delhi in early July that Bengal was "in the grip of a very great famine," even at that juncture representatives of other Indian provinces ignored him and applauded instead the suggestion that "the only reason why people are starving in Bengal is that there is hoarding[23]
  • July 1943 Bengal governor Sir John Herbert began to sound the alarm in private in early July, pleading with the viceroy:[23]
  • July 1943 44 Mansergh 1973: 44, 60; Statesman,"Bengal Assembly Meets," 6 July 1943 [23]
  • July 1943 1174 (1 July 1943 ); vol[23]
  • July 1943 216 (14 July 1943 )[23]
  • July 1943 He argued the case at a War Cabinet meeting on 31 July[23]
  • July 1943 57 Herbert to Linlithgow, 2 July 1943 [23]
  • July 1943 The Statesman changed its tune in early July, with an editorial on the province's need of "more and cheaper food[23]
  • July 1943 80 "Food Debate in Bengal Assembly," Statesman, 15 July 1943 [23]
  • July 1943 81 "Bengal Assembly Meets," Statesman, 6 July 1943 [23]
  • July 1943 114 "More Food," Statesman, 2 July 1943 ; 9 July 1943 [23]
  • July 1943 115 Linlithgow to Herbert, 11 July 1943 ; Herbert to Linlithgow, 2 July 1943 [23]
  • July 1943 117 ABP, 7 July 1943 (editorial); 22 June 1943 ; 14 July 1943 ("in practically all places and districts deficits had been reported")[23]
  • July 1943 118 ABP, 25 June 1943 ; "Food Situation Criticized," Statesman, 13 July 1943 [23]
  • July 1943 The total number of prosecutions for profiteering and hoarding reached 622 in July; 130 related to atta and flour, 115 to sugar, 92 to kerosene, 81 to coal, 52 to mustard, and only 43 to rice[23]
  • July 1943 0 0 30 60 miles 50 100 km JALPAIGURI Assam MYMENSINGH BOGRA MALDA DINAJPUR RANGPUR RAJSHAHI PABNA TANGAIL COOCH BEHAR NADIA DACCA Dacca Tangail Sylhet Sylhet TIPPERA Comilla JESSORE FARIDPUR KHULNA NOAKHALI Chittagong Bay of Bengal Barisal Patuakali BACKERGUNGE PARGANAS MIDNAPORE BANKURA BURDWAN BIRBHUM HOOGHLY HOWRAH Calcutta Kushtia MURSHIDABAD Ganges % Rise in Deaths July 1943 –June 1944 above 150 100–150 50–100 below 50 Regional boundary INDIA BENGAL Map 2[23]
  • July 1943 4 Bengal: Percentage increases in deaths, July 1943 –June 1944 [23]
  • July 1943 147 DDRA is the increase in the death rate in July 1943 –June 1944 ; DDRB also includes excess deaths in July–December 1944 [23]
  • July 1943 The huge gap, documented earlier, between black market prices in east and west Bengal after July 1943[23]
  • July 1943 Calcutta saw the famine mainly in the form of masses of rural destitutes, who trekked from the districts into the city; by July 1943 the streets were full[7]
  • July 1943 By July the index of the exchange rate had been below 30 for three months in succession[7]
  • July 1943 July 0-73 521 0-53 143 27[7]
  • July 1943 July 77 49 49 47 23 38 19[7]
  • July 1943 July 435 300 280 69 64[7]
  • July 1943 But this was abandoned in July, since the prices in these neighbouring provinces soon reached the 'maximum' levels laid down by the provincial governments[7]
  • July 1943 (43) 345, dated 30 July 1943 , Document no[7]
  • July 1943 Next, the Bengal government conducted "food drives" in June and July 1943 to expose large holdings in the countryside and Calcutta, using house-to-house searches to uncover reserves and requisition especially large hoards[8]
  • July 1943 Madras and the central government agreed to provide substantial supplies for Travancore, but could not do so: from July 1942 to April 1943 the state received only 88,000 tons of the 300,000 tons promised[8]
  • July 1943 91 The Provincial Governor of Madras informed the Viceroy in July 1943 of Madras' shortage and its unfair treatment by other provinces: on request from those provinces, Madras had sent "great quantities of rice to Ceylon, Travancore and Cochin … although we knew we were short ourselves[8]
  • July 1943 When free trade finally ended in July-August 1943 , Orissa had undergone a food-supply and food-price catastrophe that significantly worsened its already desperate conditions toward the level of famine[8]
  • August 1943 August comlast
  • August 1943 Local Officers would have required guidance in the unusual circumstances and the provisions of the Code would have had to be modified by special orders such as those issued to District Oflicers in Augustcomm-92ff
  • August 1943 Orders for the organization of relief measures were not issued until 20th Augustr and the Famine Relief Commissioner was not appointed until 26th Septembercomm-92ff
  • August 1943 This began in Calcutta in August and continued until the Army took charge of movement in Novembercomm-92ff
  • August 1943 0n the contrary when distress appeared, there was a tendency both on the part of the Government of India and of Bengal to minimize the prevalence of famine, with the result that the eflorts of the Government of India to secure external supplies were prejudiced even as late as August 1943 by the mistrust and suspicion occasioned by complaints about profi'teering which prevailed- in Bengalcomm-92ff
  • August 1943 the Government did not call for a report on the situation in the districts until June, and detailed instructions relating to relief were not issued till Augustcomm-92ff
  • August 1943 The measures initiated in August were inadequate and failed to prevent further distress, mainly because of the disastrous supply position which had been allowed to developcomm-92ff
  • August 1943 By August 1943 , it was clear that the Provincial Administration in Bengal was failing to control the faminecomm-92ff
  • August 1943 Srivastava in August and a new Secretary of the Department, Mrcomm-92ff
  • August 1943 'rom August onwards, the number of deaths rose rapidly, reaching its peak in Decembercomm-92ff
  • August 1943 If this course had been followed, the-need of Bengal for external assistance would have been recognized earlier; supplies would have been pro- cured from outside more expeditiously; earlier attention would have been given' to the state of the people in the rural areas and much of the misery would have , been avoided: On the contrary when distress appeared, there was artendency both on the part of the Government of India and of Bengal to minimize the prevalence of famine, with the result that the efforts of the Government of India to secure external supplies were prejudiced even as late as August 1943 by the mistrust and suspicion occasioned by complaints about profiteerinq which prevailed in Bengalcomm100-150
  • August 1943 ' While reports of distress in various districts were received from Commis- sioners and Collectors from the early months of 1943 , the Provincial Government ' did not call for a report on the situation in the districts until June, and detailed i instructions relating to relief were not issued till Augustcomm100-150
  • August 1943 The measures initiated in August were inadequate and failed to prevent further distress, mainly because of the disastrous supply position which had been allowed to developcomm100-150
  • August 1943 By August 1943 , it was clear that the Provincial Administration in Bengal was failing to control the faminecomm100-150
  • August 1943 Srivastava in August and a new Secretary of the Department, Mrcomm100-150
  • August 1943 From August onwards, the number of, deaths rose rapidly, reaching its peak in Decembercomm100-150
  • August 1943 the picture seen in the Calcutta emergency hospitals from August to November 1943 was that of acute starva- tion and its efiectscomm100-150
  • August 1943 August hussain_minute
  • August 1943 It comprises highlllnd types sown in April or thereabouts, and harvested in August and SeptemberIARIHDD8-001362
  • August 1943 After March, ~rrlvals diminish graclually, the month!'; of least activity being July and August m the case of paddy, und from Septembe-r to November in respect of rice"IARIHDD8-001362
  • August 1943 in August, and in Septemeer rain benefited the crops throughout the provinceIARIHDD8-001362
  • August 1943 t, April to the end of August amounted to only about 18,000 tonsIARIHDD8-001362
  • August 1943 TIules were not issued till AugustIARIHDD8-001362
  • August 1943 2nd August 1943 31 5 0IARIHDD8-001362
  • August 1943 August _ 43,200IARIHDD8-001362
  • August 1943 'l'he next st(\P wus t,aken ill AugustIARIHDD8-001362
  • August 1943 have been ?perntillg' in ~he districts on the 2~th August when the statutory price ~rst came mto lorce, dId not reach the districts till the 8th of September, that IS, only two days bc:t:ore the Jrop in the statutory price of i'ice from RsIARIHDD8-001362
  • August 1943 l111ns towards the end of August 1943 IARIHDD8-001362
  • August 1943 s again changed in August, when stntutory maximum prices were fixed, in relation to the statutory maximum wholesale pl'ice in force on the day of transferIARIHDD8-001362
  • August 1943 From August onwards, large supplies or grain, despatched on Government account from outside the province, began to arrive in OalcuttaIARIHDD8-001362
  • August 1943 Most of the kitchens 'were opened after the issue in August of the circulars giving instructions abouti 'reEef measuresIARIHDD8-001362
  • August 1943 to the Capital, from July and August onwards, haIARIHDD8-001362
  • August 1943 peak in July and AugustIARIHDD8-001362
  • August 1943 Local Officers waul(! ha,e required guidance in the unllsnal circumstances and the provisions of the Code would have had to be modified by special orders such IlS those is,med to District Officers in AugustIARIHDD8-001362
  • August 1943 Orders for the organization of relief measures were not issued until 20th August, and the Famine Relief Commissioner was not appointed until 26th SeptemberIARIHDD8-001362
  • August 1943 This began in Calcutta in August and continued until thE' Army took charge of movement in NovemberIARIHDD8-001362
  • August 1943 On the contrary when distress appeared, there was a tendency both on the part of the Government of India and of Bengal to minimize the prevalence of famine, with the result that the efforts of the Government of India to secure external supplies were prejudiced even as late as August H)43 by the mistrust and suspicion occasioned by co~plaints about l?rofiteering which prevailed in BengalIARIHDD8-001362
  • August 1943 oners and Coll~tors from the early months of 1943 , the Provincial Go'VernmelIt dId not call for a, report on ~he situation in the districts until June Rnd detailed illstructions relating to relief were not issued ~ill AugustIARIHDD8-001362
  • August 1943 The measures initiated in August were inadequate and failed to prevent further distress, mainly because of the disastrous supply position which had been allowed to developIARIHDD8-001362
  • August 1943 By August 1"943, it was clear that the Provincial Administration in Bengal was failing to, control the famineIARIHDD8-001362
  • August 1943 Srivastava in August and a new Secretary of the DepaIARIHDD8-001362
  • August 1943 In the middle of August 1943 arrangements were made for doctors to attend to destitutesIARIHDD8-001362
  • August 1943 August 84,167 609,306IARIHDD8-001362
  • August 1943 During the second half of 1943 , from August and September 'Onwards, a large number of kitchens for the freE' distribution of cooked food were opened throughout BengalIARIHDD8-001362
  • August 1943 Government of Bengal on August 20th, 1943 , the following scale was laid IARIHDD8-001362
  • August 1943 In a note dalied August 28th the Department IARIHDD8-001362
  • August 1943 The Surgeon-General stated in evidence that the medical authorities at provincial headquarbers did not becOome aware of the existence of unusual conditions until August 1943 , when sick destitutes began :00 throng the streets of OalcuttaIARIHDD8-001362
  • August 1943 In August, 1943 , the Director of Public Health put forward a proposal to Government for the recruitment of 40 dootors and 10 sanitary inspectors for anti-epidemie workIARIHDD8-001362
  • August 1943 The higher death rate in the Calcutta hospitals can be explained in various ways: in general the condition of destitutes who reached Calcutta from th& districts during the famine was bad, and many were picked up in the streets in a moribund state and taken to hospital to die; in Calcutta most of the destitutes who were seriously ill reached hospital, while in the mofussil a larger pro, port,ion of such destitutes probably elied without receiving hospital attention; the most acute phases of the medical emergency in Calcutta were during the ·months August to NovemberIARIHDD8-001362
  • August 1943 On the other hand, the supply position during August, to November 1943 made it difficult to provide a more satisfactory rationIARIHDD8-001362
  • August 1943 The very severe outbreak in Malabar waned in August 19IARIHDD8-001362
  • August 1943 The aman crop is harvested from November to December, and may be said to be assembled by the begiiming Or January; the boro orop is harvested by March-April, and the aU8 crop in August-SeptemberIARIHDD8-001362
  • August 1943 August-september would bring in the aus cropIARIHDD8-001362
  • August 1943 ,July August September TotalIARIHDD8-001362
  • August 1943 July August September TotalIARIHDD8-001362
  • August 1943 10th August 19c(3IARIHDD8-001362
  • August 1943 17th August 1943 IARIHDD8-001362
  • August 1943 August 1943 IARIHDD8-001362
  • August 1943 74 pula per bag between August 1980 and April 1983, the standard deviation fell from 0ogradac_article_pub_063
  • August 1943 conceived by Das in July-August of 1943 when hundreds of hungry destitutes entered the city of Calcutta in search of foodsummary_Das_good2
  • August 1943 (a) Winter crop which is sown in the month of May and harvested in November, (b) Autumn crop which is sown in April and harvested in August, and (c) Spring crop which is sown in November and harvested in February__lecturenotesfamine
  • August 1943 In August, the[27]
  • August 1943 " From August onward, large[27]
  • August 1943 In August, the Bengal Government again announced its decision to fix statutory maximum prices for rice and paddy, this time on a descending scale[27]
  • August 1943 " From August onward, large supplies of grain began to arrive in Calcutta from outside the province, but "the arrival of these supplies found the Bengal Government completely unprepared as regards the supervisory staff, transport, vehicles and storage accommodation[27]
  • August 1943 12 Most secret Weekly Intelligence Summaries (India Internal), 27 August 1943 , UWSI 111433, Oriental and India Office Collections, British Library, London, UK[14]
  • August 1943 34 Most secret WeekJy Intelligence Summaries (India Internal), 20 August 1943 , UWSI 111433, Oriental and India Office Collections, British Library, London, UK[14]
  • August 1943 39 Most secret Weekly Intelligence Summaries (India Internal), 19 February 1943 ,27 August 1943 ,22 October 1943 , 12 January 1945 and 22 June 1945 , LIWS1I1I506, Oriental and India Office Collections, British Library, London, UK[14]
  • August 1943 Famine relief that was undertaken by the from August 1943 to supplement private efforts already underway proved inept and inadequate[3]
  • August 1943 The sources are agreed that the Bengal Government made much the same assessment as Sen of food availability (until, in July or August, when the famine was reaching its peak, they started to realize that there was a major shortage)[15]
  • August 1943 l2th and 3lst March, but only 18,000 tons up to the end of August (FIC p39)[15]
  • August 1943 In August the Government re-controlled the market[15]
  • August 1943 Pinnell, who was director of the DCS from August 1942 to April 1943 and prepared much of the Government of Bengal's submission to the FIC; (2) those records of the FIC preserved in the Nanavati Papers; (3) the recordso f the Bengal Relief Committee; (4) the CPI newspaper, People'sW ar; (5) the nationalist newspaper, Amrit Bazaar Patrika; and (6) the papers, memoirs, and recollections of officials[18]
  • August 1943 5 In August 1943 , when tragedy loomed, gruel kitchens were set up; in October, when these failed to halt migration, workhouses were established to care for the completely destitute[18]
  • August 1943 SOURES:Offcia prce f cars rie iCacutam from Celigut14,DS94g 5, 26 prics in irbhu, Wet Benal, A Sen 982:5,c66 NOTE: In August 943, whenthe DCS noified thegraintradofasetofmaximufixed i Military 014:45, 30 September 2016 (UTC) Decontrol of assistance rice price[18]
  • August 1943 NOTE: In August 1943 , when the DCS notified the grain trade of a set of maximum prices for rice, much of the grain in the marketsw ent undergroundT[18]
  • August 1943 Sen on August 3, 1943 :9 the department was "not taking the amount of interest they should in the matter of famine relief, except in respect of local relief as in the case of the districts of Burdwan [floods) and Midnapore[18]
  • August 1943 In this situation, where the DCS considered that it alone had the answers to the food crisis, the appointment between June and August 1943 of officers to liaise between the departments did not produce a coordinated distribution of food and funds[18]
  • August 1943 The DCS dominated the planning of the next response to the famine, and the Revenue Department had little impact on the basic doctrine enunciated in late August in the Instructionfso r theO rganisationan d Distributiono f Relief( GB 1943 )[18]
  • August 1943 Despite the floods in West Bengal in July and August 1943 and the bottleneck in Calcutta in October, the main source of grain for relief was the government[18]
  • August 1943 This was clearly the case until March: it seems more likely that from April to August the political dominance of those holding the first view of the appropriate response to the famine stifled any response from the Revenue Department other than the limited application of the Famine Manual measures[18]
  • August 1943 From March to August, the prices were those in cheap-grain shops, weighted according to the proportionate supply of rice, wheat, and millet[18]
  • August 1943 By August 1943 the relief system had almost collapsed (Bell 1943 :Aug[18]
  • August 1943 The Instructionfso r the Organisation and Distribution of Relief of August 20 were singularly inappropriate for Midnapore because the main new source of grain for the kitchens was to come from social and official pressure on local landholders[18]
  • August 1943 Most of the relief funds were distributed as agricultural loans, so that those without cultivable land-the very poor-received negligible support until August 1943 , despite prices five times the norm (GBR 1944 :48)[18]
  • August 1943 By early August 1943 grain was unavailable in Dacca city except at exorbitant prices; it was obvious that the authorities had failed either to prevent black-marketing or to organize effective relief[18]
  • August 1943 This voluntary organization relied on donations, but by the end of August it was feeding five thousand people daily through free kitchens (ABP Aug[18]
  • August 1943 What appears to be the most significant factor in the failure of relief was the neglect of support for the buying power of the poor in the district from April to August 1943 (see fig[18]
  • August 1943 So in late August and early September 1943 Karim set up a series of workhouses for people who were unable to work as well as for those who could[18]
  • August 1943 Although the figure does not include food requisitioned or purchased by officers within their districts, it reflects the provincial effort, which can be divided into three periods: from October 1942 to March 1943 when little grain was sent to the districts; from April to August 1943 when the DCS sent grain purchased outside the province to the districts; and from September to December 1943 when grain, especially from the Punjab, began to flow in response to pressure from the Government of India[18]
  • August 1943 Calcutta reeled under the impact of this policy in August as thousands of the destitute fled to the city, prompting more aggressive relief measures and the tripling of relief spending for the next four months[18]
  • August 1943 From March to August 1943 the grain was divided between the market and the cheap-grain shops, with most going to the former[18]
  • August 1943 The proportions that went to cheap-grain shops and the trade during the March-to-August period reflected the competition for grain between the poor and those able to afford the higher price[18]
  • August 1943 With the introduction of the relief system of August 20, a similar type of competition was established between the cheap- [18]
  • August 1943 Although Martin indicates that elsewhere he did not find such "hardheaded and merciless" attitudes to the destitute, the August 20 instructions contained an explicit expectation that the bhadralokw ould be dealt with differently from the majority of the population[18]
  • August 1943 During the March-to-August 1943 period, when it became obvious that there was not enough grain available in the markets of Bengal to feed those most vulnerable to high prices, the administration could have opted to place all the imported grain in the districts in cheap-grain shops[18]
  • August 1943 Moreover, what evidence there is shows that the Revenue Department did not appreciate the importance of supporting the buying power of the poor in the prevailing situation: indeed, until August 1943 a greater proportion of relief funds was spent on agricultural loans and test relief than on gratuitous relief[18]
  • August 1943 In the particular circumstances of mid- 1943 , when Suhrawardy dominated the politics of the food crisis, the hesitancy of the Revenue Department to promote new ideas on the relief of the developing crisis is understandable, as is the long delay preceding the consolidation of the August 20 plan[18]
  • August 1943 Stevens, commissioner of civil supplies from August 1943 , is also reported to have complained about the lack of energy exerted by some district officers (Mansergh and Lumbey 1973:361)[18]
  • August 1943 Greenough (1982) reports that in Calcutta the price of coarse rice (wholesale) rose from 11 rupees four annas (one anna is one-sixteenth of a rupee) in January 4, 1943 to its peak 34 rupees eight annas in August 23, 1943 [20]
  • August 1943 Eventually, in August 1943 , just one month before the officially acknowledged onset of the famine, bureaucrats in the revenue department did meet to discuss the looming threat of the famine in the province[10]
  • August 1943 Sarkar, Education, Health and Lands Member, Viceroy's Executive Council, 1942 onwards, Bombay, 30 August, 1943 , vide NAI, Nanavati Papers, File no[10]
  • August 1943 In a memorandum of the food department of the GOI written in August 1943 it was stated that after the central government rationing adviser relinquished his duties three weeks prior to the drafting of this memorandum, there was no progress in the overall rationing scheme suggested for Calcutta and other towns in Bengal[10]
  • August 1943 ——— (1976), 'Famine Mortality: A Study of the Bengal Famine of 1943 ', mimeograph, London School of Economics, London, August[10]
  • August 1943 50 Circumstances came to a head with the severe monsoon flooding of July to September 1974, which destroyed much of both the minor aus rice crop (harvested in July-August) and the main aman harvest[12]
  • August 1943 Kidane, 'Demographic consequences of the 1984-1985 Ethiopian famine', Demography 26, 3 (August 1989), pp[12]
  • August 1943 atmashakti self-prowess, confidence atraf ordinary, non-ashraf people aus, aush a kind of paddy harvested in August– September[2]
  • August 1943 It grew after the first showers of spring and was harvested in July or August[2]
  • August 1943 75 The general attitude of the Bengali people to Bhadra (August–September), a very hot and humid season, provides an example of the popular response to the region's climate[2]
  • August 1943 'Bangaldesh "is growing" due to freak environmental conditions', Timesonline, 1 August 2008, http://www[2]
  • August 1943 HOW much rice do we grow or can we grow? According to official estimates about 23 crores of maunds '1 (about 84 lakhs of tons) on an average during the last 20 years; but official figures (given in Table 1 of the Appendix) have been long known to be 1 According to The Statesman of 13th November, 1943 , of Caclutta the number of admissions of starvation cases to hospitals in Calcutta alone was 13,967 between August 16 and November 10, and the number of deaths among these 4,825[25]
  • August 1943 Bodies disposed of by Corpse Disposal Organisations were 7,635 and total deaths among 'paupers' recorded by the City Corporation Health Officer were 13,614 betwgen August 1 and November 6[25]
  • August 1943 I am glad to state, however, that at the last moment in August 1943 orders were issued at the instance of the Hon'ble Mr[25]
  • August 1943 20 14 0 August [25]
  • August 1943 In this village 332 fields were surveyed by investigator A on August 14th, 1943 [5]
  • August 1943 (B-survey August 10th, 1943 )[5]
  • August 1943 In this case out of I3I fields recorded as having aus (monsoon) rice by investigator B on August 10th, 1943 , no fewer than I23 had been shown as having rice also by inves- tigator A during the earlier survey on June 28th, 1943 [5]
  • August 1943 Fairly heavy rains during the three monsoon months of July, August and September, and some further rains in December and January, are generally considered to be necessary for good harvests in most parts of India[19]
  • August 1943 The general picture in the emergency hospitals of Calcutta during the period August- November 1943 was also said to be one of "acute starvation and its effects"; it was only from about December of 1943 onwards that diseases took precedence over starvation[19]
  • August 1943 about 70 markets including Calcutta) but only from January to August of 1943 (see Appendix D)[19]
  • August 1943 Although official data on the price of rice in Calcutta show a sharp decline around August 1943 , the black market prices seem to have continued to rise until October, after which they declined rather abruptly but to a level far above the "normal"; see Brennan (1988), Figure 1, p[19]
  • August 1943 For example, the peak malaria mortality from August to December 1943 - which was also the normal seasonal pattern - may have been partly fuelled by favourable post­ monsoon conditions for mosquito-breeding (e[19]
  • August 1943 For example, total mortality from fevers (including malaria) was 45 per cent higher during June-August 1943 compared with the corresponding average for 1937-41[19]
  • August 1943 Prices rose dramatically from the beginning of 1943 , and reached a maximum in August (see also Appendix D)[19]
  • August 1943 ^ Indeed, the realisation that the provision of food was to be the only effective form of relief, came rather late (in the middle of August 1943 ) when the revenue minister had no way but to admit that "there was no question now of saving the lives of all the destitutes in Bengal, but only of saving as many as could possibly be saved"[19]
  • August 1943 Pinnell, ICS, Bengal's first civil supplies director (a former district officer and secretary to two Governors), was largely responsible for the Government's food policies in the crucial period from August 1942 through April 1943 ; he then resigned[19]
  • August 1943 On the 4th of August, Secretary of State, Amery, presented his memorandum on the Indian "food situation" to the War Cabinet in London[1]
  • August 1943 104 The Statesman, "Plight of a Province," August 8, 1943[1]
  • August 1943 On the 8th of August, Ian Stephens, Chief Editor of The Statesman, wrote and published a scathing editorial roundly condemning Government denial[1]
  • August 1943 "108 Those that were a bit less appalling, were run in a photo-spread published in the Sunday edition of The Statesman on August 22, 1943 - and in some definite sense the event since referred to as the "Bengal Famine of 1943 " was born[1]
  • August 1943 The publication of famine photographs in August of 1943 , however, was regarded by many as a singular act of journalistic courage and conscientiousness, without which many more lives would have surely been lost[1]
  • August 1943 Scores of persons collapsing from under-nourishment are daily picked up from the streets; recorded deaths from starvation cases in hospitals between August 16 and August 29 were 143; 155 dead bodies are known to have been removed from public thoroughfares by the authorities' new Corpse Disposal Squad during the ten days ending on August 24; during the week ending August 21 mortality was 1,129 as against and average of 574 in the corresponding weeks of the previous five years[1]
  • August 1943 Cholera, epidemic since June, is again on the increase; there were 140 cases and 74 deaths during the seven days ending on August 21[1]
  • August 1943 110 The Statesman, "An All-India Disgrace," August 29, 1943[1]
  • August 1943 IV, Herbert to Linlithgow, August 28, 1943[1]
  • August 1943 "124 Of the 150,000 tons promised on August 4th, only 30,000 tons of Australian wheat had, as of yet, reached India[1]
  • August 1943 At length the War Cabinet agreed to add an additional 50,000 tons of foodgrains which, together with the 120,000 tons outstanding from the War Cabinet's decision of August 4th, would be delivered "by the end of 1943 [1]
  • August 1943 Towards the end of August, therefore, two private organizations, the Hindu Satkar Samiti and the Anjuman Mofidul Islam, were contracted to dispose of corpses according to religious affiliation[1]
  • August 1943 On August 2nd a banner headline in The Statesman, the same paper that had broke the "first" famine read: "Millions to Die of Starvation[1]
  • August 1943 August 16th was designated "Direct Action Day," and Muslims across India were called on to observe a hartal (general strike), and to conduct public meetings and rallies throughout the country in support of Pakistan[1]
  • August 1943 On August 4th it was added that Direct Action would also include a no-tax campaign, "particularly in respect of taxes levied by the Central Government[1]
  • August 1943 On the morning of the 17th of August, while Calcutta was still reeling from its first long night of arson, looting and murder, approximately 500 khalasis left their quarters in a "coolie" bustee of Benthall's Bird and Company in Howrah, commandeered a number of the company's boats and steamers, and headed down river, towards the docks[1]
  • August 1943 Weekly, Special Number, August[33]
  • August 1943 74 pula per bag between August 1980 and April 1983, the standard deviation fell from 0[16]
  • August 1943 By early August, Linlithgow took a very different view, but Churchill and the War Cabinet were still unsympathetic, with Amery reporting to Linlithgow that his 'earnest' representations to the Cabinet on the food situation had produced 'not too good results'[13]
  • August 1943 ' (August 2007 update) [WWW document][13]
  • August 1943 24 Time Magazine, 31 August 19[17]
  • August 1943 html (Sudan); 'Ethiopian famine strains women, children', 21 August 2003 (AFP); Arnold 1989: 86[17]
  • August 1943 74 pula per bag between August 1980 and April 1983, the coefficient of variation across eighteen markets fell from 0[17]
  • August 1943 Leo Amery, Secretary of State for India, August 1943[17]
  • August 1943 In August Suhrawardy admitted for the first time in public that distress was widespread, and certain to become more acute in the following months[17]
  • August 1943 A separate drive against hoarders in Calcutta and Howrah was carried out amid considerable publicity over a weekend in early August, but it produced similarly disappointing results[17]
  • August 1943 shtml; BBC Thursday, 29 August, 2002[17]
  • August 1943 'The future results of British rule in India', New-York Daily Tribune, August 8[17]
  • August 1943 August 2010), pp[26]
  • August 1943 Between August and December 1943 a huge gap separated official and black market prices[26]
  • August 1943 The second drive, targeting Calcutta-Howrah in early August 1943 , forced Suhrawardy to concede that stocks in the hands of consumers, traders and employers were meagre[26]
  • August 1943 Histoiy IRELAND July/August 2010 39[26]
  • August 1943 The Statesman won accolades for publicizing the famine through a series of graphic photographs published in August 1943 [23]
  • August 1943 " Note to be outdone, perhaps, Amrita Bazar Patrika (ABP hereafter) also published a series of graphic photographs of the famine in late August 1943 [23]
  • August 1943 Amrita Bazar Patrika editorial, August 1943[23]
  • August 1943 50 On August 16 Amrita Bazar Patrika published a telling cartoon on its front page of emaciated people on a beach with ships carrying food in the distance, with the caption "A Mirage! A Mirage!"[23]
  • August 1943 , 156, Braund 1944 : 30; Amery 1988: 933 (entry for 4 August 1943 )[23]
  • August 1943 He announced at the end of August that rationing would be introduced in Calcutta and the industrial areas (but only in October)[23]
  • August 1943 " By mid-August it was adopting a much more critical stance, stating that the crisis menaced Bengal "in many ways [23]
  • August 1943 66 "Food and Society," Statesman, 13 August 1943 [23]
  • August 1943 67 "Public Opinion," Statesman, 16 August 1943 [23]
  • August 1943 68 "Bengal's Foodless," Statesman, 22 August 1943 ; "An All-India Disgrace," 29 August 1943 ;[23]
  • August 1943 84 The following notice in ABP (29 August 1943 ) reflects its part-bhadralok constituency: "Cheap canteen for Middle Class People in Calcutta: Appeals for Running Free Kitchens in the City: It is time we should turn our attention to the poor middle class families whose womenfolk are the worst sufferers in this crisis[23]
  • August 1943 The imposition of price controls on 20 August 1943 led to rice shortages even in Calcutta[23]
  • August 1943 Between August and December 1943 a significant gap separated official and black market prices[23]
  • August 1943 96 "Rice Scarcity in City," Statesman, 30 August 1943 [23]
  • August 1943 The "food drives" of June and August 1943 followed from the hoarding hypothesis[23]
  • August 1943 Criticism of the exclusion of Calcutta and Howrah led to a "food drive" directed against urban hoarders in early August 1943 [23]
  • August 1943 August 7 and 8, 1943 , were declared public holidays in order to facilitate house-to-house inspections in the two cities[23]
  • August 1943 120 "Notes by Prodigal," Statesman, 29 August 1943 [23]
  • August 1943 123 "No Mere Civil Problem," ABP, 20 August 1943 ; Greenough 1982: 126[23]
  • August 1943 127 "Hoarders and Profiteers," Statesman, 17 August 1943 [23]
  • August 1943 30 by 21 May; by 20 August, it had risen to Rs[7]
  • August 1943 In addition, 'controlled shops' were started in Calcutta in August and September 1942 , supplemented in 1943 by a scheme of'approved markets' by which government stocks were made available to selected private shops for sale to the public[7]
  • August 1943 To start with, relief was confined to personal charity and to kitchens organised by charitable organisations, but by August relief for destitutes in Calcutta was accepted as an official policy[7]
  • August 1943 August 0-75 536 0-62 168 31[7]
  • August 1943 (c) Agro-Economic Research Centre for East India (1960) ; the rice price in August 1943 is, however, corrected using (b)[7]
  • August 1943 August 75 64 47 44 22 37 19[7]
  • August 1943 August 491 280 320 57 65[7]
  • August 1943 The maximum employment of 111,000 laborers was reached only in August[8]
  • August 1943 When free trade finally ended in July-August 1943 , Orissa had undergone a food-supply and food-price catastrophe that significantly worsened its already desperate conditions toward the level of famine[8]
  • September 1943 The aman rice crop available for consumption from January, to September 1943 (when the cue crop becomes available), Was approximately 5-5 million tons (adjusted figures with 20 per cent increase over Director of Agricul- ture's estimates)comlast
  • September 1943 September comlast
  • September 1943 Orders for the organization of relief measures were not issued until 20th Augustr and the Famine Relief Commissioner was not appointed until 26th Septembercomm-92ff
  • September 1943 Distribution of food on a large scale was not begun, except in isolated areas as a result of local initiative, until September—several months after the need for it had arisencomm-92ff
  • September 1943 According' to evidence pre- sented to the Commission, the Government of India offered help in September 1943 , but the reply was received that this was not requiredcomm-92ff
  • September 1943 If the Army had been called in two months Bfll'ller: say in September, famine mortality would have been considerably reducedcomm-92ff
  • September 1943 A Famine Relief Commissioner was not appointed till late in Septembercomm-92ff
  • September 1943 Hutchings, was appointed in Septembercomm-92ff
  • September 1943 In Bengal, the new Ministry took office towards the end of April and Sir Thomas Rutherford became Governor in September 1943 , replacing the late Sir John Herbert, then suffering from the illness of which he subsequently diedcomm-92ff
  • September 1943 sented to theCommission, the Government of India offered help in September 1943 , but the reply was received that this was not requiredcomm100-150
  • September 1943 If the Army had been called in two months eaéllerii say in September, famine mortality would have been considerably re llCe - ' One of the reasons why7 the arrangements made by the Government of Bengal to deal with transport and other problems arising during the famine were unsatisfactory was that they failed to realize the magnitude of these pro- blems and the scale of the organization reguired for their successful solution 'f Associated with this was a reluctance to appeal for outside help even when the ' organization and personnel available within the province were 0bvi0usly inade- 1 quatecomm100-150
  • September 1943 A Famine Relief Commissioner was not appointed till late in Septembercomm100-150
  • September 1943 Hutchings, was appointed in Septembercomm100-150
  • September 1943 April and'Sir Thomas Rutherford became Governor in September 1948, replacing the latc""" Sir John Herbert, then suffering from the illness of which he subsequently diedcomm100-150
  • September 1943 The aman rice crop available for consumption from January, to September 1943 (when the cue crop becomes available), Was approximately 5-5 million tons (adjusted figures with 20 per cent increase over Director of Agricul- ture's estimates)hussain_minute
  • September 1943 September hussain_minute
  • September 1943 It comprises highlllnd types sown in April or thereabouts, and harvested in August and SeptemberIARIHDD8-001362
  • September 1943 After March, ~rrlvals diminish graclually, the month!'; of least activity being July and August m the case of paddy, und from Septembe-r to November in respect of rice"IARIHDD8-001362
  • September 1943 bly in September 194aIARIHDD8-001362
  • September 1943 September 39,300IARIHDD8-001362
  • September 1943 September 011Wnrc1EIIARIHDD8-001362
  • September 1943 have been ?perntillg' in ~he districts on the 2~th August when the statutory price ~rst came mto lorce, dId not reach the districts till the 8th of September, that IS, only two days bc:t:ore the Jrop in the statutory price of i'ice from RsIARIHDD8-001362
  • September 1943 Progress in the opening of these centres was, however, slow and by 3rd September only 26 had been startedIARIHDD8-001362
  • September 1943 In September a small daily ration of IARIHDD8-001362
  • September 1943 At the end of September a Relier Co-ordinating Committee was set l:p ·by Government, including representatives of voluntAry relief agencies anrl some 'l'epresentatives of the pressIARIHDD8-001362
  • September 1943 Orders for the organization of relief measures were not issued until 20th August, and the Famine Relief Commissioner was not appointed until 26th SeptemberIARIHDD8-001362
  • September 1943 Distribution of food on a large scale was not begun, except in isolated areas as a result of local initiative, until September-several months after the need for it had arisenIARIHDD8-001362
  • September 1943 If the Army had been called in two months earlier, say in September, famine mortalitv' would have been considerablvIARIHDD8-001362
  • September 1943 A Famine Relief Commissioner was not appointed till late in SeptemberIARIHDD8-001362
  • September 1943 Hutchings, was appointed in SeptemberIARIHDD8-001362
  • September 1943 In Bengal, the new Ministry took office towards the end of April and Sk Thomas Rutherford became Governor in September 1943 , replacing the late Sir John Herbert, then suffering from the illness of which he subsequently diedIARIHDD8-001362
  • September 1943 The Director General, Indian Medical Service, visited Bengal during, the first week of September, 1943 , and made· arrangements for the distribution of milk through the Indian Red Cross Society; an appeal for funds for thi, purpose was made in the same week by the VicerineIARIHDD8-001362
  • September 1943 , September 71,224 568,142IARIHDD8-001362
  • September 1943 During the second half of 1943 , from August and September 'Onwards, a large number of kitchens for the freE' distribution of cooked food were opened throughout BengalIARIHDD8-001362
  • September 1943 In SeptemberIARIHDD8-001362
  • September 1943 correc- tion slip to the original instructions was issued on September 21st, by which theIARIHDD8-001362
  • September 1943 At the beginning of September 1943 , the army handed over 200 tons of milk to the Society, and with this eupply -distribution was begun in CalcuttaIARIHDD8-001362
  • September 1943 The qnantities of evaporated and dried milk distributed in Bengal monthl)j from September 1943 to June 1944 were as follows:- Oaloutta Moju8a1lIARIHDD8-001362
  • September 1943 1943 -September 15 33IARIHDD8-001362
  • September 1943 On September 20th, 1943 , the Government issued general instructions to District Magistrates and Civil · Surgeons, giving them full authority to build additional hospitals, £0 open upIARIHDD8-001362
  • September 1943 The aman crop is harvested from November to December, and may be said to be assembled by the begiiming Or January; the boro orop is harvested by March-April, and the aU8 crop in August-SeptemberIARIHDD8-001362
  • September 1943 The aman rice crop available for consumption from January to September 1943 (when the aU8 crop becomes available), was appl'Oxirnately 5·5 million tons (adjusted figures with 20 per cent increase over Director of Agriculture's estimates)IARIHDD8-001362
  • September 1943 ,July August September TotalIARIHDD8-001362
  • September 1943 July August September TotalIARIHDD8-001362
  • September 1943 tion Inspector ofthe East IndianRailway) was obtained for Howrah in the end ofSeptember another for other sidings in October and a third in the beginning ofNovember fcIARIHDD8-001362
  • September 1943 was o():ffered by the Regional Commissioner and was appointed as Controller ofTransport at the end of September IARIHDD8-001362
  • September 1943 About 13,000 tons of foodgrains arrived at the port in September and IARIHDD8-001362
  • September 1943 In view oftbe difficult transport situation, it was decided 80t the end of September to acquire IARIHDD8-001362
  • September 1943 27th September 1943 IARIHDD8-001362
  • September 1943 26th September 1943 IARIHDD8-001362
  • September 1943 16th September 1943 IARIHDD8-001362
  • September 1943 9th September 1943 IARIHDD8-001362
  • September 1943 July to September 1943IARIHDD8-001362
  • September 1943 October to December 1942 82,000 50,000 January to March 1943 4,60,000 3,03,500 50,000 April to June 1943 • 10,05,500 5,00,000 3,00,000 July to September 1943 1,05,000 2,95,000 October to December 1943 1,10,000 6,60,000IARIHDD8-001362
  • September 1943 The Transfer of Power Documents, Volume III: Reassertion of Authority, Gandhi's Fast and the Succession to the Viceroyalty, 21 September 1942 –12 June 1943 ogradac_article_pub_063
  • September 1943 Rutherford, Governor, Government of Bengal to Linlithgow, Viceroy, India, 19September 1943 , Rl3/2/49, File No[14]
  • September 1943 80 The September 1943 Crop [15]
  • September 1943 The September crop helped, but the famine did not end until an exceptionally good,[15]
  • September 1943 In addition, from September 1942 to October 1943 the trade was trying to get the Bengal Government to import more[15]
  • September 1943 It was said at the time though, that the failure of the September 1943 crop to break the famine was due to the fact that peasants were so frightened by the effect of the famine that they retained enough to keep themselves and their families alive even if the next crop were to fail[15]
  • September 1943 after the September 1943 crop (Sen?, Wavell, Mansergh), and 5[15]
  • September 1943 The September 1943 Crop[15]
  • September 1943 Why did the September crop not break the famine?[15]
  • September 1943 The September 1943 crop produced enough to feed the country for three months , and there were only three months to go before the next crop[15]
  • September 1943 The September crop was an upland rice crop[15]
  • September 1943 At first most of this grain was consumed in Calcutta, but from April 1943 some of the grain was sent to the districts, and this amount increased sharply from September[18]
  • September 1943 Because of the political power of the supporters of the first viewpoint it dominated government activity during the famine; moreover, the possibility of an integrated administration was lost in March 1943 ; and when in September a relief commissioner was appointed for the province, it was too late and his coordinating power was directed at the districts rather than at the secretariat[18]
  • September 1943 Khan and his men were already in a desperate position because of the outbreak of violence on September 29 (GBH 1943 :16-28)[18]
  • September 1943 From September to December, the prices were those paid to the DCS by the Revenue Department for supplies used for relief, weighted according to the relative supply of rice, wheat, and millet[18]
  • September 1943 A steady grain supply to Midnapore was not restored until September 1943 , by which month Contai was again partially submerged, this time a victim of the flooding of the Subarnarekha river (GBR 1944 :35-36)[18]
  • September 1943 In the place of the grain and cash dole system the government attempted in September 1943 to set up food kitchens on a large scale[18]
  • September 1943 Beginning in early September 1943 the amount of grain and relief money coming into Dacca increased substantially[18]
  • September 1943 Their resources were exhausted by mid- 1943 , so that when first gratuitous relief and then supplies of grain became available-from about September-many of them were past succor[18]
  • September 1943 So in late August and early September 1943 Karim set up a series of workhouses for people who were unable to work as well as for those who could[18]
  • September 1943 Beyond these difficulties, which were structural and political, there was also a massive administrative blockage in Calcutta in September and October 1943 [18]
  • September 1943 Although the figure does not include food requisitioned or purchased by officers within their districts, it reflects the provincial effort, which can be divided into three periods: from October 1942 to March 1943 when little grain was sent to the districts; from April to August 1943 when the DCS sent grain purchased outside the province to the districts; and from September to December 1943 when grain, especially from the Punjab, began to flow in response to pressure from the Government of India[18]
  • September 1943 From the beginning of September, grain entering a district was divided among the cheap-grain shops, grain doles (either directly administered or thr6ugh relief organizations like the Bengal Relief Committee, which catered chiefly to the bhadralok)a,n d the gruel kitchens[18]
  • September 1943 The extent of this advantage can be appreciated in figure 5 by comparing the amount of grain that could be purchased from the gratuitous funds largely for use in the gruel kitchens with the total amount of grain brought into the districts by government from September to December 1943 [18]
  • September 1943 The data used by Amartya Sen (1997: 44) demonstrate that while the price of food grains rose sharply from September 1942 to December 1943 , the money wages of the unskilled labourers increased only marginally in this period[10]
  • September 1943 The Viceroy on Food Situation, 11 September to 8 November 1943 , letter by Nazimuddin to Thomas Rutherford, ICS, and sometime acting Governor of Bengal, 26 October 1943 [10]
  • September 1943 As late as September 1943 the famine relief commissioner declared that he did not possess evidence to prove the onset of the famine in Bengal[10]
  • September 1943 Statesman (Calcutta) ( 1943 ), 23 September[10]
  • September 1943 The price of rice, already high by the end of 1942 , rose tremendously throughout 1943 , until in September a maximum was fixed by government order [12]
  • September 1943 Note, too, the lack of market price data after September 1943 [12]
  • September 1943 in late September; by the end of the year it was still 17Rs[12]
  • September 1943 Pinnell, available in the India Office library in London, strongly suggest that the market price of coarse rice in Bengal fell steadily from September 1943 [12]
  • September 1943 In normal years in Bengal the monthly distribution of births was highly seasonal, and the level of conceptions around September-November was usually very low[12]
  • September 1943 This rate shows that the absolute level of conceptions fell to a minimum around September-November 1943 , thus broadly coinciding with the death rate peak[12]
  • September 1943 until relief measures were established by about September, 1943 [12]
  • September 1943 50 Circumstances came to a head with the severe monsoon flooding of July to September 1974, which destroyed much of both the minor aus rice crop (harvested in July-August) and the main aman harvest[12]
  • September 1943 Comparison of Figures 6 and 8 reveals that in both famines the minimum number of conceptions occurred in September of the first year (i[12]
  • September 1943 atmashakti self-prowess, confidence atraf ordinary, non-ashraf people aus, aush a kind of paddy harvested in August– September[2]
  • September 1943 75 The general attitude of the Bengali people to Bhadra (August–September), a very hot and humid season, provides an example of the popular response to the region's climate[2]
  • September 1943 NAB, CBI dept (Railway), 'B' Progs, bundle 2, file 13C-6/194: 'Extracts from notes and orders of Railway Branch', 3 September 1943 [2]
  • September 1943 7 The Statesmen, 23 September, 1943 cited by Omkar Goswami",The Bengal Famine of 1943 : re-examining the Data", Indian Economic and SocialHistory Review, 27,4 (1990o)[4]
  • September 1943 The aman crop available for consumption duringJanuary-September of this year was 5-5 million ton, but the actual requirement was of the order of 7[4]
  • September 1943 (Read at Symposium, September 27-28, 1943 [25]
  • September 1943 22 14 0 September [25]
  • September 1943 A second complete enumeration was made by investigator B about a fortnight later, on September 2nd, 1943 , who also noted independently the name of the crop or mixture of crops growing^on each individual field[5]
  • September 1943 (B-survey September 2nd, 1943 )[5]
  • September 1943 For example, according to investigator B there were altogether 63 fields under jute on September 2nd[5]
  • September 1943 Fairly heavy rains during the three monsoon months of July, August and September, and some further rains in December and January, are generally considered to be necessary for good harvests in most parts of India[19]
  • September 1943 " But such relief against the failure of food exchange entitlements did not come into operation on a significant scale until September of 1943 ; and by that time, as we shall see, mortality had already risen alarmingly[19]
  • September 1943 The fall-off in conceptions continued and reached a minimum absolute level during September-November of 1943 , which was broadly the period of highest death rates[19]
  • September 1943 In this connection, the hypothesis of "malaria refeeding" may be considered apropos the huge malaria and fever mortality peak which occurred after September of 1943 (see Figure 5[19]
  • September 1943 The start of feeding arrangements (which presumably led to an improved nutritional state) in September is hypothesized to have dispelled the latent state of malaria infection among undernourished hosts, and thus contributed to the rise in malaria mortality in the following months[19]
  • September 1943 In a survey of 2537 destitute persons living on the streets of Calcutta in September 1943 , 47[19]
  • September 1943 However, movement of destitutes towards towns and cities was considerable - especially after September 1943 when relief policy began to shift towards food distribution[19]
  • September 1943 This reinforces our view that the general course of mortality increase was largely determined by the effects (somewhat lagged) of large-scale nutritional stress and debilitation on human health, while the ^ As the Report on Bengal notes, "Distribution of food on a large scale was not begun, except in isolated areas as a result of local initiative, until September - several months after the need for it had arisen[19]
  • September 1943 This is because gratuitous relief (of which the dominant form was food distribution) did not assume significance until September of 1943 ; very few districts actually received gratuitous relief before that time[19]
  • September 1943 ^ But meanwhile "mortality rose alarmingly in September[19]
  • September 1943 ^ In view of the exceedingly high prices of food in the open market, food rationing on a card system basis was introduced in Madras in September of 1943 [19]
  • September 1943 Column (iv) gives average daily labour attendance on relief works during the main period of relief provision (January-September 1973) expressed as a per cent of the 1971 district census population totals[19]
  • September 1943 An average of just over six per cent of the state's entire population were attending scarcity relief labour works during the period January- September 1973 (although the resumption of monsoon rains meant that this relief provision was sharply curtailed by October)[19]
  • September 1943 Lobour relief provision during January-September 1973 averaged aver ten per cent of the population[19]
  • September 1943 September 23[19]
  • September 1943 Denials, indifference, and administrative incompetence led to the highly consequential failure - by default or design - to recognize famine until as late as September of 1943 - once its eruption on the streets of Calcutta could no longer be ignored[1]
  • September 1943 15 The Statesman, "Reflections on Disaster," September 23, 1943[1]
  • September 1943 Sir Thomas's appointment was signed by the King on the 4th of September and he assumed office on the 6th[1]
  • September 1943 132 Survey of destitutes in an around Calcutta by Department of Anthropology, Calcutta University, issued September 27, 1943 [1]
  • September 1943 A report by the Calcutta University Anthropology Department , released towards the end of September, confirmed the now starkly manifest disintegration of the entire social fabric of Bengal due to famine as well[1]
  • September 1943 "132 In Malda a scene, the likes of which was becoming increasingly common by mid-September, was reported in the Amrita Bazar Patrika:[1]
  • September 1943 for murdering his only son Mozaffar, aged about three years on September 16 on the ground of his inability to feed him and other members of the family, who, it is reported, had no food for 3 or 4 days[1]
  • September 1943 133 Amrita Bazar Patrika, September 26, 1943[1]
  • September 1943 On the 12th of September an Assistant Inspector of Police in Faridpur was brutally murdered by a mob when he tried to enforce a new (and again, ad hoc) Control Order[1]
  • September 1943 "135 On the 15th of September the United States Council General in Calcutta cabled to the U[1]
  • September 1943 In September, the District Relief Committee in Noakhali reported, "Men women and children are dying daily in great numbers, some on roads and at other public places[1]
  • September 1943 "138 In Midnapur a worker for the Friends' Ambulance Unit described the situation in mid-September vividly:[1]
  • September 1943 142 The Statesman, "Corporation and Starvation," September 10, 1943[1]
  • September 1943 148 The Statesman, "Lessons in Secrecy," September 14, 1943[1]
  • September 1943 On the 9th of September, therefore, the government decided to withhold official death statistics from the press[1]
  • September 1943 151 The Statesman, Bengal Council Passes Vagrants Bill," September 29, 1943[1]
  • September 1943 Despite his efforts, Rutherford admitted to the Viceroy on the 23rd of September that little progress had been made in "forcibly removing" destitute immigrants from the streets of Calcutta, due, he said "to preoccupation with [the] Assembly which was a riot yesterday[1]
  • September 1943 On the 28th of September, the Bengal Council (Governor's advisory committee) passed yet another Vagrants Bill, giving Government sweeping powers to round up "sick destitutes" in Calcutta[1]
  • September 1943 Narayan, of the Madras-based Hindu, arrived in September of 1943 and toured the famine-stricken districts of the province for several months[1]
  • September 1943 prices between September in year t (at the beginning of the[22]
  • September 1943 prices in Finland between September in year t and June in year[22]
  • September 1943 ten per cent higher in June than in the previous September,[22]
  • September 1943 The Transfer of Power Documents, Volume HI: Reassertion of Authority, Gandhi's Fast and the Succession to the Viceroyalty, 21 September 1942 -12 June 1943 [16]
  • September 1943 It was not until early September that Linlithgow relented, conceding the 'strong possibility that we are face to face with an emergency extending throughout the Province'[13]
  • September 1943 In early September in Manikganj (Dacca district), price controls drove all rice out of the municipal market, but it was fetching 40 rupees on the black market; a month later it was costing 60–70 rupees, and by October 1943 in Chittagong, 80 rupees per maund[13]
  • September 1943 A second survey, this time of destitute migrants in Calcutta in September 1943 , corroborates[13]
  • September 1943 In early September in Manikganj (in Dacca district) price controls drove all rice out of the municipal market but it was fetching 40 rupees on the black market; a month later it cost 60 to 70 rupees[17]
  • September 1943 Less well-known is the survey of destitute migrants in Calcutta conducted by anthropologist Tarakchandra Das at the height of the crisis in September 1943 [17]
  • September 1943 avail: on September 24th the war cabinet decided that it would not be possible to divert ships to lifting grain for delivery in India before the next Indian harvest[17]
  • September 1943 32 Amery (1988: 912) noted in his diary in September 1943 that 'the sight of famine conditions cannot but cause distress to the European troops and anxiety to the Indian troops as to the condition of their families in other parts of India'[17]
  • September 1943 41 BBC Tuesday, 21 September, 2004; The Guardian, Sept 29 2004; de Waal 1996: 204- 08; Howe and Devereux 2004[17]
  • September 1943 In early September 1943 that newspaper was asked to cease publishing figures "showing the number of people nearly moribund from starvation" admitted to Calcutta's hospitals[23]
  • September 1943 15 "Lessons in Secrecy," Statesman, 14 September 1943 [23]
  • September 1943 30 "Food Queue Ordeals," Statesman, 4 September 1943 [23]
  • September 1943 In a short statement on 23 September he conceded the role of "a poor rice crop in Bengal"; but in reply to Sorensen's insistence that "until recently an impression was given to the general public that the shortage in India was not so severe as obviously had been the case and [that] it was largely if not entirely due to hoarding," Amery, by now clearly unconvinced of his stance, still held that "the problem is undoubtedly, in the main, one of distribution[23]
  • September 1943 In early September Amery was informed by Lord Leathers that he had "an actual deficiency of ships" for the operational plan prepared by the military and approved by cabinet[23]
  • September 1943 51 Amery 1988: 911–12 (3 September 1943 ); Mansergh 1973: 217 (Auchinleck citation, 8 September 1943 )[23]
  • September 1943 " To no avail: on 24 September the War Cabinet decided that diverting ships to lifting grain for delivery in India before the next Indian harvest would not be possible[23]
  • September 1943 54 Amery 1988: 912, 943 (22 September 1943 , 24 September 1943 )[23]
  • September 1943 82 Statesman, 28 September 1943 [23]
  • September 1943 121 Statesman, 13 September 1943 ; 28 September 1943 [23]
  • September 1943 a confidential memorandum prepared by the Government of India Food Department, and forwarded by Linlithgow to Amery on 7 September 1943 , which found:[23]
  • September 1943 "Consequencesof Mid-I 980s Drought: Longitudinal Evidence from Mahbubnagar", Economicand Political Weekly, September 28 1991, pp[31]
  • September 1943 Because of a government order fixing a maximum price, quotations for rice transactions are difficult to obtain from September 1943 onwards, but there are non-official reports of further rises, especially in retail markets, e[7]
  • September 1943 In addition, 'controlled shops' were started in Calcutta in August and September 1942 , supplemented in 1943 by a scheme of'approved markets' by which government stocks were made available to selected private shops for sale to the public[7]
  • September 1943 Starvation and exchange entitlements 43 (April-September) has been related to the price in that calendar year[7]
  • September 1943 September 0-50 357 0-50 135 38[7]
  • September 1943 September 112 95 76 66 33 56 28[7]
  • September 1943 Rice prices are discontinued from September 1943 , when 'price control' made higher market quotations illegal[7]
  • September 1943 While these two investigations were conducted after the famine was over, a study of destitutes in Calcutta during the famine was carried out in September 1943 by Das (1949), with the help of others, covering 820 destitute family units[7]
  • September 1943 Similarly, in his survey of the destitutes who had trekked to Calcutta at the height of the famine, conducted in September 1943 , Das (1949) found that about 41%—the largest group—were from families of agricultural labourers[7]
  • September 1943 In September 1943 the government declared what was essentially a state monopoly claim on rice produced in Travancore[8]
  • September 1943 By September 1943 the British considered parts of Madras to be "seriously deficit areas" along with Bengal[8]
  • September 1943 The Viceroy up to September 1943 , Lord Linlithgow (Victor Alexander John Hope) was to some degree a specialist on Indian agriculture[8]
  • October 1943 30,689 ,, October comlast
  • October 1943 In October, two oficers from the Department of Supplies, Government of India, were sent to the Government of Bengal to help in supervising the reception and despatch of grain supplies; it appears, however, that their services were not fully utilizedcomm-92ff
  • October 1943 The Government of India sent large supplies of wheat and rice to Bengal during the last five months of 1943 , but it was not till the end of October, when His Excellency the Viceroy, Lord Wavellcomm-92ff
  • October 1943 After an interval during which they attempted to live on their scanty reserves of food, or to obtain Others wandered away from their villages in search of food, and the mass migration of starving and sick destitute people was one of the most distressing features of the faminev Thousands flocked into towns and cities; the number in Calcutta in October 1943 was estimated to be at least 100,000comm1
  • October 1943 The province receives its rainfall from the south west monsoon current and by far the greater part of it falls between the months of June and Octobercomm1
  • October 1943 In October, two oflicers from the Department of Supplies, Government of India, 'were sent to the Government of Bengal to help in supervising the reception and despatch of grain supplies; it appears, however, that their services-were not fully utilizedcomm100-150
  • October 1943 The Government of India sent large supplies ("f wheat and rice to Bengal during the last five months of 1943 , but it was not till the end of October, when His Excellency the Viceroy, Lord VVavellcomm100-150
  • October 1943 The death-rate in Calcutta, unlike that in the province as a whole, reached its peak in October, 1943 comm100-150
  • October 1943 The peak in cholera-mortality occurred in October and November 1943 , while in the case of malaria December stands out as the worst monthcomm100-150
  • October 1943 The epidemic began in July and reached, its peak in October—Novem- bercomm100-150
  • October 1943 During the period December _ 1942 to October 1943 , the purchases made by these ofiicers amounted to 721,000 comm150-175
  • October 1943 30,689 ,, October hussain_minute
  • October 1943 Thousands flocked into towns and cities; the number in Oalcutta in October 1943 was estimated to be at least 100,000IARIHDD8-001362
  • October 1943 The province receives its rainfall from the south west monsoon cunent and by far the greater part of it falls between the months of June and OctoberIARIHDD8-001362
  • October 1943 OctoberIARIHDD8-001362
  • October 1943 His Excellency the Viceroy, Lorl[ Wavcll, visited Bengal at tho UIH[ of October 1943 , when the laminG was at its {wight, uncl as it result ot' bIARIHDD8-001362
  • October 1943 In October 11)112 the litllltral Government ad(lrussed It ltltter to Provincial Govel'mnellts and asked them to f!xamin(\ 1;11e prncticability of working 0, systenl o£ individuul rationing ill l'GS1H:ltlt or riecIARIHDD8-001362
  • October 1943 'n WlO,S reckoned that in the middle of October the number in Calcutta rose to onear1y 100,000IARIHDD8-001362
  • October 1943 Towards the middle of October, some 15 lorries were made available to the relief authorities, and responsible Government officers, acc0mpanied whenever possible by non-official volunteers, toured the streets and collected destitutes by more persuasive and gentle meansIARIHDD8-001362
  • October 1943 In October 1943 it ",,'as reported that food could not be provided for kitchens, that relief was intermittent and scanty, and that rases of emaciation and deaths from starvatIARIHDD8-001362
  • October 1943 In October, two officers from the Department of Supplies, Government of India, were sent to the Government of Bengal to help in supervising the reception and despatch of grain supplies; it appears, however, that their services were not fully utilizedIARIHDD8-001362
  • October 1943 The Government of India sent large supplies of wheat and rice to Bengal during the last five months of 1943 , but it was not till the end of October, when His Excellency the 'Viceroy, Lord Wavell, visited Bengal, as his :first duty on taking office, that adequate arrangements were made to ensure that these supplies were properly distributedIARIHDD8-001362
  • October 1943 Tlae death-rate in Calcutta, unlike that in the province as a wholet reached its peak in October, 1943 IARIHDD8-001362
  • October 1943 cholera mortality occurred in October and November 1943 IARIHDD8-001362
  • October 1943 n in July and reached it!) peak in October-Novem- ber: In Bengal, March and April are normally the months of highes~ pre: wIARIHDD8-001362
  • October 1943 At a meeting of the Nutrition Advisory Committee, Indian Research Fund Association, held in Delhi on October 1st and 2nd, 1943 , the famine in Bengal was discussed and immeIARIHDD8-001362
  • October 1943 in Octoberthere were consultations in Delhi between the Minister for Public Health and Lbcal Self-Government, Bengal, and the Department o~ Education, Health and LaIARIHDD8-001362
  • October 1943 , newly appointed in October, and the ~blic Re~hh Commissioner with the Government of India arrived in Bengal m IARIHDD8-001362
  • October 1943 October 72,781 762,019IARIHDD8-001362
  • October 1943 October 15 56'75IARIHDD8-001362
  • October 1943 During the period December 1942 to October 1943 , the purchases made by these officers amounted to 721,000 tons, and during the ten months from November 1943 to August 1944 , to 700,000 --tonsIARIHDD8-001362
  • October 1943 October 1943 ', in the fifth year of the war, witnessed aIARIHDD8-001362
  • October 1943 October ~ovember December TotalIARIHDD8-001362
  • October 1943 October Nove'mber Decemher TotalIARIHDD8-001362
  • October 1943 r and OctoberIARIHDD8-001362
  • October 1943 tion Inspector ofthe East IndianRailway) was obtained for Howrah in the end ofSeptember another for other sidings in October and a third in the beginning ofNovember fcIARIHDD8-001362
  • October 1943 Another officer was therefore appointed on the 8th October to supervise storage and despatches IARIHDD8-001362
  • October 1943 On the 18th October, Mr IARIHDD8-001362
  • October 1943 30,000 tonsin October respectivelyIARIHDD8-001362
  • October 1943 Although order had been placed at the beginning of October for 50 lease·lend vehicles with specially fitted bomes only 3 vehicles were delivered on the 22nd October and 22 on the 23rd and the balance on the 18th NovemberIARIHDD8-001362
  • October 1943 28th October 1943 IARIHDD8-001362
  • October 1943 15th October 1943 IARIHDD8-001362
  • October 1943 25th October 1943 IARIHDD8-001362
  • October 1943 9th October 1943 IARIHDD8-001362
  • October 1943 s from October 1942 to December 1943 IARIHDD8-001362
  • October 1943 It will be seen from the figures that between October 1942 and June 1943 expenditure onIARIHDD8-001362
  • October 1943 October to December 1943IARIHDD8-001362
  • October 1943 October to December 1942 82,000 50,000 January to March 1943 4,60,000 3,03,500 50,000 April to June 1943 • 10,05,500 5,00,000 3,00,000 July to September 1943 1,05,000 2,95,000 October to December 1943 1,10,000 6,60,000IARIHDD8-001362
  • October 1943 House of Representatives on October 20, 2003ogradac_article_pub_063
  • October 1943 80 by the month of October, 1943 __lecturenotesfamine
  • October 1943 InBombay, forinstance, a state of scarcity wasdeclared inallthe villages of Athani and Parasgad talukas in Belgaum district, in early 1943 (the declaration was cancelled on 1 October 1943 )[14]
  • October 1943 Wavell, Viceroy, Governmentofindia, 2October 1943 , Rl3/2/49, FileNo[14]
  • October 1943 39 Most secret Weekly Intelligence Summaries (India Internal), 19 February 1943 ,27 August 1943 ,22 October 1943 , 12 January 1945 and 22 June 1945 , LIWS1I1I506, Oriental and India Office Collections, British Library, London, UK[14]
  • October 1943 The famine was not even officially acknowledged in the British Parliament until October 1943 [3]
  • October 1943 Indeed only Wavell, who took over as Viceroy in October 1943 , escaped with his reputation untarnished[15]
  • October 1943 In addition, from September 1942 to October 1943 the trade was trying to get the Bengal Government to import more[15]
  • October 1943 imports by one million tons, as late as October 1943 (Sen 1977 p54, quoting from Document 174 in Mansergh, 1973 p390)[15]
  • October 1943 As late as l9th October 1943 , when the famine was at its peak, Wavell noted in his journal[15]
  • October 1943 5 In August 1943 , when tragedy loomed, gruel kitchens were set up; in October, when these failed to halt migration, workhouses were established to care for the completely destitute[18]
  • October 1943 Relief Activity and Estimated Rice Prices, Bengal, October 1942 -December 1943 [18]
  • October 1943 Despite the floods in West Bengal in July and August 1943 and the bottleneck in Calcutta in October, the main source of grain for relief was the government[18]
  • October 1943 Thus, from mid-October 1942 to at least mid-March 1943 -five months-people who had survived the tidal wave and cyclone but had lost crops and stores were under severe pressure, especially those in villages away from the few roads that traversed the region[18]
  • October 1943 Government Grain Supply and Relief Expenditures in Midnapore, October 1942 -December 1943 [18]
  • October 1943 From October 1942 to February 1943 the prices used were the lowest in the district (or in the case of the province, the lowest in Calcutta)[18]
  • October 1943 Bell was unable to penetrate the isolated areas of Midnapore because communications remained difficult, but his diary suggests that in those tbanas that he visited most were securing more food than they had from October to March (Bell 1943 :Apr[18]
  • October 1943 It is understandable that the reorganization would take time, but as late as October 27, 1943 , E[18]
  • October 1943 The Revenue Department decided in late October 1943 that the extent of famine migration in the province was so great that poorhouses would have to be established (GBR 1944 :12)[18]
  • October 1943 Although there had never been sufficient support for Midnapore, the crucial period was from July to October 1943 , when the reduction in food supplies and funds was followed by the imposition of the gruel kitchen system without either enough transition time or enough food[18]
  • October 1943 Government Grain Supply and Relief Expenditure in Dacca, October 1942 -December 1943 [18]
  • October 1943 Santhanan ( 1943 :33), a reporter from the Hindustan Times, describes the meeting he and some colleagues had with Asok Mitra, SDO of Munshiganj, on October 12, 1943 :[18]
  • October 1943 Government Grain Supply and Relief Expenditures in Faridpur, October 1942 -December 1943 [18]
  • October 1943 Beyond these difficulties, which were structural and political, there was also a massive administrative blockage in Calcutta in September and October 1943 [18]
  • October 1943 Although the figure does not include food requisitioned or purchased by officers within their districts, it reflects the provincial effort, which can be divided into three periods: from October 1942 to March 1943 when little grain was sent to the districts; from April to August 1943 when the DCS sent grain purchased outside the province to the districts; and from September to December 1943 when grain, especially from the Punjab, began to flow in response to pressure from the Government of India[18]
  • October 1943 Government Grain Supply and Relief Expenditure in the Districts of Bengal, October 1942 -December 1943 [18]
  • October 1943 The Viceroy on Food Situation, 11 September to 8 November 1943 , letter by Nazimuddin to Thomas Rutherford, ICS, and sometime acting Governor of Bengal, 26 October 1943 [10]
  • October 1943 XXI, Edward Benthall Papers, reminiscences about the encounters with Indian leaders at about the time of the partition of India, October 1970, p[10]
  • October 1943 The date for the commencement of this scheme was set as 1 October 1943 and the government intended to continue it for five more years (Modern Review 1944 b: 168)[10]
  • October 1943 72 Rutherford to Linlithgow, letter, Calcutta, 2 October 1943 , in TOP, Vol[10]
  • October 1943 Seaman, 'Famine mortality in Ethiopia and Sudan', Paper presented to the Seminar on Mortality and Society in sub-Saharan Africa, held by the International Union for the Scientific Study of Population, Yaounde, October 1987[12]
  • October 1943 ^ Greenough notes that epidemic cholera, smallpox and malaria became prevalent between October 1943 and April 1944 [19]
  • October 1943 Moreover, even the Calcutta prices are unavailable from October of 1943 onwards, since at that time the market in rice was suspended[19]
  • October 1943 Although official data on the price of rice in Calcutta show a sharp decline around August 1943 , the black market prices seem to have continued to rise until October, after which they declined rather abruptly but to a level far above the "normal"; see Brennan (1988), Figure 1, p[19]
  • October 1943 From October 1943 onwards prices refer to the province as a whole, and they relate to coarse rice (for details see Appendix D)[19]
  • October 1943 ^ The MI started rising sharply from the middle of 1943 ; it reached a huge peak in October-November and then declined[19]
  • October 1943 October of 1943 was the month in which cholera deaths reached a maximum, and this was also the month of the highest proportional rise in mortality (shown in Figure 5[19]
  • October 1943 Mortality began to exceed its normal level around the middle of 1943 , and the MI peaked sharply in October[19]
  • October 1943 The cholera mortality peak (occurring in October) preceded the malaria (and fever and dysentery & diarrhoea) peak by two months (see Figure 5[19]
  • October 1943 Thus it is notable that cholera deaths culminated during a period of maximum provision of food-relief (October-November), which at the same time marked the maximum (proportionate) rise in overall mortality[19]
  • October 1943 But the predominantly coastal districts of Midnapore, Chittagong, Khulna and Noakhali - which were hit by the October cyclone in 1942 - did experience early rises in mortality during the first half of 1943 , as too did Tippera (which is adjacent to Noakhali) [19]
  • October 1943 During the period between 1st December 1942 and 31st October 1943 Orissa exported about 10,000 tons of rice[19]
  • October 1943 Deaths from different causes showed a rising trend from the middle of 1943 ; while cholera deaths peaked in October, the fever mortality-peak occurred just one month later (in December)[19]
  • October 1943 An average of just over six per cent of the state's entire population were attending scarcity relief labour works during the period January- September 1973 (although the resumption of monsoon rains meant that this relief provision was sharply curtailed by October)[19]
  • October 1943 The cholera mortality peak occurred in October of 1943 , and it was followed by a peak from malaria, dysentery/diarrhoea and fever occurring about two months later[19]
  • October 1943 I I n October 1943 , when Field Marshal Archibald Wavell arrived in India to assume the post of viceroy from Linlithgow, he faced a vociferous demand from Indian politicians for an inquiry into the ongoing famine in Bengal[21]
  • October 1943 (Not until Wavell took office as viceroy in October 1943 was meaningful famine relief organised in Bengal[21]
  • October 1943 In October 1769, very gloomy reports were received from Behar and North Bengal[1]
  • October 1943 , the newly appointed Relief Commissioner, issued an appeal to "legitimate" residents of Calcutta on October 1st, requesting them to "refrain from indiscriminate charity" that would only encourage the "sick destitutes[1]
  • October 1943 Newspapers reported deaths from starvation in 25 of the 27 districts in Bengal through October 11th[1]
  • October 1943 On the 1st of October the Associated Press reported from a village in the Dacca Division:[1]
  • October 1943 Biplabi reported from Midnapur that on October 10th "a man driven by hunger was eating foodgrains scattered along the railway track[1]
  • October 1943 Meanwhile, by the beginning of October, Viceroy Linlithgow was making preparation for his departure from Delhi after his seven and a half year tenure as Governor-General of India[1]
  • October 1943 In a desultory report to Amery on October 14th he looked forward to seeing the Secretary of State in person in London[1]
  • October 1943 On the 14th of October he appeared before the British Parliament and estimated that as many as 1,000 people were dying a week in Bengal (including Calcutta[1]
  • October 1943 160 The Statesman, "The Death-Roll," October 16th, 1943[1]
  • October 1943 He was sworn in on the 20th of October, and set to work on the famine situation at once[1]
  • October 1943 165 The Statesman, "Lord Wavell Sees Plight of Destitutes in Calcutta," October 27, 1943[1]
  • October 1943 166 The Statesman, "Viceroy to Approach Army for Aid in Famine Relief," October 29, 1943[1]
  • October 1943 the 14th of October he appeared before the British Parliament and estimated that as many as 1,000 people were dying a week in Bengal (including Calcutta[34]
  • October 1943 House of Representatives on October 20, 2003[16]
  • October 1943 In early September in Manikganj (Dacca district), price controls drove all rice out of the municipal market, but it was fetching 40 rupees on the black market; a month later it was costing 60–70 rupees, and by October 1943 in Chittagong, 80 rupees per maund[13]
  • October 1943 Even as late as October 1943 , London needed[13]
  • October 1943 1078 (14th October 1943 ); vol[17]
  • October 1943 352 (28th October 1943 ); Sen 1981: 195-196; Maharatna 1996: Table 4[17]
  • October 1943 Leo Amery, October 1943[17]
  • October 1943 9 He announced that rationing would be introduced in Calcutta and the industrial areas in October, meaning that Bengal was 'in effect…being organized on a famine basis'[17]
  • October 1943 By October 1943 , according to the Communist organ People's War, rice was costing 80 rupees per maund in Chittagong[17]
  • October 1943 By mid- October the Statesman, which had supported the Muslim League ministry and Suhrawardy since April, was berating politicians in London, Delhi, and Calcutta for their 'disgraceful' record of 'false or ignorant prophecy', noting how they had 'proclaimed that food-shortage in India and Bengal was practically non-existent'[17]
  • October 1943 Even as late as October 1943 London needed convincing that 'everything has been done within India to extract hoarded supplies and get them to the starving districts'[17]
  • October 1943 When a new viceroy, Lord Wavell, arrived in Bengal in October 1943 he found a situation still 'grim enough to make official complacency surprising', with thousands of destitutes from the countryside camped in Calcutta's streets and open areas[17]
  • October 1943 Then, the authorities had sought to suppress news of the crisis, and by the time a British television documentary made the 'unknown famine' the focus of global relief efforts in mid-October 1973, the worst was probably already over[17]
  • October 1943 82 Time Magazine, October 26th 1942 ; March 22nd 1943 [17]
  • October 1943 org/blog/2007/08/16/deaths-in-darfur-keeping-ourselves-honest/, October 22nd 2007][17]
  • October 1943 Although in mid-October Amery was still referring in public only to 'scarcity verging on famine', in private he knew that the game was up[26]
  • October 1943 0/data /part5of5), show rainfall of one or more standard deviations above the mean in October to November[23]
  • October 1943 There was severe hardship too in the area hit by the cyclone in mid-October and in the east of Bengal[23]
  • October 1943 " However, at the end of October The Economist's tune was a different one: "Mr Amery claims that 'substantial' quantities of shipping were allotted to take food to India early this year; but nothing that is known, by the[23]
  • October 1943 "54 Although in mid-October Amery was still referring in public to only "scarcity verging on famine," in private he must have known that the game was up[23]
  • October 1943 141; "Hungry Millions," The Economist, 30 October 1943 , pp[23]
  • October 1943 55 Amery to Wavell, 21 October 1943 [23]
  • October 1943 He announced at the end of August that rationing would be introduced in Calcutta and the industrial areas (but only in October)[23]
  • October 1943 68 On 5 October it editorialized:[23]
  • October 1943 69 "Consequences of Untruth," Statesman, 12 October 1943 [23]
  • October 1943 83 "Consequences of Untruth," Statesman, 12 October 1943 [23]
  • October 1943 40 per maund in Calcutta, but by mid-October rice was being sold openly at Rs[23]
  • October 1943 98 Brennan 1988: 544; People's War, 21 November 1943 ; "Black Market Prices," Statesman, 22 October 1943 [23]
  • October 1943 123 In October a joint statement from the Bengal, Indian, and Marwari Chambers of Commerce expressed doubts "whether apart from the stocks which the government are fully aware and are virtually under their control, there are any appreciable undeclared stocks held by merchants in Calcutta or outside[23]
  • October 1943 124 People's War, 31 October 1943 [23]
  • October 1943 138 Linlithgow to Amery, 10 October 1943 (reporting a confidential conversation between Mirza Isphahani and the acting governor in October 1943 ), in Mansergh 1973: 390; Sen 1981:[23]
  • October 1943 2 singles out Howrah, and the division is also included in an October 1943 assessment of the worst affected areas by the acting governor of Bengal[23]
  • October 1943 145 Rutherford to Linlithgow, 2 October 1943 , in Mansergh 1973: 363[23]
  • October 1943 This appears to be the main reason why rice prices rose so dramatically in the lean months before the main (1974-75) winter harvest; rice prices more than doubled between March and October of 1974, leading to a devastating contraction in command over food amongst those with little endowment to fall back on[31]
  • October 1943 in October rice being sold in Chittagong at Rs[7]
  • October 1943 Nevertheless, since the relief offered was quite inadequate, unattended dead bodies could be found everywhere in the city— 3363 had to be disposed of by relief organisations in October alone[7]
  • October 1943 |j The number of starving and sick destitutes in Calcutta was estimated to be 'at least 100,000' in October[7]
  • October 1943 The Bengal Destitute Persons (Repatriation and Relief) Ordinance, passed on 28 October, was a rather controversial piece of legislation, since it was alleged that 'repatriation' was rather more firmly achieved than 'relief' in the many 'destitute homes' and 'camps' set up outside Calcutta[7]
  • October 1943 October 0-56 400 0-56 151 38[7]
  • October 1943 October 100 85 68 57 29 50 25[7]
  • October 1943 When the existence of the famine was eventu ally acknowledged officially by the Secretary of State for India in a statement in Parliament in October 1943 , the influential Calcutta daily The Statesman wondered why 'the speech contained no direct admission of grave misjudgement on the higher authorities'part or even of error', overlooking'previous official assertions in London and New Delhi that there existed virtually no food problem in India'[7]
  • October 1943 || 'Seen from a distance', editorial, The Statesman, 14 October 1943 ; see also the editorial on 16 October following, entitled 'The death-roll'[7]
  • October 1943 In a report on 2 October 1943 transmitted to London by the Viceroy, the Governor of Bengal presented a detailed account of the 'present food situation', including a lament about 'the dubiety of all available statistics and therefore lack of accurate knowledge of what the real shortage is,'f without questioning the wisdom of the approach itself[7]
  • November 1943 '1 November comlast
  • November 1943 This began in Calcutta in August and continued until the Army took charge of movement in Novembercomm-92ff
  • November 1943 We have already described the vigorous steps taken by the Army to organize transport when it came to the rescue in Novembercomm-92ff
  • November 1943 By the end of November 1943 Calcutta was more or less free from tarnished wandererscomm1
  • November 1943 We have already described the vigorous steps taken by the Army to organize transport when it, came to the rescue in Novembercomm100-150
  • November 1943 The decrease in November and December was no doubt due to/the distribution of food, the increase in hospital accom- modation, the better care and treaiment of patients, and the removal of destitutes to camps outside the citycomm100-150
  • November 1943 The peak in cholera-mortality occurred in October and November 1943 , while in the case of malaria December stands out as the worst monthcomm100-150
  • November 1943 the picture seen in the Calcutta emergency hospitals from August to November 1943 was that of acute starva- tion and its efiectscomm100-150
  • November 1943 Atter November there Was a gradual fall in cholera deaths, and by thecomm100-150
  • November 1943 to 15, and during the ten months from November 1943 to August 1944 , to 700,000 tonscomm150-175
  • November 1943 '1 November hussain_minute
  • November 1943 By the end of November 1943 Calcutta was more or less free from famished wanderersIARIHDD8-001362
  • November 1943 In November His Excellency the Viceroy, Lord Wavell, brought in the Army f,o ,the IARIHDD8-001362
  • November 1943 and mature in November and DecemberIARIHDD8-001362
  • November 1943 This is called the boro and is sown in November and harvested in IARIHDD8-001362
  • November 1943 After March, ~rrlvals diminish graclually, the month!'; of least activity being July and August m the case of paddy, und from Septembe-r to November in respect of rice"IARIHDD8-001362
  • November 1943 The abnormal rise in prices in the latter ha1£ of November and December caused conce;IARIHDD8-001362
  • November 1943 The figures for rice and millets represented the quantities to be moved between the Is~ December 1942 and the 30th November 1943 , while the corresponding period for wheat and gram was the 1st April 1943 to the 31st March 1944 IARIHDD8-001362
  • November 1943 T~e original Plan provided for the delivery of the following quantities of rice to BOilgal between July 1943 and November 1943 :-IARIHDD8-001362
  • November 1943 November 46,900IARIHDD8-001362
  • November 1943 Between November 1942 and the end of May 1943 , over two crores of rupees (RsIARIHDD8-001362
  • November 1943 In November 1943 the total number of food kitchens reached 6,825IARIHDD8-001362
  • November 1943 It was clear, however, that supplies of clothes and cover· 'ings were needed not only for protection against the colder weather which 'begins in November, but also to restore decency and self-respectIARIHDD8-001362
  • November 1943 26 By the ena of November 1943 , the majority of destitutes had left Oa,lcutta a',1d had returned to their IARIHDD8-001362
  • November 1943 starvation diminished, relief in many areas being hastened in November and December by the help of the military transport organizationIARIHDD8-001362
  • November 1943 Until the arrival of the military in November 1943 , it was, as put by one witness, "a caSe of maklng the best of a bad job with the limited· transport available"IARIHDD8-001362
  • November 1943 This began in Calcutta in August and continued until thE' Army took charge of movement in NovemberIARIHDD8-001362
  • November 1943 We have already descrIbed the vigorous steps taken by the Army to organize tiransport when it came to the rescue in NovemberIARIHDD8-001362
  • November 1943 The decrease in November and December IARIHDD8-001362
  • November 1943 cholera mortality occurred in October and November 1943 IARIHDD8-001362
  • November 1943 But in !!enerAI the T1ieture ~een in the Calcutta e:nerl1'enc,,: hORnitaJs f)'nm AUQ'URt to November 194R waR that of aCllte c;tarvlttionIARIHDD8-001362
  • November 1943 After November there was a gradual fall in cholera dea:nha, and by theIARIHDD8-001362
  • November 1943 tlje first week of November 1943 to advise and assist in the organization of :n:redioo1 relief arid public health measuresIARIHDD8-001362
  • November 1943 In November 1943 an IARIHDD8-001362
  • November 1943 The military authorities, in November 1943 , lent the services of o~e Assistant Director of Hygiene, 10 Deputy Assistant Direc~ors of Hygiene, and 56 medical officers for employ~ellt as IARIHDD8-001362
  • November 1943 The Government of India made available in November 1943 the services of the officer in charge of the CalcuttaIARIHDD8-001362
  • November 1943 November 167,160 610,367IARIHDD8-001362
  • November 1943 In November, 1943 IARIHDD8-001362
  • November 1943 In November 1043 the Governoo(lnt drew the attention of uU Di~trict Boards to t':le vital need of ensuring uncontaminated water supplies and called for information about the numbers of derelict tube wells and the luantities of materials required to put them in orderIARIHDD8-001362
  • November 1943 Doles' of uncooked food ~ere given on a wide scale in the districts, the nllmber of recipients reaching 257,()OO in November 1943 IARIHDD8-001362
  • November 1943 November 15 68IARIHDD8-001362
  • November 1943 In November 1943 the order restricting recruibenb to esndidates over military age was withdrawnIARIHDD8-001362
  • November 1943 The repair of tube wells, urgently recommended 'by Government to 10('&1 Bodies in November 1943 IARIHDD8-001362
  • November 1943 November, plans were formulated for dealing 'with health problems on aIARIHDD8-001362
  • November 1943 was Director of Public Health up to November 1943 stated in evidence IARIHDD8-001362
  • November 1943 In November after the visit of the Viceroy and the arrival of the militIARIHDD8-001362
  • November 1943 The higher death rate in the Calcutta hospitals can be explained in various ways: in general the condition of destitutes who reached Calcutta from th& districts during the famine was bad, and many were picked up in the streets in a moribund state and taken to hospital to die; in Calcutta most of the destitutes who were seriously ill reached hospital, while in the mofussil a larger pro, port,ion of such destitutes probably elied without receiving hospital attention; the most acute phases of the medical emergency in Calcutta were during the ·months August to NovemberIARIHDD8-001362
  • November 1943 The provincialization of district health services ir~ Bengal was strongly urged by the PublicHealth COlllmissioner with the Government of India in November ~g43IARIHDD8-001362
  • November 1943 On the other hand, the supply position during August, to November 1943 made it difficult to provide a more satisfactory rationIARIHDD8-001362
  • November 1943 During the famine period up to November 1943 , there was almost a compleii& breakdown in the health servicesIARIHDD8-001362
  • November 1943 In November the atmosphere of defeaIARIHDD8-001362
  • November 1943 During the period December 1942 to October 1943 , the purchases made by these officers amounted to 721,000 tons, and during the ten months from November 1943 to August 1944 , to 700,000 --tonsIARIHDD8-001362
  • November 1943 Under the Revised Basic Plan, Bengal was allotted, in April 1944 , a qnota of 70,050 tons of pulses other than gram for the period November 1943 to April 1945 IARIHDD8-001362
  • November 1943 The aman crop is harvested from November to December, and may be said to be assembled by the begiiming Or January; the boro orop is harvested by March-April, and the aU8 crop in August-SeptemberIARIHDD8-001362
  • November 1943 November • 'J 99,334 IARIHDD8-001362
  • November 1943 October Nove'mber Decemher TotalIARIHDD8-001362
  • November 1943 Ootober November December TotaIARIHDD8-001362
  • November 1943 tion Inspector ofthe East IndianRailway) was obtained for Howrah in the end ofSeptember another for other sidings in October and a third in the beginning ofNovember fcIARIHDD8-001362
  • November 1943 Although order had been placed at the beginning of October for 50 lease·lend vehicles with specially fitted bomes only 3 vehicles were delivered on the 22nd October and 22 on the 23rd and the balance on the 18th NovemberIARIHDD8-001362
  • November 1943 Some idea ofthe magnitude of this work may be obtained from the fact that -during a period of about 30 days in Ootober-November, the congestion at Kantapukur was reducIARIHDD8-001362
  • November 1943 On tDe 1st November, the stock inhand was 50,000 tom IARIHDD8-001362
  • November 1943 Over two-thirds of the total amount purchased W80lll procured in NovemberIARIHDD8-001362
  • November 1943 It suggests that, given the disruption of traffic due to wartime restrictions, markets became more segmented during the famine, but only marginally so, apart from brief intervals in November 1942 and March 1943 ogradac_article_pub_063
  • November 1943 " The prospect of a good aman crop in November 1943 and a drop in the price of rice (15 rupees in December 1943 ) prompted most surviving migrants to return homeogradac_article_pub_063
  • November 1943 'Practical steps towards the improvement of museums in India', The Calcutta review, November: 97-100summary_Das_good2
  • November 1943 (a) Winter crop which is sown in the month of May and harvested in November, (b) Autumn crop which is sown in April and harvested in August, and (c) Spring crop which is sown in November and harvested in February__lecturenotesfamine
  • November 1943 Phase I: January, 1942 to March, 1943 , Phase II: March, 1943 to November, 1943 , and Phase III: November, 1943 to most of 1944 __lecturenotesfamine
  • November 1943 During the famine period up to November 1943 ,[27]
  • November 1943 During the famine period up to November 1943 , there was almost a complete breakdown in the health services[27]
  • November 1943 " By November 1943 therewere510suchshops(of which 127weremobile), about730000employees held ration cards, and an estimated three and a half million people were aided (among whom 963000 maunds of food were sold)[9]
  • November 1943 The situation was allowed to deteriorate in rural areas to such an extent that in November 1943 Archibald Wavell, the Viceroy of India, ordered that the army be deployed to counter the effects of famine in the Bengalcountryside[14]
  • November 1943 In November 1943 , the military authorities released an IMS officer, sothathecouldtakeoverthedutiesofaDirector ofPublic Health[14]
  • November 1943 (Biplabi, 7 November, 1943 , cited in Paul Greenough, Prosperity and Misery in Modern Bengal: the Famine of 1943 -44, New York, 1982)[3]
  • November 1943 In Bengal the most critical period of deaths from starvation lasted from March 1943 to November 1943 [3]
  • November 1943 dealt with in this paper, the inevitability of a massive food shortage in the Wollo Province was known to the Imperial Ethiopian Government from a detailed qualitative crop survey completed in November 1972[15]
  • November 1943 But when international relief was called forward in April, it took until November for bulk food shipments to begin to arrive[15]
  • November 1943 from July to November, the famine was in full spate[15]
  • November 1943 In June 1943 there was a house-to-house search for secret stockpiles, but it was found that there was very little in stock, not enough to last to the November harvest[15]
  • November 1943 In November 1943 the new Viceroy, Wavell, increased exports to Bengal and sent in the army to improve the physical and organizational distribution of the grain[15]
  • November 1943 However, epidemics now took over as the main killer, and as many people died between November 1943 and July 1944 as in the previous period[15]
  • November 1943 Speculative withdrawal and panic purchases were encouraged by administrative chaos (especially between December 1942 and March 1943 , but also up to November)[15]
  • November 1943 winter crop and by vigorous speculation and panic hoarding" from March to November 1943 [15]
  • November 1943 talks of "speculative withdrawal" especially between December 1942 and March 1943 , but also up to November[15]
  • November 1943 There was also "vigorous speculation" from March to November 1943 (1977 p50; 1981 p76)[15]
  • November 1943 s statement that there were panic purchases between December 1942 and March 1943 and that there was panic hoarding from March to November 1943 [15]
  • November 1943 The table shows that this large surplus changes into a deficit of nearly a third of a million tons by November 1943 -enough to explain the famine[15]
  • November 1943 The remaining 64 000 tons of 1943 imports are assumed to have come in November and December[15]
  • November 1943 did not know in November whether they needed one month[15]
  • November 1943 The acting governor, Sir Thomas Rutherford, sensed a degree of lethargy in the administration, and wrote to the viceroy, Lord Wavell, on November 4: I got a copy of the report sent by the officer sent out on special duty to see what were the arrangementast destinationf or taking overa nd distributingf ood supplies sent both from Calcutta and Punjab to the districts, which suggested extreme mismanagement at Dacca and this has been followed up by a report from Wakely that 80 wagonso f foodgrainsh ad arriveda nd no arrangementms ade for their unloading until he intervened[18]
  • November 1943 A Proceedings, March-November[18]
  • November 1943 5 kilograms) of rice in December 1942 it shot up to a range of Rs 80 to Rs 105 in November 1943 [Sen 1981][20]
  • November 1943 XXII, Edward Benthall Papers, extract from Assembly debates on food, November 1943 [10]
  • November 1943 The Viceroy on Food Situation, 11 September to 8 November 1943 , letter by Nazimuddin to Thomas Rutherford, ICS, and sometime acting Governor of Bengal, 26 October 1943 [10]
  • November 1943 Even in November 1943 , at the height of the scarcity, the prevailing opinion in Calcutta was that the government's main problem was a complete breakdown of public confidence rather than a real shortage of essential food grains[10]
  • November 1943 In normal years in Bengal the monthly distribution of births was highly seasonal, and the level of conceptions around September-November was usually very low[12]
  • November 1943 This rate shows that the absolute level of conceptions fell to a minimum around September-November 1943 , thus broadly coinciding with the death rate peak[12]
  • November 1943 November-December[29]
  • November 1943 The aman, or winter rice, was sown between April and June and reaped between November and January[2]
  • November 1943 25 In other bazaars, such as those at Barisal and Nimtali, most of the export trade took place between November and March[2]
  • November 1943 As in the eastern Sundarbans, districts composed of sedimentary deposits became safe after November[2]
  • November 1943 The Times, 3 November 1943 : 5; for the bhadralok's relative immunity from famine, see Indivar Kamtekar, 'A Different War Dance: State and Class in India 1939 – 1945 ', Past and Present, 176(1) (2002): 218 fn[2]
  • November 1943 HOW much rice do we grow or can we grow? According to official estimates about 23 crores of maunds '1 (about 84 lakhs of tons) on an average during the last 20 years; but official figures (given in Table 1 of the Appendix) have been long known to be 1 According to The Statesman of 13th November, 1943 , of Caclutta the number of admissions of starvation cases to hospitals in Calcutta alone was 13,967 between August 16 and November 10, and the number of deaths among these 4,825[25]
  • November 1943 Bodies disposed of by Corpse Disposal Organisations were 7,635 and total deaths among 'paupers' recorded by the City Corporation Health Officer were 13,614 betwgen August 1 and November 6[25]
  • November 1943 A survey of a small number of villages was carried out by the Department of Anthropology of the University of Calcutta in November and December 1943 and a note embodying the results was issued by Professor K[6]
  • November 1943 The general picture in the emergency hospitals of Calcutta during the period August- November 1943 was also said to be one of "acute starvation and its effects"; it was only from about December of 1943 onwards that diseases took precedence over starvation[19]
  • November 1943 The fall-off in conceptions continued and reached a minimum absolute level during September-November of 1943 , which was broadly the period of highest death rates[19]
  • November 1943 ^ The MI started rising sharply from the middle of 1943 ; it reached a huge peak in October-November and then declined[19]
  • November 1943 The number of relief kitchens (of which more than 90 per cent were Government-supported) peaked in late November[19]
  • November 1943 Thus it is notable that cholera deaths culminated during a period of maximum provision of food-relief (October-November), which at the same time marked the maximum (proportionate) rise in overall mortality[19]
  • November 1943 With military aid to the famine devastated province having begun in November of 1943 , by December 18th the Food Member of the Government of India could pronounce, "We are now faced with the problem of the future[1]
  • November 1943 In November the Collector-General 'saw an alarming prospect of the province becoming desolate' and the Government wrote home to the Court of Directors in the most alarming terms[1]
  • November 1943 169 The Statesman, "Repatriating Calcutta Destitutes," November 1, 1943[1]
  • November 1943 170 The Statesman, "Policy of Repatriation of Destitutes," November 6, 1943[1]
  • November 1943 175The Statesman, "Policy of Repatriation of Destitutes," November 6, 1943[1]
  • November 1943 Consequently, on the 5th of November the Bengal Government announced in a press release that, of necessity, stricter measures would be adopted[1]
  • November 1943 By November of 1943 , much of the countryside of Bengal had been decimated[1]
  • November 1943 187 The Statesman, "The Deserted Village," November 21, 1943[1]
  • November 1943 In November the artist Chittaprosad made his epic journey through the district, composing sketches of famine victims that were to become iconic with the Bengal Famine[1]
  • November 1943 November he could inform the India Office in London that operations were already underway[1]
  • November 1943 "199 In the end, there is no question that Wavell's prompt and comprehensive engagement saved an inestimable number of lives, but the situation in Bengal had been allowed to deteriorate to such a degree that the relief initiated in November of 1943 , for many, was far too little and far too late[1]
  • November 1943 The War Cabinet again met on November 10th, with "The Bengal Famine" now an international sensation[1]
  • November 1943 Amery on Famine Relief Work," November 12, 1943[1]
  • November 1943 207 The Statesman, "Food Distribution in Bengal," November 13, 1943[1]
  • November 1943 On November 11th he informed the House of Commons that the "military machinery for detailed distribution [was] already working," and surmised that "there [was] good reason to be satisfied with the progress made[1]
  • November 1943 the Middle-East to complement a few squadrons of dilapidated "Hurricanes," and as recently as November of 1943 , three squadrons of highly effective "Spitfires" were also sent to the region[1]
  • November 1943 172 The Statesman, "League and Food Crisis," November 17, 1943[1]
  • November 1943 173 The Statesman, Dar-el-Islam," November 28, 1943[1]
  • November 1943 At the All-India Muslim League's Council meeting in November of 1943 , Bengal's Chief Minister, Kwaja Nazimuddin argued that famine had clearly shown that Pakistan was a necessity for the poor Muslim masses[1]
  • November 1943 Hungry Bengal: A Tour Through Midnapur District, by Chittaprosad, in November, 1943 [1]
  • November 1943 disposals between July and November[22]
  • November 1943 It suggests that, given the disruption of traffic due to wartime restrictions, markets became more segmented during the famine, but only marginally so, apart from brief intervals in November 1942 and March 1943 [16]
  • November 1943 " The prospect of a good aman crop in November 1943 and a drop in the price of rice (15 rupees in December 1943 ) prompted most surviving migrants to return home[16]
  • November 1943 Noteworthy features of the famine's demography include a significant drop in conceptions that coincided with the peak in deaths in September–November 1943 , the persistence of excess mortality well into 1944 , and the importance of malaria as a cause of death[13]
  • November 1943 University College, Dublin Date submitted 16 May 2007 Revised version submitted 21 November 2007 Accepted 23 January 2008[13]
  • November 1943 20 'Chinese famine sufferers abandon children', New York Times, November 29th 19 'The desperate urgency of flight', Tim[17]
  • November 1943 61 Kenyan shillings per kilo between January and November 1984, the coefficient of variation across eighteen markets trebled from 0[17]
  • November 1943 19 People's War, 14th November 1943 ; Mitra 1989[17]
  • November 1943 34 A report from a Bangladeshi newspaper in November 2003 described the plight of the elderly poor, on[17]
  • November 1943 Moneylenders who charged a monthly rate of interest of 300 percent waited on the aman (November-December) harvest to get their money back[17]
  • November 1943 While considerable shortages persisted in some areas, the new crop began to appear in bazaars in the interior in late November[26]
  • November 1943 0/data /part5of5), show rainfall of one or more standard deviations above the mean in October to November[23]
  • November 1943 On 10 November 1943 Amery noted that Churchill's dislike of India was a factor impeding relief (Amery 1988: 950)[23]
  • November 1943 72 People's War, 28 November 1943 [23]
  • November 1943 88 People's War, 14 November 1943 [23]
  • November 1943 Stewart (Bihar) to Linlithgow, 23 November 1943 )[23]
  • November 1943 98 Brennan 1988: 544; People's War, 21 November 1943 ; "Black Market Prices," Statesman, 22 October 1943 [23]
  • November 1943 132 People's War, 14 November 1943 [23]
  • November 1943 135 People's War, 14 November 1943 [23]
  • November 1943 Some believed that the true situation was even worse than implied by the Nawab Bahadur of Dacca's declaration in February 1943 , and that some of the aman crop (the main crop, harvested in November and December) in west Bengal rotted only after it had been harvested, but against this there is the assessment of the leading merchant and Muslim League politician, Mirza Isphahani, that the shortage in[23]
  • November 1943 Winston Churchill's lack of empathy for India and "all to do with it" mattered; his immediate reaction—Amery described it as "a preliminary flourish"—to Amery's last-ditch plea for more shipping on 10 November 1943 was a remark about "Indians breeding like rabbits and being paid a million a day by us for doing nothing about the war[23]
  • November 1943 As is typical of the panic stage after a speculative mania, rice prices fell almost as sharply in markets during the week or two before the next harvest started to arrive in November[31]
  • November 1943 80 per maund (see The Statesman, 5 November 1943 ; Bhatia, 1967, p[7]
  • November 1943 Phase I : from the beginning of 1942 to March 1943 ; Phase II: from March 1943 to November 1943 ; Phase III: from November 1943 through most of 1944 [7]
  • November 1943 November 0-44 314 0-56 151 48[7]
  • November 1943 November 95 118 86 73 47 80 32[7]
  • November 1943 45 A table in Sen's chapter shows that the prices of rice peaked in March-November 1943 ; Sen, Poverty and Famines, p[8]
  • December 1943 Total requirement of this population f torn? 16th June to 31'st December in terms ofcomlast
  • December 1943 }- 99,334 ,, 175,000 " December comlast
  • December 1943 The Food Department which was established in December 1942 set out on the task of disentangling the food tangles , ' The Second All-India Food Conference was held on the 24th-26th February, 1943 , The Secretary of the Food Department once again preached the gospel of 'equality of sacrifice'comlast
  • December 1943 'rom August onwards, the number of deaths rose rapidly, reaching its peak in Decembercomm-92ff
  • December 1943 It will be noted that the famine mortality curve follows the quinquermial mortality curve, which also attained its highest point in Decembercomm-92ff
  • December 1943 From this point onwards the number of deaths rose rapidly @ithe'peah was reached in December, 1943 comm1
  • December 1943 Excellency the Viceroy, Lord Wavell, brought in the Army to province and in December a bumper amp was harvestedcomm1
  • December 1943 By the end of December 1942 distress had already appeared and by March 1943 widespread famine was anticipated by district officialscomm100-150
  • December 1943 From July to December 1943 , 1,304,323 deaths were recorded as against an average of 626,048 in the previous quinquennium, re- presenting an increase in mortality of 1083 per centcomm100-150
  • December 1943 From August onwards, the number of, deaths rose rapidly, reaching its peak in Decembercomm100-150
  • December 1943 It will be noted that the famine mortality curve follows the quinquennial mortality curve, which also attained its highest point in Decembercomm100-150
  • December 1943 The decrease in November and December was no doubt due to/the distribution of food, the increase in hospital accom- modation, the better care and treaiment of patients, and the removal of destitutes to camps outside the citycomm100-150
  • December 1943 The peak in cholera-mortality occurred in October and November 1943 , while in the case of malaria December stands out as the worst monthcomm100-150
  • December 1943 From about December onwards, there was a change in the clinical picture" seen in famine hospitalscomm100-150
  • December 1943 From July to December 1943 , 479,039 deaths from malaria were re- corded, an excess of 266,208 deaths (125-1 per cent) over the quinquennial avpragecomm100-150
  • December 1943 ' In December 1943 , the reported deaths from malaria were 202-6 per cent in excess of the quinquennial averagecomm100-150
  • December 1943 During the period December _ 1942 to October 1943 , the purchases made by these ofiicers amounted to 721,000 comm150-175
  • December 1943 Total requirement of this population f torn? 16th June to 31'st December in terms ofhussain_minute
  • December 1943 }- 99,334 ,, 175,000 " December hussain_minute
  • December 1943 The Food Department which was established in December 1942 set out on the task of disentangling the food tangles , ' The Second All-India Food Conference was held on the 24th-26th February, 1943 , The Secretary of the Food Department once again preached the gospel of 'equality of sacrifice'hussain_minute
  • December 1943 From this pqi~t onwards the number of deathf:l rose rapidly and the peak was reached in December, 1943 IARIHDD8-001362
  • December 1943 rescue of the proyince and in December a bumper crop was harvestIARIHDD8-001362
  • December 1943 and mature in November and DecemberIARIHDD8-001362
  • December 1943 Bengal, as we have seen, the aman crop, which is the most important, is· harvested by the end p£ DecemberIARIHDD8-001362
  • December 1943 The abnormal rise in prices in the latter ha1£ of November and December caused conce;IARIHDD8-001362
  • December 1943 Exports of rice and paddy from the Division were prohibited except under permit, with effect from the 22nd December,IARIHDD8-001362
  • December 1943 The Foodgruins Oontrol O]'(ler had 1wen hrought into force em the 15th December 11:)42, but it was not efficiently enforcedIARIHDD8-001362
  • December 1943 On the 21st December 1943 , the Government of India directed the Bengal Government, under Section 126-A of the Government of India Act, that the number of retail shops under the direct control and managemenli of the Provincial Governmen~ should be not more thapIARIHDD8-001362
  • December 1943 From December 1943 onwards the food kitcbens were grRdually closed down and homeless and indigent people were housed and fed in worklhouses, destitute homes, and orphanagesIARIHDD8-001362
  • December 1943 But in general Calcutta had returned to normal by December 1943 IARIHDD8-001362
  • December 1943 starvation diminished, relief in many areas being hastened in November and December by the help of the military transport organizationIARIHDD8-001362
  • December 1943 Famine raged over large areas in the province and ct\me to an elld only with the reaping of the aman crop in December 1943 IARIHDD8-001362
  • December 1943 taken by the Bengal Government towards the end of December 1942 and ill January-February 1943 IARIHDD8-001362
  • December 1943 By the end of December 1942 distress had already appeared and by March 1943 widespread famine was anticipated by district officialsIARIHDD8-001362
  • December 1943 From July to December 1943 , 1,304,323 dea~hs were recorded as against an average of 626,048 in the previous quinquennlUm, representing an increase in mortality of 108'3 per centIARIHDD8-001362
  • December 1943 From Augus£ onwards, the number of deaths rose rapidly, reaching its peak in DecemberIARIHDD8-001362
  • December 1943 It will be noted that the famine mortality curve follows the quinquennial mortality curve, which also attained Hs hig-he3t point in DecemberIARIHDD8-001362
  • December 1943 The decrease in November and December IARIHDD8-001362
  • December 1943 in tl-je -case of malaria December stands out as the worst monthIARIHDD8-001362
  • December 1943 From about December onwards, there was a chnnge in the clinical picture seerl in famine hospitalsIARIHDD8-001362
  • December 1943 'From July to December 1943 , 479,039 deaths from malariaIARIHDD8-001362
  • December 1943 In December 1943 , the reported deaths from malaria were 20"2·6 pf'J' _cent in excess of the quinquennial averageIARIHDD8-001362
  • December 1943 A severe epidemic, however, began in December 1943 and raged during the first half of 1944 , reaching its peak in March and AprilIARIHDD8-001362
  • December 1943 December 463,738 610,854IARIHDD8-001362
  • December 1943 destitute, '~9mes ,was· introduced in December 1943 IARIHDD8-001362
  • December 1943 December 10 120'5IARIHDD8-001362
  • December 1943 The Director of Public Health stated publicly in December 1943 tEIARIHDD8-001362
  • December 1943 For the mofussil hospitals these figures are from December 1943 , but in the case of the 'Calcutta hospitals some admissions previous ~ that date are includedIARIHDD8-001362
  • December 1943 The District Boards learnt, however, of the proposal to deprive them of the control of their health officers, and on December 21st a deputation of chairmen of District Boards met the Hon'ble Minister for Public Health and Local Self Gov' ernment and protested against the impending mIARIHDD8-001362
  • December 1943 ugust to December, 11,194 deaths were recorded as against a quinquennial average of 7,563IARIHDD8-001362
  • December 1943 The famine of 1943 , ended with the harvesting of the anwn crop !n December of that yearIARIHDD8-001362
  • December 1943 The :follow~ng table shows the acreage and yield of the aman crop reaped in December 1943 , as compared with that of the preceding two years IARIHDD8-001362
  • December 1943 As we have said, the aman crop reaped in December 1943 , was an ~xcellent oneIARIHDD8-001362
  • December 1943 It is true that there is a tendency for the· rice aoreage to increase-this may be maintained in view of the prevarling prices ":":"btit ii; is unlikely that the yield per acre of the aman crop during the nexu' few years will be as high as it was in December 1943 IARIHDD8-001362
  • December 1943 The aman crop is harvested from November to December, and may be said to be assembled by the begiiming Or January; the boro orop is harvested by March-April, and the aU8 crop in August-SeptemberIARIHDD8-001362
  • December 1943 v be regarded as from January to DecemberIARIHDD8-001362
  • December 1943 December •IARIHDD8-001362
  • December 1943 October ~ovember December TotalIARIHDD8-001362
  • December 1943 Ootober November December TotaIARIHDD8-001362
  • December 1943 int!: ofDecember ~IARIHDD8-001362
  • December 1943 The District Magistrate who had authority to release stocks for local consumption did not find it necessary to do so except for small quantities in October and November, 2,400 maunds in December 1943 and about 12,000 maunds in January and February 1944 IARIHDD8-001362
  • December 1943 s from October 1942 to December 1943 IARIHDD8-001362
  • December 1943 between July and December 1943 , 23 lakhs were spent on Agricultural Loans in MidnIARIHDD8-001362
  • December 1943 October to December 1943IARIHDD8-001362
  • December 1943 October to December 1942 82,000 50,000 January to March 1943 4,60,000 3,03,500 50,000 April to June 1943 • 10,05,500 5,00,000 3,00,000 July to September 1943 1,05,000 2,95,000 October to December 1943 1,10,000 6,60,000IARIHDD8-001362
  • December 1943 7 NGOs and International Aid The globalization of disaster relief highlighted by Live Aid and the response to the Asian tsunami of December 2004 has its origins in the nineteenth centuryogradac_article_pub_063
  • December 1943 " The prospect of a good aman crop in November 1943 and a drop in the price of rice (15 rupees in December 1943 ) prompted most surviving migrants to return homeogradac_article_pub_063
  • December 1943 A fi erce debate fl ared about this after a review of Mukerjee's book in The New York Review of Books from December 2010 to May 2011review_Structural_Violence2
  • December 1943 For example, by the summer of 1943 value of a haircut in units of rice had fallen to less than a fifth of what it was in December 1941 __lecturenotesfamine
  • December 1943 13 per Maund (about 82 lbs) in early December to Rs__lecturenotesfamine
  • December 1943 10 Most secret Weekly Intelligence Summaries (India Internal), 31 December 1943 , U WS1I1I433, Oriental and India Office Collections, British Library, London, UK[14]
  • December 1943 40 Most secret Weekly Intelligence Summary (South East Asia Command and India Internal), 17 December 1943 , UWSII II 433, Oriental and India Office Collections, British Library, London, UK[14]
  • December 1943 Although Bengal produced a record rice harvest in December 1943 , continuing problems of distribution and epidemics stalking a famine-ravaged land ensured that the death rate was even higher through most of the year 1944 than it had been in the phase of acute starvation[3]
  • December 1943 Attempts on the part of the government to buy at controlled prices between December 1942 and March 1943 failed to make any significant dent into the hoards of rural grain merchants, so a policy of procurement at free market prices was resumed from March 1943 which contributed to the steep rise of prices in rural areas[3]
  • December 1943 In December 1943 the Bengal Government thought that the shortage was mainly psychological[15]
  • December 1943 though rather late, crop was harvested in December[15]
  • December 1943 Speculative withdrawal and panic purchases were encouraged by administrative chaos (especially between December 1942 and March 1943 , but also up to November)[15]
  • December 1943 Finally, he does not explain why the inflationary effect should cease to apply on the harvesting of the December 1943 crop[15]
  • December 1943 talks of "speculative withdrawal" especially between December 1942 and March 1943 , but also up to November[15]
  • December 1943 s statement that there were panic purchases between December 1942 and March 1943 and that there was panic hoarding from March to November 1943 [15]
  • December 1943 supplies in December, enough to see them through to the autumn crop, with a bit in hand[15]
  • December 1943 supplies in any of the periods, January to March 1943 , March to June 1943 or June to December 1943 [15]
  • December 1943 He implies further that people suddenly switched back to their normal demand functions as soon as the December 1943 crop was harvested, with wartime inflation no longer having the same effect[15]
  • December 1943 The Famine Commission argued that, both because of the need for normal stocks and because the rice is not palatable for some months after harvest, it was not normal to start eating the December crop until February or March[15]
  • December 1943 Sen says that even if this were so, which he denies, the December 1941 crop was so big that the trade would have restored their stocks to the normal carry-over levels by the beginning of 1943 [15]
  • December 1943 The remaining 64 000 tons of 1943 imports are assumed to have come in November and December[15]
  • December 1943 When there was a shortage in Calcutta, on 27th December, Government requisitioned stocks and sold them through controlled shops[15]
  • December 1943 They did not fall until the new crop was harvested in December 1943 [15]
  • December 1943 It was suggested at the time that a switch in the supply function of this sort meant that producers (whether peasants or landlords) kept back much of the December 1943 crop, leaving supplies tight in spite of a large supply[15]
  • December 1943 after the December 1943 crop[15]
  • December 1943 It may be asked why the famine did not stop when this crop was harvested, why the starvation lasted until December[15]
  • December 1943 It was not produced in all areas of Bengal, and the people who grew it did not necessarily produce a crop in December[15]
  • December 1943 s supply, and market the rest at famine prices, hoping that they would be able to buy all they needed at a low price when the December 1943 crop was harvested[15]
  • December 1943 Possibly, too, there was some realization that if the December 1943 crop was only moderately bad, the famine would continue into 1944 [15]
  • December 1943 This charts relief activities against the estimated price(s) of rice from the cyclone to December 1943 when rice became more freely available[18]
  • December 1943 Relief Activity and Estimated Rice Prices, Bengal, October 1942 -December 1943 [18]
  • December 1943 Government Grain Supply and Relief Expenditures in Midnapore, October 1942 -December 1943 [18]
  • December 1943 From September to December, the prices were those paid to the DCS by the Revenue Department for supplies used for relief, weighted according to the relative supply of rice, wheat, and millet[18]
  • December 1943 Government Grain Supply and Relief Expenditure in Dacca, October 1942 -December 1943 [18]
  • December 1943 Government Grain Supply and Relief Expenditures in Faridpur, October 1942 -December 1943 [18]
  • December 1943 Although the figure does not include food requisitioned or purchased by officers within their districts, it reflects the provincial effort, which can be divided into three periods: from October 1942 to March 1943 when little grain was sent to the districts; from April to August 1943 when the DCS sent grain purchased outside the province to the districts; and from September to December 1943 when grain, especially from the Punjab, began to flow in response to pressure from the Government of India[18]
  • December 1943 Government Grain Supply and Relief Expenditure in the Districts of Bengal, October 1942 -December 1943 [18]
  • December 1943 The extent of this advantage can be appreciated in figure 5 by comparing the amount of grain that could be purchased from the gratuitous funds largely for use in the gruel kitchens with the total amount of grain brought into the districts by government from September to December 1943 [18]
  • December 1943 5 kilograms) of rice in December 1942 it shot up to a range of Rs 80 to Rs 105 in November 1943 [Sen 1981][20]
  • December 1943 In July 1943 it was a mere one-fourth of the December 1941 level[20]
  • December 1943 The famine was the most widespread in Bengal from September to December 1943 , but its aftershocks continued until the end of 1944 [10]
  • December 1943 The data used by Amartya Sen (1997: 44) demonstrate that while the price of food grains rose sharply from September 1942 to December 1943 , the money wages of the unskilled labourers increased only marginally in this period[10]
  • December 1943 The city's privileged status is evident from the 275,000 tonnes of rice and wheat supplied to it by December 1943 [10]
  • December 1943 The number of deaths climaxed in December 1943 , exactly coinciding with the bumper aman harvest[12]
  • December 1943 Zeitz, 'Famine in China, 1958-61 ', Population and Development Review, 10, 4 (December 1984); P[12]
  • December 1943 November-December[29]
  • December 1943 Prakash, Gyan, 'Subaltern Studies as Postcolonial Criticism', American Historical Review, 99 (December 1994)[2]
  • December 1943 A survey of a small number of villages was carried out by the Department of Anthropology of the University of Calcutta in November and December 1943 and a note embodying the results was issued by Professor K[6]
  • December 1943 Fairly heavy rains during the three monsoon months of July, August and September, and some further rains in December and January, are generally considered to be necessary for good harvests in most parts of India[19]
  • December 1943 The general picture in the emergency hospitals of Calcutta during the period August- November 1943 was also said to be one of "acute starvation and its effects"; it was only from about December of 1943 onwards that diseases took precedence over starvation[19]
  • December 1943 The number of deaths recorded by this survey for the period January to December 1943 , and the number of people recorded as alive as of January 1943 , may both have been influenced by their method of collection, which was called the "genealogical method"; see Greenough (1982), p[19]
  • December 1943 For example, the peak malaria mortality from August to December 1943 - which was also the normal seasonal pattern - may have been partly fuelled by favourable post­ monsoon conditions for mosquito-breeding (e[19]
  • December 1943 Mortality from malaria and fever, though declining from its peak in December 1943 continued to be elevated well into 1944 [19]
  • December 1943 It may be noted that the same four-fold classification as used above in terms of percentage rise in mortality during July-December 1943 as compared to the corresponding period during 1938 -42 was employed in an official memorandum submitted to the Famine Inquiry Commission by the Department of Public Health and local Self-Government (Medical) of the Government of Bengal[19]
  • December 1943 We have also estimated the correlations of percentage rise in deaths during July- December 1943 with X 4 , Xj, Xg and X?; they are respectively 0[19]
  • December 1943 mounting from around the middle of 1943 , and reached a peak in December[19]
  • December 1943 During the period between 1st December 1942 and 31st October 1943 Orissa exported about 10,000 tons of rice[19]
  • December 1943 Deaths from different causes showed a rising trend from the middle of 1943 ; while cholera deaths peaked in October, the fever mortality-peak occurred just one month later (in December)[19]
  • December 1943 * In Madras, as in Orissa and Bengal fever mortality, peaked in December of 1943 [19]
  • December 1943 1 Source: Registrar General, India, Ministry of Home Affairs, Sample Registration Bulletin, December 1987, vol[19]
  • December 1943 December 1943 [19]
  • December 1943 A famine occurred in the state of Bihar in December 1966[35]
  • December 1943 11 The Statesman, December 18th, 1943[1]
  • December 1943 With military aid to the famine devastated province having begun in November of 1943 , by December 18th the Food Member of the Government of India could pronounce, "We are now faced with the problem of the future[1]
  • December 1943 They resolved to lay up six months' store of grain for their troops and sent in December to Dacca and Backergunj to buy rice[1]
  • December 1943 Linlithgow, in his official capacity as head of the (only days old) Government of India Food Department, wrote to the Secretary of State in London on December 9th informing him that the food situation had "deteriorated seriously," and was causing "acute anxiety[1]
  • December 1943 In December when anxieties about the food supply to Calcutta began running high, Linlithgow had written to Amery that "building up of large reserves by middle-class consumers and the tendency on the part of the small subsistence farmer to keep back more of his grain than usual for his own consumption," were primary factors[1]
  • December 1943 III, Linlithgow to Amery, December 3, 1943 [1]
  • December 1943 The period covered in the chapter to follow - May 1- December 5, 1943 - is often understood to define "The Bengal Famine[1]
  • December 1943 210 The Statesman, "Army's Help n Relief Work," December 5, 1943[1]
  • December 1943 But by the first week of December, Calcutta had been largely cleared of "sick destitutes," and the Secretary of State for India was assuring the House of Commons that progress was being made[1]
  • December 1943 Stuart, who had been put in charge of famine relief, announced on December 4th that, due to Government's efforts, there was now "no shortage of food in the majority of the famine areas[1]
  • December 1943 But on December 5th 1943 war again took center stage[1]
  • December 1943 On December 5th, 1943 , in the midst of a devastating famine, with hunger- stricken bodies still accumulating on Calcutta's streets, the city was bombed in broad daylight by two consecutive waves of Japanese aircraft[1]
  • December 1943 On Sunday, December 5th, 1943 Calcutta awakened to its ongoing tribulation of famine[1]
  • December 1943 on the morning of December 5th, therefore, there was little excitement[1]
  • December 1943 57 The Statesman, "Jap's First Daylight Raid on Calcutta," December 6, 1943[1]
  • December 1943 67 The Statesman, "Sunday Morning," December 6, 1943[1]
  • December 1943 On the morning of December 6th, at 9:20 A[1]
  • December 1943 The attack itself had been devastating, very little warning had been given, no defense had been mounted, shelter had been inadequate, the official line on the attack had been patently specious, rumors were spreading unabated, and, to make matters worse, dead bodies, uncollected and unidentified, still littered the docks, even on the third day, and had begun to stink in the December sun[1]
  • December 1943 Their lorries, in fact, were still removing starvation victims from the city's streets when the December 5th bombing took place[1]
  • December 1943 Obviously, under such conditions, even a rough estimate of the number killed during the bombing of December 5th, 1943 becomes extremely difficult[1]
  • December 1943 Noon's Visit," December 7, 1943[1]
  • December 1943 3 The Statesman, "Exports of Rice and Paddy Banned," December 2, 1943[1]
  • December 1943 4 The Statesman, "Rice Purchase By Firms," December 13, 1943[1]
  • December 1943 5 The Statesman, "Plan for Calcutta," December 22, 1043[1]
  • December 1943 By December of 1943 it was apparent that the all-important aman crop, harvested in late autumn, would be a bumper crop[1]
  • December 1943 The export of rice and paddy from Bengal was strictly prohibited early in December[1]
  • December 1943 Wavell himself was in Bengal in December for a second tour of the province[1]
  • December 1943 6 The Statesman, "Lord Wavell's Assurance," December 21, 1943[1]
  • December 1943 7 The Statesman," Food Member Visits Dacca," December 18, 1943[1]
  • December 1943 32 The Statesman, "Dar-el-Islam," December 12, 1943[1]
  • December 1943 34 The Statesman, "Muslim League Session Concludes," December 28, 1943[1]
  • December 1943 33 Nazimuddin defended the record acerbically at the Muslim League's All-India conference in Karachi in the last week of December 1943 , deploring Savarkar's accusations and categorically denying that "conversions of starving Hindus had taken place[1]
  • December 1943 Herbert died on December 11, 1943 and a memorial was given at St[1]
  • December 1943 "99 From December of 1943 , the Commission reported, there was a change in the "clinical[1]
  • December 1943 Having failed to establish any legal normalization of their labor status, it is entirely likely that khalasis also comprised a fair number of the "outsiders" - whose corpses were left to rot in the sun for several days, unclaimed - killed in the Japanese bombing of the Kidderpore docks in December of 1943 [1]
  • December 1943 25(2) (December), 155-175[22]
  • December 1943 7 NGOs and International Aid The globalization of disaster relief high lighted by Live Aid and the response to the Asian tsunami of December 2004 has its ori gins in the nineteenth century[16]
  • December 1943 " The prospect of a good aman crop in November 1943 and a drop in the price of rice (15 rupees in December 1943 ) prompted most surviving migrants to return home[16]
  • December 1943 84 Market prices fell to ceiling levels only in December 1943 , as growers reaped the new season's aman crop[13]
  • December 1943 In reality, market prices fell to ceiling levels only in December 1943 , as growers reaped 'the largest paddy crop ever seen in the province'[17]
  • December 1943 Moneylenders who charged a monthly rate of interest of 300 percent waited on the aman (November-December) harvest to get their money back[17]
  • December 1943 for food in Calcutta in December 1943 [26]
  • December 1943 Between August and December 1943 a huge gap separated official and black market prices[26]
  • December 1943 Between August and December 1943 a significant gap separated official and black market prices[23]
  • December 1943 99 "Rice," Statesman, 1 December 1943 [23]
  • December 1943 100 Statesman, 21 December 1943 [23]
  • December 1943 127 Again, of the 168 prosecutions for hoarding and profiteering in Calcutta in December 1943 , twenty-eight related to kerosene, twenty- eight to medicines, twenty-one to coconut oil, eighteen to paper, and only fifteen to rice[23]
  • December 1943 Some believed that the true situation was even worse than implied by the Nawab Bahadur of Dacca's declaration in February 1943 , and that some of the aman crop (the main crop, harvested in November and December) in west Bengal rotted only after it had been harvested, but against this there is the assessment of the leading merchant and Muslim League politician, Mirza Isphahani, that the shortage in[23]
  • December 1943 In December 1943 Amery noted in his diary that the authorities were slow to recognize its effect:[23]
  • December 1943 142 On the brown rust, see Amery 1988: 954 (entry for 7 December 1943 ); Padmanabhan 1973; Dasgupta 1984; Tauger 2004, 2009; Holliday 1998: 41[23]
  • December 1943 f Mortality reached its peak only in December 1943 and stayed up for quite a while longer, but this was mostly the result of famine-induced epidemics, viz[7]
  • December 1943 The Government helped to feed Calcutta through three successive schemes of procurement at controlled prices between December 1942 and March 1943 , but since they did not prove to be very successful, free purchase at market prices was resumed in the districts from March 1943 , leading to very sharp rises in the price of rice in the districts[7]
  • December 1943 While the death rate seems to have reached its peak only in December, there is evidence that starvation was probably at its peak around the third quarter of 1943 [7]
  • December 1943 Since wages earned are typically spent subsequently, and the main peak period of earning is around December, the exchange rates have been calculated with the wage in each financial year (ending in March) being related to the price of the calendar year ending in the following December, except for 1943 -44, where the wage of the first six months of the financial year t Husain's scepticism regarding carry-over was directed towards arguing that the absolute shortage in 1943 was larger than the Commission thought[7]
  • December 1943 rate of December-January of the tripling of rice prices that was to follow before the next peak in May-June[7]
  • December 1943 December 0-33 236 0-69 186 79[7]
  • December 1943 December 75 145 118 90 62 106 42[7]
  • December 1943 The main one was the aman crop, planted in summer and harvested in December, which provided about two-thirds to three-quarters of the year's supply[8]
  • December 1943 After much reluctance, from December 1943 to February 1944 Travancore introduced rationing for the entire country[8]
  • January 1944 Rationing did not come into force in Calcutta until the 81st January 1944 comm-92ff
  • January 1944 Although the rationing of Greater Calcutta remained a matter of primary importance in the food administration of Bengal, it was not until the 31st January 1944 that rationing was brought into force in the city of Calcutta and certain neighbouring muni- cipalities, and not till May 1944 that it was extended to the whole of Greater Calcuttacomm-92ff
  • January 1944 Excess deaths from malaria accounted for 41-5 per cent of excess deaths in 1943 and 53-0 per cent ,of excess deaths from January to June 1944 comm100-150
  • January 1944 The Government of Bengal were also directed that theI'e shall be set up and operating not later than the 31st January 1944 at least 1,000 retail centres for the distribution of rationed foodstuffs in addition to shops operated by industrial concr'rns for their employeesIARIHDD8-001362
  • January 1944 In January Ul44 he was given the powers of a Secretary to GovernmentIARIHDD8-001362
  • January 1944 Rationing did not come into force in Calcutta until the 31st January 1944 IARIHDD8-001362
  • January 1944 Although the ratomng of Greater Calcutta remained a matter of primary importance in the food administration of Bengal, it was not until the 31st January 1944 that rationing was brought into force in the city of Calcutta and cerbain neighbouring municipalities, and not till May 1944 that it was extended to the whole of Greater CalcuttaIARIHDD8-001362
  • January 1944 It is significant that there was a fall in January 1944 , after registration had been improvedIARIHDD8-001362
  • January 1944 January to June 1944 IARIHDD8-001362
  • January 1944 During the months January ~o June 1944 the number of deaths from small-pox was 125,471, that is, 118,84IARIHDD8-001362
  • January 1944 By January 1944 it was reported that some 13,000 beds were available and the number in July 1944 reached 18,250IARIHDD8-001362
  • January 1944 January 1,776,166 945,436IARIHDD8-001362
  • January 1944 In January 1944 the Government sanctioned the expenditure of 1,500,000 rupees for the repair and maintenance of tube wellsIARIHDD8-001362
  • January 1944 1944 -January 10 125'0 50IARIHDD8-001362
  • January 1944 In J'anuary 1944 an attempt was made to hasten the flow by removing ~be obstruction and making sanitary inepectors responsible for collecting figures from chowkiilMsIARIHDD8-001362
  • January 1944 ,January 1944 ;':'736 were at work' in: the' districtsIARIHDD8-001362
  • January 1944 January, 1944 , the necessary hospital accommodation was availableIARIHDD8-001362
  • January 1944 The District Magistrate who had authority to release stocks for local consumption did not find it necessary to do so except for small quantities in October and November, 2,400 maunds in December 1943 and about 12,000 maunds in January and February 1944 IARIHDD8-001362
  • January 1944 61 Kenyan shillings per kilo between January and November 1984, the standard deviation increased from 0ogradac_article_pub_063
  • January 1944 Phase I: January, 1942 to March, 1943 , Phase II: March, 1943 to November, 1943 , and Phase III: November, 1943 to most of 1944 __lecturenotesfamine
  • January 1944 " Similarly, an ordinance was promulgated by the Indian Government in January 1944 ,whi ch allowed the authorities tointervene in the administration of the coal mines and force the constitution of a fund to provide for a variety of facilities-antimalarial schemes, hospitals, good housing, water supplies and mobile cinema units catering to 'recreational needs' -for colliery labour in Bengal, Bihar and Assam[9]
  • January 1944 Scarcity was also declared in Karmala, Madha, Pandharpur, Sangola andMalsiras talukas ofSholapur district from 9February 1942 whichwasextended totheSholapur taluka from 18January 1943 (the declarations were only withdrawn in January 1944 )[14]
  • January 1944 Between January and July 1943 , a maximum of 135,000 maunds of grain was sent by the government to Faridpur-enough to provide a pound of grain a day for about two and a half percent of the population (DCS 1944 b:44; DCS 1944 c: 10- 19; DCS 1944 d:30)[18]
  • January 1944 48/1, Richard Casey Papers, 25 January 1944 , p[10]
  • January 1944 The officials eventually drew up the plan in the third week of January[10]
  • January 1944 sent by the Home Department, Political to all District Officers and the Commissioner of Police, Calcutta, 20 January 1944 , in Towards Freedom (Gupta 1992; hereafter TF), Part I, p[10]
  • January 1944 The government registered the maximum number of destitutes between January 1943 to May 1944 [10]
  • January 1944 The jobs in which the male members of the families were employed in January 1943 changed by the end of 1944 in a very large number of cases, and the principal earners had either become destitute or were dead[10]
  • January 1944 48/1, Richard Casey Papers, 25 January 1944 , pp[10]
  • January 1944 48/1, Richard Casey Papers, 24 January 1944 , p[10]
  • January 1944 ——— ( 1944 a), January–June[10]
  • January 1944 1975 and 1944 ), consistent with the fact that the greatest reduction of conceptions from 'normal' occurred during the usual peak conception season (around January-March)[12]
  • January 1944 Land Sales in Bengal between January 1943 and April 1944 by Size-class of Ownership Holding[30]
  • January 1944 3 lakhs of destitutes between January 1943 and May 1944 [6]
  • January 1944 During the famine period (January 1943 to May 1944 ) the whole process was greatly accelerated but the general nature of changes remained much the same[6]
  • January 1944 Number and proportion of families living on charity in January 1943 and in May 1944 [6]
  • January 1944 destitute families living on charity number surveyed percentage of total number of families total total in change between total in net total in change between total in net number January January 1943 May increase January January 1943 May increase of 1943 and May 1944 1944 between 1943 and May 1944 1944 between class families Jan[6]
  • January 1944 (12) of the table that there was an appreciable increase in the proportion of destitute families in all classes of subdivisions between January 1943 and May 1944 [6]
  • January 1944 The parallel grading in January 1943 and May 1944 probably indicates that by the beginning of 1943 adverse conditions created by war had already affected the different areas broadly in the same pattern as in 1944 [6]
  • January 1944 Number and proportion of destitute persons living on charity in January 1943 and in May 1944 and change between January 1943 and May 1944 [6]
  • January 1944 persons total in change between total net total in change between total net class surveyed January January 1943 in May increase January January 1943 in May increase 1943 and 1944 between 1943 and 1944 between May 1944 Jan[6]
  • January 1944 1 there was an appreciable increase in the proportion of destitute persons in all classes of subdivisions between January 1943 and May 1944 [6]
  • January 1944 3 gives the estimated number of destitute families and persons in January 1943 and May 1944 [6]
  • January 1944 Estimated number (in lakhs) of destitute families and persons in rural Bengal in January 1943 and May 1944 [6]
  • January 1944 3 lakhs of destitute persons between January 1943 and May 1944 [6]
  • January 1944 4 gives the esti mates of destitute persons in January 1943 and May 1944 and the new destitutes created by the famine in the intervening period by age and sex[6]
  • January 1944 Estimated number (in lakhs) of destitute persons in rural Bengal by age and sex in january 1943 and in may 1944 and the number of new destitutes between January 1943 and May 1944 [6]
  • January 1944 January 1943 May 1944[6]
  • January 1944 The number of destitute families and persons in the subdivisions surveyed living on charity in May 1944 and classified by family occupation in January 1943 is given in table 3[6]
  • January 1944 Because of the manner in which this table has been formed, the number of families and persons given in each occu pational class (except, of course, in the group living on charity) actually show the number of new destitutes, that is, the number of families or persons who became destitute between January 1943 and May 1944 [6]
  • January 1944 6 which gives the proportional distribution by occupations of rural families living in January 1943 based on the present sample and corresponding proportions of families, turned destitute between January 1943 and May 1944 in each occupational group[6]
  • January 1944 67% of all families included in the survey had 'agriculture' as their occupation in January 1943 , while the percentage share of destitutes in May 1944 contributed by the 'agriculture' group was 7[6]
  • January 1944 CONDITION OF PARENTS & EARNERS persons living on charity in May 1944 with occupations in January 1943 number surveyed[6]
  • January 1944 4 Compared to the number of destitutes in January 1943 the largest proportion had come from the younger age-groups during the famine period of January 1943 and May 1944 [6]
  • January 1944 Esti mated number of destitute persons in lakhs by age and sex under each class of incidence in January 1943 and May 1944 , and the new destitutes created by the famine during the above period is given in table 3[6]
  • January 1944 Estimates of destitutes by sex and age in January 1943 and May 1944 have been derived from the proportional distribution within the sample of the des titutes surveyed[6]
  • January 1944 Estimated number (in lakhs) of destitute persons in each class of incidence by sex and age in January 1943 and May 1944 and the new destitutes created between January 1943 and May 1944 [6]
  • January 1944 January 1943 ?May 1944[6]
  • January 1944 groups as in infants children adult January (0?5) (5?15) (15?50)[6]
  • January 1944 1 gives the number of and proportion of families in the sample suffering change of family occupation during the period January 1943 to April 1944 [6]
  • January 1944 Number of families in the sample surveyed by occupations as in January 1943 and in May 1944 , and number and proportion of change of occupation during the period[6]
  • January 1944 occupational groups January 1943 & May 1944 (1)[6]
  • January 1944 January ?943 & May 1944[6]
  • January 1944 2 shows the actual number of families surveyed together with the family occupation as in both January 1943 and May 1944 [6]
  • January 1944 5 gives the estimated total number (in lakhs) of families in each occupational group which had retained or changed their occupation between January 1943 and April 1944 classified under the three categories ; (a) improvement, (b) deterioration, and (c) ambiguous[6]
  • January 1944 Inter occupational shift among families surveyed between January number of families in different occupations in May 1 occupational groups[6]
  • January 1944 Estimated number (in lakhs) of families in different occupatioal as in January 1943 and as in May 1944 in rural Bengal[6]
  • January 1944 Estimated total number (in lakhs) of families in rural Bengal by family occupations as in January 1943 , and the change between January 1943 and may 1944 classified under 'improvement', 'deterioration', or 'ambiguous'[6]
  • January 1944 January 1943 & May 1944[6]
  • January 1944 Rules adopted to determine economic deterioration The method adopted to interpret the nature of shift of families from one occupation to another between January 1943 and May 1944 is given below[6]
  • January 1944 Number and proportion of families mortgaging or selling paddy land (in full and in part) between April 1943 and April 1944 by family occupations before the famine in January 1943 [6]
  • January 1944 Estimated acreage of paddy land (in lakhs) transferred between April 1943 and March 1944 by occupational groups as in January 1943 [6]
  • January 1944 land transferred in lakhs percentage occupational groups of acres between of bought as in January 1943 April 1943 & April 1944 to sold bought sold difference[6]
  • January 1944 owning plough cattle owning plough cattle January owning plough (2)[6]
  • January 1944 (2) it is seen that the increase in the number of destitute families between January 1943 and May 1944 was 1[6]
  • January 1944 Index numbers of destitution and economic deterioration between January 1943 and May 1944 by occupational groups as in January 1943 occupational groups[6]
  • January 1944 Changes in economic conditions in rural Bengal during the famine period of January 1943 to May 1944 have been already dis cussed in Chapters 3 and 4[6]
  • January 1944 5 shows relative changes in the pre-famine (January 1939 ?January 1943 ) and in the famine (January 1943 ?May 1944 ) periods[6]
  • January 1944 (2) and corresponding percentages of families for changes which occurred during the famine period (January 1943 ?May 1944 ) in col[6]
  • January 1944 (3) as of change in economic January 1939 ? January 1943 ? percentage the two periods condition January 1943 May 1944 of col[6]
  • January 1944 During the famine period (January 1943 ?May 1944 ) the whole process was greatly accelerated but the general nature of changes remained much the same[6]
  • January 1944 Relative proportion of net loss of plough cattle and families losing PLOUGH CATTLE COMPLETELY BETWEEN APRIL 1943 AND APRIL 1944 TO THE PROPORTION OF total plough cattle and famil?es owning plough cattle under occupational groups as in January 1943 [6]
  • January 1944 1944 January 14[19]
  • January 1944 57 Casey Diary, January 27th, 1944[1]
  • January 1944 A concerned business owner in the area posted a letter of protest on January 10th of 1944 :[1]
  • January 1944 On the 12th of January, 1944 , in an obvious effort to punctuate the political embarrassment of starvation in India, Wavell telegraphed Amery in regards to a "Bengal Famine Enquiry[1]
  • January 1944 She arrived in Calcutta in January of 1944 to begin her tour of the province[1]
  • January 1944 20 The Statesman, "Calcutta's Mortality Raises Again," January 12, 1944[1]
  • January 1944 38 The Statesman, "Criticism of Food Member," January 7, 1944[1]
  • January 1944 44 The Statesman, "Criticism of Food Member," January 7, 1944[1]
  • January 1944 The ministry reported back that it would arrange for 1,000 ration shops to be opened by January 31, 1944 , of which 55% would be private retail shops (run overwhelming by Hindus) and 45% would be government (read: "Muslim") shops[1]
  • January 1944 48 The Statesman, "Political Comments by our Indian Observer," January 16, 1944[1]
  • January 1944 49 The Statesman, "City Corporation and Rationing," January 20, 1944[1]
  • January 1944 51 The Statesman, "Mahasabha Criticisms," January, 28, 1944[1]
  • January 1944 53 The Statesman, "Purchase and Distribution of Foodgrains," January 28, 1944[1]
  • January 1944 55 The Statesman, "Quota of Rice Increased," January 26, 1944[1]
  • January 1944 57 The Statesman, "Quota of Rice Increased," January 26, 1944[1]
  • January 1944 58 The Statesman, "Mahasabha Criticisms," January, 28, 1944[1]
  • January 1944 The Calcutta Corporation adopted a resolution on January 29th to this same effect[1]
  • January 1944 Despite ongoing contentions, however, rationing did finally get underway in Calcutta on the 31st of January 1944 [1]
  • January 1944 91 The Statesman," Casey Assumes Office as Governor of Bengal," January 23, 1944[1]
  • January 1944 Richard Casey was sworn-in as Governor of Bengal in the Throne Room of Government House, Calcutta on the 22nd of January 1944 [1]
  • January 1944 On the 28th of January he ended his diary entry despondently: "I developed a fever and had to go to bed this afternoon[1]
  • January 1944 103 In all of Bengal, as late as January 1944 , there were a total of 13,000 hospital beds available for famine victims - while an average of at least 2,300 people were dying each day of preventable disease and starvation[1]
  • January 1944 " It had been agreed, however, that shipping might be provided for the import of 50,000 tons of grain to India in January and February[1]
  • January 1944 61 Kenyan shillings per kilo between January and November 1984, the standard deviation increased from 0[16]
  • January 1944 One of the most interesting tables in the Mahalanobis survey—reproduced below, with minor alterations, as table 5—implies that the occupational status of 400,000 families dependent on 'agriculture' or 'agriculture and labour' (about 8 per cent of the total) deteriorated between January 1943 and May 1944 , in the sense that they were forced to shift from their former occupation (for example, farmer) to an inferior one (for example, labourer)[13]
  • January 1944 7 million families out of a total of over ten million deteriorated between January 1943 and May 1944 , in the sense that they were forced to shift from their former occupation (e[17]
  • January 1944 ,"Editor and Printer Tried," Statesman, 23 January 1944 [23]
  • January 1944 Pinnell, 1 January 1944 [23]
  • January 1944 In a strongly worded editorial in mid-January 1944 the Statesman berated Amery for blaming the provincial authorities for the famine, and for claiming that "when it became necessary for the Government of India to act, it did so promptly[23]
  • January 1944 70 "Famine Retrospect," Statesman, 12 January 1944 [23]
  • January 1944 100 In mid-January 1944 the price of rice, which had fallen from Rs[23]
  • January 1944 16–4 at Calcutta on January 17, against prices of Rs[23]
  • January 1944 101 "Rice Prices on the Decline," Statesman, 18 January 1944 ; 21 January 1944 [23]
  • January 1944 105 to 125 percent between January 1942 and January 1944 [23]
  • January 1944 6, which summarizes market price data for a range of food items (meat, vegetables, fruit, fish109) as reported in the Statesman between January 1943 and March 1944 , confirms that price rises in Bengal were by no means confined to rice[23]
  • January 1944 128 "Calcutta Prosecutions," Statesman, 21 January 1944 [23]
  • January 1944 the log books of the Sriniketan farm and the Sriniketan dairy, are still available for certain parts of the period, and using these it has been possible to obtain the local daily wage rate for male unskilled labour from September 1942 to January 1944 [7]
  • January 1944 January 0-36 257 0-62 168 65[7]
  • January 1944 January 64 127 111 91 57 97 58[7]
  • January 1944 in January 1939 (before the famine), January 1943 (immediately preceding the famine—in fact, in terms of our phase structure towards the end of Phase I of the famine), and in May 1944 (after the famine)[7]
  • January 1944 Despite a high rate of destitution during 1939 -43 as well as 1943 -44, the number of families dependent on husking paddy showed a net increase by a little over 66% between January 1939 and May 1944 [7]
  • January 1944 January 1939 January 1943 January 1939 January 1943 and January 1943 and May 1944 and January 1943 and May 1944 Peasant cultivation[7]
  • January 1944 By January 1944 , it appeared to have worked out a complicated FAD explanation of the famine: 'The experience of the past years has convinced the authorities in India that the loss of imports since 1942 has meant the consumption of the carry-over, and now reserves having been consumed, is a major cause of shortage and that, though the exhaustion of a concealed reserve has not been t Mansergh (1971), p[7]
  • February 1944 tion of target figures was sent to the Provincial Governments on the 16th FebruaryIARIHDD8-001362
  • February 1944 In February 1944 , the Government 01 India gave the Government of Bengal TIsIARIHDD8-001362
  • February 1944 In February 1944 , the number of such units was about 250, but this was later reduced fIARIHDD8-001362
  • February 1944 February IARIHDD8-001362
  • February 1944 February 10 122'5 25IARIHDD8-001362
  • February 1944 The District Magistrate who had authority to release stocks for local consumption did not find it necessary to do so except for small quantities in October and November, 2,400 maunds in December 1943 and about 12,000 maunds in January and February 1944 IARIHDD8-001362
  • February 1944 Scarcity was also declared in Karmala, Madha, Pandharpur, Sangola andMalsiras talukas ofSholapur district from 9February 1942 whichwasextended totheSholapur taluka from 18January 1943 (the declarations were only withdrawn in January 1944 )[14]
  • February 1944 crop harvested in February or March[15]
  • February 1944 Sen had taken in his February/March 1943 tour notes that "famine was in the offing and that its character would be overwhelming" (Nanavati 1944 :445) and his warning to collectors on June 11 that famine was imminent (GBR 1944 :17- 18)[18]
  • February 1944 He continued to describe the situation in the classical famine relief mode in February, indicating that because the majority of cultivators had neither seeds nor cattle, large areas of the district could not be cultivated, and therefore agricultural loans should be provided[18]
  • February 1944 "Policy from Mid-February to Mid-April[18]
  • February 1944 48/1, Richard Casey Papers, 13 February 1944 , pp[10]
  • February 1944 The pressure on the railway authorities to supply the provincial civil supplies department with wagons for carrying rice to the districts did not ease till 11 February 1944 [10]
  • February 1944 48/1, Richard Casey Papers, 7 February 1944 , pp[10]
  • February 1944 , 8 February 1944 , pp[10]
  • February 1944 , 11 February 1944 , pp[10]
  • February 1944 48/1, Richard Casey Papers, 25 February 1944 , p[10]
  • February 1944 Wavell to Amery, letter, 10 February 1944 , in TOP, Vol[10]
  • February 1944 48/1, Richard Casey Papers, 3 February 1944 , p[10]
  • February 1944 , 18 February 1944 , p[10]
  • February 1944 Wavell to Amery, letter, 10 and 15 February 1944 , in TOP, Vol[10]
  • February 1944 71 Wavell to Amery, letter, 10 and 15 February 1944 , in TOP, Vol[10]
  • February 1944 Final Report of the National Income Committee (1954), February, Delhi[10]
  • February 1944 According to this measure conceptions were very much reduced throughout 1943 , and reached a minimum in February 1944 [12]
  • February 1944 In the Bihar crop survey the exploratory work was done in only two districts covering about 8,ooo square miles from February to April 1944 [5]
  • February 1944 comprising about 8,ooo square miles, in the rabi (winter wheat) season in February 1944 [5]
  • February 1944 Chattopadhyay, Head of the Department, early in February 1944 [6]
  • February 1944 65 Casey Diary, February 8, 1944[1]
  • February 1944 60 The Statesman, "First Week of Rationing in Calcutta," February 8, 1944[1]
  • February 1944 61 The Statesman, "Quality of Rice at Ration Shops," February 19, 1944[1]
  • February 1944 96 The Statesman, "Sample Survey of Famine Districts," February 28, 1944[1]
  • February 1944 97 The Statesman, "Sample Survey of Famine Districts," February 28, 1944[1]
  • February 1944 " It had been agreed, however, that shipping might be provided for the import of 50,000 tons of grain to India in January and February[1]
  • February 1944 The War Cabinet met on February 7, 1944 to consider the Viceroy's demand[1]
  • February 1944 The War Cabinet met again on the 14th of February to reconsider the Government of India's demands[1]
  • February 1944 The War Cabinet met to consider the Viceroy's "counter-offensive" on the 21st of February[1]
  • February 1944 As it turned out, rationing would not begin in Calcutta until February 1944 [23]
  • February 1944 102 "Rice Procurement in Bengal," Statesman, 2 February 1944 [23]
  • February 1944 129 "Sample Survey of Famine Districts," Statesman, 27 February 1944 ; Chattopadhyay and Mukherjee 1946 : 10; O´ Gra´da 2008; Das 2008[23]
  • February 1944 "The monetization of project and emergency food aid: Project-level efficiency first!", Food Policy, 1994, February, pp[31]
  • February 1944 "Efficient alleviation of poverty and hunger: A new international assistance facility", Food Policy, 1988, February, pp: 56-66[31]
  • February 1944 After much reluctance, from December 1943 to February 1944 Travancore introduced rationing for the entire country[8]
  • March 1944 By March 1948comm-92ff
  • March 1944 If this scheme had been adopted in March controlled procurement could have continued and at the same' time control would have been obtained over supply and distri- bution in Greater Calcuttacomm-92ff
  • March 1944 Under the scheme actually adopted in March, controlled procurement was abandoned and the disturbing influence of conditions-in the Calcutta market on prices throughout Bengal continued uncheckedcomm-92ff
  • March 1944 In the conditions created by the adoption of a policy of de-eontrol in March and the introduction of free trade in May, it was impossible for the Provincial Govern- ment to obtain control of supply and distribution in Greater Calcutta and ration- ing was impracticablecomm-92ff
  • March 1944 The conclusions reached at the Second Food Conference were announced by the Governmellt of India to the provinces and the states' in a letter dated the 12th March which indicated the action required on the part of local administrations and stressed the urgeIARIHDD8-001362
  • March 1944 The figures for rice and millets represented the quantities to be moved between the Is~ December 1942 and the 30th November 1943 , while the corresponding period for wheat and gram was the 1st April 1943 to the 31st March 1944 IARIHDD8-001362
  • March 1944 From October 1942 to March 1944 , RsIARIHDD8-001362
  • March 1944 If this scheme had beon adopted in March controlled procurement could have continued and at the same time control would have been obtained over supply and distribution in Greater CalcuttaIARIHDD8-001362
  • March 1944 Under the scheme actually adopted in March, connrolled procurement was abandoned and the disturbing influence of conditions in the Calcutta market on prices throughout Bengal continued uncheckedIARIHDD8-001362
  • March 1944 Tn the conditions created by the adoption of a policy of de-control in March and the introduction of free trade in May, it was impossible for the Provincial Govern· ment to obtain control of supply and distribution in Greater Calcutta and ratiollmg was impracticableIARIHDD8-001362
  • March 1944 A severe epidemic, however, began in December 1943 and raged during the first half of 1944 , reaching its peak in March and AprilIARIHDD8-001362
  • March 1944 At the inlltance of the Government of India rates of pay were increased in March, IH44, and by the €:Tld of June 328 doctors had been obtained for famine mf>dical workIARIHDD8-001362
  • March 1944 March 5,139,101 2,605,882IARIHDD8-001362
  • March 1944 90 tons and then gradually diminished to 59,000 tons on 1st March 1944 , to 28,000 tons on 1st April, to 26,000 tons on 1st May, to 18,000 tons on 1st June, to 14,000 tons on 1st JulyIARIHDD8-001362
  • March 1944 In March 1944 the stocks which still remained (HiO lakh maunds) were sold to the Calcutta rice mills aIARIHDD8-001362
  • March 1944 7-7-0 a maund, 1·06 lakb maunda were moved between the 21st March and 27th May 0·29 lakh maunds were despatched early in July and at the time the report was made the balance was being moved gradually as the stocks were brought to rail-headIARIHDD8-001362
  • March 1944 in March 1944 , when the market price for aman paIARIHDD8-001362
  • March 1944 XLV (March 2007)ogradac_article_pub_063
  • March 1944 Phase I: January, 1942 to March, 1943 , Phase II: March, 1943 to November, 1943 , and Phase III: November, 1943 to most of 1944 __lecturenotesfamine
  • March 1944 crop harvested in February or March[15]
  • March 1944 The possibility of an integrated department of food supplies and relief was lost on March 29 when Herbert forced the resignation of Fazlul Huq's ministry[18]
  • March 1944 Sen had taken in his February/March 1943 tour notes that "famine was in the offing and that its character would be overwhelming" (Nanavati 1944 :445) and his warning to collectors on June 11 that famine was imminent (GBR 1944 :17- 18)[18]
  • March 1944 74,274,128 were spent by government on direct relief between October 1942 and March 1944 , excluding losses on grain sold below cost (GBR 1944 :14)[18]
  • March 1944 People in the south had publicized their distress at the end of March, when a procession of a reported ten thousand cultivators confronted the SDO of Madaripur demanding cheap-grain shops, interest-free loans, and free paddy seeds (PW Apr[18]
  • March 1944 17 On March 25, one thousand urban women demanded cheap-rice and cheap-cloth shops[18]
  • March 1944 GOVERNMENT FAMINE RELIEF IN BENGAL, 194 3 561 relief expenditure in Midnapore and Dacca for the period from March to August shows the greater readiness of the Revenue Department to support the buying power of the destitute in Midnapore than to aid the similarly needy people in Dacca[18]
  • March 1944 1975 and 1944 ), consistent with the fact that the greatest reduction of conceptions from 'normal' occurred during the usual peak conception season (around January-March)[12]
  • March 1944 See 'Banglar Mrittu Sankya'['An account of the mortality rate in Bengal'], Dacca Prakash, 12 March 1944 , p[2]
  • March 1944 1_ [Published March 27th, 1944 [25]
  • March 1944 In March 1944 K[6]
  • March 1944 The general plan of work was discussed in March and April 1944 ; and the training of investi gators was started almost immediately[6]
  • March 1944 AFTER-EFFECTS OF THE BENGAL FAMINE OF 1943 here are sales and mortgages of paddy land during the period April 1943 to March 1944 (that is, the whole of the Bengali year 1350)[6]
  • March 1944 Estimated acreage of paddy land (in lakhs) transferred between April 1943 and March 1944 by occupational groups as in January 1943 [6]
  • March 1944 Monthly sanctioned money on three relief heads Bengal October 1942 -March 1944 sanctioned money(Rs)[19]
  • March 1944 6 provides district-wise data on CDRs during the main twelve month period of elevated mortality, CBRs during 1944 , changes (proportional) in the harvest price of, and cultivated area under, (winter) rice in 1942 -43, and also statistics on gratuitous relief during the period October 1942 -March 1944 [19]
  • March 1944 The Chiefs of Staff met to consider their views on March 18th[1]
  • March 1944 XLV (March 2007) the likelihood of their prevention in the future[16]
  • March 1944 XLV (March 2007) from an average of 0[16]
  • March 1944 6, which summarizes market price data for a range of food items (meat, vegetables, fruit, fish109) as reported in the Statesman between January 1943 and March 1944 , confirms that price rises in Bengal were by no means confined to rice[23]
  • March 1944 Phase I : from the beginning of 1942 to March 1943 ; Phase II: from March 1943 to November 1943 ; Phase III: from November 1943 through most of 1944 [7]
  • April 1944 The figures for rice and millets represented the quantities to be moved between the Is~ December 1942 and the 30th November 1943 , while the corresponding period for wheat and gram was the 1st April 1943 to the 31st March 1944 IARIHDD8-001362
  • April 1944 A severe epidemic, however, began in December 1943 and raged during the first half of 1944 , reaching its peak in March and AprilIARIHDD8-001362
  • April 1944 The military undertook the distribution of medical supplies, and after their withdrawal in April 1944 fresh difficulties were encounteredIARIHDD8-001362
  • April 1944 April, 7,303,137 4,389,636IARIHDD8-001362
  • April 1944 , ~n April 1944 • IARIHDD8-001362
  • April 1944 April IARIHDD8-001362
  • April 1944 Under the Revised Basic Plan, Bengal was allotted, in April 1944 , a qnota of 70,050 tons of pulses other than gram for the period November 1943 to April 1945 IARIHDD8-001362
  • April 1944 Previous to April 1944 IARIHDD8-001362
  • April 1944 In April 1944 the price of common varieties sold in the ··Clatcutta market was 2 to 3 times in exoess of the pre-war levelIARIHDD8-001362
  • April 1944 90 tons and then gradually diminished to 59,000 tons on 1st March 1944 , to 28,000 tons on 1st April, to 26,000 tons on 1st May, to 18,000 tons on 1st June, to 14,000 tons on 1st JulyIARIHDD8-001362
  • April 1944 During the months of April, May and June the following'funds were aanctioned for various, kinds of relief to the different distriots :IARIHDD8-001362
  • April 1944 On April 6 the use of this sum was approved (GBR 1944 :26)[18]
  • April 1944 "Policy from Mid-February to Mid-April[18]
  • April 1944 Between April 1943 and April 1944 about 9,25,000 families sold their lands[20]
  • April 1944 5, 'Army Proposal of 23 April 1942 Submitted to Chief Civil Defence Commissioner, Bengal'; Famine Enquiry Commission ( 1944 : 26–27 and 171); Mss[10]
  • April 1944 Even after the plan was implemented, only 80,000 tonnes of rice were bought by the government by April and May 1944 , whereas the planners had initially hoped to buy 600,000 tonnes[10]
  • April 1944 In April 1974, the DSS recorded only 226 deaths compared with an average in April of 368 for the years 1971-73[12]
  • April 1944 Yet, by April 1974 conceptions were already well below average and the price of rice was three times the level of early 1972 (see Figure 8) [12]
  • April 1944 Land Sales in Bengal between January 1943 and April 1944 by Size-class of Ownership Holding[30]
  • April 1944 1943 In full In part April 1944 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)[30]
  • April 1944 acres) owned groups in April 1943 bought sold net change in April 1944 Agriculture 11,479 174 306 -132 11,347 (62[30]
  • April 1944 (4): Number of families owning plough cattle in April 1944 Col[30]
  • April 1944 (6): Number of plough cattle owned in April 1944 Source: Mahalanobis, Mukherjea and Ghosh ( 1946 ) Similar observations can be made concerning the loss of plough cattle[30]
  • April 1944 In the Bihar crop survey the exploratory work was done in only two districts covering about 8,ooo square miles from February to April 1944 [5]
  • April 1944 During the period April 1943 to April 1944 , 9[6]
  • April 1944 The general plan of work was discussed in March and April 1944 ; and the training of investi gators was started almost immediately[6]
  • April 1944 8% ; the estimated value of the percentage of families selling paddy land between April 1943 and April 1944 is 9[6]
  • April 1944 4) or a margin of error of 3% ; and the estimated value of the percentage of families mortgaging paddy land between April 1943 and April 1944 is 6[6]
  • April 1944 1 gives the number of and proportion of families in the sample suffering change of family occupation during the period January 1943 to April 1944 [6]
  • April 1944 5 gives the estimated total number (in lakhs) of families in each occupational group which had retained or changed their occupation between January 1943 and April 1944 classified under the three categories ; (a) improvement, (b) deterioration, and (c) ambiguous[6]
  • April 1944 AFTER-EFFECTS OF THE BENGAL FAMINE OF 1943 here are sales and mortgages of paddy land during the period April 1943 to March 1944 (that is, the whole of the Bengali year 1350)[6]
  • April 1944 Land sale and mortgage during the famine period (April 1943 ?April 1944 ; 1350 Bengali era) 5[6]
  • April 1944 gives the estimated number of families who were forced to sell paddy land during the famine between April 1943 and April 1944 [6]
  • April 1944 Number, proportion and estimated total number in lakhs of families selling paddy land between April 1943 and April 1944 (1350 Bengal year) sample surveyed[6]
  • April 1944 April 1943 & April 1944[6]
  • April 1944 6 gives the estimated number of families mortgaging paddy land during the famine period of April 1943 --April 1944 [6]
  • April 1944 Number, proportion and estimated total number (in lakhs) of families mortgaging paddy land (with and without sale) between April 1943 and April 1944 (1350 Bengali Year)[6]
  • April 1944 between April 1943 & April 1944[6]
  • April 1944 1943 & April 1944[6]
  • April 1944 The extent of land sales and mortgages during the famine period of April 1943 ?April 1944 can be summed up as follows : (1) 9[6]
  • April 1944 Number and proportion of families selling paddy land in part between Aprdl 1943 and April 1944 by groups of families owning different amount of paddy LAND BEFORE THE FAMINE (iN JANUARY 1943 ) families owning 0?2 acres, 2?5 acres and above 5 acres of paddy land class total number of[6]
  • April 1944 Number and proportion of families mortgaging or selling paddy land (in full and in part) between April 1943 and April 1944 by family occupations before the famine in January 1943 [6]
  • April 1944 13 which gives the total acreage bought and sold by the agricultural groups between April 1943 and April 1944 [6]
  • April 1944 Estimated acreage of paddy land (in lakhs) transferred between April 1943 and March 1944 by occupational groups as in January 1943 [6]
  • April 1944 land transferred in lakhs percentage occupational groups of acres between of bought as in January 1943 April 1943 & April 1944 to sold bought sold difference[6]
  • April 1944 2 incidates the position of plough cattle,, after the famine, based on estimates of the net loss sustained between April 1943 and April 1944 (that is, during the Bengali year 1350)[6]
  • April 1944 Number, proportion and the estimated number (in lakhs ) of plough cattle in April 1944 and the net loss between April 1943 and April 1944 [6]
  • April 1944 ^_-?-, (April April 1943 April 1944 net loss class April April net 1943 ,-*-s ?-*-? ,- -, (i)[6]
  • April 1944 In round figures there were about 70 lakhs or a little more of plough cattle in April 1944 [6]
  • April 1944 April April 1943 & April 1944[6]
  • April 1944 in April 1943 & April 1944[6]
  • April 1944 4 gives the proportion and estimated total number of families which owned plough cattle before the famine in April 1943 and after the famine in April 1944 [6]
  • April 1944 Number, proportion and estimated number (in lakhs) of families owning plough cattle in April 1943 and April 1944 [6]
  • April 1944 1944 April 1943[6]
  • April 1944 (2) The estimated net loss of plough cattle in Bengal was from ten to eleven lakhs (about 13%) during the famine period between April 1943 and April 1944 [6]
  • April 1944 Number and proportion of plough cattle lost between April 1943 and Aprdl 1944 by occupational groups owned in[6]
  • April 1944 occupational groups April[6]
  • April 1944 April 1943 and April 1944[6]
  • April 1944 7 which gives the mean number of of plough cattle owned per family in April 1943 and in April 1944 shows how the famine affected the cattle position in each occupational group[6]
  • April 1944 Number of plough cattle owned per family in April 1943 and in April 1944 by occupational groups[6]
  • April 1944 April, April April 1944[6]
  • April 1944 8 which shows the proportion of families in the sample owning plough cattle before and after the famine in April 1943 and April 1944 [6]
  • April 1944 Number and proportion of families owning plough cattle in April 1943 and April 1944 in each occupational group[6]
  • April 1944 number of families surveyed percentage of families owning plough cattle losing all owning plough cattle losing all plough cattle ,-A-? plough r--*--> between April 1943 & AprAil pril cattle April April April 1944 to families occupational 1943 1944 between 1943 1944 in April 1943 gtrootuapl s April 1943 ,-^-,[6]
  • April 1944 in 1943 & April 1944 total owning[6]
  • April 1944 percentage to total families index of change owning selling between April mortgaging in April 1943 & April 1944 between[6]
  • April 1944 in part April 1944[6]
  • April 1944 in April between change[6]
  • April 1944 in April total change[6]
  • April 1944 ^ Greenough notes that epidemic cholera, smallpox and malaria became prevalent between October 1943 and April 1944 [19]
  • April 1944 May 1943 - April 1944[19]
  • April 1944 Smallpox deaths began to rise somewhat later - from around November - and peaked in April of 1944 [19]
  • April 1944 Assuming that the main span of famine mortality in both provinces was from May 1943 to April 1944 , the Director of Public Health with the Government of India calculated excess deaths over the respective annual averages during 1938 -42; the resulting figures are 176,827 and 52,146 respectively for Madras and Orissa[19]
  • April 1944 Registered deaths from dysentery and diarrhoea, though peaking in late 1943 , were rather persistently high until the middle of 1944 ; and mortality from smallpox reached a sharp climax in April of 1944 [19]
  • April 1944 The smallpox epidemic peaked very much later (in April of 1944 )[19]
  • April 1944 In the third week of April, however, Wavell returned to the charge[1]
  • April 1944 A telegram, drafted with approval of the War Cabinet, was sent off to Washington on April 29, 1944 [1]
  • April 1944 Smallpox had reached its peak during the months of April and May,145 and with one hospital bed for every 100,000 residents of the province, had taken a very severe toll[1]
  • April 1944 146 The Statesman, "Too Much Death," April 30, 1944[1]
  • April 1944 165 The Statesman, "Rise of Prices in Everyday Goods Analyzed," April 20, 1944[1]
  • April 1944 166 The Statesman, "Paper," April 24, 1944[1]
  • April 1944 "164 By April of 1944 , the prices of a wide array of essential commodities in Bengal had risen by an average of more than 250% in just three year[1]
  • April 1944 79 Statesman, 2 April 1944 [13]
  • April 1944 It is surely telling that by early April 1944 , when the worst was over, the authorities worried about the impact of over-pessimistic expectations on the disposal of available rice stocks[17]
  • April 1944 14 Statesman, April 2nd 1944 [17]
  • April 1944 org/article/26/, uploaded 1 April 2003[17]
  • April 1944 71 "A Governor's Forecast," Statesman, 2 April 1944 [23]
  • June 1944 The death rate during the year from July 1943 to June 1944 reached '37-6 per millscomm100-150
  • June 1944 Excess deaths from malaria accounted for 41-5 per cent of excess deaths in 1943 and 53-0 per cent ,of excess deaths from January to June 1944 comm100-150
  • June 1944 During the remaining months of 1943 it declined and by June 1944 had returned to the normal ieyelIARIHDD8-001362
  • June 1944 Tuly 1943 to June 1944 reached 37'6 per milleIARIHDD8-001362
  • June 1944 s reponed in Bengal from July 1943 to June 1944 IARIHDD8-001362
  • June 1944 A severe and widespread epidemic, begmning in June, occurred during the latter half of 1943 , reaching its peak in December and continuing in 1944 IARIHDD8-001362
  • June 1944 January to June 1944 IARIHDD8-001362
  • June 1944 The total numberof deaths :from cholera reported from July 1943 to June 1944 was 218,269, thai! is, 309·7 per cent in excess of the quinquennial average for , 1938 -42IARIHDD8-001362
  • June 1944 From June onwards it declinedIARIHDD8-001362
  • June 1944 During the months January ~o June 1944 the number of deaths from small-pox was 125,471, that is, 118,84IARIHDD8-001362
  • June 1944 In June 1~44, 11 hospitals h]C[ been taken over by the Provincial Govel'nment, 44 were on the point or being taken over and negotiations for the transfer of the remainder were in progressIARIHDD8-001362
  • June 1944 At the inlltance of the Government of India rates of pay were increased in March, IH44, and by the €:Tld of June 328 doctors had been obtained for famine mf>dical workIARIHDD8-001362
  • June 1944 The qnantities of evaporated and dried milk distributed in Bengal monthl)j from September 1943 to June 1944 were as follows:- Oaloutta Moju8a1lIARIHDD8-001362
  • June 1944 Supplies, Government of India, was approached in June 1944 , for supplies of IARIHDD8-001362
  • June 1944 90 tons and then gradually diminished to 59,000 tons on 1st March 1944 , to 28,000 tons on 1st April, to 26,000 tons on 1st May, to 18,000 tons on 1st June, to 14,000 tons on 1st JulyIARIHDD8-001362
  • June 1944 During the months of April, May and June the following'funds were aanctioned for various, kinds of relief to the different distriots :IARIHDD8-001362
  • June 1944 Sen had taken in his February/March 1943 tour notes that "famine was in the offing and that its character would be overwhelming" (Nanavati 1944 :445) and his warning to collectors on June 11 that famine was imminent (GBR 1944 :17- 18)[18]
  • June 1944 Although the funds allocated in late June carried over into July, the financial stringency was felt by mid-July to the extent that an official in the district later complained to the relief commissioner, 0[18]
  • June 1944 On 6 June 1944 Roy said at a press conference that eighteen districts in the province were under the grip of smallpox and cholera epidemics, and the incidence of malaria was also increasing[10]
  • June 1944 ——— ( 1944 a), January–June[10]
  • June 1944 This material related to a population of about 60 million and was available up to June 1944 [12]
  • June 1944 But they consider their use necessary because of the lack of detailed registration data for Bengal as a whole after June of 1944 [12]
  • June 1944 Originally it had been intended to carry out the field survey with the help of University and College students during the summer vacation of May, June and July 1944 [6]
  • June 1944 The original plan of field work was to complete the investigations during the three months of May, June and July 1944 [6]
  • June 1944 Given the employment losses and high prices from the beginning of the kharif season (June) , the very scant start of relief in November may well be considered as late (see Figure 2[19]
  • June 1944 in June was followed by bowel-complaints deaths peak in August, which was followed by fever deaths peak in November (see Figure 2[19]
  • June 1944 5 indicates, relief provision declined drastically from the first monsoon month (June 1987) , while at the same time the MI was rising[19]
  • June 1944 While drought conditions usually begin from around June-July, in most cases relief did not assume significance until very late in the year (e[19]
  • June 1944 This conclusion was presumably based on unpublished registration data for the period up to June of 1944 which was only available to the Commission[19]
  • June 1944 1943 - June 1944 Vital registration (inclusive) for all-Bengal 1943 and first half of[19]
  • June 1944 Indeed, the period July 1943 to June 1944 was the most severe in terms of both increased deaths and reduced births[19]
  • June 1944 The Public Health Commissioner for India in his report for 1943 and 1944 gave the recorded numbers of deaths of "destitutes" in Calcutta - "those persons who died and whose bodies were disposed of by public arrangement" - as follows: 3,000 deaths between June 1942 and May 1943 ; and 19,000 deaths between June 1943 and May 1944 [19]
  • June 1944 The main famine mortality peak was roughly of 12 months duration: July 1943 to June 1944 [19]
  • June 1944 The main famine death peak in most of Bengal's districts seems to have lasted from about July 1943 to about June 1944 (see Table 6[19]
  • June 1944 Group A fverv severelv affected): those experiencing more than 150 per cent rise in mortality during the period July 1943 to June 1944 : Midnapore, Howrah, Murshidabad, Dacca and Tippera; Group B (severelv affected): districts experiencing 100-150 284[19]
  • June 1944 1 illustrates the regional distribution of deaths during the peak mortality period from July 1943 to June 1944 [19]
  • June 1944 1 The Regional Pattern of Percentage Rises in Deaths During July 1943 to June 1944 , Districts of Bengal[19]
  • June 1944 Vo Rise in Deaths July 1943 - June 1944 above 150[19]
  • June 1944 It is of interest to examine the direction and strength of correlations of those variables which might be thought to have a causal relation with Xi (the percentage rise in deaths during July 1943 -June 1944 )[19]
  • June 1944 X,: percentage rise in deaths during July 1943 -June 1944 over the average of 1940 and 1941 ; X^: ratio of price of rice in 1942 - 43 to average 1938 -40; X,: percentage change in area under rice cultivation in 1942 -43 compared with 1938 -40; X : government grant on gratuitous relief during Oct[19]
  • June 1944 ** It may be noted that the absolute (rather than proportional) rises in death rates during July 1943 -June 1944 have also been found to have significant positive correlations with both X 4 (0[19]
  • June 1944 However, district-level proportional rises in deaths during July 1943 - June 1944 are very strongly (r= 0[19]
  • June 1944 7 the correlation coefficient between the percentage rise in deaths during the period July 1943 -June 1944 , and the percentage decline in births in 1944 across the districts, is found to be 0[19]
  • June 1944 The maximum MI occurred in October of 1943 , while the main famine mortality peak was roughly of 1 2 months duration; July 1943 to June 1944 [19]
  • June 1944 On June 3rd he cabled back to express his "utmost sympathy," but reported that he would be unable to provide any assistance, being "unable on military grounds to consent to the diversion of shipping[1]
  • June 1944 IV: 'The Bengal famine and the viceroyalty, 15 June 1943 –31 August 1944 ' (1973)[13]
  • June 1944 0 0 30 60 miles 50 100 km JALPAIGURI Assam MYMENSINGH BOGRA MALDA DINAJPUR RANGPUR RAJSHAHI PABNA TANGAIL COOCH BEHAR NADIA DACCA Dacca Tangail Sylhet Sylhet TIPPERA Comilla JESSORE FARIDPUR KHULNA NOAKHALI Chittagong Bay of Bengal Barisal Patuakali BACKERGUNGE PARGANAS MIDNAPORE BANKURA BURDWAN BIRBHUM HOOGHLY HOWRAH Calcutta Kushtia MURSHIDABAD Ganges % Rise in Deaths July 1943 –June 1944 above 150 100–150 50–100 below 50 Regional boundary INDIA BENGAL Map 2[23]
  • June 1944 4 Bengal: Percentage increases in deaths, July 1943 –June 1944 [23]
  • June 1944 147 DDRA is the increase in the death rate in July 1943 –June 1944 ; DDRB also includes excess deaths in July–December 1944 [23]
  • July 1944 It was, however, the only feasible method for the general appeasement of hunger in the situation which developed from July on wards, when many thousands of people left their homes and flocked into towns and citiescomm-92ff
  • July 1944 We met forythe first time on July 18th, 1944 , in New Delhicomm1
  • July 1944 It was, however, the only feasible method'for the genera? appeasement of hunger in the situation which developed from July on Wardsii when many thousands of people left their homes and flocked into towns an citiescomm100-150
  • July 1944 The death rate during the year from July 1943 to June 1944 reached '37-6 per millscomm100-150
  • July 1944 The malaria season in Bengal normally extends from July to Decembercomm100-150
  • July 1944 We met,for the first time on July 18th, 1944 , in Now Dulhl, A£tIARIHDD8-001362
  • July 1944 Durjng July the amount of money allotted for relief in general was redueec1, since it was reported tlwt the agricultural operations were proceeding on a large scale in all parts of the province and that the demund £Ol'" labour had increasedIARIHDD8-001362
  • July 1944 It was, however, the onTy feasible method for the general appea~ement of hunger in the situation which developed from July onwardsIARIHDD8-001362
  • July 1944 s reponed in Bengal from July 1943 to June 1944 IARIHDD8-001362
  • July 1944 The malaria season in Bengal );lOrmally extends from July to DecemberIARIHDD8-001362
  • July 1944 The total numberof deaths :from cholera reported from July 1943 to June 1944 was 218,269, thai! is, 309·7 per cent in excess of the quinquennial average for , 1938 -42IARIHDD8-001362
  • July 1944 By January 1944 it was reported that some 13,000 beds were available and the number in July 1944 reached 18,250IARIHDD8-001362
  • July 1944 The number of vaccination", against small-pox and inoculations against cholera carried out monthly from July 1943 to May 1944 is shown belowIARIHDD8-001362
  • July 1944 90 tons and then gradually diminished to 59,000 tons on 1st March 1944 , to 28,000 tons on 1st April, to 26,000 tons on 1st May, to 18,000 tons on 1st June, to 14,000 tons on 1st JulyIARIHDD8-001362
  • July 1944 7-7-0 a maund, 1·06 lakb maunda were moved between the 21st March and 27th May 0·29 lakh maunds were despatched early in July and at the time the report was made the balance was being moved gradually as the stocks were brought to rail-headIARIHDD8-001362
  • July 1944 The report was later written by Das in the form of a book in July 1948 and was published in 1949 by the Calcutta Universitysummary_Das_good2
  • July 1944 However, epidemics now took over as the main killer, and as many people died between November 1943 and July 1944 as in the previous period[15]
  • July 1944 As figure 2 indicates, during July financial support diminished sharply[18]
  • July 1944 Although the funds allocated in late June carried over into July, the financial stringency was felt by mid-July to the extent that an official in the district later complained to the relief commissioner, 0[18]
  • July 1944 Faced with escalating rural distress in July 1943 , the collector ordered his subordinates to organize twenty soup kitchens in each of the four subdivisions (GBR 1944 :33, 35)[18]
  • July 1944 August was a difficult month throughout the district because the amount of grain arriving on government account dropped sharply from the level of July's supplies (Narayan 1944 :181)[18]
  • July 1944 Distribution of gratuitous relief should also be continued up to July 1943 " (GBR 1944 :26)[18]
  • July 1944 Between January and July 1943 , a maximum of 135,000 maunds of grain was sent by the government to Faridpur-enough to provide a pound of grain a day for about two and a half percent of the population (DCS 1944 b:44; DCS 1944 c: 10- 19; DCS 1944 d:30)[18]
  • July 1944 By July 1943 famine stalked the south-especially Madaripur subdivision (GBR 1944 :33-35)[18]
  • July 1944 Baker, ICS, Additional Secretary, GOB, Home Department, to Vishnu Sahay, ICS, Joint Secretary, GOI, Home Department, 5 July 1944 , letter, File 4/4/44, in TF, Part I, pp[10]
  • July 1944 That the viceroy was not fully aware of the scale of the famine or the gravity of the situation emerges from a statement he made in a letter to Amery in July 1944 [10]
  • July 1944 Apart from private merchants, 76 77 Wavell to Amery, letter, 19 July 1944 , in TOP, Vol[10]
  • July 1944 ——— ( 1944 b), July–December[10]
  • July 1944 The malaria season in Bengal was from July to December[12]
  • July 1944 As conditions were found in many ways similar to those in Bengal, it was possible to organize a full-scale provincial crop survey in Bihar covering about 70,000 square miles in the next crop season extending from July to September 1944 [5]
  • July 1944 Originally it had been intended to carry out the field survey with the help of University and College students during the summer vacation of May, June and July 1944 [6]
  • July 1944 There was however a delay of two months in sanctioning the grant which completely upset the time programme, and the field survey had to be extended from the end of July 1944 to early February 1945 [6]
  • July 1944 25000 was sanctioned by the Famine Relief Branch, Revenue Department, on 14 July 1944 [6]
  • July 1944 The enquiry, which was being carried out at the expense of the Indian Statistical Institute, was expanded and the field survey on a provincial scale was started at the end of July 1944 [6]
  • July 1944 The original plan of field work was to complete the investigations during the three months of May, June and July 1944 [6]
  • July 1944 It had been contemplated that the whole of the field work would be done by voluntary workers taken from college students who would be able to do this work during the summer vacation which began in May and lasted till about the middle of July[6]
  • July 1944 7 ] SANKHY? : THE INDIAN JOURNAL OF STATISTICS [ Part 4 received, it was already late in July[6]
  • July 1944 The main cultivation operations of the year had also started from July[6]
  • July 1944 , Director of Relief and Rehabilitation, a letter dated 25 March 1946 in which he pointed out that the order of 14 July 1944 sanctioning the grant had "embodied the request that the results of the enquiry be reported to Government not later than the 30th September 1944 "[6]
  • July 1944 The date 30th September 1944 had been mentioned by us on the assumption that full scale field work would be started in May and completed by July[6]
  • July 1944 The Relief Department, however, took more than eight weeks (from 12 May to 14 July 1944 ) to sanction a grant in aid, but apparently still expected the work to be completed according to the original schedule[6]
  • July 1944 While drought conditions usually begin from around June-July, in most cases relief did not assume significance until very late in the year (e[19]
  • July 1944 The signs of famine became visible about July 1942 , and its worst effects in the form of epidemics continued until December, 1944 [19]
  • July 1944 Indeed, the period July 1943 to June 1944 was the most severe in terms of both increased deaths and reduced births[19]
  • July 1944 However, fortunately, a monthly series of provincial average prices of coarse rice from July 1943 until October 1944 has been found in the personal papers of L[19]
  • July 1944 The correlation coefficient between monthly absolute rises and proportional rises in registered deaths during July 1943 -Jùne 1944 is positive and very high (0[19]
  • July 1944 The main famine mortality peak was roughly of 12 months duration: July 1943 to June 1944 [19]
  • July 1944 The main famine death peak in most of Bengal's districts seems to have lasted from about July 1943 to about June 1944 (see Table 6[19]
  • July 1944 Group A fverv severelv affected): those experiencing more than 150 per cent rise in mortality during the period July 1943 to June 1944 : Midnapore, Howrah, Murshidabad, Dacca and Tippera; Group B (severelv affected): districts experiencing 100-150 284[19]
  • July 1944 1 illustrates the regional distribution of deaths during the peak mortality period from July 1943 to June 1944 [19]
  • July 1944 1 The Regional Pattern of Percentage Rises in Deaths During July 1943 to June 1944 , Districts of Bengal[19]
  • July 1944 Vo Rise in Deaths July 1943 - June 1944 above 150[19]
  • July 1944 It is of interest to examine the direction and strength of correlations of those variables which might be thought to have a causal relation with Xi (the percentage rise in deaths during July 1943 -June 1944 )[19]
  • July 1944 X,: percentage rise in deaths during July 1943 -June 1944 over the average of 1940 and 1941 ; X^: ratio of price of rice in 1942 - 43 to average 1938 -40; X,: percentage change in area under rice cultivation in 1942 -43 compared with 1938 -40; X : government grant on gratuitous relief during Oct[19]
  • July 1944 ** It may be noted that the absolute (rather than proportional) rises in death rates during July 1943 -June 1944 have also been found to have significant positive correlations with both X 4 (0[19]
  • July 1944 However, district-level proportional rises in deaths during July 1943 - June 1944 are very strongly (r= 0[19]
  • July 1944 7 the correlation coefficient between the percentage rise in deaths during the period July 1943 -June 1944 , and the percentage decline in births in 1944 across the districts, is found to be 0[19]
  • July 1944 The maximum MI occurred in October of 1943 , while the main famine mortality peak was roughly of 1 2 months duration; July 1943 to June 1944 [19]
  • July 1944 151 On the 5th of July the Viceroy informed London that His Majesty's Government's decision had been "too little, too late[1]
  • July 1944 As detailed in the official Medical History of the Bengal Famine, on the morning of July 10, 1944 , a 32 year-old, "male Hindu," identified only as "Netai," was picked up on the streets of Calcutta and removed in an Air Raid Precaution lorry to the Campbell Medical Hospital Calcutta[1]
  • July 1944 On the 18th of July his condition was still deteriorating[1]
  • July 1944 Netai died on July 20, 1944 in bed 20A at Calcutta's Campbell hospital[1]
  • July 1944 Less than two weeks later, on the 31st of July, 1944 the Royal Commission to Enquire into the Bengal Famine of 1943 convened in Delhi under the Chairmanship of I[1]
  • July 1944 By mid-July, however, Linlithgow had changed his tune and was demanding food imports as a matter of extreme urgency, no matter "how unpalatable this demand must be to H[23]
  • July 1944 "79 In the course of a lengthy debate in the local assembly in mid-July, the opposition accused ministers of obfuscating reality by focusing on carry-over and hoarded stocks, and demanded that Bengal be declared a famine area[23]
  • July 1944 By early July Suhrawardy was conceding that there was a food availability problem:[23]
  • July 1944 0 0 30 60 miles 50 100 km JALPAIGURI Assam MYMENSINGH BOGRA MALDA DINAJPUR RANGPUR RAJSHAHI PABNA TANGAIL COOCH BEHAR NADIA DACCA Dacca Tangail Sylhet Sylhet TIPPERA Comilla JESSORE FARIDPUR KHULNA NOAKHALI Chittagong Bay of Bengal Barisal Patuakali BACKERGUNGE PARGANAS MIDNAPORE BANKURA BURDWAN BIRBHUM HOOGHLY HOWRAH Calcutta Kushtia MURSHIDABAD Ganges % Rise in Deaths July 1943 –June 1944 above 150 100–150 50–100 below 50 Regional boundary INDIA BENGAL Map 2[23]
  • July 1944 4 Bengal: Percentage increases in deaths, July 1943 –June 1944 [23]
  • July 1944 147 DDRA is the increase in the death rate in July 1943 –June 1944 ; DDRB also includes excess deaths in July–December 1944 [23]
  • August 1944 Large quantities of wheat and rice started arriving in Calcutta on Gov- ernment account from other parts of India in August and October 1948 respectively and the Provincial Government were assured of adequate supplies of both wheat and rice from the beginning of Octobercomm-92ff
  • August 1944 After spending some weeks in Delhi, where numerous ofl'icial witnesses were heard, we went to Bengal on August 11th, and remained there for about 6 weekscomm1
  • August 1944 to 15, and during the ten months from November 1943 to August 1944 , to 700,000 tonscomm150-175
  • August 1944 In August 1944 , 11 Government orphanages, with accommodation for about 1,700 children, had been constructed and occupied, or were nearing completions The bulk of the orphans were still housed in workhouses, temporary orphanage" 656-, scattered all over the province, their care being the responsibility of Districtcomm150-175
  • August 1944 ct' sponding some weeks in Delhi, where numerous official witnesses WOl'l\ IioHl'd, Wn w('nh to Bengal on August 11th, aIARIHDD8-001362
  • August 1944 In August it became abundantly clear thut Bengal was in the griIARIHDD8-001362
  • August 1944 and Collectors were called to a conference in Calcutta on August 14th, 15th andl ~6th, aud were given instructions by the GovernmentIARIHDD8-001362
  • August 1944 On August 18th Gov· emment issued 8IARIHDD8-001362
  • August 1944 strat~on", ~ circular issued by the Revenue Department on August 20th descrlbed 111 detail the relief measures to be taken and the administrative procedure to beIARIHDD8-001362
  • August 1944 Free trade was abandoned at the beginning of August but controlled procurement was not undertaken un:bil the end of that month when £amm-e was raging in the provinceIARIHDD8-001362
  • August 1944 Large quantities-of w~at and rice started arriving in Calcutta Oll Go"\'· ernment account £rom other parts of India in August and October 1\)41) respectively and the Provincial Gove~n~nt :were assured of adequate sUPlJ~ies of both wheat and rice £rom the begmmng of OctoberIARIHDD8-001362
  • August 1944 By August 1944 some 10,000 tube wells had been repaired in the various wavs '!leeded to make them serviceEible and a source of safe water supplyIARIHDD8-001362
  • August 1944 Once the position as it existed in August and SeptembeL' 194B had developed, with some millions of people starving, socially disorganized and already a prey to epidemic disease, no health service, however well-staffed and organized, could have prevented heavy mortalityIARIHDD8-001362
  • August 1944 Thereafter they remained fairly steady until about August 1944 IARIHDD8-001362
  • August 1944 During the period December 1942 to October 1943 , the purchases made by these officers amounted to 721,000 tons, and during the ten months from November 1943 to August 1944 , to 700,000 --tonsIARIHDD8-001362
  • August 1944 ' In August 1944 , 11 Government orphanagesIARIHDD8-001362
  • August 1944 ns on 1st AugustIARIHDD8-001362
  • August 1944 Mookerjee, ex-minister, Government of Bengal, to the Woodhead Committee, 15 August 1944 , Nanavati papers, National Archives of India, New Delhi, India[9]
  • August 1944 Mookerjea, ex-minister, Government of Bengal, 15August 1944 , to the Woodhead Committee, Nanavati papers, National Archives ofindia, New Delhi, India[14]
  • August 1944 crop harvested in August and September providing 24 % and the boro[15]
  • August 1944 Most of the relief funds were distributed as agricultural loans, so that those without cultivable land-the very poor-received negligible support until August 1943 , despite prices five times the norm (GBR 1944 :48)[18]
  • August 1944 From early August-in advance of provincial instructions-free kitchens were set up in the subdivisions (ABP Aug[18]
  • August 1944 August was a difficult month throughout the district because the amount of grain arriving on government account dropped sharply from the level of July's supplies (Narayan 1944 :181)[18]
  • August 1944 In late August, when the government again tried to set rice prices, the food supply problem was compounded as traders withdrew grain from the markets (ABP Sept[18]
  • August 1944 GOVERNMENT FAMINE RELIEF IN BENGAL, 194 3 561 relief expenditure in Midnapore and Dacca for the period from March to August shows the greater readiness of the Revenue Department to support the buying power of the destitute in Midnapore than to aid the similarly needy people in Dacca[18]
  • August 1944 Bangladesh Rice Research Institute (BRRI) I975 Proceedings of the International Seminar on Deep- Water Rice, August I974 (Joydebpur, BRRI)[36]
  • August 1944 4, August 1944 , pp[5]
  • August 1944 Finally, malaria set in from August and the field staff suffered acutely from this disease[6]
  • August 1944 in June was followed by bowel-complaints deaths peak in August, which was followed by fever deaths peak in November (see Figure 2[19]
  • August 1944 As early as August 1942 , Bengal's then chief minister, A K Fazlul Huq, had warned of approaching famine because of the government's scorched-earth policy in eastern and coastal Bengal, but he was deposed by the governor, John Herbert, for his refusal to toe the line on this and other issues (Huq 1944 : 15-16)[21]
  • August 1944 On August 14th, 1944 , Mr[1]
  • August 1944 186 In August he traveled to Delhi to discuss the particulars of the formula with Gandhi and it was reported to the Viceroy that he had left "much encouraged" by the plan[1]
  • August 1944 IV: 'The Bengal famine and the viceroyalty, 15 June 1943 –31 August 1944 ' (1973)[13]
  • August 1944 D714/67, draft of letter from Sir David Monteath to Sir John Woodhead, 10 August 1944 ; Linlithgow to Monteath, 12 August 1944 [23]
  • August 1944 , 156, Braund 1944 : 30; Amery 1988: 933 (entry for 4 August 1943 )[23]
  • September 1944 A small export to Bengal was allowed in 1944 by the Government of Madras, and in September 1944 , the Government ofBihar temporarily removed the ban on exportscomlast
  • September 1944 Accordingly, on leavmg Bengal on September 26th, We visited in succession Bombay City Walchandnagar Bi'a or where fami he oocurredcomm1
  • September 1944 On September 7, 1944 , Government issued a fresh Ordinance embodying the provisions of the Billcomm150-175
  • September 1944 Out of these only a §mall proportion were disposed of during the period of the first Ordinance and In September 1944 the number of pending cases was 6,498comm150-175
  • September 1944 At the end of' September a senior IIARIHDD8-001362
  • September 1944 By September 1944 some 1,850 tons of processed milk had been supplied to BengalIARIHDD8-001362
  • September 1944 The qnantities of evaporated and dried milk distributed in Bengal monthl)j from September 1943 to June 1944 were as follows:- Oaloutta Moju8a1lIARIHDD8-001362
  • September 1944 On September 7IARIHDD8-001362
  • September 1944 Out or these only a small proportion were disposed of during the period of the nrst Ordinance and in September 1944 tbe number of pending oases was 6,498, The disposal of these" and of furtber cases which may be filed, will place a beavy burden on District Officers and their staffIARIHDD8-001362
  • September 1944 A small export to Bengal was allowed in 1944 by the Government of Madms, and i,l1 September 1944 , t~e Government of ;Bihartemporarily removed the bun on exportsIARIHDD8-001362
  • September 1944 On the 1st September 1944 the amount, 3,194 IARIHDD8-001362
  • September 1944 crop harvested in August and September providing 24 % and the boro[15]
  • September 1944 This might mean that the farmers who harvested in September could not buy back the food they had sold[15]
  • September 1944 One may question whether the marketed December crop was expected to last until September, and whether the September crop was expected to last only until the next December crop was harvested (with the delays described elsewhere)[15]
  • September 1944 It is more likely that in some areas the December crop was marketed all the year, while in the areas where a September crop was grown this crop was marketed for much or most of the year[15]
  • September 1944 so, it further limits the possibility that the September crop could have been expected to break the famine[15]
  • September 1944 Martin was appointed relief commissioner on September 27, 1943 , in order to inspect, supervise, and coordinate relief work in the districts (GBR 1944 :15)[18]
  • September 1944 A steady grain supply to Midnapore was not restored until September 1943 , by which month Contai was again partially submerged, this time a victim of the flooding of the Subarnarekha river (GBR 1944 :35-36)[18]
  • September 1944 "Further Information Desired by the Commission on 3 September 1944 [18]
  • September 1944 The famine was the most widespread in Bengal from September to December 1943 , but its aftershocks continued until the end of 1944 [10]
  • September 1944 As conditions were found in many ways similar to those in Bengal, it was possible to organize a full-scale provincial crop survey in Bihar covering about 70,000 square miles in the next crop season extending from July to September 1944 [5]
  • September 1944 , Director of Relief and Rehabilitation, a letter dated 25 March 1946 in which he pointed out that the order of 14 July 1944 sanctioning the grant had "embodied the request that the results of the enquiry be reported to Government not later than the 30th September 1944 "[6]
  • September 1944 The date 30th September 1944 had been mentioned by us on the assumption that full scale field work would be started in May and completed by July[6]
  • September 1944 After that, relief works were virtually closed while gratuitous relief, though diminished, continued in response to rising mortality until September[19]
  • September 1944 ^ Cholera deaths peaked in September, which usually marks the end of the monsoon; fever mortality rose steeply in September and peaked in November (see Figure 2[19]
  • September 1944 ^® Dyson cites Ramakrishnan's suggestion that the occurrence of extremely high malaria mortality during late 1943 and early 1944 followed the establishment of "feeding arrangements" in September of 1943 , and may have been due to the fact that latent malarial infections amongst the undernourished population became manifest and fatal only after some improvement in the level of nutrition from extremely low levels[19]
  • September 1944 Consequently we have used the Calcutta prices up to September of 1943 , and we have then plotted Pinnell's provincial averages until October of 1944 (see Figure 5[19]
  • September 1944 September 12[19]
  • September 1944 FC(E)/10, dated 8th September 1944 "; column (4): Government of India, Department of Commercial Intelligence and Statistics, Monthly Statement of Wholesale Prices of Certain selected Articles at various centres in India[19]
  • September 1944 Instead, the Prime Minister, in direct consultation with his War Transport Minister, used the authority within his mandate and issued an executive order for arrangements to be made for the delivery of an additional 200,000 tons of food grains to India by September of 1944 [1]
  • September 1944 Barman, of the Calcutta Corporation, also explained to the Commission excitedly on September 13, 1944 , "there are yet famine deaths[1]
  • September 1944 176 Jinnah responded equivocally, and negotiations with Gandhi were planned for September of 1944 [1]
  • September 1944 Noteworthy features of the famine's demography include a significant drop in conceptions that coincided with the peak in deaths in September–November 1943 , the persistence of excess mortality well into 1944 , and the importance of malaria as a cause of death[13]
  • September 1944 A striking feature of conditions in the Netherlands before the Hungerwinter of 1944 -45 is that despite the high population density and the non-availability of imports, the Dutch fared relatively well in terms of food and well being until September 1944 [17]
  • September 1944 "The McAlpin Capers", Economicand Political Weekly, September 1, 1990[31]
  • September 1944 the log books of the Sriniketan farm and the Sriniketan dairy, are still available for certain parts of the period, and using these it has been possible to obtain the local daily wage rate for male unskilled labour from September 1942 to January 1944 [7]
  • September 1944 They concluded that "the epiphytotic year 1942 was different from the nonepiphytotic years of 1941 , 1943 , and 1944 in (a) unusually heavy rainfall in September, (b) unusual and prolonged cloudy weather in November, with very low sunshine hours and occasional rains, (c) higher minimum temperatures than normal …" Their sources also included studies of[8]
  • October 1944 Large quantities of wheat and rice started arriving in Calcutta on Gov- ernment account from other parts of India in August and October 1948 respectively and the Provincial Government were assured of adequate supplies of both wheat and rice from the beginning of Octobercomm-92ff
  • October 1944 a scheme of monopoly of purchase and distribution was introduced in the dist riot in October 1944 comm150-175
  • October 1944 From October 1942 to March 1944 , RsIARIHDD8-001362
  • October 1944 Large quantities-of w~at and rice started arriving in Calcutta Oll Go"\'· ernment account £rom other parts of India in August and October 1\)41) respectively and the Provincial Gove~n~nt :were assured of adequate sUPlJ~ies of both wheat and rice £rom the begmmng of OctoberIARIHDD8-001362
  • October 1944 By October 1944 the number of inoculations and vaccinations reported had reached 18 and 32 rqIARIHDD8-001362
  • October 1944 During the period December 1942 to October 1943 , the purchases made by these officers amounted to 721,000 tons, and during the ten months from November 1943 to August 1944 , to 700,000 --tonsIARIHDD8-001362
  • October 1944 The Ma~ras Government have not been able to supply rice to' the full extent of the needs of the district and in order to ensure a satisfactory distribution of t]1e total supplies a,ailable from internal and external sources, a scheme of monopoly of purchase and distribution was introduced b the district in October 1944 IARIHDD8-001362
  • October 1944 After some delay two wagon-loads of cutch 'were obtained from BareiUy in October, 1944 IARIHDD8-001362
  • October 1944 The District Magistrate who had authority to release stocks for local consumption did not find it necessary to do so except for small quantities in October and November, 2,400 maunds in December 1943 and about 12,000 maunds in January and February 1944 IARIHDD8-001362
  • October 1944 But when people continued to migrate despite the kitchens, policy changed, and on October 25 the Revenue Department set out the guidelines for the establishment of workhouses (GBR 1944 :12)[18]
  • October 1944 74,274,128 were spent by government on direct relief between October 1942 and March 1944 , excluding losses on grain sold below cost (GBR 1944 :14)[18]
  • October 1944 By mid-October 1,163 relief kitchens feeding nearly half a million people were reported to be operating (GBR 1944 :2-4), but the organization of the kitchens at short notice was difficult in the coastal region, resulting in a long and debilitating transition period (Bell 1943 :Sept[18]
  • October 1944 The Revenue Department decided in late October 1943 that the extent of famine migration in the province was so great that poorhouses would have to be established (GBR 1944 :12)[18]
  • October 1944 From the Midnapore cyclone of October 1942 to the winding down of the relief operations in 1944 , the government of Bengal was shot through with conflict between the governor and the chief minister, among ministers, and between ministers and their department heads (Nanavati 1944 :449)[18]
  • October 1944 The date for the commencement of this scheme was set as 1 October 1943 and the government intended to continue it for five more years (Modern Review 1944 b: 168)[10]
  • October 1944 In the next survey in the main winter rice season from October to December 1944 the Bihar crop survey was, however, fully organized[5]
  • October 1944 1 October 17th 2,588 4 0 4175 133-35 29 55 2 November 2nd 14,361 22-3 752 135-37 30-65 3-72 3 ,, 11th 19,813 30-8 545 140-70[5]
  • October 1944 ^ Greenough notes that epidemic cholera, smallpox and malaria became prevalent between October 1943 and April 1944 [19]
  • October 1944 However, fortunately, a monthly series of provincial average prices of coarse rice from July 1943 until October 1944 has been found in the personal papers of L[19]
  • October 1944 Consequently we have used the Calcutta prices up to September of 1943 , and we have then plotted Pinnell's provincial averages until October of 1944 (see Figure 5[19]
  • October 1944 Monthly sanctioned money on three relief heads Bengal October 1942 -March 1944 sanctioned money(Rs)[19]
  • October 1944 6 provides district-wise data on CDRs during the main twelve month period of elevated mortality, CBRs during 1944 , changes (proportional) in the harvest price of, and cultivated area under, (winter) rice in 1942 -43, and also statistics on gratuitous relief during the period October 1942 -March 1944 [19]
  • October 1944 The maximum MI occurred in October of 1943 , while the main famine mortality peak was roughly of 1 2 months duration; July 1943 to June 1944 [19]
  • October 1944 "82 Even in mid- October, when describing the crisis as "unprecedented famine," he still added a plea to cultivators and traders to release stocks for public consumption, prompting the Statesman to muse that "many will certainly disbelieve" his forecast that prices were bound to fall[23]
  • October 1944 "Millionaire 'Grain Barons' Hoarding Supplies in Sudan", The Guardian Weekly, October 20, 1985, 133, pp: 8[31]
  • October 1944 Contact Date for paper October 1996 P[31]
  • November 1944 7v The turning In November His is the tragedy which we are called e areas, and the straight- The causes of the Bengal 1 The word " destitute " was victimscomm1
  • November 1944 to 15, and during the ten months from November 1943 to August 1944 , to 700,000 tonscomm150-175
  • November 1944 The figures for rice and millets represented the quantities to be moved between the Is~ December 1942 and the 30th November 1943 , while the corresponding period for wheat and gram was the 1st April 1943 to the 31st March 1944 IARIHDD8-001362
  • November 1944 On November 11th the Revenue Secretary was appointed as Additional Commissioner Ot the Division concerned, to direct and co-ordinate reliefIARIHDD8-001362
  • November 1944 In November H)43 ll1i1itary l;ledical resources were placed at Ihe disposal ot BengalIARIHDD8-001362
  • November 1944 Up :to November 1944 , 25,551 and 203, 702 pa~ents were admitted to 'famine hospi'tials and wards in CalcuttaIARIHDD8-001362
  • November 1944 During the period December 1942 to October 1943 , the purchases made by these officers amounted to 721,000 tons, and during the ten months from November 1943 to August 1944 , to 700,000 --tonsIARIHDD8-001362
  • November 1944 Up to November 1944 IARIHDD8-001362
  • November 1944 The District Magistrate who had authority to release stocks for local consumption did not find it necessary to do so except for small quantities in October and November, 2,400 maunds in December 1943 and about 12,000 maunds in January and February 1944 IARIHDD8-001362
  • November 1944 61 Kenyan shillings per kilo between January and November 1984, the standard deviation increased from 0ogradac_article_pub_063
  • November 1944 Phase I: January, 1942 to March, 1943 , Phase II: March, 1943 to November, 1943 , and Phase III: November, 1943 to most of 1944 __lecturenotesfamine
  • November 1944 By15November 1944 , this military assistance had allowed the civilian authorities to open 582 new hospitals, 195 mobile medical units and 1352 'satellite medical centres'[14]
  • November 1944 crop, harvested in November or December, provides 74 % of the rice supply, with the upland aus[15]
  • November 1944 However, epidemics now took over as the main killer, and as many people died between November 1943 and July 1944 as in the previous period[15]
  • November 1944 When work and food became available in the districts in early November, the destitute left Calcutta (Martin n[18]
  • November 1944 1 October 17th 2,588 4 0 4175 133-35 29 55 2 November 2nd 14,361 22-3 752 135-37 30-65 3-72 3 ,, 11th 19,813 30-8 545 140-70[5]
  • November 1944 The position had been expl ained to Government in November 1944 but our difficulty was apparently not fully realised[6]
  • November 1944 Given the employment losses and high prices from the beginning of the kharif season (June) , the very scant start of relief in November may well be considered as late (see Figure 2[19]
  • November 1944 in June was followed by bowel-complaints deaths peak in August, which was followed by fever deaths peak in November (see Figure 2[19]
  • November 1944 Prices began to fall during the second half of the year and by November the relief operations were withdrawn[19]
  • November 1944 ^ Cholera deaths peaked in September, which usually marks the end of the monsoon; fever mortality rose steeply in September and peaked in November (see Figure 2[19]
  • November 1944 Smallpox deaths began to rise somewhat later - from around November - and peaked in April of 1944 [19]
  • November 1944 It seems that the major mortality peak around November of 1944 was due to fresh outbreaks of epidemic diseases[19]
  • November 1944 Moreover, two cholera mortality peaks (of almost the same magnitude) occurred in the month of November in both 1943 and 1944 [19]
  • November 1944 189 Janayuddha, "Chauler Dar," November 22, 1944[1]
  • November 1944 Malaria hit its peak in November 1944 , with as many as 51[1]
  • November 1944 61 Kenyan shillings per kilo between January and November 1984, the standard deviation increased from 0[16]
  • November 1944 Noteworthy features of the famine's demography include a significant drop in conceptions that coincided with the peak in deaths in September–November 1943 , the persistence of excess mortality well into 1944 , and the importance of malaria as a cause of death[13]
  • November 1944 Sintim-Aboagye 38526 November 1996 M[31]
  • November 1944 Pateha 39515 November 1996 T[31]
  • November 1944 Ishibe 38968 November 1996 S[31]
  • November 1944 Crow 30763 November 1996 J[31]
  • November 1944 Queen 33740 November 1996 N[31]
  • November 1944 Castillo 33490 November 1996 C[31]
  • November 1944 November 1996 P[31]
  • November 1944 Sader 33902 November 1996 P[31]
  • November 1944 Sintim-Aboagye 37644 November 1996 A[31]
  • November 1944 Phase I : from the beginning of 1942 to March 1943 ; Phase II: from March 1943 to November 1943 ; Phase III: from November 1943 through most of 1944 [7]
  • November 1944 They concluded that "the epiphytotic year 1942 was different from the nonepiphytotic years of 1941 , 1943 , and 1944 in (a) unusually heavy rainfall in September, (b) unusual and prolonged cloudy weather in November, with very low sunshine hours and occasional rains, (c) higher minimum temperatures than normal …" Their sources also included studies of[8]
  • December 1944 With the reaping of the aman crop in December and the arrival and distribution of supplies from outside the province during the closing months of the year, the famine was relieved, but the death rate remained high throughout the greater part of 1944 comm1
  • December 1944 The malaria season in Bengal normally extends from July to Decembercomm100-150
  • December 1944 reaching its peak in December and continuing in 1944 comm100-150
  • December 1944 tbe amlIn crop in December and the arrivlll ano distribution 0f sP'PpliE's fr?m out~jde th& province during the closing months of the year, the bmine w~s relieved, but the death rate remained liigh throll~hout 'the greatflr :part of 1944 IARIHDD8-001362
  • December 1944 The figures for rice and millets represented the quantities to be moved between the Is~ December 1942 and the 30th November 1943 , while the corresponding period for wheat and gram was the 1st April 1943 to the 31st March 1944 IARIHDD8-001362
  • December 1944 re the famine began a few weeks later than in Chittagong, the peak in mortality was not reached until December, when the number of deaths was 272 pE'llIARIHDD8-001362
  • December 1944 The malaria season in Bengal );lOrmally extends from July to DecemberIARIHDD8-001362
  • December 1944 A severe and widespread epidemic, begmning in June, occurred during the latter half of 1943 , reaching its peak in December and continuing in 1944 IARIHDD8-001362
  • December 1944 A severe epidemic, however, began in December 1943 and raged during the first half of 1944 , reaching its peak in March and AprilIARIHDD8-001362
  • December 1944 The aman crop reaped in December 1944 , was nouIARIHDD8-001362
  • December 1944 During the period December 1942 to October 1943 , the purchases made by these officers amounted to 721,000 tons, and during the ten months from November 1943 to August 1944 , to 700,000 --tonsIARIHDD8-001362
  • December 1944 The District Magistrate who had authority to release stocks for local consumption did not find it necessary to do so except for small quantities in October and November, 2,400 maunds in December 1943 and about 12,000 maunds in January and February 1944 IARIHDD8-001362
  • December 1944 6-4-0 a maund towards the end ofDecember the off-take was poor, the reason being that the aman crop had been reapedIARIHDD8-001362
  • December 1944 FC (N)J31-3 of the 24th December 1944 regarding paragraph 29 ofthis department's memorandum on the famine of 1943 and the measures taken in relation thereto 'IIARIHDD8-001362
  • December 1944 Although Bengal produced a record rice harvest in December 1943 , continuing problems of distribution and epidemics stalking a famine-ravaged land ensured that the death rate was even higher through most of the year 1944 than it had been in the phase of acute starvation[3]
  • December 1944 crop, harvested in November or December, provides 74 % of the rice supply, with the upland aus[15]
  • December 1944 After the excellent December 1944 crop was harvested, and the famine was over,[15]
  • December 1944 Possibly, too, there was some realization that if the December 1943 crop was only moderately bad, the famine would continue into 1944 [15]
  • December 1944 One may question whether the marketed December crop was expected to last until September, and whether the September crop was expected to last only until the next December crop was harvested (with the delays described elsewhere)[15]
  • December 1944 It is more likely that in some areas the December crop was marketed all the year, while in the areas where a September crop was grown this crop was marketed for much or most of the year[15]
  • December 1944 The famine was the most widespread in Bengal from September to December 1943 , but its aftershocks continued until the end of 1944 [10]
  • December 1944 ——— ( 1944 b), July–December[10]
  • December 1944 The malaria season in Bengal was from July to December[12]
  • December 1944 The usual mortality peak in December also reflected other factors including seasonality of births[12]
  • December 1944 In the next survey in the main winter rice season from October to December 1944 the Bihar crop survey was, however, fully organized[5]
  • December 1944 The signs of famine became visible about July 1942 , and its worst effects in the form of epidemics continued until December, 1944 [19]
  • December 1944 The number of deaths from malaria declined during the first five months of 1944 , and then rose to a second peak in December[19]
  • December 1944 Interestingly, in December 1944 there was again a major and sharp peak in dysentery/diarrhoea deaths, which coincided with the malarial peak[19]
  • December 1944 Mortality from malaria and fever, though declining from its peak in December 1943 continued to be elevated well into 1944 [19]
  • December 1944 mortality from these causes (except smallpox) from the middle of 1944 ; and peak mortality from cholera, dysentery and diarrhoea occurred about a month before the peak in fever- mortality (in December 1944 )[19]
  • December 1944 Over one month has elapsed since the air raid on December 5th, and in the vicinity of our factory on Hide Road [Kidderpore], the only repairs which have been carried out appear to be those undertaken by the Calcutta Electric Supply Co[1]
  • December 1944 " Official medical relief had begun only in December, and remained grossly inadequate[1]
  • December 1944 In December, Army relief headquarters were fielding cries of distress from several districts "saying that people were dying, not on account of lack of food, but on account of the weather because they had nothing to put[1]
  • December 1944 The Viceroy wrote a sharp telegram to London in the last week of December, warning them that the import of 1[1]
  • December 1944 188 The Statesman, "Cholera and Smallpox Threaten 97 Towns," December 14[1]
  • December 1944 190 The Statesman, "Governor Horrified by Living Conditions," December 5, 1944[1]
  • December 1944 Governor Casey toured the slums of the city in December of 1944 and was shocked: "I have seen something of the way that hundreds of thousands of the citizens of Calcutta are obliged to live," he reported, "[and] I have been horrified by what I have seen[1]
  • December 1944 147 DDRA is the increase in the death rate in July 1943 –June 1944 ; DDRB also includes excess deaths in July–December 1944 [23]
  • December 1944 Kitson-Walters 33712 December 1996 S[31]
  • December 1944 Vivas 82809 December 1996 K[31]
  • December 1944 Schrader 82736 December 1996 P[31]
  • December 1944 Sintim-Aboagye 38526 December 1996 S[31]
  • December 1944 WPS1694 What Can New Survey Data Tell Us Martin Ravallion December 1996 ,-A r> about Recent Changes in Distribution Shaohua Chen 357:3J; and Poverty?[31]
  • December 1944 After much reluctance, from December 1943 to February 1944 Travancore introduced rationing for the entire country[8]
  • January 1945 Au the beginning of January 1945 the schemeIARIHDD8-001362
  • January 1945 , dated the 3rd January 1945 IARIHDD8-001362
  • January 1945 39 Most secret Weekly Intelligence Summaries (India Internal), 19 February 1943 ,27 August 1943 ,22 October 1943 , 12 January 1945 and 22 June 1945 , LIWS1I1I506, Oriental and India Office Collections, British Library, London, UK[14]
  • January 1945 31-28 3-74 4 ,, 18th 25,934 40-4 417 141-71 30-31 3-94 5 ,, 26th 32,312 50-3 334 140-89 29-77 3-87 6 December 4th 38,818 60-4 278 139-46 29-78 4-01 7 ,, 12th 45,006 70-0 240 138-72 30-40 4-03 8 ,, 21st 51,502 80-1 210 140-05 29-63 4-06 9 January 12th, 1945 64,260 100-0 168 136-50 29-03 3-97 1-12 (Total area covered = 432 23) proportion- 31-58%/ 6-72% [5]
  • January 1945 (Read before the Royal Statistical Society, January 23rd, 1945 [5]
  • January 1945 3 presents district-wise percentage rises in deaths for the six half yearly sub-periods between January 1943 and December 1945 [19]
  • January 1945 3 Inter-district variation in mortality rise in the period between January 1943 and December 1945 Bengal[19]
  • January 1945 4 Rank correlation coefficients (Spearman) matrix for the districts in terms of proportional mortality increases in the six half-yearly sub-periods between January 1943 and December 1945 [19]
  • January 1945 328 (7430): 11 (January 3rd)[17]
  • February 1945 39 Most secret Weekly Intelligence Summaries (India Internal), 19 February 1943 ,27 August 1943 ,22 October 1943 , 12 January 1945 and 22 June 1945 , LIWS1I1I506, Oriental and India Office Collections, British Library, London, UK[14]
  • February 1945 There was however a delay of two months in sanctioning the grant which completely upset the time programme, and the field survey had to be extended from the end of July 1944 to early February 1945 [6]
  • February 1945 Owing to these diffi culties the field work had to be extended from the originally contemplated period of three months (May to July) to a little over six months from the end of July to the beginning of February, 1945 [6]
  • February 1945 the field enquiry was completed by the beginning of February 1945 , but the publication of the report has been delayed by more than one year[6]
  • February 1945 Specimen reports for two subdivisions (Tamluk in Midnapore district and Tangail in Mymensingh district) were submitted to the Government of Bengal on 22 February and 7 March 1945 respectively^ (immediately after the completion of the field work) with a request for instructions regarding the form for future tabulations[6]
  • February 1945 There are three rice crops in Bengal: (a) aman, sown in May and June, harvested in November and December (the winter crop), (b) aus, sown around April and harvested in August and September (the autumn crop), and (c) boro, planted in November and harvested in February and March (the spring crop)[7]
  • March 1945 XLV (March 2007) 0ar 5 10 15 20 25 30 35Average 0 0ogradac_article_pub_063
  • March 1945 XLV (March 2007)ogradac_article_pub_063
  • March 1945 The Bengal and Assam Railway comprised 3485 miles on 31 March 1945 [2]
  • March 1945 Fisher's crop-cutting work on wheat at Rothamsted was influenced by that of Hubback, as stated by Fisher in a memorandum on crop estimating surveys submitted by him to the Imperial Council of Agricultural Research in India on March 2nd, 1945 [5]
  • March 1945 in March 1945 [5]
  • March 1945 Specimen reports for two subdivisions (Tamluk in Midnapore district and Tangail in Mymensingh district) were submitted to the Government of Bengal on 22 February and 7 March 1945 respectively^ (immediately after the completion of the field work) with a request for instructions regarding the form for future tabulations[6]
  • March 1945 On the 1st of March 1945 , after 13 months on the job as Governor, he drafted a frank and gloomy report to the Viceroy[1]
  • March 1945 The end came on March 28, 1945 , two years to the day after Fazlul Huq had been unceremoniously removed from power[1]
  • March 1945 196 Negotiations between the parties broke down, however, and on the 28th of March a trap was laid for the Nazimuddin by the opposition in concert with Suhrawardy loyalists[1]
  • March 1945 They retreated to Mandalay in Burma, which in turn fell to Allied advance in March of 1945 [1]
  • March 1945 XLV (March 2007) 35-, 0[16]
  • March 1945 XLV (March 2007) Dyson, Tim[16]
  • March 1945 There are three rice crops in Bengal: (a) aman, sown in May and June, harvested in November and December (the winter crop), (b) aus, sown around April and harvested in August and September (the autumn crop), and (c) boro, planted in November and harvested in February and March (the spring crop)[7]
  • March 1945 The wages, however, are given for financial years (April March), while food prices refer to calendar years[7]
  • April 1945 GopALASWAMI, Secretary New Delhi, the 10th April 1945 * Signed subject to separate minutecomlast
  • April 1945 Under the Revised Basic Plan nearly 62,000 tons were received in Bengal and the quantity allotted for the-period May 1944 to April 1945 is 38,000 tonscomm150-175
  • April 1945 Under the Eevised Basic Plan nearly 62,000 tons were received in Bengal and" the quantity allotted for the period ;May 1944 to April 1945 ' is 38,000 tonsIARIHDD8-001362
  • April 1945 Under the Revised Basic Plan, Bengal was allotted, in April 1944 , a qnota of 70,050 tons of pulses other than gram for the period November 1943 to April 1945 IARIHDD8-001362
  • April 1945 New Delhi, the 10th April 1945IARIHDD8-001362
  • April 1945 Chattopadhyay on 18 April 1945 [6]
  • April 1945 But popular memory of the war is heavily conditioned by events in the western Netherlands in eight months or so before liberation in April-May 1945 [17]
  • April 1945 The wages, however, are given for financial years (April March), while food prices refer to calendar years[7]
  • April 1945 World food and agriculture situation—April 1976, Monthly Bulletin of Agricultural Economics and Statistics, Food and Agriculture Organisation, United Nations, vol[7]
  • June 1945 39 Most secret Weekly Intelligence Summaries (India Internal), 19 February 1943 ,27 August 1943 ,22 October 1943 , 12 January 1945 and 22 June 1945 , LIWS1I1I506, Oriental and India Office Collections, British Library, London, UK[14]
  • June 1945 By this criterion the main famine death peak began in June of that year and lasted until the same month in 1945 [12]
  • June 1945 The above projects were sanctioned on the recommendations of the Population Data Com- mittee which was appointed by the Government of India in May, 1944 , and which submitted its report in June 1945 [5]
  • June 1945 In accordance with the suggestions made in the course of this discussion a full note on destitution (comprising practically chapter 3 of the present report) was submitted to Government on 8 June 1945 with a statement that over Rs[6]
  • June 1945 7 ] SANKHY? : THE INDIAN JOURNAL OF STATISTICS [ Part 4 proceed with the work, the Relief Department did not inform us until after 41 weeks (from S June 1945 to 25 March 1946 ) that the present enquiry was not considered deserving of further financial support from the Government of Bengal[6]
  • June 1945 the period July 1966 to June 1967 inclusive) was only 48 per cent of that of the normal year 1963-64[19]
  • June 1945 The Congress Working Committee was released from detention on June 15, and a conference was scheduled at Simla towards the end of the month[1]
  • June 1945 There are three rice crops in Bengal: (a) aman, sown in May and June, harvested in November and December (the winter crop), (b) aus, sown around April and harvested in August and September (the autumn crop), and (c) boro, planted in November and harvested in February and March (the spring crop)[7]
  • July 1945 During July 1943 all provision for relief was slashed, ostensibly because agricultural operations were demanding labor (FIC 1945 :69)[18]
  • July 1945 Tim Dyson, 'On the Demography of South Asian Famines, part II', Population Studies, 45(2) ( July 1991): 279–97[2]
  • July 1945 There was however a delay of two months in sanctioning the grant which completely upset the time programme, and the field survey had to be extended from the end of July 1944 to early February 1945 [6]
  • July 1945 Owing to these diffi culties the field work had to be extended from the originally contemplated period of three months (May to July) to a little over six months from the end of July to the beginning of February, 1945 [6]
  • July 1945 July to December inclusive) with the numbers registered during the same months in the previous years: Year Registered deaths Year Registered deaths 1940 605,619 1943 1,332,209 1941 585,708 1944 735,943 1942 680,658 1945 565,933 It is perhaps relevant to remark that the population in mid- 1941 was of similar size to that in mid- 1945 (see Table 5[19]
  • July 1945 mortality increases in July-Dee 1944 also tended to experience relatively great mortality increases during July-December 1945 [19]
  • July 1945 the period July 1966 to June 1967 inclusive) was only 48 per cent of that of the normal year 1963-64[19]
  • July 1945 With the war in Europe now over and elections in Britain scheduled for July of 1945 , however, the Prime Minister gave the Viceroy permission to revive negotiations[1]
  • July 1945 D714/67, letter from Woodhead to Sir David Monteath, Assistant Director, India Office, Whitehall, 10 July 1945 ; Aykroyd, Conquest of famine, pp[13]
  • July 1945 45 The details are described in O´ Gra´da 2008; see, in particular, IOL, D714/67, letter from Woodhead to Sir David Monteath, Assistant Director, India Office, Whitehall, 10 July 1945 ; Aykroyd 1974: 70–1, 74[23]
  • August 1945 39 Most secret Weekly Intelligence Summaries (India Internal), 19 February 1943 ,27 August 1943 ,22 October 1943 , 12 January 1945 and 22 June 1945 , LIWS1I1I506, Oriental and India Office Collections, British Library, London, UK[14]
  • August 1945 3 (August 1988):542-67[18]
  • August 1945 ^ in the following two months official relief expenditure declined; but it rose abruptly in August when the largest sum allotted was for gratuitous relief, and test " The relief measures, especially the test works, during this period were inefficient, and entailed considerable wastage of money; see Famine Inquiry Commission ( 1945 a), p[19]
  • August 1945 during August-October)[19]
  • August 1945 176 (August 2002) pp[1]
  • August 1945 2 Kamtekar (August 2002), p[1]
  • August 1945 Wavell traveled to London towards the end of August, and though he found the leadership in the newly formulated India Office "obviously bent on handing over India to their Congress friends as soon as possible,"[1]
  • August 1945 The monsoon rains in 1945 , however, had failed; drought conditions were prevailing in most districts, and by August fears were rising that Bengal was facing imminent starvation on a large scale once again[1]
  • August 1945 204 Casey's Diary, August 8, 1945[1]
  • August 1945 In August of 1945 Fazlul Huq was on the stump at Calcutta University, thrashing the Muslim League and warning that their policies imperiled Bengal with the threat of an even greater famine than the "last[1]
  • August 1945 This police blotter of August 16th in Howrah raises some interesting questions as to the motivations of the crowds and the nature of the looting that transpired[1]
  • August 1945 Later Amery mentioned an estimate of eight thousand as the number of famine-related deaths in Calcutta between mid-August and mid-October[17]
  • August 1945 7 per 1,000) as for those born between August and October 1945 [17]
  • August 1945 There are three rice crops in Bengal: (a) aman, sown in May and June, harvested in November and December (the winter crop), (b) aus, sown around April and harvested in August and September (the autumn crop), and (c) boro, planted in November and harvested in February and March (the spring crop)[7]
  • September 1945 September 1945 [27]
  • September 1945 An appraisal of the motives behind Soviet policy in east? ern Europe appears in the results of a Fortune survey in September 1945 [27]
  • September 1945 Until September this strategy failed because of its inability to impress on the central government the extent of Bengal's needs, and the Government of Punjab's reluctance to bring pressure on farmers to sell wheat at prices much lower than those prevailing in Bengal (Mansergh and Lumbey 1973:178-80)[18]
  • September 1945 Moreover, malaria infection and mortality does not seem to have been suppressed before the start of the supposed improvement in nutrition in September[19]
  • September 1945 And this timing of peak mortality (in September 1973) exactly coincides with the Figure 7[19]
  • September 1945 208 WBSA, Home Political, "Confidential Report on the Political Situation in Bengal, Second Half of September, 1945 ," File W-37/45[1]
  • September 1945 222 WBSA, Home Political, file W-37/45 "Confidential Report on the Political Situation in Bengal: Second Half of September, 1945 "[1]
  • September 1945 221 By September the Chief Secretary was reporting "appreciable demand for rice from Government stocks for the districts[1]
  • September 1945 In September 2004 UN agencies warned of a famine in Bangladesh within three months: 'A million children face acute illness or death within weeks, UN agencies warn'[17]
  • September 1945 asp?submissionId=40032, September 2005)[17]
  • October 1945 39 Most secret Weekly Intelligence Summaries (India Internal), 19 February 1943 ,27 August 1943 ,22 October 1943 , 12 January 1945 and 22 June 1945 , LIWS1I1I506, Oriental and India Office Collections, British Library, London, UK[14]
  • October 1945 proportional excess mortality peaked in October (see Figure 5[19]
  • October 1945 during August-October)[19]
  • October 1945 221 WBSA, Home Political, file W-37/45 "Confidential Report on the Political Situation in Bengal: First Half of October, 1945 "[1]
  • October 1945 Later Amery mentioned an estimate of eight thousand as the number of famine-related deaths in Calcutta between mid-August and mid-October[17]
  • October 1945 7 per 1,000) as for those born between August and October 1945 [17]
  • November 1945 Under the Revised Basic Plan, Bengal was allotted, in April 1944 , a qnota of 70,050 tons of pulses other than gram for the period November 1943 to April 1945 IARIHDD8-001362
  • November 1945 The Times, 3 November 1943 : 5; for the bhadralok's relative immunity from famine, see Indivar Kamtekar, 'A Different War Dance: State and Class in India 1939 – 1945 ', Past and Present, 176(1) (2002): 218 fn[2]
  • November 1945 Sowings of rice continue for a good length of time, possibly till the middle of November, depending on actual conditions of rainfall in different areas[5]
  • November 1945 Mookerjee's Speech," November 15, 1945[1]
  • November 1945 219 WBSA, Home Political, file W-37/45 "Confidential Report on the Political Situation in Bengal: First Half of November, 1945 "[1]
  • November 1945 220 See publication of Calcutta Rationing Order in Amrita Bazar Patrika, November 18, 1945 , p[1]
  • November 1945 223 WBSA, Home Political, file W-37/45 "Confidential Report on the Political Situation in Bengal: First Half of November, 1945 " (italics added)[1]
  • November 1945 But the direction of "relief" was reversed within a few short months, and by November, "steps [were being] taken to reinforce Calcutta's stocks by moving stocks from the districts[1]
  • November 1945 227 WBSA, Home Political, file W-37/45 "Confidential Report on the Political Situation in Bengal: Second Half of November, 1945 "[1]
  • November 1945 On the 21st of November 1945 - amidst such bad news from every quarter - Calcutta erupted into violence, the scale of which had not been witnessed in decades[1]
  • November 1945 235 The Calcutta Rationing Department issued a press release on the 24th of November[1]
  • November 1945 234 WBSA, Home Political, file W-37/45 "Confidential Report on the Political Situation in Bengal: Second Half of November, 1945 "[1]
  • November 1945 236 Amrita Bazar Patrika, "Calcutta Rationing," November 34, 1945[1]
  • November 1945 239 Amrita Bazar Patrika, "Carry Out Congress Directions," November 23, 1945[1]
  • November 1945 After several long years of colossal calamity, suffering and insecurity, and with the specter of acute food shortage again looming on the immediate horizon, the desperate measures that characterized the November disturbances in Calcutta can, and should, be understood as a revolution denied[1]
  • November 1945 The Hindus and Muslims stood as comrades in arms and no trace of mutual rancor between the communities was evident all through the November episode[1]
  • November 1945 The emergence of unified rebellion in November of 1945 is testimony to a sense of solidarity with which the population of Calcutta understood their highly uncertain collective fate[1]
  • November 1945 127 Casey's Diary, November 25, 1945 [1]
  • November 1945 128 Casey's Diary, November 24, 1945 [1]
  • November 1945 There are three rice crops in Bengal: (a) aman, sown in May and June, harvested in November and December (the winter crop), (b) aus, sown around April and harvested in August and September (the autumn crop), and (c) boro, planted in November and harvested in February and March (the spring crop)[7]
  • December 1945 28th December 1945 ~Hungermarches organized by communistsIARIHDD8-001362
  • December 1945 Debates on the role of violence, and the meaning of Gandhian ahimsa, are movingly brought to life in a request by two women to be allowed to play their part in the freedom struggle by carrying out assassinations; and in records of Gandhi's visit to Midnapore in December 1945 , when he came to hear witnesses speak about atrocities from both sides there, confessing at the end that he could not condemn the use of violence by the Tamluk governmentreview_Structural_Violence2
  • December 1945 If, however, one accepts the overwhelming evidence that the Bengal rice crop of December 1942 was 30% below normal, an amount equivalent to 25% of the marketed surplus of India as a whole (See Famine Inquiry Commission 1945 a,b, Goswami 1990) these facts are explained[15]
  • December 1945 38 More important, Sen and Greenough were evidently unaware that detailed monthly registration data for undivided Bengal were subsequently published up to December 1945 [12]
  • December 1945 31-28 3-74 4 ,, 18th 25,934 40-4 417 141-71 30-31 3-94 5 ,, 26th 32,312 50-3 334 140-89 29-77 3-87 6 December 4th 38,818 60-4 278 139-46 29-78 4-01 7 ,, 12th 45,006 70-0 240 138-72 30-40 4-03 8 ,, 21st 51,502 80-1 210 140-05 29-63 4-06 9 January 12th, 1945 64,260 100-0 168 136-50 29-03 3-97 1-12 (Total area covered = 432 23) proportion- 31-58%/ 6-72% [5]
  • December 1945 July to December inclusive) with the numbers registered during the same months in the previous years: Year Registered deaths Year Registered deaths 1940 605,619 1943 1,332,209 1941 585,708 1944 735,943 1942 680,658 1945 565,933 It is perhaps relevant to remark that the population in mid- 1941 was of similar size to that in mid- 1945 (see Table 5[19]
  • December 1945 However, relief expenditures by the Government declined drastically in December - the month in which the number of deaths reached its maximum[19]
  • December 1945 3 presents district-wise percentage rises in deaths for the six half yearly sub-periods between January 1943 and December 1945 [19]
  • December 1945 3 Inter-district variation in mortality rise in the period between January 1943 and December 1945 Bengal[19]
  • December 1945 4 Rank correlation coefficients (Spearman) matrix for the districts in terms of proportional mortality increases in the six half-yearly sub-periods between January 1943 and December 1945 [19]
  • December 1945 mortality increases in July-Dee 1944 also tended to experience relatively great mortality increases during July-December 1945 [19]
  • December 1945 41 WBSA, Home Confidential, Confidential Fortnightly Report on Bengal, Second Half December, 1945[1]
  • December 1945 63 WBSA, Home Political," Fortnightly Report first half of December 1945 "[1]
  • December 1945 65 WBSA, Home Political, "Fortnightly Report second half of December, 1945 "[1]
  • December 1945 68 WBSA, Home Political, "Fortnightly Report first half of December 1945 "[1]
  • December 1945 130 Casey's Diary, December 4, 1945 [1]
  • December 1945 There are three rice crops in Bengal: (a) aman, sown in May and June, harvested in November and December (the winter crop), (b) aus, sown around April and harvested in August and September (the autumn crop), and (c) boro, planted in November and harvested in February and March (the spring crop)[7]
  • January 1946 Calcutta, January 26[18]
  • January 1946 Mahalanobis, 'The Bengal Famine: the Background and Basic Facts', Asiatic Review, XLII ( January 1946 ): 315; see also APAC, Mss Eur 911/8, Pinnell Papers: 'Confidential Memorandum on the Economic Condition of Bengal Prior to the Famine of 1943 ', pp[2]
  • January 1946 , 'The Bengal Famine: the Background and Basic Facts', Asiatic Review, XLII ( January 1946 )[2]
  • January 1946 If my arithmetic is not wrong, it seems that the total acreage in or about January, if it had been estimated from this I9-3 per cent[5]
  • January 1946 But this can hardly be the explanation, for if it were, any similarity between the first estimate in October and the last in January could hardly be attributed to the merits of the sampling methods employed[5]
  • January 1946 1946 ] Discussion on Professor Mahalanobis's Paper 373 in January, or the total cropped acreage for the season; and how are any of these to be estimated from a sample drawn over a lengthy period? As for the remaining crops, estimate 8 for pulses is 2,963,ooo acres, as against 2,903,000 for estimate 9, and the sugar-cane estimates show similar intriguing differences[5]
  • January 1946 The Viceroy informed London on the first of January 1946 that the food situation in India was deteriorating still further[1]
  • January 1946 While the Agro-Economic Research Centre for East India (1960) gives wage data in Birbhum from January 1939 to December 1941 , and again from January 1946 , the data for the intermediate period are not presented[7]
  • January 1946 Data from the study by Mahalanobis, Mukherjea and Ghosh ( 1946 ) can be used to construct transition matrices in the pre-famine period (January 1939 to January 1943 ) as well as during the famine (January 1943 to May 1944 ), and these are presented in the Appendix (Tables 9 and 10)[7]
  • January 1946 Using the study by Mahalanobis, Mukherjea and Ghosh ( 1946 ), it is possible to construct occu pational 'transition matrices' in the immediate pre-famine period (between January 1939 and January 1943 ) and in the famine period (between January 1943 and May 1944 )[7]
  • February 1946 lletter dated thb 24th February, 1946 addressed to, • IARIHDD8-001362
  • February 1946 8 February 6[30]
  • February 1946 6 February 5[30]
  • February 1946 The seeds were kept under observation for one month during February and the tests were made under both ordinary atmospheric conditions and in the incubator at a temperature of 86º F[2]
  • February 1946 In February of 1946 , however, disturbances again broke out in Calcutta that mirrored the November model[1]
  • February 1946 249 The incoming Governor, Sir Fredrick Burrows, was scheduled to arrive in Calcutta on February 13th to assume Emergency Rule in Bengal, but Casey, himself eager to get away, telephoned the Viceroy to advise delay[1]
  • February 1946 "250 "The Almost Revolution"251 of February 1946 was the last of its kind in colonial Calcutta[1]
  • February 1946 251 Suranjan Das uses this term to describe the February disturbance in "The 1992 Calcutta Riot in Historical Continuum: A Relapse into 'Communal Fury'?"[1]
  • February 1946 In both November of 1945 and February of 1946 , as detailed in Chapter 6, there were massive and spontaneous anti-colonial uprisings in Calcutta which were put down with swift and comprehensive martial force[1]
  • February 1946 "130 The disturbances of February 1946 followed an extremely similar pattern, both in terms of the outbreak of popular unrest, and the responses that it elicited[1]
  • February 1946 129 "Sample Survey of Famine Districts," Statesman, 27 February 1944 ; Chattopadhyay and Mukherjee 1946 : 10; O´ Gra´da 2008; Das 2008[23]
  • March 1946 XLV (March 2007)ogradac_article_pub_063
  • March 1946 XLV (March 2007) mates— in December 1941 , at the height of the crisis, than in December 1940 , before the blockade began (Joseph Brojek, Samuel Wells, and Ancel Keys 1946 )ogradac_article_pub_063
  • March 1946 Sen gives as a cause of the famine the fact that from March to November, the demand for[15]
  • March 1946 Oxford, March 8[18]
  • March 1946 For a profile of the Shaw Wallace Company see 'The Varied Activities of Shaw Wallace', in the Bengal Chambers of Commerce Centenary Supplement, ABP, 24 March 1946 , 26[2]
  • March 1946 I WAS naturally gratified to receive in March 1946 an invitation to present a paper before the Royal I WAS naturally gratified to receive in March 1946 an invitation to present a paper before the Royal Statistical Society during my visit to London[5]
  • March 1946 The total rural population based on this portion of the material is found to be 50I6 millions, roughly as in March or April 1946 , with a calculated standard error of 5 26 millions[5]
  • March 1946 , Director of Relief and Rehabilitation, a letter dated 25 March 1946 in which he pointed out that the order of 14 July 1944 sanctioning the grant had "embodied the request that the results of the enquiry be reported to Government not later than the 30th September 1944 "[6]
  • March 1946 7 ] SANKHY? : THE INDIAN JOURNAL OF STATISTICS [ Part 4 proceed with the work, the Relief Department did not inform us until after 41 weeks (from S June 1945 to 25 March 1946 ) that the present enquiry was not considered deserving of further financial support from the Government of Bengal[6]
  • March 1946 Since this epidemic of dysentery and diarrhoea is likely to have greatly affected people in relief camps, the drastic fall in the number of persons on relief in March may partly have reflected this excess mortality (see Figure 3[19]
  • March 1946 258 From the Hindustan Times, March 3, 1946 , reprinted in T[1]
  • March 1946 The "Cabinet Mission" commenced its work in March of 1946 , and by May 16th had come up with a plan that one tentative agreement from both parties[1]
  • March 1946 XLV (March 2007) classic famine diseases in temperate cli mates?in December 1941 , at the height of the crisis, than in December 1940 , before the blockade began (Joseph Brojek, Samuel Wells, and Ancel Keys 1946 )[16]
  • April 1946 (6): Number of plough cattle owned in April 1944 Source: Mahalanobis, Mukherjea and Ghosh ( 1946 ) Similar observations can be made concerning the loss of plough cattle[30]
  • April 1946 I had collected some material for this purpose and had written certain portions of the paper when I was suddenly obliged to leave India at the end of April to attend a session of the United Nations Statistical Commission in New York[5]
  • April 1946 7, part 3, April 1946 , pp[5]
  • April 1946 The total rural population based on this portion of the material is found to be 50I6 millions, roughly as in March or April 1946 , with a calculated standard error of 5 26 millions[5]
  • April 1946 VII, Wavell to Henderson, April 24, 1946[1]
  • April 1946 VII, Henderson to Wavell, April 4, 1946[1]
  • June 1946 Owing to unforeseen difficulties and pressure of work in connection with the Royal Society and Empire Scientific Conferences in London in June and July, I had no time to finish the paper[5]
  • June 1946 7 ] SANKHY? : THE INDIAN JOURNAL OF STATISTICS [ Part 4 proceed with the work, the Relief Department did not inform us until after 41 weeks (from S June 1945 to 25 March 1946 ) that the present enquiry was not considered deserving of further financial support from the Government of Bengal[6]
  • June 1946 Since most of the rains of a calender year fall during June-September, the use of these two accounting definitions of a year does not cause much difficulty in our understanding here[19]
  • June 1946 However, the number of persons on relief stayed rather high until the beginning of the monsoon in June; at that time the resumption of both the rains and normal farm activity marked a drastic reduction in relief operations (especially relief works) [19]
  • June 1946 The numbers then peaked in June and subsequently declined with the resumption of the monsoon[19]
  • June 1946 **^ However, using newly found registration data for the whole of undivided Bengal, Dyson has shown that famine excess mortality began in June of 194 3 and lasted until This period of famine has sometimes been described as the "epidemic phase" as against the preceding "starvation phase"; see e[19]
  • June 1946 3) Years to which the above data relate end on 30th June[19]
  • June 1946 Further acrimony mounted in June as the Congress leadership became ever-more equivocal, with leading industrialists lobbying for a stronger central government that would guarantee their primacy[1]
  • June 1946 A Cabinet Mission statement was issued on June 16th granting both demands[1]
  • June 1946 The Muslim League argued that if Congress was unwilling to participate in the Interim Government proposed by the Cabinet Mission on June 16th, it was incumbent upon the Viceroy to move ahead with the formation of a provisional government without them[1]
  • June 1946 On June 26th the Viceroy announced that while constitutional negotiations would continue, the formation of an Interim Government would not be presently possible[1]
  • June 1946 On June 29th the Cabinet Mission left India[1]
  • June 1946 "271 Towards the end of June there were demonstrations in Calcutta, orchestrated by provincial Kisan Sabhas, demanding immediate arrangements for the movement of at least 200,000 tons of rice to distressed districts and the immediate constitution of a Food Advisory Council[1]
  • July 1946 'In the absence of masters, anthropology can only perish', The Asian age (Kolkata), 3 July: 13summary_Das_good2
  • July 1946 5 (July 1946 ) to 65[12]
  • July 1946 Proceedings of a Meeting of the Royal Statistical Society held on July 16th, 1946 Proceedings of a Meeting of the Royal Statistical Society held on July 16th, 1946[5]
  • July 1946 Owing to unforeseen difficulties and pressure of work in connection with the Royal Society and Empire Scientific Conferences in London in June and July, I had no time to finish the paper[5]
  • July 1946 , Director of Relief and Rehabilitation, a letter dated 25 March 1946 in which he pointed out that the order of 14 July 1944 sanctioning the grant had "embodied the request that the results of the enquiry be reported to Government not later than the 30th September 1944 "[6]
  • July 1946 With the arrival of the monsoon rains in July food prices tended to decline and the famine started to draw to a close[19]
  • July 1946 272 The Statesman, "Demonstration in Calcutta," July 1, 1946[1]
  • July 1946 273 The Statesman, "Food Advisory Committee," July 1, 1946[1]
  • July 1946 Famine Mission Arrives in Calcutta," July 2, 1946[1]
  • July 1946 Food Mission Ends Bengal Tour," July 4, 1946[1]
  • July 1946 277 The Statesman, "Rise in Calcutta Mortality," July 10, 1946[1]
  • July 1946 278 The Statesman, "India's Food Import Needs," July 18, 1946[1]
  • July 1946 279 The Statesman, "No Starvation in Bengal," July 26, 1946[1]
  • July 1946 276 On July 10 the Statesman reported that mortality rates in Calcutta had risen more than 15% over the previous week,277 and on the 16th of July the Government of India's Food Adviser warned that the rationing system in Bengal was highly "inefficient," and the province "might face famine," if markets were further destabilized by black-market forces and political intrigue[1]
  • July 1946 278 On July 25 Congress representatives tabled an adjournment in the Bengal Council that focused on the "acute distress prevailing in different parts of the province because of the government's failure to reduce prices and to maintain an adequate supply of rice[1]
  • July 1946 62 The postal workers union had resorted to a strike over dearness allowances and job security on July 11th, effectively cutting off Calcutta from the rest of India in the weeks preceding the riot[1]
  • August 1946 August Revolution and Two Years'N ational Governmenitn Midnapore[18]
  • August 1946 34 On the night of August 17th, 1946 the family house at Mommenpur was attacked, several of its inhabitants were killed, and the rest were dislocated for many long years to come[1]
  • August 1946 On the 16th of August, the day of the Muslim League's call for "Direct Action," unprecedented riots had broken out and the city had quickly descended into anarchy[1]
  • August 1946 23 Kamtekar (August 2002), p[1]
  • August 1946 25 Kamtekar (August 2002), p[1]
  • August 1946 283 The Statesman, "League Direct Action Programme Includes No-Tax Campaign," August 6, 1946[1]
  • August 1946 284 Sir Arthur Waugh interviewed the Muslim League Secretary, Liaquat Ali Khan on the 7th of August and reported that Khan said that "shedding of British and Muslim blood would be deplorable, but that it was better than slow strangulation[1]
  • August 1946 VII, Waugh to Abell, August 7, 1946 [1]
  • August 1946 2The Statesman, "Suhrawardy's Message for Direct Action Day," August 7, 1946[1]
  • August 1946 4 The Statesman, "Congress Party Walk-Out," August 13, 1946[1]
  • August 1946 On the 7th of August, Bengal Chief Minister, H[1]
  • August 1946 5 The leader of the Bengal Congress, Surendra Mohan Ghosh, urged "the public to perform their normal duties on August 16th," and a movement to thwart the League's hartal took hold[1]
  • August 1946 5 The Statesman, "Protest Resolution Adopted," August 15, 1946[1]
  • August 1946 Nothing approaching the carnage that had taken place in Calcutta between the 16th and 20th of August had ever before taken place in the history of modern India[1]
  • August 1946 Very little of anything that has been written on the topic, moreover, gives any plausible explanation of the extent and ferocity of the cataclysmic violence that devastated the city in August, 1946 [1]
  • August 1946 19 On August 19th, Wavell wrote to Pethwick-Lawrence, "the present estimate is that appreciably more Muslims than Hindus were killed[1]
  • August 1946 20 The Statesman, "Communal Riots in Calcutta," August 18, 1946[1]
  • August 1946 There was a brutalization of consciousness on a mass scale, as if the people were being prepared for the inhuman episode of August 1946 [1]
  • August 1946 In the pervasive breakdown of order that characterized Calcutta between the 16th and 22nd of August, 1946 , the violence was highly diverse, motivations were, likewise, varied, and even perceptions of the violence remained relative and contingent[1]
  • August 1946 36 The Statesman, "Bill to Control House Rents," August 1, 1946[1]
  • August 1946 37 The Statesman, "Congress Party Walkout," August 13, 1946[1]
  • August 1946 The earliest violence reported on August 16, 1946 seems to have erupted, above all else, in relation to the territorial specificity of the para[1]
  • August 1946 The occupation of Calcutta's most conspicuous public space by many tens of thousand of Muslims on August 16th was a similarly symbolic spectacle[1]
  • August 1946 "Calcutta," it was noted in the Statesman on August 20th, "is like a town that has just known a heavy air-raid[1]
  • August 1946 51 The Statesman noted in an staff editorial on the 20h of August, "no one will risk saying how many dwellings and business premises [were] burnt[1]
  • August 1946 52 The Statesman, "The Calcutta Scene," August 20, 1946[1]
  • August 1946 53 The Statesman, "Death Roll Now Between 2,000 and 3,000," August 19, 1946[1]
  • August 1946 The Commissioner of Civil Supplies reported that "by Sunday, the 18th of August, large streams of refugees from affected areas were collecting at various centers, mostly operated under the auspices of non-official relief organization or ad-hoc non-official bodies set up for the occasion[1]
  • August 1946 " See also, The Statesman, "Calcutta's Ordeal," August 19, 1946[1]
  • August 1946 58 The Statesman, "Troops Work in Clearing City," August 24, 1946[1]
  • August 1946 By the 28th of August, the Relief Department reported that there were 189,015 riot refugees being cared for in 307 quazi-official camps supplied by the Civil Supplies Department[1]
  • August 1946 As to the former rank, some approximation of their numbers can be had in relation to the fact that by the 23rd of August, 110,000 people were reported to have fled the city by train since the 16th[1]
  • August 1946 87 The Statesman, "Communal Riots in Calcutta," August 18, 1946[1]
  • August 1946 In Shampukur, northern Calcutta, there was an "extensive massacre" of Muslims on the night of August 16th[1]
  • August 1946 VII, Burrows to Wavell, August 16, 1946 , p[1]
  • August 1946 VIII, Burrows to Wavell, August 22, 1946 , p[1]
  • August 1946 147 The Statesman, "Communal Riots in Calcutta," August 18, 1946[1]
  • August 1946 151 The Statesman, War Was Never Like This," August 23, 1946[1]
  • August 1946 154 "Regular rationing to the public," it was decided at a closed-door meeting at Civil Supplies headquarters on August 18th, "would be a sheer impossibility until confidence was restored[1]
  • August 1946 The violence in the streets of Calcutta in August of 1946 was, in some definite sense, a reiteration of this officially constructed truism: bodies themselves are understood as either "Hindu" or "Muslim," and, as such, the mass annihilation of bodies becomes a "communal" phenomenon[1]
  • August 1946 161 A Statesman reporter, on the 21st of August, reported that in an open plot in Shampukur he had come across a pile of about 50 bodies "that had been thrown haphazardly in two heaps and were being devoured by vultures[1]
  • August 1946 160 The Statesman, "Only Stray Cases of Assault," August 21, 1946[1]
  • August 1946 162 The Statesman, "Only Stray Cases of Assault," August 21, 1946[1]
  • August 1946 This work was reported to have been completed only a week later, on August 26th[1]
  • August 1946 169 The Statesman, "Ghastly Experience of August 16th Victim," August 26, 1946[1]
  • August 1946 171 The Statesman, "Only Stray Cases of Assault," August 21, 1946[1]
  • August 1946 Fear, uncertainty, oppression, and ultimately death on a monumental scale, had frayed the psychological, administrative and moral fiber of society; until, in August of 1946 , Calcutta became completely unraveled[1]
  • August 1946 " By August 22nd, there were 45,000 troops in[1]
  • August 1946 The bitter memory of those days, 16th to 20th August 1946 might jeopardize the smooth working of a plan which has been accepted by the major political parties, and we think it should not be adjourned, but the whole proceeding should be dropped[1]
  • September 1946 September 7[30]
  • September 1946 September 6[30]
  • September 1946 September 13[30]
  • September 1946 September 9[30]
  • September 1946 September 5[30]
  • September 1946 0 September 3[30]
  • September 1946 3 September 9[30]
  • September 1946 2 September 5[30]
  • September 1946 , Director of Relief and Rehabilitation, a letter dated 25 March 1946 in which he pointed out that the order of 14 July 1944 sanctioning the grant had "embodied the request that the results of the enquiry be reported to Government not later than the 30th September 1944 "[6]
  • September 1946 Since most of the rains of a calender year fall during June-September, the use of these two accounting definitions of a year does not cause much difficulty in our understanding here[19]
  • September 1946 Demography Thesis, London School of Economics, September[19]
  • September 1946 The period under consideration in the pages to follow, September 1939 - September 1946 , is a period that represents an unparalleled epoch of turmoil, upheaval and misfortune in modern Bengal[1]
  • October 1946 But this can hardly be the explanation, for if it were, any similarity between the first estimate in October and the last in January could hardly be attributed to the merits of the sampling methods employed[5]
  • October 1946 The question would also arise of what was being estimated: was it the acreage under the crop in October, orp[5]
  • October 1946 Fever deaths in Punjab normally peaked during October-December[19]
  • October 1946 The MI peak in October seems to be a magnification of usual fever (malaria) mortality in the post-monsoon months[19]
  • October 1946 Indian Writing, October 3, 2006[1]
  • October 1946 His colossal spirit has also been guiding me in this work since his death in October of 2001[1]
  • October 1946 The violence in Calcutta precipitated communal outburst in Noakhali in east Bengal in October, and the violence in Noakhali (and Calcutta) reverberated in Bihar a month later[1]
  • October 1946 ) Vallabhbhai Patel, in a letter to Stanford Cripps in October also suggested that "in Calcutta the Hindus had the best of it[1]
  • October 1946 108 These riots, in October of 1946 , were the first reverberation of the Calcutta riots, and the next step on the road to the even greater communal violence that wracked India for the next year in the lead-up to partition[1]
  • November 1946 Sen gives as a cause of the famine the fact that from March to November, the demand for[15]
  • November 1946 In February of 1946 , however, disturbances again broke out in Calcutta that mirrored the November model[1]
  • November 1946 245 "As in November," historian Sumit Sarkar notes, "there quickly developed a remarkable unity in the streets between students and workers, Muslims and Hindus[1]
  • November 1946 In both November of 1945 and February of 1946 , as detailed in Chapter 6, there were massive and spontaneous anti-colonial uprisings in Calcutta which were put down with swift and comprehensive martial force[1]
  • November 1946 The proceedings began in November of 1946 , and muddled along in this blame game for the next several months[1]
  • December 1946 XLV (March 2007) mates— in December 1941 , at the height of the crisis, than in December 1940 , before the blockade began (Joseph Brojek, Samuel Wells, and Ancel Keys 1946 )ogradac_article_pub_063
  • December 1946 Some of the Fellows would have read a brief account that appeared in Nature last December which had whetted their appetite for the feast they were about to enjoy that evening[5]
  • December 1946 Fever deaths in Punjab normally peaked during October-December[19]
  • December 1946 XLV (March 2007) classic famine diseases in temperate cli mates?in December 1941 , at the height of the crisis, than in December 1940 , before the blockade began (Joseph Brojek, Samuel Wells, and Ancel Keys 1946 )[16]
  • December 1946 While the Agro-Economic Research Centre for East India (1960) gives wage data in Birbhum from January 1939 to December 1941 , and again from January 1946 , the data for the intermediate period are not presented[7]
  • January 1947 41 Reflecting the system of cultivation of indigo, aman rice in the delta was sown at the beginning of the rainy season and was reaped in the winter or between November and January[2]
  • February 1947 (1) 5-9, February[15]
  • February 1947 ( 1947 ), "Famine epidemics and measures of health rehabilitation" in Modern Review, February[19]
  • March 1947 XLV (March 2007)ogradac_article_pub_063
  • March 1947 "Marchés bien fournis soutiennent l'accèsogradac_article_pub_063
  • March 1947 The Lancet, 359(9312), 30 March 2002: 1127[2]
  • March 1947 Since 1947 (the year of independence and partition) the eastern wing of Pakistan was officially called East Bengal until the constitution of Pakistan, passed in March 1956, designated it as the Province of East Pakistan[19]
  • March 1947 Murray (1975), "Refeeding-malaria and hyperferramia" in Lancet, 122, March: 653-654[19]
  • March 1947 1 (March, 1977), pp[35]
  • March 1947 XLV (March 2007) Figure 5[16]
  • March 1947 "Marches bien fournis soutiennent Faeces[16]
  • April 1947 82 (April 1985); Commodities and Capabilities (Amsterdam: North Holland, 1985); On Ethics and Economics (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987)craw32
  • April 1947 For a recent example of illegal encroachment on char lands, see Daily Star, 20 April 2008; for a narrative of using state mechanism for appropriating the khas mahals in Chittagong Hill Tracts and char lands, see Shapan Adnan, Bangladesher Krishi Prashno: Bhumi Sanskar O Khas Jamir Odhikar Protishthai @[2]
  • April 1947 (1990), "Famine Mortality", paper presented at the BASAS Annual Conference, Edinburgh, April[19]
  • April 1947 Retrieved, April 18, 2011[1]
  • June 1947 Shireen Moosvi, "Production, Consumption and Population in Akbar's Time," Indian Economic and Social History Review, X, 2, June 1973, 181-95[37]
  • June 1947 The winter or October session started as soon as monsoon water receded from the char-diaras, and the indigo plants were ready to be cut in May or June, before the char-diaras were once again submerged by the rising water during the next monsoon[2]
  • June 1947 recent assertion of ecological nationalism on the part of China, India and Bangladesh in terms of the eastern Himalayas water systems, see Iftekhar Iqbal, 'Making Sense of Water', Forum, 2(5) ( June, 2007)[2]
  • June 1947 7 per cent of total land), Towheed Feroze, 'Land Policy: Pro-Poor Plan is the Key', Dhaka Courier, 6–12 June, 24(46) (2008): 16–17[2]
  • June 1947 Feroze, Towheed, 'Land Policy: Pro-Poor Plan is the Key', Dhaka Courier, 6–12 June 2008[2]
  • June 1947 2) Data on rainfall (in inches) refer to the period between 1st June and 31st October[19]
  • June 1947 Murray (1976), "Somali Food Shelters in the Orgden and their impact on health", in Lancet, 123, 12 June: 1283- 1285[19]
  • July 1947 Alan Heston, "The Standard of Living in Akbar's Time - A Comment," Indian Eco- nomic and Social History Review, XIV, 3, July-Sept[37]
  • July 1947 Shireen Moosvi, "Note on Professor Heston's 'Standard of Living in Akbar's Time- A Comment'," Indian Economic and Social History Review, XIV, 3, July-Sept[37]
  • July 1947 The aush variety was sown after the first shower of spring and was harvested in July or August[2]
  • July 1947 Nusha Yamina Choudhury, Alak Paul and Bimal Kanti Paul, 'Impact of Coastal Embankment on the Flash Flood in Bangladesh', Applied Geography, 24(3) ( July 2004): 241–58[2]
  • July 1947 Choudhury, Nusha Yamina, Alak Paul and Bimal Kanti Paul, 'Impact of Coastal Embankment on the Flash Flood in Bangladesh', Applied Geography, 24(3) ( July 2004)[2]
  • July 1947 , 'Labor Mobility, Market Integration, and Wage Convergence in Late 19th Century India', Explorations in Economic History, 36(3) ( July 1999)[2]
  • July 1947 Dyson, Tim, 'On the Demography of South Asian Famines, part II', Population Studies, 45(2) ( July 1991)[2]
  • July 1947 Finally, in July of 1947 , with independence - and partition - pending, and without ever reaching conclusion, the commission was convened[1]
  • July 1947 (2002), 'Long Hours for High Yields; Agricultural Productivity in Pre-industrial Java (Indonesia)', paper presented at a panel on 'Agricultural Productivity in 18th and Early 19th-century Eurasia', 13th Economic History Conference, Buenos Aires, 22-26 July[38]
  • August 1947 The aush variety was sown after the first shower of spring and was harvested in July or August[2]
  • August 1947 For the reports on formation of new lands in Bangladesh, see 'Bangladesh "is Growing"', Timesonline, 1 August 2008, http://www[2]
  • August 1947 As Dyson writes, "In each case it happened in or around August and was almost certainly related to the resumption of monsoon rains"[19]
  • September 1947 Glewwe, "Growth and Equity in Developing Countries: A Reinterpretation of Sri Lankan Experience," World Bank Development Review, 1 (September 1986)craw32
  • September 1947 2) Years for columns (2) and (9) end on the 30th September[19]
  • October 1947 The winter or October session started as soon as monsoon water receded from the char-diaras, and the indigo plants were ready to be cut in May or June, before the char-diaras were once again submerged by the rising water during the next monsoon[2]
  • October 1947 One planter testified to the Indigo Commission that he had prosecuted in a civil court two goalas who used to sow their lands willingly in October, and afterwards destroyed them with their own cattle[2]
  • October 1947 2) Data on rainfall (in inches) refer to the period between 1st June and 31st October[19]
  • November 1947 41 Reflecting the system of cultivation of indigo, aman rice in the delta was sown at the beginning of the rainy season and was reaped in the winter or between November and January[2]
  • December 1947 Gyan Prakash, 'Subaltern Studies as Postcolonial Criticism', American Historical Review, 99 (December 1994): 1475–90[2]
  1. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w x y z aa ab ac ad ae af ag ah ai aj ak al am an ao ap aq ar as at au av aw ax ay az ba bb bc bd be bf bg bh bi bj bk bl bm bn bo bp bq br bs bt bu bv bw bx by bz ca cb cc cd ce cf cg ch ci cj ck cl cm cn co cp cq cr cs ct cu cv cw cx cy cz da db dc dd de df dg dh di dj dk dl dm dn do dp dq dr ds dt du dv dw dx dy dz ea eb ec ed ee ef eg eh ei ej ek el em en eo ep eq er es et eu ev ew ex ey ez fa fb fc fd fe ff fg fh fi fj fk fl fm fn fo fp fq fr fs ft fu fv fw fx fy fz ga gb gc gd ge gf gg gh gi gj gk gl gm gn go gp gq gr gs gt gu gv gw gx gy gz ha hb hc hd he hf hg hh hi hj hk hl hm hn ho hp hq hr hs ht hu hv hw hx hy hz ia ib ic id ie if ig ih ii ij ik il im in io ip iq ir is it iu iv iw ix iy iz ja jb jc jd je jf jg jh ji jj jk jl jm jn jo jp jq jr js jt ju jv jw jx jy jz ka kb kc kd ke kf kg kh ki kj kk kl km kn ko kp kq kr ks kt ku kv kw kx ky kz la lb lc ld le lf lg lh li lj lk ll lm ln lo lp lq lr ls lt lu lv lw lx ly lz ma mb mc md me mf mg mh mi mj mk ml mm mn mo mp mq mr ms mt mu mv mw mx my mz na nb nc nd ne nf ng nh ni nj nk nl nm nn no np nq nr ns nt nu nv nw nx ny nz oa ob oc od oe of og oh oi oj ok ol om on oo op oq or os ot ou ov ow ox oy oz pa pb pc pd pe pf pg ph pi pj pk pl pm pn po pp pq pr ps pt pu pv pw px py pz qa qb qc qd qe qf qg qh qi qj qk ql qm qn qo qp qq qr qs qt qu qv qw qx qy qz ra rb rc rd re rf rg rh ri rj rk rl rm rn ro rp rq rr rs rt ru rv rw rx ry rz sa sb sc sd se sf sg sh si sj sk sl sm sn so sp sq sr ss st su sv sw sx sy sz ta tb tc td te tf tg th ti tj tk tl tm tn to tp tq tr ts tt tu tv tw tx ty tz ua ub uc ud ue uf ug uh ui uj uk ul um un uo up uq ur us ut uu uv uw ux uy uz va vb vc vd ve vf Mukherjee 2011.
  2. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w x y z aa ab ac ad ae af ag ah ai aj ak al am an ao ap aq ar as at au av aw ax ay az ba bb bc bd be bf bg bh Iqbal 2010.
  3. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w x y z aa ab ac Bose 1990.
  4. ^ a b c d e f Islam 2007.
  5. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w x y z aa ab ac ad ae af ag ah ai aj ak al am an ao ap aq ar as at au Mahalanobis 1946.
  6. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w x y z aa ab ac ad ae af ag ah ai aj ak al am an ao ap aq ar as at au av aw ax ay az ba bb bc bd be bf bg bh bi bj bk bl bm bn bo bp bq br bs bt bu bv bw bx by bz ca cb cc cd ce cf cg ch ci cj ck cl cm cn co cp cq cr cs ct cu cv cw cx cy cz da db dc dd de df dg dh di dj dk dl dm dn do dp dq dr ds dt du dv dw dx dy dz ea eb ec ed ee ef eg eh ei ej ek el em en eo ep eq er es et eu ev ew ex ey ez fa fb fc fd fe ff fg fh fi fj fk fl fm fn fo fp fq fr fs ft fu fv fw fx fy fz ga gb gc gd ge gf gg gh gi gj gk gl gm gn go gp gq gr gs gt gu gv gw gx gy gz ha hb hc hd he hf hg hh hi hj hk hl hm hn ho hp hq hr hs ht hu hv hw hx hy hz ia ib ic id ie if ig ih ii ij ik il im in io ip iq ir is it iu iv iw ix iy iz ja jb jc jd je jf jg jh ji jj jk jl jm jn jo jp jq jr js jt ju jv Mahalanobis, Mukherjea & Ghosh 1946.
  7. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w x y z aa ab ac ad ae af ag ah ai aj ak al am an ao ap aq ar as at au av aw ax ay az ba bb bc bd be bf bg bh bi bj bk bl bm bn bo bp bq br bs bt bu bv bw bx by bz ca cb cc cd ce cf cg ch ci cj ck cl cm cn co cp cq cr cs ct cu cv cw cx cy cz da db dc dd de df dg dh di dj dk dl dm dn do dp dq dr ds dt du dv dw dx dy dz ea eb ec ed ee ef eg eh ei ej ek el em en eo ep eq er es et eu ev ew ex ey ez fa fb fc fd fe ff fg fh fi fj fk fl Sen 1977.
  8. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w x y z aa ab ac ad ae af ag ah ai aj ak al am an ao ap aq ar as at au av aw Tauger 2009.
  9. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m Bhattacharya 2002a.
  10. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w x y z aa ab ac ad ae af ag ah ai aj ak al am an ao ap aq ar as at au av aw ax ay az ba bb bc bd be bf bg bh bi bj bk bl bm bn bo bp bq br bs bt bu bv bw bx by bz ca cb cc cd ce cf cg ch ci cj ck cl cm cn co cp cq cr cs ct cu De 2006.
  11. ^ a b c d e Cohn 1960.
  12. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w x y z aa ab ac ad ae af ag ah ai aj ak al am an ao ap aq ar as at au av aw ax Dyson 1991.
  13. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w x y z aa ab ac ad ae af ag ah ai aj ak al am an ao ap aq ar as at au av aw ax ay az O'Grada 2008.
  14. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w x y z aa ab ac ad ae af ag ah ai aj ak al am an Bhattacharya 2002b.
  15. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w x y z aa ab ac ad ae af ag ah ai aj ak al am an ao ap aq ar as at au av aw ax ay az ba bb bc bd be bf bg bh bi bj bk bl bm bn bo bp bq br bs bt bu bv bw bx by bz ca cb cc cd ce cf cg ch ci cj ck cl cm cn co cp cq cr cs ct cu cv cw cx cy cz da db dc dd de df dg dh di dj dk dl dm dn do dp dq dr ds dt du dv dw dx dy dz ea eb ec ed ee ef eg eh ei ej ek el em en eo ep eq er es et eu ev ew ex ey ez fa fb fc fd Bowbrick 1986.
  16. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w x y z aa ab ac ad ae af ag ah ai aj ak al O'Grada 2007.
  17. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w x y z aa ab ac ad ae af ag ah ai aj ak al am an ao ap aq ar as at au av aw ax ay az ba bb bc bd be bf bg bh bi bj bk bl bm bn bo bp bq br bs bt bu bv bw bx by bz ca cb cc cd ce cf cg ch ci cj ck cl cm cn co cp cq cr cs ct cu cv cw cx cy cz da db dc dd de df dg dh di dj dk dl dm dn do O'Grada 2009.
  18. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w x y z aa ab ac ad ae af ag ah ai aj ak al am an ao ap aq ar as at au av aw ax ay az ba bb bc bd be bf bg bh bi bj bk bl bm bn bo bp bq br bs bt bu bv bw bx by bz ca cb cc cd ce cf cg ch ci cj ck cl cm cn co cp cq cr cs ct cu cv cw cx cy cz da db dc dd de df dg dh di dj dk dl dm dn do dp dq dr ds dt du dv dw dx dy dz ea eb ec ed ee ef eg eh ei ej ek el em en eo ep eq er es et eu ev ew ex ey ez fa fb fc fd fe ff fg fh fi fj fk fl fm fn fo fp fq fr fs ft fu fv fw fx fy fz ga gb gc gd ge gf gg gh gi gj gk gl gm gn go gp gq gr gs gt gu gv gw gx gy Brennan 1988.
  19. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w x y z aa ab ac ad ae af ag ah ai aj ak al am an ao ap aq ar as at au av aw ax ay az ba bb bc bd be bf bg bh bi bj bk bl bm bn bo bp bq br bs bt bu bv bw bx by bz ca cb cc cd ce cf cg ch ci cj ck cl cm cn co cp cq cr cs ct cu cv cw cx cy cz da db dc dd de df dg dh di dj dk dl dm dn do dp dq dr ds dt du dv dw dx dy dz ea eb ec ed ee ef eg eh ei ej ek el em en eo ep eq er es et eu ev ew ex ey ez fa fb fc fd fe ff fg fh fi fj fk fl fm fn fo fp fq fr fs ft fu fv fw fx fy fz ga gb gc gd ge gf gg gh gi gj gk gl gm gn go gp gq gr gs gt gu gv gw gx gy gz ha hb hc hd he hf hg hh hi hj hk hl hm Maharatna 1992.
  20. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l Das 2008a.
  21. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s Mukerjee 2014.
  22. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p O'Grada 2002.
  23. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w x y z aa ab ac ad ae af ag ah ai aj ak al am an ao ap aq ar as at au av aw ax ay az ba bb bc bd be bf bg bh bi bj bk bl bm bn bo bp bq br bs bt bu bv bw bx by bz ca cb cc cd ce cf cg ch ci cj ck cl cm cn co cp cq cr cs ct cu cv cw cx cy cz da db dc dd de df dg dh di dj dk dl dm dn do dp dq dr ds dt du dv dw dx dy dz ea eb ec ed ee ef eg eh ei ej ek el em en eo ep eq er es et eu ev ew ex ey ez fa fb fc fd fe ff fg fh fi fj fk fl fm fn fo fp fq fr fs ft fu fv fw fx fy fz ga gb gc gd ge gf gg gh gi gj gk gl gm gn O'Grada 2015.
  24. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k Iqbal 2011.
  25. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u Mahalanobis 1943.
  26. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w x y z aa O'Grada 2010.
  27. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w x y Bailey 1945.
  28. ^ a b c Gianessi & Williams 2012.
  29. ^ a b c d e Dyson 1992.
  30. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u Ghose 1982.
  31. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w x Ravallion 1996.
  32. ^ Sen 1986.
  33. ^ Nayak 2000.
  34. ^ Mukherjee 2015.
  35. ^ a b Meena 2015.
  36. ^ Farmer 1986.
  37. ^ a b c Desai 1980.
  38. ^ Roy 2007.