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Pathfinder Force
A Pathfinder Lancaster is reviewed by the king and queen, February 1944
Active	15 August 1942 – 1945
Country	United Kingdom
Branch	Royal Air Force
Size	Group
Part of	RAF Bomber Command
Group Headquarters	Huntingdon
Motto(s)	"Press On Regardless"
Commanders
Notable commanders	Don Bennett
Insignia
Group badge heraldry	A flaming arrow in front of an eight pointed star

The Pathfinder Force (PFF) was a section of RAF Bomber Command formed to improve the accuracy and destructiveness of Bomber Command's operations against Germany and occupied Europe during the Second World War. It was established 15 August 1942, with each of the groups contributing a squadron to the force. Pathfinder squadrons were to be made up of experienced crews that had proven themselves capable of accurately reaching the target. Once a crew was brought into the PFF they were given further navigational training and made proficient in the use of the latest electronic navigational aids. Though many of the Pathfinder crews were experienced, as much as a third of the force came directly from the training schools. Novice crews had to have shown aptitude and achieved a rating of above average in their training. The two hallmarks of the Pathfinder force were navigation and timing. Electronic navigational aids were developed and implemented with the PFF, which worked closely with their scientists to improve their effectiveness. The force commander, Don Bennett, expected his force to be effective regardless of weather. This goal was achieved with the help of navigational aides such as Gee, Oboe and the H2S radar, the last two of which were developed and refined by the Pathfinder Force.

A little bit of theory

[[File:The Duty of the RAF (portal) Art.IWMPST3769.jpg|thumb|Poster of Portal encouraging civilian workers in the value and importance of the airfield expansion program]]

Military theorists in the interwar period worked on how a future war could avoid the slaughter of the trenches of the Great War. The airman advanced the theory that a potent bomber force could reach across lines and attack the enemy’s means of producing war materials, crippling him and bringing the war to a rapid close. The spectra of the use of poison gas, extensively used in the later stages of the Great War, was a direct threat to the civilian population. The death toll from such attacks would be in the hundreds of thousands. With the possibility of such escalation in the conflict, Bomber Command initially used its force to drop leaflets over Germany and the occupied countries.

Daylight bombing was made nix after Bomber Command suffered heavy losses in the Heligoland raids in December 1939. In the first raid on 14 December, 12 Wellingtons were sent to attack German warships. They were picked up by German Freya radars and German fighters were put in the air to intercept them. Five of the Wellingtons were shot down, and a sixth so badly damaged that it crashed on landing. Misinterpreting the result, Bomber Command repeated the event four days later, when they sent 24 Wellingtons on a similar mission. They found no targets, and on their return flight they were again attacked by German fighters, this time between Wilhelmshaven and the Dutch border. Twelve were destroyed over the sea, and six others badly damaged, causing three to crash on landing. It was clear the bombers could not defend themselves against German fighters. Thus their missions had to be confined to those that could be done with fighter escort, limiting the bombers to the range of the fighters, which at the time was about 200 miles. The only way to reach targets in Germany was to make the attacks under the cover of darkness at night. The problem this posed was the difficulty of locating a target with little to no light to see by.

By 1942 the United Kingdom had been at war for 3 years. Ejected from the continent, the only means Britain had to bring the war to Germany was through its air arm. This they did. The bomber force helped keep up the morale of the British population, but it was not clear they were being very effective in damaging Germany. Enthusiastic aircrew reports of dropping bombs on target were often contradicted by reports from the ground and follow-up photoreconnaissance appeared to confirm this. Lord Cherwell, Churchill's scientific advisor, proposed an objective review of results. A member of the War Cabinet Secretariat, Mr. D. M. Butt, was given the task of analyzing 600 aerial photographs taken over the course of two months of bombing in June and July, a total of 48 attack missions.

Flak damage to a Wellington that still managed to return to England. The tail turret was lost, as was the gunner. The aircraft was written off

The investment being made in the bomber force was great. A tremendous amount of resources had been poured into the airfield building project of the British Air Ministry Directorate-General of Works, and precious war materials were being used in the production of the RAF's fleet of bombers. Aircrew losses were high, at over 9% each operation, with losses over 12% when the target was Berlin, and 21% over the Ruhr Valley.

• 125,000 men served in Bomber Command. Of those, 65,000 were lost from their ranks, with 55,000 killed outright, while another 10,000 managed to make it into the Luftwaffe's PoW camps, testifying to the difficulty of escaping from the inside of a burning bomber once it began to twist and fall after being critically hit. Overall the service, which only made up 2% of the United Kingdom's men in arms, suffered 14% of all causalities.
• German camouflage techniques to disguise the target and mislead the bombers.
• By this time it was clear that Hitler had rejected the use of poison gas on populations other than his own. England and the Allied powers accepted this limitation.
• the airfield project was costly, used war resources. The airfield building campaign.
• building the bombers used up a great deal of war materials.
• with the Admiralty on the ropes with the U-boat war and the Army struggling against Rommel in the desert, great demands were made for the aircraft and their control.
• First tour 30 missions, then rest, then 20 more missions, then over to training or some other service. In 1942 an aircrew would survive 8 sorties. An aircrew had about an even chance of surviving the first tour. Throughout the war the average number of sorties flown before being lost never rose to more than 9.2 sorties, so flying with Bomber Command was a deadly dangerous undertaking.
• Butt report tallied that only 5% of bombs dropped landed within 5 miles of the intended target. The implication was that Bomber Command was not impacting the course of the war, and could not bring the war to an end, as the bomber barons had promised.(double check to be sure of this citation)

Portal and the Air Ministry instigate Target Marking Force

The Air Ministry in session at Adastral House, London

1942 was a critical year in the life of Bomber Command. For two years the force had carried the burden of taking the war to Germany, and it had little to show for it. Night time bombing raids had proven to be impotent. Without exception, Bomber Command was unable to get over the target with any kind of strength, and the amount of bombs being dropped were not great enough to cause any significant damage. Over the previous two and a half years Bomber Command had dropped about 90,000 tons with some 7,000 aircrew having been lost on operations, while having no appreciable impact on German production. In January Air Marshall Richard Peirse was relieved of command of the bomber force, and replaced by Arthur Harris.

With limited resource available, and nothing to show for their efforts, the survival of Bomber Command as a strategic force was in the balance. Harris was a firm believer that Bomber Command would be a war winning weapon if it could deliver its attack on target and with enough weight of bombs to destroy it. However the force had yet to prove it. With new aircraft such as the four engine Halifax and Lancaster bombers, larger bomb loads could be carried, but he still needed to get them to the target. Sydney Bufton had been involved in a number of discussions on the idea of a Target Finding Force with leading airmen Willie Tait, John Whitworth, and Jimmy Marks. In March 1942 Bufton circulated a paper to a limited number of his senior commanders suggesting a target marking force composed of six squadrons of experienced crews.

Among the reasons the Group commanders opposed the formation of a Target Marking Force was that the best crews are being removed and placed in front, where they were most susceptible. This is something Bennett understood.

Harris sent his response to Bufton on 17 April, the same day he sent twelve Lancasters were sent on a 1,000 mile low level deep penetration daylight raid against the MAN U-boat engine plant in Augsburg, flying out in the late afternoon and making their return under the cover of darkness. It was hoped that the new aircraft would be fast enough to avoid German defenses and would carry a large enough bomb load to cause significant damage to the target. The RAF ran heavy fighter sweeps and bombing attacks on coastal targets to distract German defenses. Nevertheless the force was attacked by 20 Me 109s while crossing northern France, and 4 aircraft were shot down. Flak claimed 3 more over the target. Only 5 Lancasters made it back from the raid, all with significant battle damage, while MAN U-boat engine production proceeded without apparent hindrance. Clearly low level daylight attacks were no more practical in 1942 than they had been in 1940.

The target marking force was opposed by the Group commanders, and by Harris who supported them. A change had to be made. Everyone agreed that they wanted Bomber Command to reach its potential as a

The demand for aircraft and resources by the Admiralty and the Army was great. A change had to be made. The Air Ministry decided to move forward. Portal informed Harris that it was his job to form the force.

Selection of Bennett

To command the new force the Air Ministry suggested Basil Embry, the leader of 2 Group. Harris rejected this idea out of hand. He had only one officer in mind to command the force: the commanding officer of 10 Squadron, a young Australian wing commander by the name of Donald Bennett. Bennett had served under Harris when Harris was station commander at Pembroke Dock in Wales and Bennett was piloting flying boats in 210 Squadron. Said Harris "He was the most efficient airman I had ever met." The choice raised eyebrows among many Royal Air Force senior staff officers. Bennett was only 32 years old, was an Australian, and had spent years in civil aviation, which at the time was looked upon by the Royal Air Force much as the Royal Navy looked upon the Merchant Service. However Bennett was an ideal choice. A renowned expert in navigation, at the age of 23 he had sat for a First Class Navigator's License, passing the exam as only the seventh man to do so. In the following year he added a Civil Class B License, an Instructor's Certificate, a Wireless Operator's License, and gained a Ground Engineer's License in three categories. He had already published two books on navigation. In addition, he had amassed a tremendous amount of experience in flying. Having a 1,000 hours of flying was a great deal of experience. There were only a hundred men in the RAF that had more than 3,000 hours flying. Bennett had amassed over 10,000 hours.

Bennett was made Air Officer Commanding of the force to be on 5 July, and the force came into being six weeks later on 15 August 1942. Though the Pathfinder Force was part of 3 Group, Bennett reported directly to the command of the commander in chief of Bomber Command. He was tasked with concentrating the destructive power of the bomber force so that Germany could be bombed into submission.

Bennett speaks with aircrew on station

Bennett’s focus for the Pathfinder Force was on navigation. He expected his force would be able to find targets and bomb them with accuracy regardless of the weather. At times severe, Bennett was a demanding, no nonsense commander. He knew the jobs of piloting and navigating inside and out, and he understood all aspects of the jobs of the aircrew. His unannounced arrivals led to some discomfort, as he had a keen eye for picking out whatever might be amiss. However his presence at an airfield or a debriefing could not be resented. The AOC did not waste their time. Changes he imposed following his visits were consistently changes for the better. Crews found he was approachable, a good listener, and the possessor of a keen understanding of the problems they faced.

Bennett expected electronic navigational aids would soon be available to help in the Pathfinder mission, and he pushed their development.

Formation of the PFF

Fuel bowsers fueling a Stirling in preparation for the evening's mission

Harris instructed the four Groups of bomber command to send selected volunteer crews to one of their squadrons, and to send that squadron over to form the new air unit. The new force would be called the Pathfinder Force. Harris insisted on this name, as it suggested the role of navigational aide rather than the targeting function of the raid leader scheme that he and the AOCs had favored.

On 15 August 1942 the new force formed. No. 3 Group sent No. 7 Squadron flying Sterlings, No. 4 Group sent No. 35 Squadron flying Halifaxes, No. 5 Group sent No. 83 Squadron in Avro Lancasters while No. 1 Group sent No. 156 Squadron flying the Vickers Wellington. A fifth squadron, No. 109 Squadron was a special duty Wireless Intelligence unit which flew a mixture of aircraft and was tasked with developing wireless and navigational aides and jamming German radio beams. The airfields of the Pathfinder Force were clustered together to increase force cohesiveness and give them a better chance to help each other. The PFF squadrons originally were under 3 Group. The squadrons were based at 3 nearby airfields: Gravely, Warboys, and Oakington, with the headquarters based at Wyton, a satellite of Warboys. Bennett chose this location for its good landline communications and favourable weather record. The force was initially made up of a mixture of aircraft types, with resultant operational difficulties.

Early operations

Harris put the Pathfinder Force into action immediately, in his typical "Press on regardless" fashion. The force was to mount an attack against Flensburg on their first day. Poor weather caused a delay, and the raid did not go off until the night of 18/19 August 1942. Though no electronic navigational aids were available, Flensburg was a relatively easy target to locate. Located on the Danish peninsula, the large bodies of water made it easy to identify. However, cloud cover resulted in poor visibility, and heavy winds blew the force to the north. 16 PFF crews believed they had marked the target area, and 78 Main Force crews claimed to have bombed it. Reports from Denmark indicated bombs had fallen in a scattered area 25 miles north of Flensburg, and the town itself was not hit at all. The raid was another failure.

The PFF's second mission was against Frankfurt on the night of 24/25 August. The group once again had great difficulty identifying its target in cloudy conditions, and most of the bombs fell in open country north and west of Frankfurt. Sixteen aircraft were lost, 7.1% of the force. Among the losses was 7 Squadron’s commanding officer. One of the complaints that Bennett addressed was the Stirling’s altitude limitation. Most of the force was flying at 19 to 20,000 feet, but 7 Squadron, flying the Stirling, was limited to operating at 12,000 feet. Being separated from the rest of the force, they were subject to more intense defensive fire. Bennett reviewed this problem to see if he could get more altitude out of the aircraft. Looking to save weight, he reviewed the aircraft’s armour fittings, the reserve fuel and the ammunition carried for its guns. Armour plating was removed below the wireless operator and cabin crew. Next he looked at how much ammunition was on board at the end of missions, and how much reserve fuel. As the Stirlings were carrying several times more than what they ever used, these were both reduced. The aircraft, which had struggled to operate at 12,500 feet was able to reach 18,500 feet or more, much closer to the Halifaxes and Lancasters. Initially there was no difference between the crews of the Pathfinder Force and the regular force they came from, except experience. To this Bennett placed a heavy stress on navigation as being the key to reaching the target and achieving mission success. Initially there was little in the way of electronic navigational aides. Navigation was achieved with astrocompass, pinpointing and dead reckoning. He expected the force to reach the target regardless of weather conditions. Bennett was an innovator, and pressed for the development of electronic navigational aides. Though electronic aides had been key to helping guide the RAF's Fighter Command to winning the Battle of Britain, little had been done to help Bomber Command. Bennett led a very busy schedule, and was seemingly omnipresent at airfields and headquarters. He also generated a steady flow of memoranda to Harris and the Group commanders, pressing his needs and underscoring the successes of his units.

The stress was on training, especially in navigation. A special training site called Pathfinder Navigational Training Unit was set up at RAF Gransden Lodge on 10 April 1943. Two months later the unit moved to Upwood, and an air party was established at Warboys[1], where it remained till the end of the war. Here the airman’s navigational skills were developed further, and the use of the new electronic navigational equipment was taught.

The target area was the most heavily defended portion of the flight. In addition, the bomber had to be flown straight and level. The goal was for the command to deliver a concentrated bomb load on the target and leave as quickly as possible. To be an effective, the Pathfinder Force had to exercise strict air discipline. They had to correctly identify the target, arrive over it five minutes before the Main Force. The time frame here was very strict. Bennett allowed his aviators one minute leeway on a flight from England to Berlin. There was to be no dawdling over the target. The plan was to arrive, release the bomb load and exit. The entire force was to pass over the target in 30 minutes. If on first pass the bomb aimer could not see his target he would advise to go around and run over the target again.

On several occasions Bennett requested permission to fly along with the Pathfinder Force so that he might better be able to evaluate what was happening and to offer better advice to his crews. These requests were refused out of hand by Harris. Nevertheless, Bennett apparently found occasion to quietly take a Beaufighter out and fly along at altitude. This was the opinion of his crews, who would see him appear at debriefings dressed as though he had just stepped out of his office, but at some point along the way he would let a comment would slip out that could only have been offered from someone who had been above the target. Bennett’s secret was kept by the Pathfinder crews. These flights of Bennett’s were later confirmed in his memoir, where he stated “I also went out occasionally in person and saw how things were actually going over the targets themselves.” In doing so he was the most senior officer to have flow over Hitler’s Germany.

By such and such a mission the results were returning positive, and this continued and improved from there on out.

• You did not earn the PFF eagle until you had proved yourself as a Pathfinder.

1943: Pathfinder Force finds its stride

• Battle of the Ruhr, spring 1943 .
• Bomber Command suffered terrible losses, flirted with defeat. In 43 attacks the command lost 872 bombers, with another 2,126 aircraft damaged. Despite these losses, the command’s strength
• Hamburg attacked in a series of major attacks at the end of July. First use of Window. German night fighter defenses are confused and overwhelmed. A firestorm develops in the center of the city during the attack of 27/28 July. 4 square miles of the city consumed in the fire, and over 40,000 people were killed.

• with the losses of the air campaign the quality of crews being sent to the PFF starts to drop off. Some Group Commanders using the PFF as a means to dump crews that were low standard. PFF had trouble replacing its losses.

Over time the formation expanded, and in January 1943 was made No. 8 Group. Over the course of the next two years the formation continued to grow and its missions expanded to reach an ultimate strength of 19 squadrons. Initially the aircrew were made up predominantly from the Royal Air Force, with the Royal Navy contributing as well. New crews and replacement crews often came from the Empire Training Schools situated in Canada and Rhodesia, so that by the end of the war half of the Group's personnel were from the Commonwealth countries.

Enter Mahaddie

On 20 March 1943 Mahaddie was made Pathfinder Force “Group Training Inspector” by Bennett, a position that Bennett just created. He expected Mahaddie to improve the quality of crews coming into the Pathfinder Force, and he left it up to Mahaddie to figure out how he was going to do that. Mahaddie started by touring all the Groups to give the Main Force crews talks on how the Pathfinder Force operated, and update them on new techniques that were being developed to aide in navigation and target marking. He also was there to answer criticisms of PFF failures. Mahaddie did not shy away from this, and he used two episodes which he himself figured prominently in as examples of how things could go wrong. One was the raid against Saarbrücken, a town in the Ruhr located on a bend in the river Rhine. Unfortunately, Mahaddie marked Saarlouis, a nearby Ruhr town located on a bend in the river Rhine. This was also a worthwhile target, but the mistake caused some embarrassment to the Pathfinder Force and Mahaddie had to answer a series of sharp questions from the AOC. This incident Mahaddie referred to in his talks as “Hamish’s shame.” The other was a futile H2S guided mission against Hamburg in March 1943, which he called “Mahaddie’s Folly.” After describing how things went wrong, he would put it to the crews that if they felt they could do better, they should give it a try. He gave the strong impression that the best thing an aviator could be was to serve on the pathfinder force (he worded this better, see if you can find it from his oral history recording), and admonished them that if they did their absolute best, it might just be good enough. Mahaddie was a very personable character, with a strong Scottish accent and a gift for telling stories, and he seemed to know everybody in Bomber Command. He was very effective at his job as Bennett’s self-styled horse thief, and the quality of incoming crews under Mahaddie’s care returned to a high level.

• Air discipline among Pathfinders: If there was any doubt at all you did not drop your target indicators. Also if you were late you did not drop your target indicators.
• Supporter crews - flew along with the marker crews, dropped bombs and drew flak away.

A well marked target would result in a tremendous concentration of bombs being dropped on the target. This was far different than the scattered bombs and pinprick attacks of 1941 and 1942. It was as accurate and often more destructive compared to the Eighth Air Force's daylight raids. The red and green flares would drop through the cloud covered sky, casting an eerie light to city streets. Soon the flares were followed by the horror of a rain of high explosive and incendiary bombs. Conflagrations would develop, and whole sections of cites would be wiped out.

• a discussion as how best to improve on the effectiveness of Bomber Command had been going on for a couple of years. Bennett had been asked to offer advice comment on it in 1940(?) The broadly held belief of the Group Commanders and the AOC was specially designated crews could lead the groups to the target, and the resultant fires would be a guide for the rest of the Group. This would keep the crews of the groups together, increase accuracy and avoid a sense of elitism and jealousy that could well develop if a separate Target Finding Force were created.
• The Air Ministry had evaluated this problem as well, and they felt the measure that gave them the best chance for success would be to create a separate special force, made up of the best crews, that would mark and bomb the target in front of the rest of Bomber Command.
• a downside to creating a Target Marking Force from the best crews was that being in first their casualties would be the highest. The loss of the cream of the crews could not be accepted, as they would needs be replaced with inexperienced crews, and the whole proposition would fail on its face.

• Air discipline among Pathfinders: If there was any doubt at all you did not drop your target indicators. Also if you were late you did not drop your target indicators.

German counter measures

• Changes in German night fighter tactics had been argued among Luftwaffe commanders for some time. Following the Hamburg disaster in July 1943 a tremendous amount of pressure was exerted to effect these changes.
• It was noted by the night fighter pilots that Bomber Commands aircraft were illuminated over the target area by the fires that had started below, and that in such circumstances radar guidance was not needed for a fighter to find and attack the bombers. What was needed were pilots proficient at instrument flying, so they could find their airfields and land at night. It so happened that the Luftwaffe had a group of such pilots available, those being from the bomber arm who at that time were not flying missions. The Focke Wolfe 190 was used as the aircraft, and these pilots took to the air to help to defend German cities. Such attacks made visually by day fighters flown by bomber pilots at night over the target cities were called “Wild sow” tactics.
• German night fighters were far more feared than flak.
• Schräge Musik – upward firing cannons mounted on German night fighters, which would sneak up below a bomber. Their preferred method of attack was to fire upon the right wing root where the fuel cells were located to get the aircraft to burn.(from Oral History of the new guy – very good) Most of the bombers shot down never saw their attacker.

The Mosquito is adopted by Bennett and the PFF

An innovator, he was ready to try anything that would improve performance. A case in point was his rapid adoption of the Mosquito. He flew the aircraft and was soon enamored with what it might be able to do, but for a variety of reasons its use in Bomber Command was opposed by the Air Ministry. Bennett’s experience in flying the aircraft belayed the arguments of the Air Ministry, and he was allowed to use it. Bennett developed the Mosquito into a central part of the Pathfinder Force.

Light Night Striking Force

The Light Night Striking Force (LNSF) was an original idea of Bennetts'. He delighted in the Mosquito aircraft and saw great potential for it right away. The force used the fast and long-ranged Mosquito bomber, which could carry as much as a 4,000 pound bomb load. Mosquito production continued unabated, and Bennett found his losses were light. Over the course of time he was able to form new squadrons using surplus airplanes and surplus crews. These were used for harassing raids on Germany. To the two (Oboe-equipped) Mosquito squadrons already in Pathfinder Force, a third (No. 139) was added in June 1943, which Bennett intended to use for diversionary raids to draw the German nightfighters away from the main force. In February 1944 an entirely Mosquito raid was mounted against Düsseldorf. It was formed of the usual marker aircraft from 105 Squadron and 692 Squadron Mosquitos, each carrying a single 4,000 lb "cookie", and backup aircraft with 500 lb delayed action bombs. With Harris' support, Bennett formed more Mosquito squadrons to expand the LNSF, giving him nine bomber squadrons, as well as the Oboe-equipped markers and 8 Group's own meteorological Mosquitos. The LNSF achieved 27,239 sorties, their best month being March 1945 with nearly 3,000 sorties. This was achieved for the loss of just under 200 aircraft on operations or "damaged beyond repair".

With forward looking H2S this aircraft could truly fly in all weathers, making the Mosquito squadrons an independent force that could fly missions when all other squadrons were grounded.

Over the course of its history the Pathfinder Force flew a total of 50,490 sorties against some 3,440 targets. At least 3,727 members were killed on operations.

The force had an impact out of proportion to its size. Its attacks on Berlin in all weathers were not nuisance raids, but were mounted with as many as 120 Mosquito bombers, each carrying a 4,000 pound bomb, and were very destructive.

Defeat over Berlin

As the fall of 1943 progressed Harris had the force at hand that he believed would win the war outright without the need for an invasion. With the coming long nights of winter he had enough time in darkness for Bomber Command to reach deep into Germany. Now was the time for him for the bombing campaign he believed would bring the war to an end, the Battle of Berlin. Known by aircrews as “The big city”, it was the most heavily defended target in Germany. In mid-December 1943 long range night fighters of 141 Squadron began to accompany the bombers on the long night time journeys to Berlin. The Beaufighters and Mosquitos of 141 became part of 100 Group’s efforts to frustrate German defenses.

By January 1944 Harris recognized the losses his command was suffering were unsustainable. By the end of the effort in March losses in the air battle over Berlin were 150% of the Bomber Command force. Losses in the Pathfinder Force were slightly less than the losses of the main force. Extensive damage had been inflicted upon the city, with No conflagration was ever started. Berlin's saving grace was that it would not burn. Following an unsuccessful raid against Leipzig Harris realizes he could not keep his promise to win the war. The target was too far, the approach too predictable, and Bomber Command’s losses were too great. By March of 1944 Harris had to conceded that the Battle of Berlin was lost.

Pathfinder Force Reduced

• Nuremberg raid disaster.

Following the Peenemunde raid in August 1943 Cochrane complained of PFF marker errors and confusion, stated their own indirect method of time and distance. 37%/21% accuracy. Bennett calculates it at 37%/56%. Both thoughtful and innovative commanders. But Cochrane did not have the air experience the Bennett had, and Bennett was still flying over the target, though not officially. As the Battle of Berlin ground to its conclusion Ralph Cochrane of No. 5 Group again pressed for a change. Cochrane was an advocate of precision low-level marking, and lobbied heavily to be allowed to prove the theory, and for 5 Group to attempt targets and techniques that 8 Group would not. 5 Group had operated somewhat independently and had developed a method of target marking founded upon the low level delivery of the target markers. Explaining his methods after the war, squadron leader Leonard Cheshire pointed out: "There is an inherent problem in high level bombing. In order to bomb accurately you've got to see your aiming point, but you've got to see it 20 miles away. And you can't identify it in fact until you are over head." 617 Squadron, which had pulled off the dam buster raid, had become adept at performing extreme low level formation flying at night. Cheshire's scheme was to illuminate the target area with sky markers. A marker aircraft would then come in low over the target, 50 feet up, and drop the markers directly on the roof of the target building. A deputy marker aircraft backed up the marker aircraft a few minutes behind him. Circling number of miles off was the rest of the squadron, flying stacked up at different altitudes. After Cheshire had marked the target building satisfactorily the rest of the squadron would be called in to drop their bombs, while the squadron commander observed the results. This method was at times markedly successful, as seen in the Cheshire led bombing of the Gnome et Rhone aircraft-engine factory at Limoges February 1944 and at the attack of the V3 site in July 1944, his last operation. Bennett acknowledged that though such low level marking could be pulled off over France, but was certain the marker aircraft would not survive over intensely defended targets in Germany, and he could not see how the hundreds of aircraft of Bomber Command's Main Force orbiting a short distance away could remain unmolested while the target was being marked. Collisions were worrisome enough with that number of aircraft, but his primary concern was German night fighters, which would soon fall upon the circling force, as they did against circling 5 Group aircraft in the Cheshire led raid against the German training center at Mailly-Le-Camp. Cochrane had Harris' ear however, and when Bennett rejected the Cochrane idea Bennett was shortly thereafter summoned to RAF Bomber Command at High Wycombe where Harris informed him he was to transfer two of his Lancaster squadrons and one Mosquito squadron from the Pathfinder Force to 5 Group. Though a very hard blow to Bennett, he and the Pathfinder Force carried on in a business like manner, marking targets for the rest of the Main Force while 5 Group fought its own bomber war independently. The one good thing of the event was noted by Hamish Mahaddie, who offered that the substandard crews he had routinely received from 5 Group stopped, and from then on all the crews he received from 5 Group were crews worth the time and trouble of training. He did not even need to interview them. (recommend using a quote here instead) Cheshire and precision low level night marking of targets, initially with a Lancaster, then a Mosquito, then finally in his last raid with an American P-51 Mustang fighter.

War moves to its conclusion

The Cathedral at Cologne and surrounding structures, 1944

With the invasion of the continent entering its final stages of planning Bomber Command was placed under the orders of Dwight Eisenhower, the Supreme Allied Commander for Operation Overlord. Bomber Command was redirected to destroy the supply and communication systems of northern France. Pathfinder navigational aids and marking techniques made it possible for Bomber Command to destroy marshalling yards throughout northern France. German movement was substantially hindered, and the transportation of supplies and reserves to the Normandy battlefront became very difficult. Following the invasion and the liberation of France there was far less occupied territory to fly over. Oboe is extended by mobile stations set up on the continent, making accurate navigation all the easier. The Pathfinder Force and Bomber Command was marking and destroying two major targets a night. Nazi Germany’s cities were laid waste.

How the Pathfinder Force functioned

The prized golden eagle pin of an airman of the Pathfinder Force, never worn on operations

The most critical part of a bombing mission was the bombing run. To drop accurately a bomber could not fly evasively. He had to fly straight and level over the target area till the bomb aimer called "bombs gone", then hold his line of flight another several seconds for the automatic photoflash and the aiming point picture taken by the night camera, all completed at the one point in the trip where search lights and antiaircraft fire were the most intense.

Perhaps the best summation of the function of the Pathfinder Force was written by their adversary, the Luftwaffe. In an appraisal issued by Luftwaffenfuhrungsstab Ic/Fremde, Luftwaffen West titled British Pathfinder Operations as at March 1944, the Luftwaffe laid out the current state of affairs, and commenting on Bennett in particular and on Pathfinder Force creativity and adaptability.

To help protect the experienced Pathfinder crews, Bennett would mix in with them supporter crews - crews that flew along with the marker crews, dropped bombs and drew flak away. These were new crews that had not been earned the Pathfinder designation yet and did not drop markers. These new crews could still participate to the effectiveness of the force by flying along with the marker crews, dropping their bomb loads over the target and helping to draw flak away. Bennett took other measures to divert the German night fighters away from his Pathfinders and the Main Force bomber stream, including spoof raids and dog legged routes that would sometimes approach the target from the east. Each ship was on its own, and was flying their own mission. Of course, once over the continent you never flew straight and level, but made your way to your target with a constant irregular weave. The greatest danger was being attacked by night fighters. These did have limited time in the air at the altitude the bombers were flying at, and to be effective they had to be positioned into the bomber stream. The raid planners attempted to move them off by putting dog legs into the route so that it was hard to tell what the actual target was. They also ran spoof raids, with Mosquito laying out Target Indicators and dropping bombs on targets that were not the target of the Main Force. Later they would place German speakers on German night fighter frequencies to give bogus course instructions, or jam the frequency with high pitched noise. Later Beaufighters and Mosquito night fighters were added to

Losses among Pathfinder aircrews ended up being about the same as the Main Force, or perhaps a little less.

Technical developments

Bennett knew at the outset that to be truly effective in all weathers there would have to be significant help from electronic navigational aides.

GEE

GEE was a radio navigation system used by the Royal Air Force during World War II. It measured the time delay between two radio signals to produce a fix, with accuracy on the order of a few hundred metres at ranges up to about 350 miles (560 km). Over time the signals were jammed by the Germans, though it remained useful throughout the war to give one's position up to the coast of France, allowing a pilot to be sure of his entry point over the continent.

Oboe

Oboe was a navigational system in based on radio transponder technology. The system consisted of a pair of radio transmitters on the ground, which sent signals which were received and retransmitted by a transponder in the aircraft. By comparing the time each signal took to reach the aircraft, the distance between the aircraft and the station could be determined. The Oboe operators then sent radio signals to the aircraft to bring them onto their target and properly time the release of their bombs. The system was remarkably accurate. However, it was limited by the fact that each station operating Oboe could only control two aircraft at a time. With six stations available, the total number of aircraft that could be guided by Oboe at any given time was 12. The second limitation of Oboe was that it was a line of sight system. Aircraft could not be guided if they passed over the horizon. Thus it could not be used over distant targets such as Berlin. Once the invasion of the continent had been accomplished Oboe’s effectiveness was extended inland by the use of mobile stations.

H2S

H2S was the first airborne, ground scanning radar system. It was developed for the Royal Air Force's Bomber Command during World War II to identify targets on the ground for night and all-weather bombing, allowing attacks outside the range of the various radio navigation aids like Gee or Oboe, which were limited to about 500 kilometres (310 mi). It was also widely used as a general navigation system, allowing landmarks to be identified at long range. The H2S sets were made at PFF on breadboards. Initially used a 10 cm magnetron short pulse, with return read on a cathode ray tube. The problem with H2S was that the sets most often wold fail by the time the plane reached the target.

“Sandra” lights

Sandra lights illuminate the base of the cloud cover for night time take off.

To aid in seeing the base of the cloud cover the RAF would take three searchlights and form a cone to indicate the height of the cloud base for the departing aircraft. Search lights used in this fashion were called 'Sandra' lights.

FIDO

FIDO on either side of the runway to disperse fog.

To alleviate the dangers of attempting to land in fog, a runway system was developed to clear fog from the runway. Known as Fog Investigation and Dispersal Operation (FIDO). First put to use in November 1943, Bennett was the first to put the device to use. This installation for dispersing fog dispersing fog in bulk by artificial heating of the air consists of three main portions, burner lines, high pressure pumps, storage of the fuel. Pipes through which the petrol is pumped enclose the airfield in a rectangle, and through small holes at intervals in the pipes blazing petrol vapour is forced under great pressure, billowing two feet high. An aerodrome so equipped may use 70,000 gallons of fuel in an hour. The apparatus frequently clears the air to a height of several hundred feet, with the result that the stars are visible over the runway. Bennett was an early proponent for FIDO, arranged for its instillation at Graveley, and made the first landing on a FIDO lit runway when he brought in a Lancaster as a first test.

Summation

The Pathfinder technique enabled the greatest possible tonnage of bombs to be dropped on target in the shortest possible time. This concentration of destructive power overwhelmed the civil defenses, and led to the utter destruction of the target area. As to the air commands participating, the air war was a war of attrition. Bomber Command was able to sustain its losses, while the Luftwaffe was not.

References

Notes

Citations

Bibliography

• Ashworth, Chris RAF Bomber Command 1936-1968 Somerset, UK: Haynes Publishing (1995). ISBN 1 85260 308 9
• Bennett, Donald Pathfinder Oxford, England: Isis, 2012.
• Emerson, William Operation Pointblank Harmon Memorial Lecture No. 4 Colorado Springs (1962).
• Mahaddie, T.G. Hamish: the memoirs of Group Captain T.G. Mahaddie DSO, DFC, AFC, CZMC, CENG, FRAeS. London: Ian Allan, (1989).
• Maynard, John Bennett and the pathfinders London: Arms and Armour, (1996).
• Melinsky, Hugh (2010). Forming the Pathfinders. The History Press. ISBN 9780752454535.
• Middlebrook, Martin The Nuremberg Raid: 30 - 31 March 1944 New York, William Morrow & Company (1974).
• Middlebrook, Martin The Battle of Hamburg, Allen Lane (1980).
• Morris,
• Murray, Williamson Strategy for defeat: the Luftwaffe, 1933-1945 Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala. : Air University Press, (1989)[1983].
• Ward, Chris 3 Group Bomber Command Barnsley : Pen & Sword Aviation, (2008).

External links

• RAF Pathfinders Archive
• Pathfinder Story - Part I - a 1946 Flight article on the Pathfinders by the magazine's editor, Wing Commander Maurice A Smith, DFC.
• Pathfinder Story - Part II

Article needs

• the article needs some perspective of the difficulty of delivering bombs, the need to drop a concentration of bombs in a tight enough pattern and short enough period of time to overwhelm the civil defenses and cause a destructive conflagration, Bennett and his emphasis on navigation.

• early commitment to incendiary devices. Destroying the cities that housed the workers was more easily accomplished with fire than with blast.
• Luftwaffe appraisal March 1944. This report was obtained from Alfred Price, who brought it to the attention of Mahaddie from a former Electronics Officer in the RAFs V-Bomber Force by the name of Alfred Price.
• Initially the only advantage to finding a target that the PFF crews had over the ordinary, was that they had the best crews and the best navigators. Later they were given electronic devices to help guide the attack. These made them far more deadly.

Sources

• History of the Pathfinder Force
• The Golden Eagles: RAAF Pathfinders; Rant Foundry
• Pathfinder Force
• RAF: History page on the PFF
• Bomber Command Museum of Canada
• BOMBER COMMAND, THE PATHFINDERS, AND 97 SQUADRON
• Pathfinder Craig
• Historic UK
• RAF Wyton: The Pathfinders

To mention:

• The Bomber force had been weakened by aircraft requests by the Army and the Navy, and at the time he assumed command Harris only had 300 aircraft, with an additional 300 with the Army in North Africa, and another 300 with the Navy doing coastal patrols against the U-boat menace.
• Bennett stressed navigation - training was heavy in navigation.
• Bennett expected to be able to complete a mission regardless of the weather. Weather made no difference

In December 1941 Bennett was made wing commander of No. 77 Squadron based at Leeming in the United Kingdom, flying [[Whitley bombers (the first allied military aircraft to fly over Berlin) as part of the No. 4 Group RAF Bomber Command, in December 1941. In April 1942, No. 77 Squadron was transferred to Coastal Command where Bennett was given command of No. 10 Squadron (Handley Page Halifax) and shortly afterwards led a raid on the German battleship Tirpitz. Shot down during that raid, he evaded capture and escaped to Sweden, from where he was able to return to Britain. Bennett and his copilot were awarded the Distinguished Service Order (DSO) in 16 June 1942. A superb navigator – he authored two books on air navigation – it was Bennett who first suggested that a team of expert navigators should be formed into a force that could go to Germany in any weather, pinpoint a particular target, even through unbroken cloud or fog, and mark it for the bombers with special coloured flares and markers.

• Strong criticism from British Air Force hierarchy and from amongst their own units was at first levelled against the Pathfinder Force operations.
• Pathfinders were specially chosen from the most experienced bomber crews. They were chosen chiefly for their skill in navigation, the most important requirement in successful Pathfinding, and for tenacity and determination. They would be first at the target and at exactly the time decided before takeoff. Saturation raids, in which hundreds of heavy bombers dropped their loads in a few minutes, hinged on accurate timing, and no timing must be more accurate than that of Pathfinder.
• The nature of night bombing raid would be changed, as well. The Pathfinders would find a target and mark it in conditions which helped the bombers evade not only night fighters but also searchlights and anti-aircraft guns by using cloud cover. On normal nights the markers were dropped on the ground with a few flares in the sky, but when cloud obscured the target entirely the markers were hung in the cloud blanket and the target area marked just as accurately as ground flares. In this way the Pathfinders made possible the first successful attack on the vital Krupp steel works in Essen. Before this it had been impossible to make an accurate and concentrated attack on the Ruhr because of the industrial haze in the valley, but when the Pathfinders went to work no smoke could hide the targets. The use of flares as markers was by no means new, but the way the Pathfinders used them was unique.

Pyrotechnic experts provided a remarkable variety of markers and, by continually changing the colours and the patterns of the flares which mark the targets, they were able to confuse enemy defences. British scientists also provided markers which could be dropped accurately, had exceptional ballistic qualities and exact fusings.

Murray received his undergraduate degree in history and PhD in military-diplomatic history from Yale University.