User:Gog the Mild/Battle of Cannae

Battle of Cannae
Part of the Second Punic War
John Trumbull, The Death of Paulus Aemilius at the Battle of Cannae (1773)
Date 2 August 216 BC Location Cannae, Italy 41°18′23″N 16°7′57″E Result Carthaginian victory
Belligerents
Rome	Carthage
Commanders and leaders
Gaius Terentius Varro Lucius Aemilius Paullus †	Hannibal
Strength
86,000 80,000 infantry 6,000 cavalry	50,000 men 40,000 infantry 10,000 cavalry
Casualties and losses
67,500 48,200 killed 19,300 captured	5,700 or 8,000
class=notpageimage| Location of the battle within modern Italy

The battle of Cannae was fought on 2 August 216 BC between Roman and Carthaginian armies. The Romans, commanded by the consuls Lucius Aemilius Paullus and Gaius Terentius Varro attacked the Carthaginians under Hannibal near the ancient village of Cannae in Apulia, southeast Italy during the Second Punic War. The Carthaginians surrounded and practically annihilated a larger Roman army. It is regarded as one of the greatest tactical feats in military history and one of the worst defeats in Roman history.

Having recovered from their losses at Trebia (218 BC) and Lake Trasimene (217 BC), the Romans decided to engage Hannibal at Cannae, with approximately 86,000 Roman and allied troops. They massed their heavy infantry in a deeper formation than usual, while Hannibal used the double envelopment tactic and surrounded his enemy, trapping the majority of the Roman army, who were then slaughtered. The loss of life on the Roman side meant it was one of the most lethal single days of fighting in history. Only about 15,000 Romans, most of whom were from the garrisons of the camps and had not taken part in the battle, escaped death or capture. Following the defeat, Capua and several other Italian city-states defected from the Roman Republic to Carthage.

As news of this defeat reached Rome, the city was gripped in panic. To raise two new legions, the authorities lowered the draft age and enlisted criminals, debtors and even slaves. Despite the extreme loss of men and equipment, and a defeat later that same year by the Gauls at Silva Litana, the Romans refused to negotiate. Subsequently, the Carthaginians campaigned in southern Italy for a further 13 years, repeatedly defeating Roman armies. In 204 BC a Roman army invaded the Carthaginian homeland and defeated the Carthaginians in two major battles. Hannibal and the remnants of his army were recalled from Italy and decisively defeated at the battle of Zama. Carthage agreed to a peace treaty which stripped it of most of its territory and power.

By modern times Cannae acquired a mythic quality, and is often used as an example of the perfect defeat of an enemy army.

Primary sources Y

Polybius

The main source for almost every aspect of the Punic Wars is the historian Polybius (c. 200 – c. 118 BC), a Greek sent to Rome in 167 BC as a hostage. His works include a now largely lost manual on military tactics, but he is best known for The Histories, written sometime after 146 BC. Polybius's work is considered broadly objective and largely neutral as between Carthaginian and Roman points of view. Polybius was an analytical historian and wherever possible interviewed participants, from both sides, in the events he wrote about.

The accuracy of Polybius's account has been much debated over the past 150 years. Modern historians consider Polybius to have treated the relatives of Scipio Aemilianus, his patron and friend, unduly favourably but the consensus is to accept his account largely at face value and the details of the war in modern sources are largely based on interpretations of Polybius's account. The modern historian Andrew Curry sees Polybius as being "fairly reliable"; Craige Champion describes him as "a remarkably well-informed, industrious, and insightful historian". Polybius's account of the battle of Cannae is fully extant, although his record the subsequent Italian campaigns is fragmentary.

The account of the Roman historian Livy, was written some 200 years after the battle. Livy used Polybius's account as well as several other sources. Livy valued style and dramatic effect over strict accuracy and wrote from a strongly pro-Roman viewpoint; the classicist Adrian Goldsworthy says Livy's "reliability is often suspect". Unlike Polybius, Livy's grasp of military realities was often shaky, causing the historian Phillip Sabin to refer to Livy's "military ignorance". Livy's record of the whole of the Second Punic War has survived.

Other, later, ancient histories of the battle exist, although often in fragmentary or summary form. Modern historians usually take into account the writings of the Greek author Appian; he is described by John Lazenby as "clearly far inferior" to Livy and Philip Sabin dismisses his account of Cannae as "a worthless farrago". The Greek moralist Plutarch wrote several biographies of Roman commanders of the period in his Parallel Lives . Other sources include coins, inscriptions, archaeological evidence and empirical evidence from reconstructions.

Background Y

Pre-war

The approximate extent of territory controlled by Rome and Carthage immediately before the start of the Second Punic War

The First Punic War was fought from 264 to 241 BC between Carthage and Rome: these two main powers of the western Mediterranean in the 3rd century BC struggled for supremacy primarily on the Mediterranean island of Sicily and its surrounding waters and in North Africa. The war lasted for 23 years until the Carthaginians were defeated. Five years later an army commanded by the leading Carthaginian general Hamilcar Barca landed in Carthaginian Iberia (modern south-east Spain) which he greatly expanded and turned into a quasi-monarchical, autonomous territory ruled by the Barcids. This expansion gained Carthage silver mines, agricultural wealth, manpower, military facilities such as shipyards and territorial depth, which encouraged it to resist future Roman demands.

Hamilcar ruled as viceroy until his death in 228 BC. He was succeeded by his son-in-law, Hasdrubal, then his son Hannibal in 221 BC. In 226 BC the Ebro Treaty established the Ebro River as the northern boundary of the Carthaginian sphere of influence in Iberia. A little later Rome made a separate treaty of association with the independent city of Saguntum, well south of the Ebro. In 219 BC a Carthaginian army under Hannibal besieged, captured and sacked Saguntum, which led Rome to declare war on Carthage.

Meanwhile, the major Gallic tribes in Cisalpine Gaul (modern northern Italy), antagonised by the founding of several Roman settlements on traditionally Gallic territory, attacked the Romans, capturing several towns and repeatedly ambushing a Roman relief force. The Roman Senate reinforced their army in Cisalpine Gaul while also preparing armies to invade Carthaginian territories.

Carthage invades Italy

Hannibal's route from Iberia to Italy

Hannibal assembled a Carthaginian army in New Carthage (modern Cartagena) and marched north into Gaul in May 218 BC, leaving his brother, Hasdrubal Barca, in charge of Carthaginian interests in Iberia. The Carthaginian army crossed the Alps in October, surmounting the difficulties of climate, terrain and the guerrilla tactics of the native tribes. Hannibal arrived with 20,000 infantry and 6,000 cavalry – in Cisalpine Gaul. The Romans had already withdrawn to their winter quarters and were astonished by Hannibal's appearance. The Carthaginians asserted their power by destroying the capital of a local Gallic tribe and enslaving its populace, defeated the local Roman forces in a large skirmish and recruited heavily from the local Gauls.

The Romans concentrated their two main field armies in northern Italy near Placentia, where they were commanded by Sempronius Longus In late December 218 BC Numidian cavalry lured Sempronius and his army out of their camp and onto ground of Hannibal's choosing. there the battle of the Trebia took place with evenly matched armies of 40,000 men each. Most of the Romans were killed or captured by the Carthaginians, but 10,000 under Sempronius fought their way to the safety of Placentia. Recognising the Carthaginians as the dominant force in Cisalpine Gaul, Gallic recruits flocked to them and their army grew to 60,000.

1777 statue of Fabius

In early spring 217 BC the Carthaginians crossed the Apennines unopposed, taking a difficult but unguarded route. Hannibal attempted to draw the main Roman army under Gaius Flaminius into a pitched battle by devastating the area they had been sent to protect. This provoked Flaminius into a hasty pursuit. Hannibal set an ambush and in the battle of Lake Trasimene completely defeated the Roman army, killing 15,000 Romans, including Flaminius, and taking 10,000 prisoners. A cavalry force of 4,000 from another Roman army was also defeated at the Battle of Umbrian Lake and annihilated. The prisoners were badly treated if they were Romans; captured Latin allies were well treated by the Carthaginians and many were freed and sent back to their cities, in the expectation they would speak well of Carthaginian martial prowess and of their treatment. Hannibal hoped some of these allies could be persuaded to defect.

The populace of Rome fell into a panic when word of the defeat at Lake Trasimene was received. Quintus Fabius Maximus Verrucosus was elected dictator by the Roman Assembly and adopted the "Fabian strategy" of avoiding pitched conflict, relying instead on low-level harassment to wear the invader down while Rome rebuilt its military strength. Hannibal was left largely free to ravage Apulia for the next year, until the Romans ended the dictatorship and elected Paullus and Varro as consuls in 216 BC. The Roman Senate authorised the raising of a force of 86,000 men by Varro and Paullus, the largest in Roman history up to that point.

Opposing forces

Roman

For broader coverage of this topic, see Roman army of the mid-Republic.

The bowl of a

A Montefortino-type helmet, which was used by Roman infantry between c. 300 BC and c. AD 100. The cheek guards are missing.

Most male Roman citizens were liable for military service and would serve as infantry, with a better-off minority providing a cavalry component. Traditionally, when at war the Romans would raise two legions, each of 4,200 infantry and 300 cavalry; the infantry component could be increased to 5,000 in some circumstances, or, rarely, even more. Approximately 1,200 of the infantry, poorer or younger men unable to afford the armour and equipment of a standard legionary, served as javelin-armed skirmishers, known as velites; they carried several javelins, which would be thrown from a distance, a short sword and a 90-centimetre (3 ft) circular shield. The balance were equipped as heavy infantry, with body armour, a large shield and short thrusting swords. They were divided into three ranks, of which the front rank also carried two javelins, while the second and third ranks had a thrusting spear instead.

Both legionary sub-units and individual legionaries fought in relatively open order. An army was usually formed by combining a Roman legion with a similarly sized and equipped legion provided by their Latin allies, but sometimes consisted of two Roman and two allied legions. Allied legions had a larger attached complement of cavalry than Roman ones. For the Cannae campaign the Senate authorised the raising of a double-sized army – eight Roman and eight allied legions – each to include 5,000 infantry, giving a total of 80,000 infantry and 6,000 cavalry. These figures are based on Polybius's account; Livy passes on these figures, but also records that some of his sources suggest a smaller Roman army with a maximum of 60,000 infantry and possibly fewer.

Carthaginian

For broader coverage of this topic, see Military of Carthage.

A Carthaginian cavalryman, as depicted in 1891

Carthage usually recruited foreigners to form the cavalry and infantry units which made up its army. Many of its cavalry were from North Africa, and are usually referred to as Libyans; the region provided two main types of cavalry: close-order shock cavalry (also known as "heavy cavalry") carrying spears; and light cavalry skirmishers from Numidia who threw javelins from a distance and avoided close combat. Both types of cavalry would also carry shields, the light cavalry's were smaller and lighter than the heavy cavalry's. Iberia and Gaul also provided experienced cavalry: mostly unarmoured close-order troops. The Gallic cavalry used four-horned saddles with the wealthier among them wearing mail armour. Livy referred to the Iberian cavalry as "steady", meaning that they were accustomed to sustained hand-to-hand combat rather than hit and run tactics. Hannibal's 10,000-strong cavalry contingent would have consisted of these three types, but the numbers of each are not known.

the infantry included javelin-armed light infantry skirmishers, mostly from Africa; close-order African infantry who were originally equipped with large shields, helmets, short swords and long thrusting spears and were among the most experienced of the Carthaginian troops; they fought in a tightly packed formation known as a phalanx. By the time of Cannae, many of them had been re-equipped with Roman gear. It is unclear whether this meant just Roman armour, or if it included the distinctive Roman shields (scutum), swords and throwing spears. Specialist slingers were recruited from the Balearic Islands; they fought in open order as skirmishers. Both Iberia and Gaul provided experienced close-order infantry. These were unarmoured and would charge ferociously, but had a reputation for breaking off if a combat was protracted; they carried large shields, heavy swords, and used javelins or throwing spears. It is widely accepted that the Carthaginian army consisted of approximately 40,000 infantry and 10,000 cavalry.

Figures for troops involved in ancient battles are often unreliable, and Cannae is no exception. They should be treated with caution, especially those for the Carthaginian side. The Carthaginian army was a combination of warriors from numerous regions, and may have numbered between 40,000 and 50,000. Their infantry comprised an estimated 8,000 Libyans, 5,500 Gaetulian, 16,000 Gauls, mainly Boii and Insubres (8,000 were left at camp the day of battle) and 8,000 of several tribes of Hispania, including Iberians, Celtiberians and Lusitanians. Hannibal's cavalry also came from diverse backgrounds. He commanded 4,000 Numidian, 2,000 Iberian peninsular, 4,000 Gallic and 450 Libyan-Phoenician cavalry. Finally, Hannibal had an auxiliary skirmisher contingent consisting of 1,000–2,000 Balearic slingers and 6,000 mixed-nationality javelinmen, possibly including Lusitanians among them. The uniting factor for the Carthaginian army was the personal tie each group had with Hannibal.

Prelude

A modern monument near the site of the Battle of Cannae

In the spring of 216 BC Hannibal seized the large supply depot at Cannae on the Apulian plain. Paullus and Varro marched southward to confront Hannibal and encamped 10 km (6 mi) away.

Ihe historian Martin Samuels has questioned whether it was Varro in command on the grounds that Paullus may have been in command on the right. Daly notes that in the Roman military, the right was always the place of command. He suggests that at the Battle of Zama Hannibal claimed to have fought Paullus at Cannae and concludes that it is impossible to be sure who was in command on the day.

The two armies stayed in their respective locations for two days. During the second day (August 1) Hannibal, aware that Varro would be in command the following day, left his camp and offered battle, but Paullus refused. Hannibal then sent his cavalry to the smaller Roman camp to harass soldiers fetching water for the camp, disrupting the supply of water to it.

Battle

Deployment

The conventional deployment for armies of the time was placement of infantry in the center, with the cavalry in two flanking wings. The Romans followed this convention fairly closely, but chose extra depth rather than breadth for the infantry in hopes of breaking quickly through the center of Hannibal's line. Varro knew how the Roman infantry had managed to penetrate Hannibal's center at Trebia, and he planned to recreate this on an even greater scale. Even though they outnumbered the Carthaginians, this depth-oriented deployment meant that the Roman lines had a front of roughly equal width to their numerically inferior opponents.

Hannibal deployed his forces based on the particular fighting qualities of each unit. This aspect of Hannibal's leadership was highlighted in the use of a Spanish unit, the Balearic slingers, whom he placed behind the infantry to hurl their ranged missiles into the masses of Roman troops. He placed his Iberians, Celtiberians and Gauls in the middle, alternating the ethnic composition between Hispanics and Gauls across the front line, with himself at the front and center alongside his brother Mago. Meanwhile, infantry from Punic Africa was on the wings at the very edge of his infantry line. This infantry would remain cohesive and attack the Roman flanks.

Hasdrubal led the Hispanic and Gallic close-order cavalry on the left, near the River Aufidus. By placing the flank of his army on the Aufidus, Hannibal prevented it from being overlapped by the more numerous Romans. Hasdrubal was given 6,000–7,000 cavalry, and Hanno had 3,000–4,000 Numidians on the right.

Hannibal intended that Hasdrubal's cavalry would defeat the weaker Roman cavalry in front of them, join the Numidians and defeat the Roman cavalry on the other flank, and then attack the Roman infantry from the rear. Meanwhile, his infantry in the centre would be pressed back by the weight of Roman numbers, while the Africans on their flanks, in a deeper formation, the flanHis veteran African troops would then press in from the flanks at the crucial moment, and encircle the overextended Romans.

Initial contact

The cavalry did not move into contact at speed, but at a fast walk or slow trot; any faster would have "ended in a growing pile of injured men and horses", according to the modern historian Sam Koon. Once in contact with the enemy, many of the cavalrymen dismounted to fight; this was a frequent occurrence in Punic War cavalry combat. There is debate among modern scholars as to the reasons for this common tactic.

As the armies advanced on one another, Hannibal gradually extended the center of his line, as Polybius described: "After thus drawing up his whole army in a straight line, he took the central companies of Hispanics and Celts and advanced with them, keeping the rest of them in contact with these companies, but gradually falling off, so as to produce a crescent-shaped formation, the line of the flanking companies growing thinner as it was prolonged, his object being to employ the Africans as a reserve force and to begin the action with the Hispanics and Celts." Polybius described the weak Carthaginian center as deployed in a crescent, curving out toward the Romans in the middle with the African troops on their flanks in echelon formation. It is believed that the purpose of this formation was to break the forward momentum of the Roman infantry, and delay its advance before other developments allowed Hannibal to deploy his African infantry most effectively. While the majority of historians feel that Hannibal's action was deliberate, some have called this account fanciful, and claim that the actions of the day represent either the natural curvature that occurs when a broad front of infantry marches forward, or the bending back of the Carthaginian center from the shock action of meeting the heavily massed Roman center.

The battle began with a fierce cavalry engagement on the flanks. Polybius described many of the Hispanic and Celtic horsemen facing the Romans dismounting due to the lack of space to fight on horseback, and called the struggle "barbaric" in the sense of its utter brutality. When the Carthaginian cavalry got the upper hand, they cut down their Roman opponents without giving quarter. On the other flank the Numidians engaged in a way that merely kept the Roman allied cavalry occupied. Hasdrubal kept his victorious Hispanic and Gallic cavalry under control and did not chase the retreating Roman right wing. Instead, he led them to the other side of the field to attack the socii cavalry still fighting the Numidians. Assailed from both sides, the allied cavalry broke before Hasdrubal could charge into contact and the Numidians pursued them off the field.

The light infantry on both sides engaged in indecisive skirmishing, inflicting few casualties and quickly withdrawing through the ranks of their heavy infantry. As the Roman heavy infantry attacked, Hannibal stood with his men in the weak center and held them together in a controlled retreat. The crescent of Hispanic and Gallic troops buckled inwards as they gradually withdrew step by step. Knowing the superiority of the Roman infantry, Hannibal had instructed his infantry to withdraw deliberately, creating an even tighter semicircle around the attacking Roman forces. By doing so, he had turned the strength of the Roman infantry into a weakness. While the front ranks were gradually advancing, the bulk of the Roman troops began to lose their cohesion, as troops from the reserve lines advanced into the growing gaps. Soon they were compacted together so closely that they had little space to wield their weapons. In pressing so far forward in their desire to destroy the retreating and seemingly collapsing line of Hispanic and Gallic troops, the Romans had ignored (possibly due to the dust) the African troops that stood uncommitted on the projecting ends of this now-reversed crescent. This also gave the Carthaginian cavalry time to drive the Roman cavalry off on both flanks and attack the Roman center in the rear. The Roman infantry, now stripped of protection on both its flanks, formed a wedge that drove deeper and deeper into the Carthaginian semicircle, driving itself into an alley formed by the African infantry on the wings. At this decisive point, Hannibal ordered his African infantry to turn inwards and advance against the Roman flanks, creating an encirclement in one of the earliest known examples of a pincer movement.

When the Carthaginian cavalry attacked the Romans in the rear and the African flanking echelons assailed them on their right and left, the advance of the Roman infantry was brought to an abrupt halt. The Romans were henceforth enclosed in a pocket with no means of escape. The Carthaginians created a wall and began to systematically massacre them. Polybius wrote: "as their outer ranks were continually cut down, and the survivors forced to pull back and huddle together, they were finally all killed where they stood." Only 14,000 Roman troops managed to escape, most of whom had cut their way through to the nearby town of Canusium.

Casualties

Polybius writes that 70,000 Romans were killed and 10,000 captured, with 10,000 infantry and 370 cavalry escaping. As this gives a total higher than the number of Romans he states were engaged, these figures are usually discounted. Instead, Livy's figures are preferred: he gives 45,500 infantry killed and 3,000 captured during the battle; and cavalry losses of 2,700 dead and 1,500 captured. A further 14,800 Romans were taken prisoner the next day.

Polybius reports Carthaginian losses as 5,700, of whom 4,000 were Gauls and 200 were cavalrymen. Livy gives a total of 8,000. Goldsworthy states that either of these figures constituted an "appallingly high" proportion for a victorious army. This assumes that these figures include those wounded; it is possible that they refer just to Carthaginians killed, which would mean a staggering casualty rate for the victors. The total of more than 50,000 killed has caused Cannae to be labelled as "one of the bloodiest single day's fighting in history".

Aftermath

Roman survivors retreated to their two camps or into the town of Cannae, where they joined their garrisons, who had not fought. Overnight 4,200 Romans made their way to Canusium, 10 kilometres (6.2 mi) to the south west. The next day the camps and Cannae were attacked and the Romans there offered little or no resistance before surrendering. During the course of the day 14,800 Romans were captured. By the end of the day approximately 10,000 Roman survivors assembled in Canusium under Varro.

Miles describes Cannae as "Rome's greatest military disaster". Toni Ñaco del Hoyo describes the Trebia, Lake Trasimene and Cannae as the three "great military calamities" suffered by the Romans in the first three years of the war. Brian Carey writes that these three defeats brought Rome to the brink of collapse. Within a few weeks of Cannae a Roman army of 25,000 was ambushed by Boii Gauls in Cisalpine Gaul at the battle of Silva Litana and annihilated. In 20 months Rome had lost one-fifth (150,000) of its population of male citizens over 17 years of age.

Hannibal counting the signet rings of the Roman knights killed during the battle, statue by Sébastien Slodtz, 1704, Louvre

There has been debate among historians as to why Hannibal did not march the Carthaginian army on Rome in the immediate aftermath of the battle, in the hope of capturing the city and ending the war. One of his cavalry commanders, Maharbal, urged this course upon him, and when he demurred is supposed to have lamented "" Hannibal had good reasons to judge the strategic situation after the battle differently from Maharbal. Due to the high numbers of killed and wounded among its ranks, the Punic army was not in a condition to perform a direct assault on Rome. It would have been a fruitless demonstration that would have nullified the psychological effect of Cannae on the Roman allies. Even if his army was at full strength, a successful siege of Rome would have required Hannibal to subdue a considerable part of the hinterland to cut the enemy's supplies and secure his own. Even after the tremendous losses suffered at Cannae and the defection of a number of her allies, Rome still had abundant manpower to prevent this and maintain considerable forces in Iberia, Sicily, Sardinia and elsewhere despite Hannibal's presence in Italy. Hannibal's conduct after the victories at Trasimene (217 BC) and Cannae, and the fact that he first attacked Rome only five years later, in 211 BC, suggests that his strategic aim was not the destruction of his foe but to wear them down to a moderate peace agreement by stripping them of their allies. "In fact there were many good reasons for not marching on Rome," military expert Robert O'Connell writes, "and only one good reason for going."

Instead, Hannibal sent a delegation led by Carthalo to negotiate a peace treaty with the Senate on moderate terms. The Senate refused to parley. Instead redoubling their efforts, declaring full mobilization of the male Roman population, raising new legions, enlisting landless peasants and even slaves. So firm were these measures that the word "peace" and public tears were prohibited. The Romans were so desperate that they resorted to human sacrifice, twice burying people alive at the Forum of Rome. Fabius became consul in 215 BC and was re-elected in 214 BC.

Philip V of Macedon pledged his support to Hannibal following the Carthaginian victory.

After Cannae, the Hellenistic southern provinces of Arpi, Salapia, Herdonia, and Uzentum, including the cities of Capua and Tarentum (two of the largest city-states in Italy) revoked their allegiance to Rome and pledged their loyalty to Hannibal. Following the battle, Sicily's Greek cities rose in revolt and Hannibal also secured an alliance with the King Hieronymus of Syracuse. The Macedonian king, Philip V, pledged his support to Carthage, initiating the First Macedonian War against Rome.. After Cannae the Carthaginians campaigned in southern Italy for a further 13 years.

In 204 BC a Roman army under Publius Cornelius Scipio, who fought at Cannae, invaded the Carthaginian homeland, defeated the Carthaginians in two major battles and won the allegiance of the Numidian kingdoms of North Africa. Hannibal and the remnants of his army were recalled from Italy to confront him. They met at the Battle of Zama in October 202 BC and Hannibal was decisively defeated. As a consequence, Carthage agreed to a peace treaty which stripped it of most of its territory and power.

Historical significance

Shield of Henry II of France depicting Hannibal's victory at Cannae, an allusion to France's conflict with the Holy Roman Empire during the 16th century.

Status in military history

Cannae is as famous for Hannibal's tactics as it is for the role it played in Roman history. Not only did Hannibal inflict a defeat on the Roman Republic in a manner unrepeated for over a century until the lesser-known Battle of Arausio, the battle has acquired a significant reputation in military history. As the military historian Theodore Ayrault Dodge wrote: "Few battles of ancient times are more marked by ability ... than the battle of Cannae ... is a simple masterpiece of battle tactics ... The whole battle, from the Carthaginian standpoint, is a consummate piece of art, having no superior, few equal, examples in the history of war." Will Durant wrote, "It was a supreme example of generalship, never bettered in history... and it set the lines of military tactics for 2,000 years".

Hannibal's double envelopment at Cannae is often viewed as one of the greatest battlefield maneuvers in history, and is cited as the first successful use of the pincer movement within the Western world to be recorded in detail.

"Cannae model"

Apart from being one of the greatest defeats inflicted on Roman arms, Cannae represents the archetypal battle of annihilation, a strategy that has rarely succeeded since. As Dwight D. Eisenhower, the Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force in World War II, wrote, "Every ground commander seeks the battle of annihilation; so far as conditions permit, he tries to duplicate in modern war the classic example of Cannae". "Cannae" has become a byword for military success, and the battle is studied in military academies around the world. The notion that an entire army could be encircled and annihilated within a single stroke led to a fascination among Western generals for centuries (including Frederick the Great and Helmuth von Moltke), who attempted to create their own "Cannae".

In 1991, General Norman Schwarzkopf Jr., commander of coalition forces in the Gulf War, cited Hannibal's triumph at Cannae as inspiration for the rapid and successful coalition operations during the conflict.

Notes, citations and sources

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• Briscoe, John (2006) [1989]. "The Second Punic War". In Astin, A. E.; Walbank, F. W.; Frederiksen, M. W.; Ogilvie, R. M. (eds.). The Cambridge Ancient History: Rome and the Mediterranean to 133 B.C. Vol. VIII (2 ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 44–80. ISBN 978-0-521-23448-1.
• Le Bohec, Yann (2015) [2011]. "The "Third Punic War": The Siege of Carthage (148–146 BC)". In Hoyos, Dexter (ed.). A Companion to the Punic Wars. Chichester, West Sussex: John Wiley & Sons. pp. 430–446. ISBN 978-1-1190-2550-4.
• Carey, Brian Todd (2007). Hannibal's Last Battle: Zama & the Fall of Carthage. Barnsley, South Yorkshire: Pen & Sword. ISBN 978-1-84415-635-1.
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• Coarelli, Filippo (2002). "I ritratti di 'Mario' e 'Silla' a Monaco e il sepolcro degli Scipioni". Eutopia Nuova Serie (in Italian). II (1): 47–75. ISSN 1121-1628.
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• Erdkamp, Paul (2015) [2011]. "Manpower and Food Supply in the First and Second Punic Wars". In Hoyos, Dexter (ed.). A Companion to the Punic Wars. Chichester, West Sussex: John Wiley. pp. 58–76. ISBN 978-1-1190-2550-4.
• Etcheto, Henri (2012). Les Scipions. Famille et pouvoir à Rome à l'époque républicaine (in French). Bordeaux: Ausonius Éditions. ISBN 978-2-35613-073-0.
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