User:EyeTruth/sandbox

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  1. ^ B is cooler than A

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Blitz harvnb version[edit]

The plan was code named Unternehmen Zitadelle (Operation Citadel). According to some contemporary military historians, the operation envisioned a blitzkrieg,[a] but some other military historians and many of the German participants, including von Manstein, made no mention of blitzkrieg in their characterization of the operation.[b]

  1. ^ Some military historians consider Operation Citadel, or at least the southern pincer, as envisioning a blitzkrieg attack or was intended as such. Some of the historians that characterize the intended plan as such include: Lloyd Clark (Clark 2012, p. 187), Roger Moorhouse (Moorhouse 2011, p. 342), Mary Kathryn Barbier (Barbier 2002, p. 10), David Glantz (Glantz 1986, p. 24) (Glantz & House 2004, p. 63, 78, 149, 269, 272, 280), Jonathan House (Glantz & House 2004, p. 63, 78, 149, 269, 272, 280), Hedley Paul Willmott (Willmott 1990, p. 300), Oscar Pinkus (Pinkus 2005, p. 35), etc. Also, Zetterling and Frankson specifically considered only the southern pincer as a "classical blitzkrieg attack."(Zetterling & Frankson 2000, p. 137)
  2. ^ Many of the German participants of Operation Citadel, make no mention of blitzkrieg in their characterization of the operation. Several German officers and commanders involved in the operation wrote their account of the battle after the war, and some of these postwar accounts were collected by the U.S. Army. Some these officers are:Theodor Busse (Newton 2002, pp. 3–27), Erhard Raus (Newton 2002, pp. 29–64), Friedrich Fangohr(Newton 2002, pp. 65–96), Peter von der Groeben (Newton 2002, pp. 97–144), Friedrich Wilhelm von Mellenthin (Mellenthin 1956, pp. 212–234), Erich von Manstein (Manstein 1958, pp. 443–449), etc. Mellenthin stated: "The German command was committing exactly the same error as in the previouos year. Then we attacked the city of Stalingrad, now we were to attack the fortress of Kursk. In both cases the German Army threw away all its advantages in mobile tactics, and met the Russians on ground of their own choosing." (Mellenthin 1956, p. 217) Heinz Guderian, the most prominent of Germany's "tank men", strongly opposed the operation on the grounds that it violated his principles on the use of armour, although he made no mention of blitzkrieg (Guderian 1938, pp. 307–308). He predicted the offensive could only achieve a limited result, at a cost too great to justify the effort, saying "The great commitment would certainly not bring equivalent gains" (Guderian 1952, p. 308). Some of the military historians that make no mention of blitzkrieg in their characterization of the operation are: Mark Healy (Healy 2008), George Nipe (Nipe 2010), Steven Newton (Newton 2002), Dieter Brand (Brand 2000), Bruno Kasdorf (Kasdorf 2000), etc.

Cleaner version (from poll)[edit]

The plan was code named Unternehmen Zitadelle (Operation Citadel).[1] According to some military historians, the operation envisioned a blitzkrieg,[a] but some other military historians and many of the German participants, including von Manstein, made no mention of blitzkrieg in their characterization of the operation.[b] The plan for the operation consisted of a double envelopment that was directed at Kursk to surround the majority of the Soviet defenders and seal off the salient.[2]

  1. ^ Some military historians consider Operation Citadel, or at least the southern pincer, as envisioning a blitzkrieg attack or state it was intended as such. Some of the historians taking this view are: Lloyd Clark (Clark 2012, p. 187), Roger Moorhouse (Moorhouse 2011, p. 342), Mary Kathryn Barbier (Barbier 2002, p. 10), David Glantz (Glantz 1986, p. 24; Glantz & House 2004, p. 63, 78, 149, 269, 272, 280), Jonathan House (Glantz & House 2004, p. 63, 78, 149, 269, 272, 280), Hedley Paul Willmott (Willmott 1990, p. 300), and others. Also, Niklas Zetterling and Anders Frankson specifically considered only the southern pincer as a "classical blitzkrieg attack" (Zetterling & Frankson 2000, p. 137).
  2. ^ Many of the German participants of Operation Citadel make no mention of blitzkrieg in their characterization of the operation. Several German officers and commanders involved in the operation wrote their account of the battle after the war, and some of these postwar accounts were collected by the U.S. Army. Some of these officers are: Theodor Busse (Newton 2002, pp. 3–27), Erhard Raus (Newton 2002, pp. 29–64), Friedrich Fangohr (Newton 2002, pp. 65–96), Peter von der Groeben (Newton 2002, pp. 97–144), Friedrich Wilhelm von Mellenthin (Mellenthin 1956, pp. 212–234), Erich von Manstein (Manstein 1958, pp. 443–449), and others. Mellenthin stated: "The German command was committing exactly the same error as in the previous year. Then we attacked the city of Stalingrad, now we were to attack the fortress of Kursk. In both cases the German Army threw away all its advantages in mobile tactics, and met the Russians on ground of their own choosing." (Mellenthin 1956, p. 217) Some of the military historians that make no mention of blitzkrieg in their characterization of the operation are: Mark Healy (Healy 2008), George Nipe (Nipe 2010), Steven Newton (Newton 2002), Dieter Brand (Brand 2000), Bruno Kasdorf (Kasdorf 2000), and others.

Blitz sfn version[edit]

According to some contemporary military historians, the operation envisioned a blitzkrieg,[a] but some other military historians and many of the German participants, including von Manstein, made no mention of blitzkrieg in their characterization of the operation.[b]

  1. ^ Some military historians consider Operation Citadel, or at least the southern pincer, as envisioning a blitzkrieg attack or was intended as such. Some of the historians that characterize the intended plan as such include: Lloyd Clark[2], Roger Moorhouse[3], Mary Kathryn Barbier[4], David Glantz[5][6], Jonathan House[6], Hedley Paul Willmott[7], Oscar Pinkus[8], etc. Also, Zetterling and Frankson specifically considered only the southern pincer as a "classical blitzkrieg attack."[9]
  2. ^ Many of the German participants of Operation Citadel, make no mention of blitzkrieg in their characterization of the operation. Several German officers and commanders involved in the operation wrote their account of the battle after the war, and some of these postwar accounts were collected by the U.S. Army. Some of these officers are: Theodor Busse[10], Erhard Raus[11], Friedrich Fangohr[12], Peter von der Groeben[13], Friedrich Wilhelm von Mellenthin[14], Erich von Manstein[15], etc. Mellenthin stated: "The German command was committing exactly the same error as in the previouos year. Then we attacked the city of Stalingrad, now we were to attack the fortress of Kursk. In both cases the German Army threw away all its advantages in mobile tactics, and met the Russians on ground of their own choosing."[16] Heinz Guderian, the most prominent of Germany's "tank men", strongly opposed the operation on the grounds that it violated his principles on the use of armour, although he made no mention of blitzkrieg[17]. He predicted the offensive could only achieve a limited result, at a cost too great to justify the effort, saying "the great commitment would certainly not bring equivalent gains"[18]. Some of the military historians that make no mention of blitzkrieg in their characterization of the operation are: Mark Healy[19], George Nipe[20], Steven Newton[21], Dieter Brand[22], Bruno Kasdorf[23], etc.

Cleaner version (from poll)[edit]

The plan was code named Unternehmen Zitadelle (Operation Citadel). According to some contemporary military historians, the operation envisioned a blitzkrieg,[a] but some other military historians and many of the German participants, including von Manstein, made no mention of blitzkrieg in their characterization of the operation.[b] The plan for the operation consisted of a double envelopment that was directed at Kursk to surround the majority of the Soviet defenders and seal off the salient.[2]

  1. ^ Some military historians consider Operation Citadel, or at least the southern pincer, as envisioning a blitzkrieg attack or state it was intended as such. Some of the historians taking this view are: Lloyd Clark[2], Mary Kathryn Barbier[4], David Glantz[5][6], Jonathan House[6], Hedley Paul Willmott [7], Roger Moorhouse[3] and others. Also, Niklas Zetterling and Anders Frankson specifically consider only the southern pincer as a "classical blitzkrieg attack."[9]
  2. ^ Many of the German participants of Operation Citadel make no mention of blitzkrieg in their characterization of the operation. Several German officers and commanders involved in the operation wrote their account of the battle after the war, and some of these postwar accounts were collected by the U.S. Army. Some of these officers are: Theodor Busse[10], Erhard Raus[11], Friedrich Fangohr[12], Peter von der Groeben[13], Friedrich Wilhelm von Mellenthin[14], Erich von Manstein[15], and others. Mellenthin stated: "The German command was committing exactly the same error as in the previous year. Then we attacked the city of Stalingrad, now we were to attack the fortress of Kursk. In both cases the German Army threw away all its advantages in mobile tactics, and met the Russians on ground of their own choosing."[16] Some of the military historians that make no mention of blitzkrieg in their characterization of the operation are: Mark Healy[19], George Nipe[20], Steven Newton[21], Dieter Brand[22], Bruno Kasdorf[23], and others.

Crazy[edit]

Bad boy.[A] Good boys.[B] The earth is flat.[C] The sun is red.[D] The moon is white.[E] The sea is black.[F] The sky is green.[G] Fire will burn.[H] Water will flow.[I] Ice will cool.[J] [24]

Notes[edit]

  1. ^ a b B is cooler than C.[24]
  2. ^ a b B is cooler than A.[25]
  3. ^ a b B is cooler[26] than B.[25]
  4. ^ B is cooler than G.[24]
  5. ^ B is cooler than GGH.[27]
  6. ^ B is cooler[25] than YUX
  7. ^ B is cooler than HHT
  8. ^ B is cooler than N
  9. ^ B is cooler[26] than GX
  10. ^ B is cooler than XD

Cite error: A list-defined reference named "FOOTNOTEPope201310" is not used in the content (see the help page).
Cite error: A list-defined reference named "FOOTNOTELord201310" is not used in the content (see the help page).

Cite error: A list-defined reference named "FOOTNOTEZeus201310" is not used in the content (see the help page).

Citations[edit]

  1. ^ Glantz & House 2004, p. 25.
  2. ^ a b c d Clark 2012, p. 187.
  3. ^ a b Moorhouse 2011, p. 342.
  4. ^ a b Barbier 2002, p. 10.
  5. ^ a b Glantz 1986, p. 24.
  6. ^ a b c d Glantz & House 2004, p. 63, 78, 149, 269, 272, 280.
  7. ^ a b Willmott 1990, p. 300.
  8. ^ Pinkus 2005, p. 35.
  9. ^ a b Zetterling & Frankson 2000, p. 137.
  10. ^ a b Newton 2002, pp. 3–27.
  11. ^ a b Newton 2002, pp. 29–64.
  12. ^ a b Newton 2002, pp. 65–96.
  13. ^ a b Newton 2002, pp. 97–144.
  14. ^ a b Mellenthin 1956, pp. 212–234.
  15. ^ a b Manstein 1958, pp. 443–449.
  16. ^ a b Mellenthin 1956, p. 217.
  17. ^ Guderian 1938, pp. 307–308.
  18. ^ Guderian 1952, p. 308.
  19. ^ a b Healy 2008.
  20. ^ a b Nipe 2010.
  21. ^ a b Newton 2002.
  22. ^ a b Brand 2000.
  23. ^ a b Kasdorf 2000.
  24. ^ a b c King 2013, p. 10. sfn error: multiple targets (2×): CITEREFKing2013 (help)
  25. ^ a b Lord 2013, p. 10. sfn error: multiple targets (2×): CITEREFLord2013 (help)
  26. ^ Zeus 2013, p. 10. sfn error: multiple targets (2×): CITEREFZeus2013 (help)

References[edit]

  • King, Papa (2013). This is a test. EyeTruth.
  • Zeus, Papa (2013). This is a test. EyeTruth.
  • Pope, Papa (2013). This is a test. EyeTruth.
  • Lord, Papa (2013). This is a test. EyeTruth.
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