User:Bobanni/upa

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Ukrainian Insurgent Army
LeadersRoman Shukhevych, Vasyl Kuk
Dates of operation1943-1955
Active regionsUkraine
Size100,000
Alliestemporary arrangements with Nazi Germany
OpponentsNazi German SS, the Polish Armia Krajowa, Soviet partisans, the Soviet Red Army, NKVD
Battles and warsmainly guerrilla activity


The Ukrainian Insurgent Army ([Українська Повстанська Армія, Ukrayins’ka Povstans’ka Armiya, UPA] Error: {{Lang-xx}}: text has italic markup (help)) formed in 1943 [1] in Volhynia (located in western Ukraine). Many members of the UPA saw themselves as the military wing of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) in its struggle for Ukrainian independence. OUN was political arm of the Ukrainian independence movement. The OUN accepted violence as a political tool against foreign and domestic enemies of their cause. In aid of this policy UPA was responsible for the killing and ethnic cleansing of much of western Ukraine's Polish population. OUN's stated goal was an independent and unified Ukrainian state.

UPA fought many military forces, including the Nazi German SS, the Polish Armia Krajowa, Soviet partisans, the Soviet Red Army, and NKVD (former name of Soviet Secret Police). After World War II, UPA partisans continued fighting the Soviet Union until the early 1950s and communist Poland in 1946. It was especially strong in the Carpathian Mountain and Volhynia regions.


#UPA's Origins[edit]

Ukrainian nationalists demonstrate against Russia and for a free Ukraine in 1941.

With the outbreak of war between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union in 1941, many nationalists in Ukraine thought that they would have an opportunity to create an independent country once again. Some even collaborated with German military units. However, the Nazi treatment of the local population quickly put an end to this [2]

Many of the fighters who had originally looked to the Nazis as liberators, but quickly became disillusioned, formed two major groups: the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) (Ukrainian: Oрганізація Українських Націоналістів - О.У.Н.) and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) (Ukrainian: Українська Повстанська Армія - У.П.А.). [3] The primary goal of OUN was “the rebirth, of setting everything in order, the defense and the expansion of the Independent Council of Ukrainian National State”.[4] OUN also revived the sentiment that “Ukraine is for Ukrainians”.[5]

On June 30, 1941, the OUN, led by [Stepan Bandera], declared an Independent Ukrainian State.[6] This was immediately acted upon by the Nazi army, and Bandera was arrested and imprisoned from 1941 to 1944.[7]


The UPA was a military group that took up arms first against the Nazis, and later against the Soviets. Interestingly, the UPA was comprised of not only ethnic Ukrainians, but also Azerbaijanis, Uzbeks, Georgians, and Tatars.[8] During World War II, the UPA fought against both the Polish and the German forces. However, after the Second World War, many actions UPA took were against Soviet rule within Ukraine. Many members of the UPA saw themselves as the armed wing of the OUN in its struggle for Ukrainian independence.[9]

There has been much debate as to the legitimacy of UPA as a political group. In Soviet history, UPA is deemed an insurgent or terrorist group.[10] However, UPA still maintains a prominent and symbolic role in Ukrainian history and the quest for Ukrainian independence. [11]

#Organization of UPA[edit]

UPA recruitment poster. Its motto is written in Ukrainian on two horizontal lines Glory to Ukraine. Glory to (her) Heroes

UPA's command structure overlapped with that of the OUN in a sophisticated and highly centralized way. UPA was responsible for operations while the OUN was in charge of administrative duties; each had their own chain of command. The six main departments were military, political, security service, mobilization, supply, and the Ukrainian Red Cross. There was overlap between OUN and UPA posts and the local OUN and UPA leader were frequently the same person. Organizational methods were borrowed and adapted from German, Polish and Soviet armed forces, while UPA units trained based on a modified Red Army field unit manual. The General Staff consisted of operations, intelligence, training, logistics, personnel and political education departments. UPA's largest units, Kurins, consisting of 500-700 soldiers [,[12] were equivalent to battalions in a regular army, and its smallest units, Riys, with 8-10 soldiers [,[12] were equivalent to squads.[13] Occasionally, and particularly in Volyn, during some operations three or more Kurins would unite and form a Zahon or Brigade.[12]

UPA's membership is estimated to have consisted of 60% peasants, 20-25% workers, and 15% from the intelligentsia (students, urban professionals). The latter group provided a large portion of UPA's military trainers and officer corps.[13] However, accordingly to one of UPA commander data referred to 1944, UPA predominantly composed from peasants (poor and moderate in wealth) from western Ukraine (60% from Galicia and 30% from in Volhynia and Podillya) [14] The number of UPA fighters varied with time. A German Intelligence (Abwehr) reported from November 1943 estimated that UPA had 20,000 soldiers;[15] other estimates at that time placed the number at 40,000.[16] By the summer of 1944, estimates of UPA membership varied from 25-30 thousand fighters[17] up to 100,000 soldiers.[16]

UPA's war against Germany[edit]

Under German occupation, the UPA conducted hundreds of raids on German police stations and military convoys. A captured German document of November 25, 1941 (Nuremberg Trial O14-USSR) ordered: "It has been ascertained that the Bandera Movement is preparing a revolt in the Reichskommissariat which has as its ultimate aim the establishment of an independent Ukraine. All functionaries of the Bandera Movement must be arrested at once and, after thorough interrogration, are to be liquidated..." [18] By late 1943 and early 1944, the UPA controlled much of the territory of Volyn, outside of the major cities, and was able to organize basic services for the villagers such as schools, hospitals, and the printing of newspapers. In the region of Zhytomyr (which was taken from the Nazi by the Red Army in November 1943-January 1944, with groups of Soviet partisans moving there by February-March 1943), the insurgents were estimated by the German General-Kommissar Leyser to be in control of 80% of the forests and 60% of the farmland.[19]

As a rule the UPA did not attack units of the Wehrmacht, knowing that they were fighting against Russian Communism. Likewise, the frontline forces of the German army did not take any part in manhunts and operation against the UPA, sometimes even refusing to assist the German security and police forces against UPA. [20] Indeed, according to German Eastern Front General Ernst Kostring, UPA fighters "fought almost exclusively against German administrative agencies, the German police and the SS in their quest to establish an independent Ukraine controlled by neither Moscow or Germany." [21]

According to the OUN/UPA, on May 12, 1943 Germans attacked the town of Kolki using several SS-Divisions (in Nazi military structure SS units generally operated alongside the Nazi Army. They were responsible for intelligence, central security, policing action, and the mass extermination).The Germans as well as UPA suffered heavy losses. [22] Although there were no SS-divisions mentioned at this time in the identified areas according to mainstream historians, [23] [24] [25], Soviet partisans reported about the reinforcement of German auxiliary forces at Kolki for the end of April until mid of May, 1943 [26]

In June 1943 German SS and police forces under the command of General von dem Bach-Zalewski, seen as an expert in fighting against guerrillas, attempted to destroy UPA-North in Volyn during Operation "BB" (Bandenbekampfung). He was chosen specifically by Himmler to destroy the UPA in this operation.[27]

Accordingly to the UPA/OUN, the initial stage of “BB” (Bandenbekempfung) operation under the command of Sturbahnfuehrer SS General Platle and later under General Hintzler against the UPA produced no results whatsoever. This catastrophic development was the subject of several discussions by Himmler's staff that resulted in the sending to Ukraine of General von dem Bach-Zalewski, responsible only to Hitler himself. [28]


According to UPA/OUN(B) estimates, during Operation "BB" Bach-Zalewski had under his disposal 10 battalions of motorized SS troops with heavy weapons and artillery, 10,000 German and Polish police, 2 regiments of the Hungarian army, and three battalions of Cossacks organized from among Soviet POWs and 50 tanks, 27 planes and 5 armoured trains.[29] Another UPA estimate assessed the situation during Operation "BB" as follows: Germans send military division which formed from SS regiment, 2 Hungarian regiments, Cossacks regiment and unit of German gendarmes. Their losses from UPA was – 193 persons. [30] By August, the operation proved to be a military failure.On August 19-20, the UPA captured the military center of Kamin Koshyrsky, capturing large quantities of arms and ammunition.[31]As a result of the complete failure of the operations General von dem Bach-Zalewski recalled from his command. [32]


General Prutzmann, von dem Bach-Zalewski's successor as commander of the "BB" did not introduce any new methods in combating the UPA. The UPA-North grew steadily, and the Germans, apart from terrorizing the civilian population, were virtually limited to defensive actions.[33]

Accordingly to post-war estimates, the UPA had the following number of clashes with the Germans in mid to late 1943: in July, 35; in August, 24; in September, 15; October-November, 47. "Cite error: The <ref> tag has too many names (see the help page). During the summer of 1943, according to post-war estimates, the Germans lost over 3,000 men killed or wounded while the UPA lost 1237 killed or wounded.[34][35]

The Carpathian mountains saw some of the heaviest fighting between UPA and German forces in late 1943 and early 1944, as the UPA struggled to maintain control over several of the mountain passes. In one engagement, Ukrainian insurgents numbering about 600 men (including numbers of Ukrainian self-defence force), invoked the panic and retreat of 2 German divisions which initially took up positions in the villages of Maidan, Posich and Zaviy on November 27, 1943. As the result of this operation the Ukrainian insurgents captured a great quantity of arms and ammunition at the cost only 4 dead and 11 wounded. [36]

In May 1944 the OUN submitted instructions to "switch the struggle, which was conducted against Germans, completely into a struggle against the Soviets."Cite error: The <ref> tag has too many names (see the help page).. Nevertheless, according to the UPA/OUN, in July 1944, two more attempts by the Germans to capture the Carpathian mountain passes were repulsed. Near the villages of Kamyanka and Lypa, 3 insurgent battalions repulsed the incursions of 2 German SS divisions, totalling 30,000 soldiers (7-9 July), and on the 12th of July Germans reinforced them with a 3rd division. These Divisions were alternatively described as SS and as police Divisions by UPA/OUN sources, Avoiding direct confrontation, the UPA battalions inflicted a high number of casualties through sniping, ambushes, and attacks from the flanks and rear while abandoning their fixed positions. On 14-16 of July all of the German Divisions retreated with the loss over 600 dead. The insurgents suffered only a dozen casualties. [37] Although according to German data and mainstream historians there were no SS divisions at this time in the mentioned area [38] [39].[40].[41]


In order to fight the mutual Soviet enemy in early 1944, UPA forces in Volyn and Lviv regions engaged in limited cooperation with the German Wehrmacht contingent upon leaving Ukrainian villagers and UPA undisturbed by the Germans.[42][43] However, in the winter and spring of 1944 it would be incorrect to state that there was a complete cessation of armed conflict between UPA and Nazi forces because UPA continued to defend Ukrainian villages against repressive actions of the German administration.[44] For example, on January 20th, 200 German soldiers on their way to the Ukrainian village of Pyrohivka were forced to retreat after a several-hours long firefight with a group of 80 UPA soldiers after having lost 30 killed and wounded.Cite error: The <ref> tag has too many names (see the help page).. Such hostilities ended by late spring 1944 due to much of the disputed territory no longer being under German occupation, and to negotiations between UPA and the Germans.

In a top secret memorandum, General-Major Brigadefuhrer Brenner wrote in mid-1944 to SS- Obergruppenfuhrer General Hans Prutzmann, the highest ranking German SS officer in Ukraine, that “The the UPA has halted all attacks on units of the German army. The UPA systematically sends agents, mainly young women, into enemy-occupied territory, and the results of the intelligence are communicated to Department 1c of the [German] Army Group” on the southern Front. [45] By the autumn of 1944, the German press was full of praise for UPA for their Anti-Bolshevik successes, referring to the UPA fighters as "Ukrainian fighters for freedom" [46]

In a debriefing before U.S. authorities in 1948, a Committee of former German commanders on the Eastern front claimed that "the Ukrainian Nationalist movement formed the strongest partisan movement in the East, with the exception of the Russian Communists."[47]

UPA's war against Soviet forces[edit]

UPA's struggle against Soviet forces began when they encountered Soviet partisans in late 1942 and early 1943. In early 1943, the famous Communist partisan leader Sydir Kovpak established himself in Ukraine and in the summer of 1943, well-armed with supplies delivered to secret airfields and with several thousand soldiers (only one third of his men were ethnic Ukrainians),[48] launched a raid deep into the Carpathians. Attacks by the German air force and military forced Kovpak to break up his force into smaller units, which were then mostly destroyed by UPA in the Carpathian mountains.[31] In 1944, famous Soviet intelligence agent Nikolai Kuznetsov was captured and executed by UPA members, after unwittingly entering their camp while wearing a Wehrmacht officer uniform.[49] The total number of Soviet partisans in Ukraine is estimated anywhere from 47,800 to 500,000, only 46% of whom were ethnic Ukrainians.[48][50]


UPA began fighting Soviet military units when they appeared on its territory as the Soviet Army advanced into western Ukraine. UPA tried to avoid clashes with the regular units of the Soviet military because many of them were ethnic Ukrainians and were seen as a source of recruits into UPA. Instead, UPA focused its energy on NKVD units and Soviet officials of all levels, from high rank NKVD and military officers to the school teachers and postal workers attempting to establish Soviet control over western Ukraine after the front line had passed.[31] UPA also disrupted Soviet efforts at collectivization. In March 1944, UPA insurgents mortally wounded Nikolai Vatutin, the famous commander of the Battle of Kursk, who led the liberation of Kiev.[51] Several weeks later an NKVD battalion was annihilated by UPA near Rivne, beginning the full-scale struggle in the spring and summer of 1944, involving 30,000 Soviet troops against UPA in Volyn. Estimates of casualties vary depending on the source. In a letter to the state defense committee of the USSR, Lavrentiy Beria stated that in spring 1944 clashes between Soviet forces and UPA resulted in 2018 killed and 1570 captured UPA fighters and only 11 Soviet killed and 46 wounded. However, Soviet archives show that a captured UPA member, responsible for this battle report compilation, stated that he received a reports about UPA losses of 200 fighters while their Soviet enemies lost 2,000.[52], Despite heavy casualties on both sides, the struggle was inconclusive. By the autumn of 1944, UPA forces enjoyed virtual freedom of movement over an area 160,000 kilometers in size and home to over 10 million people and had established a shadow government.[13] As late as summer 1945, many battalion-size UPA units still continued to control and administer large areas of territory in western Ukraine.[53]


According to the NKVD of Ukrainian SRR data during February - December 1944 “OUN –bandits” suffered the following casualties: killed - 57,405; captured -50,387; surrendered – 15,990. During the period from January 1, 1945 until May 1,1945 the following casualties were reported: killed - 31,157; captured -40,760; surrendered – 23,156 [54] “OUN –bandits” actions in 1944 were 2903, and from January 1, 1945 until MAy 1, 1945 - 1289. During February until December 1944 until May 1, 1945 Soviet losses were: killed and hanged -9,521; wounded -3,494; MIA and captured - 2,131; amongst them NKVD-NKGB losses 401 killed and hanged, 227 wounded, 98 MIA and captured. NKVD and Soviet Army troops suffered 2513 killed, 2489 wounded, 524 MIA and captured. Soviet Authorities personnel suffered 1,225 killed or hanged, 239 wounded, 427 MIA or captured. In addition, 3,919 civilians were killed or hanged, 320 wounded, and 814 MIA or captured. [55]


In November 1944, Khrushchev launched the first of several large-scale Soviet assaults on UPA throughout western Ukraine, involving according to OUN/UPA estimates at least 20 NKVD combat divisions supported by artillery and armored units. They blockaded villages and roads and set parts of the forests on fire.[31] Soviet archival data states that on October 9 1944 the following NKVD units were located in Western Ukraine: 1 division (9-rifle), 8 brigades (16,20,21,25,17,18,19,23) and 1 cavalry regiment with total number of personnel - 26 304 persons. In addition, 2 regiments (256,192) with 1500 and 1200 persons, 1 battalion (517 persons) and three armored trains (45,26,42) with 100 additional soldiers each, as well as 1 border guards regiment (42) and 1 unit (27) were starting to relocate there in order to reinforce them. [56]


NKVD units dressed as UPA fighters [57] and committed atrocities in order to demoralize the civilian population.[3]; among these NKVD units were those composed of former UPA members working for the NKVD.[58] Areas of UPA activity were depopulated; the estimates of Ukrainians deported from 1944 to 1952 range from 182,543 in official Soviet archives [4] to 500,000 .[59] As for exact figures from the Soviet archives - deported (1944-47): families of OUN/UPA members–– 15,040 families (37,145) persons; OUN/UPA underground families – 26,332 (77,791 persons). [60] Although the Soviets failed to wipe out UPA, they inflicted heavy casualties, forcing UPA to split into small units consisting of 100 soldiers. Many of the troops demobilized and returned home. For this reason, by 1946, UPA was reduced to a core group of 5-10 thousand fighters, and large-scale UPA activity shifted to the Soviet-Polish border. Here, in 1947, they allegedly killed the Polish Communist deputy defence minister General Karol Świerczewski. During the latter phase of its struggle, UPA obtained help from the CIA and British intelligence, although the operation was betrayed by Kim Philby. After the huge winter 1945/46 operation by the NKVD, UPA/OUN fielded 479 units and had 3,735 fighters, according to an NKVD estimate from April 1, 1946. By January 1, 1947 MGB estimated OUN and UPA as having 530 fighting units with 4,456 fighters. On May 30, 1947 R.Shukhevych issued instructions joining the OUN and UPA in underground warfare [5]. Only in 1947-1948 was UPA resistance broken enough to allow the Soviets to implement large-scale collectivization throughout western Ukraine.[13] UPA's leader, general Roman Shukhevych, was killed in an ambush near Lviv on March 5, 1950. Although sporadic UPA raids continued until the mid 1950's, after Shukhevich's assassination UPA rapidly lost its fighting capability. An assessment of UPA's manpower by Soviet authorities in April 17, 1952 indicated that UPA/OUN 84 fighting units consisting of 252 persons. UPA's last commander, Vasyl Kuk, was captured on May, 24 1954. Despite the existence of some insurgent groups, according to a report by the MGB of the Ukrainian Ukrainian SSR the "liquidation of armed units and OUN underground was accomplished at the beginning of 1956". [6].


Prominant people killed by the UPA insurgents during the anti-Soviet struggle included Metropolitan Oleksiy (Hromadsky) of the Ukrainian Autonomous Orthodox Church and pro-Soviet writer Yaroslav Halan.


In 1951 CIA covert operations chief Frank Wisner estimated that some 35,000 Soviet police troops and Communist party cadres had been eliminated by guerrillas connected with the Ukrainian Insurgent Army adfter the end of World War II.[61] Official Soviet figures for the losses inflicted by all type of "ukrainian nationalists" during the period 1944-1953 referred to 30,676 persons; amongst them were 687 NKGB-MGB personnel, 1,864 NKVD-MVD personnel, 3,199 Soviet Army, Border Guards, and NKVD-MVD troops, 241 communist party leaders, 205 komsomol leaders and 2,590 members of self-defense units. According to Soviet data the remaining losses were among civilians, including 15,355 peasants and kolkhozniks. [62] Soviet archives state that between February 1944 and January 1946 the Soviet forces conducted 39,778 operations against UPA, during which they killed a total of 103,313, captured a total of 8,370 OUN members and captured a total of 15,959 active insurgents.[63] According to Columbia University professor John Armstrong "If one takes into account the duration, geographical extent, and intensity of activity, the UPA very probably is the most important example of forceful resistance to an established Communist regime prior to the decade of fierce Afghan resistance beginning in 1979...the Hungarian revolution of 1956 was, of course, far more important, involving to some degree a population of nine million...however it lasted only a few weeks. In contrast, the more-or-less effective anti-Communist activity of the Ukrainian resistance forces lasted from mid-1944 until 1950."[64].

UPA and Western Ukraine's Poles[edit]

The UPA ethnic cleansed the areas that it regarded as indigenously Ukrainian from Poles. The methods used included terrorist acts and mass-murder of Polish civilians. Professor Władysław Filar from Polish Institute of National Remembrance, an eyewitness to the massacres, claims that it is impossible to establish whether these events were ever planned. Although in August 1943 UPA placed notices in every Polish village stating "in 48 hours leave beyond the Buh or the Sian river - otherwise Death"[65] there no known documents exist proving that UPA-OUN made a decision to exterminate Poles in Volhynia.[66] Nevertheless, the massacres of Polish civilians began in November 1942 and continued on a large scale until 1944. In addition to UPA, Ukrainian peasants also participated in the violence.[67] Brutal methods such as beheadings and disemboweling were employed, and Soviet partisans of Rivne region reported about mass terror starting in April 1943 committed by “nationalists” against the Polish population who were not killed with fire-arms but slaughtered with knifes and cut with axes. [68] The estimates of the number of Poles murdered in Ukraine range from 100,000 to 500,000;[69] many more Poles left the area because of the UPA actions.

The UPA's activities can be seen as a reaction to past policies and actions of the inter-war Polish government, such as shutting down Ukrainian schools and churches or encouraging Polish settlement in the regions considered by OUN to be "ethnically Ukrainian".

The UPA actions resulted in similar reaction of the Polish Armia Krajowa and the extremely brutal conflict escalated out of control with many thousand of civilians being murdered by both Ukrainian and Polish forces.[70][71] Estimates of the death tolls from the retaliatory actions of the Polish Home Army forces include 2 thousand Ukrainian civilians.[72], as little as eight hundred,[73] or as high as 20 thousand in Volhynia alone.[74]

UPA and Western Ukraine's Jews[edit]

In contrast to the well established links between UPA and atrocities committed on Polish civilians, there is a lack of consensus among historians about the involvement of UPA in the massacre of western Ukraine's Jews. Numerous accounts ascribe to UPA a role in the tragic fate of the Ukrainian Jews under the German occupation.[75][76] Other historians, however, do not support the claims that UPA was involved in anti-Jewish massacres.[53][77]

It has proven to be difficult to ascribe the particular numbers of Jews alleged to have been killed specifically by UPA. Ukrainians fought in military and paramilitary forces such as the Ukrainian Auxiliary Police which were not affiliated with UPA and the Sluzhba Bezpeky ("Security Services"). Some combatants switched between forces. The Second General Congress of OUN-B (April, 1941, Kraków) held when the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, the political force behind UPA, had been in alliance with Nazi Germany, declared that the "Jews of the USSR [are] the most faithful supporters of the Bolshevik regime and the vanguard of the Muscovite imperialism in the Ukraine." Not long afterwards, a slogan put forth by the Bandera faction (recorded in the July 16, 1941 Einsatzgruppen report)[citation needed] stated: "Long live Ukraine without Jews, Poles and Germans; Poles behind the river San, Germans to Berlin, and Jews to the gallows" [citation needed]. By the time of UPA's formation over a year later, the OUN was already at war against Germany and its stance towards national minorities had changed. By 1944, it formally "rejected racial and ethnic exclusivity"[53]

One should distinguish between the driving force of the anti-Jewish actions perpetrated by the Ukrainian nationalists from the racial theories professed by the Nazis in their "Final solution" of the Jewish question. Ukrainian nationalists' main goal was not the extermination of Jews in itself, in fact they had no official policy regarding the Jews, but the drive towards the largely mono-ethnic independent Ukrainian state where minorities would be tolerated provided their acceptance of the overall Ukrainian domination. As such, it did not target Jews who were not seen as a threat to Ukrainian statehood. In the previous unsuccessful Ukrainian attempt to establish a Ukrainian state in Volhynia and Eastern Galicia (Western Ukrainian People's Republic) many Jews saw Ukrainian statehood in the territory as less dangerous to them than the Polish one which resulted in the history of the Ukrainian-Jewish co-operation in the area. As a result, there were cases of Jewish participation within the leadership of the UPA. Jewish participation was particularly visible among its medical personnel. These included Dr. Margosh, who headed UPA-West's medical service, Dr. Marksymovich, who was the Chief Physician of the UPA's officer school, and Dr. Abraham Kum, the director of an underground hospital in the Carpathians. The latter individual was the recipient of UPA's Golden Cross of Merit. Isolated reports of the Jewish families being sheltered by UPA have also surfaced.[78] One can conclude that the relationship between UPA and Western Ukraine's Jews was complex and not one-sided.

Aftermath[edit]

During the period of Soviet occupation of Ukraine, UPA was officially mentioned only in negative terms, and was considered to have been a terrorist organization. After Ukraine gained independence in 1991, former UPA members struggled for official recognition as legitimate combatants, with the accompanying pensions and benefits due to war veterans. They have also striven to hold parades and commemorations of their own, especially in Western Ukraine. This, in turn, led to opposition from the Ukrainian veterans of the Soviet Army, and disapproval from the Russian government too. So far the attempts to reconcile the two groups of veterans have made little progress. An attempt to hold a joint parade in Kiev in May, 2005, to commemorate the 60th anniversary of the end of World War II, proved unsuccessful. The assessment of the historical role of UPA remains a controversial issue in Ukrainian society, although Ukrainian president Viktor Yushchenko joined several public Ukrainian organizations in calls for reconciliation, pensions, and other benefits for UPA veterans that would equate them in status with the veterans of the Soviet Army, and aid the understanding of their role in the chaotic times of UPA operations.

File:Former UPA and SS-Galizien members in Berezhany 2006.jpg
Former UPA and SS-Galizien members with Plast Scout Organization pose for photos shortly after the Anniversary of the UPA ceremony in Berezhany, Ukraine

Recently, attempts to reconcile former Armia Krajowa and UPA soldiers have been made by both the Ukrainian and Polish sides. Individual former members UPA have expressed their readiness for mutual apology.[citation needed] Some of the past soldiers of both organisations have met and asked for forgiveness for the past misdeeds.[7]

Restoration of graves and cemeteries in Poland, where fallen UPA soldiers were placed have been agreed to by the Polish side.[8]

In late 2006 the Lviv city administration announced the future transference of the tombs of Stepan Bandera, Yevhen Konovalets, Andriy Melnyk and other key leaders of OUN/UPA to a new area of Lychakivskiy Cemetery specifically dedicated to Ukrainian nationalists.[9]

In October of 2007, the city of Lviv erected, after many years of delays, a statue dedicated to the OUN and UPA leader Stepan Bandera. The appearance of the statue has engendered a far-reaching debate about the role of Stepan Bandera and UPA in Ukrainian History.

See also[edit]

References[edit]

  1. ^ [http://warhistory.ukrlife.org/5_6_02_4.htm Військово-польова жандармерія - спеціальний орган Української повстанської армії]
  2. ^ http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1E1-Ukraine.html
  3. ^ Wilson, Andrew. Ukrainian Nationalism in the 1990s: A Minority Faith. Cambridge University Press. London: 1997.47-51.
  4. ^ Poliszczuk, Wiktor. Bitter Truth. 1999.
  5. ^ Wilson, Andrew. Ukrainian Nationalism in the 1990s: A Minority Faith. Cambridge University Press. London: 1997. 48.
  6. ^ http://www.encyclopediaofukraine.com/pages/B/A/BanderaStepan.htm
  7. ^ http://www.encyclopediaofukraine.com/pages/B/A/BanderaStepan.htm
  8. ^ http://www.encyclopediaofukraine.com/pages/U/K/UkrainianInsurgentArmy.htm
  9. ^ http://tern.ukrpack.net/upa/
  10. ^ Wilson, Andrew. Ukrainian Nationalism in the 1990s: A Minority Faith. Cambridge University Press. London: 1997. 51.
  11. ^ Wilson, Andrew. Ukrainian Nationalism in the 1990s: A Minority Faith. Cambridge University Press. London: 1997. 51.
  12. ^ a b c Institute of Ukrainian History, Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, Chapter 12, p. 169
  13. ^ a b c d [http://yurizhukov.com/doc/070900_Zhukov_UPA_Final.pdf Yuri Zhukov, "Examining the Authoritarian Model of Counter-insurgency: The Soviet Campaign Against the Ukrainian Insurgent Army", Small Wars and Insurgencies, v.18, no. 3, pp.439-466] Cite error: The named reference "Zhukov" was defined multiple times with different content (see the help page).
  14. ^ Institute of Ukrainian History, Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, Chapter 12, p. 127
  15. ^ Institute of Ukrainian History, Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, Chapter 14, p. 188
  16. ^ a b Magoscy, R. (1996). A History of Ukraine. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
  17. ^ Petro Sodol - Ukrainian Insurgent Army 1943-1949. Handbook. New – York 1994 p.28
  18. ^ http://www.infoukes.com/history/ww2/page-08.html
  19. ^ Toynbee, T.R.V. (1954). Survey of International Affairs: Hitler's Europe 1939-1945. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. (page # missing).
  20. ^ Yuriy Tys- Krokhmaluk, UPA Warfare in Ukraine. New York, N.Y. Society of Veterans of Ukrainian Insurgent Army Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 72-80823 P.232
  21. ^ Debriefing of General Kostring Department of the Army, 3 November 1948, MSC - 035, cited in Sodol, Petro R., 1987, UPA: They Fought Hitler and Stalin, New York: Committee for the World Convention and Reunion of Soldiers in the UIA, pg. 58.
  22. ^ Yuriy Tys- Krokhmaluk, UPA Warfare in Ukraine. New York, N.Y. Society of Veterans of Ukrainian Insurgent Army Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 72-80823 P.58-59
  23. ^ Wegner, B. (1990). The Waffen-SS. Padstow: TJ Press.
  24. ^ Williamson, G., & Andrew, S. (2004a). The Waffen-SS (2): 6 to 10 Divisions. Oxford: Osprey Publishing.
  25. ^ Williamson, G., & Andrew, S. (2004b). The Waffen-SS (3): 11 to 23 Divisions. Oxford: Osprey Publishing.
  26. ^ Ivan Bilas. Repressive-punishment system in Ukraine. 1917-1953 Vol.2 Kyiv Lybid-Viysko Ukrainy, 1994 ISBN 5-325-00599-5 p, 384 p.391
  27. ^ James K. Anderson, Unknown Soldiers of an Unknown Army, Army Magazine, May 1968, p. 63
  28. ^ Yuriy Tys- Krokhmaluk, UPA Warfare in Ukraine. New York, N.Y. Society of Veterans of Ukrainian Insurgent Army Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 72-80823 p.238-239
  29. ^ Krokhmaluk, Y. (1973). UPA Warfare in Ukraine. New York: Vantage Press. p. 242.
  30. ^ P.Mirchuk “Ukrainian Insurgent Army 1942-1952” –Munich; 1953 p.41-42
  31. ^ a b c d Krokhmaluk, Y. (1973). UPA Warfare in Ukraine. New York: Vantage Press. pp. (page 242). Cite error: The named reference "Krohmaliuk" was defined multiple times with different content (see the help page).
  32. ^ Yuriy Tys- Krokhmaluk, UPA Warfare in Ukraine. New York, N.Y. Society of Veterans of Ukrainian Insurgent Army Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 72-80823 p.140-142
  33. ^ Yuriy Tys- Krokhmaluk, UPA Warfare in Ukraine. New York, N.Y. Society of Veterans of Ukrainian Insurgent Army Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 72-80823 p.242-243
  34. ^ Institute of Ukrainian History, Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, Chapter 14, p. 186
  35. ^ L. Shankovskyy (1953). History of Ukrainian Army (Історія українського війська). Winnipeg. p. 32.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link)
  36. ^ Yuriy Tys- Krokhmaluk, UPA Warfare in Ukraine. New York, N.Y. Society of Veterans of Ukrainian Insurgent Army Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 72-80823 P.67
  37. ^ Yuriy Tys- Krokhmaluk, UPA Warfare in Ukraine. New York, N.Y. Society of Veterans of Ukrainian Insurgent Army Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 72-80823 P.69-73
  38. ^ Wegner, B. (1990). The Waffen-SS. Padstow: TJ Press.
  39. ^ Williamson, G., & Andrew, S. (2004a). The Waffen-SS (2): 6 to 10 Divisions. Oxford: Osprey Publishing.
  40. ^ Williamson, G., & Andrew, S. (2004b). The Waffen-SS (3): 11 to 23 Divisions. Oxford: Osprey Publishing.
  41. ^ Tieke, W. (1999). In the Firestorm of the Last Years of the War: II SS-Panzerkorps with the 9 and 10 SS-Divisions "Hohenstaufen" and Frundsberg". Winnipeg: JJ Fedorowicz Publishing
  42. ^ p.192
  43. ^ Yaroslav Hrytsak, "History of Ukraine 1772-1999"
  44. ^ p.196
  45. ^ http://www.history.neu.edu/fac/burds/Gender.pdf
  46. ^ Martovych O. The Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA). – Munchen, 1950 p.20
  47. ^ Russian Combat Methods in World War II. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History. 1950. p. 111.
  48. ^ a b Subtelny, p. 476
  49. ^ Ihor Sundiukov, "The Other Side of the Legend: Nikolai Kuznetsov Revisited", 24 Jan. 2006. Retrieved on 18 December 2007.
  50. ^ "Soviet partisans in Ukraine, 1941–5.". Encyclopedia of Ukraine. Retrieved 2007-12-20.
  51. ^ Grenkevich, L., translated by David Glantz. (1999). The Soviet Partisan Movement, 1941-1944: Critical analysis of. Routledge. p. 134.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
  52. ^ Institute of Ukrainian History, Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, Chapter 15, p. 213-214
  53. ^ a b c Orest Subtelny, Ukraine: a history, pp. 489, University of Toronto Press, 2000, ISBN 0-8020-8390-0 Cite error: The named reference "Subtelny367" was defined multiple times with different content (see the help page).
  54. ^ Ivan Bilas. Repressive-punishment system in Ukraine. 1917-1953 Vol.2 Kyiv Lybid-Viysko Ukrainy, 1994 ISBN 5-325-00599-5 p.604.
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  56. ^ Ivan Bilas. Repressive-punishment system in Ukraine. 1917-1953 Vol.2 Kyiv Lybid-Viysko Ukrainy, 1994 ISBN 5-325-00599-5 P.478-482
  57. ^ Wilson, A. (2005). Virtual Politics: Faking Democracy in the Post-Soviet World. New Haven: Yale University Press. p. 15.
  58. ^ Ivan Bilas. Repressive-punishment system in Ukraine. 1917-1953 Vol.2 Kyiv Lybid-Viysko Ukrainy, 1994 ISBN 5-325-00599-5 P 460-464, 470-477
  59. ^ Subtelny, p. 489
  60. ^ Ivan Bilas. Repressive-punishment system in Ukraine. 1917-1953 Vol.2 Kyiv Lybid-Viysko Ukrainy, 1994 ISBN 5-325-00599-5 P.545-546
  61. ^ Simpson, Christopher (1988). "Guerrillas for World War III". America's recruitment of Nazis, and its disastrous effect on our domestic and foreign policy. Collier Books / Macmillan. p. 148. ISBN 978-0020449959.
  62. ^ http://history.org.ua/oun_upa/upa/24.pdf p.439
  63. ^ Institute of Ukrainian History, Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, Chapter 21, pp. 385-386 [1]
  64. ^ John Armstrong, Ukrainian Nationalism New York: Columbia University Press, 1963
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  69. ^ Norman Davies. (1996). Europe: a History. Oxford: Oxford University Press
  70. ^ Subtelny, p. 475
  71. ^ Speaking of the escalation in violence, a former soldier in a Polish nationalist partisan unit stated "The ethnic Ukrainians responded by wiping out an entire Polish colony, setting fire to the houses, killing those inhabitants unable to flee and raping the women who fell into their hands, no matter how old or how young...we retaliated by attacking an even bigger Ukrainian village and...killed women and children. Some of our men were so filled with hatred after losing whole generations of their family in the Ukrainian attacks that they swore they would take an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth...This was how the fighting escalated. Each time more people were killed, more houses burnt, more women raped." Taken from the chapter Ethnicity, Memory, and Violence: Reflections on Special Problems in Soviet and East European Archives, by Jeffrey Burds, 2005, in Archives, Documentation, and the Institutions of Social Memory: Essays from the Sawyer Seminar, Francis X. BLouin and William G. Rosenberg, eds. Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press.
  72. ^ J. Turowski, Pożoga. Walki 27 Wołyńskiej dywizji AK, Warszawa 1990, p. 513
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  74. ^ Analysis: Ukraine, Poland Seek Reconciliation Over Grisly History, Jan Maksymiuk, RFE/RL, May 12, 2006
  75. ^ Ukrainian Insurgent Army in the Encyclopaedia of the Holocaust, Israel Gutman, editor-in-chief. New York: Macmillan, 1990. 4 volumes. ISBN 0-02-896090-4.
  76. ^ Tadeusz Piotrowski, Ukrainian Collaboration in Poland's Holocaust: Ethnic Strife, Collaboration with Occupying Forces and Genocide in the Second Republic, 1918–1947 pp. 220–59, McFarland & Company, 1998, ISBN 0-7864-0371-3
  77. ^ Himka, John-Paul. "War Criminality: A Blank Spot in the Collective Memory of the Ukrainian Diaspora" (PDF). Spaces of Identity. 5 (1): 5–24.
  78. ^ Friedman, P. "Ukrainian-Jewish Relations During the Nazi Occupation, YIVO Annual of Jewish Social Science v. 12, pp. 259–96, 1958–59". {{cite journal}}: Cite journal requires |journal= (help)

Books and Articles[edit]

External links[edit]

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