Talk:United States involvement in regime change/Archive 3

Archive 1

Archive 2

Archive 3

Archive 4

Archive 5

Deleting 2005: Iran?

User "185.125.206.135" deleted the section on "2005: Iran", saying "Iran Topic was based on unreliable information and was simply a lie." That article included citations to ABC News as well as a Seymour Hersh article in The New Yorker and an article on Foreign Policy magazine. I did not check to see if the citations supported the claims made here. However, if user "185.125.206.135" feels that section is inappropriate, s/he will need to provide more evidence than a simple claim that it's "a lie." I'm reverting this change for lack of evidence to support the claim. DavidMCEddy (talk) 15:46, 24 December 2018 (UTC)

Recentism?

I'm a bit worried that the section on Venezuela at the end is getting rather inflated due to WP:Recentism. It is now one of the longest (if not the very longest) section in the article, despite not being more noteworthy than eariler more significant events. I think, as per WP:NOTNEWS, as the situation is unfolding, it is safer to keep it lean and flesh it out if necessary when the dust settles. BobFromBrockley (talk) 17:26, 29 January 2019 (UTC)

WW2 France

Not sure why it's here.--Jack Upland (talk) 09:12, 11 March 2019 (UTC)

It was a regime change. The US was involved.Adoring nanny (talk) 09:15, 11 March 2019 (UTC)

I would suggest one sentence saying the USA helped overthrow Hitler.--Jack Upland (talk) 09:35, 11 March 2019 (UTC)

More is needed, per WP:DUE.Adoring nanny (talk) 10:01, 11 March 2019 (UTC)

I don't see why there can be any objection to including this and giving it more than one sentence (the current four or five sentences seems DUE to me, although it should maybe also mention the US role in the end of the Vichy regime too?) as it is a really clear case of US military action helping to topple regimes (the Nazi occupation government and the Vichy puppet government) and helping impose a new one (the Fourth Republic). The only reason not to would be if we consider overthrowing occupations differently from changes to regimes, in which case we need to get rid of the sections on S Korea, China, Greece and the Philippines. Another grey area would be interference in elections once regimes are established, which is what the final (1948+) para of the Italy section is. BobFromBrockley (talk) 13:45, 28 March 2019 (UTC)

I guess the problem is there was a lot of "regime change" in and after WW2. Based on that we could have a huge amount of text on this. However, this is well-covered in other articles.--Jack Upland (talk) 18:37, 28 March 2019 (UTC)

So shouldn't we at least link to those articles? E.g. a See also tag at the start of the section? BobFromBrockley (talk) 10:43, 3 April 2019 (UTC)

Good idea. Just added several.Adoring nanny (talk) 12:58, 3 April 2019 (UTC)

Korea

Korea from 1945 is a case of regime change because the Koreans were willing and able to take over the government once Japan was defeated. If the Americans hadn't intervened, it is clear that a different government would have emerged. The subsequent events up to the installation of Syngman Rhee as President are also regime change as they amount to the prevention of any other government.--Jack Upland (talk) 08:53, 25 March 2019 (UTC)

We should cover actual change. Per WP:Crystal, we should not cover what "would have" happened. Adoring nanny (talk) 10:59, 25 March 2019 (UTC)

Change is a constant. The difference is between what would have happened without US intervention and what happened because of US intervention. To some extent the future is always unknowable, but certainly we can say that the US government destroyed the new Korean government that was emerging under Lyuh.--Jack Upland (talk) 08:00, 26 March 2019 (UTC)

As soon as you write about what "would have happened", you run afoul of WP:Crystal. The relevant change in South Korea, the one that actually happened, was from the Japanese Administration to the Republic of Korea. If you look at my preferred version, it does cover Lyuh in a fashion consistent with WP:DUE.Adoring nanny (talk) 11:30, 26 March 2019 (UTC)

But necessarily the concept of regime change includes a recognition of what would have happened without the US involvement. If subsequent events would have happened anyway, then there is no change. Change, of necessity, involves conceptualising alternative realities. But nothing in the text I've added includes speculation about things that might have happened. And, furthermore, the period of Japanese Administration to the Republic of Korea, which you call the "relevant change", is from 1945 to 1948, which is exactly the period my text covers. Your preferred version removes a lot of information about the US involvement between 1945 and 1948, including an explanation of why the Division of Korea became permanent. This means the description of the foundation of South Korea is devoid of an explanation as to why it is South Korea. So a lot of the "actual change" is missed out.--Jack Upland (talk) 09:37, 28 March 2019 (UTC)

If we are going to ignore WP:Crystal, what "would have happened without US involvement" is surely a continuation of Japanese rule. Are you arguing that the article should focus on what would have happened with certain portions of US involvement, but without other portions of US involvement?Adoring nanny (talk) 11:13, 28 March 2019 (UTC)

No, I'm supporting the current text, which doesn't involve any crystal ball gazing, as far as I can see.--Jack Upland (talk) 18:39, 28 March 2019 (UTC)

You've twice attempted to justify the additional material by saying it is rooted in an understanding of "what would have happened", and now you are saying that it doesn't involve any WP:Crystal. The bottom line is that your arguments are self-contradictory, which certainly doesn't meet your WP:Burden as the person who adds or restores material. So I'm deleting it. Please recognize that until you meet your WP:Burden, you should not restore the material. Thank you.Adoring nanny (talk) 22:38, 28 March 2019 (UTC)

You have not identified any crystal ball gazing with the previous text. Since you agree that the regime change stretches from 1945 to 1948, there seems no reason you should object to the description of the US involvement in this process. Do you have any specific disagreement with the text you removed? Also, I don't understand why the US defence of the ROK amounts to regime change.--Jack Upland (talk) 08:42, 29 March 2019 (UTC)

The negotiation business is WP:UNDUE. A negotiation is obviously a complex affair with proposals by both sides. Are you going to go into detail about all of them? Lyuh's assassination was not a US action and is again WP:UNDUE. Regarding Rhee and the Korean war, one was a fight against an uprising, the other against an invasion. However the war is more deserving of inclusion because it was a US action, while what Rhee did was not. Additionally, the Korean War is obviously more WP:DUE. Going into depth about Rhee's assiciations is again WP:UNDUE. Rhee was not the regime; he merely won that election. Adoring nanny (talk) 10:18, 29 March 2019 (UTC)

The failure of negotiation led to permanent division of Korea and the establishment of the ROK; hence it is fundamental to regime change. I don't think the war was regime change; it was regime survival. Rhee's associations are notable. It is also notable that his opponents like Lyuh and Kim Koo were assassinated. He was not simply the guy who won the election.--Jack Upland (talk) 19:56, 31 March 2019 (UTC)

You're missing the point and skipping past the reasons I've explained above. I have nothing to add.Adoring nanny (talk) 20:59, 31 March 2019 (UTC)

What you're claiming about Jack Upland applies to yourself and read about this regime change that did happen, do not double down on your narrative as to not demonstrate that facts/sources about regime change being ignored: United States Army Military Government in Korea — Preceding unsigned comment added by RBL2000 (talk • contribs) 13:49, 13 April 2019 (UTC)

Where is Venezuela?

It would be strange if the United States has not involvement in regime change in Venezuela, especially the current crisis. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 62.68.51.117 (talk) 15:30, 22 December 2018 (UTC)

Indeed. Please add it. --David Tornheim (talk) 16:55, 29 December 2019 (UTC)

We should add Bolivia to this as well. 173.88.23.106 (talk) 08:53, 15 November 2019 (UTC)

Indeed. Please add it. --David Tornheim (talk) 16:55, 29 December 2019 (UTC)

@David Tornheim: Since this is not the first time you add an opinion in a similar manner, I'll note that you should provide a rationale or further argue your position if you want to contribute to the discussion. Otherwise your comment is your an opinion or a vote at best (see WP:FORUM and WP:ILIKEIT). --Jamez42 (talk) 21:44, 29 December 2019 (UTC)

@Jamez42: So, are you disagreeing with the need to add a section on U.S. regime change in Venezuela when it is likely sufficiently notable to have its own article? --David Tornheim (talk) 22:41, 29 December 2019 (UTC)

@David Tornheim:Yes, I am, but not because "it is likely sufficiently notable" but because you have not argued why. Please read the first Venezuela section if you haven't already. If you're interested in a neutral article on its own about foreign involvement in Venezuela, you can take a look at Foreign involvement in the Venezuelan presidential crisis and its talk page. --Jamez42 (talk) 11:10, 30 December 2019 (UTC)

Answered here in this section (permalink). --David Tornheim (talk) 16:56, 30 December 2019 (UTC)

Map is inaccurate

The map is inaccurate because it ignores US involvement in the removal of multiple Nazi and Japanese regimes during World War 2, as well as the regime changes in Germany and Japan after WW2. It should be fixed or removed. Adoring nanny (talk) 10:54, 20 March 2019 (UTC)

@Adoring nanny: Link me to a source and explain which country should be coloured in what way and I will edit the map if it makes sense. Sarrotrkux (talk) 14:58, 24 September 2019 (UTC)

User:Sarrotrkux I wish I had one. The fundamental issue is described above.Adoring nanny (talk) 13:21, 26 September 2019 (UTC)

Venezuela

Jamez42 reverted the addition of post-1998 Venezuela, claiming that "support of opposition is not regime change." Not only is it generally understood to be such, it is widely understood to be the case particularly with the US and Venezuela.. This well-documented material should be restored immediately.GPRamirez5 (talk) 22:59, 14 April 2019 (UTC)

@GPRamirez5: The Venezuelan government has accused the US of attempting a regime change for nearly 20 years. As early as 1999, when there were massive mudslides in the north country during the Vargas tragedy, Chávez rejected help from the United States. There are countless accusations of coup attempts, assassination plots, sabotage, etc, most of the times without providing proof. Sadly this has also been used to dismiss or persecute the opposition, including groups financed by the National Endowment for Democracy, and as a scapegoat for protests. My fear is that due to recentism the section is hastly included; the earliest Venezuelan events that the Bloomberg refers to are from 2018, and parallels are only drawn between government recognition, not regime change. In short, this is a lot different from, say, CIA financement or operations. Please notify me the next time I'm involved in the matter. --Jamez42 (talk) 00:22, 15 April 2019 (UTC)

• "...the earliest Venezuelan events that the Bloomberg refers to are from 2018, and parallels are only drawn between government recognition, not regime change." That is blatantly false Jamez42. The Bloomberg article reads "[Maduro's] critics inside and outside the country have talked for years of regime change."GPRamirez5 (talk) 17:24, 15 April 2019 (UTC)

References

@GPRamirez5: Precisely, that sentence doesn't specify any events either. --Jamez42 (talk) 20:43, 15 April 2019 (UTC)

• And let the record show that contrary to these sad arguments, the source for the section was not Chavez, nor any Chavistas, but The Washington Post, one of the most anti-Chavez organs in the hemisphere.GPRamirez5 (talk) 12:42, 16 April 2019 (UTC)

Defining the arguments as "sad" is unnecessary; I ask you to please refrain from it. The Washington Post details about National Endowment for Democracy, USAID and OTI financement, the recognition of Juan Guaidó and the threat of military intervention, not the "coup attempts, assassination plots, sabotage" that I have explained before; in short, regime change. The article was even written this year, which confirms part of my fear about recentism. Namely, the section focused on Guaidó as the sole leader that arised from the student movements, were there have been several others such as Yon Goicoechea, Stalin González, Freddy Guevara, Miguel Pizarro and Daniel Ceballos. --Jamez42 (talk) 16:55, 16 April 2019 (UTC)

What a flawed argument! It's not about the Washington Post, is about who writes the articles in the Washington Post. Some WaPo contributors, like noname academic Timothy Gill are longtime Chavez fanboys producing dozens of garbage papers that usually get zero academic citations anyway.--ColumbiaXY (talk) 03:45, 6 July 2019 (UTC)

• To clarify, User:James42, in your learned opinion, delegitimizing an established government and threatening it with military invasion do not constitute involvement with regime change. A very unique and telling definition.GPRamirez5 (talk) 01:41, 17 April 2019 (UTC)

Please treat other users with respect. Thank you.Adoring nanny (talk) 02:21, 17 April 2019 (UTC)

No, it doesn't. Quoting from the article's lead, no "alteration, replacement, or preservation" of said foreign government has taken place. I can argue that the United States has not been the only country to not recognize Maduro as the president of Venezuela, if it helps, and it has been discussed in other talk pages how a military invervention is unlikely. Elliott Abrams even admitted in a prank call that he dismisses the option. In any case, if it is argued that these, indeed, constitute involvement in regime change, then it must be reasoned here. Only one of the four paragraphs of the removed section mentioned "delegitimizing an established government and threatening it with military invasion"; the others did no mention of it whatsoever, meaning that if a section of Venezuela is to be included, it should not talk about of all of its 20 recent years. I also ask to please use a more respectful tone not only in your comments, but also your edit summaries, since this isn't the first time that you have used it. --Jamez42 (talk) 12:51, 17 April 2019 (UTC)

• User:Jamez42, I've treated you with the level of respect appropriate to someone who misrepresented the Bloomberg article as not mentioning regime change. I also notice that you misrepresented The Washington Post article as only mentioning Guaido, when in fact it specifically mentions Stalin González and Freddy Guevara as student leaders—and Washington clients.GPRamirez5 (talk) 11:15, 18 April 2019 (UTC)
• And you've just misrepresented the lead by claiming it defines the article with successful alteration of a government, when actually it defines it as operations "aimed at altering, replacing, or preserving foreign governments." The latter is absolutely a description of the US project in Venezuela.GPRamirez5 (talk) 12:43, 18 April 2019 (UTC)

@GPRamirez5: Are you saying I deserve less respect for allegedly "misrepresenting" references? I'm not sure if you claim that I'm offering a wrong interpretation in purpose, but if that's the case you would not be assuming good faith either. You also wrote in your edit summary "Lying is the greatest disrespect"; I believe this isn't the first time you call me a liar, so I ask you again to please stop personalizing the comments, since it only makes the discussion more difficult.

I understand there could have been a confusion that when I mentioned the article, the main space in Wikipedia, I meant the Bloomberg article, but I specified that a section focused about Guaidó, and in my later comments I continued referring the paragraphs of said section and how it includes events since 1999, not only 2019. Again, there should be an agreement that these actions constitute "involvement with regime change", when there wasn't with the removed section. --Jamez42 (talk) 13:47, 18 April 2019 (UTC)

Before the discussion gets any longer: I should leave clear that in any case I think it is WP:TOOSOON to include the section, and from what I'm reading in the talk page it seems my fear of recentism is shared. --Jamez42 (talk) 13:55, 18 April 2019 (UTC)

Summary: someone wrote an entire section around one (demonstrably one-sided and easily refuted) BLOG.[1] And then, to make things even better, put that one blog opinion in Wikipedia's voice, with no attribution as the opinion of one bloke. Someone else rightly removed the text.[2] And the first someone is complaining and using personal attacks along with the complaining. [3]

Who is looking not so good here?

GPRamirez5, your editing habits are coming across my radar all too often. (And I haven't even started with WP:CLOSEPARAPHRASE. Or making personal attacks in edit summaries, which is a whole 'nother level of bad.)

• The U.S. has quietly supported the Venezuelan opposition for years. Gill, Timothy M. Washington Post – Blogs, Washington: WP Company LLC d/b/a The Washington Post. Feb 19, 2019. From ProQuest.

SandyGeorgia (Talk) 02:55, 19 April 2019 (UTC)

• Dude please. Given that the Post will soon have more digital subscribers than print ones it's time to drop the pretense that its online material is illegitimate, particularly when the author had his research accepted by Georgetown University.GPRamirez5 (talk) 03:43, 19 April 2019 (UTC)

1959 Iraq

The 1959 Iraq section[4] strikes me as speculative and tenuous. I'm not removing it yet, but I'm interested in what others think.Adoring nanny (talk) 01:58, 10 May 2019 (UTC)

It's not speculative, please read the footnotes. The section was watered down to obscure the cooperation between US intelligence and Saddam Hussein. The cooperation also existed after Saddam had to flee because the operation was botched. Because it was watered down, you got the misimpression that it's "speculative." Please read the sources and think of ways to remove weazel words and of other ways to improve it.--NYCJosh (talk) 18:28, 7 July 2019 (UTC)

Of course the section is highly speculative; it's based entirely on anonymous sources speaking out nearly 50 years after the fact in 2003 to just one news outlet (UPI) and never confirmed by any other news agencies (including the U.S.'s major papers of record, The New York Times and The Washington Post) or any academic sources or any declassified documents. As can be seen from the archives (here, here, and here), both of the proponents of including this content—most prominently NYCJosh—candidly acknowledged when pressed that they were not in confident possession of additional corroborative evidence of U.S. involvement but rather relied solely on that single dodgy source from 2003; neither could name an academic expert that wholeheartedly endorsed Sale's allegations, although I am aware of several academics that have raised major concerns about their veracity, as well as others that take the more neutral stance that there is no definitive proof either way (then again, it is a matter of basic logic that one cannot prove a negative). Unless he has new sources or bombshell declassified documents at his disposal, I have no idea why NYCJosh would continue to blithely act as though the content in question isn't even controversial in the slightest and is the equivalent of the many undisputed historical facts cited throughout this article. Given the rancorous debates of the past and the fact that there has been some serious academic inquiry into this matter in recent years, I would not support any effort by Adoring nanny (or anyone else) to remove this content at this time (although it is better-suited for other articles than this one); however, the standard of evidence that NYCJosh would like to apply (selectively, I hope) to this case is extraordinarily low and inconsistent with Wikipedia's core content polices, starting with WP:NPOV. Wikipedia can't treat Sale/UPI 2003 as gospel truth, ignoring all other sources/evidence, no matter how strongly NYCJosh might choose to believe every word of it.TheTimesAreAChanging (talk) 20:59, 9 July 2019 (UTC)

RFC on Venezuela

The following discussion is closed. Please do not modify it. Subsequent comments should be made on the appropriate discussion page. No further edits should be made to this discussion.

---

I propose to add text to the article concerning Venezuela (1998-present). GPRamirez5 (talk) 00:05, 1 July 2019 (UTC)

I propose to add the following text to the article:

1998-present:Venezuela

Shortly after Hugo Chávez’s election as president, the US government-funded National Endowment for Democracy (NED) initiated guidance of Venezuelan political parties towards his defeat. NED agents traveled to Venezuela and met individually with Venezuelan party leaders from the opposition, offering guidance on how to electorally defeat Chávez, construct coalition political platforms and reach out to youth. Stephen Kinzer and other scholars have cited the NED as a successor to the CIA’s regime change programs of the 1960s, dedicated to a neoliberal economic agenda. A coalition of all the main NED funded organizations spearheaded the two-month lockout and production stoppage at Venezuela’s central oil company, which, when it ended in February 2003, had cost the Venezuelan people approximately $10 billion in economic damage as a means of destabilizing the Chavez government. . US diplomats also met with the opposition over the course of a decade to advise strategy against Chavez.

Agencies such as the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) initiated operations developing neutral-looking organizations in poor neighborhoods focused on community initiatives such as participatory democracy. U.S. ambassador William Brownfield described how USAID/OTI, “directly reached approximately 238,000 adults through over 3,000 forums…providing opportunities for opposition activists to interact with hardcore Chavistas, with the desired effect of pulling them slowly away from Chavismo.”

USAID/OTI also materially supported the recently developed anti-Chávez student movement, which produced the political career of Juan Guaidó and other young opposition leaders. OTI functionaries provided students with resources including paper and microphones, paid for travel expenses, and organized seminars to maximize resistance to the socialist government. According to a Washington Post analysis, “U.S. diplomats regularly met with opposition student leaders who primarily operated in Caracas, discussing plans of action against the Chávez government.”

The campaign against Venezuela’s left-leaning government continued under four US presidents, Most recently, the Trump administration has recognized the opposition leader Juan Guaido as president and openly threatened to launch military action to overthrow the government of Nicolas Maduro.

References

GPRamirez5 (talk) 00:05, 1 July 2019 (UTC)

Support new text

• I'm not sure why there is even debate about this, other than WP:STONEWALLING and anti-Chavez POV. Even this mainstream book on Venezuela acknowledges:

  Felix Rodriguez, a former CIA operative and influential Bush supporter in south Florida, claimed in an interview with Miami’s Channel 22 that the administration has “contingency plans.” When pressed to explain, Rodriguez said the plans “could be economic measures and even military measures.” Rodriguez and his views must be taken seriously…it is not as if the Venezuelan leader is unjustified in feeling paranoid. In the run up to the April 2002 coup d'etat against the Chavez regime, the Bush administration funneled US taxpayer money to the Venezuelan opposition through the National Endowment for Democracy.

GPRamirez5 (talk) 00:10, 1 July 2019 (UTC)

• Support. Frankly I'm surprised there isn't already a section on Venezuela and the presented text looks like a good and well-referenced start. I've browsed the discussion on this matter that appeared earlier on this talk page and the objection on the grounds of 'recentism' is, I feel, bogus. Oska (talk) 02:20, 1 July 2019 (UTC)
• Support — this is an important addition to the article.--Jack Upland (talk) 08:01, 1 July 2019 (UTC)
• Support, although I would imagine that such a section should include more mention of the 2002 Venezuelan coup d'état attempt. _signed, Rosguill ^talk 19:06, 1 July 2019 (UTC)
• Support — As editors have already mentioned, this is well-referenced and fills an important gap in the article as it currently stands. I don't think WP:TOOSOON applies here at all; US involvement in regime change in Venezuela is clearly notable based on its coverage in the sources listed, among others. I agree with Rosguill that the 2002 Venezuelan coup d'état attempt would be useful to include. I also did some minor copyediting of the text, which you can see here. Hope it helps. — cmonghost 👻 (talk) 18:29, 2 July 2019 (UTC)
• Support--Our article is about "overt and covert actions aimed at altering, replacing, or preserving foreign governments..." I agree with Cmonghost. --NYCJosh (talk) 18:44, 7 July 2019 (UTC)
• Support the text, with modifications if necessary. Reading this cited piece from Gill in the news section of the Washington Post [5], it's clear there is ample material available (in reliable sources) showing long-term US interest in replacing the Venezuelan government. -Darouet (talk) 02:22, 8 July 2019 (UTC)
• Support. It seems strange to cite recentism at this point - this isn't that recent - but even beyond that, there has been extensive, sustained coverage both in the news and academia, so I don't see how recentism could apply. --Aquillion (talk) 04:51, 11 July 2019 (UTC)

Oppose

• Oppose as written I am not opposed to having a section on Venezuela. However, as written, the proposal is inconsistent with WP:NPOV. In addition to the problem of ignoring the rest of the world, which I discuss below, Obama didn't sanction Venezuela until it started shooting demonstrators. So it's really accurate to say the campaign against Venezuela "continued" under Obama; rather, he put an end to it until the shootings and similar outrages.Adoring nanny (talk) 13:07, 5 July 2019 (UTC)

@Adoring nanny: A start has to be made and, in my opinion, this is a decent start. Edits (and discussion of edits) to the proposed text can be made once the text is added (as is, of course, usual wikipedia practice). Previously added sections on Venezuela have been removed completely rather than an attempt being made to find a good compromise text. It's important that this article has a section on Venzuela (as you agree) and so we must make a start otherwise GPRamirez5's charge of stonewalling would appear to have some validity. Oska (talk) 09:46, 6 July 2019 (UTC)

I suspect the stonewalling charge does not pertain to me. Typically in this type of RfC, the creator is willing to make adjustments in response to reasonable criticisms. This time, the opposite appears to be the case, which is concerning as I imagine the resistance would be likely to continue after insertion, resulting in an unfortunate situation. I made considerable efforts below to get a more acceptable text, which as you can see went nowhere. Had they been successful, I would have supported.Adoring nanny (talk) 11:44, 6 July 2019 (UTC)

• Oppose in current form Can't find much supporting evidence for claims in sections 2 & 3, detailing the USAID & OTI involvement. I'm also highly skeptical of Timothy M. Gill and his attempts at substituting verbosity for scholarship. He has more than 2 dozen borderline irrelevant papers on Venezuela & Lat Am that have failed to make a noteworthy impact in the research community. More reliable research should be used for claims like those proposed for inclusion in the article.--ColumbiaXY (talk) 03:36, 6 July 2019 (UTC)

@ColumbiaXY: For supporting info on USAID and OTI, the WaPo article links to this article, written by Gill and Rebecca Hanson, another academic researching Latin America. They conducted interviews with USAID/OTI employees and contractors through their research. There is also this William Brownfield cable released by Wikileaks outlining USAID/OTI goals, which related directly to weakening and dividing chavismo. Your criticism of Gill doesn't seem particularly substantive; his work has appeared in numerous peer-reviewed journals and has been cited by other researchers, clear indicators that his work is being taken up by others. — cmonghost 👻 (talk) 13:31, 6 July 2019 (UTC)

@Cmonghost: I've checked TM Gill's work via Researchgate and Web of Science. His papers offering some support to the ideas he presents in WaPo and thenation are very new and have between 0 and 2 citations each. Data backing his claims and numbers I could not find from other researches. Rebecca Hanson's trak record on Venezuela does not look better -her papers are also very recent and don't seem to have made an impact -at least not yet. Should other academic sources confirm those mentions i will support including the sections. --ColumbiaXY (talk) 05:44, 8 July 2019 (UTC)

• Oppose Besides the recentism and neutrality issues pointed out in the past, the section is vague and broad regarding the reported involvement of the United States. For example, the section mentions the 2002 oil strike and the student movement, but it doesn't mention that, at first, the purpose of the strike was to protest against the firing of oil executives (which Chávez even admitted later that he abused power) and that the latter sought to protest against the closure of one of Venezuela's oldest television stations, Radio Caracas Televisión, as well as a constitutional referendum that would have allowed indefinite presidential reelection. This is opposition to the government, but not regime change. It's also important to note that foreign funding of political parties and NGOs was prohibited in 2010, which mean there hasn't be financing ever since. The section is based mostly in the position of a single author Timothy M. Gill, as well as opinion articles, which makes me worry about cherrypicking and the need of secondary sources. Without going into detail about which opposition parties or non-government organizations have been funded, like it is done in the Poland and Yugoslavia sections, as well as its efforts, can lead to a worrying oversimplification.

Chávez has been accusing the US of conspiring to carry out a coup, an invasion or an assassination, which means that allegations of US involvement and fearmongering aren't new; the thing is that most of the time it's only that, accusations and allegations. The articles describes mostly involvement in coups, discredit campaigns, electoral intervention or financement, military interventions, assassinations, weapon assistance, etc, but most importantly, actual regime change. This is not the case in Venezuela. Even if this involvement is politically or electorally indirect, like I've mentioned, the extent of its effects on regime change is disputed, or even if it can be considered as such. Pinging editors involved in previous discussions: @BobFromBrockley and SandyGeorgia:--Jamez42 (talk) 18:40, 6 July 2019 (UTC)

@Jamez42: So, for clarity, is your position that there should be no section for Venezuela in this article?

And by the way, regarding your pinging of two editors, I hope they weren't chosen for holding views similar to your own. Perhaps you might like to review WP:CANVAS. Oska (talk) 01:03, 7 July 2019 (UTC)

Answering last things first, my pinging was chosen, like I said, in the participants of previous discussions regarding Venezuela in this talk page, namely the "Recentism?" and "Scope (again)" sections. GPRamirez5 opened this RfC and Adoring nanny has already joined the discussion, so the editors left were BobFromBrockley and SandyGeorgia. Please remember to assume good faith.

That being said, my position at the very least would is opposed of using 1998 as a starting year. I fear that quoting financement of political parties and NGOs, whose purposes can be completely different from politics or electoral participation (see Súmate, for instance), without going into detail about which ones they are and their role in seeking a regime change would be ambiguous, broad, or even far-fetched. Again: mere opposition should not be considered, by itself, regime change.

I imagine that a section could be started given the recent events and the presidential crisis, but In think that we need a discussion to agree on what constitutes regime change. However, I still fear that there might be bias due to recentism (and Donald Trump's rhetoric has certainly not helped with that), and I would be support having the discussion once an actual change of government occurs. Before that, I think direct involvement should be considered; for instance, if it is referenced that Guaidó received help to be chosen as deputy, as president of the National Assembly or if he was influenced to declare himself as president.

In short, I'm don't rule out completely the idea of having the section. --Jamez42 (talk) 13:04, 7 July 2019 (UTC)

• Oppose text as written per Jamez42. The text suffers from WP:RECENTISM, NPOV and is strongly based on Timothy Gill. Comment: better criteria need to be defined in this article to understand where do we want to go with a section on Venezuela in this article.--MaoGo (talk) 20:10, 7 July 2019 (UTC)

Oppose text as written I think there should be such a section in this article and certainly some account of the 1998+ period, but it needs to be phrased much more carefully. The proposed text is highly POV, very selective in its sources, and gives a misleading impression. In particular, especially for the 2019 period, it makes it seem as if the US role was far more unilateral and exceptional than it has been, given that the US has acted in concert with several other countries, including in the region. The case illustrates some of the blurry lines between different forms of action which get linked into “regime change”: legitimate support for democratic opposition movements, humanitarian aid or rhetorical support for allied politicians - through to electoral interference and armed intervention. BobFromBrockley (talk) 11:25, 16 July 2019 (UTC)

• Oppose. This is a highly biased text, sounds like an attack page. My very best wishes (talk) 18:17, 31 July 2019 (UTC)

Discussion

The last paragraph should note that most of Europe and South America followed the US lead.Adoring nanny (talk) 23:13, 1 July 2019 (UTC)

It doesn't seem to be noted in the relevant source material.GPRamirez5 (talk) 01:07, 2 July 2019 (UTC)

It took me about 30 seconds to find this via Google.[6] I'm sure there are better sources, and frankly they can't be hard to find.Adoring nanny (talk) 03:08, 2 July 2019 (UTC)

I see, but that Times article also notes the neutrality of the United Nations and the position of China. If we're noting every third party then we're starting a tangent that's non-encyclopedic. The relevant matter is the United States-Venezuela relationship.GPRamirez5 (talk) 13:56, 2 July 2019 (UTC)

The problem is that you make it look like some unilateralist thing, which it isn't. See Responses to the 2019 Venezuelan presidential crisis. No one has objected to mentioning British and Canadian involvement in the liberation of Western Europe, or the 34-country coalition for Desert Storm, so it's not just the Venezuela portion.Adoring nanny (talk) 02:39, 3 July 2019 (UTC)

Well then I'll object to it now. Third parties shouldn't be mentioned unless necessary. The US is the world's only superpower, it goes without saying that many countries would follow its lead for political reasons. The US has a track record of using its power and privilege to coerce other countries' foreign policy in these matters, so we should avoid WP:UNDUE emphasis on it.GPRamirez5 (talk) 05:52, 5 July 2019 (UTC)

"Obama didn't sanction Venezuela until it started shooting demonstrators." That's an dubious point User:Adoring nanny. Do you have any theories as to why Obama did not sanction Saudi Arabia for shooting demonstrators in Bahrain, or bombing masses of civilians in Yemen? Or perhaps on why he did not sanction Colombia for its links to death squads that kill dozens of union leaders and journalists every year? GPRamirez5 (talk) 14:16, 5 July 2019 (UTC)

Whataboutism. --Jamez42 (talk) 17:12, 6 July 2019 (UTC)

It is not whataboutism to point out that the US ignores some human rights abuses and not others. The value of the comparison between Venezuela and say Saudi Arabia, as I see it, is not just to call the US a hypocrite to make them look bad (which would be whataboutism)—it is to point out that the US's standard human-rights excuse for intervention in other nations' affairs does not really hold water because it is only ever applied to the US's opponents (ideological or otherwise). Thus it doesn't matter whether "Obama didn't sanction Venezuela until it started shooting demonstrators"; if the US's goal in sanctioning Venezuela was to protect demonstrators it would have sanctioned Saudia Arabia and many others long ago. — cmonghost 👻 (talk) 02:08, 7 July 2019 (UTC)

Actually you and the Nanny would seem to be engaging in the "whataboutism" Jamez42, using recent Venezuelan abuses to excuse US subversion which was already well underway.GPRamirez5 (talk) 20:52, 6 July 2019 (UTC)

Continue with personal attacks and I will start a complaint in the admin's noticeboard. You have already been warned in the past about this and it is already a long lasting behavior. --Jamez42 (talk) 21:03, 6 July 2019 (UTC)

@Jamez42: Perhaps I can contribute an 'outsider' opinion here (as I haven't ever edited this article and only came to it after seeing the RfC notification). I looked through the talk page before making my first comments here and I have noticed a number of times when you call out supposed 'personal attacks' by GPRamirez5 when there seems to be very little to complain about (including this example that I am replying to). It would seem to me that such call-outs are inflammatory in themselves and derail proper discussion. I suggest you tone it down. Oska (talk) 00:49, 7 July 2019 (UTC)

By your own reasoning wouldn't you have initiated the personal attack, since you cried "whataboutism" first? Mind the boomerang on those noticeboards, they're a mother...GPRamirez5 (talk) 22:39, 6 July 2019 (UTC)

Let me point out additionally that there is nothing to impugn about the scholarship of Timothy Gill. Anyone who has an issue should take it up with The Washington Post and the University of Pittsburgh Press who've published this research by him. They can also take it up with Johns Hopkins University Press and Oxford University Press, who've published the other sources.GPRamirez5 (talk) 16:51, 6 July 2019 (UTC)

Everyone please cool down. We have a content dispute. We don't need to make it about other editors.Adoring nanny (talk) 01:23, 7 July 2019 (UTC)

Thought I would note a reference I saw just today indicating a general recognition of US regime change campaigns against Venezuela (4th element in list):

In concrete terms, this means the Quincy Institute will likely advocate a withdrawal of American troops from Afghanistan and Syria; a return to the nuclear deal with Iran; less confrontational approaches to Russia and China; an end to regime-change campaigns against Venezuela and Cuba; and sharp reductions in the defense budget.

https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2019/06/30/soros-and-koch-brothers-team-end-forever-war-policy/WhyENwjhG0vfo9Um6Zl0JO/story.html

Oska (talk) 12:53, 2 July 2019 (UTC)

• Comment I want to seek clarification here on a couple vague arguments I'm seeing in the "oppose" section.

• Recentism — A number of opposing editors have suggested that the text suffers from recentism. None have specified what part of the text is problematic due to recentism.
• Timothy Gill — Several opposing editors have suggested that it is a problem that Timothy Gill's research is cited several times in the text. None have made substantive criticism of the research itself; none have explained why it is a problem for our article to be based on research by an academic subject-matter expert; and none have provided alternative experts or any peer-reviewed studies contradicting Gill's work.
• Ambiguity about what constitutes regime change — Some opposing editors have mentioned that better or more clear criteria on what constitutes regime change in this article are needed; none have suggested any. (Note that as NYCJosh points out, there are quite clear criteria in the first line of the article itself, which reads: United States involvement in regime change has entailed both overt and covert actions aimed at altering, replacing, or preserving foreign governments.)

I would welcome further discussion on any of the above points, or some supporting sources, if anyone is willing to elaborate. Thanks. — cmonghost 👻 (talk) 21:04, 7 July 2019 (UTC)

Moving my comment up from being buried in the 2019 section. — cmonghost 👻 (talk) 20:14, 31 July 2019 (UTC)

2019

@Jamez42: re: your suggestion above that the US's actions in Venezuela don't constitute regime change—such claims are belied by stories like this, which describes how groups working to get humanitarian aid into Venezuela are having difficulty with US aid because of the degree to which it is politicized:

• President Donald Trump has so closely linked U.S. humanitarian assistance to his attempt to oust Venezuelan strongman Nicolás Maduro — even placing goods along the country’s border as an incentive for Venezuelans to revolt — that some groups are citing security concerns and asking U.S. officials if they can strip legally required U.S. branding from aid sent to Venezuela, three aid officials told POLITICO.
• “This whole idea that in Venezuela aid was going to be part of a political change process — it’s rare to see it that overt,” said Joel Charny of the Norwegian Refugee Council
• Over the next few weeks, the U.S. dropped off more than 200 tons of food, medicine and other humanitarian aid at points along Venezuela’s border, with the goal of spurring Venezuelans — including military leaders — to rally against Maduro and push him out.

It's clear that reliable sources, as well as people on the ground involved with USAID, recognize the goal of US involvement. Direct foreign funding to NGOs and political parties is not the only way to carry out regime change. — cmonghost 👻 (talk) 02:01, 7 July 2019 (UTC)

@Cmonghost: Sure, but my response was addressed directly at the section proposed, and there's not mention of the aid shipment on it. Even in that case, like I mentioned above, we should have a discussion on the definition or what constitutes a involvement in regime change. Shipment of humanitarian aid is very different of election interference, for example. --Jamez42 (talk) 13:24, 7 July 2019 (UTC)

Is it your position that actions with the goal of spurring Venezuelans — including military leaders — to rally against Maduro and push him out do not constitute regime change efforts? Reliable sources, including peer-reviewed journal articles such as the ones cited in the proposed text, as well as the news article I cited, clearly indicate otherwise. — cmonghost 👻 (talk) 16:44, 7 July 2019 (UTC)

@Cmonghost: It is my position that attribution and secondary sources should be used before concluding that shipping humanitarian aid ultimately had the goal to "spurring Venezuelans — including military leaders — to rally against Maduro and push him out". I'm not sure which other sources or articles you mean, but please provide them if there are others. Yes, there were criticisms regarding the politicization of the shipment, including from the UN, but politicization is different from regime change. --Jamez42 (talk) 18:22, 7 July 2019 (UTC)

@Jamez42: Why is attribution necessary? We have only seen sources supporting one perspective. If there is another, no one has provided any sources for it yet—only opinions. As for secondary sourcing, the article I just linked and then quoted from is a secondary source, per the definition at WP:SECONDARY. Here's another from NPR:

• The U.S. effort to distribute tons of food and medicine to needy Venezuelans is more than just a humanitarian mission. The operation is also designed to foment regime change in Venezuela — which is why much of the international aid community wants nothing to do with it.
• U.S. officials acknowledge that positioning the aid on the border is, in part, designed to provoke. The idea is to convince Venezuelan military officers to defy Maduro's orders and allow the aid into the country.
• "Members of the army are Venezuelan citizens. ... Our hope is that they will be able to persuade Maduro, or they will simply disobey orders to continue the starvation of the people of Venezuela," Elliott Abrams, the U.S. special envoy for Venezuela, said at a State Department briefing earlier this month. [...] Such a rebellion could lead to Maduro's ouster

I am sure you can find more if you put in a little effort. This isn't meaningfully contested, even by US officials. The explicit goal is regime change. — cmonghost 👻 (talk) 20:39, 7 July 2019 (UTC)

Because per WP:NPOV (WP:WIKIVOICE), opinions and seriously contested assertions must avoid being presented as fact. Politico's quotes of the unnamed three aid officials appears to have been regarding "security concerns and asking U.S. officials if they can strip legally required U.S. branding from aid", and not the "attempt to oust Venezuelan", and Joel Charny of the Norwegian Refugee Council was the one quoted to asset that the "idea that in Venezuela aid was going to be part of a political change process". Even though government change is the most expected political change, this change could be any other than government change, such as changing the members of the Electoral Council. The transcript of the NPR source you provided doesn't talk about government change in an editorial voice, saying that "The risks of linking aid to regime change are already coming into focus" and quoting Daniel Almeida, a CARE International volunteer, warning that "Local AGOs received sort of retaliations or warnings because of their engagement with international aid." and that The whole environment is becoming more aggressive." Allegations of intentions of military intervention aren't new, including along the shipment of the humanitarian aid, which has been rejected by the US and OAS secretary general Luis Almagro. Vice President Delcy Rodríguez even went has far as saying that the aid was "carcinogenic", a claim dismissed by the and the US administration, USAID administrator Mark Green and deputy José Manuel Olivares.

These are quotes and contested assertions, and as such they should be attributed at the very least. Per WP:BURDEN, you are the one that must provide references and demonstrate that the "explicit goal is regime change". In any case, this would be the case with this year's events, any my previous points stand for the rest of the pre-2019 allegations. --Jamez42 (talk) 13:37, 8 July 2019 (UTC)

@Jamez42: I'll first address your attempts to rule out the sources I provided. Politico says, in their editorial voice, Over the next few weeks, the U.S. dropped off more than 200 tons of food, medicine and other humanitarian aid at points along Venezuela’s border, with the goal of spurring Venezuelans — including military leaders — to rally against Maduro and push him out. The NPR article I posted says, in their editorial voice, The operation is also designed to foment regime change in Venezuela. The transcript of the audio version also links aid to regime change, stating The U.S. is trying to convince Venezuelan military officers to defy Maduro's orders and allow the aid into the country. Such a rebellion could lead to Maduro's ouster. Furthermore, the part you quote, the risks of linking aid to regime change are already coming into focus, when read in context is a clear statement that the US is doing so (otherwise why would the risks thereof be coming into focus?). Here's another example, from the editorial voice of the NYT: The United States military began flying humanitarian aid to a Colombian city close to the Venezuelan border on Saturday in an effort to turbocharge a relief plan that has become a cornerstone of the quest to oust President Nicolás Maduro.

To establish that the assertions made in these reliable sources are "seriously contested" we would need to see some sources contesting them. Otherwise we're just talking about your opinions, which unfortunately are not relevant in this context. You have yet to provide any (the sources you linked are denials of military intervention plans, not denials that the aid program has the goal of removing Maduro), but here are some more sources describing the US as having the goal of regime change anyway:

• "the United States had just about run out of options to achieve its goal in Caracas: a peaceful change of power."
• "President Donald Trump is still committed to a pressure campaign to force Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro to step aside to make way for opposition leader Juan Guaido, Washington’s envoy for Venezuela said on Tuesday."
• "But after playing some of its best chess pieces and coming up empty, the U.S. government is running low on ways to counter such escalations and boot Maduro from Caracas."
• As the United States makes its biggest diplomatic push in Latin America in years to try to oust Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro
• U.S. Vice President Mike Pence told the Security Council on Wednesday the Trump administration is determined to remove President Nicolás Maduro from power in Venezuela, preferably through diplomatic and economic pressure, but "all options are on the table" — and Russia and others need to step aside.

Your points actually don't stand for the rest of the pre-2019 "allegations" for the same reason they don't stand for the 2019 ones: because you haven't provided any evidence that reliable sources contest them. — cmonghost 👻 (talk) 20:33, 9 July 2019 (UTC)

@Cmonghost: Wait, now hold on a second. This is at least the second time you suggest that I'm presenting my opinions as justifications for the changes, which is an unjust treatment since I have quoted references and policy guidelines. Since this is a controversial topic, I ask you to please refrain from it. That being said, we are mixing and confusing three different issues here at hand: pre-2019 events, the presidential crisis as a whole and the humanitarian aid shipment.

Since you and I have talked about 2019 and the president crisis so far, we should ask: does the United States want a government change in Venezuela? Sure, this is an issue that is uncontested based on public declarations, and not only the US but also the Organization of American States, the European Union and more than 50 other countries. Otherwise they wouldn't have asked Maduro to summon new elections, declared him as illegitimate when he didn't and recognize Guaidó as legitimate president; however, these are just wishes, willingness and supoort at most. Is different to say that the United States wants government change instead of promoting it. Let's remember that we are discussing and considering "overt and covert actions". Sure, diplomatic declarations and actions can count as such, but the article deals mostly with the actions I described in my first response. I will use your same quotes to point this out, "President Donald Trump is still committed to a pressure campaign to force Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro to step aside to make way for opposition leader Juan Guaido.", "U.S. Vice President Mike Pence told the Security Council on Wednesday the Trump administration is determined to remove President Nicolás Maduro from power in Venezuela, preferably through diplomatic and economic pressure, but "all options are on the table"."

There are arguably three main events during the presidential crisis that have had the intention to undermine Maduro's authority: the 23 January proclamation of Guaidó, the 23 February aid shipment and the 30 April uprising. Direct involvement of the US in the first and third ones hs not been discussed here, besides possible diplomatic support. If we are going to focus on the aid shipment, we have to reference which is this involvement, which are these actions, specifically focused on producing a regime change, and not only intent. Copying the quotes above:

1. President Donald Trump has so closely linked U.S. humanitarian assistance to his attempt to oust Venezuelan strongman Nicolás Maduro — even placing goods along the country’s border as an incentive for Venezuelans to revolt — that some groups are citing security concerns and asking U.S. officials if they can strip legally required U.S. branding from aid sent to Venezuela, three aid officials told POLITICO.
2. This whole idea that in Venezuela aid was going to be part of a political change process — it’s rare to see it that overt,” said Joel Charny of the Norwegian Refugee Council
3. Over the next few weeks, the U.S. dropped off more than 200 tons of food, medicine and other humanitarian aid at points along Venezuela’s border, with the goal of spurring Venezuelans — including military leaders — to rally against Maduro and push him out.
4. The U.S. effort to distribute tons of food and medicine to needy Venezuelans is more than just a humanitarian mission. The operation is also designed to foment regime change in Venezuela — which is why much of the international aid community wants nothing to do with it.
5. U.S. officials acknowledge that positioning the aid on the border is, in part, designed to provoke. The idea is to convince Venezuelan military officers to defy Maduro's orders and allow the aid into the country.
6. "Members of the army are Venezuelan citizens. ... Our hope is that they will be able to persuade Maduro, or they will simply disobey orders to continue the starvation of the people of Venezuela," Elliott Abrams, the U.S. special envoy for Venezuela, said at a State Department briefing earlier this month. [...] Such a rebellion could lead to Maduro's ouster.
7. The U.S. is trying to convince Venezuelan military officers to defy Maduro's orders and allow the aid into the country. Such a rebellion could lead to Maduro's ouster.

Only quotes 1 and 3 mention that there's a specific intention to promove a rebellion, which are from the Politico source. While quote 5 mentions willingness for "military officers to defy Maduro's orders", it continues saying that it is only to allow the aid into the country; quote 6 doesn't specify what disobeying orders means, and quote 7 also says that the goal of defying orders was to allow aid into the country, not regime change. Yes, military insubordination is related with regime change, but the reference needs to say that was the goal, and not allowing the trucks across the border, or otherwise it simply is original research.

I need to ask again. It is the case that the humanitarian aid shipment, which intended to deliver food and medicines to Venezuelans that needed them, had the "explicit goal of regime change"?. Let's not lose focus of this, this is what needs attribution and secondary sources. I will remind that my first response to the RfC was completely unrelated with the shipment of humanitarian aid, and before I continue contesting the allegations it must be decided first which one of these are going to be included to the article. WP:BURDEN stands. --Jamez42 (talk) 19:56, 11 July 2019 (UTC)

@Jamez42: Sorry, but I don't see a problem with pointing out when claims, such as that reliably sourced information is "seriously contested", are based on reliable sources or on editors' opinions. That isn't intended to denigrate you, just to indicate that you have not supported your claims with any sources.

I initially brought up the aid shipment as an additional example, because you suggested that the US's actions did not constitute regime change; the reaction to the shipment indicates that those working on the ground, as well as reliable sources, think otherwise. I didn't feel it necessary to provide more sources for the incidents mentioned in the draft because they are already sourced in the draft, and no one has brought forward sources indicating that they are contested. If you don't think it is relevant here since the RfC text doesn't mention it directly, I would be open to continuing the discussion outside the RfC itself, but I do think that the aid shipment should be part of the eventual Venezuela section of this article for the reasons I've already stated.

I'll point out the following about your list of quotations:

(a) You appear to have chosen selectively. For example, you left out this quote from the NPR article: The operation is also designed to foment regime change in Venezuela. You also missed the article from NYT, which says The United States military began flying humanitarian aid to a Colombian city close to the Venezuelan border on Saturday in an effort to turbocharge a relief plan that has become a cornerstone of the quest to oust President Nicolás Maduro (emphasis added).

(b) Even if we rule out all sources but the Politico article (which I would contest), we are still left with (at least) 1 RS asserting that the aid shipment had the goal of regime change and 0 RS asserting the inverse. In other words, you still haven't shown evidence that the assertions in the quotations are "seriously contested" by anyone other than yourself.

I fail to understand why you continue to suggest that "attribution and secondary sources" are necessary. I have provided numerous secondary sources, including those above, and attribution is not necessary for uncontested and uncontroversial factual assertions. Note that, again, "uncontested and uncontroversial" means among reliable sources, not among Wikipedia editors. — cmonghost 👻 (talk) 20:28, 11 July 2019 (UTC)

@Cmonghost: I didn't include quotes unrelated to the shipment, sorry if I missed those. Still, neither of them go into depths about any actions (which and how), only intent. Almagro's quote directly contests the claims. He's quoted saying that the aid es puramente ayuda alimentaria y humanitaria, and nadie está planificando ninguna invasión ni nada de ese tipo, which translated as "[the aid] is purely food and humanitarian aid", and "nobody is planning an invasion and nothing similar". He also was present during the delivery of the aid, and he wished that everything went along peacefully. --Jamez42 (talk) 20:41, 11 July 2019 (UTC)

@Jamez42: What more depth do you need them to go into? The NYT source clearly lists the actions ("flying humanitarian aid to a Colombian city close to the Venezuelan border") as well as the goal ("to oust Maduro").

As for Almagro, I don't see how he can be considered a reliable source for the intentions of the United States—he's an involved and clearly biased individual. That's not comparable to NYT or even Politico. Even if he was a reliable source, though, he's not contesting that the aid has the goal of weakening Maduro's position or encouraging an ouster, he's just contesting claims that the aid is a pretext for military invasion, or that the aid contains weapons. That's not what's being asserted in the sources I provided, so to bring it up here seems a bit of a strawman argument. — cmonghost 👻 (talk) 20:52, 11 July 2019 (UTC)

The discussion above is closed. Please do not modify it. Subsequent comments should be made on the appropriate discussion page. No further edits should be made to this discussion.

Laos section/Third World Traveler

I don't have any strong opinions about this latest addition by NYCJosh concerning the U.S. role in Laos during the Vietnam War, but I removed the link to Third World Traveler as a source; as I recall, Third World Traveler was blacklisted on Wikipedia several years ago because of large-scale copyright violations. I don't have the internal wikilinks on hand, but there was even a clean-up project to remove any references to the site from Wikipedia, and I have no reason to believe that the situation today is any different.TheTimesAreAChanging (talk) 21:13, 9 July 2019 (UTC)

I found this page which makes reference to the cleanup project User:Groupuscule/Third World Traveler. It's also an open task on Wikipedia:WikiProject Countering systemic bias/open tasks. — cmonghost 👻 (talk) 21:05, 11 July 2019 (UTC)

If you can show that the specific page of TWT that is linked to by our article, the article by William Blum cited, infringes a copyright, then you may have a point. But just because other pages of TWT are alleged to infringe copyrights does not mean this one does. That's like saying any webpage that links to any article of WP is a contributory copyright infringer because you can show that there are a couple of other articles of WP that infringe copyrights--not that any article of our precious WP would even do such a thing :-) ````

Blum was a published author that profited from his writings. Where is the evidence that he waived copyright and consented to have Third World Traveler republish this article or any of his work? This is precisely the issue: Third World Traveler has "reprinted" much copyrighted content without necessarily having the rights to it. Frankly, Blum isn't a very reliable source—his Wikipedia bio labels him as an "historian" but he has no historical training or degree, and there's no shortage of actual historians out there—but I wouldn't necessarily have any issue with you citing Blum as a source but merely dropping the link to this blacklisted site, because I don't know that Blum's claims about Laos are exceptional or at odds with the consensus of historians.TheTimesAreAChanging (talk) 21:08, 13 July 2019 (UTC)

Also, Josh, I can't tell if you are genuinely unaware, but this "article" is actually chapter 24 of Blum's book Rogue State: A Guide to the World's Only Superpower ([7]), complete with all of the footnotes. It's just bizarre that you would assert that Third World Traveler has the right to "reprint" it unless I am able to prove that Blum didn't waive the copyright, when you have produced zero evidence that he did. Again, basic logic suggests that you have the burden of proof reversed.TheTimesAreAChanging (talk) 21:17, 13 July 2019 (UTC)

Iraq 1963

I added information from several major newspapers (e.g. The Indepedent (U.K.)) that had based reporting in part on work by the late Said Aburish, a journalist who had been a reported for Radio Free Europe and the London Daily Mail and a writer whose tomes on major Middle East figures were published by major American and other publishing houses.

TheTimesAreChanging deleted some of this with the note that Aburish is "a conspiracy theorist." This seems pretty cavalier and inconsistent with WP rules (e.g. RS, OR)

I also added information from a piece published by a U.S. national security council staff member, author and Harvard PhD Roger Morris.

This same editor deleted this based on his personal assessment of Morris' information. Morris is giving us an inside look into the workings of the national security policy for part of the writing--telling us what CIA officials were saying at the time. --NYCJosh (talk) 23:05, 18 July 2019 (UTC)

You're using an op-ed by a non-expert and a twenty-plus years-old newspaper article to "refute" a 2011 book published by Oxford University Press, one of the world's leading academic publishers. That's unacceptable, and I don't know how often we are going to rehash these same arguments from the archives (see, e.g., here, here, and here), but any acceptable text for this article is going to have to conform to the more nuanced picture of the evidence found in recent academic RS rather than, say, the writings of Said Aburish. For example (copied at random from the archives):

• Hahn, Peter (2011). Missions Accomplished?: The United States and Iraq Since World War I. Oxford University Press. p. 48. ISBN 9780195333381. Declassified U.S. government documents offer no evidence to support these suggestions.
• Gibson, Bryan R. (2015). Sold Out? US Foreign Policy, Iraq, the Kurds, and the Cold War. Palgrave Macmillan. pp. xvii, 58, 200. ISBN 978-1-137-48711-7. However, a careful examination of a wide range of documents and interviews raises important questions about the veracity of these claims as to whether the CIA was behind the 1963 B'athist coup. ... In sum, barring the release of new information, the preponderance of evidence substantiates the conclusion that the CIA was not behind the February 1963 B'athist coup.
• Citino, Nathan J. (2017). "The People's Court". Envisioning the Arab Future: Modernization in US-Arab Relations, 1945–1967. Cambridge University Press. p. 222. ISBN 9781108107556. Although the United States did not initiate the 14 Ramadan coup, at best it condoned and at worst it contributed to the violence that followed. (emphasis added)
• West, Nigel (2017). Encyclopedia of Political Assassinations. Rowman & Littlefield. p. 205. ISBN 9781538102398. Although Qasim was regarded as an adversary by the West, having nationalized the Iraq Petroleum Company, which had joint Anglo-American ownership, no plans had been made to depose him, principally because of the absence of a plausible successor. Nevertheless, the CIA pursued other schemes to prevent Iraq from coming under Soviet influence, and one such target was an unidentified colonel, thought to have been Qasim's cousin, the notorious Fadhil Abbas al-Mahdawi who was appointed military prosecutor to try members of the previous Hashemite monarchy.

There is much to object to in your recent edit and I provided a detailed rationale for each sentence that I removed in all of my recent edit summaries, which I would be happy to expand on here if further clarification is needed. Even on relatively minor points such as its assertion that Saddam personally participated in the 1963 purge, the Morris op-ed appears to be strikingly cavalier about the facts as this is not an assertion that I can find in Saddam's biographies; to the contrary, Karsh and Rautsi 2002 expressly states (pp. 22–23) that "Saddam, nevertheless, had nothing to do with these events" (emphasis added) as he remained "on the fringes of the newly installed Ba'thi administration and [had] to content himself with the minor position of a member of the Party's central bureau for peasants."

And, yes, Aburish is a highly unreliable source, according to relevant academic experts. Albeit on a different subject, see, for example:

• Podeh, Elie (May 2007). "Nasser: The Last Arab by Said K. Aburish". International Journal of Middle East Studies. 39 (2): 305–307. doi:10.1017/S0020743807070183. JSTOR 30069584. Methodologically, the most serious flaw in the book is the (mis)use of sources. Aburish has ignored new sources on Nasser and Nasserism based on declassified archival material that has been published in recent years and that sheds new light on Nasser's personality, his attitude toward both East and West, his relations with other Arab leaders, and his domestic policies. Instead, Aburish has relied on old, well-known biographies as well as several biased interviews, which he accepts at face value (especially with Hasanayn Haykal and Nasser's daughter, Huda). ... The book suffers from factual mistakes and unwarranted statements ... serious students of the Nasserite period will have to wait for another biography.

Serious students of Iraq would also be well-advised to stick to the academic literature.TheTimesAreAChanging (talk) 00:13, 19 July 2019 (UTC)

Roger Morris' editorial has been approvingly cited in academic literature. Here it is cited in a Yale University Press book.GPRamirez5 (talk) 02:45, 19 July 2019 (UTC)

That may be true, but it doesn't change the fact that op-eds (by definition) have not been fact-checked or peer-reviewed and are not RS for unattributed claims of historical fact on Wikipedia, especially those by a non-expert. Also, I contend that there are several sensational claims in the op-ed that even academic sources that have cited it (critically or uncritically) never touch, but if I am mistaken about that then we could just cite said academic sources directly and I would have no objection to doing so. To put it another way, why is this source the hill that you want to die on? Finally, consider the litmus test that I laid out above: Did Saddam Hussein directly participate in the anti-communist purge of 1963, as Morris says that "some people say"? That question should not, on its face, be particularly controversial or shrouded in mystery, yet Karsh and Rautsi 2002 firmly states that Saddam "had nothing to do with these events". I am aware that you can find unreliable tabloids and blogs that conflate Saddam's activities as the head of the Ba'athist security service in the mid– to late–1960s with the events of 1963, but in terms of RS, is there any reason to believe that Morris has this right and that Karsh/Rautsi have it wrong? Whatever the case, surely it would be a major blow to the credibility of the party that cannot be trusted to get such basic facts straight?TheTimesAreAChanging (talk) 04:24, 19 July 2019 (UTC)

With regards to declassified documents, they are heavily classified and allow for plasuible deniability as some scholars have pointed out. I agree with Ramirez and NYCJosh Aburish has been published in many RS and books, just because he has received criticism doesn't mean we just throw his work in the garbage, especially when others have spoken good about him.

For example here's William Zeman from California State Polytechnic University:

Said K. Aburish is perhaps the most complete writer on the topic of U.S. intervention in Iraq from 1958 to1963. His books, A Brutal Friendship: The West and the Arab Elite, 1997 and Saddam Hussein: The Politics of Revenge, 2000 acknowledge the research of previous writers such as Malik Mufti, Hanna Batatu, Muhammad Heikal, and the Slugletts but go much further. Aburish’s great contribution is that he adds detailed information gained from personal experience as well as numerous interviews with key figures in the 1963 coup such as James Critchfield, CIA chief of the Middle East during 1963; Hani Fkaiki, member of the Ba’ath Party Command during 1963; and many other Americans and Iraqis both named and confidential. A Brutal Friendship cites 58 named interviews and 29 off-the-record interviews; Saddam Hussein cites 67 named interviews and 46 off-the-record interviews."24.57.43.93 (talk) 04:08, 19 July 2019 (UTC)

You're citing a master's thesis by a known conspiracy theorist, which is also not a RS. User:Aleiraq Aleazim, I would advise you to login and stop with the COPYVIOs that you've been repeatedly warned about in the past, including by an administrator. Here's a hint: If you find yourself copying text like "see bibliography for web address," then you're probably copying a bit too much.TheTimesAreAChanging (talk) 04:24, 19 July 2019 (UTC)

Bloomsbury has also praised Aburish: "In this meticulously researched and iconoclastic work, Said Aburish, the internationally respected Palestinian political analyst and writer, turns the popular western perception of Yasser Arafat upside-down." & "He concludes with a stimulating analysis of the likely future for Palestine and of the crucial world implications." https://www.bloomsbury.com/us/arafat-9781582340005/

And others: “'A brilliant Arab-Western examination - by one uniquely placed - of the psychology and makeup of one of the world's political phenomena, in clear historical context, written with pace, detail, and a host of witnesses and sources'” – SUNDAY TRIBUNE

“'Powerful. Aburish provides shameful details of Western complicity, cynical and mostly clandestine, in Saddam's reign of terror'” – HERALD

“'The hypocrisy and amorality of Western policy make uncomfortable reading Aburish's unmatched contacts in the Middle East enable him to provide a rare glimpse into the secret world of Saddam. A chilling biography'” – OBSERVER

https://www.bloomsbury.com/us/saddam-hussein-9781408829134/ 24.57.43.93 (talk) 04:42, 19 July 2019 (UTC)

You do realize that you're citing his publisher? Either way, academic sources are the gold standard on Wikipedia.TheTimesAreAChanging (talk) 04:47, 19 July 2019 (UTC)

1. Morris a "non-expert?" With a PhD in a relevant field from a major university and years of experience working in senior positions in the US national security apparatus, incl. as staffer for the US NSC? Morris's account based on his personal info, e.g. senior CIA people at the time describing close relations between Ba'athists and CIA, is important. The fact that it was published as an oped by the NY Times does not diminish the import of his testimony.

2. Aburish's facts that I cited are unrefuted. It is unsuprising that CIA documents to which academic researches have access do not corroborate. The CIA goes through great lengths to keep its dirty laundry secret, esp. given the embarrassing Iraqi Ba'athist history post Aug 1990, etc.

3. The fact that King Hussein had CIA links only makes his account more credible when he is spilling the beans about CIA actions in the region because it means he may have access to information or perhaps even participated in some of the channels of communication at the time (he had reigned Jordan since the early 1950s) and because he had some allegiance to a Western perspective.--NYCJosh (talk) 12:50, 19 July 2019 (UTC)

1. Morris has no academic expertise relevant to Iraq. In the interest of "fostering debate," The New York Times turned over its op-ed page to a number of cranks promoting unverified conspiracy theories about Iraq around the same time that it published Morris; for example, in January 2003 it published Stephen C. Pelletiere's conspiracy theory that Iran gassed its own Kurdish allies at Halabja and that Iraq was subsequently framed for the Halabja massacre. Unlike Morris, Pelletiere cited real first-hand experience as the CIA's senior Iraq analyst at the time and indicated that he had seen documents in the United States Army War College that supported his theory, yet Halabja chemical attack makes clear that (according to all academic experts and RS) there is no factual basis whatsoever to such assertions of Iranian culpability. Hardly anyone cites Pelletiere anymore, so it's strange that editors would continue to cite a similar op-ed by someone with much weaker credentials and riddled with clear errors in order to "refute" academic RS 16 years after the fact.

2. "Aburish's facts that I cited are unrefuted." That may be your personal belief, but it is not a perspective that can be found in reliable sources, such as those listed above and in the previous archived discussions.

3. "The fact that King Hussein had CIA links only makes his account more credible ... " Quite possibly true, and no-one has previously opposed including Hussein's allegations in this article; however, reliable sources are always careful to put his remarks in context, to whit:

• Batatu, Hanna (1978). The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq. Princeton University Press. pp. 985–987. ISBN 978-0863565205. It is not clear what prompted Husain to say these things. He had, of course, never been a friend of the Ba'ath party. But his observations should be read in the light of the recent revelation that he has been since 1957 in the pay of the C.I.A. It is perhaps pertinent to add that a member of the 1963 Iraqi Ba'ath Command, who asked anonymity, asserted in a conversation with this writer that the Yugoslav embassy in Beirut had warned certain Ba'athi leaders that some Iraqi Ba'athists were maintaining surreptitious contacts with representatives of American power. The majority of the command in Iraq was, it would appear, unaware of what was said to have gone on. Be that as it may, it is necessary, in the interest of truth, to bring out that, insofar as the names and addresses of Communists are concerned, the Ba'athists had ample opportunity to gather such particulars in 1958-1959, when the Communists came wholly into the open, and earlier, during the Front of National Unity Years—1957-1958—when they had frequent dealings with them on all levels. (emphasis added)
• Wolfe-Hunnicutt, Brandon (March 2011). "The End of the Concessionary Regime: Oil and American Power in Iraq, 1958-1972" (PDF). In this war of position, the Al-Ahram editor and Nasser confidant, Muhammad Hasanayn Haykal, played a leading role. In late September, Haikal published an interview with Jordan's King Husayn that cast the BPI [Iraqi Ba'ath Party] as little more than a neo-colonial client of the CIA. The King, who was himself, widely regarded as an American puppet, sought to absolve himself of any untoward associations with American intelligence by indicting the supposedly 'radical' Ba'th ... King Husyan effort's to clear his name is another story. For present purposes, it suffices to say that Haykal used the King's comments as part of his effort to undermine the credibility of the Ba'th. Haykal continued this theme of the 'Ba'th as collaborator' in November when he characterized the party as dependent on '"certain international powers" who have been persuaded that the Baath is the only political force in the area capable of blocking Nasser's revolutionary tide.' ... Batatu expresses uncertainty about what 'prompted' Husain to make such a comment, but in the context of the argument that I am making, it is clear that it was Haykal that prompted the King to make his statement, as part of the Egyptian's effort to discredit the Ba'th. (emphasis in original)

In other words, Hussein's statement was exploited as part of an Egyptian propaganda campaign against the Ba'ath after the fall-out between Nasser and the Ba'ath Party over the collapse of the UAR.TheTimesAreAChanging (talk) 23:36, 19 July 2019 (UTC)

With regards to Roger Morris, he says that he's seen NSC documents proving U.S. complicity in the coup: "Roger Morris [wrote to Juan Cole] to say that he had seen national security documents proving US involvement in the 1963 coup."

Not including Aburish's or the many authors/scholars' research, Mid East expert Juan Cole was able to corroborate Morris' assertion: "Roger Morris, a former National Security Council staffer of the 1960s, alleged that the US played a significant role in this Baath coup and that it was mostly funded “with American money.”. Morris’s allegation was confirmed to me by an eyewitness with intimate knowledge of the situation, who said that that the CIA station chief in Baghdad gave support to the Baathists in their coup." https://www.juancole.com/2006/12/for-whom-bell-tolls-top-ten-ways-us.html

Also, Aburish has been cited by numerous academic scholars, just a few examples:

https://books.google.ca/books?id=8RI5AAAAQBAJ&pg=PA322&dq=aburish+iraq&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiTkZnMyMLjAhUygK0KHVzpBPE4RhDoAQheMAk#v=onepage&q=aburish&f=false

https://books.google.ca/books?id=IiV_q4CYXA0C&pg=PA91&dq=aburish+iraq&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjS8f6NycLjAhVB-6wKHXj7DW04MhDoAQg1MAI#v=onepage&q=aburish&f=false

https://books.google.ca/books?id=xveCBAAAQBAJ&pg=PA139&dq=aburish+lloyd+gardner&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjX5L_SycLjAhURIqwKHXmUCSoQ6AEIQjAE#v=onepage&q=aburish&f=false

https://books.google.ca/books?id=t3eeAx8yLW4C&pg=PT196&dq=lloyd+gardner+aburish&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwi9tp79ycLjAhUPiqwKHY7zDmgQ6AEIMDAB#v=onepage&q=aburish&f=false

https://books.google.ca/books?id=4GdtAwAAQBAJ&pg=PA246&dq=lloyd+gardner+aburish&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiF3bXUzsLjAhVRI6wKHW2GDoQQ6AEIKjAA#v=onepage&q=aburish&f=false

24.57.43.93 (talk) 04:03, 20 July 2019 (UTC)

I'm not sure what that list of Google search results is supposed to prove. Sure, Aburish (despite not being an academic source and perhaps even being a primary source due to his past business dealings with Saddam Hussein's government) has been cited in some RS, just as he is cited in this article; Gibson cites Aburish, too, while refuting all of his central allegations about Iraq; I myself have previously cited Aburish's statement that any collaboration between the U.S. and Saddam prior to the October 1959 assassination attempt on Qasim is impossible. As usual, context is key—i.e., what is Aburish being cited for, by whom, and how broadly are Aburish's specific claims accepted by relevant academic experts. Three of your citations are to the activist publisher The New Press, and none of the others cite Aburish for anything related to the 1963 coup; one is merely a reference guide to the Arab–Israeli conflict that includes Aburish's biographies of Nasser and Arafat. Taken together, these search results do not indicate that Aburish's conclusion that the CIA "masterminded" the February 1963 coup in Iraq is mainstream within the academic historiography of either Iraq or U.S. foreign relations. (On the other hand, numerous major histories of Iraq devote not even a single sentence to an alleged U.S. role in the coup, for example Charles R. H. Tripp's A History of Iraq.)

Juan Cole is an academic with relevant expertise on the Middle East (albeit a controversial one), but I would be reluctant to cite his blog in this article rather than his published academic work.TheTimesAreAChanging (talk) 10:41, 20 July 2019 (UTC)

1. Morris--Morris cites his own experience working in the halls of the U.S. foreign policy apparatus--statements he heard by senior CIA officials. For example, he writes that he heard CIA officials describing that relations between the CIA and Ba'athists were close. The fact that CIA officials described the relationship in this way is not disputed by any other source, academic or otherwise (as far as I know--please correct me if I am wrong). This being the case, per WP rules on RS those Morris statements should be included. The fact that TheTimesAreChanging can find some CIA man who put out CIA documents with self-serving CIA disinformation about Iranian misdeeds (it was not our boy Saddam who gassed Kurdish villagers but the Iranians) has nothing to do with Morris. 2. Aburish--Specific factual claims that Aburish makes that are undisputed by an other RS should be included. On the other hand, if someone finds RS that contradicts specific claims by Aburish, then both that and Aburish's version should be included. Ultimately we as editors do not get to decide what is "true," we follow WP rules.--NYCJosh (talk) 01:25, 22 July 2019 (UTC)

Wikipedia policy is clear that op-eds cannot be used for unattributed statements of fact and that academic sources are the gold standard for historical articles. While it is not possible to prove a negative regarding alleged decades-old conversations with no supporting documentation and recounted by just one party to the supposed conversation (any others being unnamed and/or deceased), I have also pointed out several dubious assertions and examples of sloppy attribution in the Morris op-ed; for example, as previously discussed in the archives, one of Morris's few named sources, David Wise, told Reuters in April 2003 that he was not aware of any evidence of Ba'ath–CIA collusion. (Morris may have cited Wise for other claims tangentially related to his main thesis, but that is not the impression that the average reader would have come away with.) The Pelletiere op-ed denying Iraqi responsibility for the Halabja massacre is an on-point reminder that the "opinions" section has not been fact-checked or peer-reviewed, hence the Wikipedia policy that such sources should only be used sparingly and never for unattributed statements. I agree that Wikipedia policy is not to determine "truth" (cf. WP:TRUTH), and that facts and analysis from unimpeachable RS such as, say, Ben Kiernan (on the subject of Cambodia/Vietnam) cannot be removed regardless of what any Wikipedia editor might personally think of Kiernan's scholarship, but the sources that you have presented on the subject of Iraq are very weak by comparison.TheTimesAreAChanging (talk) 07:33, 23 July 2019 (UTC)

Batatu

Just to be clear, with regard to this deletion of RS content, the relevant excerpt from Batatu is as follows:

• Batatu, Hanna (1978). The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq. Princeton University Press. pp. 985–987. ISBN 978-0863565205. It is not clear what prompted Husain to say these things. He had, of course, never been a friend of the Ba'ath party. But his observations should be read in the light of the recent revelation that he has been since 1957 in the pay of the C.I.A. It is perhaps pertinent to add that a member of the 1963 Iraqi Ba'ath Command, who asked anonymity, asserted in a conversation with this writer that the Yugoslav embassy in Beirut had warned certain Ba'athi leaders that some Iraqi Ba'athists were maintaining surreptitious contacts with representatives of American power. The majority of the command in Iraq was, it would appear, unaware of what was said to have gone on. Be that as it may, it is necessary, in the interest of truth, to bring out that, insofar as the names and addresses of Communists are concerned, the Ba'athists had ample opportunity to gather such particulars in 1958-1959, when the Communists came wholly into the open, and earlier, during the Front of National Unity Years—1957-1958—when they had frequent dealings with them on all levels. (emphasis added)

User:Aleiraq Aleazim, I appreciate that you have dropped the COPYVIO and that your recent edit is far more grounded in RS than anything that NYCJosh has ever added to this article, but I would urge you to partially self-revert your deletion of Batatu's analysis or to propose a better summary if you feel that the long-standing one was inadequate or misleading in some respect. I await your reply,TheTimesAreAChanging (talk) 05:00, 19 July 2019 (UTC)

In light of your failure to respond, I have restored Batatu's analysis that "the names and addresses of Communists" in Iraq were well-known to the Ba'athists because "the Communists came wholly into the open" during 1958–1959 and both parties "had frequent dealings ... on all levels" during 1957–1958 as part of their shared opposition to the Hashemite monarchy of Iraq.TheTimesAreAChanging (talk) 11:02, 20 July 2019 (UTC)

Egypt 1952?

This article pushed a WP:FRINGE theory that the Egyptian revolution of 1952, which brought Nasser's anti-Western Free Officers Movement to power, was actually a Western plot and an instance of United States involvement in regime change, without citing any sources that characterize it as such, based on a CIA officer ("Kim" Roosevelt Jr.) supposedly meeting some of the Free Officers shortly before the coup, as well as afterwards. According to historian Hugh Wilford, this anecdote originates with the heavily fictionalized memoirs of Miles Copeland Jr. and is denied by all of the other alleged participants:

William Lakeland, who himself had close links to Nasser and the Free Officers, expressed doubts that Miles and Kim met with leading members of the movement before the revolution ... In a second echo of March 1949, when Za'im approached British military adviser Colonel Gordon Fox prior to launching his coup, there is evidence of the Egyptian Free Officers courting Western suitors besides the Americans. In December 1951, another British military instructor, former RAF intelligence officer Group Captain Patrick Domville, wrote the Conservative member of Parliament Julian Amery telling him that friends in the Egyptian army and air force had asked him to seek secret British support for a plot "to overthrow ... the King and then to set up a military dictatorship." Perhaps most damaging to Miles' claims, both Kim Roosevelt himself and several of the Free Officers allegedly involved later denied any CIA role in the conspiracy to depose Farouk.—source: Wilford, Hugh (2013). America's Great Game: The CIA's Secret Arabists and the Making of the Modern Middle East. Basic Books. p. 138. ISBN 9780465019656.

Reading that again, I suppose you could argue that Roosevelt et al. only denied "any CIA role in the conspiracy to depose Farouk," not earlier contacts, but that's awfully thin gruel to rely on, especially when there is actual documentation that the Free Officers reached out to the former colonial power, Britain, and yet no-one describes Nasser's revolution as "British involvement in regime change"—for the simple reason that no material support was in fact forthcoming. Perhaps British and American intelligence had foreknowledge that Farouk's regime was falling apart (no rocket science required there, folks) and made no attempt to share intelligence with or otherwise prop it up—Britain's later antagonism with Nasser should not obscure the reality that Farouk had alienated virtually everyone by his final days in power, the British very much included—but only an extraordinarily elastic definition could possibly include that as an example of "United States involvement in regime change." Surely, removing this FRINGE and WP:UNDUE content should not be controversial in the slightest?TheTimesAreAChanging (talk) 22:55, 3 September 2019 (UTC)

If a CIA officer says the CIA was involved, then that is fringe? If a CIA officer denies it, this is extremely damaging? I don't understand the logic, Kermit.--Jack Upland (talk) 10:45, 4 September 2019 (UTC)

Thus far, I agree with User: TheTimesAreAChanging here. To push this theory, one would need considerably better evidence than we currently have.Adoring nanny (talk) 00:05, 6 September 2019 (UTC)

Yes, but you have a pro-American opinion on everything.--Jack Upland (talk) 09:38, 6 September 2019 (UTC)

@TheTimesAreAChanging: You are completely misrepresenting the source you're citing. The passage you quoted actually does not end where you misleadingly inserted a full stop after "the conspiracy to depose Farouk". It actually reads (emphasis added):

[...] in the conspiracy to depose Farouk, Kim explicitly rejecting the suggestion that he returned to Egypt after his February trip to meet with Nasser and the others—although he did admit that the Agency was “informed indirectly” of the coup plot (and family correspondence indicates that he might in fact have traveled to Cairo in April).

Moreover, here is the text immediately following your selective quotation, which explains why it doesn't mean much that Kim et al denied the allegations; it also details the extensive secret American-Egyptian contact after the revolution (emphasis added):

Of course, it is hardly surprising that both Kim and the Free Officers should have denied Miles’s claims, the former because he later developed business relationships with several Arab monarchs and would therefore want to avoid any appearance of having once been involved in a republican conspiracy, the latter because the suggestion that a Western imperial power was present at the creation of Egypt’s revolutionary government was politically embarrassing. Moreover, there is a considerable amount of evidence that, whether or not the CIA dealt directly with the Free Officers prior to their July 1952 coup, there was extensive secret American-Egyptian contact in the months after the revolution. As in 1949, when Steve Meade had provided a key channel to the Za‘im regime during the early months of its existence, Air Attaché David Evans was the Free Officers’ first point of contact. Within hours of the revolution, Evans received an invitation to Military Intelligence headquarters, where he learned of the new government’s desire for cooperation with the United States and its plans to crack down on Egyptian communists. William Lakeland, too, stayed close to the officers; befriended Nasser’s favorite reporter, the up-and-coming journalist Muhammad Haikal; and regularly hosted Nasser himself for supper at his apartment overlooking the Nile. Although the American ambassador, Jefferson Caffery, a stately Southerner approaching retirement, preferred to deal only with the nominal Egyptian premier, General Naguib, he quietly encouraged Evans and Lakeland to build on their contacts with Nasser. A long-time critic of British imperialism, Caffery was keen to promote American friendship with the Free Officers; he boosted the new regime in his reports to Washington.

The section should be restored immediately. It can be added that the involved parties denied the claims, but there's clearly no justification for deleting it entirely. — cmonghost 👻 (talk) 16:45, 6 September 2019 (UTC)

Cmonghost, thank you for your substantive response. I agree with Wilford that the denials by both Kim and the Free Officers, by themselves, are not surprising or definitive, but I reject the notion that quoting Wilford accurately constitutes a deliberate misrepresentation (for the record, I read that book at my library back in 2016, when I used it to edit several articles—as you can easily verify—and this is just one quote that I wrote down for future reference, but I'm looking it over again now in Google Books). By "perhaps most damaging to Miles' claims," Wilford clearly did not mean to suggest that the denials are definitive, merely that they are among the most striking contradictory accounts to the Copeland narrative on record. (At no point in the book does Wilford say anything like "so-and-so is obviously a liar;" rather, he will say things like "this account proved controversial," etc.)

It may be worth emphasizing, however, that when Wilford refers to "Kim explicitly rejecting the suggestion that he returned to Egypt after his February [1952] trip to meet with Nasser and the others," that is not a reference to an earlier meeting with Nasser that Kim acknowledged; rather, as Wilford explains on pp. 135-136, Kim met with Farouk that February in an attempt to convince the king "to implement a reform program that would diffuse the 'revolutionary' forces in Egyptian society and thereby save his throne." So, at least as late as February 1952 (if not later), U.S. policy in Egypt was to attempt to "save" Farouk's regime and forestall anything like the revolution that was to occur in July and had been plotted long beforehand. At some point, certainly, the U.S. gave up on Farouk, just as it eventually abandoned Batista and declined to launch a major invasion of China to further prop up Chiang Kai-shek, but that's a far cry from any conspiracy in which the U.S. actively abetted Nasser. Of course, Egypt is a complicated case because the U.S. undoubtedly did prop up Nasser, saving him from its allies during the Suez Crisis and benefiting from Nasser's role in stamping out the Syrian communist party during the short-lived United Arab Republic. (Although Nasser did not prove to be a reliable "client" for U.S. purposes, his successors—starting with Anwar Sadat—completed the transition of post-revolutionary Egypt into a U.S. client state.) Nevertheless, at a minimum, any acceptable summary of these events would have to note that all parties stipulate that the U.S. was supporting Farouk until at least a few months prior to the latter's overthrow, and that Copeland's memoirs are contradicted by all other parties—which, regardless of what the WP:TRUTH may be in reality, to me just begs the question of how much WP:WEIGHT is appropriate for something that is denied by both the U.S. and Egyptian sides (the denials admittedly "prove" nothing, but I have no WP:BURDEN to prove a negative).

Ideally, this article would not be a collection of WP:OR and WP:SYNTH maintained by Wikipedia editors with subjective criteria for inclusion, but would be based on secondary sources (e.g., Kinzer, Stephen (2007). Overthrow: America's Century of Regime Change from Hawaii to Iraq. Times Books. ISBN 9781429905374.; Stuster, J. Dana (2013-08-20). "Mapped: The 7 Governments the U.S. Has Overthrown". Foreign Policy.), none of which seem to mention Egypt (even William Blum's Killing Hope, which I wouldn't generally cite because the author has no historical training, downplays an American role in the Egyptian revolution and instead emphasizes alleged American plots against either Nasser or the UAR—possibly for ideological reasons, as Nasser likely represents the "hope" that the U.S. was supposed to have been "killing" in the minds of many of Blum's readers; as I recall, Wilford makes clear that no such efforts ever really got off the ground). Given the sad state of this article, perhaps I shouldn't be surprised to find some advocates for inclusion, but I definitely don't see how anything that follows the sentence "Moreover, there is a considerable amount of evidence that, whether or not the CIA dealt directly with the Free Officers prior to their July 1952 coup, there was extensive secret American-Egyptian contact in the months after the revolution" (italics in original) is relevant to establishing the criteria under which this incident is supposed to qualify as an example of United States involvement in regime change.TheTimesAreAChanging (talk) 21:11, 6 September 2019 (UTC)

@TheTimesAreAChanging: My position is that Wilford's (reasonable) skepticism of Copeland's account is not sufficient reason to completely purge it from the page. Wilford is far from dismissing the account completely. For example, he notes that Kim's family correspondence indicates he might in fact have traveled to Cairo in April, which would support Copeland's account. If it were truly a fringe theory I would expect him not to mention it at all, or only in passing—let alone give it the amount of credence that he does. What's more, plenty of secondary sources exist that do not dismiss the account as readily as you do; several can be found at our page on Project FF, including Geoffrey Wawro's Quicksand: America's Pursuit of Power in the Middle East and Matthew Holland's America and Egypt: From Roosevelt to Eisenhower. As I've already said above, it's perfectly appropriate for our text to note that the allegations were disputed (as many allegations of regime change are), but it's by no means a fringe view and it would not be OR, nor would it be SYNTH to include it. As you note, our task isn't to determine what the truth is; our task is to summarize what secondary sources say, and numerous reliable secondary sources describe the events. That means that they belong in our article—with the appropriate level of nuance. — cmonghost 👻 (talk) 03:47, 7 September 2019 (UTC)

@Adoring nanny: Re: your last edit to this page: I took "per talk" to mean "per rationale on talk" (and I have seen it used similarly in many other edit summaries). Anyway, since you did not cite any issues with the content you removed other than the edit summary, I have just reinstated the content with a more verbose edit summary. WP:REVERT has the following to say on the subject: Do not revert an otherwise good edit solely because an editor used a poor edit summary or has a bad username. You cannot remove or change prior edit summaries by reverting, even if you made the edit in question. If an edit summary violates the privacy policy or otherwise qualifies for oversighting or deletion, then see Help:Edit summary#Fixing. Otherwise, ignore it. — cmonghost 👻 (talk) 04:54, 9 September 2019 (UTC)

Cmonghost, I don't believe that Adoring nanny was merely making a semantic point; rather, she was noting the lack of consensus in this discussion over whether Egypt is DUE to include within the scope of this article and, if so, exactly what would constitute an acceptable summary. The version that you restored fails to properly attribute the claims in question, which needs to be corrected. Among other issues, it also suggests that there was a CIA operation with the codename "Fat Fucker," which is actually a hoax; no such CIA codename is believed to exist, while the source—Copeland—stated that "Fat Fucker" was merely an unofficial nickname that some in the CIA used to refer to CIA activities in Egypt and/or Farouk himself.TheTimesAreAChanging (talk) 01:43, 10 September 2019 (UTC)

@TheTimesAreAChanging: To me, Reverting per misleading edit summary seems like a pretty unambiguous statement of intent to revert based on the edit summary. In any case, if the revert were about lack of consensus, it would still be on shaky ground, as there is equally no consensus to remove Egypt, and in the absence of consensus it's standard to go with the status quo. It's up to those in favour of a change to build a consensus to implement that change. Anyway, as I said above, I'm not opposed to adding attribution, etc. (you're obviously free to go ahead and do so yourself if you have the time, as you seem to have a pretty solid grasp of what sources could be added). What I'm opposed to is the wholesale removal of Egypt from the article altogether. I think it would be more productive to improve the content that's already there. — cmonghost 👻 (talk) 03:57, 10 September 2019 (UTC)

Done.TheTimesAreAChanging (talk) 20:07, 12 September 2019 (UTC)

Congratulations, learned editors of this page, you resolved this one and produced a contribution to this page by finding consensus without too much name calling! --NYCJosh (talk) 12:40, 15 September 2019 (UTC)

Someone should make one of those shiny beautiful vector maps highlighting every country the US has interfered with.

Maybe color coded for when it happened (decade or era?) and/or whether the previous regime was democratic or not.Vandergay (talk) 19:14, 7 October 2019 (UTC)

Bolivia

In respect of the recent editing war, a consensus should be agreed upon in whether the recent coup in Bolivia should be listed. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2019_Bolivian_protests Aldan-2 (talk) 02:26, 14 November 2019 (UTC)

One good reason for opposing Bolivia being added when it's so obvious at this stage (why it hasn't been added already is beyond me.) could be this : that you're a propagandist, or you're flat out fucking stupid. User0088800 (talk) 17:39, 14 November 2019 (UTC)

The issue has been thoroughly discussed at the Evo Morales government resignation talk page, and no agreement has been reached, including a move proposal. I strongly suggest reading the sections that refer to the denomination as a "coup" before attempting to include it here, and to continue the discussion here if needed. Best regards. --Jamez42 (talk) 23:12, 14 November 2019 (UTC)

I think the important question is: has there been any US involvement? If yes, then include. If no, don't.--Jack Upland (talk) 03:54, 15 November 2019 (UTC)

@Jack Upland: Ah, yes, the term has been thrown around so much that I nearly forgot about the most important thing. The last inclusions have only vaguely reported to allegations ("It has been alleged that the US involved"), without focusing on the how. --Jamez42 (talk) 13:02, 15 November 2019 (UTC)

Australia - Gough Whitlam's dismissal?

There are some pretty solid allegations that the CIA was involved in the dismissal of the Whitlam government of Australia in the early 1970s. Would it not be worth adding that to the list of covert regime changes instituted by the United States? — Preceding unsigned comment added by Loomhigh223555 (talk • contribs) 02:54, 25 December 2019 (UTC)

@Loomhigh223555: Do you have sources at hand regarding this? --Jamez42 (talk) 21:02, 25 December 2019 (UTC)

See 1975 Australian constitutional crisis#Alleged CIA involvement.--Jack Upland (talk) 22:48, 25 December 2019 (UTC)

Thanks! I'll take a look at it. --Jamez42 (talk) 21:26, 26 December 2019 (UTC)

Orchestrated

I restored language that the coup in Iran was "orchestrated", because that is what is in the WP:RS. As far as I can tell that language has has never been challenged since it was first added in October 2012. I may have seen one editor claim that the U.K. had no part in it who was overruled. --David Tornheim (talk) 12:21, 1 January 2020 (UTC)

@David Tornheim: "Orchestrated" is a loaded term that violates WP:NPOV and WP:LABEL. Verifiability does not guarantee inclusion, and if a word in a reliable source violates the neutrality principle in Wikipedia it should be changes, specially if the meaning doesn't changes.

WP:SILENCE establishes that as long as an edit is not disputed, the consensus is that it should be stayed, but consensus changes as soon as it is disputed.

In any case it would be useful if you pinpointed every use of the term, since around a third of the references where the term is included are books, making its verifiability harder. I'm restoring "back" because of this. --Jamez42 (talk) 04:54, 4 January 2020 (UTC)

It's the right term for the event. The U.S. and U.K. did not simply back the coup, they planned it. If you can identify sources that are used with the word "orchestrated" that do not suggest an effort at planning the coup, please point them out. SharabSalam agrees with me on this point. See this edit. --David Tornheim (talk) 04:20, 6 January 2020 (UTC)

Pinging @SharabSalam:, who hasn't participated in this thread but is removing the NPOV inline tags that I have added. You are saying that I'm removing said terms, but I'm only tagging the statements. Has I have mentioned before, if the meaning of the words is the issue, a more neutral synonym can be used, such as "plan". WP:ONUS and WP:LABEL still apply. --Jamez42 (talk) 15:45, 6 January 2020 (UTC)

Jamez42, thats not a synonym. You are changing what sources are saying. Backed-by is not the same as planned by or orchestrated-by so, please I really dont think I should say that. You also claimed to have reverted to the status quo ante yet you are changing it? How does WP:LABEL apply here? I feel this like WP:GAMING.--SharʿabSalam▼ (talk) 15:48, 6 January 2020 (UTC)

@SharabSalam: WP:NOTHERE. I'm suggesting "plan" or other term that has a similar meaning, not insisting on "back". Quoting from WP:LABEL: Value-laden labels (...) may express contentious opinion and are best avoided unless widely used by reliable sources to describe the subject, in which case use in-text attribution. --Jamez42 (talk) 16:04, 6 January 2020 (UTC)

Jamez42, Orchestrated or planned by are not value-laden labels. Let me show you what "orchestrated" means according to Google "plan or coordinate the elements of (a situation) to produce a desired effect, especially surreptitiously." This is exactly what the sources are saying.--SharʿabSalam▼ (talk) 16:11, 6 January 2020 (UTC)

Describing it as "orchestrated" is clearly WP:DUE and backed by reliable sources. The article on the 1953 coup describes it as such and adds in the last paragraph of the lede: "In August 2013, sixty years afterward, the U.S. government formally acknowledged the U.S. role in the coup by releasing a bulk of previously classified government documents that show it was in charge of both the planning and the execution of the coup, including the bribing of Iranian politicians, security and army high-ranking officials, as well as pro-coup propaganda.[29][30][31] The CIA is quoted acknowledging the coup was carried out "under CIA direction" and "as an act of U.S. foreign policy, conceived and approved at the highest levels of government".[32]" Therefore tagging it in this article as POV is absolute nonsense.--C.J. Griffin (talk) 15:57, 6 January 2020 (UTC)

If I may, if we are to rely on reliable sources for the term, several references talking about the coup do not use the term "orchestrated":

• CIA admits role in 1953 Iranian coup - The Guardian
• Iran's Rouhani tells UN: we pose no threat to the world - The Guardian
• US Publishes Report on Its Role in 1953 Iran Coup - VOA News
• Iran 1953 Covert History Quietly Released - Federation of American Scientists (FAS)
• New Findings on Clerical Involvement in the 1953 Coup in Iran - NSA Archive
• FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1952-1954, IRAN, 1951–1954 - Office of the Historian, Foreign Service Institute --Jamez42 (talk) 16:21, 6 January 2020 (UTC)

  Jamez42, you are selectively choosing sources. The majority of independent reliable scholarly sources (in addition to the sources already in the article like the one from the WaPo) use the term "orchestrated" which is an NPOV term and more accurate. Here are some of these sources.

  • [8] Duke University Press, Dec 27, 2005, by Michel Gobal
  • [9] Routledge by Khalil Osman
  • [10]
  • [11] and this is a book called "Secrecy and Security: U.S.-orchestrated Regime Change During the Cold War" and this is a solid source.

  --SharʿabSalam▼ (talk) 17:04, 6 January 2020 (UTC)

Would also again note that the word "orchestrated" means "plan or coordinate the elements of (a situation) to produce a desired effect, especially surreptitiously."--SharʿabSalam▼ (talk) 17:08, 6 January 2020 (UTC)

@SharabSalam: I'm not being selective, I'm showing that there isn't an agreement to use the term. What makes the sources above a majority of said sources? --Jamez42 (talk) 17:10, 6 January 2020 (UTC)

Those are scholarly sources. They are regarded as the most reliable sources in Wikipedia. Also even the sources you presented support the meaning of the word "orchestrated" which is again to "plan or coordinate the elements of (a situation) to produce a desired effect, especially surreptitiously". The source you are using don't say that what happened isn't within the definition of "orchestrated". There is no reliably sourced problem here. You have not explained why orchestrated (plan or coordinate the elements of (a situation) to produce a desired effect, especially surreptitiously) is a wrong term.--SharʿabSalam▼ (talk) 17:17, 6 January 2020 (UTC)

@Jamez42: If a diverse set of solid, reliable sources use a term, it's good evidence that it's not really a contentious label. Some other sources not using it doesn't mean that they did so because it's non-neutral. It simply means they chose another word—English has a lot of them. What you would want to show to indicate that "orchestrated" is not NPOV would be a style guide saying so, or evidence that only sources on one "side" of the dispute used it. (Also, note that a number of the sources you link above, e.g., history.state.gov and voanews.com, are US government sources, not neutral sources.) — cmonghost 👻 (talk) 17:20, 6 January 2020 (UTC)

• My point here is did the U.S. and the U.K. in the past "plan[ed] or coordinat[ed] the elements of (a situation) to produce a desired effect" or not? Is the usage of the term is right? Per reliable sources, yes!. They were planned or coordinated!.--SharʿabSalam▼ (talk) 17:28, 6 January 2020 (UTC)

Precisely because of that an alternate and more neutral wording can be used. I don't have a particular preference towards the phrasing in the article, and my change of "orchestrate" was only another attempt to improve it. As such, I won't dispute if a consensus forms to keep it. Still, I feel that it is important for me to clarify that there is an important neutrality problem here. Cheers. --Jamez42 (talk) 23:11, 6 January 2020 (UTC)

Notice

This article mentioned here: Wikipedia:Neutral_point_of_view/Noticeboard#Regime_change_(esp._Venezuela). --David Tornheim (talk) 08:02, 4 January 2020 (UTC)