Talk:Science/Archive 3

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Archive 10

Germ theory - Is it a fact?

This article says Germ Theory is a fact. In reality it is not. Only a small number of people exposed to a germ get the disease. Many continue to have M tuberculosis in their body without ever having the disease. Germ theory can not explain a lot of things and it is not a fact. Lakshayaa (talk) 18:02, 14 September 2010 (UTC)—Preceding unsigned comment added by Lakshayaa (talk • contribs) 02:37, 13 September 2010 (UTC)

Only a small number of people who don't wear their seat belts ever die in auto crashes, but this is not evidence that lack of seat belts never killed anybody. The germ theory of infections disease says that "germs" are a necessary ingredient in transmissable (infectious) diseases, but it doesn't mean they are sufficient. Many other factors are necessary. The seed can do nothing without the soil, the water, the weather, and many other conditions. Still, without the seed there is no plant. In this sense the germ theory of disease is rather like the sperm theory of pregancy. It may not be true 100.0000% of the time, but it's still a very, very useful idea. S B H arris 03:48, 13 September 2010 (UTC)

Unfortunately these are circular arguments. These arguments can be easily put against germ theory. In normal conditions sperm leads to pregnancy and in normal conditions seed grows into a plant. In normal conditions M tuberculosis is contained by macrophages and ultimately killed by cell mediated immune system. Therefore, if M. tuberculosis is causing tuberculosis, the same argument can be used to say that sperm is not leading to pregnancy and seed is not growing into a plant. It is abnormality (impaired immunity) that is the cause of tuberculosis and not M. tuberculosis. It just happened to be around.Lakshayaa (talk) 17:11, 14 September 2010 (UTC)

I found Sbharris' analogy helpful, but I think Lakshayaa might still be missing Sbharris' point. Lakshayaa, have you walked through your argument carefully?

Premise 1: M tuberculosis is normally harmless.
Premise 2: If a thing does not normally cause an effect, it is not a "fact"
Conclusion: M tuberculosis never contributes to deaths.

Your conclusion is false - partly because premise 2 is unjustified. Moreover, notice I think it helps that I used the word contribute, since I believe you may be confused by a "Single-cause fallacy". I mean - "Does M tuberculosis CAUSE death?" is not the right question to ask, because even a bullet to the head cannot be said to simply CAUSE death if we're going to get really picky. Still, Humans often call multiple explanatory variables "factual". -Tesseract2 (talk) 22:44, 14 September 2010 (UTC)

Most of the adults become tuberculin positive. This means they harbor live and potent tuberculosis germs in their body and are not inconvenienced by them. A bullet in the head will normally kill a person while under normal circumstances TB germ would do nothing harmful. If bullet in the head is a killer by the same argument TB germ is harmless. In unusual conditions only TB germ becomes harmful and in unusual circumstances a bullet in the head would not kill.

These are different perspectives. Germ theory originally meant only germs gave birth to germs. That aspect of germ theory is fact even today. But germ theory for human disease is an aberrant hypothesis. I can understand that these are different perspectives. Germ theory of disease is useful for pharmaceutical companies as it would help them to market their products. If immunity is down anti-TB drugs can be of little help. One such example is co-existent TB and HIV infection where treatment of TB is exceedingly difficult. On the other hand many patients of tuberculosis recovered before the advent of anti-TB drugs as their immunity improved.

I intend to discontinue this discussion here. My conclusion is that holding germs responsible for disease may be good from the perspective of pharmaceutical companies and even medical establishment but it not so good from the perspective of people who need a wider perspective. Both perspectives should be included in the article. Lakshayaa (talk) 09:45, 15 September 2010 (UTC)

Germ theory is treated as an established scientific theory by the most credible reliable sources. That settles the issue of how it should be treated in this article. We should not be giving WP:FRINGE or WP:OR viewpoints equal treatment. The sperm and seed analogies seem very mixed up. The vast majority of sperms never fertilise an egg. In the normal course of events, sperm just die without leading to pregnancy. A similar argument can be made for certain types of seed. Should we then dismiss the sperm theory of pregnancy? MartinPoulter (talk) 12:38, 15 September 2010 (UTC)

The "wider perpective" ended up killing a lot of people when Peter Duesberg argued in the early 1990's that HIV was not the "cause" of AIDS. It is the cause, in the sense of being the cause of the new epidemic disease we call AIDS.

In the study of infectious disease, a little math-like formula is often used to illustrate the important concepts behind infectious disease:

Risk={virulence*innoculum(dose) \over immunity}

There are some microbes of high virulence, like the 1918 flu, which kill even healthy people like military-age in training camps. There are some innoculums so large, that they will give the disease to any animal, such as a huge injection of pure bacteria or fungi of many types. Finally, the host's immunity is always important, unless totally overwhelmed by the other two factors.

A good demonstration of the importance of the pathogen, however, is what happens when we get rid of it. After smallpox was vaccinated out of existance in the 1970's, there were no more epidemics of it. Only a few cases of people developing the disease after lab accidents from stores of frozen virus. S B H arris 01:29, 17 September 2010 (UTC)

It is a shame that, so far, Lakshayaa has thought it best to terminate discussion. I wanted to see where he/she stood on my point that, basically, we should not be discussing probabilities or norms at all. It seems that was the point being missed. Even if only 1 in 100 000 000 experiences all 3 conditions for some consequence, it is still a fact that these conditions are each contributors to the consequence in question. That is why I recommended reading Fallacy of the single cause. In this case, I wonder whether we really disagreed on the real fact in question: Germs do not always guarantee - but often contribute to (and often very significantly) - diseases. This claim, to me, encompasses Germ Theory.-Tesseract2 (talk) 06:14, 19 September 2010 (UTC)

It can be stated more narrowly. The Germ Theory states that the only think that microbes "cause" in the normal sense, is contageous outbreaks or epidemics of infectious disease. For any given case, it's a multifactorial thing. In that case, the germ is necessary but not sufficient. To cause the outbreak itself, only the microbe is sufficient-- that's the whole idea behind germ warfare. Not everyone will become ill, but enough will to get a population-disease. S B H arris 02:31, 20 September 2010 (UTC)

Voting to resolve lead definition of this article

There has been an extensive discussion on what should be the main or lead definition and focus of this article. Currently, there are two competing definitions and implied focuses:

Definition 1: Science is nothing more than just a knowledge about a set of skills/behavior or even just a skill set that produces reliable outcomes. In this case, it would include fields such as engineering and mathematics as well as activities (not the study of) such as crochet and cooking. This definition appeals to the figure of speech, "having it down to a science." Based on the discussion on this talk page and the definition itself, it is not clear what this definition does not exclude. Aside from Wikipedia, I am not aware of any reputable scientist or scientific organization that promotes this definition.

Definition 2: Science is a systematic process of creating a body of knowledge that is falsifiable. This definition would probably not include other fields of knowledge such as the ~~history~~ , literature, fine arts, ~~engineering, mathematics,~~ religion etc, due to the uniqueness of the process (often called a scientific method) that is employed to falsify that knowledge or to test the limits of a scientific paradigm. It would also exclude activities (not study of) such as crochet and cooking. This definition or variants of it can be found in many introductory scientific textbook at the college level (e.g., physics, chemistry, anthropology, psychology, etc). User 98.249.185.122 has a provided an excellent list of reference to support this definition (See discussions above).

Rationale for Definition 2: The reason why I am proposing this vote is because the lead definition of this article has been changed several times. As a result, there is no overall stability or consistency in this article. Further, it is difficult to build on an article or topic if it is not clear what the article or topic should be about. The reason why I am proposing definition 2 over definition 1 is because there is wider consensus on definition 2 within scientific literature and community. Except for Wikipedia, I have yet to meet one scientist, be they natural, social, and yes, library, who can state explicitly that acts such as cooking and crocheting are sciences. If anything, it is a fringe view. Moreover, several editors on this talk page have voiced their concern over definition 1 precisely because it is non-mainstream and vacuous. Moreover, the other editors and myself suspect that definition 1 is misleading and will not serve to educate many naive readers on what science is and is not.

If we adopt definition 2, it will allow us to link and perhaps build a hierarchy of science articles (e.g., science -> social science -> anthropology -> physical anthropology) that is coherent and internally consistent in both content and meaning. It will also be consistent with other science articles such as history of science, philosophy of science, and scientists. Furthermore, other important scientifically relevant topics such as peer review, scientific publications, etc can also be discussed or incorporated into this article. These are topics that are especially important and will serve to educate the general public on the limitations and the self-correcting process of science. With the exception of creation science, I am not opposed to the inclusion of other fields with the word "science" in them such as library science, etc into this article. They can be described in a unique subsection of their own and would not be given undue weight. I am also not opposed to any discussion of the etymology of the term science provided that it is NOT the main focus of this article. Readers are invited to read the evolution article as an example. In that article, there is also a subsection on the history of evolutionary thought. But that discussion is within a subsection and there is a link to a main article on the history of evolutionary thought. That article does not define evolution by its original meaning such as "to unravel" or to promote a nonconventional use of that term. It defines evolution as it is understood today. Like evolution, the main focus of this article should not be on the etymology,history, or philosophy of science. With the exception of the etymology of science, there are already articles on those topics. Perhaps there should be an etymology article as well. This article should instead focus on what is it that is common in all of the sciences such as physics, chemistry, biology, sociology, psychology, economics, etc as it is understood today. It should be broad enough, but not vacuous that it would include activities such as plumbing, crochet, ice skating, or cooking. Please be aware that it is never my intention or the intention of the other editors to make this article a duplicate of natural science as IT IS defined in the natural science article. Once again, I invite you to vote on this issue so that we can put it behind us and move on. mezzaninelounge (talk) 16:04, 18 September 2010 (UTC)

Please leave/type your signature or ip below the definition that you would like to vote for. You may also provide a one sentence explanation for your vote.

Definition 1

Definition 2

mezzaninelounge (talk) 16:04, 18 September 2010 (UTC)
Engineering is the application of science; history and literature are arts; mathematics is collection of mostly interoperable modeling languages; crochet and cooking are technologies. ~rezecib ^(talk) 17:58, 18 September 2010 (UTC)
Definition 2 "Science is a systematic process of creating a body of knowledge that is falsifiable" is correct. The following explanation however isn't. History is a science. Math is debatable, but most will view it as a set of tools required to perform science, and the language of nature, but not a science in itself. Most social sciences are also sciences. Arts and techniques aren't. Headbomb {talk / contribs / physics / books} 19:21, 18 September 2010 (UTC)
Support, but the associated explanation seems to be hyperfocused on the modern application of the term, the emphasis needs to be on it's wide variability of use and not a standard use such as those presented by "scientific" textbooks which often try to narrow the field for the importance of Modern "pure" sciences, Sadads (talk) 19:46, 18 September 2010 (UTC)
Support, with some qualms or qualifications but, bottom-line, support (see below) The Tetrast (talk) 20:44, 18 September 2010 (UTC)

Please note that if you do not like any of the two definitions above, feel free to add your name to the list below (created by Sadads) or to talk about it in the new discussion thread below. DO NOT modify the voting options. This is not meant to be censorial. We are just trying to resolve one issue at a time.

Both definitions are inadequate (See discussion below) ~~#Sadads (talk) 18:54, 18 September 2010 (UTC)~~

I agree that neither proposal is adequate. These two definitions have apparently been made to be deliberate extremes, and obviously WP is not the place for us to pick winners. We just report what happens in the RS world. And in the world of reliable sources there is some fuzziness about this term. I have below proposed a lead which mentions both broad and strict senses, but more logically than the current version. Also everyone who is pushing for having pure or extreme science (or natural science) articles on Wikipedia please consider WP:CFORK.--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 11:20, 19 September 2010 (UTC)

As the conversation stands, we are deciding between false alternatives. Neither is adequate, unless 1 is a strawman and 2 is a woodman, with hopes of building on 2, brick by brick, on top of a wooden foundation. --Ancheta Wis (talk) 18:05, 19 September 2010 (UTC)

Agree here also. When Wikipedia gets a word that has multiple meanings in common use, it either directs the word to a disambiguation page, or else devotes a page to untangling the terms for those who have difficulty present and past meanings. Either of those should be done here. Duplicating much the natural science article and calling it science, with some non-natural science add-ons in a special section, is not the way to go. Here's what would happen if we did that with the word "cell":S B H arris 22:47, 19 September 2010 (UTC)

The options presented are indeed inadequate. Note also that cooking may certainly be considered a science as it was commonly taught in schools as Domestic Science. Professionally, we have food technology and its advanced practitioners would commonly be recognised as scientists. Colonel Warden (talk) 10:53, 20 September 2010 (UTC)

Call me on my cell

"Call me on my cell"

"You've got trillions of them. How do I call one??"

"Dope. From context, you should know that when I say use the word "cell" like this, I mean "cell phone."

"Oh. Like when you say "science" you mean "natural science."

"Right. So what's your problem?"

"Well, I'm ancient, is one. 25 years ago they didn't have what we call cell phones. Even Gordon Gekko had something that looked like a WW II Handie Talkie."

"A what? Gordon who? Look, I don't remember what happened 25 years ago; I was in diapers. I want words to mean what they mean NOW. For ME. (music) Me-me-me-ME-me-me-me-me."

"Well, if I type in "cell" in Wikipedia, I get a disambiguation page with all the different meanings."

"ZOMG, bro. WP:SOFIXIT! Wikipedia is not a dictionary, you know! "Cell" should direct to "cell phone" because that's what most people mean by the word NOW. All the rest is ancient history. You can write a history article."

"That will make some people unhappy on Wikipedia.."

"So what? Most of them are MY age. Like, young. Old farts, academics, and people who know history aren't special on Wikipedia. Didn't you know that? You're not the boss of me!"

Discussion

By employing the use of either definition, I think you are missing the point of an encyclopedia article. I think in either definition, we have become hyper focused on the Modern popular assumptions behind the term. What happens to fields such as astrology, which today is a pseudo-science, but Early modern period it was practiced as an art and science at the same time? What about "social sciences"? I have a professor of history, that insists that history as a process is both a scientific and artistic process, and that refining it to one of these is a inadequate solution resultant of academic politicking. Why should we automatically exclude such a common academic assumption? (Many economic or social historians consider their practices scientific). Shouldn't multiple approaches to defining science be explored instead of settling on one as our "primary" definition? In an overview of the literature, I think you would find most academics of science questioning the existence of "science" as a unified/definable field or process to begin with. Philosophy of science and history of science deal with this extensively. Instead, I think we should be discussing a wide array of issues behind the concept of science. Sadads (talk) 18:52, 18 September 2010 (UTC)

Sadads, both definitions would include the social sciences as well. No one is disputing that (see discussions above). The distinction between the two is a matter of how broad should the main lead definition be, which will then allow us to move to what should be the main focus of this article. Again, it is possible to explore other uses, that would not be an issue. The issue at this point is the lead definition of this article. Once we have that resolved, I think we can begin to address more fully some of the questions that you brought up such as science relationship to literature, humanities, fine arts, etc. mezzaninelounge (talk) 19:04, 18 September 2010 (UTC)

'New defintition 'I would suggest something along the lines of :"Science, broadly speaking, is a process and field of study based on the use of experience through examples combined with logic to create falsifiable propositions. Science can take many forms and the term can be applied in many ways in both contemporary and historical discourse." Any thoughts, Sadads (talk) 19:24, 18 September 2010 (UTC)

Your definition appears to be a rephrase (albeit, a more elegant one) of definition 2. By the way, as Headbomb pointed out, I made a mistake and have striked out history from the second sentence of definition 2. This will have the effect of including it in definition 2, which is consistent with the consensus that it is one of the social sciences. I just wasn't aware that it was as I thought it was a traditionally classified under humanities. mezzaninelounge (talk) 19:38, 18 September 2010 (UTC)

After reading R. G. Collingwood (1889-1943), The Idea of History, I must disagree that history is a science. --Ancheta Wis (talk) 20:18, 18 September 2010 (UTC)

Better Definition 2 than Definition 1.
A: Definition 1 makes science be simply your knowledge - that which is proven to you - rather than that which (in practice, not just in principle) can be proven (or confirmed etc.) to others and which is scientific knowledge in the broadest sense; at the current stage of science and verification/falsification, that excludes astrology. No reason for the idea of science, in that broadest sense, to exclude mathematics. I don't get the exclusion of mathematics from 'falsifiable' areas of knowledge. Rigorously proven mathematics is not 'falsifiable' in the sense of disprovable but it is still testable for falsity or checkable for falsity, which is the heart of falsifiability, no? I agree that the word "science" is not generally understood to encompass mathematics these days, but the distinction of mathematics should be made in some other terms - the kinds of knowledge-building methods used, the distillation of postulates, the purely hypothetical or ideal/imaginative universal subject matter (thanks to its endless mappabilities, its metamorphosic bridges across the greatest outward disparities). Anyway, contrary to Definition 1, science is not just knowing something, instead it's knowing in or on what light or basis you know something, so that you could establish it for others or tell them how to establish it. That excludes the fine arts, which don't necessarily involve knowing on what basis or bases one knows things, but instead involve understanding in what effects (in a general sense) one feels things ('feel' in a general and variegated sense of emotional affectivity). I also don't see why history should be excluded, though it doesn't usually find laws; history is descriptive and, to some extent, explanatory. Yes, it can involve 'arts' - but so can studies involving less idiosyncratic phenomena - research itself is an 'art' of expediting and economizing the discovery process.
B: Science continually aims at building sound, firm structures that support further such structures, bases for further conclusions, bases for further bases (just as information is a difference that makes a difference) - all of that may suggest structure, entelechy, a final product standing finished, the scientific knowledge itself, but that vision introduces a bias, embodied in Definition 1. Science (likewise as mathematics) is impetus, process, culmination, structure, all at once, in various ways. The firm structures which constitute knowledge, indeed the knowledge itself, cannot be understood apart from the building process. How well do you know something if you don't know how it was discovered, established, etc.? Science is not just a collection of facts or data. It's not even just a collection of facts, classifications, domains or contexts, and laws. Furthermore, insofar as science involves self-correction and, in its forward-looking way, potentiality for as much self-correction as needed, it involves the idea of a community without definite limits. For the maintenance and growth of science at other than the most glacial pace, this implies the idea of a community of dedicated researchers carrying the process out. So again, with some qualifications, I prefer Definition B. The Tetrast (talk) 20:44, 18 September 2010 (UTC).

In case this ever becomes an issue, I just want to clarify that the exclusion of any field of study, technique/technology, or artistic expression by definition 2 does not in any way imply that that field of study/technology/expression is inferior or less rigorous than science (as defined by definition 2). I don't want to offend any reader who might perceive it as a potential slight. The rationale behind this vote is to clarify and stabilize the scope and focus of this article and not get bogged down over what is science and what is not. That way, we can move on to address many of the important and interesting questions and topics that have been brought up recently by several voters. mezzaninelounge (talk) 21:31, 18 September 2010 (UTC)

I mostly agree with mezzaninelounge here (maybe I'd look to some non-mathematical sense of "rigorous"). I'd say that it goes for 'ruling' arts (arts of ruling, governing, being ruled or governed, self-governing) - architecture in certain regards (besides its fine-arts function), community planning, education of character, and so on, as well as productive arts/sciences - e.g. engineering, technology, and medicine (sciences of means), the fine arts, and the maths and sciences. The productive arts/sciences have become so richly interconnected with the theoretical ones that it is hard to draw a sharp bright line between them. Between the 'ruling' arts (especially architecture) and the fine arts, a sharp bright line is not always to easy to come by either. Anyway, they're all disciplines of knowledge, in some sense, and when their aim is not only knowledge, it's also vision and character, or it's competence and performance, or it's sensibility and appreciation, basic elements of the life of the mind and of society. The Tetrast (talk) 22:33, 18 September 2010 (UTC).

Well, the discussion above and especially below, has gone on in enough directions to make the task seem quite formidable. I've given a try at a characterization of science, trying to encompass various viewpoints except that of Definition 1. Definition 1 leaves science indistinguishable not only from know-how that has a component of communicable knowledge but also from simple skill sets which are general active competencies like riding a bicycle. I would be surprised at a reliable reference supporting such an idea. By that logic, since an affective or fine art involves understanding emotional effects and meanings, it also should be called science - and likewise a reliable repeated set of feelings and tastes themselves should be called science. And since 'ruling' arts involve understanding what decides - well, you can see where I'm going, any sort of repeated decision process itself, any habit, will be called a science. So any reliably repeated volition, ability, feeling, or cognition - habits, skills, fond attachments or settled dislikes, and familiarities - will all be "sciences." Science even in a two-level soundbyte isn't knowing what volitionally decides, or know-how, or understanding what something means affectively, but instead is knowing what is the cognitive lesson to be drawn - knowing what something (more or less) proves, knowing what was, is, will be, or would be established. So whatever else, I vote against Definition 1.

Anyway, the characterization, for what it is worth:

Science encompasses expandable, systematically integrated knowledge secured through success of experimentally or observationally tested predictions drawn logically from theories or models which thereby stand tested and further testable for falsity or inaccuracy and which are developed to simplify, condense, organize, and increase understanding, in a methodically wary and self-improving process of trying hypothetical explanations in the determination to find ever more of the truth, initiated and impelled by wonder at phenomena that resist understanding. Science is, with varying frequency, identified as being one or another of those aspects: the knowledge, the thorough testing, the methodically self-improving process, the wonder-impelled drive for truth, and the research community itself that lives for those things and is what gives them life.

Well, it's too long, tries to say too much, what can I say. The Tetrast (talk) 21:16, 19 September 2010 (UTC).

You are doing it wrong

You are doing it wrong. The right way is not to try to make a wording that sort of kind of covers what you think science is about, the right way is to find a number of different definitions used in authoritative sources (definitions of science have of course varied between paradigms, traditions and historical periods) and see what is common to all and what differences there are between them. Having a vote between two arbitrary definitions neither of which seems to be well grounded in actual sources is the wrong way.·Maunus·ƛ· 21:19, 18 September 2010 (UTC)

Maunus, I can only speak about definition 2. This definition and its variants are grounded in many authoritative sources such as the "logic of scientific discoveries" by Karl Popper, "Consilience" by E.O. Wilson, "Voodoo Science" by Roger Park, and the "Demon Haunted World" by Carl Sagan. Just to name a few. They can also be found in introductory science textbooks (e.g., Biology by Campbell and Reece). You are right, I am not able to find any reference to support definition 1, which is one of the principal reasons why I am not in favor of it. Nevertheless, it was ~~(and still is)~~ and a variant of it is the lead definition of this article and has been proposed as the main alternative to definition 2 by one of the editors (SBHarris) on this talk page. The reason for the vote is because there appears to be irreconcilable differences between the editors as to which of these two definitions should be the lead definition. Hence, an imperfect and last resort solution is a vote on this issue. mezzaninelounge (talk) 21:42, 18 September 2010 (UTC)

If forced to choose, I'd go for Def. 2, but I'm not so forced. I like

Def. 3a at http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/science, which I'm glad ot see is cited in the article. Britannica Micro or Macro articles for Britannica (on which, see http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/528756/science ) is OK too. Falsifiabiliy is a useful ideal & gold standard, but it's my understanding that the methodological foundation that Karl Popper proposed has problems, which his collaborator David Miller (philosopher) has bravely written on. Per definition, to paraphrase Einstein (speaking on simplicity), it is good to be as precise as one can but not more so. I think that one problem w advocating falsifiability too strictly is that may exclude Stephen Hawking's 10-or-is-it-11 dimensional description of everything in his latest book The Grand Design (book) (wait — I better post before I change my mind). Looks like an interesting article anyhow. --Thomasmeeks (talk) 22:11, 18 September 2010 (UTC)

For what it's worth, C. S. Peirce said,

That which constitutes science, then, is not so much correct conclusions, as it is a correct method. But the method of science is itself a scientific result. It did not spring out of the brain of a beginner: it was a historic attainment and a scientific achievement. So that not even this method ought to be regarded as essential to the beginnings of science. That which is essential, however, is the scientific spirit, which is determined not to rest satisfied with existing opinions, but to press on to the real truth of nature. - Peirce, in "The Marriage of Religion of Science," Internet Archive Eprint.

More quotes of him on science here. There one will see that Peirce tended to emphasize that a science is a community determined to find the truth and "that its most marked characteristic is that when it is genuine, it is in an incessant state of metabolism and growth." The Tetrast (talk) 22:59, 18 September 2010 (UTC).

I've now looked at Definition 3a at at http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/science. It's too much like Definition 1. The Tetrast (talk) 23:39, 18 September 2010 (UTC).

Tetrast, I agree that there is definitely a community aspect of science. Once we have this lead intro issue resolved, I would like to suggest that one of the next step would be to look closely at the contents of this entire article and see which areas to expand, modify, and reduce. One of the areas that I would like to suggest emphasized is, as you say, the community aspect of science, which I believe is central to the creation of scientific knowledge. This would include the peer review process, scientific conferences, academies, scientific publications (e.g., journals, monograms), acknowledgments (e.g., Nobel Prize), etc mezzaninelounge (talk) 23:51, 18 September 2010 (UTC)

I was thinking that maybe the word "community" could be sneaked into the definition somehow - I don't mean into the sound byte "Definition 1" above, I mean into the Science wiki's first paragraph, in whatever form it ends up taking. I don't want to be pushy, since I haven't been involved in the editing of the "Science" wiki, only the "Scientific method" wiki, and Ancheta's been more active than I there. I notice also that the Science intro points to predictive power as essential to science, and that tends to exclude history unless one regards the historian as making predictions about what other investigators will find if they check up enough on the historian's claims (which may not just be about what are the historical occurrences but a lot more - their causes and effects, influences, relationships, dependences, independences); but even then I'm arguing only that in principle history can be a science, not that it actually is. There seem to be knotty problems with a number of human/social studies, something to do with their being us studying ourselves and our being rather complex. The Tetrast (talk) 00:49, 19 September 2010 (UTC).

Tetrast, I am certainly not opposed to such a suggestion. We have quite a bit of work ahead. User 98.249.185.122 has written a prototype intro, which is buried in Intro/definition section. It probably needs some work as far as style, but it has many important elements that I think are good starting points. What do you think? mezzaninelounge (talk) 01:00, 19 September 2010 (UTC)

@Maunus, I share your reservations; from my own POV, Science is what results when a community of scientists practice a scientific method. Note that this community need not be restricted to simultaneous contemporaries or to co-located associates, only that they communicate the results of their work to each other. They need not have the same goals, they need not use the same terms, they might not agree with each other. They do need to express what they see is wrong about the work in process.

"Alas, that wisdom is so large

"And truth so manifold! — Emily Dickinson

@mezzaninelounge-Danielkueh, it may be necessary to divide the aspects of this project to rewrite the lede. What appears in 1 & 2 are doomed to be strawmen, from my POV. In the truth article, there are no less than 5 definitions for truth.

--Ancheta Wis (talk) 05:08, 19 September 2010 (UTC)

Ancheta, I am not sure if we have to go that far. Judging by the votes and comments, there doesn't appear to be much support for definition 1. Moreover, it is not verified by any reference. To my knowledge at least. So I don't think we have to expand too much on it. Plus, I think the Philosophy of Science page does that very well.

Proposal

How about defining it less specifically e.g. simply as "Science is a method used by humans for creating knowledge, it has had many conflicting definitions through history." Then start listing the different sourceable definitions and conditions that have been proposed e.g. falsifiability etc.·Maunus·ƛ· 22:46, 18 September 2010 (UTC)

Maunus, that can be done within the history section of this article. Nevertheless, much of the discussion of what constitutes science, etc, as well as conflicting views, etc has been been addressed extensively in History of Science and Philosophy of Science. I am not sure, from an administrative perspective, if it a good wiki form to have that (history of conflicting definitions, etc) be the main focus or the lead intro of this article. mezzaninelounge (talk) 22:58, 18 September 2010 (UTC)

with lots of complex concepts with many different definitions it is the only viable alternative to simple misinformation. Some concepts can only be defined through their intellectual genealogies - I am pretty sure science is one of those. ·Maunus·ƛ· 23:26, 18 September 2010 (UTC)

Definition 2 would not qualify as simple misinformation, given that it is neither a wrong or a bad definition. Moreover, as you can see with the votes, there is already a growing consensus on this talk page that favors this definition, albeit, with the need for a few refinements. I agree that science as a whole is fairly complex and that discussion of intellectual genealogies should be considered. There is a history section in that article that does that already. Moreover, there are two main articles that have already address those issues extensively: Philosophy of Science and History of Science. If we were to focus on the intellectual genealogies at the very beginning, we would have effectively created another Philosophy/History of Science article and not a broadly Science article, which should include among many things, contemporary scientific practices and methods, science's relationship with other fields, role of science in society, scientists, etc. Just saying. mezzaninelounge (talk) 00:06, 19 September 2010 (UTC)

The problem with your definition, Maunus, is that it centers too much on the inability to define science. The truth is, nothing can be truly defined in today's philosophical and scientific contexts. Instead, scholastic communities have opted to describe and define axioms, principles, and ideas in terms of models. The reasoning behind models is that they can convey specific and accurate information in many different levels, provided they are not taken out of context. (See: Conceptual model). Therefore, mentioning that science is difficult to define would defeat the purpose of defining it; that is, to elucidate and clarify the point in discussion. The point of definition itself is to explain key structures, so conflicting definitions are not so much of problem as overly ambiguous defintions, which, although sounding very politically correct, genrally fail to impart any essential information regarding the defined term or subject matter, and may even be misleading at times. ☲Fireyair☲ (talk) 01:20, 19 September 2010 (UTC)

For the lead definition, why not:

use the first three sentences of the article as they stand at the time of this post:

'''Science (from the Latin scientia, meaning "knowledge") is, in its broadest sense, any systematic knowledge that is capable of resulting in a correct prediction (i.e. falsifiability in Karl Popper's sense) or reliable outcome. It is a system of acquiring knowledge based on the scientific method and an organized body of knowledge gained through such research.[1][2] It is a "systematic enterprise of gathering knowledge about the world and organizing and condensing that knowledge into testable laws and theories".[3 '''

The next sentence and the next paragraph about earlier meanings etc. belong in a dictionary, not an encyclopedia.

Jamie Anderson —Preceding unsigned comment added by 110.175.68.241 (talk) 06:21, 19 September 2010 (UTC)

I'd say on the contrary that what you are proposing is more like a dictionary style, where a clear meaning is being set out and not discussed? What am I missing?--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 11:27, 19 September 2010 (UTC)

That it can then be discussed and amplified in the next couple of paragraphs. There's nothing wrong with a 4-paragraph lede for a topic this complex.S B H arris 18:49, 19 September 2010 (UTC)

I would agree that if it solves problems then in principle this can be done. But actually the current lead is partly long because it swings back and forth repetitively between different visions? It is maybe easiest to point to the draft I wrote to show what I was thinking.--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 19:33, 19 September 2010 (UTC)

Another comment about the lead

Hi. I saw mention of this discussion because Natural Science is on my watchlist. I believe the current lead is logically wrong. I think it is a good idea to start with the broadest definition. Problem: That Popperian definitions of science are common is not controversial, to claim that they are a mainstream consensus would be controversial, but more to the point what the lead currently says is that Popperian definitions are the "broadest". That is simply incorrect. The second paragraph therefore directly contradicts the first by saying that science sometimes refers to reliable knowledge. I think it is obvious that this is a broader sense and the Popperian version in the first sentence is a stricter sense? However, I am not sure "reliable" is enough. If you look at Aristotle's definition of epistemê, normally translated as science, he points out that some reliable knowledge is not science, for example direct observations. Science is therefore normally not only reliable, but also something put into the form of a logical explanation in words; something that can be taught. Of course his definition of epistemê will not work for modern science in a strict sense, but I think this is closer to the broad definition needed. Does this make sense?-Andrew Lancaster (talk) 10:06, 19 September 2010 (UTC)

Proposal for consideration:-

Science (from the Latin scientia, meaning "knowledge") is, in its broadest and oldest sense any knowledge which can be put into the form of a logical and convincing explanation and communicated. This type of knowledge is therefore distinguished by being considered reliably true due to the strength of its premises, and strength of the logic leading to its conclusions.

From Classical times until the Enlightenment, "science" had more-or-less the same broad meaning in English that "philosophy" had during those times. By the early 19th century, "natural philosophy" (which eventually evolved into what is today called "natural science") had begun to separate more definitively from "philosophy" in general. In many cases, "science" continued to stand for reliable knowledge about any topic, in the same way it is still used in the broad sense in modern terms such as library science, political science, and computer science.

This article focuses upon science in this more restricted sense, sometimes called experimental science, and also gives some broader historical context leading up to the modern understanding of the word "science." In modern times, the stricter definitions of "science" generally require a specific methodical approach to the collection of evidence and conclusions. While there is debate about how to define this method, one of the most common demands is that conclusions should be "falsifiable" or in other words capable of being proven wrong by experiment. This makes modern science a "systematic enterprise of gathering knowledge about the world and organizing and condensing that knowledge into testable laws and theories".[3]

A couple of observations:

the concept of science in the Middle Ages goes back to classical times.
the distinction between natural science or philosophy and other types also goes back to classical times. Some would say that there was a long detour. As Aristotle explained it, Socrates changed philosophy by trying to turn it towards the study of human good, whereas it had previously been dedicated only to the study of nature. (He says this in the Metaphysics)

Cheers--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 10:24, 19 September 2010 (UTC)

Some practical considerations for us editors on WP:-

That it is difficult to get a consensus on a choice between two extremes is only to be expected, because that is also how the field is.
If there are differences of opinion in the RS world, then we should reflect that here and not try to re-write reality the way we think it should be.
The current version of the lead mentions both broad and narrow meanings, and I see no problem with that. It seems a very good way to cover the problems discussed here. It just hasn't been done in a clear and consistent way.
Therefore, my proposal above is suggested in the spirit of being a proposal that hopefully will not be considered to make the lead worse by anyone. In other words, it is a step to improving the lead which is hopefully easier to accept than any of the various proposals to try to purify the lead in one of two extreme directions, both of which I think can never achieve a consensus?
There should be some consideration as to how we divide subject matter between natural science and this article. If this article is actually about natural science then the logical implication is that the two articles should be merged eventually. See WP:CFORK.--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 11:25, 19 September 2010 (UTC)

But what do you call the merged article? There are sciences like formal science in the info box here, that are NOT natural science. I propose that the article that talks about the differences between these present disciplines be called "science"! It's tempting to merge that stuff into the History of science article, and I don't object too much, so long as there are many pointers to say that the information on disambiguation of the various sub-sciences is discussed in the history article, now. But I don't think that's a very good solution. It's easier to have the Science article say that it's often used as a synonym for natural science (which see), but has many other meanings, many of them in current use, as political science, computer science, and so on. Then go on to DO that job of pointing out how the various types of science disciplines differ from each other. S B H arris 18:55, 19 September 2010 (UTC)

Hi SBH. Just noticed I missed this response. I do not propose a merger myself, but if Science will be limited to discussion of Natural science then that material should be merged article with natural science. Most obviously, because the term science is being used in a specific sense which is not the only one around, we should call that article natural science. And then I guess we could use the Science article to cover science "broadly". I don't see history of science as relevant, because I am talking about all the contemporary and alive meanings of the word science, which by the way are not just words that sound the same but meanings which are related and which have something in common. That is just running through the logic as it appears to me. If people really insist on different extreme proposals then I guess the other thing we could consider is turning Science into a dab, but that seems wrong to me. Science in the broad sense is a modern term with a single definable clear and real meaning which goes beyond any of the proposed "strict senses" or any specialist or historical senses. Why shouldn't WP have an article about science in the broad sense? And why not call it Science? --Andrew Lancaster (talk) 19:31, 19 September 2010 (UTC)

Andrew, I appreciate your thoughtful comments on this issue. The reason why I brought up the vote because I felt this is a very important article and that the first few sentences in this article is extremely crucial to establishing the scope of this article. Plus, I wanted to avoid any future edit wars. I wanted to invite as many editors who have an interest in this issue to speak their minds about it. Definition 1 has been used as the lead definition of this article. It has not been verified by any reference. At least not to my knowledge. The user (SBHarris) who promotes its use here has yet to provide a reference. There is a citation from Webster's, but looking at those 5 definitions on science, they certainly will not lead one to define science using definition 1. Plus, it is quite controversial. Several attempts have been made to change it, only to find it reverted. The number of sections on this talk page dedicated to debating its validity is overwhelming and exhausting. As you can see, it continues to grow. Unless it is resolved, I am afraid, we will not make much progress on the other contents and issues of this page that desperately need attention as we will always be bogged down by questions such as "is this a science, is this not a science?" And if by RS, you mean "real science," then I must confess that I do not know of any real scientist, be they natural, social, or behavioral that uses or promotes definition 1, excluding the one editor on this talk page that is. I know many scientists (personally and through their work) who at least know definition 2. Definition 2, while certainly imperfect is at least verified by several references and are familiar to many editors (I am basing on the comments and votes). We can include other definitions, but I think must insistent on having that definition verified by a reputable source. Finally, this article is not about the natural sciences and I don't think it should be. Definition 2, the scientific method, the use of math in science, and peer review certainly goes beyond physics, chemistry and biology. They are also used extensively in the social sciences as well such as sociology, economics, psychology, etc. mezzaninelounge (talk) 18:00, 19 September 2010 (UTC)

A reference from a book on my shelf What is Science? by N. Campbell is coming later today as soon as I type it, but it's from 1921, and you have a history of "moving the goalposts" by refusing to to use the dictionary definition of "science" already. I suspect you won't like this one because it's 90 years old. But 1921 is well into the modern era, post relativity and well nearly through the long birth of quantum mechanics. It's near enough to the present that "science" is already used in the sense of "natural science" (indeed the book is about natural science) but not so far that the British scientist author doesn't have a clear sense of how the term came into being and is still used in many other senses. S B H arris 18:36, 19 September 2010 (UTC)

Hi SBH, indeed this is a common way of defining science, but not the only way. As mentioned above, I think I can beat your date. The concept science, although it has changed a bit, goes back to a Latin word which was a translation of a Greek word and Aristole reports a split amongst Greeks between natural philosophers and philosophers who attempted to bring philosophizing into discussing subjects of the market place. You could say Socrates and his students pulled science away from natural science for >1000 years, and then the early moderns such as Francis Bacon are the source of the assertion you have found that really science should be more restricted in what it studies. Many follow him but not all. That this has always been a conflict which has never been fully won by either side gives us some indication of how difficult it would be for someone on WP to declare an end to this problem. You should by the way keep in mind that the works of Aristotle and Bacon, just to name two authors, are still alive and being read today. Some people will find their way of writing confusing and they might even come to Wikipedia to try to understand.--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 18:49, 19 September 2010 (UTC)

Oh, yes, I know, but if you go back that far you risk running afoul of people who want to put all that stuff in history of science. so it's not a matter of beating dates. We want something in the realm where the change was taking place. The lovelist example I've found is the one I put in the article here a long time ago, which is John Locke desparing in the late 17th century that natural philosophy didn't have a teachable method, and thus might not be fully capable of being made into a "science"! That's how far we've come. Nowadays you can guarantee that any grad student who chooses a proper topic and does the work, can come up with data that is reducable and relatable to known work, and publishable to the advancement of scientific knowledge. We now have "natural science" mostly down to a science, if you will. That's the "scientific method." Though used from prehistorical times, it was not set down as a method until really quite recently. If you don't count statistics, that was not till the end of the 19th century (no, Bacon didn't really have the whole picture), and if you do want to include statistics, it's not until early in the 20th century that the full modern system of inductive model proposal, and deductive model testing got explicitly laid out. The credit for all this, is rather like the the case of the "standard model of physics." It's not the work of a single person, and it's hard to give most of the credit for it to one person, as (for example) we do with relativity. That includes Popper, who in no small part described what was already happening, rather than taught scientists what they SHOULD be doing. In fact, I can hardly think of a case where the "philosophers of science" (a separate academic discipline in philosophy) ever taught working scientists anything important about how to do science. Rather, they follow along, as observers, and act as reporters. For an example of how working science ignores Popper, see physicist Lee Smolin's latest popular book The Trouble with Physics: the Rise of String Theory. Theoretical physicists might listen to Smolin, but they surely didn't listen to Popper. In fact, there are many ways around Popper's prescriptions, and modern hard-core non-fringe academic science, may be found using them all. S B H arris 19:05, 19 September 2010 (UTC)

I guess it is sometimes argued that Popper did not even describe what was already happening, and that many great moments in science are not science according to his definition. Anyway, the point is, once again, that in the real world outside of WP, the sources do not agree, and old sources remain important subsets of the sources being read today and which WP should therefore try to cover. We should not try to pick a winner, if you see what I mean.--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 19:21, 19 September 2010 (UTC)

May I ask you to comment on my draft proposal above by the way? Even if you don't like it your comments might help me understand.--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 18:56, 19 September 2010 (UTC)

I like your first two paragraphs very much. The problem is the third one, which acts to ease the article into being a natural science article. I would simply leave out your third for this article, and instead use the space to talk about the differences in the various sciences that aren't natural science. Then the rest of the article (which need not be long) to flesh that out. Your paragraphs would also make a great intro for the "history" section of the natural science article. A condensed history needs to go there, with the {main} redirect to the history of science article. S B H arris 19:33, 19 September 2010 (UTC)

OK. I was using pre-existing material, which is why I kept in that sentence. Here is another version though which leans more in the direction you and I perhaps prefer, but still tries to compromise:-

Science (from the Latin scientia, meaning "knowledge") is, in its broadest and oldest sense any knowledge which can be put into the form of a logical and convincing explanation and communicated. This type of knowledge is therefore distinguished by being considered reliably true due to the strength of its premises, and strength of the logic leading to its conclusions.

From Classical times until the Enlightenment, "science" had more-or-less the same broad meaning in English that "philosophy" had during those times. By the early 19th century, "natural philosophy" (which eventually evolved into what is today called "natural science") had begun to separate more definitively from "philosophy" in general. In many cases, "science" continued to stand for reliable knowledge about any topic, in the same way it is still used in the broad sense in modern terms such as library science, political science, and computer science.

In contemporary usage, especially in academic contexts, many authors use science as a technical terms limited strictly to experimental science. Generally these narrow definitions of "science" therefore also require a specific scientific method be used in the collection of evidence and conclusions. While there is debate about how to define such a method, one of the most common demands is that conclusions should be "falsifiable" or in other words capable of being proven wrong by experiment. Science understood this way is a "systematic enterprise of gathering knowledge about the world and organizing and condensing that knowledge into testable laws and theories".[3]

What do others think of this? Once again, even if people hate it, maybe the answers help us avoid wasting time on misunderstandings. I think the definition 1 versus definition 2 contest is not meaningful unless we are proposing something more concrete, in a semi-polished form. Otherwise it looks like a choice between straw men.--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 19:41, 19 September 2010 (UTC)

Hi mezzaninelounge and thanks for your welcome which helps me understand. Perhaps to make a shorter comment this time, I do fear and hope that the positions are not as far apart as they seem. Your efforts to break the circle seem a good idea, because some of it may simply be due to misunderstandings. People often fear the most extreme version of what others propose, but there is often more common ground that there first appears to be. May I ask what you think of my intended practical compromise? Even if you don't like it your comments might help me understand.--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 18:20, 19 September 2010 (UTC)

No problem Andrew. I will give your ideas some thought after this vote. I have to run now. Sorry to keep this short. Will talk more soon. :) mezzaninelounge (talk) 19:47, 19 September 2010 (UTC)

No worries. Make the most of the weekend! Looking forward to further discussion.--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 19:54, 19 September 2010 (UTC)

Andrew, I posted a quick and dirty summary of what many folks have been discussing on this page since the vote. I am just trying to get a feel of where everyone stands as far as the scope of this article is concerned. I think it is important that there is some general consensus as to what this article should or should cover first before going into lengthy details. Let me know what you think. mezzaninelounge (talk) 00:39, 20 September 2010 (UTC)

Hi. I saw you've also moved ahead and changed the current lead. I appreciate I came in late to the discussion and so this might be best for now. However I think is that the vote, because it was based on "straw men" and not real concrete examples, may not finish the discussion. Good news is that we now have your new version. Can we consider that as your concrete proposal? Perhaps we can get better discussion, and something closer to consensus, if we compare your concrete proposal and mine?--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 07:48, 20 September 2010 (UTC)

Of course it can not do your edit justice, but I might as well make a simple comment: your proposal states from the first sentence that science only includes what is falsifiable. I am sure that you can find sources which say this, and also get people to vote for it on WP, but it is nevertheless still known by all of us to be a specific position which not everyone agrees on either outside of WP or on WP. I believe the only way to make a real consensus is to define science broadly first, and then later mention the various special sub-definitions given by different notable movements. If you reply to this that people who define science differently should move their material to other articles then I think you raise the big question of whether others can suggest the same back. The logical conclusion if everyone took such positions would be that we need to split this article up and make it into a dab. But I see no reason for that. A broad definition would cover all the sub-definitions and so starting the article with one would be a natural compromise. If editors can't find a compromise something like that though, then we could end up having no "science" article on WP except for a dab.--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 08:29, 20 September 2010 (UTC)

Andrew, you may consider my summary as a proposal. The change of the lead definition was primarily to resolve the vote, which I admit is imperfect as well as the contentious debate about definition 1, which has been very very controversial as exemplified by the amount of edits, discussions, and heated arguments over it above. My purpose was primarily to move on to definition 2, because at the very least it is widely known and understood. There is more consensus for it (5 editors). No one voted for definition 1 and quite a number (excluding myself) are explicitly against it. That said. I understand that your want to broaden the definition, etc or at least introduce a broader one that precedes it. I must confess I am very nervous about that idea because I am really afraid that it will take us a step back towards something like definition 1, which again, is very very controversial. But if that does in principle, make this a better and more informative article, then I have no problems with that provided we have to keep several things in mind about any new or additional definition.

1) it is verifiable, current, and widely used/known/understood within the scientific community (social, natural, or behavioral scientists).

2) it allows us to define the scope of the article and and does not bring us a step back to a long drawn discussions of debating "what is science and what is not."

4) should not be so broad so as to be vacuous. At some point, we have to be able to tell readers that science is different from just pure knowledge, philosophy, technology, tradecraft, behavior, etc. Otherwise, we may as well have this science page be a redirect to all of these areas.

5) be logically consistent with all other science articles in Wikipedia.

Other than that, I think this is something that we can work with. Again, I hope you understand why I am very nervous about this because I just feel we have made some progress. Again. thanks for all your efforts and time in wanting to make this a better article. mezzaninelounge 13:34, 20 September 2010 (UTC)

First a warning that I have not tried to understand the details of who said what in the older arguments. I figure I can probably do more good by not doing this. So I am not always sure if what I say might sound like I am on a "side". My impression though, just to put it in a rough way, is that the heaviest argument is between people who want ONE subset of the valid meanings of science to not only dominate the article, but even take over the article. As I said before though, this is doomed to failure. To say that there is a dominant idea of science understood in a strict sense and which deserves special position is OK though. But why should one meaning "win", especially when all the sub-meanings have their own articles? And if we accept ANY level of multiple meanings, then I think you need something in the first sentence about the broad meaning of science to at least set the lighting. I could not quite see any reason to be scared of that but I now understand from your post that you fear the alternative is the mess that there used to be? However, it seems that part of this was that no-one had a good idea about how you could unite all the meanings into one broad meaning that was consistent with all the others. This is why I am proposing this "broad meaning first sentence" structure as a possible help. Going through your 5-ish points, I'd say they are very reasonable indeed:-

1) No problem. There is a surfeit of sources on this subject. You could source anything, which is the problem.

2) Yes. See my explanation. That is indeed an aim of this structure I am proposing.

3) There is no 3) LOL

4) Yes. Again, it is all about getting a structure which will cover everything. I should mention that there will be areas where the outside world disagrees, and in those cases it is our job to report that disagreement?

5) See 2)

Make sense?--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 13:53, 20 September 2010 (UTC)

Yes. :) ~~141.218.93.205 (talk) 15:22, 20 September 2010 (UTC)~~ mezzaninelounge 15:23, 20 September 2010 (UTC)

Lead: concise

The Lead discussion has become so extensive that I'd like to read a 10–20 line bulleted NPOV statement about it, particularly the proposed alternatives, by a few who've followed it through, perhaps based on the one above. I'm new at this page but I've helped improve many Leads here. I'd rather not vote or contribute until I get most of the issues, and I (and probably many) will probably never digest this argument without help. As the Lead stands, it contains syntax that could be tightened and repetition. A few carefully chosen words blow away streams of consciousness, be they in a talk page or a featured Lead. Best, Trev M ~ 16:07, 19 September 2010 (UTC)

I agree. There's a lot going on here. I also caution against some of the language being proposed here that may make the lead unwieldy for readers. WP articles should be written for the sake of the readers, not for the writers. The current intro seems like it will lose people very quickly. (e.g., "falsifiability in Karl Popper's sense" -- I'd guess that the overwhelming majority of readers won't know what that means.) -Nick^talk 17:48, 19 September 2010 (UTC)

The lead definition of this article was originally definition 1. At some point, an editor (Kenosis) has admirably tried to reconcile its use with other definitions (definition 2 for example) of science. In the process, it resulted in 3 or 4 definitions in the lead paragraph. I don't think it helped readers to understand the article any better. I agree that language is a potential issue. And so we can substitute for example "falsifiability" with "testability." In any event, whichever definition we use, I believe that it is important that the definition be verified by a reputable scientific source and that it is at least widely known or understood in the scientific community. mezzaninelounge (talk) 18:09, 19 September 2010 (UTC)

I don't think any of the proposals we are talking about will have much difficulty being sourced. I don't know if switching from falsifiability to an even weirder word will help? That bracket in the first sentence currently makes it wrong because Popperian is not broad.--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 18:16, 19 September 2010 (UTC)

You are right, the current lead definition in this article is not correct, hence my proposal to replace it with definition 2. mezzaninelounge (talk) 18:26, 19 September 2010 (UTC)

Is it really important to anyone to keep that bracket in the first sentence? I mean Popperian ideas should be discussed, but that sentence is being over-worked right now. Is it about the broad definition or one popular strict definition?--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 18:50, 19 September 2010 (UTC)

Definition 2 seems like a "strict definition", and only one of the proposals that can be found in reliable sources. Furthermore there are other articles which discuss different aspects of this strict definition, and its competitors. So while I think for sure Popper's ideas need to be in this particular article I can not understand how it could be proposed to make Wikipedia take a side in an age old argument like definition 2 seems to demand?--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 18:53, 19 September 2010 (UTC)

It would be encyclopedic to mention several divergent but very notable defintions (including historical ones) in the Lead, provided each is kept to one para of very few lines with some citations. Trev M ~ 19:37, 19 September 2010 (UTC)

That's what I am also thinking. What do you think of my proposal above?--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 19:44, 19 September 2010 (UTC)

Science (from the Latin scientia, meaning "knowledge") is, in its broadest and oldest sense any knowledge which can be put into the form of a logical and convincing explanation and communicated. This type of knowledge is therefore distinguished by being considered reliably true due to the strength of its premises, and strength of the logic leading to its conclusions. From Classical times until the Enlightenment, "science" had more-or-less the same broad meaning in English that "philosophy" had during those times. By the early 19th century, "natural philosophy" (which eventually evolved into what is today called "natural science") had begun to separate more definitively from "philosophy" in general. In many cases, "science" continued to stand for reliable knowledge about any topic, in the same way it is still used in the broad sense in modern terms such as library science, political science, and computer science. In contemporary usage, especially in academic contexts, many authors use science as a technical terms limited strictly to experimental science. Generally these narrow definitions of "science" therefore also require a specific scientific method be used in the collection of evidence and conclusions. While there is debate about how to define such a method, one of the most common demands is that conclusions should be "falsifiable" or in other words capable of being proven wrong by experiment. Science understood this way is a "systematic enterprise of gathering knowledge about the world and organizing and condensing that knowledge into testable laws and theories".[3]

Does that include all the notable and historic concepts that contributors to this discussion would like to include – at the cost of confounding those that would like to use fewer definitions? It's a big wadge of text that needs to be spaced (even more than as you give it in the top presentation) into smaller paras representing each statement, then precised and separately referenced, imo. I couldn't find the other end of the citation you've given the whole thing. Trev M ~ 20:13, 19 September 2010 (UTC)

Good questions and points. Indeed it would be good to hear if this defines a skeleton that can be agreed upon. If it is, then I think all those other problems can be fixed pretty easily. The "[3]" is an existing ref in the current article, because I wrote this by starting with what is there already.--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 20:43, 19 September 2010 (UTC)

Retouch Basic classifications

While drawn into the Leader debate, and for a diversion, I've started reading the rest of the article. I've precised Basic classifications and made it so the classifications cascade more – i.e. made it as hierarchical as possible without drawing diagrams – and wrung out some repetition in the process. Please check that I've not lost anything significant or inadvertently added some original research of my own. If you think I have brought major issues into it, please feel free to undo the whole change (I have a copy I can continue to work on) and explain the issue(s) here. If you find minor issues, just fix them and/or discuss 'em here. Trev M ~ 22:51, 19 September 2010 (UTC)

Hi Trev. I noticed that you've been reverted? I have not looked closely but it seemed odd to me that the revert gave as one reason that you were ignoring the discussion about the lead, because this was not the lead. I'd suggest the person who reverted explain here a bit more, just to avoid misunderstandings.--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 07:52, 20 September 2010 (UTC)

I notice that the reverter User:K has made no contributions to this Talk page, and has made 5 alterations to the mainpage, all revertions, and all dating back to 2006. If they would care to express their problem with my edit, I'll happily discuss it. In the mean time, if anyone feels sufficiently strongly that this was a POV issue, in view of my statement above, please reinstate or discuss. Copy below, as removed.

Extended content

Basic classifications

Sciences involve an objective, careful and systematic study of an area of knowledge and are grouped according to whether they are based upon observation of empirical phenomena, or formal verification by a priori methods.^[1] Scientific observations must be capable of being tested for their validity by other researchers working under the same conditions.^[1]

Empirical scientific fields are commonly divided into two groups: natural sciences, which study natural phenomena (including biological life), and social sciences, which study human behavior and societies.

The formal sciences of mathematics, including statistics, and logic are vital to the empirical sciences. Major advances in formal science have often led to major advances in the empirical sciences. The formal sciences are essential in the formation of hypotheses, theories, and laws,^[1] both in discovering and describing how things work (natural sciences) and how people think and act (social sciences).

Within these categories of science are specialized fields that can include elements of multiple scientific disciplines and often possess their own terminology and body of expertise.^[2]

Applied sciences, such as engineering and health science are the practical application of other fields. Interdisciplinary sciences cover more than one field.

Best, Trev M ~ 10:27, 20 September 2010 (UTC)

I would also add that if his/her concern was to do with jargon then maybe this can be fixed. I think you were also trying to structure the section, so things like terminology can be adapted.--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 11:50, 20 September 2010 (UTC)

I apologize for the delay in commenting here. A lot of the current discussion is a bit WP:TLDR and will take some investment of time to more thoroughly review. You'll find my earlier contributions prior to 3 September under http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:Contributions/Kenosis.
..... As to the Basic classifications section, frankly it's fine as it is, though we recognize there's always room for improvement. My reasoning for this edit is given in the edit summary. The version above in the collapse box is hacked up into stranded paragraphs and simply isn't an improvement. It doesn't present any new substance; it mistakenly includes logic as a subset of mathematics and it's also misleading to include statistics as a subset of maths, when in fact it's a formal science all its own which uses mathematics, and has a few other quirks that just don't help the explanation, at least in my opinion.
.... If one were to choose to point out obvious things presently in need of improvement (I'm staying out of the discussion about the lede for the moment at least), I'd immediately point to the image and caption relating to evolution in "Certainty and science". Scientists of either gender don't "believe" in evolution--it's one of the most confirmed theories ever proposed and is the backbone of biology and its subdisciplines. Nothing in biology makes sense except in the light of evolution. Of course it's always open to fasification, but arguably is a poor illustration of the issue for the readership, because the number of observations in biology, biochemistry and geology which confirm the basic phylogenetic tree is exponentially increasing today, and only have served to increase the certainty about evolution as a basic fact as dependable to scientists as the theories of gravity, relativity and electromagnetism.
..... Please also remember who the readership is when trying to grapple with complex issues of definition and demarcation--folks looking for the very basics about science, frankly it's mostly kids (for evidence of this please review the history when it's not semiprotected and one will see the constant barrage of IP vandalism and juvenile comments inserted into the text--"Adam Edginton Discovered science", "billy loves Mrs. Finklestein" and such). ... Kenosis (talk) 15:06, 20 September 2010 (UTC)

Thanks Kenosis. It should help. You mention TLDR. The aim is that all the extra discussion will not last forever.--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 15:23, 20 September 2010 (UTC)

Of course. I just don't have adequate time to go through all of it at present. It's been a fairly rapid barrage with a very wide range of specific issues and viewpoints thrown in pretty much all at once. ... Kenosis (talk) 16:09, 20 September 2010 (UTC)

K, Kenosis, the part of your reply that deals with the edit to Basic classification is composed of unsupported opinion and plain misreading, as well as fact. You use the term "hacked-up" which quite clearly expresses disdain. You may prefer the style of convoluted prose, others may prefer the style of brief statement: there is no need to be rude about it. With issues of classification, my opinion is that clarity and brevity are best. You incorrectly state that I say logic is part of mathematics: there is a comma after statistics, before "and". I do however, incorrectly if you say so, say that statistics is part of maths: it was, when I was taught maths. The section was ambiguous about it before I – er "hacked" it, therefore I should have looked into the matter more. However, it is a very simply rectified matter, needing only the removal of the one word "including", before "statistics", in order to fix the sole factual error you point out. Hardly a reason for reverting the whole edit. Neither was it my intention to present any new substance, but to present what was there more clearly, rather than in the round and about manner it was presented. If what is more clearly revealed is an inappropriate classification, than I am delighted to have revealed it. My change was neither intended to be frivolous nor assumed to be long lasting. Trev M ~ 19:54, 20 September 2010 (UTC)

A cite in support of definition “2”

I’ve never taught the history of science but I’ve taken a few courses in it, and its philosophy. So, recently when I was accused of wanting to make “science” mean something other than “natural science” just to make the phrase “down to a science” make sense, and as a fringe view because I had no published references-- I became annoyed. On my shelves are many books about science-as-undertaking, and I looked at them. My favorite one on this matter has some snarky comments on why and how we use the word in the modern context. Except that the “modern” writer here, is writing in 1921. The book was republished in 1953 by Dover, New York City, in the U.S. (ISBN 0-486-60043-2) It is What is Science? by Norman Campbell, SC.D., F.INST.P. As you can see by his credentials, a British scientist. Here is what he says, and the differences even over 89 years, are interesting. I’ve added some paragraphing (large paragraphs and many semicolons didn’t terrify 1921 British editors), adding a personal comment or two, in brackets. This is from pages 8-10 in the first chapter, for the book is actually about natural science:

<blockquote=What Is Science?>

When it was recognized that the studies which now form part of science required a separate name, they were called “natural philosophy” in distinction to “moral philosophy.”; for at that time “philosophy” and “science” had practically the same meaning [G. “love of knowledge” vs. L. “knowledge”] and were used interchangeably, though the former was the commoner.

All these expressions survive; at the older universities a professor of natural philosophy is indistinguishable from a professor of physics or chemistry; and “moral science” is a common name for what is usually called philosophy [N.B. certainly not the case in the US in 2010! However, it is still true that what we now call philosophy has split out natural science but yet still comprises metaphysics, ethics, aesthetics, and other things that require different types of judgment, if not always moral judgment].

That “natural philosophy” has become obsolete while “natural science” survives, is partly due to the inexplicable vagaries of language which determine, apparently at random, which of the two synonyms is to die out; but it is also partly due to the fact that the older branches of learning from which the students of science desired to separate themselves were more often known as philosophy than science. Again, the “natural” has been dropped, and only the “science” retained, partly by mere abbreviation (just as “omnibus” has been changed into “bus.”), and partly because students of science were by no means adverse from hearing their study called “science” without any qualification; for “science” is simply the Latin for “knowledge”, and the implication that all that is not science is not knowledge, naturally flattered their vanity.

And it is important to remember the history. For the older and more general use of the word to mean pure knowledge in general, or indeed any kind of knowledge, has not vandished; and we must on our guard against imaging that everything to which the words “science” and “scientific” are attached to-day[sic] have anything more to do with natural science than any other kind of knowledge. When a journalist speaks of a “scientific batsman” [cricket] he merely means that he is skillful and does not imply that he is learned in physics or astronomy. Here no doubt the general use is clearly distinguished from the more special, but some misunderstandings about the science that we are going to consider [natural science] probably arise from this double use of the word.

Please read the last paragraph again, all. The example of the “double use of the word” is from a 1921 book on science, written by a British scientist, republished in paperback in the US in 1953. It’s not from my imagination. However much it has been suggested in the above discussion that it might be. S B H arris 23:58, 19 September 2010 (UTC)

Hi SBH. I am thinking we can get the point across more clearly if we deal in terms of a real concrete proposal. I understand my proposal was OK for capturing what you want?--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 07:50, 20 September 2010 (UTC)

Resolved vote and moving on to discuss entire article

Judging by the number of votes for definitions 1 and 2, it appears there is no support for definition 1. There are five editors who support definition 2, albeit with some reservations on technical details here and there. Andrew Lancaster and Ancheta Wis have expressed reservations about definition 2. I invite them to elaborate or provide several more verified alternatives/additions. Since there are several editors (excluding myself) who are explicitly opposed to definition 1, its place or a variant of it as the lead definition in this article is untenable. I have therefore removed it from the lead of this article and substitute it with definition 2 for the time being. BUT the conversation is not closed. It just means that we have moved on from one obstacle. As you can see this is not an easy fix. But not to get bogged down too much on definitions, there is at least some consensus among the editors as to what science is and isn't. That by itself is progress!

Based on the votes and the comments below the voting section, I have tried to summarize the general consensus/comments on this issue. Here it is:

Science is:

knowledge
testable/falsifiable
logical
method-based
community-driven
diverse
complex

Science is not:

a technique, skill, or tradecraft (e.g., crochet)
a technology (e.g, cooking)
a behavior (e.g., eating, walking, switching between television channels)
just natural science (as defined in the natural science article)
just knowledge (religion/mythology/folklore would also be science if it is)

Science would include:

natural sciences (e.g., physics, chemistry, biology, etc)
social sciences (e.g., history, psychology, economics, etc)

Science would not include:

literature
humanities
fine arts
religion
mythology

Science may or may not be (this is where it gets controversial):

engineering
mathematics

Science has a:

long history
historical relationship with other fields (e.g., philosophy, mathematics, etc)

Again, this is just a list or summary of all the comments that I have read. I am trying to build a skeleton that we can all work on. Appreciate your comments. mezzaninelounge (talk) 00:23, 20 September 2010 (UTC)

I propose interpolating my comments as notes in the article. The citations backing up the annotation will be more difficult because I am travelling and do not have my books on hand. So in general, the backup for my notes will not have page numbers until I can return to my books - I will usually be able to cite author and title. Is that alright? --Ancheta Wis (talk) 00:43, 20 September 2010 (UTC)

Ancheta, I am not sure if I follow. Do you mean adding text to the article and adding references later on? mezzaninelounge (talk) 00:48, 20 September 2010 (UTC)

No I mean adding <ref>annotation, citation</ref>. A general statement can then be qualified without disturbing the flow of the general thought. --Ancheta Wis (talk) 01:19, 20 September 2010 (UTC)

I guess that's fine if you believe it will improve the article.mezzaninelounge (talk) 03:09, 20 September 2010 (UTC)

In the Basic Classification section I see the POV statement that Mathematics is a formal science. Lakatos would disagree; when a concept is being investigated, math can be informal. This then gives the link between math and computer program development, and also the link to proof generation. Gauss himself admitted that he used informal methods to arrive at his theorems. --Ancheta Wis (talk) 04:10, 20 September 2010 (UTC)

Ancheta, while you are on that, what did you think of Trev's recent (currently reverted) attempt to restructure that section?--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 13:26, 20 September 2010 (UTC)

This version flows well... whether it includes all that is required... but needs breaking into paras. Summary much appreciated. The precepts of the classification section I just "retouched" seem to address the issue of the place of engineering and maths. Trev M ~ 01:04, 20 September 2010 (UTC)

COMMENT: You say: Science is not just knowledge (religion/mythology/folklore would also be science if it is). Well, you need to differentiate between the things those "fields" claim, and the knowledge of what they claim. Study of what people believe is social psychology. As for the beliefs themselves, some are demonstrable, and others are not. Those not, are not science, but it has to do with the demonstration, not the knowledge. Your knowledge of your personal relationship with Jesus Christ is not science. "Christian science" and "creation science" are misnomers in every natural scientist's views, including mine. They claim undemonstrable occult "knowledge"). However, much of what we know of history, or think we know, isn't science in this sense, either. The scientific parts are those that make predictions and that can be demonstrated to others, on demand (archeology). Somewhere above, it was objected that palentology and astronomy are not sciences in this sense because they're over and done with. But that's not so-- the new measurements and digging goes on, and if your theory doesn't successfully predict what you'll dig up next, or see next in your new telescope, you're going to have to discard it (or else consider that perhaps it's unfalsifiable, and thus indeed not science). In this view, engineering IS a science, of course. And yes, so are crafts and really simple physical acts. But because it's very simple knowledge, doesn't make it not-science. Science can be very, very simple. S B H arris 01:52, 20 September 2010 (UTC)

Although this is still pretty far from being resolved, I think one structure that could address a lot of the definition of science is something like this: "Science refers to a method of generating knowledge, the knowledge generated as a result of that method, and the community that practice that method." Obviously the "method" still needs to be addressed, but I think that structure at least covers the "knowledge but not just knowledge, oh, and also a community" issue. As for the definition, perhaps the lead section of Scientific method can help with that. ~rezecib ^(talk) 03:48, 20 September 2010 (UTC)

Not a bad point, and I would say it is not really obviously in conflict with anyone's proposals? Such points about science referring to three types of thing could be added in anyway?--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 07:55, 20 September 2010 (UTC)

ML, in reply to your call for comment above: first remember I did already make a draft. It would be helpful to comment on that because even though you contrasted my position to SBH's, which is possibly correct, it seems he finds my draft OK. Second, concerning your points, you'll note my comments all have a common theme which is that I see a broad and narrow definition both being equally valid in different contexts:- Science is:

knowledge: YES (for broad definition), of the type that CAN BE PUT INTO WORDS. (cf. instinct) This is a classical definition by the way. (But note the point of Rezecib that by extension the word science also refers to more than just the knowledge. We use the word to refer to the practice of science as an entity.
testable/falsifiable: NOT ALWAYS (so this is not broad). More generally it is CONVINCING (broad version). Falsifiability is one property of a conclusion which makes it more convincing.
logical: YES (for science broadly), and I would add that it can always be put in words, as above, and also that it THOROUGHLY THOUGHT THROUGH. (Intelligent design for example, is convincing, methodical, logical but wrong.)
method-based: If this means "logical" then YES, BUT REDUNDANT, otherwise NOT ALWAYS. (It is methodical, because it is trying to be a full thinking through and convincing, but which method does it use? Whichever is most convincing. If science needed philosophers to agree on one method then they would not yet have been able to start science.)
community-driven: If this means "convincing" then YES, BUT REDUNDANT, otherwise NOT ALWAYS. (A scientist can work on his own.) So I don't really see this. I distinguish this from the point Rezecib made though.
diverse: Don't see the point of this.
complex: Don't see this either.

Science is not:

a technique, skill, or tradecraft (e.g., crochet) or a technology (e.g, cooking): (I unite two points because they are effectively the same.) This is a classical Greek distinction which is no longer really used much. It can be mentioned, but I think it is not for the "broad" definition.
a behavior (e.g., eating, walking, switching between television channels): YES, because it is a KNOWLEDGE and CAN BE PUT IN WORDS
just natural science (as defined in the natural science article): YES, BUT the article should accommodate the fact that there are some who talk or write this way.
just knowledge (religion/mythology/folklore would also be science if it is): YES, but all those are rational and can be put in words, so the key differentiating factor here is how convincing science is when thought through logically.

NOTE: The "Science is" and "Science is not" answers overlap and say the same thing. It would not therefore not seem to be appropriate to have two such sections in the article. Science would include:

natural sciences (e.g., physics, chemistry, biology, etc): YES
social sciences (e.g., history, psychology, economics, etc): YES, and more as well. It seems important to mention that at least some people consider some sciences more scientific than others.

Science would not include:

literature, humanities, fine arts, religion, mythology: The only consensus wither on WP or in reliable sources on these is that they are all debatable, i.e. that there is no consensus. This is however entirely consistent with what science is. It does not need to be clear and simple.

Science may or may not be (this is where it gets controversial):

engineering, mathematics: The same as last section. No consensus outside WP, so we should not demand one on WP.

Hope my answers make sense!--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 08:16, 20 September 2010 (UTC)

Andrew, sorry, there is a lot going on on this page. How about we do the discussions just here. I don't mean to burden you but could you paste the writeup that you made in this section so that I can have a look? In any event, I have ~~no problems with your comments/answers above.~~141.218.93.205 (talk) 15:17, 20 September 2010 (UTC) mezzaninelounge 15:24, 20 September 2010 (UTC)

I am not quite sure which writeup you want moved where but within reason please feel free to move my stuff around where you think it works best.--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 15:27, 20 September 2010 (UTC)

I meant the draft that you were speaking about. But the table below solves all that so I don't think it is necessary. mezzaninelounge 15:34, 20 September 2010 (UTC)

Andrew, I am not trying to be fickle minded or anything, it is just that when I wrote my response to your comments above, I did not carefully read some of the points that you made about my summary. This is my mistake of course, and so I would like to clarify some of my positions. First, I agree that we agree more than we disagree. The one thing I am not convinced is the "convincing" requirement. How convincing is convincing? It is quite subjective. Creation science for example may not be convincing to you and me but it is quite convincing to people who accept it.

The point on science being community driven is not as redundant as it might seem. Yes, a scientist can do science alone. That is not the issue, The issue is the knowledge that is derived from that work. If science is a lone man enterprise, then its knowledge would not be so different from those in religious text. But because it is community-driven that involves one scientist evaluating the work of another scientist and point errors, etc, that is what makes science a self-correcting process. We throw what doesn't work or explain, and keep what does work and explain. And if we are going to use the "convincing requirement," then there has to be a community that sets rules and boundaries of what is agreed and accepted. This of course is moving away from Popper's perspective of science and more towards Kuhn's perspective of scientific paradigms and paradigm shifts. I admit, it is not my favorite approach but I am not intellectually against it either.

If we are talking about whether religion itself is a science, then I think the consensus in and out of Wikipedia is quite clear. Religion is not. But if we were to study religion from scientific perspective (as they do in anthropology), then yes, it is scientific. As SBHarris correctly pointed out, it is a question of "differentiating between the things those "fields" claim, and the knowledge of what they claim." So yes, depending on whether we differentiate the claims and the knowledge of those claims, I think we can be quite clear and simple.

But other than that, I have no problems with everything else. Sorry again for this backtracking. It is better that I do it now than later. Again, thanks for your comments. 18:10, 20 September 2010 (UTC) mezzaninelounge 18:14, 20 September 2010 (UTC)

No worries about missing the details first time around. Given the talk page's complexity I think that is to be expected!!

The word "convincing" is maybe not the best for the point I was trying to convey. The point is that all scientific proofs rely on certain assumptions and arguments, AND some religious people claim to do the same. It is in fact hard to define the difference exactly, for example if a religious person tells you something is a logical certainty, say the equivalent of 1+1=3, how do you disprove it? But the fact of the matter is that we know it when we see it. In terms of sources I am more or less spouting Hume here, but of course he is an influence on many people still writing today.
I do also have sympathy for your point about science being community driven, and maybe in a way it is your way of seeing my "convincing" thing. It certainly always works in communities in practice. My hypothetical hermit would effectively have to criticize himself like a community and would a pretty special person. But is science community based by definition? Of course nothing stops us from saying "in practice" for example if that is the only gap between us. (I would say the importance of things like Popper's demands are also "in practice" and not definitive.)
For sure if we write this article in such a way that even Kuhn fans are cut out of science that would be a problem. Good to see that you probably agree.
I did not mean to argue that religion is really scientific. I guess my point there is that it is quite normal in science, maybe even part of what it is, that there are a whole bunch of fringe disciplines who occasionally claim to be scientific. This article certainly should not agree, but we consider whether it is notable to mention these types of things.--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 20:21, 20 September 2010 (UTC)

method-based - more like method-developing but that's not crucial; anyway "methodical" would do just as well there. Logical as implying method-based: Logic is usually taken as a way of thinking, while method is usually taken as a way of doing; scientists don't just know and think, they also do science. One could say that a method is a logical form of conduct as a replicable means to an end. One can talk about a method of logic or the logic of a method and, insofar as those are two different things, the use of both words seems quite defensible and probably warranted.
community-driven - does that mean community-steered or community-impelled? Either way sounds off. More like community-based, the checks & balances etc., though even that is far from the whole story.
Regarding the idea of the lone scientist being good enough for science - or for a science: Science involves the hope or confidence that the truth would be discovered by any and all who press investigation far enough, such that, for example, convergence by researchers starting with differing opinions/approaches/etc. is taken as a hopeful, not infallible, sign of nearing the truth. So, in this sort of thing, two heads are better than one. Neither Kepler nor Galileo worked in a vacuum; they criticized each other, for example. We need to look at this in a comparatively practical way, rather than coming up with a definition that removes everything that is conceivably removable via extreme cases from the definition; science is not a mathematical object. Inquiry is less limited than the individual inquirer. Science is just too big a job to be done by one from scratch, and we don't know enough about Archimedes to say otherwise - he and a few others are, at most, outliers. A scientist is not presumably free of the hindrance of bias or one-sidedness or insufficiencies in awareness, feeling, competence, or will and effort, but instead benefits often crucially from the:
- intelligent supports and checks & balances,
- vital community through distinctively shared values,
- resource-bearing cooperation,
- dynamic vying - conflict, competition, rivalry, debate,
- (though of course not bad kinds of any of those things),
which only a research community of other and more-or-less independent minds can provide - even if one is isolated from other living scientists, at least there is the tradition available in records, as well as the prospect of review, correction, buildup, etc., by other people, who knows who, in the future.
As for the community aspect being just another redundant form of the convincing, community is not just about convincing people, but about expediting the research process itself - it's a big job. Now the idea of a community, at least a potential one, that would vindicate one's findings, is a practical implication of the idea of science and rational inquiry of any kind. We also notice the involvement of community through the experience of the use of the word "science" and by experience regarding science itself, and so include it in the conception, such that we don't usually call something a science if no actual community pursues it; science is not just any rational inquiry, not implying more than a potential community. And again, the actual research community is not only for convincing, but also for expediting discovery and indeed every step and aspect of the scientific process.
not only knowledge - the key here is not only convincingness, and let's say what science's aim is. (Note, I share some qualms about the word "convincing", but it is convenient for this discussion, at least/most) Religion, mythology, and so on, do not aim at discovering ever more of the truth. We not only don't find them scientifically convincing, we also don't expect them to become so, because of their aims and methods. Religion is a kind of valuing and valuational community with regard to decision-making, power, submission, self-governance; it is centered on feeling in regard to will, though of course it brings ability and cognition and learning into play (religion is huge); also it usually has some magical beliefs at its core (Zen Buddhism is supposed to be an exception); whereas science is a kind of learning process, knowing or learning what cognitively establishes what, what teaches us what. I think that, in order to define science more or less as it is now generally understood, we need to refer to its AIM, its goal, its telos: to find ever more of the truth, neither depending on anybody's mere opinion as if it were infallible, nor giving up in relativism or radical skepticism or nihilism. From that aim comes the scientific method, whose germinal essence is fallibilism, in practice, about inquiry (so that it checks and tests) and hope or confidence, in practice, that there is truth to be found, that truth stands discoverable and would be discovered by any and all who search far enough, such that a research community is a great aid in that checking and testing, among other things, and such that reaching agreement/consensus is a goal but, achieved, is no infallible proof although, for a time being, the actual researchers are left with no actual doubts (this is a highfalutin way of saying that the most convinced scientific researchers still don't say "it's true because we say so" or "because our chief says so"). Now you don't find, in religion or mythology, a non-glacial process of self-correction and, more precisely, since we're not just talking about basic cybernetics or organismic behavior - self-revision, not only renovation but re-design, a vibrant, active kind of truth-seeking evolution. Now, one could say that it's another case of what's convincing - the aims and methods of religion are not convincing about their scientific character - but, if one has gone so far as to refer to science's aim and method, one should say what they are.
engineering and mathematics - An even tougher one than engineering is medicine. I've distinguished science/math from other disciplines by two-level soundbytes - there's know-how, knowing what practice achieves what, and then there's science/math, knowing what establishes what. But with engineering and especially medicine there is so much application of science that it's more a three- or four-level thing - medicine as a kind of knowing what establishes what with regard to what practice achieves what. However, again, by looking at the AIMS involved, we can make some distinctions. Medical science is not about finding ever more of the biological or related truth about humans, but specifically about using science to repair and improve health; but there's definitely some full-fledged science involved, and that's to be noted.
As for mathematics, I agree that it's only in a very broad sense that it is science - fallibilistically pursuing ever more of the truth which it believes is really there. Mathematicians also pursue conjectures, do tests, etc., experiment with mental or actual visual diagrams, or quasi-diagrams consisting of formulas, arrays of algebraic expressions. But the word "science" simply isn't used these days in reference to mathematics. By science we mean the study of actual individual objects or occurrences (pace Aristotle) as subject matter, with the object being to discover links and orderings (including historical and geographical), characteristics and classifications, domains (animal, vegetable, mineral, particle, etc.), and norms and laws, those that, because of their idiosyncrasy, cannot be deduced from mathematics or induced from purely abstract statistical considerations (or philosophical ones for that matter). So there's difference of methods and subject matter, though not a difference at a higher level, that of seeking to discover ever more of the truth, and of a fallibilistic and hopeful method of doing so.
Speaking of statistics, does statistics - mathematical, descriptive, and inferential - count as a science? Statistics is more general than physics (Russell placed it as the first empirical science), but, it doesn't seem to be about actual objects at all - it's about classes and characters/outcomes etc., correlations and dependencies, material implications writ large and complex - not specially about actual objects and causation etc., yet about positive phenomena in general, positive patterns, tendencies, etc. This is perhaps not such a big question yet. Statistics is like probability theory backward - instead of deducing from a total population to samples, you induce from samples to a larger or total population. If there get to be more in terms of powerful inductive fields that are reverse versions of correlated deductive fields (maths of optimization, information, and logic) - then the question will become more pressing. Arguably philosophy, with its penchant for concluding in inductive generalizations, is potentially just such a field, but that seems to be only a potentiality. The Tetrast (talk) 21:08, 20 September 2010 (UTC).
diverse and complex - agree that those are kind of vague - nearly everything is diverse and complex in some sense. Any major department of human interest is especially diverse and complex. An given piece of science can be simple in comparison to other pieces of science. The Tetrast (talk) 21:08, 20 September 2010 (UTC).

Andrew, I think we are closer to agreement than we both might realize. I agree with your statement, "all scientific proofs rely on certain assumptions and arguments." I believe this is where we can incorporate Kuhn's perspective of scientific paradigms and the ideas on community, etc. We cannot disprove 1 + 1 = 3 if we 3 is used as the symbol for 2. That much is clear, and that is why mathematics for this reason, is not considered a science (contentious perhaps) if we used the falsifiable definition. The problem that we run into is one described by Carl Sagan very well when he talked about finding an invisible dragon (or some mythical creature) in his garage in his book The Demon Haunted World. You, I and Carl would not be convinced by the presence of invisible dragons in a garage unless there is some evidence. But dragon worshipers (if there such a thing) would be in the absence of evidence. Evidence is the key. I admit I am not religious so I might be bias when I say that you don't need the kind of evidence that science demands to believe in a deity, whether it is called God, Allah, or Thor. So evidence is the key word to convincing people. Acceptance of religions knowledge and ideas in general is not dependent on evidence but on faith. This is not to say that religion is inferior to science as much as saying they are both playing by different rules. So I guess to come to a consensus, would it say satisfy you if we changed the lead definition to "Science (from the Latin scientia, meaning "knowledge") is a systematic enterprise involved in the creation of knowledge based on testable evidence" For the sake of consensus, I am willing to give up a golden egg (falsifiability). :) mezzaninelounge 21:14, 20 September 2010 (UTC)

Actually I think evidence is not enough of a key. And intelligent religious readers of Wikipedia will also be put off by any such over-simplification. Let's try to imagine them when we write. And I think I'm not saying something terribly strange there. Tetrast makes a good point above about religions. Religious people have the same ability to see evidence and use logic, but they do not use it at certain critical moments because that is simply not their aim. It is not that they disagree about what is convincing. I remember once being in an argument about miracles with a very intelligent person who was arguing for them. I said something like "the evidence is simply stronger". And he said, "yes, but you are only looking at the evidence". There are a lot of people who think like that.--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 21:23, 20 September 2010 (UTC)

Tetrast, thanks for your input. I just glanced through it, so do gimme some time to digest and get back to you on those points. mezzaninelounge 21:14, 20 September 2010 (UTC)

Wordy but worth reading Tetrast! I think a new point for me is the one about speaking of the aim of science being truth. This of course is why science and philosophy sometimes refer to the same things. Most versions of the lead seem to agree this science/philosophy link should be mentioned as an historical fact and maybe there is a neat way to do this using your point.
On Science versus engineering. Writers like Aristotle divides medicine into two: medical science knowing the cause and effect whether you cure people or not, and the medical art, aimed at fixing people whether you know why it works or not. But he also divided knowledge of such arts into two parts: the part you can write down and explain and potentially teach to someone, and the stuff you can not explain.--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 21:27, 20 September 2010 (UTC)

Thanks, I too need a break in order to digest more here too because everybody is making good points. As to my wordiness, it's so true! Thanks for asking people not to let my wordiness deter them. I used to compress to unintelligibility, ridiculous stuff. Still, I put energy into paring down. That's no excuse, I agree. The Tetrast (talk) 22:15, 20 September 2010 (UTC).

Andrew, I agree and insist with Aristotle that the practice of medicine is not the selfsame thing as either familiarity or science in medicine's service. As for pictures, words, and formulas/diagrams representing the medical art or practice, there's to note whether those aspects merely are soever needful expressive and mnemonic aids or are determinant factors of the nature of the practice. An art or practice in this sense is a dealing with regard to dealing, a plying of a skill, sumpn' like that (been a long day). The Tetrast (talk) 06:00, 21 September 2010 (UTC).

Andrew, I can certainly understand and appreciate why you want to be proactive in being sensitive and not wanting to offend readers who are not necessarily scientists. But that cannot be a reason not to state a fact. Otherwise, articles such as the evolution article would not be able to state explicitly that all living species come from a common ancestor for fear of offending conservative and religious individuals who believe that all species were individually created instead. I make no apologies that this is a science article and not everything in it will satisfy or not offend every non-scientist that reads it. If we were to self-censor for the sake of sensitivity and politeness, then we would also have to remove statements such as "logic, community, etc" because it would imply that non-science fields do not have these things. Whether these things are present in other fields is not the point. The point is what is/are the defining characteristic(s) of science? Is evidence a defining characteristic of science? Absolutely. Without evidence, falsifiability itself will not be possible. Scientific research is done to gather evidence. Evidence is indeed a requisite in forming and testing propositions (hypothesis, theories, etc) in science. It is not a requisite in religion. In fact, quite the opposite. A defining characteristic of religion is faith, which is belief in the absence evidence. Playing by this rule, it is therefore possible for religious individuals to believe or have a belief in a god without actually seeing one. I do hope you will give my compromise proposal a second thought. It is I think a very small, yet practical and workable solution to bridge the gap, which again, I think is quite small at this point. Off to sleep now for me. mezzaninelounge 01:16, 21 September 2010 (UTC)

Tetras, great stuff as always. I agree with Andrew, a little wordy but definitely consistent in theme with the summary and with rest of the editors. Right now, we need to build a general lead that will be last for a while. mezzaninelounge 01:16, 21 September 2010 (UTC)

Thank you! I agree that we need to build a general lead that will last for a while, so I've gone along with most of it below, and you're moving things fruitfully along, even if we have to admit that Kenosis is right about our going too fast. I agree about the importance of evidence, but part of my point about referring to purposes is what Andrew saw, another kind of distinction from religion - a lot of what I said was in that direction. Evidence is not alien to religion, and never mind doctrine, lots of religious people will tell you that they find evidence for their religious beliefs in their daily lives. This does not mean that evidence is not essential in science, but we're not trying just to distinguish scientific beliefs from unscientific ones (science is not just a class or system of beliefs) but I'll leave off here. The Tetrast (talk) 03:01, 21 September 2010 (UTC).

@mezzaninelounge, it may help to drill down in your summary "Science is not:

"a technique, skill, or tradecraft (e.g., crochet)
but scientific results use replicable techniques which are published, per scientific method
"a technology (e.g, cooking)
but Science uses technology, as well as being the inspiration for technology
"a behavior (e.g., eating, walking, switching between television channels)
but certain behaviors are presumed for scientists and violating those behaviors is injurious to reputation
"just natural science (as defined in the natural science article)
but scientists irrespective of discipline benefit from being part of a community of like-minded people
"just knowledge (religion/mythology/folklore would also be science if it were)
but that knowledge is also true, not just what we wish were true

--Ancheta Wis (talk) 05:47, 21 September 2010 (UTC)

Ancheta, I agree with your comments/adjustments. mezzaninelounge 12:23, 21 September 2010 (UTC)

Tetras. I see what you are saying as far values and goals. Nevertheless, like the word convincing, I find it problematic in the sense that theologians are concerned with the truth. What is truth to them may not be truth to you and me. But unlike science, they may or may revise their propositions/statements when new evidence is presented. For example, how long did it take the Catholic Church to finally recognize evolution as a fact and as a valid theory? Not until the mid 1990s. The question is how do we determine truth in science? At the end of the day, what do we based our decisions on? Evidence (in modern parlance, we call them results, data, outcomes, etc). We always ask, "where are the evidence?" For example, we accept evolution as a fact and as a valid scientific theory not because it is convincing or in sync with our values and goals, but because we have the evidence that evolution has occurred. We see evolution of bacteria, viruses, and fish in controlled experiments. We see corroborating facts (fossil records and carbon dating) that are consistent with the facts and theories of evolution. And most importantly, these evidence are testable, i.e., anyone (given sufficient knowledge and training) can replicate similar results (or evidence). Yes, you are correct to say that there are people who find evidence in their beliefs but that is usually after the fact or post hoc and they are usually personalized evidence (e.g. I saw a vision...), which why is your statement on science being community-based, which Kuhn would call "shared paradigm" among scientists, is especially important. In any event, I am glad you are finding the current pace to improving the article acceptable. :) mezzaninelounge 12:47, 21 September 2010 (UTC)

That's what I get for paring down! I had discussed the whole idea of self-revision, which is a telling point vis-a-vis religion. It's the kind of point that comes more easily to light when we keep from thinking of science too much as finished product - seeing it as the claims that were revised when evidence warranted - and think of science as impetus, process, culmination, and structure (settlement, like finished product) all at once. Then we say, not just that the established claims were revised appropriately, but also will be and would be revised when and if evidence will or would warrant it - then we're talking about a (testable, predictive) rule or norm, not just a past 'regularity'. This is better than saying to religion, "the claims that I already have are better than the claims that you already have." Distinctions of impetuses (such as wonder at strange phenomena), methods, and aims, not only puts science on increasingly different grounds than religion, but also tends to increase understanding of, and confidence in, science's more-or-less settled products.
Knowledge is, so to speak, the entelechy, the form standing finished, of theoretical cognition (I'm thinking of such cognitions as assumptions/suppositions, opinions/beliefs, understandings), so it biases us into thinking of science that way - and I've seen that you often avoid doing that, so I think we're in the same general direction here. Of course, that firm form or structure, that knowledge, is a basis or foundation for more learning, so the process doesn't automatically terminate. The Tetrast (talk) 17:12, 21 September 2010 (UTC).

OK, let's look at the two concrete proposals...

Maybe this helps everyone see where we have now gotten to. Comments on the differences would be great. I noticed while doing this that differences are smaller than you might think.--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 15:18, 20 September 2010 (UTC)

Number	just before both proposals	edit of Andrew Lancaster	edit of mezzaninelounge
1	Science (from the Latin scientia, meaning "knowledge") is, in its broadest sense, any systematic knowledge that is capable of resulting in a correct prediction (i.e. falsifiability in Karl Popper's sense) or reliable outcome. It is a system of acquiring knowledge based on the scientific method and an organized body of knowledge gained through such research.^[3]^[1]	Science (from the Latin scientia, meaning "knowledge") is, in its broadest and oldest sense any knowledge which can be put into the form of a logical and convincing explanation and communicated.	Science (from the Latin scientia, meaning "knowledge") is a systematic enterprise involved in the creation of knowledge that is testable or falsifiable. ^[4]^[1]^[5]
2=?	It is a "systematic enterprise of gathering knowledge about the world and organizing and condensing that knowledge into testable laws and theories".^[6]	This type of knowledge is therefore distinguished by being considered reliably true due to the strength of its premises, and strength of the logic leading to its conclusions.
3=?	This article focuses upon science in this more restricted sense, sometimes called experimental science, and also gives some broader historical context leading up to the modern understanding of the word "science."
4=OK?	From the Middle Ages to the Enlightenment, "science" had more-or-less the same sort of very broad meaning in English that "philosophy" had at that time.	From Classical times until the Enlightenment, "science" had more-or-less the same broad meaning in English that "philosophy" had during those times. [NOTE: needs fix: not just English over these periods]	From the Middle Ages to the Enlightenment, "science" had more-or-less the same sort of very broad meaning in English that "philosophy" had at that time.
5=OK	By the early 19th century, "natural philosophy" (which eventually evolved into what is today called "natural science") had begun to separate from "philosophy" in general.	By the early 19th century, "natural philosophy" (which eventually evolved into what is today called "natural science") had begun to separate more definitively from "philosophy" in general.	By the early 19th century, "natural philosophy" (which eventually evolved into what is today called "natural science") had begun to separate from "philosophy" in general.
6=OK	In many cases, "science" continued to stand for reliable knowledge about any topic, in the same way it is still used in the broad sense in modern terms such as library science, political science, and computer science.	In many cases, "science" continued to stand for reliable knowledge about any topic, in the same way it is still used in the broad sense in modern terms such as library science, political science, and computer science.	In many cases, "science" continued to stand for reliable knowledge about any topic, in the same way it is still used in the broad sense in modern terms such as library science, political science, and computer science.
7	In the more narrow sense of "science" today, as natural philosophy became linked to an expanding set of well-defined laws (beginning with Galileo's laws, Kepler's laws, and Newton's laws for motion), it became more common to refer to natural philosophy as "natural science".		In the more narrow sense of "science" today, as natural philosophy became linked to an expanding set of well-defined laws (beginning with Galileo's laws, Kepler's laws, and Newton's laws for motion), it became more common to refer to natural philosophy as "natural science".
8	Over the course of the 19th century, the word "science" become increasingly associated mainly with the disciplined study of the natural world (that is, the non-human world). This sometimes left the study of human thought and society in a linguistic limbo, which has today been resolved by classifying these areas of study as the social sciences.		Over the course of the 19th century, the word "science" become increasingly associated mainly with the disciplined study of the natural world (that is, the non-human world). This sometimes left the study of human thought and society in a linguistic limbo, which has today been resolved by classifying these areas of study as the social sciences.
9		In contemporary usage, especially in academic contexts, many authors use science as a technical terms limited strictly to experimental science. Generally these narrow definitions of "science" therefore also require a specific scientific method be used in the collection of evidence and conclusions. While there is debate about how to define such a method, one of the most common demands is that conclusions should be "falsifiable" or in other words capable of being proven wrong by experiment. Science understood this way is a "systematic enterprise of gathering knowledge about the world and organizing and condensing that knowledge into testable laws and theories".[3]

Mezzanine's edit is essentially a more concise form of the original, which I support, if 2 is addressed.
I think the original is better than either proposal, but as it stands needs to be merged with the last sentence of 1.
Unsure about whether that should be deleted; if we actually broaden the article, then yes, but until then, no.
Original/Mezzanine -- "Science" as the English word in "Classical times"? What?
"more definitively" is, I think, not an important distinction, and just lengthens the sentence. Original/Mezzanine
They're the same.
Keep.
Keep.
Add.

Looking back, it actually seems like 4-8 should be in the History section rather than the lead. ~rezecib ^(talk) 15:48, 20 September 2010 (UTC)

Response to your comments:-

1 and 9. Difference in 1 is whether to say that Popper defined science and everyone accepts it. I think on WP we can not take sides with one author like this because he is popular and widely taught but by no means a consensus. My paragraph 9, which you say should be added, is INSTEAD of this, and possibly would not make sense if you insist on Popper being in the first sentence. My proposal is basically saying that Popper and his ilk are very dominant but not really a consensus. I believe this is a correct weighting of what is really said in the outside world.

4. If the Middle Ages is recognized as having some continuity with modernity, then we must go further because the Medieval concept of science is certainly not closer to the modern one than the classical one.

8. Second sentence seems unencyclopedic to me?--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 17:43, 20 September 2010 (UTC)

The summary of the History and etymology section was recently inserted into the lead by SBHarris; and after some minor reworking it took the form in which it presently exists in the article, I happen to think it's useful up front because of the very same kind of definitional issues that caused the current very lengthy discussion about the what the proper scope of this article should be. If it's deemed by consensus to be unsuitable to the lead, I think at the very least that summary should be placed at the beginning of the history and etymology so the reader has an opportunity to see some of the most basic issues that lead to disagreement about what's meant by "science". ... Kenosis (talk) 15:58, 20 September 2010 (UTC)

Agree with Rezecib. Agree with Kenosis on points 1-3. Points/paragraphs 4 onwards should move to history section in a way that Kenosis suggested. mezzaninelounge 17:05, 20 September 2010 (UTC)

I notice that there's been extensive discussion and debate and a vote about the lead of this article, which was essentially rubberstamped yesterday as "signed sealed and delivered", all within a few days. Without getting into the substance of the lead at the moment, here are a couple WP policies/guidelines that might also be worth keeping in mind: WP:CCC, WP:NOTVOTE, and perhaps also WP:CONLIMITED, at least to the extent that WP:RfCs (which often can resemble a vote on a presented issue) are generally expected to go at least a week and aren't automatically closed for 30 days, thereby allowing a wider range of participants to notice something might be an issue and to comment as their time may permit. Not that I necessarily dislike expedience, but one of the goals is to try to make these decisions as reasonably sustainable as possible, hopefully without having to repeatedly revisit the same issues over and over while saying to those who may disagree that "it's already been decided". ... Kenosis (talk) 15:51, 20 September 2010 (UTC)

Kenosis, duly noted. I admit I was just following the "mood" of the crowd. I will know better next time. mezzaninelounge 16:08, 20 September 2010 (UTC)

If the numbering refers to specific paragraphs, then I suggest paragraph 1 be divided and incorporate the summary/list of things that were discussed (see summary above). This will set the scope of the entire article quickly and clearly. Then we can move on to history, etc. mezzaninelounge 16:36, 20 September 2010 (UTC)

1. Support Mezzanine's edit. Lancaster's could be added to it.

2. Remove original. Like the original except I think it's incomplete: I'd say "It is a systematic enterprise of gathering knowledge about the world and organizing and condensing that knowledge into testable laws, theories, and accounts". Yes, that breaks the quotation, but "systematic enterprise" has already been moved into #1 by Mezzanine which I support and #1 covers most of this, except the ideas of organizing and condensing, which are important but I'm willing to opt for keeping it short and simple. But if it's merged into #1 (I'd like that), I'd like "accounts" included. Not only history and geography, but also zoology, biology, geology, oceanography, astronomy, etc., involve a lot of accounts, narratives and maps of individual occurrences and their links, orderings, hierarchies, and tapestries, which need to be established scientifically, subject to criticism and a lot of testability for falsity and inaccuracy, and without which we'd establish no general laws or norms, not to mention total-population parameters. That knowledge is a considerable part of the content of scientific knowledge, increasingly so as one goes from "lower" to "higher" (or "more basic" to "less basic") levels of phenomena. Our Big-Bang Universe is a big individual event.

3. Unsure about removing. Don't feel strongly. "Experimental science" is often opposed to "theoretical science" in physics, they're both part of it. Say something about science with a strong experimental side?

4. "Science" understood as international word = its source Latin scientia and even Ancient Greek episteme, it's no problem. Use. (Added: It's the term "science," not the word "science," that's in question - just an old technical distinction, meanwhile the text in that regard is fine as it stands).

5-8. Original/mezzanine.

9. Lancaster.

Agree with mezzanine as to Kenosis's, move points 4-9 to history etc. but say something about it in intro, I dunno, "the word's meaning has changed" or "developed," and "some earlier meanings are still current" etc. E.g., add Lancaster's #1 after mezzanine's #1, then add about changed meanings, see History and etymology below. The Tetrast (talk) 23:58, 20 September 2010 (UTC). Edited The Tetrast (talk) 00:12, 21 September 2010 (UTC).

4. Lancaster preferable. The current sentence of the lede conveys the impression that Science occupied the same space as it does today, which was not the case - see lede for Science_in_Medieval_Western_Europe#Overview for a better statement. --Ancheta Wis (talk) 04:34, 21 September 2010 (UTC)

8. Rewrite 'linguistic limbo' sentence. Certainly sociology emerged in the nineteenth century, but there were thinkers in politics, economics, and anthropology in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. What about the omission of Military science? The Chinese had military science and civil service-based government as a precise practice, 2200 years ago. --Ancheta Wis (talk)

9. Lancaster. --Ancheta Wis (talk) 07:57, 21 September 2010 (UTC)

4. Now agree Lancaster preferable (assuming reference available for claim), see that I had read sloppily before, Lancaster's needs to be corrected from talking about English in "Classical times." Don't see Ancheta's premiss - no difference between original and Lancaster regarding occupied space, instead difference in time, from Middle Ages to Enlightenment versus Lancaster's from Classical times to Enlightenment. But all the same, now support a revised Lancaster in 4. The Tetrast (talk) 04:51, 21 September 2010 (UTC). Edited. The Tetrast (talk) 04:54, 21 September 2010 (UTC).

4. Your proposed improvement of my 4 seems good, and non controversial. Why not just do that in the article? I don't see any big objection being made about the other change from Middle Ages to Classical?--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 10:32, 21 September 2010 (UTC)

8. Similarly I agree with Ancheta Wis that the "linguistic limbo" sentence needs fixing one way or another. It is not encyclopedic at the moment. It looks like WP presenting a WP opinion. Again, if there is a non-controversial idea why not boldly moving ahead on this fairly simple bit so we can focus on any leftover controversial stuff?--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 10:40, 21 September 2010 (UTC)

I had not noticed ML's version of the first sentence changes "knowledge" to "enterprise". I also don't see anyone commenting on it, so I wonder if others saw it. I think I see the point. Interesting.--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 10:56, 21 September 2010 (UTC)

comment on this section so far

To me it seems, starting from easiest ones:

4, 5, 6 same or small differences. No need for more special discussion?
7, 8, 9. People seem to want to keep all 3. Does this make sense though? 9 was kind of written to replace 7 and 8. Look for redundancy or too much detail.
1, 2, 3. This looks like where we will eventually need to focus a bit more. There is strong support for Popper, but I still think this is problematic. Here are some conversation starters about this:-

Reminder of my proposal that this opening says a broad meaning and then a more specific meaning. I think this basic aim can still be achieved even though it seems it needs to be less emphasized.
Concerning that more specific hardcore meaning, I can see it will be more emphasized up front than my draft, but Popper specifically and falsifiability specifically seems undue.--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 10:52, 21 September 2010 (UTC)

And here is a first attempt at a new compromise, yet another one, this time starting with ML's version of sentence 1, slightly adjusted, and then stealing some bits from below for a new second sentence. (This would require removing redundant bits from below of course.)

Science is a systematic enterprise involved in the creation of knowledge that is demonstrated with thorough logical consideration and experimental testing. In the oldest and broadest sense the concept has developed from the classical Graeco-Roman philosophical term for a particularly reliable and communicable type of knowledge about nature, in Greek epistemē, in Latin scientia. In contemporary usage, especially in academic contexts, many authors now use the word "science" as a technical terms limited strictly to experimental science.

Crazy?--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 11:05, 21 September 2010 (UTC)

First sentence still gives the most concerns. This version goes further from ML. Consider it "playing around" but maybe it helps?

Science is a type of communicable knowledge that is developed through thorough communal logical consideration, and by extension it is also the enterprise of creating this knowledge. In the narrow contemporary sense of the term, systematic experimental testing of falsifiable hypotheses is considered necessary in order to call something scientific. In the oldest and broadest sense the concept has developed from the classical Graeco-Roman philosophical term for a particularly reliable and communicable type of knowledge about nature, in Greek epistemē, in Latin scientia.

Cheers--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 11:42, 21 September 2010 (UTC)

Andrew Lancaster, your proposal for a lead sentence includes more substance than the current one. It acknowledges that the problem of intersubjective verifiability is addressed in a scientific community, using long established techniques: public disclosure, disinterested critique by a community of like-minded researchers, and an emphasis on replicable results. The connotation of predictive results is left out, justifiably, because there are some subjects where we are entangled, such as economics. But certainly in the natural sciences, a prediction based on hypothesis is attainable. --Ancheta Wis (talk) 12:27, 21 September 2010 (UTC)

If you replace "through communal considerations" with "shared paradigm" and cite Kuhn, I think you will have more support. As it stands, I am not able to support either of those definitions at this time. You are right, we should move on with the rest first. mezzaninelounge 12:19, 21 September 2010 (UTC)

Hi AW and ML, could you mention which of the two versions you are commenting on? ML, no issue with citing Kuhn but, a bit like the word "falsifiability", I am not sure the words "shared paradigm" fit smoothly into this difficult opening sentence, nor whether the basic concept can't be stated at least in that first sentence in more "everyday" words?--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 12:45, 21 September 2010 (UTC)

Andrew Lancaster, I am critiquing the lead sentence of the article - "Science (from the Latin scientia, meaning "knowledge") is a systematic enterprise involved in the creation of knowledge that is testable or falsifiable.[1][2][3][4]". The points you bring up are

1) the enterprise need not be centralized because the community plays by 'rules of the game', in that truth is the goal. I am uneasy with "creation of knowledge" because knowledge is subjective (see the Born citation in the article), so that what was "created" for one person already existed for another person. Perhaps reframing it to "discovery of knowledge" solves that problem. The "systematic enterprise" then has a division of function between the discoverers and the systematizers, where previously accepted knowledge is itself critically scrutinized (hence self-correcting).
2) "systematic experimental testing" is a little too specific. In geology and astronomy, the experiments are restricted to observations of what has already occurred.
3) when something is testable or falsifiable, it has already been developed to the point where time & money have already been invested in the investigation. The current lead sentence in the article does not give enough credit to 'doubt'. (That is the problem with a 'shared paradigm'. How much cheerleading was involved?) In other words, an enterprise will, of its own nature, tend to ignore doubts, because the followers do not necessarily entertain any doubts held in private by the leaders. So there is a stage in the development of a scientific fact where doubt is of equal or greater strength than belief, in the mind of the researcher (see the Ludwik Fleck citation in the lede). --Ancheta Wis (talk) 13:54, 21 September 2010 (UTC)

Thanks AW, isn't the sentence you quote the proposal of ML? Anyway:-

1. Accumulating of knowledge better than creating or discovering? Accumulating and systemizing? (If that is a word!)--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 14:15, 21 September 2010 (UTC)

Accumulating is an excellent choice. That gets around the questionable practice of wholesale rejection of previous research. --Ancheta Wis (talk) 14:28, 21 September 2010 (UTC)

OK, but can you confirm what you think about the two versions I created in this sub-section of talk? Sorry for making a mess of a messy talk page!--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 14:32, 21 September 2010 (UTC)

Lancaster:

Science is a systematic enterprise involved in the creation of knowledge that is demonstrated with thorough logical consideration and experimental testing. In the oldest and broadest sense the concept has developed from the classical Graeco-Roman philosophical term for a particularly reliable and communicable type of knowledge about nature, in Greek epistemē, in Latin scientia. In contemporary usage, especially in academic contexts, many authors now use the word "science" as a technical terms limited strictly to experimental science.

This is acceptable. I especially like the link to 'the Ancients', as Newton put it, which you place in Graeco-Roman times. But the biases of the Greeks against technology and mechanism echo to this very page, which are class differences between the philosophers and the laborers of the time. Have you followed the John Ziman link? I repeat it here, see especially pages 2-3: "Scientific knowledge is the product of a collective human enterprise to which scientists make indiviual contributions which are purified extended by mutual criticism and intellectual cooperation." I see the similarities to your sentence, which you arrived at independently. --Ancheta Wis (talk) 16:58, 21 September 2010 (UTC)

Interesting sourcing possibility to keep in mind.--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 17:24, 21 September 2010 (UTC)

I don't want to be too pedantic but I can't help it. I like "accumulating" but I prefer "building" better. We can build from scratch and we can build from existing knowledge. Doubt or skepticism is ok, but these are more attitudes of individual scientists, which I am not sure is suitable for a broad definition. If the contention is the world falsifiability, then I would like to propose replacing testability or falsifiability with "testable evidence." Andrew used a similar term called "experimental testing" in his proposed compromised definition. The problem is that experiment also has a technical meaning in science and may be problematic in the future as it may draw us into a debate of "what is an experiment" and "what is an observation." Testable evidence or testable results are broad enough terms that are inclusive. Ultimately, terms such as doubt, skepticism, convincing, truth, falsifiability, shared paradigms, logical, etc, all these things still rests on the evidence. mezzaninelounge 15:52, 21 September 2010 (UTC)

'Building' is OK; 'doubt' is a necessary antidote to confirmation bias, which John Stuart Mill recognized as the weak point of inductivism. So even 'resting on the evidence' is an invitation to confirmation bias. As (my teacher) Feynman pointed out "you must be your own worst enemy." when working in science. Feynman was not the first, Alhazen said it 1000 years earlier. --Ancheta Wis (talk) 16:48, 21 September 2010 (UTC)

I don't see much difference between "truth" and "knowledge" as regards subjectivity. I haven't read Born's book, but maybe he's saying that knowledge is perspectival? In special relativity, some quantities of the observed are relative to the observer's motion but their relations disclose some quantities (such as the observed object's time in its own frame) that don't depend on the observer's motion ('perspective', in a sense). The system of perspectives discloses such info to observers in it, and that system is itself a perspective in some sense. But that's different from calling knowledge "subjective" in the sense in which the general reader would take that word - as meaning that it isn't really knowledge or really having the truth. If by "truth" we mean "true representation of the real," then we'll end up saying that truth is subjective too.
"Creation of knowledge" does perhaps give a little too much comfort to the idea of wholesale rejection of previous knowledge. Regarding "accumulating" of knowledge, one can tip too far away from the idea of revision of previous knowledge as well. We could say "production and improvement of knowledge." "...building of knowledge" is good though "the building of knowledge" could be taken in the sense "the edifice of knowledge". Maybe the "build-up" or "building up"
"Communal logical consideration" doesn't work, partly because "communal" is the adjectival form of "commune," not of "community." Anyway, the inquiry is less limited than the inquirer, and the rational inquirer adopts, to the extent possible, the less-limited standpoint of the inquiry. And it's better to have an actual community of inquirers doing this, since the knowledge is always not developed in an actual community gathering - at many stages, instead of actual give-&-take, an inquirer has little imagined community gatherings in mind, engaging in mental dialogues with imagined fellow inquirers, so all the better if the inquirer knows actual inquirers and their ways and ideas, so that it's more fruitfully realistic.
Agree, not just experiment, but also observation.
To "discover knowledge" sounds like discovering somebody else's knowledge, like discovering the ancient Egyptians' knowledge of how to build pyramids.
It's true, we don't want to suggest that the enterprise is centralized. Maybe "...a general enterprise for the production and improvement [or for the building up] of systematic knowledge...". (I also like substituting "for" in place of "involved in" - then the definition is pretty nearly saying that the purpose is to find ever more of the truth.)
As regards Andrew's second intro, I don't think that we should start out with a definition of science as something other than that for which the general reader came to the page.
While I was writing the following, mezzanine talked about substituting a mention of "testable evidence" in place of "testable or falsifiable" and that would be good instead too, though the knowledge should be testable, checkable, in every aspect, the evidence, the reasoning, the methods of working with the data, etc. Anyway, here's what I wrote: Personally, for the sake the general reader, I'd prefer in the lede "testable for falsity" or "testable for falsity or inaccuracy" instead of "falsifiable" which (besides its primary meaning of "fakable" and the like) is morphologically bad, since "falsified" means not merely "tested for falsity" but furthermore "confirmed to be false". To put it another way, "falsifiable" should mean "confirmably false" if "falsified" means "confirmed to be false." I don't usually reduce philosophical questions to verbal ones, but if ever there was case, it's this, I've seen it lead to too many unnecessary arguments. I don't want to start another one, and I suppose that the general reader needs to be introduced that quirky term at some point, why not at the start, etc. The Tetrast (talk) 16:28, 21 September 2010 (UTC).

testable for falsity or inaccuracy

Interesting approach. I see why you like this, but is falsity a word? And I guess someone should ask why, if this is a good option, we would not just ask whether "testable for realism", "testable for being wrong", or indeed "verifiable" might not be worth considering.--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 17:28, 21 September 2010 (UTC)

"Falsity" is a word. I learned the distinction between it and "falsehood" from reading Quine. "Falsity" means "falseness." "Falsehood" mean "falsity" or "false statement." The Tetrast (talk) 20:30, 21 September 2010 (UTC).

Agree with Tetras. How about this one?

::*"Science is an enterprise that builds knowledge based on testable evidence."

Short and sweet. :)mezzaninelounge

Acceptable on its own but is the first sentence? Concerns in that case would be:-

Is science only the enterprise or even primarily the enterprise? I think most definitions and discussions agree it is primarily a type of knowledge and an enterprise by extension?
My old theme: if this were the first sentence is means defining science by its admittedly most notable contemporary aspect, but not any broad definition which gives perspective about where this aspect came from and how it links to the other meanings?--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 17:24, 21 September 2010 (UTC)

"Science is an enterprise that dedicatedly builds knowledge that is testably based on testable evidence, about the actual world." Includes purpose ("dedicatedly"). Alludes ("testably based") to transparency and to the testability of reasoning and methods as well as evidence. It distinguishes science from math, which in a sense is about the actual world, but not only about it. I'd say "concrete world" but it sounds a bit strident somehow, can't put my finger on it. Opening words should define science in the sense for which the typical general reader comes to the wiki. Add Lancaster's definition afterward, mention changes of meaning, "see History and etymology" etc. The Tetrast (talk) 17:55, 21 September 2010 (UTC).

Tetras, that is almost a tongue twister! mezzaninelounge 18:02, 21 September 2010 (UTC)

I thought so too, I was hoping that others wouldn't think so. The Tetrast (talk) 18:14, 21 September 2010 (UTC).

Tetrast, google "Thus it dawned upon me that fundamentally everything is subjective" under Max Born (1949), Natural Philosophy of Cause and Chance. Hope this helps. --Ancheta Wis (talk) 17:08, 21 September 2010 (UTC)

Google shows me little more than a snippet, unfortunately. The Tetrast (talk) 18:14, 21 September 2010 (UTC).

Tetrast, Born puzzled over this all his life before publishing his solution in 1965, he solved the puzzle with a technique from the optics lab (See the 1965 addendum to Natural Philosophy of Cause and Chance). In principle it solves problems of intersubjective verifiability. --Ancheta Wis (talk) 14:51, 22 September 2010 (UTC)

Andrew, it is both knowledge and enterprise. Whether, it is primarily or not is not a concern of the first sentence. That comes later. :) It is ok to define it by a contemporary aspect. Take the world evolution for example. It no longer means "to unravel." Or even a computer, which now refers to a machine or device and not to a person as it would be centuries ago. Again, giving a contemporary definition will not prevent or sever any link to the past. It just means, we have a little bit more explaining to do. :) mezzaninelounge 17:36, 21 September 2010 (UTC)

I see no one disagreeing that it is both knowledge and enterprise then. But if so then the first sentence should not say science is only enterprise?--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 18:21, 21 September 2010 (UTC)

We already have the 'static' aspect in the reference to knowledge. So instead of calling it a "system of knowledge" or the like, we bring in the other aspect by calling it an "enterprise." A day or two ago I posed a definition that said science is identified with four such aspects. But it's just too much for an opening. The Tetrast (talk) 18:45, 21 September 2010 (UTC).

Let's see if we can go broader without losing its meaning. Here goes: Science is evidence-based knowledge that is testable.

Don't like saying that science is simply what is already known, testable, and evidence-based.
"Science is an enterprise that, by aim, builds testable, evidence-based knowledge about the actual world." The Tetrast (talk) 18:14, 21 September 2010 (UTC).

I kind of like that. Playing with word choice though:- "Science is an enterprise that deliberately (or intentionally?) builds testable, evidence-based knowledge about the actual (or real?) world."--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 18:19, 21 September 2010 (UTC)

If you have testable do you need evidence based? Isn't that already jumping to something for an up-coming sentence perhaps?--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 18:23, 21 September 2010 (UTC)

Let's try patching something up and seeing what it looks like. (Let's call this DRAFT AL4):-

Science is both an enterprise that intentionally builds up testable knowledge about the natural world, and the resulting body of knowledge shared within the participating community. In contemporary academic contexts, systematic experimental testing of falsifiable hypotheses is considered necessary in order to call something scientific in the most widely accepted strict sense. In the oldest and broadest sense the concept has developed from the classical Graeco-Roman philosophical term for that type of knowledge which is both communicable, and most reliable, in Greek epistemē, in Latin scientia.

--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 18:31, 21 September 2010 (UTC)

(I tried to add this before the above comment was added.) It's an enterprise, so what it does is implicitly deliberate or intentional, done for some purpose. "By aim" says that what follows is the purpose. "Real" and "actual" are sometimes used interchangeably, but I'd say that numbers are real but are not actual objects or occurrences. They're real in that they are what they are regardless of particular opinions. If we got from deep space a signal consisting of the first twenty primes, we'd assume an intelligent source not only because physical nature doesn't produce prime number sequences but also we'd expect other intelligent things to come to the pretty much the same conclusions about numbers (such as primes) as we do. "Evidence-based" is not too much to say in the opening sentence, I think. The Tetrast (talk) 18:45, 21 September 2010 (UTC).

Science is both an enterprise dedicated to accumulating testable knowledge about the natural world, and that resulting body of knowledge shared within the participating community. ?--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 19:14, 21 September 2010 (UTC)

Last one, science is an enterprise that builds evidence-based knowledge. Gonna go dissect some leeches. Keep working at it. :) mezzaninelounge 18:32, 21 September 2010 (UTC)

Doesn't sufficiently distinguish science from mathematics. Also, "testable" seems more important than "evidence-based," though I'd rather have both. Words like "evidence" and "experiment" seem to distinguish science from math because we think of physical evidence, physical experiments, So it kind of sneaks in that which we may as well say right out, that science about the actual, concrete world, since mathematical evidence and mathematical experimentation do occur, and by "evidence" we mean something that lends itself to a conclusion without necessarily proving it, the situation that science finds itself in often enough, but math does too. The Tetrast (talk) 18:57, 21 September 2010 (UTC).

I don't want to argue for meths being science, but all science has a mathematical and/or logical style to it, right from the beginning. Why I mention this is because it makes me wonder whether distinguishing maths from science is practical and/or necessary in the first sentence.--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 19:16, 21 September 2010 (UTC)

Tetrast, I am very sympathetic. In fact, my preference would be for E.O. Wilson's definition, "Science is a systematic enterprise of gathering knowledge about the world and organizing and condensing that knowledge into testable laws and theories." As you can imagine, that was one of the factors that led to the vote, which I am hoping to avoid. mezzaninelounge 19:35, 21 September 2010 (UTC)

That sentence was used in earlier versions I think? What was the objection to that sentence ML?--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 19:40, 21 September 2010 (UTC)

The one objection was that it would leave out library science (it doesn't in my view but let's no go there). It was replaced with definition 1. I and several others objected. Kenosis reconciled it (hence a hybrid appearance of the definition in the original) with Wilson's and even narrowed down the article down to Wilson's definition. Debate ensued and exploded. Votes were cast and here we are. mezzaninelounge 19:48, 21 September 2010 (UTC)

Is DRAFT AL5 better ML?

Science is both an enterprise that intentionally builds up evidence-based knowledge about the natural world, and the resulting body of knowledge shared within the participating community. In contemporary academic contexts, systematic experimental testing of falsifiable hypotheses is considered necessary in order to call something scientific in the most widely accepted strict sense. In the oldest and broadest sense the concept has developed from the classical Graeco-Roman philosophical term for that type of knowledge which is both communicable, and most reliable, in Greek epistemē, in Latin scientia.

Have fun with those leeches--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 18:40, 21 September 2010 (UTC)

AL, too worthy and not broad. Problematic words: intentionally, natural. Needless words: participating community and shared (implied in enterprise). By stating that it is both, makes it schizophrenic. Simpler, simpler. mezzaninelounge 19:35, 21 September 2010 (UTC)

"Wordy" perhaps? (Worthy would be nice.) I agree about the problem words. The wordiness comes from me trying to reinsert the fact that science is not just an enterprise but also the knowledge. Perhaps you were saying that the attempt was worthy? Anyway, given that as per your above post this starts to come close to the EO Wilson quote, perhaps we should take a moment to think about why the EO Wilson quote failed to convince people so far.--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 19:43, 21 September 2010 (UTC)

OK, I see the debate started here: [1]. Maybe this is bringing us closer to the difficult core of previous disagreements? I might start a new section just to consider it so as not to stop discussion here.--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 19:49, 21 September 2010 (UTC)

yes, wordy. :) mezzaninelounge 19:50, 21 September 2010 (UTC)

I have no problems at all reinstating Wilson's definition as the lead definition. mezzaninelounge 19:51, 21 September 2010 (UTC)

Important to include "testable" as well as "evidence-based."
Many will take "natural world" as excluding humanity and society. I pondered "natural and social world" and the like before saying "actual world." "Concrete world" still seems a possibility.
"Intentionally" doesn't do enough work; "by aim," girt by commas, still seems better in sense but is too bumpy in the new complicated sentence structure.
"Community" is worked into the sentence in a way that seems like trying to find an occasion to mention community.
"Science is an enterprise that, by aim, builds testable, evidence-based knowledge about the natural world and its inhabitants. Science is also regarded as the resulting body of knowledge; in its broadest and oldest sense, it is any knowledge which can be put into the form of a logical and convincing explanation and communicated. (See History and etymology below)."The Tetrast (talk) 19:51, 21 September 2010 (UTC).

I personally like this. What do others think? Also, Tetrast, what do you think of ML's preference for the Wilson quote?--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 19:55, 21 September 2010 (UTC)

I'm sorry I put my comment in ahead of earlier comment by mezzanine! I'm afraid to even try fixing it now. Update: Moved it all down into chronological place.The Tetrast (talk) 20:16, 21 September 2010 (UTC).

LOL. Apologies to anyone trying to follow, but as we have several people managing to keep up, I am trying to take advantage of this and get almost real time discussion aimed at breaking the logjam here. Let's frame what you had, because I like it:--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 20:03, 21 September 2010 (UTC)

"Science is an enterprise that, by aim, builds testable, evidence-based knowledge about the natural world and its inhabitants. Science is also regarded as the resulting body of knowledge; in its broadest and oldest sense, it is any knowledge which can be put into the form of a logical and convincing explanation and communicated. (See History and etymology below).
— Tet opening draft 1

Actually I'm getting a hankering for mentioning like Wilson does about organizing into laws and theories. I can read theories broadly as including what I called "accounts."
"Science is an enterprise that, by aim, builds knowledge, organized into testable, evidence-based laws and theories, about the natural world and its inhabitants. Science is also regarded as the resulting body of knowledge; in its broadest and oldest sense, it is any knowledge which can be put into the form of a logical and convincing explanation and communicated. (See History and etymology below)". The Tetrast (talk) 20:16, 21 September 2010 (UTC).

But if for example EO Wilson's definition was rejected by some good faith editors, then maybe if we CAN say "accounts" we should?--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 06:59, 22 September 2010 (UTC)

I like it too BUT I believe in concision. If certain problematic or needless words are removed, I will support it.

"Science is an enterprise that ~~, by aim,~~ builds and organizes knowledge into testable, ~~evidence-based knowledge~~ laws and theories about the ~~natural~~ world ~~and its inhabitants~~. In its oldest and broadest sense, science is also a ~~regarded as the resulting~~ body of knowledge ~~it is any knowledge which put into the form of a~~ that can be logically and convincingly explained ~~and communicated.~~ (See History and etymology below).mezzaninelounge 20:19, 21 September 2010 (UTC)

Seems a worthy effort!. I will frame this also if I may, but I'll play with a few words also:--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 06:59, 22 September 2010 (UTC)

Science is an enterprise that builds and organizes knowledge into testable explanations of things. In its oldest and broadest sense, science is also that body of knowledge that can be logically and convincingly explained. (See History and etymology below).
— Tet->ML->AL DRAFT

What's wrong with saying that it's a purpose or aim? The Tetrast (talk) 20:26, 21 September 2010 (UTC).

Aim is problematic in that sometimes scientific discoveries are unintentional or serendipitous. Plus, it is implicit in the term enterprise (a large undertaking) mezzaninelounge (talk) 20:29, 21 September 2010 (UTC)

That serendipity would seldom happen without the aim; luck favors to those who try. Your second reason makes more sense though. I suppose "world" can stand as a vague reference to the actual world. I can go with it as you've edited it. The Tetrast (talk) 20:37, 21 September 2010 (UTC).

I think I agree with T. Serendipitous discoveries always at least still have someone who wants to know the truth. Otherwise they would not be seen? But, indeed I am not sure if the intention absolutely needs to be mentioned, at least in the opening lines.--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 06:59, 22 September 2010 (UTC)

A new try

I am quite enthusiastic about the opening line mentioned above, my modified version of ML's version of Tetrast's and thought I'd try to imagine how the whole lead might look. Comments please?--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 07:58, 22 September 2010 (UTC)

no.	current version	proposal
1.	Science (from the Latin scientia, meaning "knowledge") is a systematic enterprise involved in the creation of knowledge that is testable or falsifiable.[1][2][3][4]	Science is an enterprise that builds and organizes knowledge into testable explanations of things. In its oldest and broadest sense, science is also that body of knowledge that can be logically and convincingly explained. (See History and etymology below).
2.	From the Middle Ages to the Enlightenment, "science" had more-or-less the same sort of very broad meaning in English that "philosophy" had at that time.	From Classical times science as a type of knowledge was closely linked to the philosophy as a way of life, and into early modern times the two words were sometimes used interchangeably in the English language.
3.	By the 17th century,[5] "natural philosophy" (which is today called "natural science") could be considered separately from "philosophy" in general.[6] In these cases, a "science" continued to denote reliable knowledge about its topic,[7] in the same way it is still used in the broad sense in modern terms such as library science, political science, and computer science.	By the 17th century,[5] "natural philosophy" (which is today called "natural science") could be considered separately from "philosophy" in general[6] but the term "science" continued to be used in the broad sense as it is still is today in such examples as "library science", "political science", and "computer science".
4.	In the more narrow sense of "science" today, as natural philosophy became linked to an expanding set of well-defined laws (beginning with Kepler's laws, Galileo's laws, and Newton's laws of motion), it became more common to refer to natural philosophy as "natural science". Over the course of the 19th century, the word "science" became increasingly associated mainly with the disciplined study of the natural world (that is, a world independent of human intervention).	On the other hand, natural philosophy or natural science became linked to an expanding set of well-defined "laws of nature" (beginning with Kepler's laws, Galileo's laws, and Newton's laws of motion). And this form of study has become the dominant meaning of "science", especially when used in academic or technical contexts.
5.	This sometimes left the study of human thought and society in a linguistic limbo, which has today been resolved by classifying these areas of study as the social sciences.[8][9]	Other types of study such as "social science" are also still referred to as science, but they are frequently distinguished as being less scientific than "hard sciences" like Physics and Chemistry.

This reads well, but the last line is putting a lot of pressure on the social scientists to perform like Isaac Newton. That's a tough precedent for them to live up to. How about using the lede sentence from the Social sciences article instead. "The social sciences are the fields of academic scholarship that explore aspects of human society.[1]" --Ancheta Wis (talk) 09:04, 22 September 2010 (UTC)

Hi AW, I don't think it is me putting pressure on them. The sentence is intended to report a kind of "pressure" (or critique or categorization really) which is out there in the real world - not a consensus, but a notable part of mainstream thinking about science. Nevertheless I feel reasonably confident that we can play around with this particular sentence and find a way. I think the bigger question is what you think of the first sentence.--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 09:24, 22 September 2010 (UTC)

The lead sentence is non-controversial, in my view. It can be viewed as the mission statement for industrial companies that build capital equipment. There are entire integrated circuit companies that build products this way, for example. --Ancheta Wis (talk) 09:36, 22 September 2010 (UTC)

AL, for the lead sentence, ff you are going to replace laws and theories with explanations, then do add predictions. Because laws do not necessarily explain as much as predict (e.g., Newton's second law). And please remove "of things." Very redundant and sincerely no offense, a little tacky. With those addition and removal, I have no problems. mezzaninelounge (talk) 13:50, 22 September 2010 (UTC)

I like the advice and have boldly tried something on the article. Hope this is at least not a worsening! BTW am intrigued by the use of the word tacky in this particular subject matter. I like it, but I reckon it will take some skill to use it clearly. I guess it would contrast with elegant though, right?--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 14:02, 22 September 2010 (UTC)

Yes. You're very perceptive :) mezzaninelounge (talk) 14:06, 22 September 2010 (UTC)

Oh, and do keep "about the world" in. So it should read:

Science is an enterprise that builds and organizes knowledge into testable explanations and predictions of the world.

I guess you beat me to it. I don't mind natural world but in environmental science, natural world is a technical term (believe it or not) to mean any physical world that is not "man made." The article that you are looking it to seems to have a broader meaning. If people understand that, I don't think it will be a problem. I am just being pedantic. :) mezzaninelounge (talk) 14:21, 22 September 2010 (UTC)

Yes, I saw the same problem and what I changed to now is hopefully a "least tacky" solution. Options like "reality", "things", "stuff", "the cosmos" also ran through my mind. But they all have some kind of other meaning to them. Same problem with "the world" and "inhabitants" mentioned in recent discussion above. I have to admit being tempted most of all by good old "things", as this does a good enough job of being vague and broad and yet excluding the supernatural and metaphysical (which I see as a requirement). I only hope it does not now look too much like a "natural science POV" wording because that is not the intention.--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 14:28, 22 September 2010 (UTC)

Not at all. I must confess, this whole effort or "enterprise" if you will has exceeded my expectations. The lead paragraphs look great. I think we can move on to any outstanding issues. mezzaninelounge (talk) 14:31, 22 September 2010 (UTC)

Just a crazy idea but if "things" (which I actually would like) is not better that "natural world" do we need anything on the end of the sentence at all? Could it be only we who are spending time on the subject are worried someone might say that religions and occult theories are sciences if we do not? --Andrew Lancaster (talk) 15:18, 22 September 2010 (UTC)

I don't think we need to add anything at the end. Less is more. Right now, it looks fine. I don't think it is just us who are worried about the distinctions between science and nonscience. Many prominent scientists and intellectuals are as well. Here is an example.

Yes, I was actually proposing to make the sentence shorter, not longer. Now we have "about the natural world". I was thinking about "about things", and even just nothing there.--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 15:50, 22 September 2010 (UTC)

I find things to be too broad and vacuous. It could mean just about anything, even "spirits." My preference would be just "world," and still maintaining the link to the the natural world article. Plus, "world" has less letters than "things." Much shorter. :) mezzaninelounge (talk) 16:01, 22 September 2010 (UTC)

I definitely prefer "the world" - that is the allusion to the distinction from mathematics. Suggest going back to E.O. Wilson's "laws and theories." (That would also eliminate problem of what preposition to use before "the world"!) The Tetrast (talk) 16:46, 22 September 2010 (UTC).

World could mean "this planet" and if you broaden it you can broaden it to any level you like. Did anyone notice that I proposed having no word there? Why do we need an object there?--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 17:06, 22 September 2010 (UTC)

People won't usually take it to mean the planet when one says "the world" outside a planetary or astronomical context. E.O. Wilson said "the world" in his definition. I think we need "the world" there to allude to the distinction from mathematics. The word "the" before "world" tends to discourage generalization beyond the actual, concrete world, our vast common anchorage. The Tetrast (talk) 17:24, 22 September 2010 (UTC).

Outcrop

At the end of the Philosophy of science section Gould's quote reads "then you go to the out crop of rock" - I haven't got a copy at hand, but shouldn't it be outcrop? Xosé (talk) —Preceding undated comment added 16:31, 20 September 2010 (UTC).

Even if the quotation is right, it's wrong. The word is "outcrop." Sometimes I for one prefer not to correct an original quote, but in this case, even if the quote is exact, I think that the rule of "silent correction" (it's in the Wikipedia rules somewhere) is quite applicable. So I wouldn't worry about whether by some glitch "out crop" got into the original text, I'd go ahead and change it to "outcrop." The Tetrast (talk) 00:21, 21 September 2010 (UTC).

Hold it, I found the original quote, and the text in the wiki is wrong in another way. The Tetrast (talk) 00:27, 21 September 2010 (UTC).

I've found via Google Books an 1987 edition which ends with "then you go to the outcrop." - outcrop is printed as one word, not followed by "of rock." But the that 1987 edition also says "the vanity of unknown processes" instead of "the working of unknown processes." "Vanity" has got to be a glitch. Google won't let me view the 1991 edition. So, I'd say just go ahead and change "out crop" to "outcrop." The Tetrast (talk) 00:34, 21 September 2010 (UTC).

Done, thanks. Xosé (talk) 17:54, 22 September 2010 (UTC)

Lack of adequate summary explanation in the lead section

May I recommend that all participants in the discussion about the lede section become familiar with Hugh Gauch's Scientific Method in Practice (2002). The author and publisher appear to have been sufficiently altruistic to make through searches possible at Google Books and a full pdf is currently available from the Library of Congress (or heck, maybe it's a mistake by the LOC, but it's currently viewable in full online). For starters, find the Introduction at page 2 and look at the diagram presented by Gauch. It's a sensible schema that well illustrates some of the definitional issues that IMO should presently be in the discussion about the lede, IMO at least.
..... Gauch's presentation accommodates different methodology by different disciplines much more clearly than the present WP article lede does. It readily handles the oft-encountered disagreements about whether social sciences such as psychology are "science" (something Tesseract2 has been trying to work on recently in this article), accommodates longstanding disagreements between the "hard sciences" and "soft sciences", so to speak, etc. Right now the opening paragraph of the lede is correct and well cited, but unfortunately doesn't explain a heck of a lot to the article's readership. Personally I thought the prior versions did a better job (e.g. as of August and early September 2010, even if there were debatable points in the explanation. I think the present participants can do better. But it would help to become yet more familiar with the ins-and-outs of the discussion as presented by reliable sources, and Gauch is an excellent place to find a presentation that reconciles some of the ongoing disagreements about what science is and how one might best define it. To those who aren't yet familiar with this book, happy reading. ... Kenosis (talk) 13:50, 21 September 2010 (UTC)

Thanks K. First line of Intro notes that the position it takes is controversial at least amongst non-scientists. Concerning "philosophical doubts" they cite Feyerabend only (a fairly extreme example, I think chosen for that reason), and cite him in a dismissive way, saying that scientists (like the authors?) ignore such stuff for the most part. They therefore leave an enormous field of not-stupid debate uncovered I think? I am not saying that makes it useless, but it does not seem to be a source which covers all positions. I think it is an interesting point to reflect upon that they correctly state that most scientists do not really have much to say about method. It confirms that in our time being a scientist is quite separable from being someone with a strong opinion about what defines science, like say a Popper.--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 14:30, 21 September 2010 (UTC)

Please see the diagram on p2, which pretty much sums up many of the disagreements, then keep flipping through the book. You'll see plenty of valuable information, e.g., that "science" is a community enterprise, you'll see that full disclosure is a standard expectation in order to allow others to actually fulfill the testability, and some other important aspects that make science "science", including of course testability and falsifiability as presently noted in the article lead. Right now most of what I see in the discussion seems to reflect a lot of "hunt and peck" via web searches. Here's an opportunity to get intimately familiar with a contemporary, post-Popperian examination of "science". Or, alternately, by all means don't read it. I've got RL stuff on my plate right now so I'm afraid I can't actively help a whole lot here. Maybe this weekend. Cheers, for now. ... Kenosis (talk) 14:50, 21 September 2010 (UTC)

Thanks Kenosis. I will review it and get back to you. Do give me some time. mezzaninelounge 15:40, 21 September 2010 (UTC)

Gauch p. 37 discusses intersubjective verification. --Ancheta Wis (talk) 16:15, 21 September 2010 (UTC)

Just a comment. I want to commend everyone for doing a great job trying to improve this article. That said, I hope that we all bear in mind that at the end of the day, the main goal of having a broad definition of science is not so much to create a statement that is a politically acceptable or expedient as much as writing a statement that accurately reflects the zeitgeist of the scientific community. Unlike culture, national identity, etc, there are right and wrong answers/statements in science, which makes science quite unique in this way. With that in mind, there are right and wrong or even outdated definitions of science that should not be included, even if there were a small of group of scientists that adhere to them. There are some biologists (a small % based on Gallup poll) who are creationists, but that doesn't mean that we should give them the light of the day if the rest of biologists don't.

Kenosis, I thumb through the linked book quickly. I've seen it before. It is good, but like many contemporary book, it doesn't give one concise definition but rather just a list of characteristics of science. I think it would converge thinking of the editors but I don't think it solves the main problem at hand, which at the moment appears to be mainly centered on the use of certain vocabularies. mezzaninelounge 16:22, 21 September 2010 (UTC)

ML, Your points are quick and general, so it might be better to avoid focusing on them over much in preference to the concrete text proposals we have been working on. However, just comments on what you might mean:-

1. Contrast between what scientists think and what non-scientists think. Scientists are not the only mainstream field using this word. I do understand that if there was a conflict between the two "mainstreams" (philosophical and scientific to use the terms in the source mentioned above) then we'd have to consider splitting the article or something. However, the two meanings are intimately linked and in fact inseparable. To understand either one you need to understand both.

2. Old fashioned versus new fashioned. A lot of people read old books, and old books still continue to be cited and relevant in many fields. People looking up science on WP will sometimes be wanting a meaning that works not only in recent scientific journals but also in other types of literature. --Andrew Lancaster (talk) 17:17, 21 September 2010 (UTC)

Andrew, no problem with 1 but again, remember, we have plenty of space of write in this article. My main point is that we don't have to jammed everything into a single sentence. That will not give you a broad definition. As for point 2, that is a given. BUT again, this is not a history of science article. Again, the evolution article is an excellent example. Its definition is new and contemporary and may not be recognizable to people who read origin of species. But if they want to know more, they can scroll or go to the history of evolutionary thought article. If they learn something, then Wikipedia has done its job. And if they want even broader article, then they can go to introduction to evolution. I just hope everyone is aware that there are practical constraints to consider. :) mezzaninelounge 17:44, 21 September 2010 (UTC)

Sounds agreeable. I agree this article should not be a history of science article. But in parallel I think it is not a scientific method article? I also think that we should turn this into a dab page which simply gives people a choice between "history of science" and "scientific method" (or any combination of similar specialized choices). There is a real link between all the sub-meanings of science, which is science in a broad sense. It has historical roots, but those historical roots are not dead. --Andrew Lancaster (talk) 18:17, 21 September 2010 (UTC)

Actually, there is already a science (disambiguation) page with its own definition! mezzaninelounge 18:36, 21 September 2010 (UTC)

Another article that serves as a good example is Psychology. Look at how it is defined. Its definition is contemporary. Psychology, like science, was at one time a part of philosophy. In fact, was there anything that wasn't? mezzaninelounge 18:06, 21 September 2010 (UTC)

Science is a much more abstract term, and most importantly what you perhaps think of as old meanings are not only old meanings. They are still being used. In psychology there are only really modern meanings in any level of general use. Does that make sense?--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 18:17, 21 September 2010 (UTC)

Andrew, make sense but not the case. There is a technical definition (the science of blah blah blah) that psychologists use and then there is nonscientific definition that many other people still used (Science of the mind). Much like science. The article lists the former. Just like evolution. I think we can do likewise. mezzaninelounge 18:28, 21 September 2010 (UTC)

Yes, I know what you mean and to a certain extent to understand the meaning of a psychology and evolution it helps to know these old meanings. A quick sentence in those articles about the old meanings would however be enough. However this is much less important than the case we are dealing with here because the old meaning of science is not only rarely used today. It is still very much alive and possibly even the MOST common use. (Scientists themselves are not always interested at all, and also not consistent, in how they use the word; philosophers of science tend to use it more like the old way; the general educated public, like the scientists, tends to use the word inconsistently.) It is not a "dead" meaning. Do you see the difference?--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 18:38, 21 September 2010 (UTC)

The difference you are pointing out would be between evolution and psychology. As you say, the old meaning of evolution is very much dead. The problem we have in defining science is very much the same as psychology. The old meaning (science of the mind) of psychology, as you would say, is "very much alive and possibly even the MOST common use." I am suggesting that we use the format (with appropriate modifications of course) of the psychology article as a model here. mezzaninelounge 18:47, 21 September 2010 (UTC)

Not sure if I agree or disagree. Perhaps better to play with concrete examples and see where we end up. Sometimes general theorizing makes differences look bigger than they are in practice.--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 19:11, 21 September 2010 (UTC)

Back for short while with about a couple hours to spend on WP stuff tonight. I want to apologize to all here about my mistake (in my initial comments starting off this section) in thinking the US Library of Congress had offered Gauch's entire publication (Scientific Method in Practice) for free viewing online. I'd thought it an opportunity for the present participants to collectively have full immediate access to at least one credible 21st century book on the topic, but I now see that the available .pdf file only goes to page 20. I happen to have a hard copy and would be willing to try to convey responses to any specific questions that are reasonably answerable.
..... For the moment I avoid trying to answer the question about how much WP:WEIGHT might rightly be given to the perspectives of the scientific community (Gauch's book has received a lot of praise, e.g. for being the first to put forward a perspective to which scientists can much more readily relate than was the case prior to its publication), as contrasted with the commentary of the philosophical community and other commentators about the demarcation problem and sociological observations about how "science" might be perceived by a wider audience.
..... Gauch's point in his Introduction which Andrew_Lancaster referred to above, about Paul Feyerabend having essentially called science a free-for-all without any rules (and whose criticism is already discussed in this article at present), was to set the stage for laying out an in-depth description of the "territory", if you will, within which the scientific community actually does work, and also that there is a core set of widely agreed principles, and also that there are variations in the methodology applied by specific disciplines (as represented by the diagram on page 2). The value of a perspective such as this to this present group of participants in this WP article was, to my thinking at least, to be found in a better understanding of what the scientific community actually does, as opposed to how and where philosophical commentators think the demarcation lines can be drawn, and also as opposed to how science might best be defined for the general public. So I suppose we're more or less back to square one on that idea of mine. ... Kenosis (talk) 02:42, 22 September 2010 (UTC)

Hi K, just to make sure there is no misunderstanding this definitely looks like a good source. But I have been focusing myself on the lead, and especially upon the first sentence. It is not possible, I think to explain so much detail in the first sentence.--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 06:50, 22 September 2010 (UTC)

Agreed, not for the first sentence or two. K's concerns bring us to the topic of the scope of the article, its format and organization, as well as the summary list. mezzaninelounge (talk) 13:56, 22 September 2010 (UTC)

And it is appreciated.--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 13:57, 22 September 2010 (UTC)

Thanks for saying that. I was proposing that the participants here invest in getting more familiar with the sources rather than try to figure this stuff out from the context of the talk-page discussion. I'll give an example, some evidence in support of why I thought it would be helpful to do so. The lead presently explains a whole lot less than the lead had previously explained about science (see the selected versions below for comparison). And, here are the current citations:

**http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/science The current choice of usages picks only one out of six available definitions without providing context or explaining to the reader of this WP article why that particular one was chosen for this article, something the lead did do for a very long time.
**Popper's (1934) The Logic of Scientific Discovery , beginning of Chapter 1 at page 27 of the 1959 English edition: "A scientist, whether theorist or experimenter,, puts forward statements, or systems of statements, and tests them step by step. In the field of the empirical sciences, more particularly, he constructs hypotheses, or systems of theories, and tests them against experience by observation and experiment."
**Edward O. Wilson's (1999) Consilience: The Unity of Knowledge What page? or pages? What does Wilson actually say in support of the article text to which it is appended?
**Ludwig Fleck (1935) Genesis and development of a scientific fact. What pages or at least what chapter?

Note also that two of the sources, Popper and Fleck, are from the mid-1930s. Of course Popper's book is a classic, so I've no objection to its inclusion. But I think, as I said, we can do much better here to present a reasonable summary of the lay of the land for the readership, which, remember, is comprised in very large proportion of kids looking for the basics about what science is today, not a complete historical and etymological perspective or a philosophical solution to the demarcation problem.
..... For quick reference, compare this version of 22 September 2010 to this version of August and early September 2010, and with this revision from early 2010]. ... Kenosis (talk) 14:51, 22 September 2010 (UTC)

Hi Kenosis. A really quick remark:-

1. Focusing only on the first sentence or two: The first one is now, the second one is OK to me personally (but the second sentence presumably drew criticism given the prominent position being given to what is effectively a side issue for most people), and the third one seems like the second one with a bit too much extra stuff forced into it?

2. Concerning aims: I think a part of what we have to make sure if we are to avoid making the opening lines either unreadable or argument magnets is NOT to try to fit everything in?--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 14:59, 22 September 2010 (UTC)

3. I think an outsider would not consider the first two diffs shockingly different. Obviously we are all sensitive to the differences, but they are obviously two related versions?--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 15:01, 22 September 2010 (UTC)

Kenosis and AL, perhaps we should start with the summary soon. It will allow us to address the scope of the article more clearly. mezzaninelounge (talk) 15:33, 22 September 2010 (UTC)

What is actually needed next? Was there also a editing logjam there? I was kind of hoping that the lead was the centre of problems.--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 15:49, 22 September 2010 (UTC)

No, just "cleaning up." This part is much easier to do than the definition. I don't think this even requires a whole new writeup but rather a few bits of edits here and there. Right now the article is a collection of different things stitched together. Some things need to be clarified, such section on Math (a modification of that heading would be sufficient I think). Not as urgent as the lead if that is the main concern. mezzaninelounge (talk) 16:04, 22 September 2010 (UTC)

Here are among the problems I see in the current lede ([2]), which begins:

..... Science (from the Latin scientia, meaning "knowledge") is an enterprise that builds and organizes knowledge in the form of testable explanations and predictions about the natural world.^[1][2][3][4] In its oldest and broadest sense, science is also the resulting body of reliable knowledge that can be logically and convincingly explained.^[5] (See "History and etymology" section below). This will not be sustainable I feel sure. It jumps from a single sentence defining science today, then jumps back to a restatement of something Aristotle said over 2300 years ago.
..... Since classical antiquity science as a type of knowledge was closely linked to philosophy, which was the corresponding way of life. And into early modern times the two words were sometimes used interchangeably in the English language. This, the first sentence of the second paragraph, now continues with antiquity, and does so a good but clumsily. What, for example, is meant by "closely linked to philosophy, which was the corresponding way of life."?
..... The next few sentences are reasonable IMO, except that the lone footnote says:With the caveat that an any time, the precision and error of a statement may yet remain undetermined, that is, in some sense, unreliable. See Nassim Nicholas Taleb, The Black Swan Honestly, if there needs to be a caveat like this, please don't say it in the lede, or rephrase it so it doesn't need a caveat that will look like complete gobbledygook to a fourth, fifth or sixth grader, or for that matter a high-school student. I had a very hard time figuring out what it might be intending to say, and I'm a good bit beyond high school.
..... The third current paragraph is to me a reasonable casual explanation until we get to the last sentence:
..... W.r.t. the sentence Many of the other areas of scientific study outside the natural sciences such as are today classified as social sciences and treated as being less scientific, or not "hard science".[9] This is way off the mark--very close to being pure bunk that doesn't belong in the lead, or for that matter anywhere in the article (another reason I suggested a contemporary perspective such as Gauch). Today, the old colloquial distinction has fallen largely by the wayside in academia at every level, except among die-hard logical positivists. Part of the point of Gauch's in-depth explanations and the diagram on p2 of Scientific Method in Practice is to dispel old myths such as the social sciences not being regarded as "as scientific as the hard sciences". The point is that the methods used in social sciences (e.g. psychology) are scientific to the extent the community of researchers in those areas use methods appropriate to the type of inquiry and analysis conducted in their area of study, not that they're "soft". Today they're called social sciences, not "not hard science" and not "soft science".

In short, I think another approach might be in order here, or at least a good reworking of the existing approach, because I don't see how the existing text can last for very long. I don't quite know what that approach is, and I recognize it might be that no approach will last very long in this article, but will try to get back to it this weekend sometime. Take care for now. ... Kenosis (talk) 16:37, 22 September 2010 (UTC)

Agree, hence my call for more cleaning up. mezzaninelounge (talk) 17:00, 22 September 2010 (UTC)

Hi Kenosis. Thanks! It is great that you have found time because I have had you in mind as someone potentially critical of the approach building up. I suggest that we try improving what we have for a while before a radical break, but let's see. I'd like to go over some of your useful comments:-

not be sustainable I feel sure. It jumps from a single sentence defining science today, then jumps back to a restatement of something Aristotle said over 2300 years ago. I reckon this is the most important one. The first approximately two sentences seem to be the hardest to get into an uncontroversial and elegant form. So if I can ask one favour it would be that you think through this one a bit more and give a bit more detail about what you think is needed on that first one or two sentences. Is it really just the jumping back and forth? Is that so bad (especially if it is hard to avoid)? The old version you cited just above had a similar problem to what you describe here?

Kenosis a second thought: if jumping around is the problem perhaps also consider whether changing the sequence is a possible help?--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 17:38, 22 September 2010 (UTC)

And a third thought! Maybe if you would comment on the idea proposed below in a new sub-section about yet another proposal for a first and second sentence based on the EO Wilson quote, that might also help home in on further improvements.--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 05:33, 23 September 2010 (UTC)

clumsily: "closely linked to philosophy, which was the corresponding way of life." OK. I'll work on that. My bad. Then you can focus on commenting on that first sentence? :)
footnote with caveat. I think I agree. Don't know if anyone would see removing it as a big issue?
Last sentence. I wrote that and I actually do not think that sentence is very important. I think it evolved from various things people said here, but probably fails to capture them anyway. It might be better to handle whatever it was trying to say in the sections?--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 17:02, 22 September 2010 (UTC)

Kenosis, have made some adjustments on the last 3 points. --Andrew Lancaster (talk) 17:40, 22 September 2010 (UTC)

Kenosis, greetings. I have no problem with the deletion of the Taleb caveat from the lede. But its omission codifies a bet (i.e., Feynman's position that "Probability is best defined by betting") made by the scientific community in behalf of its clients (i.e., the laymen, which includes even scientists who are not specialists in the specific topic of inquiry). Taleb's position is that scientific statements have an associated risk from talking a statement at face value - in Taleb's book this is referred to as the fat tails of the probability curve representing the likelihood of the statement. John Ziman characterizes this approach in the problem of intersubjective verifiability; Ziman pinpoints a scientist's rhetorical task, which is to pursuade the community, in Broken English (the international language of our time) - Reliable Knowledge p.12. Thus the nuances of a scientist's mother tongue are held hostage to this imperfect communication of what is meant to be public knowledge.

Regarding Ludwik Fleck: Thomas Kuhn, who wrote the preface to the 1976 translation into English, states that he only knew 2 people who had read the 1935 German edition, one of them a personal friend of Fleck. Kuhn notes that he found Fleck's German style to be very difficult. Popper's contemporaneous book was much better known at the time of publication. Nevertheless, Kuhn knew that Fleck's book was radically opposite the scientific feeling of the time, which was epitomized by logical positivism, (i.e. Hans Reichenbach's position that facts were facts, signed sealed delivered). So Fleck is in fact one of Kuhn's primary sources, and serves as balance to Popper. His importance is well known to the History of Science community, of course. To learn more, google Denkstil (thoughtstyle). If you can get a copy, Kuhn's preface and the first chapter are the gist, which gives the intellectual basis for learning just how a scientific concept is built up. It's very similar to the process we all are observing on this talk page.

These are points that need not be including in the lede, as they might tend to confuse laymen (i.e, non-experts in a topic under study), but a scientist with intellectual honesty must confront these issues, of course. --Ancheta Wis (talk) 00:25, 23 September 2010 (UTC)

Please also remember that the readership of this article consists of roughly third grade and up. Of course it should state the appropriate basic facts intelligently and accurately, but as simply and straightforwardly as possible, especially in the lede. No need to try to definitively solve the demarcation problem or note arcana at that initial stage of presentation, IMO. Though in addition to testability a note about probability would be most appropriate up front I should think, since modern statistical methods were what broke the decades-long stranglehold of Popper's "falsifiabiliity" criterion on demarcating science from other things-in-the-world (one black swan proves the generalization wrong, and such). Also, it would seem appropriate to note in simple language what falsifiability is-- perhaps something like "a valid hypothesis or theory must be capable of being proven inaccurate if evidence is found that contradicts it", though I'm not sure whether this might best be done in the lead. Talk with y'all later on. ... Kenosis (talk) 07:43, 23 September 2010 (UTC)

In order to be valid, a hypothesis or theory needs to be falsifiable, that is, capable of being tested for falseness or inaccuracy. A falsified hypothesis or theory is one that has been tested and found false or inaccurate. The Tetrast (talk) 20:49, 23 September 2010 (UTC).

The first sentence ("a hypothesis or theory needs to be falsifiable, that is, capable of being tested for falseness or inaccuracy." ) is reasonable. The second sentence ("A falsified hypothesis or theory is one that has been tested and found false or inaccurate.") is highly misleading, if not wrong. (I think the confusion here is quite understandable though. ) The scientific community doesn't ordinarily use "falsified" in this way. See, for instance, this article about peer review in which the words "falsify" (or "falsifying") are used four times, all of them referring to misrepresenting or fabricating data. By contrast, "falsifiable" and falsifiability are terms of art in the philosophy of science (in which Popper specialized). The geocentric model and the water memory hypothesis weren't "falsified", but rather the former was superceded by a more accurate theory when evidence accumulated in support of the heliocentric model, and the latter failed to be replicated by other researchers. Most participants in the scientific community today expect theories and hypotheses to be "testable" or "replicable" or "repeatable" or "verifiable", or similar.
..... Also, as Ancheta Wis and I both were pointing to, even in the thirties Popper's proposed criterion of falsifiability (essentially that one black swan shoots down the whole theory that "all-swans-are-white") was counterbalanced by the offerings of Ludwig Fleck. Popper's argument "won the day", so to speak, and held sway for several decades. But Popper's arguments about falsifiability as a defining characteristic of scientific method were made in the midst of dominance by the analytical school in philosophy (the logical positivists). Even Popper acknowledged later in his career the advances in statistical methods and other aspects of scientific method and community, and retreated from this position about falsifiability being a defining characteristic (can't provide citations for you at the moment, but they're out there, in Popper's own words). Gauch also mentions this issue w.r.t. Popper's falsifiability in Scientific Method in Practice at p82. So maybe it might not be such a great idea to put falsifiability right up front in the lead again (remember the current source for falsifiability is Popper's, written in 1934). The current revision is reasonable in this respect, IMO. Given these difficulties I've just touched upon and the extremely subtle but very important differences in terms that at first sound alike, maybe we should resolve in this discussion to leave the article's discussion of falsifiaibility for the section on scientific method or the section about philosophy of science, or indeed perhaps out of this article entirely, and leave it instead for the articles on scientific method and philosophy of science. Then perhaps note the dates during which this discussion occurred, for future reference. Just a thought or two. ... Kenosis (talk) 01:00, 24 September 2010 (UTC)

I think Kenosis is right. Falsifiability is a popular mental prop for talking about science, still common in textbooks, but I do not believe it defines how science is done in any general or comprehensive way.--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 06:41, 24 September 2010 (UTC)

Kenosis, I agree with many of your points with the main exception of "The scientific community doesn't ordinarily use "falsified" in this way." or "that it is misleading or wrong." Those are overstatements. There are many scientists who use falsified that way. It is all about context. Perhaps, what you mean to say is that the second sentence may be "misunderstood" by scientists or non-scientists who do not use or understand that the word can be used in that way. My two cents. :) mezzaninelounge (talk) 18:36, 24 September 2010 (UTC)

Ah, interesting. Daniel, I assume we can have just a bit of friendly fun with this point you've raised? (Say, metaphorically over a cold one in the mezzanine lounge :-) and strictly for the purpose of getting a better handle on the topic for the purpose of improving the article, of course.) Since when do your colleagues refer to a "falsified" hypothesis? Do any of them work to "falsify" a hypothesis? Of course not, especially since they're obliged to assume a null hypothesis. If they find evidence that clearly contradicts a hypothesis, do they say in their conclusion section that they've falsified it? No way, I'd surely bet; they say something along the lines of that they found evidence that doesn't support it, or that the evidence contradicts the hypothesis, not that it's been "falsified". I doubt we'd find many "conclusion" sections of scientific papers in which it's used. It's just much too charged a word. And, for example, as I imagine you may already know, a researcher today wouldn't be allowed to get very far with a Popper-style modus tollens argument in a conclusion section of a scientific research paper--the scientific community has simply progressed way beyond that sort of bivalent logic. So, in general, I'd argue this type of usage is essentially obsolete.
..... When words to the effect that a hypothesis or theory is "not falsifiable", though, then we're more likely to recognize that they're being uttered in a very different context, which is that the hypothesis or theory is framed in a way that it automatically affirms the consequent or that it's incapable of being contradicted by evidence. In this kind of usage, we understand the person to be referring to the Popperian view, which still holds sway in this specific type of context. Either way, the distinction is sufficiently subtle that I'm advocating we don't subject the typical readership of this article to the requirement to need to understand the subtleties of all this and more. That's the main thing I'm saying. ... Kenosis (talk) 20:53, 24 September 2010 (UTC)

Yes, let's have a little fun with this. :) First of all, should we subject the typical readership of Wikipedia to these terms? Not sure and in any event, that is NOT what I am advocating. IF we do decide to expose readers to these terms, then we have A LOT of explaining to do, which probably makes the cost-benefit ratio unattractive and it will probably detract readers from the main issues/topics. For those reasons, maybe not. So no disagreements there. Now for the friendly fun part. With respect to the use of the null hypothesis, you're probably right, no one would say to "I'm trying to falsify the null hypothesis," because 1) it goes without saying and 2) unless they are statisticians, no one (I might be bias here) would care to say anything about the null hypothesis anyway. All they care about is whether the p-value is significant. Nevertheless, people (myself included) still "talk about" falsifying hypotheses in day-to-day discourse. Granted, they may not do it explicitly in journal articles. BUT from time to time, it still happens, see this example. The point I'm making is that it is not as strange or antiquated as you may think. You're probably right in thinking that you would not find that many scientists writing this way in journals, especially conclusions. It is not because it is incorrect or too charged but because 1) it is redundant, just as it is redundant to say "we hypothesized that..." or "we theorized that.." 2) scientists who do know or apply the Popperian approach may not be familiar with the term (quite sad) and editors typically like the language to be simple and concise. 3) Granting agencies typically prefer statements to be phrased in the positive rather than the negative, i.e., calling a bet after rolling a dice. This of course flies in the face of the Popperian approach. But as you can see, old habits die hard. :) 21:54, 24 September 2010 (UTC)

OK, OK, I give up :-) ( ... "Bartender, another round here please") Anyway, I wasn't referring to the typical readership of WP in general, but to the readership of this article, which consists in very substantial part of a lot of youngsters just trying to get the very basics (I offered evidence in support of this farther up in this section). As to the null hypothesis I mentioned, the WP article offers a reasonable description of the concept, IMO, though one can find it in plenty of RSs too. An objective introduction to a scientific research paper is generally expected to frame the hypothesis in a way as to show that the study was designed to find out "if" or "whether" a given hypothesis is borne out by the evidence collected in the experiment. My point in mentioning it is that we're normally expected to assume the null (as vs. the alternative hypothesis we're investigating) as the starting point in order to take an objective position in the experiment and try to minimize observer bias, Hawthorne effects, and other bias-related aberrations, and in general just to show we're willingly taking as objective a stance as possible. Twas all I was saying there. (K now leaves a tip for the bartender) Gotta go for now--take care. ;) ... Kenosis (talk) 22:55, 24 September 2010 (UTC)

I see that mezzanine has made the point that I was going to make about "falsifiable" and "falsified," and that "falsified" is sometimes used by scientists to mean "disconfirmed" or "disproven." I'm already on record here saying that I think that the word is morphologically bad. I also think that it's a problem that the main everyday sense is "fakable" especially with regard to documents or their contents. The problem extends, as far as I can tell, to the word's cognates in French, Spanish, etc. I wish Popper had said "countertestable" or "contratestable" or some such. Longer and harder on the eyes, but less damaging to language and understanding (and "contratested" would follow morphological rules and mean tested for falsity, not disproven or disconfirmed - but it's too late now, the "falsify" terminology is entrenched). I also agree with comments above regarding falsity versus mere inaccuracy. I also agreed with SBHarris about another problem with a rule of falsification. The Tetrast (talk) 01:41, 25 September 2010 (UTC).

It is an awkward word to be sure (and not just an awkward concept to handle). I think there is a level of general agreement that although it is important in any extended discussion of modern science, it is not practically suitable for a first sentence, and probably not for the lead generally?--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 06:31, 25 September 2010 (UTC)

Kenosis, I agree, last round on me. :) Clarification, when I say WP readers, I meant to include those who visit this article. By the way, I really appreciate your pragmatic approach to this article as you always stress that we need to keep the readers in mind. I suspect that as we move along to do more edits and reorganization, that will become the limiting factor here. I accept your points on the importance of framing null hypothesis. I have no disagreements except to say that I must confess, I don't know that many people who think in those terms, unless they are in social sciences, e.g., social psychology, etc. But even then they only think about it when they have to analyze their data, tsk tsk. In summary, I agree with Tetras, Andrew, and you that "falsifiable" is perhaps not the best term to use in the first definition or lead of this article. I can see that the term itself is easily open to misinterpretation and so I would be incline to agree with alternative terms or phrases such as "to disprove, to test, to determine, etc." mezzaninelounge (talk) 17:06, 25 September 2010 (UTC)

^ ^a ^b ^c ^d ^e Popper, Karl (2002) [1959]. The Logic of Scientific Discovery (2nd English ed.). New York, NY: Routledge Classics. ISBN 0-415-27844-9. OCLC 59377149. Cite error: The named reference "Popper" was defined multiple times with different content (see the help page).
^ See: Editorial Staff (March 7, 2008). "Scientific Method: Relationships among Scientific Paradigms". Seed magazine. Retrieved 2007-09-12.
^ "Online dictionary". Merriam-Webster. Retrieved 2009-05-22. knowledge or a system of knowledge covering general truths or the operation of general laws especially as obtained and tested through scientific method . . . such knowledge or such a system of knowledge concerned with the physical world and its phenomena
^ "Online dictionary". Merriam-Webster. Retrieved 2009-05-22. knowledge or a system of knowledge covering general truths or the operation of general laws especially as obtained and tested through scientific method . . . such knowledge or such a system of knowledge concerned with the physical world and its phenomena
^ Wilson, Edward (1999). Consilience: The Unity of Knowledge. New York: Vintage. ISBN 0-679-76867-X.
^ Wilson, Edward (1999). Consilience: The Unity of Knowledge. New York: Vintage. ISBN 0-679-76867-X.

[Popper-1] Popper, Karl (2002) [1959]. The Logic of Scientific Discovery (2nd English ed.). New York, NY: Routledge Classics. ISBN 0-415-27844-9. OCLC 59377149. Cite error: The named reference "Popper" was defined multiple times with different content (see the help page).

[2] See: Editorial Staff (March 7, 2008). "Scientific Method: Relationships among Scientific Paradigms". Seed magazine. Retrieved 2007-09-12.

[3] "Online dictionary". Merriam-Webster. Retrieved 2009-05-22. knowledge or a system of knowledge covering general truths or the operation of general laws especially as obtained and tested through scientific method . . . such knowledge or such a system of knowledge concerned with the physical world and its phenomena

[4] "Online dictionary". Merriam-Webster. Retrieved 2009-05-22. knowledge or a system of knowledge covering general truths or the operation of general laws especially as obtained and tested through scientific method . . . such knowledge or such a system of knowledge concerned with the physical world and its phenomena

[5] Wilson, Edward (1999). Consilience: The Unity of Knowledge. New York: Vintage. ISBN 0-679-76867-X.

[6] Wilson, Edward (1999). Consilience: The Unity of Knowledge. New York: Vintage. ISBN 0-679-76867-X.

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