Talk:Munich Agreement/Archive 2

Archive 1

Archive 2

Archive 3

Czechoslovakia had alliance with Britain?

From the introduction: The phrase "Munich Betrayal" (Czech: Mnichovská zrada; Slovak: Mníchovská zrada) is also used because the military alliance Czechoslovakia had with France and Britain proved useless. Britain had no formal alliance with Czechoslovakia - UK was bound only by vague Covenant of the League of Nations. I changed this nonesense few years ago and it is back...Pavlor (talk) 19:03, 11 June 2014 (UTC)

Before Munich France was allied with Czechoslovakia and UK was allied with France - so UK was not bound only by vague Covenant of the League of Nations.--Posp68 (talk) 13:29, 10 May 2019 (UTC)

At Munich Brittain and France maneuvered Prague into the position of a defeated power being presented with ultimatums from friends and enemies.--Posp68 (talk) 16:41, 11 July 2019 (UTC)

After Munich Britain and France had military obligations toward Czechoslovakia. 15 March 1939 France betrayed its obligations to Czechoslovakia for the second time.

Great Britain and France had to pay heavely. Whether they wanted to or not, they had to fight for the annulment of

Munich and the liberation of Czechoslovakia. Munich will stand for ever as a warning to future generations.

The Commonwealth span Europe, Americas, Africa, Asia and the Pacific and The Prime Minister of the United Kingdom "knew nothing" over "far-away countries" in Central Europe.

--Posp68 (talk) 07:21, 14 October 2017 (UTC)

Look at a map. Czechoslovakia is land-locked with no access to the sea. Just how was Britain supposed to get troops into Czechoslovakia when all of the surrounding countries - through which British troops would have to travel overland by road or rail to get there - were either allied with Nazi Germany or where friendly to Hitler and so were extremely unlikely to give Britain permission to move troops through these countries.

It is not about a map. Poland was not land-locked, but has all the same. France was not land-locked, but has all the same in result. I mean, there never were any intentions to fight. It was only empty promises, and all who believed in it were betrayed. For real intentions see 'Operation Pike' for example. It is also good hypocrisy example, to say that it was after Hitler-Stalin non-aggression treaty, because is was signed only after Munich Betrayal.

At Munich Britain had no way of helping Czechoslovakia at a time when Britain was doing its best to avoid another war after the previous one had cost it and its empire nearly a million dead, all for trying to help other countries who were unable or unprepared to defend themselves.

Foreign pilots saved Britain during The Battle of Britain in the summer and autumn of 1940.

(including Poles, Czechs and Slovaks)

With no way of getting friendly troops into Czechoslovakia Britain had no way of forestalling Germany occupying Czechoslovakia other than by actually going to war, and even if Britain had done this, Britain still had no way of directly assisting Czechoslovakia

Czechoslovakia was given up at Munich becasue it was just impossible to get to. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 95.149.247.9 (talk) 08:59, 2 February 2018 (UTC)

Britain signed away the territorial integrity of a sovereign state and maneuvered Prague into the position of a defeated power. --Posp68 (talk) 15:41, 17 September 2019 (UTC)

It wouldn't be a question of putting Allied troops into Czechoslovakia. The only plan would be for France, and to a lesser extent Britain, to present a military threat in the West to draw off German forces and give the fairly powerful Czech military a better fighting chance. However, even when Britain and France did go to war in defence of Poland a year later, they didn't really do anything and it didn't help Poland. In autumn 1938, in theory, the French army's 68 infantry and two light armoured divisions could have crushed the nine German infantry divisions (five regular, four reserve) facing them on the border and advanced into Germany. But the French air force was obsolete and the Armee de Terre would have relied for fighter cover and bomber support on the RAF, which frankly wasn't much better at that time. And although Daladier might, just, have favoured military action, the rest of his government and the military staff did not. There was no chance of the French doing anything, so Chamberlain couldn't have done anything even had he wanted to. And he didn't want to, particularly because of the state of Britain's air defences. The Luftwaffe could not attack London at once, because they were ranged against Czechoslovakia and besides, to reach England they would have to overfly the Low Countries, where the flak would not be friendly. But they would come eventually, and the British Chain Home radar network was only half complete, and the new eight-gun fighters were not operational: there were only five Spitfires in service -- you could literally count them on the fingers of one hand -- and, although there were five squadrons of Hurricanes, neither their guns nor their oxygen systems would work above 15,000 feet until substantial modifications were made. So Britain's air defence relied mainly on six squadrons of Gladiators and nine of Gauntlets, all biplanes. The Gladiators had a very small speed advantage over Do17s and He111s and the Gauntlets had no advantage at all, and both types were lightly armed, and they wouldn't have had proper radar control. Meanwhile the army was still equipping with the Bren gun, the light armoured carrier and the new trucks, and the navy was short of ships: the KG5 class battleships were still in build; Warspite had finished her rebuild but QE and Valiant would take another year to complete theirs; Ark Royal, the first modern fleet carrier, wasn't in service till the end of 1938 and nor was the Skua fighter-bomber. While Germany got much stronger in the next year to September 1939, the British government did not feel ready to fight till then, and the French, for all their numbers, were never really ready at all. Khamba Tendal (talk) 15:32, 6 March 2018 (UTC)

Plus, in 1938 Soviet Union was allied with France and Czechoslovakia. In september 1939 Soviet Union was to all intents and purposes allied with Nazi Germany because of Munich and Nazi-Germany could start the second world war. --Posp68 (talk) 16:43, 7 April 2018 (UTC)

I see in this debate about "why it was the only option for UK and France to side with Nazi Germany against Czechoslovakia" that appeasment is live and well even today.Cimmerian praetor (talk) 20:21, 22 April 2018 (UTC)

Britain and France didn't side with Nazi Germany. The only alternative to the Munich Agreement was for Hitler to execute Fall Grun and seize the whole of Czechoslovakia by force at once, as he originally intended. He would certainly have succeeded, and revisionist claims that the Czechs could have won are disproved by the mere fact that the Czechs chose not to resist at all. They had a well-equipped modern army about the size of Germany's and many times larger than Britain's, but they had no intention of using it. Their fabled border defences were many years from completion, were much less formidable than the Maginot Line (itself useless) and there was no plan at all for what to do if the enemy broke through. In addition, Hungary and Poland would probably have joined in, to take the pieces of territory they had their eyes on, and the Soviets were not going to help because neither Hungary, Poland nor Romania would allow the Red Army through -- and in any case the Red Army, mid-purge, would have had some difficulty fighting its way out of the average wet brown paper bag.

We don't need to speculate on what the Anglo-French plan would have been, if Hitler had refused Chamberlain's demands, because we already know. It would have been the plan they drew up in April 1939 after Hitler broke the Munich Agreement and swallowed the rest of Czechoslovakia: they would form a defensive line along the German and Belgian borders and wait for the Germans to make the first move, and this is what they did in September 1939. We also know what Britain would have done a year earlier, at the time of Munich, because it was discussed at a Chiefs of Staff meeting in Downing Street before Chamberlain caught the plane. CIGS Lord Gort VC would send the pre-agreed two divisions (out of the mere five regular divisions that the British Army possessed) to Northern France, and it would take till December 1938 to instal them. No one had done the staffwork with maps and railway plans to see where the troops and their equipment should go or how to get them there.

Churchill's view of Munich -- 'the French with nearly 60 or 70 divisions could certainly have rolled across the Rhine and into the Ruhr' (The Gathering Storm, Cassell 1948, p.311) -- is delusional. Churchill's Francophilia forbade him to see the institutional weakness of the Armee de Terre. They had given up all offensive action in the trauma of 1916, leaving the British to win the war in the mobile 1918 campaign, and they were not going to go on the offensive again. Their sole strategy was to sit on the Maginot Line and, as Lord Gort reported to Chamberlain in December, the Maginot Line, like all fixed defences, was certain to crack. The French, like the Czechs, had no Plan B, once the fixed defences were inevitably breached, except to surrender. Meanwhile, the French Chief of Air Staff, General Vuillemin, stated that the Armee de l'Air was obsolete and mostly unserviceable and that he would require 120 RAF bombers for air support on the first day, another 120 three weeks later, and so on. These bombers would have been the obsolescent Fairey Battles of 1 Group, which were functionally useless and could not survive without strong fighter escort -- and the RAF had no modern operational fighters in 1938.

Adolf Hitler, dictating his thoughts to Martin Bormann in early 1945 (see Richard Overy, Why The Allies Won, Pimlico, London, 2006, ISBN 978 1845950651, pp.386-7), concluded that Munich was his downfall. 'The start of his troubles Hitler traced back to the Munich crisis of 1938. He regretted his failure to keep his nerve and conquer Czechoslovakia in defiance of Britain and France. He was convinced that had he done so the west would have backed away, German domination of the Continent would have become fact and the great war to the east could have been postponed until Germany was thoroughly prepared... Munich was the fault of Neville Chamberlain, "who really intended to wage ruthless war against us." '

Which Chamberlain did, in a way. On 10 November 1938 his Secretary of State for Air, Sir Kingsley Wood, announced to the Commons RAF Expansion Scheme M, due for completion in March 1942, with a home-based Metropolitan Air Force of 163 squadrons comprising 2,549 front-line aircraft including 50 Fighter Command squadrons and an all-heavy Bomber Command of 85 squadrons. (John Terraine, The Right of the Line, Sceptre, London, 1985, ISBN 0-340-41919-9, p.70) The manufacturers were already at work on the 1936 bomber specification which, by 1942, would produce the Lancaster. Wood announced that Scheme M would require production of 3,700 fighters (allowing for attrition and reserves), and orders were immediately placed for half this total. Most of them would be Spitfires. When Air Chief Marshal Sir Hugh Dowding, C-in-C Fighter Command, heard about Munich, he spoke two words: 'Thank God.' (Leo McKinstry, Spitfire, John Murray, London, 2007, ISBN 978-0-7195-6875-6, p.96) And the rest, really, seriously, is history.

Most modern criticism of 'appeasement' stems from the United States. This is due to bad conscience. And, if you consider what the US was actually doing about Hitler in 1938 -- with Ford Germany and GM Opel building his army trucks, and DuPont and Standard Oil supplying him with fuel and building the ethyl and synthetic-fuel plants that would power the Blitzkrieg, and IBM supplying and manning the information systems that would enable the registration of Jews and the administration of the death camps (and, even at the height of the war, IBM were still doing that, and Ford and GM were still making those trucks, and the Focke-Wulf company under American ownership was making Fw190 fighters and Fw200 maritime patrol bombers, all for American profit, and post-war American governments paid such companies enormous sums in compensation for bomb damage) -- it's richly ironic. Khamba Tendal (talk) 18:12, 3 September 2018 (UTC)

Britain and France didn't side with Nazi Germany.

So what exactly was Munich Agreement then? Britain and France could just sit on their hands and do nothing. Instead they signed agreement with Germany according to which Germany was entitled to invade and occupy a part of Czechoslovakia.

He would certainly have succeeded, and revisionist claims that the Czechs could have won are disproved by the mere fact that the Czechs chose not to resist at all.

Over 100 KIA and over 2000 MIA Czechoslovak personnel in the weeks leading up to the Munich Agreement. Please go spit on someone elses' graves.

there was no plan at all for what to do if the enemy broke through

There were two additional lines of defense set up inland behind the border defense line. Major arms factories were moved further inland during the 1930s (including Česká Zbrojovka Uherský Brod, which is nowadays one of the world's largest small arms manufacturers, larger than Colt or Heckler & Koch).

In addition, Hungary and Poland would probably have joined in

Hungary and Poland DID join in, and they did it precisely because of the Munich Agreement. This is the stategically most important part of the Munich Agreement. As Britain and France sided with Germany, Poland and Hungary followed. German military command even gave order to let Polish forces take areas designated for German occupation with no resistance in case that happened.

Look at the map to understand why Hungary and Poland joining in with Germany was strategically more imporant than the Britain's and France's steps. Read upon 1930s European politics to understand why that would not happen without Munich Agreement.

Soviets were not going to help

Czechoslovak defense plans were not based on Soviet direct involvement, merely on deliveries of goods through Romania.

Neville Chamberlain, "who really intended to wage ruthless war against us."

If this is truly your argument, I must ask whether you also suffer from years of drugs abuse induced delirium like Hitler did in 1945. Cimmerian praetor (talk) 07:57, 4 September 2018 (UTC)

The only alternative to the Munich Agreement was for Hitler to execute Fall Grun and seize the whole of Czechoslovakia by force at once, as he originally intended. He would certainly have succeeded.

In 1938 the Chief of the German General Staff Ludwig Beck and his conspirators were convinced that a war with France, Soviet, Britain, and Czechoslovakia could only end in Germany's defeat.

Beck's plan was to arrest Hitler and try him either as a traitor or have him committed to a mental institution.

This group contacted the British Foreign Office and advised the United Kingdom to issue a stern warning against Germany should Germany move against Czechoslovakia.

Instead of issuing such a warning, Britain and France signed away the territorial integrity of a sovereign state and called the agreement "Peace with Honor" and "Peace in our Time".

(every third tank used in the invasion of France was built at the Škoda ironworks in Czechoslovakia.)

Under such circumstances, it was impossible to arrest the successful dictator on the grounds that he was mad, and the coup with the best chances of success did not take place.--Posp68 (talk) 10:33, 9 September 2018 (UTC)

to execute Fall Grun and seize the whole of Czechoslovakia by force at once, as he originally intended. He would certainly have succeeded

Well first of all Fall Grun was based on the presumption that Czechoslovakia will be caught off guard. Not only Czechoslovak spies were providing the country with plans of invasion since 1937, but by the time of the signing of the Munich Agreement Czechoslovakia already declared full mobilization, manned border defenses and was generally gearing up. There was no planning in Fall Grun for such a situation

Second of all, we simply don't know how successful German army could be - as long as Poland and Hungary would stay out of the invasion (which they did only as a direct result of Munich Agreement - neither would dare without it). Germany had two key advantages: aerial superiority and fifth column presented by the ethnic Germans in Czechoslovakia. However planes would face heavy countermeasures from ground and those ethnic Germans they could most count on were by that time already within Germany (all those were low-rank soldiers - defection rate among ethnic German officers in Czechoslovak army was next to non-existent). Germany lacked when it came both to armor (their tanks were unable to make it on their own to Vienna - and that on roads - as part of Anschluss celebrations) as well as heavy weaponry (canons) and especially machine guns - Czechoslovakia had several times more machineguns than Germany.

Those machine guns proved especially useful in the war that was taking place from 17 September up to the Munich agreement - in every skirmish where they were used they were essential in defeating numerically superior German forces (armed mostly with rifles and sub-machineguns).

Maybe Germany would prevail in actual fight. Maybe Prague would stand down following heavy arial bombardment (I don't think so). Maybe Czechoslovakia would become Germany's Finland. The fact is that we will never know. Because when the time came for UK and France to choose between sitting on their hands and dishonor, they chose dishonor.

Which led Hungary and Poland to act like vultures and join Germany in its invasion of Czechoslovakia. (I come from Polish occupied territory. Essentialy, a state of lawlesness - arson, theft, rape - ensued during that time to the point that later German occupation was considered with much of a relief). Cimmerian praetor (talk) 21:24, 10 September 2018 (UTC)

Excuse me, especially Hungary "did not act like vultures" and did not "join Germany in its invasion of Czechoslvakia". Moreover, rejected the German demands to take military actions together or even to maintain complete annihilation and i.e. resettle the historical Hungarian-Polish border. Hitler's philosophy was in order to gain something or more, you have to take part in the military actions, and had severe debates with the representants of Hungary regarding by the diplomatic affairs heavily criticizing Hungary's unwillingness to take severe steps. That's why only the "last minute" in an appendix was settled of the agreement that territorial disputes may be settled by mutual negotiations, but no guarantees, nothing more. By the First Vienna Award, Hungary would have gained less territories if it would up to be only to the Germans.(KIENGIR (talk) 22:26, 11 September 2018 (UTC))

So what exactly did Hungary demand in the note send to the Czechoslovak government on 22 September 1938, at the time when German units were already conducting cross border operations into Czechoslovakia and pressure was mounting to accept the demands raised by Britain and France to secede borderlands to Germany? Cimmerian praetor (talk) 15:28, 18 September 2018 (UTC)

On that day, the Hungarian ambassador of Prague asked the Czechoslovak government the handover of Hungarian-inhabited territories or a plebiscite to be held.(KIENGIR (talk) 17:52, 18 September 2018 (UTC))

KIENGIR, Hungary did not rejected "the German demands" (in general). In the long-term, she collaborated with Nazi Germany with the goal of the "historic revision" and at some moment she was for the common attack and at another moment she was against it, taking into account the contemporary situation and her own interests. "Hungary would have not gained less territories if it would up to be only to the Germans", please read (at least) contemporary diplomatic documents; published e.g. by Ladislav Deak, The First Vienna Award - Documents I-III. Hungary originally demanded much more than she received. Ditinili (talk) 19:28, 18 September 2018 (UTC)

Ditinili,

1. I did not say that ""the German demands" (in general)" would be rejected, I said what were specifically rejected

2. I did not say "in a long-term she would not collaborate with nazi Germany with the goal of the "historic revision"" or "that she would not taking into account the contemporary situation and her own interests", I said what happened. If she was to be a common attack is dubious, however we already discussed this case once, I know your opinion, there is no need to repeat.

3. I think I know very well the situation, you probably misunderstood what I was reffering since what you have written in the last two sentences has not any connection or does not annihilate/contradict what i have said. Now I noticed, you cited me improperly because you insterted one word to my statement:

--> My original statement: "Hungary would have gained less territories if it would up to be only to the Germans"

--> Your citation: "Hungary would have not gained less territories if it would up to be only to the Germans"(KIENGIR (talk) 19:32, 19 September 2018 (UTC))

On this day, 80 years ago, Hitler told during meeting with Chamberlein that secession of the borderalands will not do. He demanded that Czechoslovakia must be dismantled as a state, and that its territory to be distributed to neighboring countries. Later in the evening, after general Czechoslovak mobilization, Hitler called Chamberlein and said that borderlands will do fine.

In his daytime demand, Hitler was knowingly counting on the fact that Poland and Hungary would be eager to take their part in taking Czechoslovakia apart. Poland actually gave order on 22nd to a terror cell "K7" which it established & armed to attack Czechoslovak strongpoints (200 members conducted 25 attacks) and on 23rd to soldiers of "Legion Zaolzie" to cross border and attack Czechoslovak units (LZ had 1700 soldiers, it is not clear how many crossed; meanwhile Polish army was station in battle formations along the Czechoslovak border).

Please describe in points what was Hungary doing at this time and how you understand that conduct to be anything other than vulturious. Cimmerian praetor (talk) 19:14, 22 September 2018 (UTC)

Your presentation of the events is a bit "summarized", not necessarily following a cause-effect implication. Especially, in the article is already described what happened on that discussion with Chamberlain and according to that, he already decided to accept the transfer of German-inhabited territories before the Czech mobilization, and after it also officially, so it is dubious to put on the condition of the Czech mobilization.

"In his daytime demand, Hitler was knowingly counting on the fact that Poland and Hungary would be eager to take their part in taking Czechoslovakia apart." -> this is your statement, the facts are totally different, regarding Hungary the opposite is true, since Hitler already new Hungary won't do any anything.

Finally, you accuse/state about a vulturious behavior, also previously stating things about Hungary that are not true or did not happen, I already refuted these. However, the depth of the discussion an arguments may lead to a very little abstraction level, let's try with these points for now:

1. 21 August 1938. - German-Hungarian meeting on a top diplomatic level. Despite the friendly initiatives, the negotitations went cold since Hungary made an agreement with the states of the Little Entente that their respect their mutual rights of weaponry and their development and they will ignore any violence with each other. Ribbentrop told to Kánya that with this practically Hungary lost any chance of revision towards Czechoslovakia. Ribbentrop asked what Hungary would do in case the Germans would act againt the Czech provocations, Kánya said that they would not act and cannot risk any military conflict or any action without secruing i.e. the Yugoslavian border, anyway the Hungarian military was having poor condition, etc. When Horthy tried to persuade Hitler not to do any military intervention, he became very angry, an he accused Horthy provocating his military commanders against him. The negotiatons failed, the Germans was dissatisfied the revisionist Hungary won't take part in any common action against Czechoslovakia.

2. 15 September 1938. - Sir Geoffrey Knox, English Ambassador to Hungary was asked by Kánya that in Czechoslovakia plebiscite should be held on the Hungarian inhabited territories.

3. 18 September 1938. - Barcza, Hungarian ambasador to London demanded a plebiscite or transfer of the Hungarian inhabited territories.

4. 20 September 1938. - Hitler asked Kánya and Imrédy and demanded Hungary to participate crushing Czechslovakia. Hungary refused, they only would do that in written they describe their demands in order to support the negotiations with Chamberlain.

5. 22 September 1938. - János Wettstein, the Hungarian ambassador of Prague asked the Czechoslovak government the handover of Hungarian-inhabited territories or a plebiscite to be held.

6. 24 September 1938. - After Kánya complained to Knox that they would accept the uncodintional retransfer of territories to Germany that were subject to the Czech crown for more hunderd years, they are reluctant regarding thousand-year old Hungarian territories that are only 20 years under Czech occupation, Lord Halifax indicated after the arrangement of the Sudeten crisis, the Hungarian demands may be also discussed.

7. During the conference Hitler stated he will only care about the German question, nothing else, even the query of Lord Halifax regarding also the case of Hungary on 29 September, Hitler, the French and English prime did not wish to negotiate on that. Only beucase of the Hungarian diplomatic efforts to Italy, Mussolini made finally an appendix to be agreed that the respective sides should arrange their argues during negotiations.

So you can see only diplomatic efforts had been carried out, Hitler could not count on anything, Poland's case is another story. However, Hitler's anger did not stop with this, when negotitions started on the prelude of the forthcoming First Vienna Arbitration later, he even rejected the negotiation of the representants of the Hungarian govenrment due to his dissatisfaction regarding the Czechoslovak question and pointed another politican, the former prime, Darányi, the only person te be negotiated...this negotitation went also wrong, that Hitler became so angry on Hungarians that he left psyched out after an approx. 45 minutes argue & monologue and Ribbentrop had to continue the negotiations, etc. That's why I pointed out, regarding the Munich agreement, as well the Vienna Award only the Italy showed more understanding, etc.(KIENGIR (talk) 21:19, 23 September 2018 (UTC))

Thank you for taking the time with this lengthy answer. But still, if we dumb it down, the short version is that Hungary was demanding secession of part of Czechoslovak territory at the time when both German and Polish forces were already crossing the border into Czechoslovakia (Freikorps and SS in case of Germany, Legion Zaolzie in case of Poland) and the state was effectively in state of war, albeit with low-level hostilities.

That meant that strategically, Czechoslovakia had to reserve part of its forces to defend around the Hungarian border. It is nice that Hungary refused German demands for direct military intervention (as you claim), but their political and diplomatic steps changed very little as regards threat of war being waged by Czechoslovak army command.

BTW, 80 years ago today, Czechoslovak army command concluded that there is no strategic option as regards defending country alongside its entire border, and demanded that the government secures Polish neutrality, even if it meant ceding part of the territory. Cimmerian praetor (talk) 13:10, 25 September 2018 (UTC)

A short overview:

* The Hungary had a complex revisionist strategy focused on the destruction of Czechoslovakia.

* This was a prerequisite to restore her rule over Slovakia. The Hungary openly repeatedly declared this territorial claim to her German, Polish and Italian partners.

* She should avoid such statements toward Western powers. So, she pretended claims on the ethnic Hungarian/mixed southern territories. However, this was just as a tactical step and a contemporary propaganda.

* In the pre-Munich period, she felt unprepared to the open military attack (in fact, she was not ready) and she considered such adventure to be to dangerous. She did not exclude this option in general, but she tried to temporize. E.g. just 2 years ago, Horthy declared that Czechoslovakia is the cancer tumor, which should be removed. This unreliable approach outraged Hitler and he temporarily dropped of Hungary from his strategy.

* In the post-Munich period, she exploited the situation and benefited from the First Vienna award. The award was not understood as a final solution, but a preparation for further expansion/aggression. However, Hitler had no real interest to strengthen Hungary too much. He just needed to break Czechoslovakia and to support his further aggression.

P.S.: the opinion that Slovakia is "only 20 years under Czech occupation" (occupation? sic!) was typical for the contemporary revisionist ideology and the rejection of reality. Ditinili (talk) 14:13, 25 September 2018 (UTC)

Cimmerian praetor,

no problem, things has to be discussed after all. I have to refuse again your conlusion that Hungary would be "effectively in state of war", it is totally false, and her situation cannot be compared of Germany or Poland. The fact that Hungary was dissatisfied with the new border arrangement was not a new thing, it was known since 1920 openly, diplomatic efforts cannot be confused anything else, such efforts have been done by plenty of states before or after, it is nothing extraordinary (and also don't forget that plebiscite was demanded with the conjuction or). Your next pharagraph is your own conclusion, it does not change anything on the situation that is not "my claim", I just listed historical facts.

Ditinili, some reactions, the following order you listed the information:

1, Hungary had revisionist strategies since 1920 for almost all the territories she lost, the main thing is what type of solution she would support in case (as every country had such and not just who lost something). What is relevant what happened in the end.

2, This was one possible alternative, but this had also more screenplays, since some hoped Slovakia with autonomy would better chose to be with Hungary, regardless how far such aims it was from the reality.

3. This is your opinion or the Czechoslovak/Slovak opinion. The outcome did not support this theory, since with a proper agreement with Hitler Hungary could annex Slovakia and Croatia either, but Horthy both resigned on this.

4. It is true, but such plans every country have for every situation, this is how diplomacy work, what is relevant even when it would be the chance and support, this option was ignored. The opinion of the Czechoslovak state does not change anything on this, before and after it was considered by many as a non-viable state, since 1920.

5. Again, this is your opinion or the Czechoslovak/Slovak opinion. Hungary exploited much less that she could achieve pre or pro Munich. However, some "benefit" was obvious due the large number of Hungarians in Czechoslovakia. The fact Hungary was prepared - regarding all of his neighbors - for possible recovering her fomer territories is nothing extraordinary, this was true for almost every countries on that time, again what is relevant what happened in the end. Yes, the German leadership considered that Hungary even gained much also with other territorial arrangements, and with the chance of further revisions kept motivated i.e. Hungary and Romania and created a rivalry.

P.S. - I think to ride on words regarding contemporary diplomatic disussions that were not opened to the public necessarily is useless here, as well you could say "Czech" would be inproper since "Czechoslovak" would be better, etc. It cannot be compared with the "rejection of reality", since the Czech Army occupied the territory, and later Czechoslovakia was formed, of course there is a difference between a simple occupation or a legally recognized state, here we met on rather a kind of negative euphemism, that are again common in diplomatic discussions, as also today neighboring countries speak about occupation regarding Hungary in some cases but they ignore to speak about the real legal situation. However, maybe Kánya's words should have been translated better to rule/dominion, sorry, but you have to see that regardless of informalized language of discussion it would not mean Kánya or Hungary would not recognize Chechoslovakia.(KIENGIR (talk) 20:31, 25 September 2018 (UTC))

I will not catch up on your bait with the occupation, but let's open another question.

Czech part of the border was set alongside the border of Kingdom of Bohemia that existed throughout the Austrian domination as a separate administrative entity, albeit not with the level of independence that Hungary enjoyed. That was true both as regards the ethnic-German minority territory as well as the area contested by Poland - where Poland actually received larger part of territory after the French diplomatic intervetion in 1919 (Duchy of Těšín was part of Czech kingdom since 14th century).

So the logic behind the Czech border is clear. The border was always there, and in 1918 it was reinstated as an independent country that it was not ever since losing in the 30 years war. With the exception of Silesia that Habsburgs had lost to Prussia and which had always been more losely connected to the Czech Crown.

KIENGIR, what was the logic behind setting up of Slovak-Hungarian border in 1918 and in what way does your understanding differe from it? Cimmerian praetor (talk) 08:53, 26 September 2018 (UTC)

If I understand you correctly, you have not any real objections against my summary. You only say that a) the Hungary had the similar policy also toward other countries b) you believe that what she did was somehow standard and common diplomatic practice c) only what happened at the end does matter d) Horthy resigned on such policy. Of course, the expansionist policy focused on the elimination of the neighboring country (in addition, in the close collaboration with other totalitarian states) is not something common, usual and "what every country do" , something standard among "several screenplays" or "nothing extraordinary". We should also avoid cherry-picking, e.g. to make references exclusively to such events that show how Hungary "refused" the aggression against Czechoslovakia. Because the statements like "Horthy resigned on something" are not true. He did not "resigned", but temporized. Thus, I cannot agree with the claims like "only what happened at the end does matter", but we should properly describe the goals, the plans and the tools used by key players (including e.g. state sponsored terrorism, etc). "At the end", the occupation of the whole Slovakia was not realized because of the "resignation" on this goal, but because of unwillingness of Germany.

Add. to the alleged Czech "occupation", "dominance", "rule", etc. According to the contemporary propaganda, Slovakia was literally occupied (in the negative sense) by Czechs. Slovaks even could not express their opinion and wish to return to the Kingdom of Hungary (allegedly). Yes, some Hungarians representatives had a serious problem with the interpretation of the events in Czechoslovakia. I guess that by the "Czech Army" you mean Czechoslovak legions organized by Slovak Milan Rastislav Štefánik and operating with the explicit permission and request of the Slovak National Council. Kanya probably missed that the First Czechoslovak Republic was a democratic country ruled by the government coalitions (including parties like Bund der Landwirte, Deutsche Christlichsoziale Volkspartei or Hlinkova slovenská ľudová strana) and not by "Czechs". Ditinili (talk) 12:20, 26 September 2018 (UTC)

Cimmerian praetor,

first of all I have to refuse that anything would be "my bait", not I was the one who put on more importance in it.

Secondly in 1918 not any "Slovak-Hungarian border" were set up. In 1920, by the Treaty of Trianon a border was set between a new state, Czechoslvakia and the Kingdom of Hungary having that this newly formed state included territores from the former Kingdom of Hungary, according to her subdivison, Slovakia and Subcarpathian Ruthenia respectively. "Logic" I don't see in a way, or i could ask on who's viewpoint? The new borders were set imporperly, since approx. 1 million Hungarians remained in Czechoslovakia although the borders could be easily drawn having these people remained in Hungary, since the majority was en masse compact and continous with the Hungarian inhabited territories. So by this way I don't see any logic. On the other side, Czechoslovakia had further official demands, including further territories (i.e. of present-day north eastern Hungary, or present-day Western-Hungary, having a corridor with Yugoslavia), although those region were inhabited by the majority of Hungarians and this way Czechoslovakia would have had approx. 2 or 2,5 million Hungarians included. So I can conclude the claims were not based on sanity or reality, but to take the maximum possible and weaken Hungary the most possible. So the Treaty of Trianon finally did not support all the insane demands, but still was not correct since it left approx. 3 million Hungarians outside the borders, although majority were adjacent to the Hungarian inhabited territories as referred earlier, only with one exception of Székely Land, as between the mixed Hungarian-Romanian inhabited territories were significant. So, Hungary sought a solution and revision of this arrangement, a more truthful and correct one.

Ditinili,

I don't think you would understand me correctly entirely, also I don't support cherrypicking, not I am the one who is doubting some things, I just reacted in a demonstrative way. My objections of your summary can be read above. Moreover:

a, I said that the policy and the sought for revision was clear, as it was common for all the countries who had losses. However, Even Czechoslovakia, Romania and Yugoslavia had further territorial claims towards Hungary that cannot be called revision, buth further expansion, i.e.

b, same as a, it is not my "believe", these are facts.

c, In any sane context we can operate and judge the things what happened, not contemplating of various strategies or possible plans in any situation, since every country everytime in history having these allegedly or non-allegedly, since this is how inner-outer diplomacy is working, as the sun is shining. Every country in any time has i.e. at least 10 prepared plans if any "hic rebus stantibus" would change, come on.

d, It is fact, that Horthy resigned on that cases what I referred, when it was the chance or it was offered. "Temporization" is your opinion, we'll never know in an alternate history line what would have happened exactly. Most of the countries - as I reffered - had an expansionist policy, some countries had a irredentist/revisionist policy, and anyway "what every country do" still goes to point c. That is another question what would have been fulfilled in an alternate history line. It is marginal if collaboration based on totalitaran states or not, since both side (i.e. Axis and Allies) collaborated with such.

If we would describe all possible claims, goals or outcomes than we could expland all the history books and as well WP with long-long contemplations of hyphotetic outcomes with at least a double space, but I don't see why they would be necessary, since we can judge real happenings, not speculations. Regarding "...but because of unwillingness of Germany..." is again possibly your opinion, a kind of speculation we cannot judge like "yes or no".

Add, First of all I am not Kánya and don't put his words in my mouth or make it equal with my point, so there is nothing "I mean" or similar. However, I don't think Kánya missed anything or would not know the situation, you are again riding on something that has really not any serious weight, in a private diplomatic discussion, where people not necessarily use the formal and official language and they maintain negative euphemism, he probably wanted to express the Czech dominance in a way.(KIENGIR (talk) 19:55, 26 September 2018 (UTC))

a) and b) The First Czechoslovak Republic had no territorial claims toward Hungary. She signed the peace treaty and did not plan any further aggression, expansion, etc. And surely, she did not form any coalition to completely eliminate some of her neighbors, like Hungary and Germany did.

c) and d) We do not talk about any alternative history. "In any sane context" the country which (allegedly) resigned on something will not perform activities to achieve her goal. The statement that he resigned "on that cases" what you referred is absolutely essential (because it was too risky at the particular moment). We should NOT ignore further activities. And no, it is not marginal, if she collaborated with the totalitarian states to achieve her goals. It is a notable fact, that the states that were notorious civil and minority rights offenders used this pretext to eliminate another state. Also, it says a lot about the priorities of the contemporary revisionist ideology and the Hungarian political representation. Don't take it personally.

Add.: it was not something declared only on the private meeting and without "any serious weight", but the long term and intentional propaganda, distributed by Hungary even in Slovakia. If you do not believe me, I can upload photos of such propagandistic materials. Ditinili (talk) 08:51, 27 September 2018 (UTC)

Ditinili,

a,b, Well, I've met with territorial demands dated to 1921 that were not identical with those that was shown in the Paris Peace Treaties. Such statement that Hungary would form a colation to eliminate other countries are vague and overexaggerated, especially we should not mix or confuse with open German declarations for such. Hungary first of all struggled to a more truthful border arrangement, and regardless Czechoslovakia was not considered the perfect state especially becuase of the large minorities included, her efforts openly and primarily was for the revision, not with other aims, it had not any connection how the other state is named or called.

c,d, Here again I see some possible personal POVs included, like "too risky" or something, as such could be stated for any country where judgements with reflections are made in any situation. Horthy declared by his resignation to include Croatia that he is interested of the revision of Hungarian inhabited territories, not because it would be "too risky". Anyway we should remain in the scope of the article, I disagree with other approaches. The statement regarding "notorious civil and minority rights offenders" and "pretexts" seems again a speculative generalization, the same could be also understood to the states you would consider probably as a "victim". Back to totaliatarianism, I am convinced it is irrelevant, since in this context countries involved in any sides collaborated with such states, thus I see it just again a trial of identify some states in a more negative manner as they are and with this to undermine their goals or render a negative evaulation of those, regardless of the original motivation.

Add.: as I just said, I was the one who demonstrated some open considerations of the Czech-Slovak relations, so this is not needed, it's not about my belief, I heard and met both sides of the coin in this context.(KIENGIR (talk) 20:26, 27 September 2018 (UTC))

Kiengir, Germany and Hungary conspired against the existence of Czechoslovakia. The German goal was the annexation of the Czech Lands, Hungary should annex whole Slovakia and Ruthenia. This is supported by numerous preserved and published documents. So, there is nothing "vague and overexaggerated". To my alleged "POV" that she simply considered it to be too risky in August 1938 and to your statement that she allegedly resigned on this goal:

August 1938:

On 25 August the attack was again delayed, althouth it was felt that France would only support Czechoslovakia if she could be sure of British help. By then it had become clear that Hungary would not join the attack unless Yugoslavia remained neutral. Horthy had told Hitler on a visit on 21-26 August that Hungary had only just begun to rearm and needed one or two year to reach full strength. Afrer Ribbentrop had assured Horthy that Czechoslovakia's allies (France, Britain, Yugoslavia and Romania) would not support her, Horthy agreed to tak part but would not be ready before 1 October. (...) There also German-Hungarian discussion at Kiel, where Hitler promissed Upper Slovakia to Hungary if the two countries jointly attacked Czechoslovaia. But Hungary was worried about possible action by the Little Entente in the event of a German-Czechoslovak war.

September 1938

Hungary had recently annouced a large military budget and had desighns on the whole of Slovakia and the Ruthene area. If Hungary got these, it would block German eastward expansion. There was also the danger, from Hitler's point of view if Hungary gained the Ruthene terriory...

Crowhurst, Patric: A History of Czechoslovakia Between the Wars: From Versailles to Hitler's Invasion, 978-1780763439 (https://www.amazon.com/History-Czechoslovakia-between-Wars-International/dp/1780763433 ), the same in Deak Ladislav: Hungary's game for Slovakia: [Slovakia in Hungarian politics in the years 1933-1939]. where the complete summary and deep analysis of the strategy of all keyplayers is published. So, it is obviously not my "personal POV" and to your statement about a "resignation" is not true.

Totaliarism is not "irrelevant" or a "trial of identify some states in a more negative manner as they are". It is very relevant to mention, who were these "protectors" of minority rights in Czechoslovakia (Germany and Hungary), how they respected self-determination right of other nations, what were their goals, etc. Obviously, these activities are not something what "every country does", such statements are absolutely inappropriate. As you can see from the quotes above (and numerous contemporary documents), these activities can be described as (i) Planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances; (ii) Participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the acts mentioned under (i). --Ditinili (talk) 07:39, 28 September 2018 (UTC)

Ditinili, I see you still overexaggerated as well in you initial sentence, since i.e. having revision of some former Hungarian territories does not necessarily mean that Czechoslovakia would not exist. However, thank for the statements you presented it perfectly described however Germans pushed Hungary to participate, but Hungary resigned and quit, with several and different arguments in mutual diplomatic negotiations. It could be read next to those presentations I provided, Kiel was the place when German-Hungarian relations became cold. The other citation is again an opinion of someone else, a possible deduction as multiple deduction exist in order to explain the events.

My statement on resignation is true, since Hungary did occupy and annex the "whole Slovakia". Hungary was not a totalitarian state, and such accusations that would criticize Hungary would not respecting self-determination right of other nations would be a comedy, since beucase this was heavily not respected in the Treaty of Trianon, and also regarding the Germany minority in the Treaty of Versailles, the whole misunderstanding and motivation of the events was this. Obviously every country struggles in such situation for a solution to her minorities, of course, maybe those don't do that necessarily who were not subject to heavily injust treaties where ethnic populations without plebiscite or taking into their wish was put into other countries against their will. Also your last sentence seems a trial if you would be the charge in front of the court, I see it exaggerated also, since i.e. Hungary's goal was to avoid war as much as possible, you include the word "aggression" continously in a stigmative way, and if we speak of the "violation of agreements and assurances" that goes heavily ot the Paris Treaties after WWI as I referred above (to say nothing of those listed "punitive terms" could be also told those countries and entities that attacked Hungary then). A bit weasel words that seems to identify Czechoslovakia as the state of perfectness of legitimation, democracy, minority rights, a heaven, and Hungary the bad, evil aggressor, violator, warmonger who regardless what she does or say, anyway, she is evil and will be evil...no way, much more objectivity is needed and not to fall neither or harsh i.e. Hungarian or Slovak POVs regarding the subject, but balanced information and if needed, to represent both sides of the coin.(KIENGIR (talk) 22:13, 28 September 2018 (UTC))

It's not clear which war Hungary tried to avoid as much as possible, because Czechoslovakia did not plan any offensive war against her.

However:

At a meeting with Hitler at Berchtesgarden in August 1936 Horthy revived the idea of the joint attack on Czecho-Slovakia under the pretext of "removing a cancerous ulcer from the hearth of Europe". The Hungarian leader wrote: "I am convicted that our hope is well-founded, since sooner or later the blow will come and then we should occupy the whole territory of Slovakia, ... (Deak, L.: Hungary's Game for Slovakia, p. 38)

A few months later, the prime minister of Prusssia, Goring, on the occasion of the funeral of Gy. Gombos, assured Hungarian politicians that "the desctruction of the republic would present no problems (ibid p. 37)

On 12th March 1938, when H. Goring, prime minister of Prussia and associate of Hitler, informed the Hungarian ambassador in Berlin that Czecho-Slovakia came next in the queue after Austria (ibid p. 47)

On May 1938 János Esterházy wrote a report for the Hungarian government about the information he obtained from Konrad Henlein. Hitler informed Henlein that Germany is planing to annex whole Czechia and Slovakia will be given to Hungary. (Segeš D. (ed), Slovakia and the Slovak question in Polish and Hungarian documents (1938–1939), p. 181, document no. 50). Note, that both leaders of Czechoslovak minorities were well informed what's going on.

It has been also proven that your statement that Horthy allegedly rejected the German offer in August 1938 was at least inaccurate, because he promised to participate. Hungary considered also other solutions, but: "Therefore, the Hungarian government kept to its previous position, which it formulated on 17.9.1938 in the words: "Prepared for battle, we will await a favorauble moment for intervention, but will not start at the same time as a German attack, and even less before it". (Ibid, p. 77) "This position clearly shows that the Hungarian government did not exclude military intervention against Czecho-Slovakia, but wanted to decide for itself the time of attack which would be most favorauble for Hungary and least risky". (Ibid, p. 77).

Of course, the Hungarian tactic varried. For example, on the 25th May 1938, Beck asked Kánya several times, how do Hungary imagine a new border after the break-up of Czechoslovakia. Kánya answered that "Hungary claims her historic borders". As Jorg Hoensch says: "the Hungarian government absolutely naively expected, that Slovakia and Carpathian Ruthenia will be occupied by Polish units and then transferred to Hungary without any compensation". Hoesch, Jorg K: Slovakia and Hitler's Eastern Politicy, p. 45 (SK translation). Or a "peacefull solution" - the internal desintegration of Czechoslovakia supported by Hungary by several steps such as the instruction for leaders of HU minority to follow a German strategy - to raise their demands that it would be impossible for the Czechoslovak government to achieve any agreement, state sponsored terrorism, etc.

As you can see, the statement that Germany and Hungary conspired against the existence of Czechoslovakia is not exaggerated.

You say that it would be a comedy to say that contemporary Hungary (or let's say her representatives) did not respect the self-determination right of other nations. What about the self-determination right of Czechs who were planned to be put under the Nazi rule, the self-determination right of Slovaks or the self-determination right of Ruthenians (anyway, Carpathian Ruthenia was later occupied by Hungary).--Ditinili (talk) 08:17, 6 October 2018 (UTC)

Regarding your additions, I did not really met with anything new. There were many opinions/possibilities, and what I said holds, since the Germans were rejected, Hungary did not join them. As it seems your struggle is to support that thing that has been already discussed and pinpointed, that in diplomacy there are several plans for several situations, as is it valid for every country in the world, the same for Hungary, as it is useless to emphasize the Czechoslovakia state was not considered a viable state, etc., nobody denied it. What counts is the outcome. As well, the trigger what we may call a "conspiration", then you may tell this really about every country that participated in the Munich Agreement, however, Hungary's revisional aims were clear from 1920 after the heavily injust treaty, thus to call it as a real, bloody "conspiration" is dubious by many poins of views. Such way also it could be said the members of the Little Antant conspirated all the time against Hungary etc. Regarding your last sentence, you mention such things in that were not even known or expected or happened, you have and advantage since you know all the events what really happened from the future, thus you cannot condemn anyone who could not be able to do that and were living in the past. Btw, I don't know what would be Hungary's invonvelment of the self-determination right of the Czech's, since Hungary did not limitate or intervened in such. Regarding the Slovaks, Hungary recognized the new Slovak state. Regarding the Ruthenians, true Hungary did not enact the provisional autonomy, but again, by creating Czechoslovakia without plebiscite with almost as many foreign ethnicities that are almost equal in number with Czech or Slovaks even any accusation cannot be taken seriously, since every arrangement was far more truthful and fair than before - yes, one possible exeption could be the case of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia - but again, these happenings are far after the Munich Agreement, thus they does not belong here and are not reference for any claims back in time.(KIENGIR (talk) 11:48, 7 October 2018 (UTC))

As you can see from the quotes above, Germans were not rejected at all and Hungary was willing to participate also after the alleged rejection in August 1938 (in fact, her promised to participate). What did happen next? In January 1939 Adolf Hitler and István Csáky agreed that Hungary will wait until the break-up of Czechoslovakia (Deák, L: Hungary's Game for Slovakia, p. 125). Hitler hid his real plan for the break-up for Czechoslovakia, but Hungary was aware that Germany had three alternatives for Slovakia. In March 1939, Hitler dictated the tactic himself. Although Hungarian representatives still dreamed about the Greater Hungary or at least, partitioning of Slovakia between Germany, Hungary and Poland, Hitler ignored any previous promise (ibid). Hungary, surprised by the declaration of "independence" quickly recognized Slovakia, but not because she gave up her plans. Precisely the reverse - she believed that this temporary step is necessary to avoid deeper collaboration between Ludaks and Nazis, otherwise her plans could not be realized. In parallel, she did everything to persuade Germany that the "independent" Slovakia has no value and to save her for Hungary (ibid, 127). You know the rest, Hitler decided for a client state.

Your opinion that Hungary allegedly did not know about a German plan to annex Czechia is untenable. It is clear that this plan was known not only to the Hungarian government, but it was also known to Konrad Henlein and János Esterházy. Segeš, p. 181, document no. 50, dated to 24 May 1938, signed by Janos Vornole, envoye and extraordinary minister, the Hungarian Royal Embassy in Prague. If the problem is in a missing plebiscite, I am curious why did not Hungary organize a plebiscite in Carpathian-Ruthenia, but decided for the occupation? --Ditinili (talk) 21:11, 7 October 2018 (UTC)

....you are circling about continously on some things...again you present some opinions, possibilities, alternatives etc. and excommuinicate them as facts nad/or court sentences. Again, shortly: Hungary rejected the German pleas. Hungary did not join Germany and did not participate in the Munich Agreement, she only presented her claims that were known since almost twenty years and made efforts by diplomatic patterns for the revision.

Putting sentences in my mouth I never said like "Your opinion that Hungary allegedly did not know about a German plan to annex Czechia" are untenable. Moreover, again I don't understand why you wish to involve Hungary in things having no business with, it seems again a kind of negative campaign against Hungary, although such things are really out of scope of the article, All the world knew the open German plans also written in "Mein Kamp" or all the information that secret services or diplomatic affairs could gather, also Pearl Harbor was known before - of course this was not revealed for a long-long time - and million other things, knowing or not knowing is not necessarily a guilt or whatsoever, depends on the context and frame, however I did not made any allegations about this, I just pinpointed that what the heck would be the connection between Czech self-determination and Hungary, since there is not, only in the opposite way as the Czechs did not care about such regarding Hungarians.

For your last question, ask Imrédy or Horthy if you can...btw., how could have been organized a plebiscite i.e. without being present? Seriously, I think in those fragile times, nobody would wait and do just nothing, if Hungary would not make a step, other's would make it, considering the Czech happenings events in 14 March.(KIENGIR (talk) 19:39, 8 October 2018 (UTC))

"you present some opinions, possibilities, alternatives etc". No, I present the real plans, the contemporary policy and the activities of Germany and Hungary. I support my statements by reliable sources.

"Hungary rejected the German pleas". Again, reliable sources (works of recognized authors and published diplomatic documents) do not support this myth.

"he only presented her claims that were known since almost twenty years" Definitely. For almost twenty years, she was unable to accept the formation of Czechoslovakia and dreamed about her "historic borders" (not only about some ethnic border).

"I just pinpointed that what the heck would be the connection between Czech self-determination and Hungary" "The heck", as you can see from the contemporary diplomatic documents, the Hungary had no problem to "sacrifice" Czechs to Nazis just to open an opportunity to annex Slovakia and Carpathian Ruthenia. And in the same time, when leading Hungarian politicians complained on "unjust" ethnic borders, they dreamed about the border near the High Tatras.

However, if you ignore reliable sources, it does not matter to continue.--Ditinili (talk) 07:08, 9 October 2018 (UTC)

- No you present some opinions, possibilities, alternatives, and yes, some plans, some factual and assumed contemporary policies from a narrative of an author. Some may be true, some may be just an assumption, some are some hyphothetic contemplations you added. Anyway, not all your statements are supported by your sources, you interpret things sometimes in a very weird way, even recurrently what I have written and you draw a totally different conclusion that I did not even thought of.

- Sorry, this is not a myth, this a fact and even my and your sources clearly outline that nothing that the Germans actually claimed regarding military intervention from Hungary were fulfilled.

- So you agree. Well, some cases they possibly "dreamed" about historic borders, some cases they possibly would dream about a justful ethnic border. What a thing!

- This is very unprofessional, even having 1000 plans at the time there is no guarantee that one will be surely fullfilled unless you don't have a reliable prophet or did not invented time travel. Hungary had no business or any responsibility, affair regrading the Czechs, Hungary had no involvement on those happenings, seriously you wish to put Hungary's shoulder everything, does she responsible for Poland or anything regarding France, Britain, Spain, the South Americas or the Pacific Ocean? Again, Hungary DID NOT annex Slovakia. Your last sentence is a hyphothetic weird accusation that clearly shows you went heavily offtopic into the ground of alternative speculations. Generally every nation or country would dream anytime their historic borders, but again this is as well out of scope, a basic generalization just to again put Hungarians to be seen negative.

- I did not ignore anything. You are continuing and extending the discussion significantly out of scope as I indicated earlier. If you wish to discuss about such, feel free to do it in my talk page.(KIENGIR (talk) 17:45, 9 October 2018 (UTC))

I don't think that it is necessary. It was already well explained why she did not. Your trials to evaluate "what is just an option" vs. "what is the real policy", "what every country does", "what is just a narrative of the author", seeking similarities between the Little Entente vs. Nazi Germany and Hungary are typical OR. Of course, every my statement is supported by RS. --Ditinili (talk) 22:40, 9 October 2018 (UTC)

Well, agreed that is not necessary anyway, and yes it was well explained what she did or not, but regarding the "why" some may be true, some not, some other are just speculations. I would better call OR some of your statements/deductions and the way you do it, but at least as not really strong neutral point of views. I did not seek any similarity, I just wanted to demonstrate what kind of double measure is applied with some inobjective approaches. I cannot agree with your last sentence, some of your statements are personal deductions and generalizations, especially assuming any responsibility for the actions of Hitler-Tiso-Hácha and blame Hungarians for them would be still amazing.(KIENGIR (talk) 18:30, 10 October 2018 (UTC))

Nobody blames Hungary for the actions of Adolf Hitler. I only said that the Hungarian leaders knew about the plan of their German partners to annex Czechia, they did the same with Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia and they planned to do the same with Slovakia, but failed to do so. All of these statements are well founded. And I did ask how is this contemporary policy compliant with the (alleged) respect of the self-determination right of other nations. Instead of a serious explanation, I read something like "every country does XYZ", "that's how diplomacy works", etc. --Ditinili (talk) 12:48, 11 October 2018 (UTC)

Well, such statement in genereal could not be stated, the possible fate of Carpathian Ruthenia was not preset and there are more alternate theories, some say Hungarian dominion it was not confirmed/supported/wanted from German side, while other state informally that "Hitler allowed it", this is not clear even among Hungarian historians, or at least they don't have a unified view about this. A third version is that Hungary without any external confirmation or negotitation made her own action, that is also generally stated in many sources that some of the population did not even expect Hungarians, but Germans...18 March 1939, the Council of Ministries started to negotiate the outline of the autonomy law. Prime Minister Teleki - as a moral obligation - supported and initiated the territorial autonomy of the nations of Transcarpathia, 23 July 1940 he introduced the bill in the Parliament about the self-goverment of Transcarpathia, but the Honvéd General Staff opposed it due the risky war situation. Imrédy also acknowleged Hungary's promise to Bródy, but said "due to current situation we are redempted morally to fulfill it yet".(KIENGIR (talk) 22:18, 11 October 2018 (UTC))

Hitler allowed it already on 12 March 1939 (2 days before liquidation of Czechoslovakia, Kredatus, J: The policy of the Second Polish Republic and Carpathian Ukraine on the eve of the establishment of the Slovak state, p. 398). You probably want to say that immediately after the occupation (by the state which allegedly respected the self-determination right of other nations), Hungary liquidated the existing autonomy (already granted by §1, C-S Act No. 329/1938 Sb).--Ditinili (talk) 07:41, 12 October 2018 (UTC)

As I reflected, there are many views, your source reinforces one of them. No, I did not said such, anyway the logic fails, since Czechoslovakia did not generally respect the self-determination right of other nations, though it is true finally after near two decades she granted autonomy to Transcarpathia. Since Czechoslvakia ceased to exist already when Hungarians enetered they could not liquidate something that was already non-existent. I wanted to say that immediately they started to plan the autonomy, but unfortunately it had not been carried out.(KIENGIR (talk) 22:28, 12 October 2018 (UTC))

1) The self-determination is held by "peoples" and ethnic and other minorities are not recognized as separate peoples. 2) The contemporary German Nazi and Hungary revisionist policy was not driven by the self-determination right of any group in Czechoslovakia, but by the idea of Lebensraum and Greater Hungary. Especially, they could hardly argue by the "self-determination" after the Munich Agreement and the First Vienna award. 3) The theory that Hungary did not liquidated Ruthenian autonomy, because she occupied the territory and subsequently none autonomy/independence existed is not worth of comment.--Ditinili (talk) 07:58, 16 October 2018 (UTC)

1, ?? I am not sure if I properly understand you...the problem is if the self-determination of any peoples, mostly done by ethnics or other minorities are not recognized...

2, This is not the standalone truth, the concept of Lebensraum is a bit wider regarding Eastern-Europe, mostly considered territories from the Soviet Union, not necessarily territories inhabited by ethnic Germans. Thus Germany's struggled mainly to create a nation state and the Sudeten Germans supported the idea, thus their self-determination was supported. Regarding Hungary similarly, the major and primary goal was to achieve a more truthful arrangement, determining as a minimum that the largely Hungarian inhabited territories should be returned and this as well met with the wish and self-determination of Hungarians. Thus on the contrary, both of the events was in support of self-determination, having a much-much correct result in contrast to the Paris Treaties.

3, You again turn out a little bit what I said again from it's meaning and as well your causation is flawed...the almost two decade drawn out "last minute" autonomy established by Czechoslovakia abolished the same time Czechslovakia did, not Hungary abolished it.(KIENGIR (talk) 11:56, 16 October 2018 (UTC))

1) You should improve your understanding of the self-determination right. 2) Both events were considered by the contemporary German and Hungarian representatives as a preparation for further agression/expansion. Period. 3) Not clear, how Hungary imporoved the situation of Ruthenians and how is this step complaint with the self determination right of other nations. The fact is that Hungary DEPRIVED minority rights below the standard enjoyed during CSR. --Ditinili (talk) 13:31, 16 October 2018 (UTC)

1, No, you are misunderstanding, I don't understand your English or if I understand your English then the sentence that you have written cannot have an accuarate interpretation. 2, This is your opinion, with your recurrent word "aggression" that you use incorrectly sometimes. The primary goal was what I have written earlier, i.e. Hungary's sought for revision was not a "preparation" for anything, but an obvious struggle. 3, What is clear, that Hungary did not encated the promised autonomy, but again, you cannot speak about any "deprive" since Czechoslovakia ceased to exist, anyway your were explained but it seems you don't wish to interpret it properly... The same goes to the step complaint that Czechoslovakia since it's creation was not a nation a state and the self-deterrmination rights of the peoples included were not respected with and exception of the Czechs (Slovaks), etc. As well in this context we have to emphasize the "enjoyment" of Carpathian Ruthenia came very late, not immediately.(KIENGIR (talk) 11:31, 17 October 2018 (UTC))

• Comment: Ahem. This is all very interesting theorizing on what Britain or France should or shouldn't have done. But aren't we supposed to be putting in the article what is stated in the WP:RS rather than substituting our own theories, which is WP:OR? --David Tornheim (talk) 20:33, 27 September 2018 (UTC)

• Comment: The Czech Kingdom of Bohemia and Magraviate of Moravia were historical lands (Crown of Saint Václav - in Latin Wenceslas), they existed with strong kings of House of Přemyslid. The official name in Middle Ages was Čechy, in Latin Bohemia. As a kingdom Čechy, antedates the Germans kingdoms, not excepting Saxony, Bavaria and Prussia. German immigrants have known very well where they settled from the very beginning. Self-Determination of Nations or Self-Determination of Minorities? German immigrants to the Czech Lands were a minority - not a nation, and most countries in Europe have minorities. A minority led by a Nazi like Konrad Henlein (his mothers name was Dvořáček) is not a minority, but a horde.--Posp68 (talk) 12:46, 1 December 2019 (UTC)

Another call for historians to review this article

Hi. This is my second call to a historian or historians to review this article: to review the chronology and sections, to remove, if identified, own research, non-NPOV, and spurious details, to balance it and perhaps move peripheral matters to other (new?) articles. Tandrasz (talk) 07:10, 13 October 2019 (UTC)

User [Posp68] is not satisfied with Poland being called a "vulture" and "accomplice of Nazi Germany". He/she now keeps adding a "jackal". I will add a POV-check tag. Tandrasz (talk) 11:42, 13 October 2019 (UTC)

I am not a historian but I've gone ahead and removed the paragraph at the end of the Polak-Węgier section, as it was unsourced. And this article has too many quotes in my opinion.

No idea what could be meant by "Poland had been a useful jackal to Germany." Is that a Polish idiom translated word for word? – filelakeshoe (t / c) 🐱 11:55, 13 October 2019 (UTC)

I looked it over and (Poles as jackals) was said by Vyacheslav Molotov, So I put in the right Section. I added Source for the deleted text and also did a bit of trimming, to for a complex topic like this I think the quotes give a good view on the topic.SkyRobin (talk) 15:21, 13 October 2019 (UTC)

To SkyRobin: Posp68 undid part of your edit and inserted: "Polen should know what occupation and partitioning of a country means." Can we put the POV-check tag again? I think the balance of the article (The Munich Agreement) is not right. Poland is mentioned 32 times, Britain 28, Italy 15. Tandrasz (talk) 20:41, 13 October 2019 (UTC)

Tandrasz I put it Back to the way it was before the Ip added their own Commentary (Polen should know what occupation and partition means).SkyRobin (talk) 04:18, 14 October 2019 (UTC)

SkyRobin In 5 edits user Posp68 (aka 171.23.6.111) reverted your edits.Tandrasz (talk) 07:53, 15 October 2019 (UTC)

Tried to bring some order to that section, but as Churchill wrote (https://books.google.com.au/books?id=Daxn4IOTqC4C&pg=PA290&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q&f=false), Poland and Hungary were on the *fringe* of Munich discussions, nowhere near as important as Soviet propaganda made it later to be to justify the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact. I think there would be no Polish or Hungarian demands if France stood firm by Czechoslovakia and the UK stood by France. I still think that this article should be reviewed by historians and fringe issues summarised, keeping the main points of view of all involved, but without ěderogatory references to animals, and the detailed descriptions possibly moved to a separate article. Tandrasz (talk) 13:55, 16 October 2019 (UTC)

Just as I have finished writing here, Posp68 started reverting my edits. Help, please? SkyRobin filelakeshoe — Preceding unsigned comment added by Tandrasz (talk • contribs) 14:00, 16 October 2019 (UTC)

Have you actually previewed my edits? I fixed the chronology, added a note about the use of the word ultimatum, replaced a reference from an illustrated encyclopedia with a reference from a book dedicated to the subject, fixed a spelling error in 'abadon'. Your edits, on the other hand, are mostly reverts, often don't have meaningful comments, so others have to guess your intentions, plus now you are attacking me personally. The goal here is to improve the article. Tandrasz (talk) 19:55, 16 October 2019 (UTC)

Posp68 I have reverted your reverts of my edits. If you want to improve this section, please read the section first, in its entirety. References to Google books allow you to read the source yourself, online. Also, can you use just one account to edit this article, not multiple? Tandrasz (talk) 20:37, 16 October 2019 (UTC)

To Posp68: Can you take more care when you edit? Your edits bring the quality of the article down: reading it now: there is a duplicate section, there is a paragraph starting with a lowercase letter, the chronology is messed up, the explanatory note about the ultimatum of 27 Septemeber, which was not an ultimatum, was removed from where it needed to be. Your edits usually don't have comments. Your edits mix what is your opinion with what is in the source. When we have no access to the source, like that illustrated encyclopedia, we don't know what was actually there. Putting two single quote characters at the start and end will mark it properly. Then you leave the article like that for days.

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— Preceding unsigned comment added by Tandrasz (talk • contribs) 22:55, 19 October 2019 (UTC)

Tandrasz Posp68 We all should be working together not making comments like (If you need Help, consult a doctor) that does not seem helpful.SkyRobin (talk) 19:02, 21 October 2019 (UTC)

To: SkyRobin - I fully agree. I'm dismayed by how this article and a few others related to Zaolzie are being edited by some, and how little attention these edits get from actual historians. I know it goes completely against the spirit of Wikipedia, but I feel like editing some sensitive articles should be restricted to verified professionals. I want wikipedia to be an objective, trusted encyclopedia. Tandrasz (talk) 22:24, 21 October 2019 (UTC)

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NPOV dispute again: original research, personal feelings, falsification of history

This is a follow up to the original POV added 19 November 2017. Since then the article has again been edited to disproportionately and falsely present the role of Poland. The word Poland now occurs 23 times, Polish - 19 times. The article needs a review by a professional historian and possibly a block against further editing.

For example, user Cimmerian praetor edited this article with his particular point of view (original research?) which he showed in the Talk page earlier:

Hungary and Poland DID join in, and they did it precisely because of the Munich Agreement. This is the stategically most important part of the Munich Agreement. As Britain and France sided with Germany, Poland and Hungary followed. German military command even gave order to let Polish forces take areas designated for German occupation with no resistance in case that happened. Look at the map to understand why Hungary and Poland joining in with Germany was strategically more imporant than the Britain's and France's steps. Read upon 1930s European politics to understand why that would not happen without Munich Agreement.

This is quite true. Hungary and Poland did in fact take advantage of Czechoslovakia to seize territory. No appreciation of Poland's sufferings can erase that. They did act like vultures.158.111.236.10 (talk) 19:18, 18 December 2019 (UTC)

His personal feelings are also impacting his objectivity. From the Talk page comments above:

Which led Hungary and Poland to act like vultures and join Germany in its invasion of Czechoslovakia. (I come from Polish occupied territory. Essentialy, a state of lawlesness - arson, theft, rape - ensued during that time to the point that later German occupation was considered with much of a relief).

He subsequently made edits to the article, including the introduction, in September 2018‎ and January 2019‎, which should be reverted.

This section below - what Daladier told the Soviet ambassador, also creates a distortion of history. Poland's position was always to support France, and if France decided to defend Czechoslovakia against Germany, Poland would defend Czechoslovakia as well.

On 22 May, Juliusz Łukasiewicz, the Polish ambassador to France, told the French Foreign Minister Georges Bonnet that if France moved against Germany in defense of Czechoslovakia: "We shall not move." Łukasiewicz also told Bonnet that Poland would oppose any attempt by Soviet forces to defend Czechoslovakia from Germany. Daladier told Jakob Surits, the Soviet ambassador to France: "Not only can we not count on Polish support but we have no faith that Poland will not strike us in the back."

Tandrasz (talk) 09:18, 17 July 2019 (UTC)

Poland's position was always to support France, and if France decided to defend Czechoslovakia against Germany, Poland would defend Czechoslovakia as well.

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First, I have to object to the language of the Soviet propaganda that you are using Posp68. Poland in 1938 was an authoritarian state, not "half-fascist". The Soviets called Poland "fascist" to justify why they were murdering Polish intelligentsia and officers including after "liberation" in 1944/45. I also have to object to the description of Poland as untrustworthy. As far as I know, Poland did not break any agreements. It was Czechoslovakia that attacked Poland in January 1919 and later tricked the Polish delegation in Spa to accept whatever the French propose, earlier convincing the French to give Zaolzie to Czechoslovakia.

I don't have access to the AJP Taylor's book. Btw, this book tells a revisionist version of history and probably should not be cited - see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/A._J._P._Taylor#The_Origins_of_the_Second_World_War. Anyway, do you have a context of that quote, the date? The crisis was months long and from what I remember there were multiple points when the Czechoslovak government was mobilising to defend against Germany, but was pushed back by France, then by the UK who had a defence agreement with France, and even by the US. These great powers felt that Germans had a point about Sudetenland, and they did not want to start a war about it.

Polish-German non-aggression pact of 1934 was a 10 year promise to not start a war. It had no secret protocols. Poland signed a non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union in 1932. Again, no secret protocols. Poland had a defence alliance with France since 1921 (binding since 1923). This one had secret protocols: it was about defence against German and Soviet aggression.

Czechoslovakia had a defence treaty with France as did Poland. Poland had no defence treaty with Germany. If France went to war with Germany, Poland would be on the side of France. When the Munich Agreement was signed, France clearly told Czechoslovakia, that it would not come to their defence if they started fighting Germany. That was it. Czechoslovakia would be alone and that's why Beneš decided not to fight. If I was to use the same language as you use towards Poland, I would add an adjective "cowardly", but I won't do that because as I said in the original NPOV comment, I read a proper history book on the subject, and I know that Czechoslovak citizens including many of German ethnicity, were ready to defend their country. I hold Czech people in high esteem.

Poland's choice in those hasty hours after signing of the Munich Agreement was to let Germany take Zaolzie, or request Czechoslovakia to give it to Poland. Poland demanded and Czechoslovakia agreed. In 1938 nobody knew that a war would start a year later. Hindsight is great for what/if discussions, but is completely irrelevant to what was going on back then - it is not suited for an encyclopaedia. If you wanted to pursue hindsight, you should blame Czechoslovakia for the Munich Agreement, because she agreed to the annexation of Austria earlier on. Germany was seriously concerned that Czechoslovakia would oppose German demands, but Czechoslovakia quickly agreed, not realising what would happen next. Hindsight is amazing, isn't it?

Also, for context, Czechoslovakia was not exactly a friend of Poland in the interwar period: Czechoslovakia attacked Poland in January 1919 to capture ethnically Polish territories: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polish%E2%80%93Czechoslovak_War Polish causalities were: 92 killed, 855 wounded, 576 captured, 813 missing. Have a look at the vague language used on this wiki page - it would be hard to say who attacked who at first glance: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polish%E2%80%93Czechoslovak_border_conflicts#Czechoslovak-Polish_conflict_in_1919

Czechoslovakia did not let through arm shipments and Hungarian troops to Poland when Poland was fighting for her existence against Russia in 1919-21.

Last but not least, Beneš was friends with Stalin at the time when Stalin was murdering Poles in the Soviet Union: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polish_Operation_of_the_NKVD

Who knows if the mysterious death of Sikorski in 1943 was not a Soviet sabotage action with a little help of a Czech pilot: https://polishgreatness.blogspot.com/2011/07/sikorski-death-of-polish-prime-minister.html - the British have not opened their archives, yet, and maybe that's for better, because Poles like Czechs, and I think that Poles, Czechs and Slovaks would all do much better if they had good relations back then and, what's more important, in the future. 12:15, 22 July 2019 (UTC) — Preceding unsigned comment added by Tandrasz (talk • contribs)

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There is no scientific term "half-fascist state", as far as I know.

If you knew a bit about history of Poland, you would know that Kresy were part of Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and millions of Poles lived there. My grandfather was born, grew up and studied in Lviv. I don't condone any aggressive war though. You cannot argue that Czechoslovakia had the right to start a war with Poland in 1919 after giving Poland a 2 hour ultimatum, causing hundreds of deaths and injuries, to take over a territory populated by Poles, and all was good because Czechoslovakia was a democratic country, but when in 1938 Poland sent a 24 hour ultimatum to reclaim the said territory, so it does not fall into German hands, it was bad, because Poland was not a democracy. Come on.

Putting a blame on Poland for Czechoslovakia not declaring a war on Germany is a falsification of history.

Czechoslovakia signed an alliance treaty with the Soviet Union in 1935. Just a reminder: in 1935 the Soviet Union had already murdered millions of their citizens. That agreement was not a "we will not attack you" treaty that Poland had with Germany and the Soviet Union. It was a "we will fight together with you against your enemy" treaty that Poland had only with France.

I remember a Wołoszański podcast about an attempted assassination of Stalin and that when Czechs learned about it, Beneš warned Stalin personally. Beneš also refused Sikorski's proposal of an alliance against the Soviet Union. He was actually passing secrets to Soviets: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polish%E2%80%93Czechoslovak_confederation

From the book I read about Munich, I remember that Beneš talked with Roosevelt by phone, and was pressured to keep negotiating with Germany and not start a war. Nobody wanted to start a war over the German minority in Czechoslovakia, but if Czechoslovakia did not give in to German demands again and again, but stood her position and Germany attacked, then France would have to attack Germany, which would cause Poland, the UK, and the Soviet Union to declare war on Germany too. This is how the treaties were set up, as I understand it, although the Locarno pact details did not make these actions automatic, so there was always uncertainty about how good the alliance was, which Poland learned about the hard way in September 1939.

As to why Sikorski had a Czech pilot. He must have been a good pilot and Sikorski probably liked him. The Czech language sounds very endearing to Polish ears. We love the Czech language and culture - apparently, it's our weakness.

Tandrasz (talk) 01:14, 27 July 2019 (UTC)

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Updated my comment above - you have the right to not say anything about your background, but you also have a responsibility to edit the article with an objective view of the whole and not use revisionist sources. This is an encyclopaedia, not a private vendetta project. Tandrasz (talk) 04:18, 28 July 2019 (UTC)

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I got access from my library to the electronic version of the book that you cited Posp68 - AJP Taylor, THE ORIGINS OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR. These quotes are NOT present there: "I assumed we would be in war with Germany in two or three days, and at least I wanted to ensure Poland's neutrality." "The answer that Poland sent me was the last and decisive reason why I did not, in spite of the demands of Moscow, declared war against Germany in 1938."

Instead, Chapter 8 ends with the following after Daladier gave Czechoslovakia the ultimatum to accept the Munich Agreement (had to retype it here, cannot copy and paste and not allowed to upload a screenshot):

"Benes turned despairingly to the Soviet ambassador. 'Czechoslovakia is confronted with the choice either of beginning war with Germany, having against her Britain and France,... or capitulating to the aggressor.' What would be the attitude of the U.S.S.R. to these two possibilities, 'that is, of further struggle or capitulation'? Before the Soviet government could debate the question, another telegram informed them that no answer was necessary: 'The Czechoslovak Government has already decided to accept all the conditions.' It is difficult to believe that the inquiry was made seriously. Benes remained true to his resolve that Czechoslovakia must not fight alone nor with Soviet Russia as sole ally. Years later, in 1944, he claimed that the Polish threat at Tesin had given him the final push into surrender; if so, it was only a push in the direction where he had determined to go. Benes still believed - rightly, as things turned out - that Hitler would over-reach himself; but the process took longer than he had hoped. Meanwhile, the Czechs were spared the horrors of war, not only in 1938 but throughout the second World war. Afterwards, surveying Prague from the President's palace, Benes could say: 'Is it not beautiful? The only central European city not destroyed. And all my doing.'"

Tandrasz (talk) 14:05, 28 July 2019 (UTC)

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You must have an older version of AJP Taylor's book. My quote comes from the current electronic version of that book. I can send you screenshots if you don't believe me. Tandrasz (talk) 03:38, 14 August 2019 (UTC)

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Removed Churchill's post-war memoirs "vultures" quote from the reactions section. Churchill was not a PM at that time. His position on the agreement is noted in another section. The quote is from his post-war book. Tandrasz (talk) 22:18, 29 July 2019 (UTC)

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Sorry, to keep removing the Churchill "vulture" quote from the Reactions Rjensen, but maybe there is a better place for it? Maybe in the Opinions, or maybe in a new section about the post-war history - how it affected the post-war politics in different countries? Is there anything from Churchill about this quote later on?

I am planning to re-read "Munich, The 1938 Appeasement Crisis" by David Faber - got it from the library today in a paper form. I will try to find Churchill's reaction to the Munich Agreement in 1938. Thank you. Tandrasz (talk) 02:47, 30 July 2019 (UTC)

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Churchill wrote the most important history of the war and his interpretation was of enormous importance to historians, policy makers and the general readers. (the language is striking in its own right--it won him the Nobel Prize in Literature) -- so his analysis of Munich after the war is especially important. Do people erase it because it annoys them?? NPOV rules require all major viewpoints and this certainly qualifies. Rjensen (talk) 03:08, 30 July 2019 (UTC)

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Is it in the right section of the Article though? The Reactions section covers reactions at that time - in 1938. Whose viewpoint in 1938 was that Poland and Hungary were vultures? Tandrasz (talk) 04:12, 30 July 2019 (UTC)

Always good to note that the Sudetenland was never part of the German Empire...

I feel it's always essential to note that Germany did not have a territorial claim on Czechoslovakia. The Sudetenland had been a part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, never part of the German. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 158.111.236.10 (talk) 19:22, 18 December 2019 (UTC)

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