Talk:Battle of Tsushima/Archive 1

Japanese art of war

• Japanese are full of resources: they managed to sink 21 ships, capture 7 ships and disarm 6 ships, when the Russian fleet was composed of 12 battleships and 8 cruisers!

• Out of joke: someone should check the numbers! --Panairjdde 16:15, 5 Apr 2005 (UTC)

• This is best handled by a table, which I'll re-edit and insert below shortly. Fabartus 20:30, 13 Jun 2005 (UTC)

• Let's see:
  • sunk: battleships: Suvorov, Alexander III, Borodino, Navarin, Oslyabia, Sisoy Veliki, Adm. Ushakov (coastal), cruisers: Adm. Nakhimov, Vladimir Monomakh, Dimitr Donskoy, Svetlana, Izumrud (run aground after a breakthrough near Vladivostok), Ural (in fact auxiliary cruiser, made of a liner), 5 destroyers. 3 auxiliary transports were also sunk, what gives 21, but it is arguable if to count them.
  • captured: battleships: Orel, Nikolay I (old), Adm. Senyavin, Adm. Apraksin (both coastal), 1 destroyer (+2 transports)
  • interned: cruisers: Oleg, Avrora, Zhemchug, 1 destroyer
  • broke through: Almaz (cruiser, in fact armed yacht), 2 destroyers Pibwl 20:44, 20 Jun 2005 (UTC)

I've seen Borodino's sinking credited to the last major salvo of the battle, by Adm Yawara Matsumoto. Trekphiler 12:13, 2 December 2005 (UTC)

Fleet return

IIrc Togo, who had studied in England, deliberately kept the fleet at sea only returning to port on the 21st of October (Trafalgar Day) as a symbolic gesture.Alci12 17:32, 12 April 2006 (UTC)

The Brits had a mutual defense pact with the Japanese which kept the other European Powers (especially Germany and France, the Tsar was cousin "Nicky" to the Kaiser) out of the war. The Russian Baltic fleet had even mistakenly shot up some British fishing vessels while transversing the North sea. Pproctor 16:32, 24 October 2006 (UTC)

casualty numbers

The Japanese sunk 21 ships when the Russians had only 19 in their fleet? I think there is a little mix up here lol. Maybe the Japanese and Russian number of ships were switched?

I think the Russian number includes auxillary ships such as destroyers and coal carriers which are missing from the article. --Revth 05:24, 15 November 2006 (UTC)

Ah, most of the coal-carriers were chartered Hamburg-America colliers who made it quite plain that their contract did not extend to naval battles long before this, and the destroyers were few in number. 21 sunk ships does sound excessive.

Article's "B" Quality Rating questioned

The article is rated as being of B Quality. However, one of the requirements for a B grade is that the article be adequately cited. Although there is a list of references at the end of the article, there are no citations within the text. Should this article not be downgraded? Or, at least, flagged with a "citation needed" notice at the top? I would particularly like to see citations for the Naval Tactics section, given such statements as "and this was something Togo wanted to avoid." Did Togo actually say this? If so, I'd like to know the source.

I also noticed that the pictures in the battle section over run the text, though that may just be my browser displaying things improperly. Agoodall 02:29, 8 April 2007 (UTC)

U-turn

Does somebody really think that 4,5-5 kilometers-long Japanese squadrone coud make U-turn during only FIVE MINUTES??? Did it really move with 54-60 km/h speed??? The russian withnesses spoke about 15 m. 'Mikasa' did her turn in 2 minutes (if article's timing is true) and the rest of squadrone - 3 m. later. But 'Mikasa' was first ship in the formation. If your timing is right, then 11 Japanese ships turned with speed of 80 km/h. That's impossible. —The preceding unsigned comment was added by Manchjurshi (talk • contribs) 09:14, 10 April 2007 (UTC).

"11 Japanese ships turned with speed of 80 km/h. That's impossible." Oh? You're assuming (I think) they all ran to a point & turned. If all they did was reverse in their own lengths (essentially swap lead ship & tail), it's far from impossible, absent evidence to the contrary (& I'm too ignorant of their tactical evolution to comment). Trekphiler 09:39, 10 April 2007 (UTC)

Z flag?

The special "Z" flag is mentioned twice, but what was its meaning? Jpatokal 11:30, 10 July 2007 (UTC)

As soon as I can unpack my books after I finish moving this weekend, I'll list the English text of the meaning of the signal. It means something like "The fate of the nation is at risk. Let every man do his duty," and is a deliberate homage by the Japanese to the immortal memory of Lord Nelson. GABaker 16:08 20 July 2007

Admirals Name is Spelled 'X'

First of all: the family of the Russian commander was Rozhestvenski, without "D" letter!

• There are six acceptable western renderings of his name... depending upon the lexigrphical convention used by a given translator, they break down into two major familys per one historian whose reference seems to be up on the third floor attic at the moment. He used it as an illustration of how difficult the multi-language renderings were to remain consistant with current usage (When ever he wrote that is - still true today, only worse). See one of:
• F.R. Sedwick, (R.F.A.), The Russo-Japanese War, 1909, The Macmillan Company, N.Y., 192 pp.
• Colliers (Ed.), The Russo-Japanese War, 1904, P.F. Collier & Son, New York, 129 pp.
• William Henry Chamberlain, Japan Over Asia, 1937, Little, Brown, and Company, Boston, 395 pp.
• Edwin O Reischauer, Japan - The Story of a Nation, 1970, LoCCC# 77-10895 Afred A. Knopf, Inc., New York. Previously published as Japan Past and Present (4 Eds., 1946-64)
  • Dennis and Peggy Warner, The Tide At Sunrise, 1974, Charterhouse, New York, 659 pp.
  • Frank Theiss, The Voyage of Forgotten Men, 1937, Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1st Ed., Indianapolis & New York, 415 pp.
  • Geoffrey Jukes, The Russo-Japanese War 1904-1905, 2002, Osprey Publishing, Oxford, Ox2 9LP (Britain), ISBN 1-84176-446-9, 95 pp.
  • Richard Hough, "The Fleet That had to Die", LoCCC# 58-9650, The Viking Press, New York, 1958, 212 pp.

I can not find the discussion again quickly, but suffice it to say that Hough, Theiss, and Warner are all considered authorative, and give the two opposing spellings as Ro zhest ven sky and Ro zhd est ven ski respectively two to one. Jukes makes it 3 out of four and it's outside the scope of the first four references, save Chamberlain introduces yet another variant: "Roz daev sky". Thiess is a translation.

• Ahhhhh, Theiss translated by Fritz Sallagar covers the matter on a "Translators Note" just after the dedication page, and before the texts TOC. Some stranger spellings: A doubled end using "ii" close to that used by the Warners, and alternate with "D" Rozhdestvenski, and Kruiz hanovsky among others with leading 'K'.

J.N Westwood, Witnesses of Tsushima, 1970 uses Warners, and encyclopedia of Asia History 1988 uses the "D" variant mentioned in the translators note above... making the tally 3 : 2 : 1 :1. The encyclopedia references Warner and The Japanese Oligarchy and the Russo-Japanese War by Shumpei Okamoto, 1970 this later reference presumably led to adopting this later variant.

• The preponderence of notable historians having spoken, I conclude the the spelling should be X.Fabartus 20:30, 13 Jun 2005 (UTC)

I don't know if there is any "official" spelling, but since in Russian it is Рожественский, the simplest way would be Rozhestvenski. Definitely there should be no "D"!. A pronunciation of ending part of such Russian (and Polish) names is exactly like "ski" in English (not "sky"). Pibwl 20:44, 20 Jun 2005 (UTC)

---

The admiral’s name was Рожественский. It does not contain the letter “д”, the Russian equivalent of “d”. There is no question about it, as anyone who speaks Russian will find soon enough if they consult Russian sources on the subject. The corresponding English spelling is Rozhestvensky (or Rozhestvenski, or Rozhestvenskiy, or Rozhestvenskii), and there is no reason on earth (transliteration rules or anything else) why a “d” should be added.

The ending is not that important. Whatever variant you use, it does not turn this name into a different one. What really matters is that the addition of the "d" does turn it into a different Russian family name (cf. Johnston/Johnson). It is true that the family name Rozhdestvensky (with a “d”) is much more common in Russia than Rozhestvensky (which probably explains why this unfortunate error occurred in the first place), but this is no reason to use one family name in place of the other.

I hope the above will convince whoever wrote/edits this and related articles that this is not a matter of “prevailing” or “official” English spelling and that the spelling with a “d” is wrong whether supported by “authoritative” English reference sources or not. If not, I encourage you to do some further research. The poor guy might have been the worst (or most unlucky) admiral ever, but he deserves his name to be spelt right, as do Wikipedia readers. --80.94.225.222 20:07, 4 February 2006 (UTC)

Sorry, but I'm russian-speaking and I studied history of Russia in the XX-th century for five long years in a Russian university. And I can assure you: his surname is "Рождественский", with "д" ("d")."Rozhdestvenski" is a variant that I can offer. You also may check russian Wikipedia to be sure. Manchjurshi

There is no "d" in Rozhestvenskiy family name. With respect, Ko Soi IX (talk) 03:42, 27 November 2007 (UTC)

Crossing the T twice

Togo managed to cross the T twice. Why is it only mentioned once on the article's command section? To cross it twice don't you need to turn twice? Do someone have a good battlemap for this battle?ParallelPain 03:51, 18 June 2007 (UTC)

Actually, Jutland involved crossing the "T" twice. The fact that the victim managed to get away both times after inflicting heavier damage is just too embarrassing to mention. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 61.254.246.251 (talk) 13:29, 23 December 2008 (UTC)

or it may mean that 'crossing the T' is over-rated. Sandpiper (talk) 21:28, 15 October 2009 (UTC)

The need for neutral

Originally called East Sea improperly, the Sea of Japan known as Wikipedia, where a new name, or a discussion about restoring the original name was intended to. --Idh0854 (talk) 08:53, 14 May 2010 (UTC)

Yawn. Not another Korean ...

Battleship Fleet Combat Experience vs Any Naval Combat Experience

Lesser warships; Patrol Boats, Destroyers, and Submarines, prior to the 21st century could've been commanded by Ensigns, LTjgs, LTs, LCDRs, or CDRs. Cruisers & BBs might be CPTs or above. Fleets were commanded by Admirals. The larger the warship the higher the rank. Or if groups of smaller fighting ships, the higher rank. Why? Responsibility is why. Men of high rank were supposed to have the experience, training, and maturity to hold high rank, and thus be able to command larger vessels or groups of vessels.

Any naval combat experience is good for career sailors. But "combat experience" is a double edged sword; it's a mental tool that can either make a leader overly cautious (I don't ever want to experience that again!) or extra good in combat (knows what to expect and when to expect it, and plans and reacts accordingly). In short, combat experience can be either good or bad; like almost anything in life.

If a sailor has "any" naval combat experience, but not "battleship" combat experience, then you're correct, a shells a shell whistling over-head. The only real difference is the size of the projectile and the range it was fired from. But as long a men remain physically and psychologically the same as they've been since recorded history, with the same senses, desires, fears, limitations and capabilities, etc. Then there will be a difference in special types of warfare, in this case, battleship fleet actions and other naval actions. Battleships are heavy weight boxers, and lesser fighting vessels are equal to middle weight and feather-weight boxers. One punch from a heavy weight boxer can send a feather-weight contestant to the hospital, but generally not so if he strikes an equal contender (another heavy weight).

• Battleship commanders, both single units and fleet cdrs, have a psychological burden of their nation resting upon their shoulders; whereas a cruiser or destroyer skipper DOES NOT. Generally speaking (Java Sea, a surface cruiser action is one exception) cruiser & destroyer captains cannot lose a war or even sometimes a battle by themnselves, but prior to the aircraft carrier, battleship captains possibly could. At the Yellow Sea, Togo was just about a cautious as Jellico was at Jutland, and for nearly the same reason(s); if Togo lost his battlewagons fighting Admiral Vitgeft, he'd have none left to fight the Baltic Fleet (later redesignated the 2nd Pacific Sqd) when they arrived. So in a real sense, the fate of his nation rested upon how he "risked" his battleships.

• Psychological & Physical effects on men (as they have existed in the past up until today) when exposed to modern (Tsushima) battleship warfare. Even though the common seaman doesn't have the "mental burden" of the nation resting upon his shoulders, compared to the captain of the warship or his staff, to some extent & in many cases...he will. The battleship sailor KNOWS he's a battleship sailor, and he KNOWS how important a battleship is (or was back then). He KNOWS his represents his country; and in the case of the USN, battleships actually were named after states, most schoolboys have heard of the USS Arizona sunk at Pearl Harbor, resulting in WWII for America. Arizona became a state in 1912...it's part of America. When the enemy sank the Arizona, they sank part of America. This was part of the psychological make-up of a battleship crewman. It was a responsibility (mental burden) that cruiser/destroyer sailors did not have.

• Combat & Training (Maneuvers): During the Vietnam era in the US, the peace-time military (non-combat zone) used to have training schedules. Those schedules listed on paper would have dates/times and list the training for those dates/times, using the ground forces as an example, one might look like this: Reveille, breakfast, formation (drill/ceremony), tank machinegun (coax), main gun (90mm), final formation (end of the day). As the years rolled by, lasers and computers added some reality to the training, such as showing "hits" and "your tank is dead." But that "reality" only designated who got killed and who didn't. The designation process certainly didn't have any elements of "horror" in them. The ONLY training that ever got even close to real combat was shooting the cannon (main gun). The ground forces should have conducted much more of that type of training, but it was far far to expensive to conduct such training on a regular basis. Forget what you watched in the film "Battle of the Bulge" starring Robert Shaw and Henry Fonday from the 1960s...standing waist high from the TC hatch (Tank commander's hatch) and observing his shells thru binoculars which he's holding to his eyes, as he tries to spot his shells (sense rounds) as they're fired from his tank gun...they do it in movies (films) all the time...right? Looks cool doesn't it? The tank commander advancing upon his objective, proudly standing waist level out've the TC's hatch, his binoculars held so warrior like to his eyes, as his mighty war machine belches flame and smoke and crushes all before it! Well...when that little 4.1" (105mm) gun goes off (keeping in mind that this is smaller than a destroyer's 5" gun) from men that have been through it, the tank commander will feel like some one just "slapped" him in the mouth (would've been the whole face, but he had binoculars covering his eyes). Most TCs will go through that ONCE, next time they'll lower themselves into the turret hatch for the next round. Now, multiply that little 4 inch gun by the hundreds but triple their size...into shall we say 12" guns, and this time add explosions to the TC hatch...so he's not just sending shells downrange, he's recieving "incoming" too. Concussion alone can send a normal man into shock. Battleship Fleet Admirals have to know and experience what large caliber shells can do to a crewman's "mind". The ship's captain is the brain, his men are his hands, arms, eyes, and ears, if he losses them, he losses control of his ship. He has to know what kind of "mining" effect on both his ship and crew, from a near miss from a battleship shell.

If the battleship admiral has never experienced such catastrophic chaos, it wouldn't be the first time that a man has "frozen" in the face of battle. For a commander, such a loss of nerves during battle will most likely result in utter defeat. But if he's been thru it before, and isn't afraid of what he's learned, and might actually look foreward to going thru again (like General George Patton probably would have), then the combat experienced battleship fleet commander will have the ace up his sleeve...when the next engagement comes. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 75.104.160.54 (talk) 02:45, 23 September 2010 (UTC)

The Charge of the Light Brigade

Some good points. As an added example, the English poet Lord Tennyson honored the British charge of their "Light Brigade" at Balaclava in 1854 during the Crimean War. Portions of his poem, read as follows: "...Boldly they rode and well...they had fought so well...when can their glory fade?...Honour the charge they made...

And against, of all people; the Russians! So Great Britain makes nearly the same type of charge during the Crimean War, and then honors it. When the Russians make nearly the same type of charge at Tsushima, the English degrade it (as noted above).

What would a British or German Admiral have done at Tsushima? What British, German, French, or American Admiral has ever travelled 18,000 miles with inexperienced sailors, and untested warships; and then immediately become engaged with an enemy fleet? NONE!

"Mad Dog" Rozhestvensky at least showed some honor on the battlefied...by charging the enemy. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 66.60.156.2 (talk) 20:15, 22 March 2010 (UTC)

I think the british universally agree the charge of the light brigade was very very stupid.Reply: Many people will agree; and many people will not. You cannot please all the people all the time. At any rate, history (people) remembers the "Light Brigade" and little else of the Crimean War...so in the short run it may have been "stupid", but in the long run those men are still remembered (so maybe it wasn't so "stupid" after all) and besides, the French called it "Magnificent!" Brave, perhaps, and exemplifying the willingness of trained forces to attempt the impossible, but no less stupid for that. The crimea war was another total cockup.Reply: There was a strategical reason for the Crimean War (keeping Russia landlocked). Wars usually are.Reply: War is the obtaining of a political goal by other than political means (Clausewitz).Cradock engaged Spee at Coronel with inexperienced sailors and untested warships with much the same result. He also knew he was on a suicide mission.Reply: Neither Maximilian Von Spee's armored cruisers, nor Cradock's were tested in combat. Spee's cruisers had 8" guns and were newer warships, being built in 1906, while Cradock's vessels were built in 1901 and were armed with 9" and 6" inch guns. Again, a sailor's got to fight with what he has, orders are orders.Sandpiper (talk) 09:02, 10 October 2010 (UTC)

dreadnought development

The article introduction says: Prior to the Russo-Japanese War, countries constructed their battleships with mixed batteries of mainly 152 mm (6-inch), 203 mm (8-inch), 254 mm (10-inch) and 305 mm (12-inch) guns, with the intent that these battleships fight on the battle line in a close-quarter, decisive fleet action. The battle demonstrated that big guns with longer ranges were more advantageous during naval battles than mixed batteries of different sizes.

This is quite a big claim. Cunniberti published his dreadnought gunned battleship design in 1903 and others were also working on similar designs. The idea certainly predates the battle. The article also says Fisher said the battle confirmed the importance of big guns. Fisher was already a proponent of all big gun ships, so it certainly didnt convince him. Padfields book on the subject of ship development discusses Tsushima and says the side with the greater number of big guns lost (the russians). Hardly a demonstration of their benefits, then. It would seem to me that all this battle actually demonstrated was how things could have been done better than they were. Perhaps the biggest lesson was the futility of sending off an untrained fleet.Sandpiper (talk) 20:25, 3 August 2010 (UTC)

Reply: True, designs were being drawn up on paper prior to the battle, Fisher was an advocate of the big gun, and Padfield did give his version of the fight (as did other authors). But Capital! Or as Frederick the Great stated, "no money, no war!" (Reference his book "Frederick the Great on the Art of War" authored by himself). Battleships already existed, and for a maverick admiral like Fisher to begin preaching about all big gunned fast battleships...this was going against the status quo (going against established tradition), according to his many detractors (and like most famous men, he had many; reference "Dreadnought" by Massie). Until the advent of the aircraft and nuclear aircraft carrier, the most expensive machine ever built by man was the battleship, and only highly civilized nations could afford to build them. Another words ANY nation could raise an army, but only the civilized ones could build a navy. Whitehall already had a navy, and they certainly weren't going to scrap the one they had based on some maverick admiral's theory (Fisher's)...that is of course, unless this "maverick" admiral submitted some proof! He did in 1905 (reference Massie). It wasn't by accident that Captain Pakenham and his staff from the Royal Navy had a ringside seat at Tsushima that day. True, Britain built those IJN battlewagons, but they were there for the show, and they recieved an eye-full! Fisher had been redeemed! Whitehall was convinced, and Dreadnought was born (5 months after Tsushima). —Preceding unsigned comment added by 75.107.96.58 (talk) 22:02, 19 September 2010 (UTC)

As I said above, the British navy was in the habit of building experimental ships. Does the US today spend money on weapons development? Fisher was not a maverick. The fact that he was appointed first sea lord holding the views he did meant those views were already accpeted at the highest level. He did not keep his views on shipbuilding secret, but was a keen believer in the benefits of campaigning to get support. Previously as third sea lord he had also been responsible for innovative ship designs. The service life of a sailing ship might be 100 years with a bit of luck, but in the buildup to WW1 a ship was obsolete in 10 years. Quite a turnover in very expensive ships.Sandpiper (talk) 21:30, 10 October 2010 (UTC)

Electronic Warfare

"It is commonly recognized that this battle was the beginning of what today is called electronic warfare.[3]" I don't have access to the book, but this seems like a stretch. Electronic Warfare usually refers to jamming and scrambling signals, not just using radios. Blowing up a telegraph line in the US Civil War has more in common with modern electronic war than just using a wireless. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 68.57.109.180 (talk) 17:40, 12 October 2010 (UTC)

Combat Experience

The article which is referring to "combat experience" (in battleships), is in reference to 4 hours of combat in battleship fleets prior to engaging in another battleship fleet engagement. Which effectively eliminates any future modern battleship fleet actions from any debate.

In other words, no Battleship Fleet Commander fighting in WWI possessed 4 hours (or any amount of time) fighting a sea battle with modern steel battleships in a fleet action, prior to entering into a sea battle consisting of battleships. Same for WWII. Non-Applicable afterwards.

The (Battleship) Admirals that fought in WWI, went into their naval action as cold & un-prepared as Admiral Rozhestvensky did at Tsushima. But there were three main differences:

1. Jellico and Scheer were new at fighting battleships, consequently, they were overly cautious and one ran away and the other got lost (couldn't re-locate his enemy).

2. Rozhesvensky was just as new as Jellico and Scheer, but Rozhesvensky fought his battleships until they were scrap metal and finally sunk.

3. Scheer nor Jellico had to fight the only combat experienced battleship fleet admiral in the world. They were two "newbies" combating each other. Rozhestvensky, was the unfortunate admiral to have drawn the (unlucky) "number" to do battle with the most combat experienced (Steel Battleship Fleet) admiral in history; Admiral Togo.

Admiral Togo and Vitgeft had their Jutland at the Yellow Sea; and Jellico and Scheer had their Yellow Sea at Jutland. Togo got a chance to correct his errors and do it right at Tsushima; while Jellico & Scheer never had another opportunity to correct their errors, because they never met again. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 24.10.75.150 (talk) 04:47, 10 April 2010 (UTC)

There were other officers that had some experience fighting with battleships in the baltic and mediterranian, and David Beatty on the british side of jutland had engaged german captial ships at dogger bank. The German commanders in the Baltic engaged russian battleships at Gotland and Moon Sound, so there were commanders with some limited experience. For example in the Black Sea Wilhelm Souchon's force engaged russian battleships breifly on several occasions.XavierGreen (talk) 19:32, 10 April 2010 (UTC)

Reply: You are correct, and to make it even more interesting, at Moon Sound, the old Russian flagship from the Battle of the Yellow Sea was there, the Tsesarevich; along with the very last of the Borodino class pre-dreadnaughts, the Slava (who, fortunately for her, wasn't completed in time for those 1905 sea battles). Although, the officers you mentioned were veterans of sea actions, with those exceptions such as involving the old Tsesarevich & Slava, those engagements consisted primarily of battlecruisers (and lesser) forces. Which is, in reality, strictly a technicality; because, for example, in reality (in the real world) those WWI battlecruisers were larger and for the most part had more powerful guns than an old Tsushima type pre-dreadnaught (a 600 or 700 foot long battlecruiser with guns over 12" compared to 1904 pre-dreadnaught at 397 feet in length with 12-inchers) and in all probability could've easily blown a 1905 era pre-dreadnaught out of the water, with little trouble. But often times, the military runs on technicalities; consequently, battlecruisers don't count as battleship commands, at least as far as history books are concerned.

Secondly, the naval officers you mentioned, weren't Scheer nor Jellicoe; and those were the two men in command. There is no dishonor in being a novice, every military and naval officer had to start out somewhere. Another words every officer, NCO, or common soldier (sailor) had to have a first battle, somewhere, or at sometime. If he doesn't, he'll never be able to claim that title of a "combat veteran." As a matter of fact, as was mentioned in the articles, Makarov, Rozhestvensky, and Togo all had previous combat experience. Makarov fired naval histories first self propelled torpedoes in combat during the Russo-Turkish War, and Rozhestvensky also saw action against Turkish warships. Togo had blasted Chinese cruisers at the Yalu River during the Sino-Japanese War in 1894. In fact, all three men may have had more combat experience than either Scheer or Jellicoe even before Tsushima or Jutland. Simply based upon the Turkish and Sino wars. But none of them had battleship fleet combat experience until the Yellow Sea (and in a small way Port Arthur). And, as stated previously, although Stark, Makarov, Vitgeft, and Togo had all recieved some form of baptism in blood in battleship fleet warfare at Port Arthur and/or the Yellow Sea, they were all either gone from the scene or dead, leaving only Admiral Togo, alone, to reap and digest the secrets of battleship fleet combat. Togo absorbed that knowledge, perfected a plan with it, then executed it; on 27 May 1905. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 24.10.75.150 (talk) 02:00, 12 April 2010 (UTC)

I am a bit confused about what point is at issue here. I dont quite see why there is a need to distinguish between battleship combat experience rather than any kind of ship combat experience. The main difference is simply of scale, bigger guns at bigger distances. Im sure the experience of shells whistling overhead is the same if they are small shells on a small ship or big shells on a big one. Most navies of this period lacked combat experience precisely of the kind they needed when engaging in a big ship battle, but they had all sorts of other training for war. Jellicoe experienced being on a ship sunk by damage from another. he experienced being under fire and wounded. He had a lot of experience drilling his fleet in manoeuvres and gunnery. As far as I can see he was very much better prepared for combat than was Rozhestvensky, who had a fleet cobbled together with brand new ships still with construction problems, ancient ships taken out of mothballs, regular sailors who were already those considered second rank (the better ones already having been sent to the far east), merchant sailors pressed into the navy and total tyro peasants forced to make up the numbers needed. He had no chance to drill his fleet whatsoever. It was hopelessly badly prepared for combat. Jellicoe understood the priorities of wwI, which was to avoid any significant damage to his fleet. Sheer understood he was outnumbered and it would be plain foolishness to engage Jellicoe head on. They acted accordingly. Rozhestvensky had orders to attack the Japanese. Opinion was that the attempt was futile even when they started when the plan was to operate from Port arthur in conjunction with the then surviving russian ships there. Things just got worse as he travelled. He did not have the choice of declining battle, however sensible it might have been to do so.

Beatty at Jutland had the most combat experience, but the consequence of this was that he was overconfident and made serious mistakes in taking on Hipper. Jellicoe did not 'loose' his enemy. He let him go, because he did not want to risk a night action. It is probably the case that Jellico could have tried to close with scheer again before nightfall if he had better information on scheers precise wherabouts, but since no one had invented radar, this was tricky. Beatty complained afterwards that jellicoe had refused to send the fleet to follow him and chase scheer, yet in fact Burny (I think), who was told to follow beatty, was already as close or closer to the enemy than was beatty. The reality was that the first priority for the british, however unsellable from a public relations perspective, was not to take any risks. To continue to exist was to win.User:Sandpiper

Reply: "You cannot choose your battlefield, God does that for you; but you can plant your banner where a banner never flew." (Reference, "We Were Soldiers Once...and Young" by Moore & Galloway). Like battlefields, Fighting Men (Marines, Airmen, Sailors, and Soldiers) have no control over the weapons or equipment possessed by their opponents; they simply must fight with what they have. During the Samar segment of the Leyte Gulf battle (WWII), USN Cdr Ernest E. Evans charged his Fletcher class destroyer, along with 6 other "tin cans" against impossible odds (IJN cruisers & battleships)(Coincidentally on the same date as the British Army's "Charge of the Light Brigade", 25 October 1854 at Balaclava during the Crimean War). They were shot to pieces, and Evans went down with his destroyer. He knew his 5" guns were ineffective against those larger warships, but if he could get close enough to use his torpedoes...that would do it. A 15,000 yd slow run was out of the question, it had to be fast, therefore a 6,000 yd run at high speed would be the most appropiate...but this involved "going into to the enemy's guns". The cdr made a decision, and went with it. He charged, his men died, his ship was sunk, but the enemy turned tail. He went with what he had to accomplish his mission (to save the escort carrier task force). (Ref: Samuel Eliot Morison, Leyte 1944).

But in order to do this, Evans had to know his men and equipment. In another words the commander had to know the maximum effective range, minimum effective range of his weapons and vessel, as well as the capabilities of his men. Then try to pull off the mission. In this particular case, it was suicide, and he (and probably his men) knew it. But the mission was to save the task force (escort carriers)...and in those days...the mission came first!

Evans had used what combat experience/equipment he possessed to fight capitol ships.

Forty years earlier, Togo made the mistake of trying to take on a Russian shore battery and their battleships at the same time at Port Arthur, he quickly learned not to repeat that mistake again. He had to split his fires, and ended up taking a pounding from both targets, while at the same time doing damage to neither! At the Yellow Sea he opened fire at excessive range, next time he'd do it at closer range. Togo knew what his battleships and 12" guns could do, and what they could not do; just as Evans knew what his Fletcher class destroyer could do and not do. Both men knew their limitations and their capabilities. But it was the mission that drove those two men. Regardless of the types of warships they manned.

Tsushima was a battle of desperation for both Rozhestvensky and Togo. Rozhestvensky had to get through to Vladivostok, and Togo had to stop him! Rozhestvensky didn't have orders to fight the IJN, he wanted to go around them if he could, but the distance was to great...the 18,000 mile journey was taxing enough without having to add another several hundred miles. The shortest distance between two points was where he was at...Tsushima, and the commander made a decision, he charged Togo's battleline to get to it.

Whereas Jutland was a battle of caution and lost opportunities; Tsushima was a battle of desperation and decision. True, Rozhestvensky didn't have battleship fleet action experience, but he fought with what experience he possessed and was guided by his mission; reach Vladivostok! Rozhestvensky's fleet did conduct some gunnery enroute from Madagascar in the Indian Ocean, and if reader's will read closely, they will find that the Russian sailors shot well at Tsushima; Togo's flagship was hit about 15 times by 12" main battery fire. That's pretty darn good shooting from forward guns from a moving platform with a so called "green crew." Historians should start giving abit more credit where credit's due to some of those men from the past, rather than bashing them so much. The next time you read a book, take a closer look at the author...where's he from...and what's his background...that might help show the direction in which he's writing.

As the Royal Navy's Admiral Nelson once told some of his officers, "A captain can't do much wrong staying close to the enemy (ship)", when the IJN & Russians locked horns at Tsushima, they certainly abided by that rule. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 75.104.160.36 (talk) 01:09, 20 September 2010 (UTC)

Beatty lost two battlecruiers from a force of 6 against 5 german ones at Jutland using a strategy of closing with the enemy, who were rather surprised he allowed them to get so close before commencing shooting. Reply: Then Beatty should've been in command of the dreadnoughts, maybe then there could have been a "decisive" action! Sometimes the best commander during the most critical moments is the one that "throws caution to the wind" and goes for it! In Nelsons day the weaponry was rather different. Battles by sailing ships were very different. I would hope Nelson would have done better than Beatty. Reply: If Beatty is the one that "closed with the enemy" then it would be he that would've pleased Nelson. Overly cautious officers are great during peacetime, they keep accidents and funding to a minimum. But during wartime, it's aggressive commanders that win battles! Even though there actions may result in more casualties and more carnage. As I and others have said, what lessons there might be from Tsushima about the importance of big rather than small guns was extremely clouded by the fact the battle was at short range, where these advantages were least. Reply: Remember, until 27 May 1905, no man had ever witnessed a modern steel battleship sunk by the guns of another modern steel battleship...from two separate distinct battlelines. On this date observers got to see three (3) of them sunk strictly by battleship gunfire. How critics & students want to study them, is up to them. But this was histories first opportunity. Few military leaders have sufficient combat experience, but instead try to learn from the experience of others. Sandpiper (talk) 09:02, 10 October 2010 (UTC)

I don't see what the combat experience matters here. Reply: Togo didn't split his fires like he did at Port Arthur; he shortened his range by at least half from that of the Yellow Sea fight. Those were at least two corrections that he made, that his opponent knew nothing about. The Russian fleet was outnumbered 4 to 1, Reply: Actually this should be reversed, the Russians outnumbered the IJN in Battleships. had weaker guns, Reply: The guns were of the same quality and power; shells & rangefinders were different though. slower ships, Reply: Didn't really matter at that point of the fight, Rozhestvensky's formation had been capped (his T was crossed). had supply issues, Reply: Again, for the actual sea battle unfolding on 27 May 1905, the supply issue(s) would've been a non-priority; other than ammunition. and did not know where the enemy was (whereas the japanese fleet even knew the exact formation of the russians).Reply: Rozhestvensky's men knew, they hit Togo's flagship enough times! The battle was over before it even begun, regardless of the qualities of the commanders. Reply: Yes, for the reasons you stated at the end of this paragraph. The only thing which could have saved the russians was if they'd turned and run immediately when they found out they were detected. Reply: This is a rather amazing statement, because this would have been the final solution for their survival!213.112.199.226 (talk) 16:58, 29 October 2010 (UTC)

A 3rd Russian Pacific Squadron?

The term "suicide mission" that Rozhestvensky supposedly sailed on in October 1904 for the Far East (Far Orient) could not have applied to him, as Port Arthur and the Yellow Sea (the only battleship fleet actions fought) certainly were not naval battles that ...could have struck fear into the heart's of men! That, was in all probability simply to enhance publishing sales by the writers. However, IF there had been a 3rd Pacific Fleet dispatched to the Pacific to replace Rozhestvensky's destroyed 2nd Pacific Fleet...the term "suicide mission" (to the Pacific) would almost certainly HAVE APPLIED. As a matter of fact, it was the Tsushima Battle that supplied the fuel for the mutiny aboard Russian battleship Potemkin in 1905, which was triggered by bad food for the men.

People do not have to be afraid of a mission for it to be suicidal. In the event, describing it as such was proved correct by events. Sandpiper (talk) 20:01, 10 October 2010 (UTC)

Reply The dictionary defines "suicide" as intentional destruction..., and "suicidal" as leading to, or foolishly, or rashly dangerous. The closest definition pertaining to Rozhestvensky's fleet would be foolishly or rashly dangerous; and yet again, there was no precedence for their sailing to destruction to demonstrate any "foolishness or rashness" on their part. As stated above, the only battleship actions were Port Arthur and the Yellow Sea, neither of which, as stated previously, were the type of actions that struck fear into the hearts of men!" —Preceding unsigned comment added by 75.105.32.52 (talk) 06:36, 31 October 2010 (UTC)

Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan on Tsushima

Mahan's view on the "Battle of the Japan Sea", more commonly referred to as the battle of Tsushima, was that Admiral Togo had defeated Admiral Rozhestvensky by relative positioning, and not by battleship speed and guns; as advocated by Admiral Jacky Fisher during his promotion for the UK Dreadnought battleship.

He argues that the Russian Baltic Fleet, later re-designated the 2nd Pacific Squadron, had orders to reinforce the Russian battleship squadron at Port Arthur, and later, while still under steam for that objective, their orders were changed to Vladivostak. Admiral Rozhestvensky was to reach his objective by avoiding "contact" with the Japanese Navy, failing that, he was to continue his advance to Vladivostak with as little fighting as possible. Russia had adapted a defensive strategy during this war, in which they would reinforce their battleship squadrons at either Port Arthur or Vladivostak, then once combined, they would face off with the Japanese Navy in one decisive naval battle.

To forego this, Admiral Togo intended to, and ultimately did, bring Admiral Rozhestvensky to battle, before he reached his assigned objective. The Japanese admiral, with the use of wireless communications, had placed his reconnaissance vessels out over a hundred miles from his command group. Thus, when visually contacted, the scouts were able to signal the Russian Fleet's composition, speed, and bearing to Admiral Togo. The Japanese admiral now had a picture of Rozhestvensky's fleet.

Naval Intelligence had already made known to Togo of Rozhestvensky's mission, that of reaching Vladivostak, but addressing which route he would take getting there was the question. Again, the Japanese reconnaissance elements came into play, and by their reports, Togo prepared his fight in the Tsushima Straits.

Even though Togo knew that Rozhestvensky's battleship's speeds had been reduced by their long voyage, which had fouled their bottoms, Togo positioned his battle line in the Tsushima Straits "preserving his interior lines of movement...", creating less distances to cover for himself, regardless of Rozhestvensky's speed; and guaranteed the Russian Fleet would be brought to battle.

In Mahan's description, Togo had positioned himself to "steer east taking a perpendicular of a right angled triangle..." while leaving Rozhestvensky's battleships the "hypothenuse", or the other side of the verticle angle, which together formed a triangle. In simpler terms, it appears that Togo had crossed Rozhestvensky's T; and the Russian battleships were unable to deliver effective broadsides.

Mahan advocated the retention of secondary batteries, as the "holed" funnels, reduced the speed of warships; although not necessarily a deciding factor in this battle, as compared to positioning, he none the less agreed that speed had played a role at Tsushima. Three (3) Russian battleships had been sunk by gunfire alone: the Oslyabya, Alexander III, and the class leader of the Borodino pre-dreadnoughts, the Borodino. This brought into question whether or not "shots penetrating near or below the water line were the cause...". The assumption was that the Russian battleships had been over-loaded with "coal" (fuel), etc. which had caused submerged armor belts, exposing the un-armored portions of the battleship hulls to enemy gunfire. This, Mahan does not totally dismiss, but he does question how those battleships could have been so crowded with coal after sailing so far. They should have been nearly empty, or at least not very full.

In the end, Mahan writes, that with the exceptions of surrender or retreat, the Russian admiral had but two choices at Tsushima; "a direct charge in line abreast" or a formal "pitched battle." The latter was chosen, but Rozhestvensky's double column (which he had tried to change to no effect) could not bring their full broadsides into play.

• U.S. Naval Proceedings Magazine, June 1906, Volume XXXII, Number 2. Reflections, Historic and Other, Suggested by the Battle of the Japan Sea. By Captain A. T. Mahan, USN. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 74.93.176.154 (talk) 18:31, 6 November 2010 (UTC)

Admiral Jacky Fisher (Sir John Arbuthnot Fisher)

The Royal Navy's Jacky Fisher was born in Asia (Ceylon, now called Sri Lanka; p. 407 from Robert K. Massie's book entitled Dreadnought, Britain, Germany, and the coming of the Great War; published in 1991). Admiral Fisher appeared to be Asian in physical appearance, and was labeled as an Oriental, or at least a Eurasian (p. 403) by his opponents, such as Captain Wilheim Widenmann of the Imperial German Navy, as one example (Ref: P. 403). As a result of such up-bringing, Jacky was a fighter.

Admiral Fisher began scrapping the RN fleet against the criticisms of the British politicians and Royal Navy (fellow naval officers), determined as he was to create newer and better warships for the RN (ref: P. 463-465). The term "Maverick", consequently, referred to in the above editorial comments was most likely intended to be a polite term for an other wise determined, and aggressive British Admiral. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 74.93.21.110 (talk) 17:54, 23 October 2010 (UTC)

Accusations of orientality may have come only late in life. Supposedly he turned somewhat yellow after getting seriously ill in mid life in egypt. Then, it was his political enemies who were throwing about slurs. Maverick implies not so much how you do something as what you do. He may have had opponents but he clearly also had supporters and could not otherwise have done anything. He was not simply aggressive but clearly charismatic. Sandpiper (talk) 08:30, 30 October 2010 (UTC)

Reply: Generally agree. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 75.105.32.38 (talk) 01:22, 8 November 2010 (UTC)

Rangefinders

All Russian 1st and 2nd class warships in Tsushima had from 2 to 4 Barr&Stoude FA-2 rangefinders. The Lujols were used for back-up only, in the same fashion as Fiske hand-held devices. The first shot from "Suvorov" on "Mikasa" was off by only 15-20 yards at 3.2 miles distance. In the first 10 minutes "Mikasa" was hit 15 times. That testifies more than anything else to the quality of Russian fire-control, at least initially, before the rangefinders and optical gun-sights were thrown out of alignment. The Forczyk's Osprey-series book ("Murzilka") is the biggest piece of trash written on the subject recently. I can't believe such a kindergarten-level pamphlet could appear in this day and age. Retvizan-LA (talk) 22:49, 8 February 2011 (UTC)

This article is in serious need of clean up. However, I am on a mobile device and unable to tag it myself. Could someone assist? —Preceding unsigned comment added by 165.91.15.52 (talk) 21:53, 31 March 2011 (UTC)

Timeline tense

Is there a good reason why a description of events of over a century ago is written in the present tense? Roger (talk) 07:09, 25 August 2011 (UTC)

• Most contributers probably aren't professional or experienced writers, so possibly it's just their style Roger. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 67.139.60.34 (talk) 00:09, 6 April 2012 (UTC)

Only decisive battleship battle?

I believe the Battle of the Denmark Strait was also decisive. --Whoop whoop pull up ^{Bitching Betty | Averted crashes} 20:15, 10 June 2011 (UTC)

• Battleship is short for...LINE-OF-BATTLE-SHIP (from the old days). Or SHIP OF THE LINE. Tsushima was the only DECISIVE Line-of-Battle(ship) fleet action ever fought. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 67.139.60.34 (talk) 00:04, 6 April 2012 (UTC)

• Whoop whoop you needed to focus on the word "fleet" action. Battleship fleet action (not an aircraft fleet, cruiser fleet, destroyer fleet, etc.). — Preceding unsigned comment added by 99.111.48.153 (talk) 00:40, 13 April 2012 (UTC)

Authority and Approval

Authority is sanctioned, approval generally is not. Example: "Approval for the project is granted pending further review, upon which authorization will be given to proceed." No changes were made to the article, as authority and approval can be at times like "spilting hairs." — Preceding unsigned comment added by 69.62.163.96 (talk) 21:01, 7 July 2012 (UTC)

New image

In case this article's main editors are interested. — Crisco 1492 (talk) 11:48, 11 October 2013 (UTC)

Contradiction

In the 'Prelude' section, para 1 we have: "Overall neither side had a significant maneuverability advantage..." but in para 2 of the same section this springs up: "...Tōgō was able to use the superior maneuverability of his fleet to his advantage..."

Clearly one of these statements is wrong, but which ?

RASAM (talk) 18:50, 11 October 2013 (UTC)

Somebody hates the Borodino?

Why does every single ship mentioned in the article have a link to its own page except the Borodino? There was one link to Borodino-class battleship, but none the the ship itself. There were several places were it lists a number of ships, all blue links, only to leave one single ship in black text...the Borodino. Is that on purpose? Why would you take the time to link every ship in the list and then leave that one last ship out? Anyway, I went through and changed several references to the Borodino into links, so anyone who wants to read about it can do so without going through the page of the Borodino-class battleship to get there..45Colt 06:02, 5 March 2014 (UTC) — Preceding unsigned comment added by .45Colt (talk • contribs)

Outlandish and inaccurate statement?

"The Battle of Tsushima was the only sea battle in history in which steel, engined-powered battleships fought a decisive fleet action." Does anyone else think this sentence is a bit over the top. What about the Battle of Jutland or any of the numerous battles in WWII in which battleships were a part of? Note: Jutland was NOT a decisive battleship FLEET action. Additionally, Jutland was primarily fought with battlecruisers; those were the largest losses sustained. WWII was dominated by carriers. HMS Hood was a battlecruiser. Prince of Wales and Bismark were single units. -Brozozo 01:08, 31 May 2007 (UTC)

• I believe that is why it says "was the only sea battle." --ScottyBoy900Q 04:11, 20 July 2007 (UTC)
  • Then shouldn't it be "the first" rather than "was"? —Preceding unsigned comment added by 68.57.109.180 (talk) 17:29, 12 October 2010 (UTC)
• No, because "the first" would imply that there was a "second" battle; which there wasn't. Consequently, the word (or term) "only" is used, which indicates "it only happened once in naval history" (just like it was all said to begin with). —Preceding unsigned comment added by 75.104.160.36 (talk) 06:09, 23 October 2010 (UTC)
  • World War 2 did not see a single "fleet action" between battleships. Only one surface action of the war (Surigao Strait) saw both sides with more than a single battleship, and that one was still not a fleet action as the Japanese force consisted of only 7 ships, 3 or 4 of which were lost to destroyers. Statalyzer (talk) 03:25, 18 April 2014 (UTC)

Battle of Denmark Strait was not a "battleship fleet" action

This is the second time, since 2007 that a reader missed the work "fleet" when he questioned the Tsushima naval battle. If one were to look up at #11 "Outlandish and inacurrate statement" he will find that the "Denmark Strait" naval action was sufficiently answered, and better than is being presented here. The Denmark Strait, nor any other WWII sea fight was a clash of battle ship fleets (fleets of the battle line slugging it out). The only exceptions were Leyte Gulf, and maybe some other small battlewagon engagements. The Tsushima reader might want to remember, Tsushima wasn't a clash between individual units (battleships), but of ships of the line; forming opposing battlelines...as battleships were designed and intended to do battle. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 99.111.48.153 (talk) 00:38, 13 April 2012 (UTC)

• And even Leyte Gulf did not include a single battleship fleet action. Nishimura's force of 2 battleships, 1 cruiser, and 4 destroyers was not a "battleship fleet". Statalyzer (talk) 03:35, 18 April 2014 (UTC)

Inaccurate track charts

The track charts used in this article, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Battle_of_Tsushima_(Chart_1-3)_J.PNG ... https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Battle_of_Tsushima_(Chart_10)_J.PNG, are inaccurate. Japanese Wikipedia stopped using them. For accurate charts, see 「日本海海戦第１合戦分図」(アジア歴史資料センター) http://www.jacar.go.jp/nichiro2/sensoushi/kaijou_09_detail.html (sorry in Japanese). Kkddkkdd (talk) 15:44, 7 September 2014 (UTC)

issues with article

have just been reading about Tsushima in my extended pup-crawl of the victorian navy up to WW1. Padfield/The battleship era, which is one of those summary books discussing the rise and fall of the battleship through history, considerably downplays Tsushima's significance. This article starts by saying The battle demonstrated that big guns with longer ranges were more advantageous during naval battles than mixed batteries of different sizes. Well, no, at least according to padfield it did not. For example, he says the Japanese had 16 12in guns and 112 8 and 6 in. The Russians had 16 modern 12in guns, another 10 older ones, 17 10in and 121 6-8 in. In other words, the losing side had more big guns than the winners. Hardly an immediate demonstration of their ability.

He says the Japanese ships were nearly twice as fast as the russians, who were hampered by the presence of slow coastal defence ships which should never have been sent. This allowed the Japanese to dictate range and positioning. The Japanese had better shells. The russian ships were overloaded so their armour belts were below the waterline and holes above it let in water. The victory was accomplished by an overwhelming hail of fire of all sorts, not by precision gunnery which didn't exist in the sense later achieved. The japanese were better shots and generally were under orders not to waste shells by shooting when they did not have a good target. The russians acknowledged their own gunnery was terrible. It was a victory achieved by going in all guns blazing and thus certainly did not demonstrate that only big guns mattered. Rather, this sounds like a vindication of the then-existing notion that actions would be decided at medium range by weight of broadside slowly reducing the enemy to scrap. Togo withdrew and used destroyer/torpedo attacks when that was more effective, as his superior speed allowed him to do. Togo was the better admiral, and in general Padfield is very disparaging about all russian commanders (except apparently Makarov, who had been in charge of the russian fleet at port arthur until unfortunately killed when his ship hit a mine).

If there was an object lesson to be drawn from this, it was perhaps encouragement to the German kaiser of how an inferior fleet might hope to take on a better equipped but poorly trained one and dispose of it piece by piece, which turned out to be german strategy in WW1. Sandpiper (talk) 22:19, 15 October 2009 (UTC)

• "Well, no, at least according to padfield it did not. For example, he says the Japanese had 16 12in guns and 112 8 and 6 in. The Russians had 16 modern 12in guns, another 10 older ones, 17 10in and 121 6-8 in. In other words, the losing side had more big guns than the winners. Hardly an immediate demonstration of their ability" .... the problem with this argument is that the statement "Tsushima demonstrated that the bigger guns of the battleships dominated their smaller armament" is unrelated to how many big guns each side has. It is very related to the range of the bigger guns dictating the range of the conflict and inflicting the vast majority of the critical damage. Admiral Jackie Fisher was the first to notably draw this conclusion (along with the conclusion that even a small speed advantage was crucial) and this is what led him to create the Dreadnought. Statalyzer (talk) 03:25, 18 April 2014 (UTC)

The Greater the Foe, the Greater the Glory

In reference to the above, "issues with article" and the statement, "...considerably downplays Tsushima's significance..."; you made an excellent point! It might be best to consider the author(s) before coming to any conclusions on the Battle of Tsushima. Here's a few examples of why, for starters:

1. C.S. Forester (Cecil Scott Forester) was the pen name of a British writer named Cecil Louis Troughton Smith (1899-1966). C.S. Forester wrote the book titled, "Hunting the Bismarck" in 1959.

2. Britain produced a film based on the British writer's book, and titled it, "Sink the Bismarck" in 1960.

And, as EVERYONE knows; the mighty German battleship was an excellent ship, with an excellent crew. And the British Navy defeated them! Thus; for Britain...the greater the foe, the greater the glory!

Now enter, the Battle of Tsushima:

1. British(?) writer Mr. Padfield down-grades the Battle of Tsushima. According to the "...issues with article..." author.

2. British(?) writer Geoffrey Regan (in the Wikipedia article) states, "...but it's opponents (Russians) had been weak..."

Therefore, according to these British writers, the Japanese victory was not very great because their enemy was inferior (the Russians). "The weaker the foe, the weaker the glory."

Writer's are human beings, and humans can suffer from vanity. It is possible that some form of "National" vanity has surfaced into some of these British writings.

British (writers) vanity or facts?:

1. The Russians had twenty-six 12" guns and sixteen 10" guns. The IJN had sixteen 12" guns. Reference "Russian Battleship vs Japanese Battleship" by Forczyk, p. 59.

2. The 18,000 mile voyage caused the Russian battleships to have reduced speed, not terrible seamanship (an element of being "weak" according to Geoffrey Regan). Ref: Forczyk, p. 32.

3. IJN battleships didn't go "twice as fast as Russian battleships", only a few knots, due to fouled hulls from the voyage. Ref: p. 32.

4. Russian battleships OVERLOADED with coal...while attempting to breach the Tsushima Straites!? This has been a very common statement by nearly all writers. About as common as stating that the Russian battleships were all obsolete (which again, inferred that the IJN had defeated an obsolete batch of outdated warships). 1) How could the Russian battleships still be overloaded with coal after journeying 18,000 miles? 2) How could the Russian battleships be outdated and obsolete, when four of the battleships, to include the FLAGSHIP were so new, that the journey itself had been their SHAKE DOWN CRUISE!? 3) Those Borodino class battleships as was the Tsesarevich represented the very latest in (French) naval technology, so much so, that todays 21st century Zumwalt destroyer(s) contemplated utilizing those same hull forms.

5. The Russian sailors have largely been accused (by those same or similar aforementioned writers?) of being not only poor seamen, but poor gunners; and yet they managed to hit the IJN flagship 15 times with 12" shells in 5 minutes. Ref: p. 59. The Russians also fired approximately 4 12-inch shells every minute and 18 6-inch shells every 60 seconds.

6. Mr. Padfield's down playing of the Tsushima fight, might well consider the fact that the keel of HMS Dreadnaught was laid over 4 months after Tsushima (in October 1905) and not before, nor during the Battle of Tsushima. For the obvious reason(s) that Whitehall desired to know the results of such a ship (Dreadnaught) before they gave approval to the actual building of it.

7. And lastly, if those Russian battleships at Tsushima had been German battleships instead (all of equal vintage for their era); would they have tried to run away (as they did at Jutland)? Admiral Rozhestvensky COULD have surrendered; the Germans at Jutland DID run away (the proper term might be "retreated" but the RESULT is the same). So the Russian Admiral who chooses to fight (almost to the death) is treated as incompetent, whereas the German Admiral who flees the field of battle (at Jutland) is called a great commander (by the British)? (There's that "The Greater the foe...greater the glory... again). And the German High Seas Fleet certainly didn't jump from an 18,000 mile voyage directly into a hot sea battle! But Admiral Rozhestvensky certainly did. And hit the IJN flagship 15 times (with 12" main gun fire) as soon as he went into action.

Before jumping to conclusions, consider the source! (Of those authors). —Preceding unsigned comment added by 71.197.120.23 (talk) 09:12, 22 March 2010 (UTC)

Sorry, this is a very drawn out debate and didnt see this reply before posting again below. I dont know as much about this battle as I need to to rewrite the article, but on the basis of information to date:

Im british, read only english and therefor read what is published in English. You accuse the english of downplaying the Japanese success, but Im not sure this is the automatic bias. The Japanese were very much a british proxy at this time, with battleships based on British designs, whereas, as you say, the main russian battleships were based on French designs. So I think the British were rooting for the Japanese. There seem to be some contemporary russian accounts deatailing how disastrously bad was the russian fleet (available online). The russian admiralty was corrupt and prone to nepotism rather than ability. The Japanese seem to have had the benefit of a 'fresh start', as did the Germans, in basing entry requirements much more on ability instead of family tradition or highly placed relatives. User:Sandpiper

Reply: Accusation is a strong word; was simply stating authors & film producers, to include (although not listed above) the current military channel/history channel television series, supported and/or sponsored by...BBC, Sandhurst, Imperial War Museum, etc. which all happen to be British (UK). The victor writes the rules remember (they also write the history). Point #2, Japan was a proxy only to the point of their 1902 treaty with Britain. Otherwise, the UK didn't want Japan to get anymore powerful than they thought they might. Which is why Britain heavily tried to sway the IJN from getting "too involved" against Admiral Von Spee's squadron during WWI. It was little bit of the same treatment that the USN gave the RN in the Pacific during WWII (termed "short-legged" (short ranged) by the USN, being unable to re-fuel at sea). And yes, the British were rooting for the IJN, so was the US...but then did they really believe they'd actually win?! When the IJN did win, it was..."Oh Oh!"

1 The russians had more big guns, which contributes to the issue of how this battle demonstrated their decisive importance since the russians lost. However, half of them were older designs which fired slowly and were on the older ships, which were not taking part in the modern battleship exchanges which decided the encounter. Even so, the 12 in guns on most sides seem to have performed poorly and could not penetrate main armour. Most damage was don by medium calibre guns demolishing the unprotected parts of ships. The best you can say about this battle for 12 in guns is that it demonstrated their potential. {User:Sandpiper thinks he wrote this para and is now trying to sort out the conversation interweave}

Reply: Again, this is academic. It's not what kind of gun you use...but how you use it! Another words...it's bullet placement! But, for the sake of discussion, the IJN had a main battle-line of 16 12" tubes (discounting obsolete canet guns carried aboard some cruisers); the Russian's had a primary battle-line consisting of about 26 12" tubes, of which 16 were mounted upon the new Borodinos. Consequently, the "primary" batteries would've amounted to 16 tubes vs 16 tubes, if only the "newest" of each sides battleships were counted.

Different guns had different abilities. The main advantage of big guns to Fisher was their ability to operate at long range. Hit the enemy at a distance at which he could not reply. Fisher was a firm believer in stacking the odds his way. This advantage was not apparent at Tsushima where the ships fought at relatively close ranges so that the smaller guns were also effective. Reply: According to Russian naval officer Semenov (also spelled Semenoff) and British naval officer Pakenham who were "there" on the battlefield (sea battle), the 12" shells were far more effective than smaller shells. Pakenham's report was transmitted to Fisher. The battle did not rely on another advantage of big guns, that their big shell had a greater 'punch' once it arrived, so was able to penetrate main armour. Reply: Again, according to Semenov and Pakenham, the IJN fire was "over-whelming" and killed Russian crewmen, and started horrific fires, including amongst the painted steel upper deck areas. Penetrating main armour didnt happen, for whatever reason. Reply: Many of the Russian shells were duds, and almost all of the IJN shells were set for contact detonation...thus the fires. The contact explosions "holed" the funnels, thus causing a loss in warship speed (engine pressure was lost). In effect, this was very similar to the British and French methods of naval warfare during the age of wooden ships & sails; one side preferred to "hole" their opponent's wooden hull, whilst the other preferred to "de-mast" their enemy. In effect, the IJN was "de-masting" the Russian battlewagons. The battle was fought by attrition: Reply: The battle was fought via the use of "over-whilming (concentrated) fire power." (Ref: Semenov & Pakenham). a smaller shell makes a smaller hole, but if there are more of them, then they are equally capable of demolishing an enemy ship. Reply: Agree. This was also an argument used by naval officers to retain the secondary batteries. This was the reasoning behind battleship design at that time, weight of broadside, however it was made up, could demolish the enemy faster than he could demolish you. The Japanese ships followed existing british designs which were based on this idea of how a battle would be conducted, and all in all rather vindicated it. Thus the battle gave no direct evidence of advantages from big guns. Reply: Again, two naval officers who "witnessed the whole spectacle" will say otherwise...and again, their reports (at least one of them) reached "Fisher's Dreadnought" committee. Sandpiper (talk) 09:02, 10 October 2010 (UTC)

Reply: Now, did the Russians have BAD ships, or did they have ships that no-one, not even the commanders, had tried in battle before? BigRift (talk) 03:03, 28 October 2014 (UTC)

2 accounts I read say the seamanship was terrible, and Rozhestvensky thought it was too, the new ships were packed with new recruits including conscripts who had never been to sea. There was never any occasion for proper practices.User:Sandpiper

Reply: "Mad Dog" was hard to please, as any hard (tough) commander should be. And he wasn't called "Mad Dog" for nothing.

• Was the DKM Bismarck "packed with new recruits?" She was on her maiden voyage when she fought and sank.

• Were DKM sailors conscripted?
• Was the Prince of Wales "packed with new recruits?" She too was on her maiden voyage, she even had civilian workmen on board during the fight.
• Were British sailors drafted?
• Did Nelson's navy use "press gangs" to fill this ranks?
• Remember, the Russian Navy was the "new kid on the block" in Europe, and they learned their naval ways from primarily the Royal Navy and the French.

I suspect Togo was also hard to please?Reply: Your suspicions are probably correct.Russia was not the 'new kid on the block'.Reply: Yes, Russia was the "new kid on the block", Russia had been trying to become a naval power since Peter the Great in the 1700s. They even enlisted foreign sailors to help them out, the American war hero John Paul Jones served in the Russian navy after he fought in the American Revolutionary War (1776-1783). The Crimean War was partly fought to keep Russia in check due to "...strategic rivalries amongst Britain, France, and Russia (Ref: World Book Encyclopedia vol. 4 (2009 edition) p. 1143). One of the terms of settlement for the Crimean War was that "...no military-MARITIME arsenals..." were to be maintained by Russia in the Crimean region (Ref: The Encyclopedia Americana International Edition (1997) Vol. 8, p. 205). Japan and Germany were the 'new kids'.Reply: Not quite; Germany didn't exist until 1871, after the Franco-Prussian War, and Japan is not in Europe (they're not part of the European neighborhood). Both of them seem to have set about creating serious fighting forces. Japanese sailors seem to have been highly motivated and keen to do a good job Reply: The Japanese are a maritime people (Ref: Samuel Eliot Morison, vol. 3), and like the British seamen, it was expected of them., whereas most russians just wished they werent there Reply: MOST DRAFTEES wished they weren't there! (No matter their nationality, no matter the war). Press gangs' do not necessarily deliver a bad crew. An angry one, yes, but if you press competent sailors, then you still get a capable one. Reply: The term "Press Gangs" was used to show that Britain "drafted their men too" not just the Russians. You're absolutely correct, sometimes "draftees (press gang men)" make up some of the best fighting men, on sea or land (or in the sky). The books I read say there were no competent sailors to be had in Russia. Reply: Not a fair statement, so consider the source. There's almost never an absolute "yes" or "no" in war. The "correct" statement or more accurate statement would've been, "...there were very few competent sailors to be had in Russia..." Which is true, because Russia has traditionally always been a LAND-LOCKED nation. Which is why they had to hire foreign sailors to help them modernize. I dont know if Togos men were conscripts or all volunteers, but they were not picked at the last minute and rushed into action with inadequate training. Reply: They were mostly draftees (conscripts), very few men enjoy excessive discipline! And most navies during those days were ROUGH on men. During the Mexican War (1846-1848) the US Navy still flogged it's men, while for the most part, the US Army had largely discontinued it. In WW1 some British ships also suffered from having untrained reserve crews rushed into action, for example those sent to Coronel. Reply: Most, if not all services, in nearly all wars, from all nations, have had to use "untrained men" at some point and time during war. Combat experienced men are NOT BORN, they have to be "blooded" (combat experienced)...and that cannot happen until there is an opportunity to fight a war. Therefore, long periods of peace can nearly destroy a military. "Had peace time continued much longer, I fear the men would be wearing rouge (female make-up)!" (Frederick the Great) Sandpiper (talk) 09:02, 10 October 2010 (UTC)

3 I exagerated, but as far as fighting a naval battle is concerned, just 1 knot speed advantage is enough to allow you to set the range and choose to close or widen. The issue was not how fast the brand new russian borodinos were, which was about international strandard, but how fast the old ships forming the fleet could go. A fleet can only travel as fast as its slowest ship. This was why Rozhestvensky tried despearately to get rid of the older ships, thinking he was better off without them as he could travel faster.User:Sandpiper

Reply: At the commencement of "battle" the "self-sinkers" (as Mad Dog called them) were quickly left behind...he had a fight to deal with. Those vessels probably depressed him more than anything else during the voyage.

But he still had the slower fleet unless he was willing to abandon most of his ships. One of the problems was that he failed to concentrate his ships attacks while Togo did, allowing Togo to pick off Russian ships one by one. In particular, Togo concentrated on the Russian command ships, and once the Russian admirals lost the ability to control the remainder, the whole Russian fleet ceased to act as one fleet. Heck, one Russian admiral was dead before the battle started.Reply: He passed away from natural causes enroute to the Pacific. His death was kept a secret (military secret) for obvious reasons, to not jeopardize the spirit of the crews. In those days, many sailors used to be "superstitious", and such news of one of their dead "leaders" very well could have cast further gloom upon an otherwise still worrisome voyage. He failed to demonstrate initiative, or skilled leadership as it proceeded. Reply: Quite the contrary! What naval leader in history has ever sailed "new battleships" (this was a shakedown cruise for the new Borodino class battleships) combined with "old battleships" (to slow him down), new crews, on the longest coal powered battleship fleet voyage in the annals of recorded history? None, except Rozhestvensky correct? Just getting there with "no loss of ships" was an historic feat! Secondly, immediately upon arriving in sector (region), Rozhestvensky was violently thrown into naval histories only decisive battleship fleet action ever fought! This type of war experience (lightning quick and decisive) may have occurred to navy men during WWII, when the advent of aircraft carriers brought high speed and surprise to "old time surface sailors", but in 1905...no man alive ever experienced what Admiral Rozhestvensky experienced! Sandpiper (talk) 09:02, 10 October 2010 (UTC)

4 the French built tsarevitch seems to have been a better ship than her four russian built classmates. The russian versions were 600 tons heavier and consequently floated 2ft lower in the water. This meant the thicker hull armour, which was supposed to reach above the water line, didnt. This was a common issue on several russian designs, they floated too low. This meant that in battle thinner armour was at the water line which could be more easily penetrated and the ships flooded. Armour thickness varied from place to place, but in fact the maximum on the borodinos was 7.5 in, less than the 9 in on the tsarevitch. Some of the extra weight was apparently used to improve officers quarters. Under standard conditions there should still have been 2ft of armour above the waterline on the heavier borodinos, which isnt much of a margin in any kind of sea. The ships were loaded with 2-3 times their normal allowance of coal, which seems to have left them 4-6 feet lower in the water than the original design. Hence the armour was underwater. The ships could not carry anything like enough coal to travel from russia to Japan so refuelled many time on the way. When they set out on the last leg to Vladivostok they would have been carrying as much coal as possible once again. I dont know exactly how much was left by the battle. Apparently there is debate over the hull form, which it has been suggested was a contributor to quick capsize/sinking after starting to take on water. This might not be an issue in modern warships which aren't expected to survive multiple shell damage? User:Sandpiper

Reply: Again, the Russian navy learned from other European navies, and "officer's quarters" were over-done. Russian engines were used instead of the French engines which caused a modification of the hulls themselves...which turned out to be an inferior design; the Tsarevitch had much more tumblehome than did the Borodinos, was a far more beautiful ship, and was designed/built better, because it was designed for the engines that the Tsarevitch used. #2 the re-fueling (coaling) problem was a DIRECT RESULT of the British-Japanese Treaty of 1902; Britain made sure the Russian Fleet stayed neutral during their journey (above all else, the Russians greatly feared/respected the Royal Navy). Which made it near impossible for the Russians to re-coal enroute...they had to hire contractors, re-coal at sea, and SNEAK into un-authorized ports and hidden bays in order to gain fuel.

Not sure what you are saying? Are you agreeing that the russian ships were overloaded with coal even during the battle because of these coaling difficulties?Reply: Stating that during construction, the Borodinos were built top heavy to satisfy the luxury needs of the Russian naval officers. Another words, they kept "adding more and more" things to the ships during construction. Thus making them heavier and more top heavy. I know they were working under great difficulties and Rozhestvensky seems to have impressed the world simply by getting there, but that still left him with overloaded ships on the day. Reply: This might have been an "easy way out" for some writers of those days, in trying to make up excuses on why a Western navy was defeated by an Eastern navy. The Russian Baltic Fleet (later redesignated the 2nd Pacific Fleet) was indeed over-loaded with coal when they left the Baltic Sea. But after 18,000 miles, and after extreme difficulty in "re-coaling" by stealth (hidden in neutral ports...like French Indo-China (later known as South Vietnam), or upon the high-seas, it is standard proceedure for any vehicle, be they airplane, car, tank, or ship, to be LOW ON FUEL near the end of it's journey! Unlike, for example, sandbags, sacks of coal lying about also did not help extinguish fires on the decks. I am not concerned with why the ships were overloaded either with coal or with additional superstructure, but the fact they existed and pushed the armoured sections to below the water line. Thus the question of whether the enemy could achieve armour penetrating hits with its big guns became entirely academic. It didnt need to.Sandpiper (talk) 09:02, 10 October 2010 (UTC)

5 The russian success at gunnery you mention occurred when the japanese fleet executed a turn in succession, generally considered a foolish move because it exposes every ship in turn on the same patch of sea, making an easy target. At this point the japanese also had not commenced firing: it is a lot easier (apparently) aiming well if explosions all around are not upsetting your aim. Early russian success tailed off rather when they came under fire. Forczyk also says the russians wasted 10 minutes of these good conditions before deciding to start shooting. The actual quote does not make it clear whether the hits were 12 in or 6 in rounds.User:Sandpiper

Reply: "...Generally considered foolish...?" by whom? Which navy had performed that maneuver before in actual battle, in order to pass such judgement? If that manuever hadn't been done before "in actual battle" then whose to say whether it'll work or not...besides, that comes under the old saying of, "if you succeed you'll be a hero, it you fail you'll be flogged!" In Togo's case he was a hero. #2-You're correct, shooting at "turning" ships is easy prey, but it still counts as good shooting...just as a WWII fighter shooting down a "slow big target" such as a twin/four engine bomber is "easy" shooting...but it stills COUNTS towards ACE status!

Generally considered foolish, eg by commentators of the battle of Jutland when Beatty ordered a similar turn of british battleships while under fire. Reply: Those commentators might have been armchair strategists. The dictionary defines an "armchair strategist" as characterized by a lack of practical experience. Another words, those folks use 20/20 hindsight, they're spectators sitting in the bleachers, they're not in the arena with the Gladiators doing battle. It's easy for them to pass judgement, since they're not under the stress of combat. During the Vietnam War there once was a US Cavalryman who had two M551 Sheridan tanks blown from under him. When issued a third one, he quickly requested (and recieved) a new job driving the Captain's jeep. That's one small example of combat stress. Few, if any "armchair strategists" would've considered that cavalryman's mental state when addressing an historical battle. The maneuver gave the russians an opening, though on the whole they failed to exploit it. I am not here seeking to criticise Togo by the standards at the time, but simply state he did give the Russians an opportunity, Reply: Togo performed that manuever for only one reason; to maintain "himself" (his battleship) at the head of the column. Had he ordered each individual vessel to turn about in place, then he (his ship) would've been at the tail end, and he wanted to personally command that sea fight, not gamble with a subordinate possibly blowing the only chance they had. and I think this was the only time they managed to get their act together against him. Reply: That's when the Russians had their best time yes; because as soon as Togo had his battleline formed, he cut loose with his guns. Sandpiper (talk) 09:02, 10 October 2010 (UTC)

6 if dreadnought's keel was laid 4 months after tsushima, the design was underway well before tsushima. Similarly the japanese themselves were already working on an all big gun design before the battle. Whether or not anything had happened at Tsushima, Fisher would have pushed through Dreadnought. He had been working on it for years.

Reply: The discussion concerns HMS Dreadnought, the IJN's new ship designs are NOT applicable here, as Dreadnought was first. #2-Not without funding he wouldn't. And no government's going to put out billions in cash for something unless they have sufficient cause.

You miss the point that the British navy was the worlds biggest with the biggest budget and was willing to spend on new designs in accord with its size. Reply: Not stating that the UK wouldn't finance ONE (experimental) warship; was stating that the UK would not scrap the whole fleet without cause. The first sea lord had enormous authority and influence and hand picked the committee to consider the Dreadnought design from his supporters. The British built some awful experimental ships which were declared successes and sent into service. Had dreadnought failed they would probably not have built more, but spending the money for an entire experimental ship was quite normal. Consider HMS Captain (1869) or even HMS Victoria (1887). Victoria's sinking wasn't down to her design directly, unlike Captain which was simply unstable, but it didnt help. Happily her main armament of 16 in guns wasnt called into battle, but it was chosen for political reasons and was impractical. Had they stuck to 12 in guns, then she might have been designed with 4 matched big guns 15 years before dreadnought. They built two of those. The japanese ships, based on british naval designs, were the beneficiaries of whatever was learnt from british naval experimental ships failures (and successes). As I recall it, although Dreadnought was first built, that was only because Fisher pushed through construction in half the normal time. Otherwise other navies might have completed their dreadnoughts first and we would have a different class name. The americans had construction problems and so did the japanese. The truth is that dreadnought was not a revolution but an evolution. Reply: Sounds about right. What Fisher did was not so much something stunningly new but to bring together the existing latest technology into one design. Despite a willingness to try experimental designs, the British also had a tendency to rely on established ones. Fisher pushed the pace of change. Incidentally, directly because of pressure from 'new kid on the block', Germany. Reply: With Russia out of the game; yes, in May 1905, Germany was now the "new kid on the block."Sandpiper (talk) 09:02, 10 October 2010 (UTC)

7 Rozhestvensky could not have surrendered. That was a clear part of his orders, that this was not an alternative. The fleet set out in full knowledge it was probably a suicide mission. Even if he wanted to run from Togo, the only friendly place he could go was vladivostock, and to do that he had to either sneak past or defeat Togo. At jutland the Germans knew there was a friendly port quite near, if they could get around Jellicoe, which they managed during the night. Sandpiper (talk) 10:19, 6 August 2010 (UTC)

Reply: Naval History's last surrender of a Battle-Fleet on the high seas was the Battle of Tsushima, when Russian Admiral Nebogatov (Rozhestvensky was badly wounded & unconscious at the time) surrendered his warships to Togo the following morning on 28 May 1905. #2-Admirals Rozhestvensky, Vitgeft, Nebogatov, etc. could have easily fled to the German Navy port of Tsingtao it is right there along the coastline of the Yellow Sea. Its closer than the open sea itself...and the German Kaiser was a cousin to the Russian Czar (they would've been greeted with open arms)! If the Russians wanted to pull off an "Admiral Scheer" (retreat/disengagement), and wanted to stop at that German Naval facility and NOT FIGHT, they could have easily done so. #3-Regards to this often quoted Russian "suicide mission" to the Pacific. You'll note that in "some" books (and probably web sites too) that the "Russians knew they were headed on a suicide mission"; and at the very same time the writer states, "for the first time in history an Eastern (Oriental) nation defeated a Western (Occidental) one (at least since the days of Ghengis Khan)! Well, if that's the case, then how did the Russians know it was a suicide mission (before they even fought)? As a matter of fact, the Westerners under-estimated the IJN during the HMS Prince of Wales & HMS Repulse sinking on 10 December 1941, and the Battle of Savo Island in '42, USN Admiral Richmond K. Turner even stated that fact in his after action reports (ref: Frank, Guadalcanal)..."US forces thought they were mentally superior...and paid for that kind of thinking at Savo..." Consequently, Russian thinking in 1904 had to be the same as it was with the British, French, Germans, and Americans...since the Russian Navy was modeled after the European navies. Writers are commissioned to write books by the publishing companies...and DRAMA SELLS! Readers used to, and probably still do, have a fixation with "suicide missions" (especially television), this Russian suicide mission to the Orient (East) must've been to sell books! Author Steven Zaloga, in his book entitled "Armored Thunderbolt" calls such writings and television shows "SHODDY SENSATIONALISM", and he might be right. The Russians had a superiority complex as any other Western (Occidental) Navy; otherwise they never would've set sail to begin with!

The Tsar was also cousin to the king of England, but that did not mean his ships were welcome to refuel in british ports. Reply: "Two's company, Three's a crowd!" Britain and France were the chief naval players in Europe. They didn't want Germany nor Russia to play the (naval) game. So if Britain could eliminate a competitor, then they'd do it. They chose the weakest one first...Russia; goad them into a fight with Japan (which was Germany's doing), then if Russia loses, Russia's no longer a player (competitor). Britain and Japan signed the 1902 treaty, that sealed Russia's fate. fleet was not sent to Japan to shelter in port but to relieve the existing russian fleet. Reply: Not to "relieve" but to REINFORCE. To do this it had to fight its way through the Japanese. Neither of the Russian forces was adequate to assure victory by itself but only in combination. Reply: Yes, they surely knew they had to fight their way thru the IJN. And yes, the Russian forces were adequate to accomplish victory. The Russian fleet consisted of 4 BRAND NEW battleships of the latest technology and designs (French), and they had the numbers in guns (it was simply up to God and luck, or destiny or fate). Rhozestvensky knew he had an inadequate force when he set out. Reply: Rozhestvensky knew he didn't have the trained sailors (battleship crewmen) that the IJN or RN had. By the time he arrived he was certain of it, because the other russian ships had by then been lost. Reply: Of course when battle commenced, he was certain of it. It's referred to as the "moment of truth". I would think that the better an admiral you are, the more clearly you would understand that the mission you have been given is impossible to carry out. Reply: Better admiral? What's a better admiral? An Admiral that never loses a battle, but never wins one either (they're always a draw)? An Admiral that wins every battle but loses many men and ships whenever he fights? An Admiral that never fights, never loses, never wins, but is liked by his men (a peace time admiral)? A good leader (admiral, general, captain, etc.) is flexible and adapts to the situation. John Paul Jones (I have not yet begun to fight!) lost his ship in battle, but he defeated his foe anyway! A good commander doesn't believe a fight's impossible; it just might take alittle longer to win! Losing and coming back alive was not an option. Reply: Sure it is. Admiral Nebogatov surrendered the Russian fleet the following morning. When he got back to Russia, he did a little time in prison and then was released early by the Tsar. In fact one Russian battleship captain who surrendered his ship at Tsushima was later an infantryman fighting in WWI; when the enlisted man was pointed out to the inspecting Russian Tsar, the ex-captain now foot soldier was pardoned on the spot and allowed to go home. There were trials afterwards when the survivors got home. What do you think would have happened to them had they simply sat in port and refused to fight? Reply: Very few people (men or women, military or civilian) have respect for cowards. If those men that displayed such cowardice, or refused orders were not shot for it (executed) then OVER TIME they most likely couldn't live with themselves either. Most often, such men, either commit suicide, become users of vice (drugs or alcohol, etc.), change their names out of shame, etc. and become very unhappy men. Sometimes, as in the case of that Russian warship commander, they are willing to lower themselves to enlisted ranks, and FIGHT TO REGAIN THEIR HONOR. Those particular men earn special praise and honor from their countrymen. I think you must be correct in saying that someone thought the russian ships stood a chance, otherwise they would not have been sent. But there is a whole gulf of difference between what those in charge think (the tsar?) and the admiral with orders to carry out think. Reply: Fighting men are not politicians (although Generals/Admirals must be, at least partially), "Ours is not to question why; Ours is to do and die" (Charge of the Light Brigade) Do you reckon Rozhestvensky would have said to the Tsar's face 'but your majesty, we are going to lose'? Reply: Rozhestvensky was specifically selected because he was not such man. Any leader that (seriously) said such a thing, would probably not be in a position of leadership for long. Leaders have to INSPIRE their men, not ruin their morale! And if that leader said such a thing to his Tsar, he would have "ruined the tsar's morale!" Not an option. Reply: There are almost always options; it's just that usually there are "penalties" attached to some of them. Sandpiper (talk) 09:02, 10 October 2010 (UTC)