Talk:Battle of Isandlwana/Archive 1

BATTLE OF YELLOW FORD COMPARISON

I disagree that this battle can be compared to Isandlwana.

1. Both sides were similarly matched in respect of weaponry at Yellow Ford, whereas at Isandlwana the British, man for man, enjoyed overwhelming firepower superiority and this, indeed, accounted for the heavy Zulu losses. 2. The disparity in numbers at Yellow Ford was not comparable to Isandlwana where the British column, even with Natives, was outnumbered around 12-1. 3. The terrain (and heat) of South Africa was alien to the British whereas Ireland is far more similar. 4. Although the Irish were regarded as inferior by the British and attrocities committed against them, there were White and Christian and were not regarded as "savages" to the same extent as were the Zulus.

The justification for this comparison is, therefore, lacking and I have edited it.

At the Battle of the Yellow Ford, it was forces of the English crown versus the Irish because of course, at the time, the Irish were British (Kentish 3 Jan 09) —Preceding unsigned comment added by 89.211.58.139 (talk) 16:18, 3 January 2009 (UTC)

NPOV

Below "The fight":

Durnford's 1,400 soldiers fought bravely, but were totally overwhelmed.

Bravely? I don't think this subjective phrase belongs in an encyclopedia. Therefore I must remove it. cun 17:44, 22 Jan 2005 (UTC)

If they fought against a greatly superior enemy falling almost to the last man, it can be said that they fought bravely. Don't you think that it can be said that the Spartans fought bravely in Thermopylae? --80.186.100.180 23:57, 8 July 2006 (UTC)

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Zulu nation is not linked correctly!

This is fixed. →Raul654 01:40, Mar 16, 2004 (UTC)

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In the Article it says "While Chelmsford was out"

LOL:some one shoud insert "to lunch" after that!
I've always liked his comment  My only fear is that the Zulu will not fight Philip

Lieutenant Coghill fell from his horse and wrenched his knee in an attempt to catch a fowl but was able to remain with the column. - Well, I liked it, so I am putting it here for posterity :-) Wizzy 07:51, 21 Jul 2004 (UTC)

Number of Zulus at Rorke's Drift

This article says: "From a morale perspective, this was made even worse by the victory of a small handful of British over hundreds or thousands of Zulus at Rorke's Drift."

But the Rorke's Drift atricle says: "At Rorke's Drift approximately 150 British soldiers defended their garrison against an intense assault by roughly 5000 Zulu warriors."

Which is correct, hundreds or thousands of Zulus, or roughly 5000?

Perhaps one of the articles should be changed to reflect the correct number.

---The Zulu force which attacked Rorke's Drift numbered around 4,000 men.

Dubidub 22:55, 28 Aug 2004 (UTC)

I have read an interesting article that question whether Rorkes Drift was really a victory. In Zulu tradition if you have taken the enemies cattle you have won the battle.

-Interesting. However, given the fact the Zulus' aim was to capture Rorke's Drift and defeat the defenders and that they totally failed to do this, suffering heavy casualties in the process, it is difficult to argue how it could have been a Zulu victory. The British did not rely on the cattle that were at Rorke's Drift in the same way that the Zulus' traditional enemies may have done.

--Renier Maritz 17:51, 6 April 2007 (UTC)

Aftermath

I do not like the last section as it is at the moment. I think it is wrong for several reasons:

• This amounted to the death of 10% of all Zulu males This implies that there were only 30,000 Zulu males (and say 20% not fit for active service). I have never seen an article which says that there were only 100,000 adult Zulus. I think this needs to be sourced.
• The Zulus did not want the war. They knew that they could not hope to win a long war of attrition agaist the British
• Losses of 3000 or more in one battle was nothing new for the Zulus - (
• The Zulus knew about laagering, because of battles like the Battle of Blood River where civilians armed with muskets had defeated them, so Rokes drift would have come as no suprise to them, and is the reason the Zulus had been given orders not to attack fortified/laagered postions.

So I have rewritten it. Philip Baird Shearer 11:11, 4 October 2005 (UTC)

Commander is listed as Chelmsford, but he was absent from the battle, shouldn't Henry Pulleine and Anthony Durnford be listed instead of or with Chelmsford as Commaders? BritBoy 14:22, 11 January 2006 (UTC)

Brevet Lieutenant Colonel Henry Pulleine was the official CO. I ahev changed the article accordingly.

Survivors?

I just a show called Turning Points on History Channel International that said there were only eight survivors, this says sixty. Anyone know for sure? —The preceding unsigned comment was added by 209.206.165.7 (talk) 09:40, 15 January 2007 (UTC).

The Battle of Rorke’s Drift says "Only about sixty white and four hundred black soldiers survived". Eight seems far too low. Nunquam Dormio 20:46, 15 January 2007 (UTC)

There were 5 Imperial officers who escaped the battle and 50 or so other ranks. Several hundred Africans escaped, mainly as they fled the field early.

Zulu tactics, etc.

It would be nice to have description at all of Zulu tactics, actions, etc. I know nothing but broad strokes of these events, but surely someone better informed can supply much more on the context of this battle for Zulus... Also important is a much more detailed description of the events leading up to the battle; The British presented an ultimatum [what ultimatum? in what context?] on 11 December 1878, to the Zulu king Cetshwayo... is a pretty sketchy exposition. Pinkville 03:37, 22 January 2007 (UTC)

Well, the ultimatum et al is covered in the overview article for the whole war, so re-listing the entire information might not be the best route, but some clarification can't be a bad thing to help the conext. The Kinslayer 16:01, 22 January 2007 (UTC)

Yeah, the article on the battle should be able to stand alone, though, of course, one would expect much greater detail on the background of the battle in the linked article (Anglo-Zulu_War#The_Ultimatum). At the moment this reads like a fragment. Pinkville 16:10, 22 January 2007 (UTC)

citation request

The Natal Native Contingent broke, and led the flight to Fugitive's Drift. After the battle, the Zulus, as was their tradition, ripped open the dead bodies of their casualties and those of their enemies to free the spirits. I feel this need a citation. thanks —Preceding unsigned comment added by 81.144.161.223 (talk • contribs)

Washing of the spears

This article mentions the death to the redcoats but not the Zulu ceremony of splitting the stomachs of the dead enemies, to release the dead spirit. Kendirangu 06:48, 2 February 2007 (UTC)

No credit to the Zulus?

Great article - I enjoyed reading it. One question: why is there seemingly no credit given to the Zulus for their victory? It seems like the only explanations for tohe outcome are: (i) technological problems (the rifles jammed in the heat); (ii) lack of adequate defences; (iii) leadership... etc. Was the outcome of this battle solely the result of British actions? Surely either the planning, leadership, stealth, surprise, etc. by the Zulus was important(?). Or am I missing something? Thanks, Hu Gadarn 18:38, 23 February 2007 (UTC)

The Zulus certainly concealed their position successfully until quite a late stage. The key reason for the British defeat was that they divided their forces without first knowing the disposition of the enemy. This classic blunder is still used an example in military academies, I understand. Nunquam Dormio 14:22, 24 February 2007 (UTC)

The Zulus exploited their enemies' weaknesses well but could not have defeated the British if they had taken proper defensive positions.

Stuff about battle formerly in the Isandlwana article

The Isandlwana article had all this stuff about the battle. If there's anything of value here, please integrate it into the main article. Nunquam Dormio 06:27, 13 April 2007 (UTC)

After having crossed into Zululand at the head of No.3 column made up of approximately 4,000 men - of whom about 1,500 were British and European - Lord Chelmsford ordered camp to be made underneath the rocky slopes of Isandlwana on January 21st. Scout reports led Chelmsford to believe that the main Zulu impi lay to the south west and, eager to find and engage this force, he split his forces. In fact, he had been outmanouvered by the Zulus, whose main intention had been to lure the British forces from the camp and then strike a decisive blow against it.

Under Colonel Pulleine, Chelmsford left behind six companies (between 60-100 each) taken from both battalions of the 24th Foot, made up of experienced and steady troops, many of whom had seen active colonial service previously. In addition, Pulleine had further British forces in the shape of two guns from the Royal Artillery with about seventy gunners. Colonial forces added a further 500 troops to the defence of the camp, although of these the Natal Native Contingent (NNC) were not intended to be used in frontline defence but rather as a reserve - they consisted of tribal conscripts armed mainly with spears (only one in ten had firearms, many of these outdated) and led by White officers. On the morning of the 22nd January, Colonel Durnford was ordered to march up from Rorke's Drift (a with his contingent of about 400 natives (both foot and mounted) and a rocket battery. He arrived at the camp early morning. There has been much debate over whether Durnford - as senior - was supposed to take over command of the camp or whether he believed his orders were to support Chelmsford's advance. The orders were vague and the debate persists.

In any case, during the early morning of 22nd January, groups of Zulus could be seen in the distance away from the camp. Durnford believed that these forces were possibly attempting to attack Chelmsford's rear and he took out his mounted infantry as well as the rocket troop to push the Zulus back, not appreciating the odds he was facing. The camp was ordered to stand-to. At this stage, there was no realisation that the camp was incredible danger from vastly superior forces and a calm mood prevailed. Pulleine sent a message to Chelmsford informing him that a Zulu force was moving on the camp - though at this stage there was no request for reinforcements. It was expected that even fairly small British forces could deal with a native force several times their number due to the firepower and discipline they enjoyed.

Mid-morning, as they were several miles from camp, scouts from Raw's Troop (under Durnford) stumbled upon a large Zulu impi (army), which had possibly been intending to wait another day before attacking (the 22nd January saw an eclipse, which was not a suitable day to be fighting for the Zulus). The force was sitting down in a large gulley and numbered some 25,000 men. Durnford and his mounted troops began a fighting retreat towards the encampment but Major Russell and the rocket troops was overrun and the crew killed after having only managed to fire one, ineffectual rocket.

With reports of the Zulu advance reaching the camp, Pulleine deployed his infantry in an extended firing line over a mile in length and some considerable distance from the camp in an effort to meet the attack - which seemed to be developing from a specific area - head on. He had not fully grasped the Zulus' use of "the horns" of the buffalo, which were intended to move behind the British force and envelop it. The redcoats were in two ranks, standing some five yards apart in extended order. They carried about 70 rounds of ammunition for their Martini-Henri rifles. Pulleine has been criticised for using a firing line as opposed to a square, as it spread the men too thinly and left the flanks wide open to attack. However, it probably wasn't at first clear, given the topography of the terrain and the gunsmoke, that either the Zulus were attacking in such overwhelming force or that they intended to outflank the British position.

For roughly an hour, the firing line held back the Zulu attack and most of the estimated 3,000 Zulu casualties were inflicted in this period. The Martin-Henri was a formidable weapon and could stop a man dead in his tracks, shattering bone and leaving an exit wound the size of a large plate. The Zulus were forced to lie down in the long grass to seek protection and for a time their attack in the centre stalled.

At this stage, then, morale was strong in the British lines and it appeared that all was going well. However, it soon became apparent that the men were both running low on ammunition and seriously exposed. Durnford's troops, which had been defending a donga (dried stream) on the right of the British line after their fighting retreat, and who had therefore been in action for longer than the rest of the force, were the first to pull back in an attempt to re-form in the camp. This left the right flank of the firing line - Charlie Pope's "G" Company - totally exposed and they were slaughtered to a man, unable to form in rallying groups larger than three of four men at a time due to their extended formation.

Pulleine may have seen this and this led to his command for the rest of the British line, whose right flank and rear was now exposed, to also fall back on the camp and take up a more secure, tigther defensive formation. The gravity of the situation was only now becoming clear. It was too late. As the British line pulled back, the Zulu force in the centre which had hitherto been pinned down, rose and charged forward. Although reports vary, it is generally accepted that centrally-organsied British defence fell apart at this moment and the retreat became confused with no central rallying point and with Zulus and British mixed together as they ran into the camp. The Zulus were able to outrun many of the redcoats who were weighed down with heavy boots and kit.

Once the line had broken, all hope of maintaining a concerted defence was lost, although there was still much killing to be done. Individual groups, large and small, rallied together but were overwhelmed amongst the debris of the camp. Unarmed cooks, servants and European "casuals" who had accompanied the column were speared as they tried to flee. The Zulus attacked in the shape of a horn to envelop the whole British position and cut off the retreat. As the camp was overrun, the British defenders fought to the last man in bitter hand to hand fighting, back to back and using rifle butts, fists and even pocket knives, once their ammunition had been expended. Zulu accounts testify to the bravery of the defenders and the tenacity of their resistance.

The position of the bodies indicated a number of determined stands of several large groups (40-100 men) mainly from the 24th Foot but also including other defenders who found themselves left in camp with no escape. These stands took some time to break down, but with ammunition running out and facing overwhelming odds, they were wiped out by a foe who asked and gave no quarter - an example the British in the rest of the war would follow. The bravery shown by the redcoats - and their use of the bayonet to spear the Zulus through the throat, face and belly - earned them the Zulus' respect - one legend is that the Zulus allowed the remnants of one group under Capt. Younghusband to shake each others' hands before they were finally killed. No prisoners were taken and even animals were slaughtered. Once the Zulus had taken the camp, they set about mutilating the bodies of the dead in a ritual that was brutal but actually a spiritual act to free the soul of the dead and stop the killer's body from swelling.

Stragglers who had left the battle before the British line collapsed completely were hunted down in what is now called Fugitives' Drift, and only thirty Europeans, all mounted, survived. The colours of the 24th Foot were lost, despite heroic efforts by Lt Melville and Coghill to save them. In total some 1,200 men were killed in and around the camp. Not one man of the 24th Foot lived and only five imperial officers survived, along with about 300 natives who fled very early in the engagment. The battlefield today is marked with many whitewashed stone cairns, covering the remains of the dead - mainly British as they were left on the battlefield for several months after the defeat. In a bitter irony, Isandlwana Mountain is shaped like the very Sphinx on the 24th Foot's regimental crest that had been awarded for its service in Egypt some fifty years before the regiment suffered its most infamous reverse.

Various reasons have been given for this defeat including difficulty in supplying ammunition and attempting to defend too great a frontline with too few men. Once the Zulus were able to penetrate and outflank the British line their strength in hand to hand combat and sheer weight of numbers proved critical. However, the key factor in the defeat was the total failure to secure the camp by forming a laager - the traditional Boer method of defence against an attacking Zulu force, whereby the camp would be enclosed and barricades erected, where possible. This would have kept the British forces supplied with ammunition and protected their flanks - and possibly changed the course of the battle. Indeed, this was to be the case at Rorke's Drift where 100 British held off 4,000 Zulus. However, the bravery of those troops left and who fought to the last man has long held fascination for historians and laymen alike - C.E. Fripps' famous painting, on show at the National Army Museum, of the last stand of the 24th Foot, is extremely evocative.

Lord Chelmsford returned that night of 22 January 1879 to a scene of utter devastation and his men spent the night amidst the carnage in what must have been an extraordinarily unpleasant experience, given that these men had lost comrades and friends they had only left a few hours before oblivious to their fate. They were deliberately woken before dawn to escape the full horror of the camp, but many of them slept in the blood and entrails of the dead and the next morning gave the impression of badly wounded men, such was the condition of the blood-soaked ground. The sight of smoke rising over Rorke's Drift in the distance - where one company of the 24th Foot was left to guard - would not have helped the morale of the men, either. However, as Chelmsford and his column would soon discover, the position had been held and Britain had one piece of news to celebrate on an otherwise terrible day.

Location?

The location of this battle is not very clear from this article.User:Tebucky 20:16, 23 June 2007 (UTC)

I've added a sentence that should help. Nunquam Dormio 09:33, 24 June 2007 (UTC)

ENDS

memorial

I dont think that it is fair that there is a picture of a memorial to the zulus but not to the british because a lot of british died there too

Geographic Coordinates

Can someone please check the geographic coordinates for Isandlwana? Isandlwana is close to 10 miles from Rorke's Drift. henkberg55 13:15, 18 September 2007 (UTC)

Looks wrong to me. It is the wrong side of the N2. I can't vouch for Rorke's Drift either, but it looks like it might be correct. They face each other over the Tugela. Wizzy…☎ 12:38, 18 September 2007 (UTC)

Is this correct {{coord|28|48|0|S|29|8|60|E|display=inline}} ?

Socrates2008 (Talk) 12:13, 27 December 2007 (UTC)

How does one correct information on a Google link? These coordinates are definitely wrong- the battle is shown as having taken place high in the Drakensberg! Also, one of the Google links still shows a comparison to the battle to Yellow Ford: "... remaining one of the greatest British military defeats at the hands of native forces in history, second only to the 1598 Battle of the Yellow Ford defeat to the Gaelic Irish." This is erroneous, and not only for the reasons set out by the editor who removed it from Wikipedia above. The defeat in Ireland was of English forces - not British. The various Acts of Union were still a century or more away and there was as yet no such thing as a 'British' army. To compound the irony of the overly enthusiastic entry by an Irish patriot, there were Irishmen amongst the dead of the Imperial British force at Isandlwana.

Co-ordinates updated, based on map B here Socrates2008 (Talk) 13:27, 9 January 2008 (UTC)

Wikipedia:WikiProject Military history/Assessment/Tag & Assess 2008

• Ensured that the article is: within project scope, tagged for task forces, and assessed for class.

• This article would benefit from: subheaders and additional in-text citations. --Rosiestep (talk) 23:03, 26 April 2008 (UTC)

This article needs a lot more citations.

This article needs a lot more citations. For example the battle box states:

Strenth: 1,400 British, ca. 2,500 African, Zulus 22,000 men

Where do these numbers come from? And near the start of the article:

"It would have been possible to bring in the troops to a closer formation, with the rocky Isandlwana feature securing the rear and the overwhelming British firepower beating back the attacking force, even when this greatly outnumbered the defenders."

Who says it would have been possible? Who says that the fire power would have been enough? Throughout the article there a facts and figures given and opinions expressed with no supporting citations. --Philip Baird Shearer (talk) 16:48, 6 June 2008 (UTC)

Article has a lot of citations

Article has been extensively edited and references & bibliography added from primary, secondary and tertiary sources. Section on why the British lost could be cut down more. Ref tag could be removed.Tttom1 (talk) 05:41, 2 October 2008 (UTC)

Were the actions of Sir Bartle Frere wrong because they supposedly violated his instructions?

We must remember that in 1879, communications between London and the various colonial outposts were not swift! Information available to the Foreign or Colonial Office from South Africa and Natal was generally delivered by ship. The most recent information could be anywhere from a month to three or four months old when received. Therefore, any diplomat was given instructions to guide his actions but also was expected to take action in the best interests of Her Majesty's subjects if the circumstances required, even if not contemplated in his instructions. It is certainly clear from The Washing of the Spears that the Zulus were a very dangerous power. (1) They had a true army which could be compared favorably to any European army in the ares of discipline, tactical doctrine, morale and even, to some extent, battlefield communications. We tend to be deceived by the fact that they were "only" armed with short spears and shields made from animal hide. Remember that in the decades before this battle, the Zulus had spread south from their original homeland and, in the process, smashed every native tribe that stood in their way. (2) By the time of this battle, the Zulu king had a very serious problem on his hands: he had a huge army, far larger than needed for self-protection, a very large percentage of the regiments which comprised this army had not yet been allowed to done the head ring of a Zulu warrior and marry. This is because according to Zulu customary law a warrior could not marry without having "washed his spear" in the blood of an enemy in battle. The Zulu king well remembered how he himself came to power and depended upon his army to remain loyal to him so he could stay in power. The only way he could achieve this was to allow the army to engage in aggressive warfare to slaughter other tribes and seize their cattle (a primary source of wealth in the culture). It may well be true that the King did not order an invasion of Natal and may, indeed, not have wanted one. Unfortunately, it is very unlikely that he would have been able to resist the growing pressure from his army for action. I believe that Sir Bartle Frere recognized this quite clearly and realized that it was not a question of whether the Zulus would have to be fought but merely a matter of when and where they would have to be fought. He concluded that immediate action was necessary. Clearly, engaging in a long-distance discussion with the Colonial Office (with months between each communication) was out of the question. Thus, he acted with the authority he had been given.Broadsword-6 (talk) 02:44, 15 January 2009 (UTC)

Plenty of sources back up the view that Bartle-Frere and Chelmsford acted knowingly against the wishes of Her Majesty's Gov't and 'cooked the books' to provoke a war with the Zulus. Does the article say his actions were wrong or do they state the case with NPOV and from that a reader concludes they were wrong?Tttom1 (talk) 01:29, 17 January 2009 (UTC)

Bias

There is no bias inherent in stating the armaments for both sides, its a plain statement of facts and these facts are supported by references to secondary sources. There is however an obvious lack of NPOV in deleting the armaments as it suggests that somehow there is no advantage in having modern weapons over primitive weapons. Unless reputable secondary sources can be provided to show that particular theory the statement: " A 20,000 strong Zulu army equipped mainly with spears and shields defeated a mixed British and native force armed with modern firearms and artillery. " referenced by: Peter Doyle, Matthew R. Bennett, Fields of Battle, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002, ISBN 1-4020-0433-8, Tony Pollard essay, The Mountain is their Monument,p. 118, "It was here...the British army suffered it worst defeat at the hands of a technologically inferior indigenous force." should stand and reverts ended. The article still has a very heavy British slant as is and could go a long way further to a fair balance expressing the Zulu positions.Tttom1 (talk) 23:50, 11 March 2009 (UTC)

FAC

I have removed a FAC nomination of this article because the nominator had barely edited the article and had not consulted the principle contributors. Further, while it's clear that a lot of work has been put in to the article, it clearly does not meet the FAC criteria at this time, as about half of the content is not yet referenced. Good luck, and I hope to see it at MilHist A-class review or FAC soon! Maralia (talk) 15:13, 15 March 2009 (UTC)

On this topic: The different weapons should obviously be explained, but it's not clear if the "modern" is the correct phrase. I mean, they were modern weapons at that time, but they weren't running around with late model M16s and light machine guns.

Is there a way of rephrasing this, to make it clear that the British had up-to-date firearms, without calling them modern?

Maybe I'm just talking myself into circles here, I dunno.

ManicParroT (talk) 06:49, 1 April 2009 (UTC)

Have rephrased weapons differential to make clearer. Some content is still a hold over from the previous version, that seemed mostly a cut and paste job from an old book and probably can't be reliably referenced. If you can point out statements likely to be challenged that aren't ref'd it could help. Thanks.Tttom1 (talk) 18:33, 1 April 2009 (UTC)

Reconstruction of sentence

The statement "Isandlwana remains the worst military defeat for Britain at the hands of a native force" seems to be arguable, as the term native is very broad and in reference to British Empire would be implied to a vast area and surely the Brits have lost battles to natives which could be far more devastating. The sentence could be re-phrased as "The British army suffered it worst defeat at the hands of a technologically inferior indigenous force at Isandlwana", this would also clarify why this was an embarrassing defeat for the Brits.Bmayuresh (talk) 03:27, 20 May 2009 (UTC)

Third opinion

Bigger digger (talk · contribs) wants to offer a third opinion. A request was made but there is currently only one side to the dispute, which seems to be dated to mid-May. To assist with the process, editors are requested to summarize the dispute in a few sentences below. I will ask LordSaddler (talk · contribs) and Tttom (talk · contribs) at their talk pages to contribute here. An edit war is a proven method of achieving nothing and winding editors up, I would hope both are keen to contribute here to reach an agreed way forward. Others involved in editing the page are also invited to offer their opinion to help reach a consensus. Thanks, Bigger digger (talk) 13:00, 2 June 2009 (UTC)

What the dickens are you talking about? Nunquam Dormio (talk) 16:35, 2 June 2009 (UTC)

Have a look at the history from mid-May for the slow-burn edit war between the aforementioned editors. The link from WP:3O led to the heading above, Talk:Battle_of_Isandlwana#Bias. I'm trying to work out what's going on here as much as you! Bigger digger (talk) 16:55, 2 June 2009 (UTC)

Viewpoint by Tttom

....The lead paragraph accurately (with reference) states the technological discrepancy in weaponry and difference in numbers between the Zulus and British as a necessary factual description of each side and for that reason should remain for the readers' understanding of the battle. Other details were posted on this talk page abovein section- Bias.Tttom1 (talk) 21:35, 3 June 2009 (UTC)

Viewpoint by Nunquam Dormio

Clearly the mismatch between the British and Zulu weapons is what makes the outcome of this battle exceptional. Using then modern weapons, the British had had many easy victories in Africa and elsewhere. But not on this occasion. Nunquam Dormio (talk) 08:30, 4 June 2009 (UTC)

Third opinion by Bigger digger

Well, this won't be a third opinion as the editors here are in agreement. I would agree with Tttom1 and Nunquam Dormio that it is important to mention the superiority of the British weapons. LordSaddler would need to prove a change in this consensus before trying to remove the references to British technical superiority. I don't think it's necessary for me to keep this page on my watchlist but if you need me again I can obviously be reached on my talkpage. Cheers, Bigger digger (talk) 15:34, 4 June 2009 (UTC)

LordSaddler comments

Right, I seem to have made a bit of a mistake here. LordSaddler is not making this easy for me as he hasn't posted on this talk page at all, but today he wrote on my talk page and I'll quote the relevant part:

Sorry, I still think there is a bias on that page. The line implies the Zulus won despite being armed with inferior weapons, but they won because they achieved tactical suprise, heavily outnumbered the British troops, and the British used the wrong tactics (fighting the Zulus in a straight firing line and not a square with Isandlwana covering their rear and consolidating their fire like at Rorke's Drift or at the final battle, Ulundi). I think it is irrelevant to mention the weapons differences.

— LordSaddler (talk • contribs) 07:01, 11 June 2009

I read the article and understood it, but clearly wasn't thinking quite straight (excuse: I am only human). The lead makes no reference to the full reasons for the British defeat and does not provide any context. Providing wikilinks is all well and good but there should be more explanation of the reasons for the British presence in southern Africa / the Zulu kingdom and the size of the British army. Imagine I came to the page via the Special:Randompage, I should not have to click WLs to find out what the British were doing in southern Africa or for a quick description of the war — the links are there if I need more information, not as a way to omit that information. I have no time to edit the page (and will not revert LordSaddler, although that would be justified as he has not attempted to reach a consensus for his edits) at the moment — that is best left to those with more knowledge of the battle and better access to sources, but I hope everyone can see this as an opportunity to improve the article! Thoughts? Bigger digger (talk) 09:11, 11 June 2009 (UTC)

PS. For further info please see WP:LEAD and WP:LINK Bigger digger (talk) 09:23, 11 June 2009 (UTC)

I agree with LordSaddler's analysis of the ultimate reason for the victory, but I still think the weapons difference is significant enough to belong in the lead. Wizzy…☎ 13:44, 11 June 2009 (UTC)

Thanks for the opinion Wizzy, I think that both issues need mentioning in the lead. They are not mutually exclusive, but LordSaddler's lack of contribution to the talk page has made that difficult to ascertain - he was just reverting out the mention of weapons without adding anything to mention the tactics, et al. Bigger digger (talk) 15:22, 11 June 2009 (UTC)

Theories as to why the British lost are covered in a separate section of the article. As seen, there is no consensus among historians as to why they lost and few, if any adhere to the idea of numerical advantage - further, to say so would be original research OR. Possibly that is because the British face numerical disadvantages in several other battles in the war that their superior technology overcomes. If there is any bias here its a refusal to allow the extraordinary difference between the armaments of both sides to be factually stated. In many military studies even a small difference in weapon technology is often found to be a significant factor in a battle. Repeating rifles and breech loading rifles versus muskets in the 19th century, for example.Tttom1 (talk) 17:00, 11 June 2009 (UTC)

This lede was reached by consensus and 3rd opinion.Tttom1 (talk) 19:42, 22 January 2010 (UTC)

LEAD

While the opening paragraph of the lead is confined to the battle, the lead section overall provides a fairly full context for the battle and the war in the following paragraphs of the lead section. It could be rewritten, but it covers the essentials - more so that the lead in the Anglo-Zulu War for example does, in comparison.Tttom1 (talk) 17:25, 11 June 2009 (UTC)

I have rewritten the lede to include more context as suggested by BiggerDigger and the points from LordSaddler as to the numerical superiority of the Zulus and faulty deployment of the British. I believe this is sufficient for a lede as all these points are discussed in greater depth in the body.Tttom1 (talk) 22:09, 11 June 2009 (UTC)

Tttom1, top work! I'm sure that LordSaddler might think there's still a bit too much emphasis on the weapons, and not enough about the tactics, but for a more detailed consideration you would probably need to ask for help from a more knowledgable party, I guess from WikiProject Milhist. I will make a few copyedits, to remove a whitespace issue and to remove "extreme" - it is for wikipedia to show the facts, not tell the reader how big this gap might be (fists v tanks could be "extreme", it's an unnecessary modifier...). Hopefully any improvements will be discussed here. I'll keep this page watchlisted now to reply to any changes. Cheers, Bigger digger (talk) 00:03, 12 June 2009 (UTC)

Victory, but decisive?

The result has been changed to "Clear, decisive Zulu victory" from "Decisive tactical Zulu victory".

I don't think either description is quite right. It was clearly a tactical Zulu victory - they won the battle. But I'm hesitant to use the word decisive - they lost the war. Regards, Ben Aveling 22:12, 8 August 2009 (UTC)

• It doesn't matter that they lost the entire war. A battle is decisive when it changes the situation of the war at the time. The Zulu victory at Isandlwana effectively stopped the British invasion and forced London to reorganize and relaunch the whole operation. On the reverse, it strengthened British resolve to win the war whereas before they weren't that concerned. I think decisive victory is straight forward enough. Scott Free (talk) 05:25, 9 August 2009 (UTC)

"State of the Art"

While the Martini-Henry was undoubtedly new it was not necessarily "state of the art". It was favoured by the British over other guns because they believed it to be more accurrate, however soldiers had to reload after each shot whereas there were rifles in existance that could fire much more rapidly (which in this instance would have been much more useful). I shall therefore change "state of the art", which suggests the pinnacle of rifle, to "modern", which is true but does not suggest that it is the best. I know its being pedantic and im quite happy for you to change it back if you disagree!--Willski72 (talk) 20:48, 26 August 2009 (UTC)