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Great Souled Man

The concept of Great Souled Man is a critical component of Aristotle’s approach to Nicomachean Ethics. Also referred to as Megalopsuchos, Aristotle defines the true embodiment of the Great souled man with an overarching goal of happiness in a person who prioritises virtue in their activities. The achievement of this archetypal framework can be through a multitude of characteristics such only dedicating their time to honourable activities of great meaning, expressing their attitudes and beliefs independently of fear or consequence and moving and acting in a measured, grounded way instead of neurotic and hasty anxiousness. Further, they are inclined to lead life according to their desires and not to suit others. The article will further investigate these characteristics, explore the historical and current developments of this concept and identify the perspectives of notable sources in relation to the practical utility of the Great Souled Man ideology.  There are notable and numerous examples of seemingly contradictory statements and principles that have been analysed and placed in modern contexts.

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Characteristics

The concept of the Great Souled Man is a reflection of the core ambiguity of virtue itself.  Aristotle states that “the human good is an activity of the soul in accordance with virtue, and if there are several virtues, in accordance with the best and most complete”.  In the search for the avenues in which humans may embody these characteristic virtues, Aristotle introduces the concept of the Great Souled Man or Megalopsuchos and awards the description to Socrates.  Aristotle portrays a character of great heroism with an infallibly high degree of moral virtue.  In the execution of deeds of the highest nobility and calibre of excellence, the Great Souled Man is depicted to risk personal harm, viz. the loss of one’s own life.  The actions of the Megalopsuchos are limited, yet of a high degree of greatness. A primary conflict dealt with in the depiction of the Great Souled Man is the congruence between what one should find pleasant and those that are naturally pleasant, namely, the pursuit of justice and virtuousness in the soul.  Those who strive for indulgence in external affairs are described to be at odds as these are not naturally pleasant in absence of the contemplative and thoughtful life of moral grounding. In essence, it is stated that life in itself is pleasant and ‘does not need pleasure to be added’.  This being said, the natural progression of this inner characteristic is the desire in taking pleasure in noble deeds, primarily generosity of spirit.  The wisdom acquired by the Megalopsuchos character resides at a higher level of priority than intelligence, however, maintains a lower predominance when compared to one’s ‘gentleness or temperance’.  

Historical Development

The historical formation of the Megalopsuchos ideology is centred upon the attainment of happiness through action.  Aristotle highlights the pursuit of numerous virtues as the medium through which happiness can be cultivated.  These philosophical insights have been developed over numerous studies as regards Nicomachean Ethics.  The development of these perspectives stemmed from the application of shared values of goodness and life experience to practical thinking in an attempt to model the best life.  This approach led to a formulation of definitions and analysis of virtue, excellence and ethics. The Great Souled Man ideology shifts focus from Nicomachean Ethics into a deeper formulation and particularly an array of exemplifications of virtue in concrete scenarios.  Be that as it may, the conceptualisation of the Great Souled Man shares a diverse array of principles and soul driven objectives with Aristotle’s discussions regarding Nicomachean Ethics.  The intertemporal development of the Great Souled Man ideology lies at the heart of it’s prime tractates; a key foundation lying in the virtue of the individual. This is substantiated through the commentary concerning ‘to fight with pleasure is harder than to fight with wrath … and virtue, like art, is always more concerned with what is harder, for the harder the task the better the success.’

Current Development

The inherent issues of honour and pride within the Megalopsuchos character have evoked modern commentary and analysis.  Aristotle highlights to the negative nature of pride or honour-seeking via his allusion to the Illiad where “For his part, the great souled man appears to have transcended the political courage exemplified by Hector, as his virtue has no roots in the fear of dishonour.” This issues ties in with an inherent difficulty highlighted by Tolland, whereby Aristotle makes two claims; “An essential part of the virtuous person’s motivation is a desire to obtain honour and avoid losing it” and “Honour procuring behaviour (i.e. acting in ways that help one obtain honour and avoid dishonour) is an essential part of acting virtuously).  These claims highlighted by Tolland, yet originally portrayed by Cordner and Sarch describe an inherent conflict of commentary within the Aristotelian perspective as regards the impact of pride and honour of within Great Souled Man.  Current developments argue of Aristotle’s disobedience to these two claims in resonance with a stronger focus on “internal values based in the human telos” or teleological morality. An outlook as regards the term magnanimity or rather the aforementioned megalopsuchia.  Wilken writes on the applicability of Aristotle’s GSM precepts and requisite characteristics in the modern era.  His first pertinent point regards the internal paradox of ‘being fine and good’ and one who is ‘already adorned with all the virtues catalogued in the Nicomachean Ethics. Because magnanimity requires all the virtues, attainment is only possible for one who already “thinks himself worthy of great things and is really worthy of them” In other words, the magnanimous man knows he is magnanimous without any sort of external promotion.’. This description highlights the inherent difficulty in interpretation of the GSM as Aristotle gradually defines it.  An interpretation of such applicability in the current subsets of modern social systems is highlighted through the idea that ‘The apparent bravado Aristotle affords magnanimity strikes modern readers as repugnant. It seems like an old-world notion exclusive in its membership and misogynistic toward women.’

Difficulties of Analysis

Contending perspectives regarding the Great Souled Man provide means for careful analysis. There are perceptions of being a person of strong theoretical virtue. Others claim strength of morality through one’s position within the political spectrum. There is argument that “the ambiguities are inherent in the subject matter, and it is part of the exactness to preserve them where they are found”. An insight that requires a sense of “double vision” amidst philosophical inquiry describes virtue as a self concerning phenomena and as part of the whole of virtue and of broader political life. This conundrum is addressed by Aristotle via ‘Phronêsis’, understanding of futility of moral virtue in the absence of practical wisdom, thereby acknowledging virtue as the knowledge of what is acceptable morality in all practical contexts. Resultantly, the innate difficulty of classifying the Great Souled Man lies within it’s fundamentally political action embodied by a philosophically detached relationship to politicism. Aristotle provides clarity pertaining to good of the soul and of physical body.  The priority lies evidently in the soul and draws importance from the ability to embody complete virtue via philosophical speculation and a life of contemplation to achieve the desirable happiness frequently sought after in man’s life.

This ties directly with the analysis whereby it is stated that ‘At issue is whether supremely happy human beings are wholly self-sufficient with respect to virtue. Aristotle suggests that they are not, and that, just as they cannot have become virtuous in the first place without being open to moral correction, they will continue to need friends for the maintenance and improvement of their virtue.’  The inherent difficulty of assessing the plausibility of such a state thereby lies in the ability to or potential fortune to be in connection with the appropriate sources of companionship and friendship.

Be that as it may, Aristotle clarifies his viewpoint and dictates a sturdy argument for his opinion, namely via ‘To begin with, Aristotle makes it clear that gods can be friends neither with each other nor with human beings. Hence the friendship of supremely happy men will necessarily involve individuals who fall short of godlike perfection.’  This conveys insight into the suggestion by Aristotle with respect to the observation that ‘even the best of men may grow better through friendship. "The friendship of equitable men," he writes, "is equitable, and grows together with their association; for they seem to become better and to correct one another by putting their friendship into practice".  A key insight into the difficult and contradictory nature of the GSM analysis articulately resides in this description, whereby Aristotle ‘suggests that the magnanimous man is entirely uninterested in the average person. Therefore, if the improvement of others referenced in is a responsibility of the magnanimous man, then the magnanimous man seems to be a contradiction between assisting others’ rise in virtue and remaining uninterested in the average person.’  The numerous, apparent contradictory arguments provide a series of obstacles to uncover the bare essence of the GSM characteristics and expectations of fulfillment.  

Practical Utility

The practical utility of the Megalopsuchos is grounded in the act of ‘Phronêsis’, the ability to apply the appropriate acts of virtue to practical situations with wisdom. Aristotle considers “Intolerance of insults” as a common factor amongst great men of fictional and historical accord. This characteristic bears practical utility in discerning the fallible nature of honor-loving individuals and the tragic rage they are prone to face when confronted with insulting situations. Aristotle writes that Great Souled Men are not savage in their nature, unless towards those who act unjustly. This provides a point of misalignment, as the aforementioned intolerance within Great Souled Men can lead to frustration when those close to them do not reciprocate the virtue.A pertinent precept relates to the function of man, predominantly through the utilisation of rationality in accordance with virtue. This has been delineated as true as regards striving for excellence and resultantly has been identified by Aristotle as a general outline for good. The GSM endures the pleasures and pains associated with living through virtuous deeds, having been substantiated by inner strength of character. In outlining the implementation of the characteristics regarding the GSM; particularly as regards the cruciality of practical utilisation.  Aristotle states ‘But most men, instead of doing this, fly to theories, and fancy that they are philosophising and that this will make them good, like a sick man who listens attentively to what the doctor says and then disobeys all his orders. This sort of philosophising will no more produce a healthy habit of mind than this sort of treatment will produce a healthy habit of body’.  Evidently, Aristotle clearly defines the GSM as a character whom acts rationally and implements the wisdom and requisite virtue consequently attained.