User:TheLastWordSword/Reason

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia


Experimental philosophy
"Why Philosophers Should Care About Computational Complexity" by Scott Aaronson (my apologies for lack of better attribution)

Qualia Direct and Personal Experience (XP!), Truth (Truthful)
The knower as a huge and unique formal logic in which the knowledge is encoded, comparable to a uniquely encoded (Hadoop?) database. Facts must be conveyed to others in an entirely different and more conventional format, typically language or behavior. The essential and defining trait of Qualia is that a great deal of experiential and informative value is lost in the translation. Barring mental telepathy, there is no hope of a lossless transfer of the original conceptualization. "Qualia" and "Original Research" are strongly related, and without valid truths, we would have no valid facts at all. P:D

Russell's_paradox#Informal_presentation The complementary set does not qualify its contents in its own right, but is the complement of a qualified set. As a complement, negation, or exclusion of a qualified set, it forms an unqualified set. (!!!)

In arithmetic, we can exponentiate a base as a recursion of multiplication, and multiply numbers as a recursion of addition. But of what is addition a recursion? Why, counting, of course!
Counting requires two things: <-i> represents the qualifications of objects to be counted (red delicious, not golden delicious apples, present on this table at this moment) and the recognized presence of those objects that meet these qualifications <+i>; that is,
<-i> * <+ix> = x. Theoretical estimates need only make use of an additional variable in the qualification definitions, such as proportion of a population, or theoretical probabilities, expressed similarly to: <-i(p/U)>. Similarly, we can apply the same standards to set theory, in that we require a set to be qualified in its own right. I cannot as yet address the formal presentation of the paradox, but I'm sure this insight might be helpful. Too bad I'm not likely to get the credit for my work, unless this little nugget simply isn't enough in comparison to the gold mine I could produce! P;D
See Godel Unknotted (you know, the wiki Sannse refused to stipend) for some related material.


Data Indirect and Social Experience , Facts (Factual)
Information Indirect and Social Experience , Facts (Factual)
Information history
Fact Indirect and Social Experience , Facts (Factual)

"Scientific facts are generally believed to be independent of the observer..."


Am I going to give away what I can sell? Screw being screwed over like Otis.


Anti-psychologism
They shared the argument that, because the proposition "no-p is a not-p" is not logically equivalent to "It is thought that no-p is a not-p", psychologism does not logically stand. "no-p is a not-p" is an absolute and virtual point within the Ding an Sich; which can be pointed to by a variety of experiences, but cannot be encapsulated within Kennen an Sich itself. (Our experiences form parallel lines which converge at the "point at infinity"; another metaphor would be lines which converge at the horizon-line, at the edge of our ability to discern anything.)

Theory of justification

Philosophic burden of proof

Legal burden of proof

Rebuttable presumption

Conclusive presumption


Closed-world assumption -- the closed-world assumption can only be properly be used in the case where statements are (presumed to be) true by definition,

(it is not true that there exists a triangle that has four sides)

Open-world assumption -- in the case where statements cannot be presumed to be true by definition, statements which require observations or evidence, the open-world assumption must hold

These two principles have an effect on both Argument from ignorance and Argument from silence, in that statements of definition need not be justified by evidence, whereas any other statement requires such a justification. Note that a corrupt argument may begin with prejudicial or convenient definitions.