User:Nerickson32/sandbox

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Article Evaluation[edit]

Freedom to Travel to Cuba Act

Stub-level article

This article uses coded language to conflate democracy with a free market. It also alleges human rights violations against Cuba, yet provides no examples or evidence.

The article represents the points of view of those both for and against the Freedom to Travel to Cuba Act. It does not adequately represent the Cuban point of view, aside from mentioning the anti-US protests that occurred during Obama's March 2016 visit.

Another issue is the use of a quote by Al Fox, president of the Alliance for Responsible Cuba Policy. The citation is broken, and the link returns no address. Additionally, the quote is opaque due to its lack of context. Those who included it should not assume that the reader is well-versed in Chinese-Taiwanese relations; this background knowledge is necessary to understand Fox's analogy. Reference to a "South Florida family feud" is also opaque and goes unexplained. The text immediately following this quote does not provide further context, nor does it directly relate to or explain what Fox says. Finally, the text immediately following the quote does not relate to it.

The citation for the aforementioned quote [12] is also empty; the link is broken. This is true for many citations throughout the article: 1, 2, 3, 10, 11, and 13.

Overall, the article is written from a very US-centric point of view. It should include quotes and opinions from Cuban people and officials, as well as updated citations.

Choosing possible topics[edit]

Trade sanction reform and export enhancement act (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trade_Sanction_Reform_and_Export_Enhancement_Act)

At the top of the page, Wikipedia indicates that the article requires cleanup, but for no specified reason. No citations follow the correct format, and the writer only cites three sources. The article discusses the specifications of the law, but does not mention any significant effects that it had on the U.S., Cuba, or third-party nations. This is a short summary page that could use improvements in structure and depth of content.

Cuban-American lobby https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cuban-American_lobby This article is lacking in in-depth content, and mostly comprises lists of U.S. officials in the Cuban-American lobby. It does not discuss the effects of the lobby's actions. It also contains charged language that should be made neutral. For instance, it states that the lobby does work because of "a moral obligation to the oppressed people that suffer under the Communist regime."

Agreement for Democracy https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreement_for_Democracy Like the Cuban-American lobby article, this page is mostly a descriptive list and does not contain any analysis. There is no mention of the effects of the Agreement for Democracy, which is strange considering 120 organizations signed it. Additionally, it lacks in-line citations and therefore its credibility/verifiability are not strong.

Chosen Wiki article: Cuban-American lobby[edit]

History and origins[edit]

The Cuban-American lobby was formed by Cuban expatriates during migratory waves throughout the latter half of the twentieth century. In the 1960s, many Cubans left the island due to fear of revolutionary reforms. They were often white, wealthy, and/or supporters of the Fulgencio Batista dictatorship[1]. Hardships in Cuba during the 1980s and 1990s also encouraged expatriation motivated by economic prospects in the U.S. The ideological makeup of the Lobby shifted drastically after Raúl Castro lifted travel restrictions in 2013; the group constituting this exodus was young and much more moderate than earlier groups.
This demographic is one of the most geographically concentrated of immigrant groups in the United States. Many Cuban expatriates have followed family and friend to the U.S. and built a "Second Havana" in Miami.

Makeup of the lobby[edit]

The Cuban-American lobby currently varies in its level of sympathy towards the Castro government and Cuban Revolution, although it has become much more moderate since the 1990s. However, the most influential organizations and politicians within the political sector of the lobby are still conservative. They advocate for punitive maintenance of the embargo. It should be lifted, then, only if Cuba shifts towards a more capitalist economy and makes strides in economic privatization[2]. The most notable organization with this viewpoint is the Cuban American National Foundation. Less influential organizations advocate for an easing or lifting of the embargo before or regardless of whether Cuba changes its government structure and policies.

The academic circles within the lobby, though not monolithic in opinion, generally believe that the U.S. and Cuba should more readily exchange scientific information and advances. Some organizations within the intellectual wing of the Cuba lobby advocate for travel as a human right, and have affected change on U.S. travel policies towards Cuba[3].

Business interest lobbies often advocate for lifting the embargo so as to increase trade between the two nations. They believe trade with Cuba would be beneficial for the U.S. economy, and usually point more to financial than humanitarian reasons for their stance[3]. Lobbies outside the Cuban-American community have also advocated for liberalization of trade between the two nations, most notably the agribusiness lobby [1].

Political influence[edit]

In the 1980s, most Cuban expatriate interest groups were only active in southern Florida. These groups were splintered and their voice was poorly organized. The lobby became more powerful after many organizations pledged to change the inner workings of Cuban government, as powers within the U.S. government shared the same objective. The Reagan administration strongly supported the Cuban American National Foundation (CANF), which formed the month the president took office[2]. The lobby built institutional ties with the administration through their ideological sameness, growing conservative Cuban-American groups' influence and giving them increasingly early access to information through the 1980s.
Organizations within the lobby have affected public policy by collaborating with both Republican and Democratic lawmakers. One of the most notable collaborations occurred in 1992 between the Cuban American National Foundation and Democrat Robert Torricelli. Torricelli, whose liberal views on the embargo characterized his early career, sought election campaign funds from the CANF. He adopted a stronger anti-Castro, pro-embargo stance, secured CANF funds, and was reelected to Congress[1]. Torricelli subsequently sponsored the Cuban Democracy Act, often referred to as the Torricelli Act, which was signed into law by Bill Clinton in 1992.

The conservative lobby’s influence waned when Jorge Mas Canosa, founder of the Cuban American National Foundation, died in 1997. The international custody case of Elián González, which lasted from November 1999 to June 2000, also had negative effects on conservative influence within the Cuban-American community. The rise of moderate and liberal influence within the community are often partially attributed to Canosa’s death and González’s repatriation into Cuba[1].
While still influential, the Cuba lobby appears to be weakening due to dissenting opinions within groups[4]. Younger Cuban-Americans are more likely to be open-minded regarding relations between the two countries and the lifting of the embargo.

Rising influence of moderate voices allowed room for the agribusiness lobby to push for reforms that softened the embargo. The lobby campaigned for the Trade Sanction Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000, with success partially due to conflict within the Cuban-American community after the death of Canosa and the case of Elián González. The law allowed for the trade of some agricultural and medical goods between the two nations[1]. A more persuasive reason for the agribusiness lobby’s success and the rise of moderate and liberal voices is the recent economic reforms instituted by Raúl Castro. For instance, the proportion of state-owned agricultural land has fallen from 75% in 1992 to 20.7% in 2012[1].

Effect of the lobby's campaign contributions[edit]

A logistic regression model analyzed Congress members' attitudes towards two nearly identical pieces of pro-embargo legislation before and after receiving campaign funds from the Cuban-American Lobby groups. Trevor Rubenzer found that pro-embargo PAC contributions had a statistically significant effect on Representatives' likelihood to adopt a pro-embargo stance[5].

Effect of the lobby on presidential elections[edit]

During election years between 1992 and 2004, policy regarding Cuba and the embargo followed the hard-line exiles' agenda during presidential election years. During non-election years, any legislation implemented during election years was either nullified or not enforced. Embargo-related legislature became more conservative in presidential years, and less conservative in non-election years[6].
The lobby typically becomes more successful during presidential election years, as Cuban Americans live in the largest swing state in the U.S. Florida accounts for one-tenth of electoral college votes, and the winner-take-all electoral college system makes Cuban votes in the swing state all the more critical to presidential electionsCite error: A <ref> tag is missing the closing </ref> (see the help page)..

Effect of the lobby on presidential elections[edit]

During election years between 1992 and 2004, policy regarding Cuba and the embargo followed the hard-line exiles' agenda during presidential election years. During non-election years, any legislation implemented during election years was either nullified or not enforced. Embargo-related legislature became more conservative in presidential years, and less conservative in non-election years[6].
The lobby typically becomes more successful during presidential election years, as Cuban Americans live in the largest swing state in the U.S. Florida accounts for one-tenth of electoral college votes, and the winner-take-all electoral college system makes Cuban votes in the swing state all the more critical to presidential elections<ref name="Eckstein">.

Changes made[edit]

  • Above sections
  • Updated list of Cuban members of Congress
  • Edited "Cubans in state government" section
  • Added photos of 2 Cuban-American Senators
  • Other minor edits

Changes made in "Cubans in state government" section[edit]

Edited to remove bias and subjective phrases like "much success" and "enormous political success, as well as speculation about the moral intentions of Cubans elected to state-level positions."
Previous paragraph:

Cuban-Americans have had much success at the State-level. In Florida, where Cuban-American legislators hold more seats than anywhere else in the nation, pro-Democracy, anti-Castro, and anti-Chavez legislation is often promoted and passed even though states cannot dictate U.S Foreign Policy. However, it is done as a moral obligation to the oppressed people that suffer under the Communist state their parents, grandparents, or they themselves had to flee from. Even in states where Cuban-Americans are not concentrated in large numbers they have had successes especially in New Jersey, where albeit a tiny minority concentrated in Union City, Elizabeth, and Newark, they have had enormous political successes.

New paragraph:

Many Cuban-Americans have been elected to office at a state level, especially in Florida. New Jersey also elects many Cubans to state-level positions, though there is only a small concentration of Cubans in Union City, Elizabeth, and Newark.

Media Added[edit]

Photos of Bob Menendez and Ted Cruz, Cuban-American Senators

  1. ^ a b c d e f Koçak, Canberk (2017). "Interest Groups and U.S. Foreign Policy towards Cuba: the Restoration of Capitalism in Cuba and the Changing Interest Group Politics". Class, Race and Corporate Power. 4 (2). doi:10.25148/CRCP.4.2.001664. Retrieved March 8, 2018.
  2. ^ a b Haney, Patrick J. (June 1999). "The Role of Ethnic Interest Groups in U.S. Foreign Policy: The Case of the Cuban American National Foundation". International Studies Quarterly. 43 (2): 341–361. doi:10.1111/0020-8833.00123. JSTOR 2600759. Retrieved February 10, 2018.
  3. ^ a b https://Horowitz, Irving Louis (Autumn 1998). "The Cuba Lobby Then and Now". Orbis. 42 (4): 553–563. doi:10.1016/S0030-4387(98)80005-7. Retrieved February 6, 2018.
  4. ^ Lindsay, James M. (December 2002). "Getting Uncle Sam's Ear: Will Ethnic Lobbies Cramp America's Foreign Policy Style". Brookings.edu. Brookings. Retrieved February 10, 2018./
  5. ^ Rubenzer, Trevor (October 2010). "Campaign Contributions and U.S. Foreign Policy Outcomes: An Analysis of Cuban American Interests". American Journal of Political Science. 55 (1): 105–116. doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2010.00483.x. Retrieved March 8, 2018.
  6. ^ a b Susan Eckstein (May 2015). Díaz Balsera, Viviana; May, Rachel A (eds.). How Cubans Transformed Florida Politic and Leveraged Local for National Influence. University Press Scholarship Online. doi:10.5744/florida/9780813060118.001.0001. ISBN 9780813060118. Retrieved March 15, 2018.