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Timeline of events in North Korea relations with China and the Soviet Union during the Cold War

A series of articles that recount events as chronicled by outside contemporary observers
28.08.1946 Labour Party North Korea
List of articles in this timeline
1953-1959: Post-war, purges 1960-1969: DPRK takes sides in Sino-Soviet split 1969-1978: DPRK seeks equidistant friendship with DPRK and USSR 1979-1991: US-PRC Rapprochement continues with the establishment of diplomatic relations; China remains a strong ally of North Korea, but with diminishing strong rhetoric; The USSR-DPRK relations first become warmer, and later with the decline of USSR and DPRK's friendship pivot back to China

Timeline of North Korea's relations with China and the Soviet Union: Contemporary scholarly observations of events (1960-1991)

During the Cold War, North Korea's closest allies were the Soviet Union and P.R. China. These communist allies and neighbors were key to the origins of the country, and the struggles and survival of its regime. How North Korea managed and navigated its relations with its two key allies which it needed for its survival is an important historical question. Further, understanding how outside contemporary experts observed and interpreted those relations as they unfolded, illuminates how countries around the world based their strategic analysis and policy making for that region.

This timeline principally includes events as chronicled in contemporaneous academic journals and other serial academic publications that sought to provide quarterly or annual expert digests of developments in North Korea and/or its key allies. When those publications provided citations to other sources (mostly of news outlets), these are also cited in this article to provide insight into how the academic authors conducted their research and from which sources they drew information.

The secrecy and opacity of both North Korea and its communist neighbors meant that outside observers had very few, if any, independent sources. Often researchers resorted to heavily relying on the tightly controlled official state media and other forms of official communications from those three countries. Then, they tried to discern greater meaning from analyzing what was said, how it was said, what was omitted, any discrepancies between the press publications among the three countries, and by analyzing those in the broader economic and geopolitical context of the time.

In such a timeline of relations dependent on state media, visits by delegations, signing of treaties, and press editorials expressing fraternal support, feature prominently.

Methodology

This timeline series includes contemporary scholarly observation of events and developments between Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK; North Korea), and the People's Republic of China (PRC), and the Soviet Union (USSR). The timeline is extracted principally from academic journals, which also include contemporary scholarly analysis. Whenever possible the news sources cited by the journals are also referenced here.

Introduction: The division of the Korean peninsula and the Korean War

See also: History of North Korea, Division of Korea, and Korean War

North Korea's relations with the Soviet Union and P.R. China were key to the origins of the country's and later developments.

Korea had for centuries been a high-ranking tributary state within the Imperial Chinese tributary system, until in the late 18th century Japan began to assert greater control over the Korean peninsula, culminating in its annexation in 1910. It remained a colony of Japan, until Japan lost World War II in 1945.

Shortly before the end of WWII the Soviet Union declared war on Japan, and quickly moved to occupy the Korean peninsula. Soviet troops advanced rapidly, and the US government became anxious that the USSR might occupy the whole of Korea. The US government proposed, and the USSR quickly accepted, the 38th parallel as the dividing line between a Soviet occupation zone in the north and a US occupation zone in the south. The U.S. chose that parallel as it would place the capital Seoul under American control.

In December 1945, at the Moscow Conference, the Soviet Union agreed to a US proposal for a United Nations-sanctioned trusteeship over Korea for up to five years in the lead-up to independence of the whole Korean peninsula.

The USSR worked with existing People's Committees and local communist groups in the Northern Korean peninsula assigned as their trusteeship, recognizing in 1946 their authority to govern the territory. Since late 1945 Kim Il-Sung (who had fought the Japanese in Manchuria in the 1930s but had lived in the USSR and trained in the Red Army since 1941) began to unify communist factions under his leadership, with the support - and tutelage - of the Soviets, establishing the Workers' Party of North Korea (that later became Workers' Party of Korea, ruling Korea since 1949 to the present). Under Kim Il-Sung's leadership and Soviet support, the territory that would become North Korea quickly became fully communist.

Negotiations between the U.S. and USSR on holding unified elections in the peninsula, towards a unified and independent Korean peninsula broke down. In 1948 the U.S., with the U.N. approval, resorted to organizing elections on the southern territory under its control, quickly followed by the proclamation of the establishment Republic of Korea as the sole legitimate government of the entire peninsula. The Soviets quickly followed organizing their separate elections and the creation of the Democratic Peoples' Republic of Korea (with Kim Il-Sung as its official leader) and also claiming the same pan-Korean legitimacy.

With the purpose of unifying the peninsula, Kim Il-Sung had repeatedly asked Joseph Stalin for approval and support to take the South by military force, with Stalin initially being opposed to the idea. In 1949 the Communist victory in China and the development of Soviet nuclear weapons made Stalin re-consider Kim's proposal. Kim also courted Mao Zedong for his support, and uppon apparently gaining such support, Stalin approved the invasion.

The Korean War went from 1950 to 1953. First the North (aided by the Soviet Union with advisors and material support, but not with troops) quickly took over most of the South, until the U.S. and other nations under the United Nations banner military intervened and quickly regained ground, at which point China directly intervened by surprise sending troops in support of the North, leading to a bloody stalemate until an armistice was signed in 1953. The armistice solidified the continued, and bitter, separation of North and South roughly along the 38th parallel.

Timeline: 1960-1969 — The DPRK takes sides in the Sino-Soviet split

See also: Sino-Soviet split

1960: The DPRK initially sides with the PRC

• 1960: Both the USSR and PRC agreed again to aid with North Korea's upcoming Seven-Year Plan.
  • The initial Soviet pledge was somewhat lower than earlier commitments, conforming to the steady downward trend in aid from the immediate postwar rehabilitation program.
  • China's contribution equivalent to 105 million US Dollars, was the largest loan offered to the DPRK in the postwar period, but the terms had shifted from earlier grants (in goods) to loans.

• 1960-February-4: North Korea was invited to the Warsaw Treaty talks.
  • The summoning of the meeting of the Warsaw Treaty powers in Moscow on February 4 was surrounded with much mystery. At first it was stated on January 28 by Moscow Radio that the Communist Party and government leaders of the European satellites would be coming to Moscow for an agricultural conference on February 2. Delegations of observers from North Korea, Outer Mongolia, China, and Vietnam attended "by invitation." A Chinese delegate also present made a speech praising and supporting the USSR's disarmament proposals, but also saying that the U.S. was not be trusted and that China needed time to strengthen its military to be able to counter America's "imperialist" actions in Korea and elsewhere in Asia.

Picture of Nikita Khrushchev in 1963. Khrushchev's de-Stalinization and and proposed peaceful coexistence was not well received by China or North Korea

• 1960: China opposes to the USSR's proposed theory of peaceful coexistence. The Sino-Soviet split begins, and the PRC and USSR compete for allegiance of satellite Asian states, including the DPRK. The DPRK initially seems to lean in favor of the USSR.
  • In April China voiced for the first time its opposition to peaceful coexistence.
  • Russia called "dogmatic" and "left sectarian" those who saw as incompatible peaceful coexistence and disarmament with Marxism-Leninism. However, Russia refrained from explicitly stating who those were.
  • At the same time, General Li Chih-min, writing in the People's Daily on the 10th anniversary of the outbreak of the Korean war (June 25) declared that "the modern revisionists" had been so scared by the "imperialist blackmail of nuclear war" that they exaggerated the destructiveness of such a war and begged the imperialists for peace at any price, thereby undermining "the militant spirit of the socialist countries." The dispute was carried to the Bucharest Congress in the last week of June, when Khrushchev rallied support from the European satellite parties for his policy, from which he said the Soviet Union "will not retreat a single step." However, the Chinese delegate, Peng Chen, still maintained that "so long as imperialism exists there will always be the danger of war."
  • Each side tried to win over other Communist Parties to its own point of view; in particular, the Soviet Union, challenged in its leadership of the Communist bloc by the Chinese criticism, circulated to other parties full texts of Khrushchev's speech at the Romanian Communist Party Congress at Bucharest in June. Almost all the European parties showed themselves willing to follow the Soviet line; the contest was rather for the allegiance of the Asian parties, and here too both the Mongolian People's Republic and North Korea inclined to the Soviet side.

• 1960-June-22: The USSR and DPRK signed a treaty on trade and navigation.

• 1960-July-27 - 30: North Korea and China among others attended as observers to the Soviet-led Council for Mutual Economic Aid in Budapest.

• 1960-November-11: The DPRK issued a memorandum on "The Peaceful Unification of Korea", to which on December 7 the USSR issued a statement of support.

• 1960-December-24: The DPRK and USSR signed an agreement for Soviet technical assistance.

• 1961-1971: The USSR and China continued to supply military hardware to the DPRK at favorable price conditions.
  • According to a September 1973 report of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency to the U.S. Congress, in the 1961-71 period the Soviet Union supplied North Korea with $505 million worth of military hardware, with the latter paying 50% or 60% of the list price.
  • China, on the other hand, provided $115 million worth of supersonic aircraft and naval ships either without charge or under a barter arrangement.

• 1961-May:The military coup in South Korea of May 1961 seemed to have intensified Pyongyang's fears that the U.S. was only making time until an attempt was made to destroy the DPRK and the North Korean leadership apparently felt the need for military guarantees from both the USSR and PRC.

• 1961-July-6: Kim Il-sung travelled to Moscow to sign a Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Aid.
  • The visit was from June 29 to July 10, with the treaty signed on the 6th. The treaty was scheduled to be automatically renovated every 5 years, with an initial period of 10 years.
  • On July 10 a joint communiqué announced two other agreements to provide further Soviet financial, technical, and industrial assistance.
    • The communiqué also stated that the Korean Workers Party acknowledged the Soviet communist party "as the universally recognized vanguard of the world Communist movement" and that both "condemned dogmatism, sectarism, and backsliding principles of Socialist internationalism"

• 1961-July-11:Kim Il-sung travelled to Beijing to sign a Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Aid. It was set to be valid indefinitely, and closely resembled the agreements signed days before with the USSR.

• 1961-September: Deng Xiaoping visited North Korea.

• 1961-October: When Khrushchev attacked the Albanian leaders at the 22nd CPSU Congress and provoked an angry retort from Zhou Enlai, Kim and the DPRK delegation remained publicly silent.

• 1962: By this point there were indications that Kim had already succeeded in purging the rival political factions (including the "Yenan", "indigenous", and "Moscow" factions), creating a monolithic political and media apparatus following and adulating him even with greater intensity that Mao in China.

• 1962: The DPRK made great efforts to remain friendly with both the USSR and PRC as the Sino-Soviet split was unfolding, and struggled in avoiding aligning itself with one of the two powers.
  • The DPRK greatly depended on the aid from both countries, although there were indications that recently the Chinese support had been more generous.
    • Moreover, the PRC and DPRK had stronger geographical and revolutionary bonds, and a shared mistrust of "big power chauvinism" by which the USSR was seen to accommodate the US while disregarding the interest of Asian Communist movements.
  • The Korean Workers Party refused to criticize Albania or to follow the full de-Stalinization campaign proclaimed by Khrushchev, but at the same time, it continued to enthusiastically praise the Soviet Union and the CPSU, and to insist that its friendship with both the USSR and the PRC was unbreakable.

• 1962: On the Indian-Chinese border dispute, the DPRK displayed complete support of Beijing. On the same matter, Moscow displayed ambivalence.

• 1962: The USSR's back down in the Cuban Missile Crisis gave the DPRK even more reason to doubt Moscow's resolve in a direct confrontation with the US. Kim criticized Khrushchev's appeasement strategy.
  • The North Korean leadership also backed the PRC's aggressive policy as more likely to produce quick gains in Asia, Africa and Latin America.

• 1962-February: The DPRK signed another trade agreement with the USSR.

• 1962 - 1964: The DPRK ended up openly siding with China in the sino-soviet split. The DPRK's relations with the USSR deteriorated with the development of Soviet "revisionism”.

• 1962-April: The emergence of Korean Communist nationalism within the KWP, was exemplified in an article published on the occasion of the 50th birthday of Kim Il-song, which stressed the establishment of Juche ideology by the KWP and mentioned neither Russia nor China.

• 1962-63: The DPRK displayed renewed belligerency and aggressiveness. While Premier Khrushchev continued to stress the policy of coexistence, the fifth plenum of the fourth Central Committee of the KWP (December 10-14, 1962) "especially emphasized the need of arming the entire people, strengthening our defense power to that of an iron wall, and turning our entire country into an impregnable fortress."
  • In the field of foreign policy, North Korea had been striving to broaden its contacts with the non-Communist bloc while maintaining a precarious "neutralism" in the Sino-Soviet dispute.

• 1963: Although North Korea renewed its treaties and agreements of mutual economic, scientific, and technical cooperation with the Soviet Union and the Eastern European satellite countries, it moved a step farther this year toward Communist China in the Sino-Soviet dispute.
  • An editorial in Rodong Sinmun reiterated the necessity of maintaining unity within the socialist camp and criticized open attacks launched by some of the "fraternal parties" against China. The editorial stated that there was virtually no difference between attacking China and joining the anti-Chinese imperialist camp. Further Rodong Sinmun editorials that year issued strong attacks against Tito's revisionism, as thinly veiled attacks against the USSR itself.

Choe Yong-gon in 1955

• 1963-June: Choi Yong-kun (the chairman of the presidium of the People's Supreme Assembly) visited China, apparently generating much goodwill.
  • Choi visited China from June 5 to June 23. His appeals for a "decisive struggle against imperialism" and "revisionism" and his reminiscences about Sino-Korean cooperation in the Korean War were very well received.
  • On June 18, the North Korean press published the CCP's letter to the CPSU of June 14, and on June 23 a Sino-Korean joint statement declared that "it was absolutely impermissible one-sidedly to reduce the foreign-policy of socialist countries to peaceful-co-existence."
  • A joint statement of Choi and Chairman Liu Shaoqi declared that "both sides were completely identical in their stand and views."
    • The statement elaborated on various points of contention in the Sino-Soviet dispute and in each case stressed the agreement between China and North Korea.

• 1963-July: In the lead to a USSR-PRC summit, China republished texts denouncing the USSR, authored by foreign communist allies including the DPRK.
  • As Russia and China prepared to meet for bilateral talks (which began in Moscow on July 5) both sides seemed increasingly determined to make a stand on their well-known and very different positions. As before, the Chinese people were kept informed of foreign criticism in the dispute. While the Russians observed the truce on public polemics the Chinese press reported without comment news of Russia's infidelity-giving aid to India and moving closer to an agreement with the US on a nuclear test ban. This was supplemented by reprinting selected North Korean, North Vietnamese and Japanese Communist articles which supported the Chinese point of view. In contrast the USSR preferred to give the Chinese statements as little publicity as possible.

• 1963-September-18: President Liu Shaoqi visited North Korea from September 18-27.
  • A communiqué issued at the end of the visit announced a "complete identity of views on all subjects discussed," including "important questions arising in the international Communist movement." North Korea still refrained from denouncing Khrushchev by name.

• 1963: North Korea (together with North Vietnam), refrained from signing Moscow's nuclear test-ban treaty. This was the first major issue in the Sino-Soviet dispute on which these two countries had to choose between the USSR or PRC.

• 1963-September: An academic publication in the USSR made a list of communist countries. The list did not include China, Albania and North Korea.

• 1964-March: A Romanian delegation, after visiting Beijing in an effort to mediate in the Sino-Soviet split, visited the DPRK, and the DPRK showed it had taken sides in favor of China over the discussion on where and when to hold a proposed general conference of Communist Parties.

• 1963-October-14: The Sino-Korean Trade Protocol for 1964, signed in Pyongyang on October 14, envisaged a marked growth in trade.

• 1964: China began to export an unspecified amount of oil to North Korea, under the protocol on mutual supply of goods signed the previous year.

• 1964: In border demarcation negotiations between PRC and USSR, China mentioned how past USSR loans to China had been used to finance the Korean War.
  • China claimed that it was willing to take the "unequal treaties "as the basis for a frontier settlement", even though the USSR had stirred up trouble in the borderlands. During the negotiations, China pointed that Soviet aid and trade had certainly not been disinterested as the USSR claimed. Moreover, most of the Soviet loans had to be used to finance the Korean War.

• 1964-August: China and North Korea boycott the USSR's international meeting.
  • The Chinese Communist Party reiterated its determination to boycott the preparatory meeting of the twenty-six Parties in a letter to the Soviet Communist Party. China was supported in its boycott by the Albanian, the North Korean, the North Vietnamese, the Indonesian and the Japanese Communist Parties.
  • On the issue of the international Communist meeting called by Khrushchev for December 15, Pyongyang issued a strong statement in September denying its legality. Pyongyang continued to issue pronouncements praising the accomplishments of Albania.

1964: Tensions mount between China and the DPRK

• 1960's (early-mid): The consequences of taking sides in interallied disputes, regardless of North Korean motives for doing so, were sobering. The Soviet Union responded by terminating almost all economic and military aid to the DPRK.
  • This, along with inadequate Chinese compensation, led the North Korean leadership to question the wisdom of its policy. Implementation of the Seven-Year Plan slowed down. The new military program of intensified guerrilla activities against the South had also met with difficulties.
  • Pyongyang showed fears of becoming isolated in the communist world and started to consider a return to its previous policy of neutrality in the Sino-Soviet split. By 1965, the Soviet Union was also ready to resume cordial relations. Khrushchev's successors had concluded that the escalation of the war in Vietnam and the persistent Sino-Soviet disagreement required moves to restore Soviet credibility in Asia.

• 1964-June: One of the important events in North Korean foreign affairs in 1964 year was the hosting of the "Asian Economic Seminar," held on June 17-23 in Pyongyang.
  • The more interesting aspect of the seminar for outside observers was the sharp criticism it drew from Moscow, which the Pyongyang regime utilized as an opportunity to review the imperialistic aspect of Soviet policies toward North Korea.

• 1964: Although the trade agreement with the Soviet Union was renewed this year and some Soviet technicians were sent to North Korea, the Korean Communists maintained their pro-Chinese stance in the current schism within the Communist camp.

• 1964-October: The removal of Nikita Khrushchev from power in the USSR, opens the door to improved relations between USSR and DPRK.

• 1960's (mid): Tensions mounting during China's Cultural Revolution to the point that Red Guards put up wall posters in Peking calling Kim Il-Sung a "counter revolutionary revisionist "as well as a "millionaire, an aristocrat, and a leading bourgeois element in Korea." As Soviet-North Korean relations improved throughout the latter half of the 1960s, Chinese-North Korean relations deteriorated accordingly.

• 1964-December: USSR and DPRK signed a trade protocol for the sale of Soviet airliners.

• 1965: The Soviet Union's stiffer attitude toward the United States since the beginning of regular air strikes on North Vietnam in February 1965 may have convinced the North Korean leadership that Khrushchev's policies of "peaceful coexistence" are undergoing re-evaluation.

• 1965-February to May: Kosygin visited Pyongyang and offered the military aid agreement which was later announced in Moscow in May.
  • Soviet Premier Kosygin was cordially treated in his visit to Pyongyang in February in the spirit of "traditional friendship, " and in May, Moscow agreed to help North Korea with additional military hardware. For North Korean leadership, Moscow was of more help than Beijing in certain respects, however in the denouncement of "American imperialism" and in the admiration of Cubans in their fight against "American imperialism" at America's door-step, North Korea pursued a Beijing line.
• 1965: Forced by South Korean participation in the war in Vietnam, North Korea committed itself to help North Vietnam with arms and equipment. It is in this sharing of the common enemy that North Korea had identified itself more closely with Communist China in the ideological dispute between Beijing and Moscow.

• 1965-August: The Soviet Union sent Shelepin to Korea's liberation anniversary while the Chinese sent a low-level delegation.

• 1965: The 15th anniversary of Communist China was celebrated with the attendance of international leaders including President Choe Yong-gon of North Korea.

• 1965-November-19: China said UN should cancel resolutions condemning China and DPRK as aggressors in the Korean war.
  • A People's Daily editorial restated China's demands for "thorough reorganization" of the U.N.: "Expelling the members of the Chiang Kai-shek clique from the UN and restoring to China its legitimate rights is an indispensable step for the United Nations to correct its mistakes and undergo a thorough reorganization. But it is far from enough to do this only. The United Nations must also resolutely condemn U.S. imperialism, the biggest aggressor of our time and cancel its slanderous resolution condemning China and the DPRK as aggressors and all its other erroneous resolutions. The UN Charter must be reviewed and revised by all countries of the world. Its members must include all independent countries to the exclusion of all the puppets of imperialism."

• 1965-October: Korean delegates attended an International Red Cross Conference in Vienna which China boycotted.

• 1965-November: Korea abstained from a vote in which Sino-Soviet lines were drawn at the World Trades Union Conference in Warsaw.

• 1965-late: After Korea's three-year-old policy of solidarity with China, the recent accumulation of minor amity gestures between the DPRK and USSR, hinted to a change of policy in Korea, and suggested that the DPRK and the USSR had been edging closer together since Khrushchev's fall. These helped to change North Korea's international image from a satellite of Beijing to the would-be Romania of the East.

• 1965-October-10: Kim Il-sung said he wanted to have an "independent and principled stand" between the two great communist powers. He also continued to remind the USSR that the Koreans had not yet forgotten their grievances against them and were not at all likely to exchange one big brother for another.
  • In a major speech on the 20th anniversary of the Korean Workers' Party on October 10, Kim made Romanian-like charges against Russian economic policies in Korea: "They opposed our party's line of socialist industrialization, the line of the construction of an independent national economy in particular, and they even brought economic pressure to bear upon us, inflicting tremendous losses upon our socialist construction."
  • Kim also made Chinese-like attacks on revisionist-capitulationism: "The biggest harm of modern revisionism lies in the fact that, scared by the nuclear blackmail of U.S. imperialism, it surrenders to it, gives up struggle against imperialism and compromises with it. (...) Revisionism still remains the main danger in the international communist movement today".
  • On December 6, an editorial in the North Korean Party paper, Rodong Sinmun, repeated Kim's warnings about modern revisionism which "emasculates revolutionary peoples."

• 1965-December-14: China and North Korea signed a 1966 goods exchange protocol in Pyongyang.
  • For that occasion, NCNA wrote that "the negotiations were held in a friendly atmosphere." The Korean news agency reported the same details but omitted any reference to the "friendly atmosphere."

• 1966: During the Cultural Revolution, Chinese Red Guard posters charged North Korean "revisionist cadres" with extravagance and corruption and accused Kim himself of being a "millionaire, an aristocrat and a leading bourgeois element."
  • This was seen as a new low in poor Chinese-North Korean relations.

• 1966: the KWP continued to consolidate its position of neutrality in the Sino-Soviet conflict. The KWP, even if still wary of the CPSU, relations between the two party appeared to be improving. As a result of the KWP's advocacy of united action in Vietnam and its militant stand on independence, relations between the KPW and CCP deteriorated.

• 1966: the North Korean press published an explicit criticism of Chinese ideographs.
  • The DPRK said that Chinese characters symbolized linguistic backwardness and that the Korean people should be proud of their phonetic alphabet and should not waste time trying to learn the Chinese symbols.

• 1966-January-3 to 15: At the Tri-continentnal conference of Havana, the USSR wanted to include the concept of peaceful coexistence in the leading resolutions of the conference. China and North Korea opposed it; the USSR was supported by a majority in its inclusion, but the pro-Chinese bloc succeeded in keeping them out from the general and political resolutions.

• 1966-March: North Korea sent a high level delegation to the 23rd Party Congress of the CPSU which Beijing boycotted.
  • Choi Yong Kim attended the congress. In a speech there he said that "the Korean and Soviet peoples" were "linked by ties of friendship from the time of their joint struggle against Japanese imperialism", and expressed the desire to continue to strengthen relations and cooperation between the two countries.
  • The CPSU report published at its conclusion stated that it had "good fraternal relations" with a number of countries including the DPRK, but it did not list the PRC.

• 1966-August-12: North Korea asserted its independence by a newspaper article criticizing in equal measure both Moscow and Beijing, while also declaring the pursuit of a policy of self-reliance.
  • On August 12 the DPRK published a Rodong Sinmun editorial entitled "Let Us Defend Independence" that was widely interpreted as a "declaration of independence" from both Chinese and Soviet influence. This was consistent with the analysis of the recent editorial lines of Pravda and People's Daily, which showed throughout the year a gradual increase in Soviet news about North Korea combined with a decline in Chinese reportage. Most observers abroad, as well as some leading Korean analysts interpreted the doctrinal statement as a further indication of national differentiation within the Communist international system, as well as a correlate of the war in Vietnam and of the "cultural revolution" in Beijing.
    • The article rejected the universal applicability which the Chinese claim for Maoism: "No matter how good the guiding theory of the Party of a certain country may be, it cannot be applied to all parties because the requirements and situations of revolution differ in all countries." It rejected "big-nation chauvinism": "There are big parties and small parties but there can be no superior party or inferior party nor a party that gives guidance and a party that receives guidance." It praised the "just stand" of the Japanese Communist Party which, distressed by the cultural revolution, had recently been voicing disapproval of Beijing. It also urged for "joint action and a united front in the struggle against U.S. imperialism" (especially in support of North Vietnam). It also declared the pursuit of a self-reliance.

• 1966-October: The DPRK apparently purged Kim Ch'ang-man, a well-known leader of the pro-China Yenan faction. He was removed from his position as Vice Chairman of the Central Committee of the Korean Workers Party in October 1966. At that time, too, Nam Ii, Vice-Premier and equally well-known leader of the Soviet faction, was assigned to be Minister of Railroads. Nevertheless, he was allowed to retain the title of Vice-Premier, even though his major job became relatively unimportant. Nam Ii appeared at the opening ceremony of the Seventh Session of the 3rd Supreme People's Assembly on April 25, along with the members of the Presidium of the Politburo.

• 1966-October-5 to 12: The KWP held a major conference of its central committee. By calling it a "conference" instead of a "congress" (the last congress having been held in 1961), the KWP did not have to invite foreign delegations, as a way to maintain its "neutralist" approach to the Sino-Soviet split.
  • Kim in a speech emphasized again the policy of self-reliance: "To build an independent national economy on the principle of self-reliance is a consistent line of our party (...) Complicated problems that have arisen within the socialist camp make imperative for us to cement further the foundations of the independent economy of the country" and "it is of paramount importance in our revolutionary struggle and construction work today to reorganize all work of socialist construction in line with the requirements of the prevailing situation, and in particular, to carry on the parallel building of the economy and defense so as to increase our defense capabilities (...) This will require lots of manpower and materials for national defense and will inevitably delay the economic development of our country in a certain measure".

• 1966-November: Li Yung Ho, leading the KWP delegation to 5th Albanian Workers Party congress, made no direct mention of the USSR or PRC, but said "it is inadmissible for communist and workers' parties either to impose their will on another party or to submit to the course and policy of another party".

• 1966-December: 1966 ended with the DPRK having stayed muted on the Chinese cultural revolution.

• 1967: Apparently Kim Il-song had tightened his ruling oligarchy by removing both the Soviet and Chinese factions from the center of power. On the other hand, he was desperately trying to build a strong wall by which he could stop the waves of the Red Guard Movement from China. As of that time, Rodong Sinmun had not carried a single article on the Red Guard Movement in China, although the danger of dogmatism had been mentioned several times. That North Korea still wanted to maintain cordial relations with China was evident in the Rodong Sinmun editorial titled "the aggressive friendship bound by blood."

• 1967: China's Red Guards negatively affected foreign relations, including quarrels of varying magnitude with 32 countries, including North Korea. Zhou En-Lai reigned them in later.
  • Chinese diplomatic staff abroad, who felt bound to allay suspicions at home that they were living lives of luxury, carried out demonstrative and sometimes violent propaganda for Mao's cultural revolution. During September, however, the moderates in the Foreign Ministry strengthened their position; Red Guards were rebuked by Zhou En-lai, Chen Boda and Jiang Qing for attacking embassies and it was Yao Teng-shan's turn to be criticized by wall posters.

• 1967: The most conspicuous development of 1967 in North Korea was the continuing détente with the Soviet Union and the visible deterioration in relations with Communist China. Since North Korea's declaration of the so-called "independence line" in Communist international relations, its relationship with Communist China had deteriorated rapidly. The Chinese accused the Koreans of betraying their friendship with China and the revolutionary movement in Asia. It was not unusual to see Beijing wall posters calling for the removal of Kim Il-sung, and even reporting in February that Kim and his lieutenant Kim Kwang-hyop had been arrested by the army. In return, the North Korean Central News Service bitterly criticized Chinese intervention in the internal affairs of North Korea.

• 1967: North Korea pursued a rapprochement with the Soviet Union in part driven by the impending necessity to modernize its armed forces with new weapons as well as to seek economic aid to complete the Seven Year Economic Plan.
  • The fact that North Korea was spending almost one third of its total budget on military defense was significant. The leaders of North Korea apparently believed that another Korean war was near, due to the escalation of the Vietnamese war. Rodong Sinmun's editorials had become increasingly bellicose. Although North Korea normalized its relationship with the Soviet Union because of economic and military necessity, its ideology still remained closer to that of the Chinese. Recent speeches of Kim Il-sung reveal that he still opposed peaceful coexistence; he still did not believe that the nature of capitalism had changed; he still criticized both modern revisionism and dogmatism; and he still supported wars of national liberation. Thus he called for the unity of the socialist camp and the solidarity of international Communism. His cry for an "all out fight against American imperialism" had created tensions and concerns in Korea.
  • In 1967 not a single anti-Soviet article appeared in Rodong Sinmun.

• 1967-January: China's Red Guard posters spread rumors of a coup in Pyongyang.

• 1967-February: China's Red Guard attacked Kim Il-sung as a "fat revisionist" and "Khrushchev's disciple," accusing him of sabotaging the struggle in Vietnam and slandering the cultural revolution.
  • Korea did not reply directly but late in February, Korean representatives in Cuba, India and elsewhere issued statements denying the coup rumors and demanding a cessation of the "calumnies " and "defamation" being disseminated in China.

Picture of First Vice-Premier Kim Il in 1974

• 1967-February - March: North Korea's détente with the Soviet Union rapidly accelerated, with North Korea sending an important mission headed by First Vice-Premier Kim Il to Moscow, apparently to seek more economic and military assistance.
  • The mission stayed in Moscow more than two weeks and signed agreements for economic and cultural as well as military assistance. Although the content of the agreements were unknown, the Soviet Union was then positively supporting North Korea's plan "to develop industry and defense simultaneously."

• 1967-May: The Soviet Union appointed a new ambassador to the DPRK and sent Vice-Premier V. N. Novikov to Pyongyang.

• 1967-May - October: In July a Korean-Soviet scientific exchange program for 1967 was agreed upon, and another agreement followed in October to establish an economic and scientific technical consultative commission to accelerate the cooperation between the two countries.

• 1967-September: The DPRK ambassador to China (Hyon Chun-Kuk) leaves China in September due to the strained relations caused by the Cultural Revolution. China's ambassador to the DPRK, Chiao Jo-yu, had also returned to China in mid-1967.

• 1967-68: More purges of political leaders in the DPRK took place, being replaced by more "hawkish" ones. The purge may have been caused due to differences in the policies of the individuals toward the South Korean revolution and toward Communist China.
  • Rumors and absences from the public scene indicated that the purge may have included: Pak-Kum-Chol and Yi Hyo-sun; third and fourth in rank, respectively in, the Presidium of the Korean Worker's Party. Also, Kim To-man (Secretary General of the Supreme People's Assembly), Yim Ch'un-ch'u (member of the Party Standing Committee), Ko Hyok (Vice-Premier in the cabinet), and Ho Sok-son (chief of the Party Cultural Bureau).

• 1968: Kim seemed to go back on its old thesis of peaceful Korean unification, and designated the year 1968 as one of preparation for war, stressing slogans such as "the fortification of the whole country," "armament of all people," "the modernization of the army," and "upgrading the quality of the people's army [Kindae ii Kanbu Hwa].
  • He apparently felt that there was a real threat of another Korean War and thought that the nation could exist only through its own strength since Russia and Communist China were seen as no longer reliable.
  • In order to implement those slogans, the North Korean defense budget was raised to 1,617,330,000 won (approximately $652 million, $172 million more than the preceding year), which constituted 30.9% of the 1968 national budget. The DPRK regime also intensified its own brand of "cultural revolution" in order to prepare for the coming war. Kim had increasingly stressed the value of "thought reform" on a national scale, believing that ideologically unprepared people could not win the war. During that movement, Kim was idolized as a "true revolutionary," and people were forced to study his life and teachings. The "cult of personality" was practiced in its highest form to date in North Korea.

• 1968:In the realm of international relations, Kim maintained his "independent line" policy and continued to criticize both the "revisionism" of the Soviets and the "dogmatism" of the Chinese. He warned against "big power chauvinism" and maintained that the international Communist movement should be based on the principles of equality, sovereignty, mutual respect, and non-interference in another country's internal affairs. Kim had retained close ties with North Vietnam, Cuba, and the Communist party in Japan, all of which supported this "independent line." On the other hand, North Korea did not send a delegation to the preliminary conference for world Communist parties held in Budapest, and Kim has already hinted that the DPRK will boycott next year's Moscow meeting. North Korea severely criticized the liberalization movement in Czechoslovakia, but did not openly support the Russian intervention there.

• 1968: The relationship between the Soviet Union and North Korea had continually improved since 1965, while relations with China had slowly deteriorated. The USSR sent Vice-Premier Polyansky to congratulate the DPRK on its 20th anniversary; China, Albania, and Czechoslovakia sent no one (although Chou En-lai did send a congratulatory telegram).
  • The Chinese Red Guards were still accusing Kim Il-sung of being a "revisionist and anti-revolutionary." In turn, Kim had systematically purged all the pro-Chinese elements in his regime, while the pro-Soviet members had been elevated in stature. In the new cabinet, for instance, Nam II, a prominent pro-Soviet leader, was promoted from the Railroad Ministry to Vice-Premier. In spite of Kim Il-sung's "independent line," increased dependence on the USSR for military and economic aid had propelled the North Korean position progressively toward the Soviet orbit.

• 1968-January-23: DPRK captured the USS Pueblo. With this event, DPRK can demonstrated independent initiative from the big communist powers, and its readiness to combat American imperialism. The USSR demonstrates more praise while China's response is less enthusiastic.
  • The Pueblo was seized on the eve of a preparatory meeting for a World Communist party conference, and the DPRK leaders hoped the incident would become a major focus of the conferences' attention. North Korea could further claim to have done more to harass the U.S. and help Communist brethren in Vietnam by direct and dangerous action than any other Communist nation apart from North Vietnamese itself.
    • By doing so the DPRK could demonstrate to China that North Korea was not a pawn of the Soviet Union and that it was as ready to combat American imperialism as was China herself. North Korea had succeeded in embarrassing the U.S. and in testing the reliability of its own allies.
  • The event was praised immediately by the Soviet Union and North Vietnam.
  • The first report in China's media came with a three-day delay, on January 28. The statement gave firm support to the North Koreans but made no definite commitment. It also stated that "Should U.S. imperialism dare to embark on a new war adventure, it is bound to taste the bitter fruit of its own making and receive even more severe punishment".

• 1968-September: The DPRK celebrated its 20th anniversary. The cool relations with China was demonstrated with no presence a Chinese delegation, while on the other hand Kim made a speech in support of the USSR.
  • After the DPRK had failed to publicly support the USSR's invasion Czechoslovakia, both the North Korean press as well as Kim in a speech (of September 7) criticized Czechoslovak "errors", which appeared to be a sufficient concession to ensure continued Soviet support.

• 1968-December-5: The DPRK and USSR sign an annual trade protocol.

• 1968-1969: DPRK-PRC frontier disputes and incidents are reported in the Manchurian border. China seemed to demand territorial "compensation" for the intervention of its "volunteers" in the Korean war.
  • In the summer of 1969, a Chinese road-building program was under way in the Changbai Mountains of Manchuria near strategic Mount Paektu, generally regarded as marking the Sino-Korean border but then mentioned in Chinese publications as being within China's Manchuria.

• 1969: In 1969 the DPRK relations with the USSR appeared to continue to be good. DPRK-PRC relations might have begun to thaw.

• 1969-April: The 9th National Congress of the Communist Party of China opened in Beijing on April 1st. No greetings were sent by DPRK.
  • Greetings were received from a number of foreign countries, though the majority of well-wishers were small parties and groups; there was no word from North Korea, and of the Eastern European bloc, only Romania sent greetings. Unlike earlier congresses, there were no foreign guests.

• 1969-May:The most important visitor to North Korea during the year was N. V. Podgorny, Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, in May.
  • Bringing with him several companions, including V. V. Kuznetsov, First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, as well as the Vice Chairman of the State Committee on Economic Relations and the Chairman of the Maritime Territory Committee, it could be assumed that the Soviet visitors were interested in discussing the shooting down of the American EC-121 the previous month, and the possibilities of North Korea's attendance at the June "summit" meeting of communist parties in Moscow.
  • While condemning American "provocations" (not intrusions) in his public speech upon arrival in Pyongyang, Podgorny emphasized that "We resolutely advocate reduction of tension in the Far East and peace and security in that area." North Korea did not attend the summit meeting.

• 1969-October-1: Chairman Choe Yong-gon led a strong North Korea delegation to attend in Beijing China's National Day. This was seen as an early indication that DPRK-PRC relations might had begun to improve.

Timeline: 1969-1979

1969: Improved relations with China and the regaining of equidistance of DPRK with PRC and USSR

• 1969: The end of the Cultural Revolution in China opened the door to improved relations between the PRC and DPRK.

• 1969-1970: North Korea was reverting steadily to the fence-sitting posture in the Sino-Soviet dispute which had been habitual in the years before the Cultural Revolution. Exchanges of visits and courtesies between China and North Korea were treated with great prominence in the Chinese press, as did the affairs of the North Korean Party Congress.

• 1969-April: a U.S. reconnaissance plane was downed over North Korea. The Russians helped the Americans to search for survivors, while China denounced the 'aggression.'
  • Relations between China and North Korea warmed considerably after this incident.
  • By early 1969, Pyongyang had become wary of Moscow's friendly gestures toward Washington and Tokyo.

Choe Yong-gon in a picture of 1955

• 1969-October-1: For the first time since 1965 North Korea sent a special delegation, led by President Choe, to China's National Day celebration. The delegation won concessions from China.
  • The delegation reportedly also won Chinese concessions on the disputed Mount Paektu territory as well as a new trade arrangement calling for annual transactions totaling $120 million.
  • This event was considered the turning point in China-DPRK relations. The DPRK delegation flew to Beijing at the last minute, and it also included Foreign Minister Pak Song-chol.

• 1969-October-8: The DPRK sent a message of congratulations on the success of China's two nuclear tests in late September. No such message had been sent after the test in December 1968.

• 1970: China criticized the USSR, and the USSR said Mao was responsible for the death of his son Mao Anying during the Korean War.

• 1970-January-30: New China News Agency announced that China and North Korea had held "friendly consultations" to conclude the Yalu and Tumen Rivers Navigation Coordination Committee Agreement.
  • This was the warmest description of border relations between the two countries since 1965.

• 1970-February-17: Hyon Chun-Kuk, the North Korean Ambassador, who returned home in September 1967 during the Cultural Revolution, returned to Beijing and was received by Zhou Enlai on 17 February, with whom he had a "cordial and friendly talk". The NCNA reported the event.

• 1970-February: In late February, a Chinese trade delegation led by the Vice-Minister of Foreign Trade, Chou Hua-min, visited Pyongyang.
  • It was also noticeable that the North Korean and Chinese official news agencies began again to quote from each other.

• 1970-March-4: In a gesture of renewed friendship, Son Gwan-oj was appointed North Korean ambassador to Albania, China's closest ally.

• 1970-March-10: The Deputy-Chairman of the USSR State Commission for Foreign Economic Relations M.N. Suloyev, arrived in North Korea.
  • This visit was seen as a possible reminder to Pyongyang that the Soviet Union had more resources for offering aid than China.

• 1970-March: Pyongyang refused to take part in a joint oceanographic research project with the Soviet Union on the grounds that Moscow, contrary to agreement, had invited some Japanese scientists to attend.

• 1970-April-5: Premier Zhou Enlai paid a state visit to North Korea on April 5-7, the first top-level contact between the two countries since Choe Yong-gon visited China in 1964. It was also Zhou Enlai's first diplomatic visit to any foreign country after the Cultural Revolution.
  • The common denominator of the revived Pyongyang-Beijing friendship was their mutual fear of a hostile U.S.-Japanese alliance designed to revive Japanese militarism (the automatic extension of the U.S.-Japanese Security Treaty in June reinforced this view).
  • This was Zhou's first journey outside China since 1966 and marked both the obvious attempts being made to improve relations with Korea and a return to normality in the Foreign Ministry. The joint communiqué following this visit condemned "modern revisionism" as well as "imperialism" and reactionaries of various countries" and this seemed to be a sign that Korea was moving closer to China in terms of the Sino-Soviet dispute than had been the case since 1967.
  • In their public statements, the Chinese emphasized that Korea had been the historical route to Manchuria, while the North Koreans vividly recalled who fought beside them in 1950-1953. As Kim Il-sung told Zhou: "Should U.S. imperialism and Japanese imperialism forget the historical lesson and dare to launch a new adventuresome war of aggression again, then the Korean people will again, as in the past, together with the Chinese people, fight against the enemy to the end."
  • This visit brought about new Chinese commitments for military and economic assistance for the following six years, in preparation for the North Korea's new six-year plan of 1971-76. Such commitments were probably later increased during Kim Il-sung's visit to Beijing in the spring of 1975.

• 1970-April-23: The appointment of a new Chinese Ambassador to North Korea was announced, as part of China's post-Cultural Revolution normalization of relations with multiple countries. The previous Ambassador, Chiao Jo-yu, had returned to China in mid-1967, leaving the post empty for almost three years due to the strained relations. The new Ambassador, Li Tun-chuan, had previously been posted in the Republic of Dahomey (present-day Benin) until January 1966 when Dahomey broke off diplomatic relations with China.

• 1970-April-late: The Soviet Chief Chief of General Staff Zhukov. Just like with China, the DPRK also concluded a new six-year trade and aid agreement, in preparation for the North Korea's new six-year plan of 1971-76.

• 1970: Beijing signed a five-year aid agreement with the DPRK and quietly dropped its claim to a 100-square mile strip of DPRK territory bordering Manchuria.

• 1970-June-25: The 20th anniversary of the beginning of the Korean War was marked with large-scale celebrations of the "blood-cemented revolutionary friendship between the Chinese and Korean people."
  • A joint editorial from the People's Daily, Red Flag and Liberation Army Daily was published on June 25 and a rally held in Beijing on the same day.
  • Delegations were exchanged between the two countries, the Chinese one led by the Chief of Staff of the PLA, Huang Yung-sheng, and the North Korean by the Foreign Minister, Pak Song-chol. They were received respectively by Mao and Kim II-sung and a series of fraternal banquets was held in both capitals attended by senior government and military leaders.
  • Although the 15th anniversary of the Korean War was celebrated in 1965 and there had been annual commemoratory editorials until 1966, the scale of the celebrations that year, as well as their resumption after a gap of four years, was clearly intended to demonstrate that relations were on a new and improved footing.

• 1970-July-25: A DPRK military delegation visited China.
  • A North Korean military delegation led by General Oh Jin Woo, the Korean Chief of the General Staff, and including the Commander of Artillery, Commander of the Navy and Deputy Commander of the Air Force, visited China from 25 July to 4 August at the invitation of Huang Yongsheng. They were received by Chairman Mao and had "very cordial and friendly" talks with both Zhou Enlai and Huang Yongsheng.

• 1970-July-27: China and North Korea published a joint editorial on the 17th Anniversary of the Korean armistice.
  • the People's Daily marked anniversary with a large character editorial published jointly with the People's Liberation Army Daily and entitled "U.S. imperialism has not laid down its butcher's knife." This said that, in face of United States "aggressive activities in Asia," the Chinese people would "further strengthen their unity" with the Korean people and those of the three Indo-China states. After quoting Kim II Sung as saying that the Korean people were "fully prepared to crush any surprise attack," the editorial continued: "If U.S. imperialism dares to reimpose war upon the Korean people, the Chinese people will, as always, stand side-by-side with the fraternal Korean people to defeat the U.S. aggressors completely."
  • This anniversary had not been noted by an editorial in the Chinese press for a number of years and was clearly being used as a peg for statements about friendship with North Korea.
• Delegations were also exchanged in celebrating the anniversary.

• 1970-August-15: The commemoration of the Russian liberation of North Korea was relatively low-key.
  • K. T. Mazurov, first Deputy Chairman of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers, called for an "Asian Collective Security" arrangement; the KCNA report of the speech omitted this passage.

• 1970-October-17: Two new agreements were signed: one on economic and technical aid and the other on the exchange of goods from 1971 to 1976.
  • The last known economic and technical aid agreement had been signed in 1960 to cover the period 1961-64. Since 1967 there had been annual protocols on the exchange of goods.

• 1970-October-25: The 20th anniversary of the entrance of the Chinese People's Volunteers into the Korean War, was also greatly celebrated by both the DPRK and PRC.
  • There were exchange of delegations and large meetings in both Pyongyang and Beijing. Editorial comment in Beijing emphasized the close links between China and Korea ("like lips and teeth") and praised Kim Il-sung as the "great leader of the Korean people," and the same praise was given to Chairman Mao.

• 1970-November-2: North Korea conducts its 5th Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea on November 2-13, with shows of mutual friendship with China, and of enmity towards the USSR.
  • China's greetings to the congress was read out on the first day, while the Russian message had to wait until the third meeting.
  • Kim Il-sung bitterly criticized the Soviet Union, probably in response to Russian attempts to interfere with North Korea's foreign policies (and perhaps the internal politics of the KWP, as well)..
  • After hearing these and other oblique attacks on the USSR, the Party Congress reaffirmed the DPRK's "independent line."

• 1970-December-8: Kim II Sung's report to the North Korean Party Congress was published in full in China's People's Daily on 8 and 9 December: a total of eight pages.

• 1970: Some South Korean newspapers quoted Hong Kong sources reporting in 1970 that Beijing had offered the North Koreans its full assistance if Pyongyang mounted a full scale attack on the South.
  • This might have been because the July 1961 treaties by which Beijing and Moscow pledged themselves to assist the DPRK are more ambiguous than the ROK-U.S. treaty of October 1953.
  • However, both in 1970 and 1971 Chinese spokesmen declared that they planned to come to North Korea's assistance only if it were attacked.
  • Moscow was cool to Pyongyang's forward strategy in 1968-69. Statements from Beijing as well as Moscow in recent years have generally endorsed North Korean statements on unification only when their approach was explicitly peaceful and specified no foreign interference. Neither China nor the USSR probably would want to reverse America's withdrawal from Asian theaters.

1971: PRC accession to UN and the start of PRC's diplomatic support for the DPRK through the UN

• 1971: Sino-Korean relations continued to be reported prominently (and warmly) in the Chinese press.

• 1971: China's envoys continued to be favored over Russia in 1971 at official functions in the DPRK.
  • For example, there was a Chinese representative at the DPRK's 23rd national day on September 9, but none from the Soviet Union.

• 1971-February-3: The DPRK and the USSR signed an agreement on the delivery of commodities and payments for 1971-1975.
  • According to Soviet sources, this stipulated a growth of 55% in trade over the previous five-year period. 83% of the DPRK's foreign trade was conducted with communist countries, with the Soviet Union's share of the total trade being 70%.

• 1971-March: DPRK delegates attended the 24th Soviet Party Congress, while China and Albania were the only two ruling Communist Parties not to send delegates.

• 1971-July-10: The 10th Anniversary of the Sino-Korean Treaty of Friendship was greeted with a message from Mao, Lin Biao and Zhou Enlai, as well as a large-character People's Daily editorial.

• 1971-July-11: There was a Pyongyang mass meeting to celebrate the 10th Anniversary of Chinese-Korean Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance. Although smaller than on similar occasions, it was attended by Central Committee members Kim Il, Pak Song-chol, So Chol, Yang Hyog-sop, and Ho Dam.
  • There had not been a rally to celebrate the 10th anniversary of the Russian-Korean Treaty a few weeks earlier.

• 1971-July-16: President Nixon's surprise announcement on July 16 of his 1972 trip to China deeply concerned the DPRK, which was worried its security.
  • China proclaimed July 9-15 (the very moment when Henry Kissinger was in Beijing) as "Chinese-Korean Friendship Week", probably to reassure the DPRK.
  • A DPRK delegation visited Beijing during that week, led by Kim Chung-nin, secretary of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea|Central Committee of the Korean Workers’ Party, and Kim Man-kum, Vice-Premier of the Cabinet of the DPRK.
  • On July 15, the day before the Nixon announcement, a Chinese delegation left for Pyongyang, led by Li Xiannian, Vice-Premier of the State Council, and Li Te-sheng, Director of the General Political Department of the PLA, probably to explain China's reasons for inviting the head of an adversary state.

• 1971-July-27: The 18th Anniversary of the "victory of the Fatherland Liberation War of Korea" also merited a large-character editorial in the Chinese press.
  • The editorial said that "U.S. imperialism" was perpetuating "its occupation of South Korea" and waiting "for an opportunity to invade the DPRK." At the same time the "Japanese reactionaries" were intensifying their "infiltration into South Korea, economically, politically and militarily" and clamoring "for a 'pre-emptive' war" against the North. However, China and Korea had fought and won together before and "in the days to come we will continue to unite with the Korean people like brothers and fight through to the end to defeat our common enemy."

• 1971-August-6: Kim Il-sung publicly reacted to the announcement of the plans of Nixon's visit to China for 1972, supporting China and verbally attacking the US.
  • The DPRK's first full official reaction to China's action waited until August 6 (Hiroshima day, and a date of special significance for the Koreans), during the remarks given in welcoming the visit of Cambodia Prince Sihanouk, a representative of the Indochinese War.
    • Kim said "Nixon's visit to China will not be a march of a victor but a trip of the defeated, it fully reflects the destiny of U.S. imperialism which is like a sun sinking in the western sky: Nixon was "going to turn up in Beijing with a white flag." China had experience both of "countering the spear of the enemy with a spear and breaking it, and countering the delusive tactics of the enemy with revolutionary principle and defeating it."
    • Kim then went on to declare his confidence in China's support: China will in the future "invariably and tightly adhere to its revolutionary principles and continue to actively support and encourage the Fighting revolutionary people."

• 1971-August: North Korea announced for the first time willingness to negotiate with South Korea without any preconditions. Kim gave voice to the recognition that a new flexibility had now entered East Asia by reversing his Foreign Minister's statement of four months earlier: "We are ready to come in touch any time with all political parties, including the Democratic Republican Party of South Korea, public organizations and individual personages".
  • Seoul's proposals for Red Cross talks, made six days later, could have been viewed as a form of response to the new North Korean overtures.

• 1971-August: Zhou Enlai told American journalist James Reston that China would welcome an international conference to deal with Korea.
  • Zhou also strongly indicated his concern about the conjunction of tensions on the Korean peninsula and the fears of Japanese expansion. Zhou prolonged the discussion past midnight to talk of nothing else but the 'Korean problem'.

• 1971-August-15: The DPRK and the PRC signed an economic agreement in Beijing. No details were given.

• 1971-September-6: The DPRK and PRC signed another unspecified agreement on free military aid in Beijing.
  • For the first time since the Korean War, it was stated this aid was to be provided free of charge. It was signed on the Chinese side by Huang Yongsheng.

• 1971-September-9: North Korea's 23rd National Day was celebrated with China, but not with the USSR.
  • It provided another occasion for a message from Mao, Lin and Zhou as well as a large-character People's Daily editorial.
  • These added nothing new to the editorial of 27 July but the fact that together they occupied all the front page of the People's Daily was clearly intended to emphasize the closeness and importance of relations.
  • There was a Chinese representative at the DPRK's national day, but none from the Soviet Union.

• 1971-September-25: Kim Il-sung indicated interest in increased contacts with the West, and stated his support for the improved relations between China and the US.
  • In an annual five-hour interview with the visiting editor of the Tokyo daily, Asahi Shimbun, Premier Kim Il-sung indicated interest in increased contacts with the West: “My view is that as a result of the China visit by President Nixon, the international situation will move in the direction of easing tensions, albeit temporarily. When the trend is toward the easing of tensions, we have no intention of pursuing policies which go against the current situation. How U.S.-China relations will change has no direct relation to us, but we welcome the situation being eased. We intend to see what attitude the United States takes toward us.”

• 1971-October-19: 25th anniversary of Chinese entry into the Korean War was greeted in the North Korean press.
  • the North Korean press called for " unity." " The situation in Asia," said a Rodong Sinmun editorial, "demands that the peoples of all countries in Asia unite ever closer (...) No machinations by the U.S. and Japanese aggressors will bar the road of the Korean and Chinese peoples (...)".

• 1971-October-21: While Henry Kissinger was again in Beijing, the DPRK Ambassador to China, Hyon Chun-kuk, in a rare press conference meant to clarify Korea's position at a pivotal moment, denounced "U.S. imperialism and Japanese militarism "which supported the "Park Chung-hee puppet clique."

• 1971-October-25: China was admitted to the United Nations (on the 21st anniversary of China's entrance into the Korean War in 1950; an irony not lost on neither the Chinese nor the Koreans).
  • China was expected to focus the U.N.'s attention on Korea. Both China and the DPRK were vitally concerned with the U.N. rescinding its resolutions which branded the two as aggressors; more-over, both were interested in abolishing the U.N. military command structure under which American forces technically operated in South Korea. It was conceivable that China could muster enough votes in the General Assembly to give orders to the U.N. Command. This would actually not have had an effect on the American presence in South Korea, but would have been a major propaganda victory for China and the DPRK. As a result, it was seen as possible that the two Koreas would be admitted to the U.N. as one of the several divided nations in the world.

• 1971-October-25: the 1971 anniversary of China's entry into the Korean War passed almost unmarked in each country.

• 1971-November-15: China reiterated its support for the DPRK at its opening speech at the U.N.
  • In his opening speech to the U.N. General Assembly of 15 November, Qiao Guanhua reiterated China's support for Korea's "just demand that all the illegal resolutions adopted by the UN on the Korean question be annulled and the 'UN Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea' be dissolved."

• 1971-November: The 11th Meeting of the Korean-China Committee for Cooperation in Border River Transport, signed an agreement in Beijing.

• 1971-November-20: Kim Il-sung sent a personal message of congratulations to Mao and Zhou on a Chinese nuclear test.

• 1972-February: Upon Nixon visiting China, the DPRK criticized Nixon, and declared "a great victory of the Chinese people".

• 1972-April-24: China celebrated the 40th anniversary of the Korean People's Revolutionary Army.
  • Mao and Zhou Enlai sent a joint message of congratulations to Kim II-sung. The message acknowledged the Korean people's "valuable proletarian internationalist support" to the Chinese during the war against Japan, and described the friendship between the two peoples as "firm and unbreakable."
  • A Chinese government military delegation, led by Politburo member Chen Xilian, and including the Commander of the PLA navy Hsiao Ching-kuang, visited Pyongyang to attend the celebrations.

• 1972-April-27: Kim Il-sung, in the context of the Nixon recent visit to China, said that China remained true to its principles.

• 1972-May: Kim Il-sung said he saw "little hope" that either Moscow or Beijing could help to improve Korean-American relations. Kim also questioned the need for U.S. troops in South Korea since the U.S. was in better terms with the USSR and PRC.

1972: Talks of reunification

• 1972: Messages Pyongyang exchanged with Beijing on various occasions were invariably couched in the warmest possible language. Furthermore, both sides explicitly recognized the supremacy of each other's "Great Leader" in their respective countries. Editorials in People's Daily on North Korea contained at least one direct quotation from Kim Il-sung, with Rodong Sinmun reciprocating the favor by quoting from Mao Zedong.
  • It is noteworthy that, in an earlier period of Sino-North Korean solidarity from 1962 to 1964, North Korean publications never mentioned Mao Zedong's thought. Nor did, of course, Beijing acknowledge Kim Il-sung's alleged contributions to marxism-Leninism.
  • In a message sent by Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai, the Chinese government went conspicuously beyond the USSR, in praising the achievements claimed by leader of the DPRK, saying that that Kim had "creatively" applied the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism to the concrete practice of the Korean revolution and it had made an "important contribution to the world people's revolutionary cause against imperialism." The message sent by Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai to Kim Il-sung on the same occasion endorsed the preceding claim.

• 1972-April-24: At the ceremony marking the 40th anniversary of the Korean People's Revolutionary Army, the DPRK ranked the PRC ahead of the USSR.
  • The PRC military delegation headed by Chen Xilian, Commander of Shenyang Units of the People's Liberation Army, was mentioned and later received by Kim Il-sung first, while the Soviet military delegation headed by Marshall Kirill Moskalenko, Deputy Minister of Defense, was relegated to the third-ranking position behind the Romanian delegation.
  • This is one of multiple celebratory instances where the DPRK consistently ranked the PRC ahead of the USSR.

• 1972-June-10: Kim said of Nixon's rapprochement to China that the US should also pay attention to smaller countries.

• 1972-June-21: Kim expressed for the first time his willingness to meet with South Korean President Park Chung-hee, in an interview with Harrison Salisbury.
  • Analysts attributed this newfound interest of developing contacts with the South, to the geopolitical shifting grounds after Nixon's visit to China.

• 1972-July-9: China praised the North-South Korea talks on peaceful unification, while continuing to exhort the non-interference by the U.S. or other outside powers in Korean affairs, and the closure of the United Nations Command.

• 1972-July: The 11th anniversary of the PRC-DPRK and USSR-DPRK treaties of friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance were marked by a preferential treatment of the PRC by the DPRK.
  • On July 6, the banquet hosted by the Soviet ambassador to commemorate the 11th anniversary of the Soviet-North Korean treaty was held in the Soviet Embassy and attended by So Chol, the 9th-ranking member of the Political Committee of the KWP Central Committee, and lesser officials including two vice-ministers.
  • On July 11th, The celebrations of the DPRK-PRC treaty were not only held in Ongnyu Hall, normally reserved for a state banquet, but attended by Second Vice-Premier Pak Song-chol (ranked 4th in the KWP roster), 0 Chin-u, Chief of the General Staff of the Korean People's Army (ranked 7th in the KWP roster), Vice-Premier Chong Chun-t'aek, Foreign Minister Ho Dam, and Finance Minister Kim Kyong-nyon.

• 1972-September-8: China congratulated the DPRK on its 24th anniversary.
  • A cable of congratulations on the 24th anniversary of North Korea was sent over the signatures of Mao Zedong, Dong Biwu, Zhu De and Zhou Enlai. The struggle of the Korean people had been "a great inspiration to the Chinese people and the revolutionary people of all countries."

• 1972-September-22: China supported a U.N. resolution for the reunification of Korea.

• 1972-October: China's ambassador Qiao Guanhua praised the DPRK at the U.N. General Assembly and demanded the U.S. withdrawal from South Korea.

• 1972-December: The Foreign Minister Ji Pengfei paid a three day visit to Pyongyang.

• 1972-December-29: Mao stated that the DPRK was part of the communist family, supporting each other, while omitting the USSR.
  • Nguyễn Thị Bình, Foreign Minister of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam, visited Beijing and was received, in his study, by Chairman Mao. Photographs of their meeting were prominently displayed in the People's Daily the following day. Unusually, part of what Chairman Mao had said was quoted: "We are of the same family. We and you, South and North Vietnam and also Laos and Cambodia and Korea are also of the same family. We support each other."

1973: The DPRK tried to keep good equidistant relations with both PRC and USSR, but relations with PRC seemed to be warmer

• 1973: North Korea continued to maintain substantial ties with both Moscow and Beijing. Despite its singularly warm relations with Beijing, Pyongyang kept up personnel and economic exchanges with Moscow.
  • According to a Soviet source, in addition to trade, Moscow "renders [Pyongyang] technical assistance in the construction of a number of industrial enterprises."
  • China expressed support for the rapprochement happening between North and South Korea (although later in 1973 these efforts were halted).

Ho Dam in a picture of 1972

• 1973-February: The DPRK Foreign minister Ho Dam visited China; they issued a joint communiqué.
  • Ho Dam visited China from 9-14 February and held talks with Ji Pengfei "on further strengthening and developing the friendly relations and co-operation between China and Korea and on important international issues of mutual interest," during which "identical views were recorded".
  • On the reunification of Korea, the communiqué said that China supported the North Korean view on "the independent and peaceful reunification of the fatherland "and believed that U.S. forces "using the signboard of the United Nations" should be withdrawn from South Korea.

• 1973-April-11: A People's Daily editorial supported DPRK proposals for reunification and called for US withdrawal.

• 1973-October-2: China in the U.N. called for the abolition of the Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK).

• 1973-June/August: Moscow opened its doors to South Korean visitors in June and again in August, and in response the DPRK boycotted the University Games held in Moscow. South Korean athletes participated in the Games.

• 1973-November-14: China at the U.N. asked again for the abolition of UNCURK.
  • Huang Hua, in the First Committee, said that China supported the reunification of Korea; if either part of the territory was to enter the U.N. before this had been achieved, it should be under the name, Confederal Republic of Koryo, representing the whole country. Also, the UNCURK should be abolished, as it was an "out and out tool for aggression", and the UNCURK issue should not be referred to the Security Council since its life would then be prolonged with the use of the veto.

• 1973-November-24: With China's support, an agreement was reached at the U.N. to disband the UNCURK (UNCURK itself had proposed its dissolution). It also coincided with the first appearance in the U.N. of a North Korean delegation, which was able to participate in the debate.
  • UNCURK itself had proposed its dissolution, on the grounds that the dialogue between North and South Korea had reached agreement in principle to peaceful and independent unification. Two competing draft resolutions were introduced, and although both agreeing on the dissolution, differed on how to promote peaceful unification. One resolution, sponsored among others by China and the Soviet Union, emphasized the termination of foreign interference in Korea as the key to easing tensions and facilitating reunification. Another, sponsored by the U.S. and others advocated for greater involvement in the matter by the UN Security Council. A compromise resolution was approved instead.
  • The behind-scenes agreement in the U.N. to disband UNCURK was welcomed by the People's Daily in an editorial that declared that the Commission had always been a tool for foreign interference in Korea and it also welcomed the first appearance in the U.N. of a North Korean delegation. The editorial criticized the continuation of the U.N. command in Korea and said that it "should be disbanded and all foreign troops completely withdrawn from South Korea".
  • According to reports from Seoul, the compromise U.N. declaration, which was not put to a vote, was the consequence of a secret agreement between Kissinger and Zhou Enlai during the former's visit to Beijing.

• 1974-August: Unlike Korea, China reported on Nixon's resignation in a neutral tone, making special emphasis on Ford's announcement to not change U.S. foreign policy.

• 1974-September-19: At the U.N., China called again for the withdrawal of foreign troops in South Korea.

• 1974-November-29: China at the UN called again for the U.S. military withdrawal from South Korea.

• 1975:The close similarity of outlook on international affairs between China and North Korea continued to find expression in both countries.

• 1975-January: On the occasion of China's new constitution, Zhou Enlai issued a report on China's foreign policy. Enlai expressed support for the DPRK, while also expressing optimism towards relations with Japan and the U.S.
  • Unlike the 1954 Constitution of the PRC, the 1975 one did not include a reference to the Korean war.
  • China's new constitution included in its preamble a small section on international affairs, designed to express formal long-term commitments of general principle. The preamble included a commitment that "China will never be a superpower."
  • Zhou Enlai's report included a survey of China's current views on international affairs:
    • "We firmly support the just struggles of the people of Korea, Viet Nam, Cambodia, Laos, Palestine and the Arab countries as well as countries in southern Africa. We support the countries and people of the second world in their struggle against superpower control, threats and bullying. We support the efforts of West European countries to get united in this struggle. We are ready to work together with the Japanese Government and people to promote friendly and good-neighbourly relations between the two countries on the basis of the Sino-Japanese Joint Statement."
    • "There exist fundamental differences between China and the United States. Owing to the joint efforts of both sides the relations between the two countries have improved to some extent in the last three years, and contacts between the two peoples have developed. The relations between the two countries will continue to improve so long as the principles of the Sino American Shanghai Communique are carried out in earnest."

• 1975-Spring: The USSR showed little enthusiasm for a proposed visit by Kim Il-sung.
  • Kim wanted to visit the Soviet capital before he went to China but was asked to defer his trip until later in the year on the grounds that the Soviet leaders were too preoccupied with other activities.

• 1975-April: Kim Il-sung visited China, heading a major diplomatic effort which included a ten-member delegation of top leaders in North Korean political, military, and economic fields. The visit spanned ten days from April 17 to 26, and was welcomed by Mao.
  • • • Even though China continued to support North Korea and their demand for the U.S. military withdrawal from the South, China seemed to realize that America could not back down from the ROK so soon after their withdrawal from the Vietnam war.
      • The DPRK was referred to as "the sole legitimate sovereign state of the Korean nation," which was indicative of a potential Chinese pledge not to move in the direction of two-state solution. The Russians had yet to endorse that approach.
      • The communique also condemned the "Pak clique for aggravating the tensions, resorting to a machination of national division, trampling on the North-South joint statement, sabotaging talks, and intensifying fascist oppression of the South Korean people." The Chinese "firmly support the South Korean people in their just struggle for the democratization of society and the independent and peaceful unification of the fatherland." The joint communique further condemned U.S. "imperialism" in pursuing a two-Korea policy, and maintained that the U.N. Command should be dissolved and "all the U.S. armed forces must be withdrawn from South Korea."
      • In the speech delivered at the banquet on April 18, Kim engendered a feeling of crisis when he said: “If revolution takes place in South Korea, we, as one and the same nation, will not just look at it with folded arms but will strongly support the South Korean people. If the enemy ignites war recklessly, we shall resolutely answer it with war and completely destroy the aggressors. In this war we will only lose the military demarcation line and will gain the country's reunification”.
    • Conspicuous by their absence in the joint communiqué were references to "hegemonism" and modern revisionism. This contrasted with Deng Xiaoping's welcome speech of April 18 in which reference to Chinese opposition to hegemonism was stressed: "the scramble between the superpowers for world hegemony," The absence of such references in the joint communiqué probably indicated Kim's desire and ability to maintain a neutral stance between the Soviet Union and China. The tone of the joint communiqué was more temperate than Kim's remarks of April 18, and was devoid of the strong anti-South Korean rhetoric he used in his banquet speech. The role of China had been the focus of much speculation, but a dominant interpretation was that Beijing exerted a moderating influence over North Korea.

• 1975-April-28: China supported the membership of the DPRK to the World Meteorological Organization.

• 1975-May-20: In a published speech in Taiwan, allegedly to have been made by Foreign Minister Qiao Guanhua, he stated that China's unwillingness to send troops to aid the DPRK in the future.
  • The China News of Taipei published a transcript of a speech alleged to have been made at Tientsin by Foreign Minister Qiao Guanhua on May 20. In this speech Qiao was quoted as saying that China would not send troops to assist North Korea in the reunification of the peninsula unless it became the victim of "imperialist aggression and when the battle had reached the Yalu River."
  • China would restrict her aid to moral and material support, adding that even then "we will have to take a careful look at the prevailing situation and the attitude of our Korean comrades. I am afraid it won't do if they are only against the imperialists without taking a stand against the revisionists at the same time."
  • Qiao also warned his listeners about the effect of an intervention in Korea on Japan: "It is possible that militarism will make a comeback in Japan as a result of a new Korean war."

• 1975-June: Kim Il-sung toured the East European countries, conspicuously omitting the USSR.

• 1975-August: China proposed at the U.N. the admission of North and South Vietnam, but opposed the approach U.N. admission of two Koreas.
  • China sponsored resolutions in the Security Council calling for membership of the two Vietnam states, and submitted a draft resolution with 34 other states for the General Assembly on the withdrawal of the United Nations forces from Korea.
  • On August 11, Huang Hua spoke in the Security Council in favor of the admission to membership of both States of Vietnam. In another meeting on the same day when the U.S. had vetoed the draft resolutions, Huang strongly criticized it for calling for a "package deal" linking the admission of South Korea with the admission of the two parts of Vietnam. This was a violation of the provisions of the U.N. Charter. Huang said the two Vietnam states had a prior agreement, as the two German states had had, that both would apply for UN membership. Korea was different, wishing to reunite at an early date.

• 1975-August: The Korean issue was discussed during two U.S. congressional visits to China. It appeared that both sides shared the view that war should be avoided.

• 1975-September: A delegation of the Chinese Communist Party, led by Zhang Chunqiao, visited North Korea from September 21 to 27, and was given an audience by President Kim Il-sung on the 24th; on the following day Kim received Zhang Chunqiao for a second time.
  • At a speech at Nampo on the 23rd, Chang said that "the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese people will wage till the end the struggle against modern revisionism ... ," and in a speech in Pyongyang on the 26th he made similar references to revisionism and hegemonism. These were both reported by the Korean Central News Agency.

• 1975-September - October: China at the U.N. rejected a U.S. proposal regarding the continuity of the Korean armistice. China instead proposed a resolution for the U.S. withdrawal from South Korea.
  • Foreign Minister Qiao Guanhua, attending the U.N. General Assembly in September, rejected the proposal which Henry Kissinger made on September 22 for a conference between China, the U.S. and the two Koreas to preserve the armistice after the dissolution of the U.N. command in South Korea.
    • Qiao maintained that there were no grounds for fearing a new war in Korea as a result of not having an armistice. As both North and South had agreed upon not using force and on peaceful reunification, they alone should meet to agree on some necessary measures pending reunification. Meanwhile, he argued, the fears of a new war, which were "much ado about nothing," and Kissinger's new proposals were designed to justify the continued presence of American troops in South Korea and the division of the country.
  • Huang Hua, China's ambassador and permanent representative at the United Nations, spoke in October to the First Committee of the General Assembly on Korea.
    • He welcomed the participation of representatives of North Korea and discussed two draft resolutions. China opposed the resolution sponsored among other by the U.S., which Huang said was an attempt to legalize the presence of U.S. troops and support "two Koreas."
    • In China's view the UN Command should be ended and U.S. troops should be withdrawn, as recommended in the second draft resolution, co-sponsored by China, leaving Koreans to settle the Korean question without outside interference. In China's view all artificially divided countries would eventually reunite in accordance with popular demand.

• 1975-September: Chang Chun-chiao visited Pyongyang. There he made a reference against hegemonism.

• 1975-Fall: North Korea could not pay its trade bills, but Kim Il-sung visit to China in Spring 1975 won him a reduction of DPRK's debt. Some scholars believe this to have been the primary motive for his visit.
  • North Korea found itself unable to meet its trade bills, and by the fall of 1975 its debt to trading partners was estimated at anywhere from $700 million to as high as $1.7 billion. As a result, Japan (North Korea's largest trading partner outside the Communist Bloc), Sweden (North Korea's largest trading partner in Europe), and West Germany suspended the issuing of export insurance on deals with Pyongyang. According to many observers, it was to correct these payment problems rather than to gain backing for an attack on South Korea that Kim Il-sung went to China the prior spring after the fall of Indochina. According to these reports, Kim won a reduction of $150 million in his country's debt to the Chinese.
  • Among the debts at risk of default were at least US$430 million dollars owed to non-communist countries. It was believed that the DPRK had incurred these debts in its efforts since 1970 to escape political pressure being put upon it by the USSR, and that the terms of trade had worsened against North Korea when the Soviet Union increased its oil prices in line with OPEC policies and the value on the world markets of North Korea's exports (mostly iron and zinc) had fallen.

• 1975-October-25: China celebrated the 25th anniversary of the Chinese entry into the Korean War.
  • A joint editorial in the People's Daily and the Liberation Army Daily underlined that China would never forget that North Korea had fought to defend China as well as North Korea from American attack in 1950. "No matter how violent a storm may break out in the world hereafter, the Chinese people will always unite and fight together with their Korean comrades-in-arms". Vice-premier Chen Hsi-lien commented: "They were the first to punch a hole in the myth of so-called invincibility of U.S. imperialism." But the root cause of the present tension remained the "protracted presence of U.S. aggressor troops in South Korea".

• 1975-November-18: The UN General Assembly approved a resolution 3390 (XXX) calling for the dissolution of the United Nations Command, and withdrawal of the troops stationed in Korea under the United Nations flag. The Chinese ambassador Huang Hua celebrated its passing.
  • Huang said the United States could not legitimately claim some its forces were in South Korea in accordance with a "US-ROK bilateral defence arrangement" when they went out as U.N. forces, and when the Armistice Agreement prevented the introduction of reinforcing military personnel in Korea. Huang ended by saying that the Korean question should be settled by the Koreans; all "artificially divided countries will eventually realize their national reunification" and the Chinese people would always "fight shoulder to shoulder with the fraternal Korean people and support them in their just struggle until final victory".

• 1976: There were strong signs that Pyongyang's ties with Moscow were sturdy.
  • A North Korean economic delegation led by Vice Premier Kong Jin Tae visited Moscow in January to conclude a new four-year agreement on trade and economic cooperation.
  • A delegation of the Korean Workers'Party headed by Pak Song-chol, member of the Political Committee as well as a Vice-Premier, attended the 25th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union from February 24 to March 5.

• 1976-January: A "friendship" oil pipeline opened, linking China and North Korea
  • The opening was marked by ceremonies on each side in the first week of January, attended by Vice-premier Kong Chin-tae, the Vice Minister of foreign trade Han Su-kil, and his Chinese counterpart, Chou Hua-min.
  • A ceremony in Beijing for the same event was attended by the two vice-ministers of foreign trade.
  • neither its location nor any other details were disclosed during the announcement.

• 1976-January-8: A DPRK posts and telecommunications delegation under the minister of communications, Kim Hak-sop, arrived in Beijing.

• 1976-January-14: A DPRK-PRC border river transport cooperation agreement was signed in Shenyang by Paek Il-kon and Ma Pei-teh.

• 1976-February-9: A DPRK-PRC protocol on mutual supply of goods for 1976 was signed by the two vice-ministers of foreign trade, Chen Chieh and Han Su-kil.

• 1976-July-6: The Soviet-North Korean treaty of friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance, first signed in 1961, was automatically extended for another five years.
  • Significantly, in commemorating the occasion, the Soviet press underscored the importance of Soviet economic and technical assistance to North Korea. Pravda noted on July 6 that the Soviets had helped to build or rebuild 60 enterprises and industrial facilities in the past 15 years and that the volume of trade between the two countries had more than trebled in the same period.
    • On October 8, Moscow Radio reported that in 1975 North Korea imported from the Soviet Union $257,500,000 worth of commodities. An article published in the August, 1975 issue of the Soviet publication Foreign Trade, claimed that among the 50-odd projects in which the Soviets were engaged in North Korea were North Korea's largest iron works, mines, thermal and hydroelectric power plants.
  • A similar treaty between North Korea and the PRC, also concluded in July 1961, was valid indefinitely in the absence of a specific agreement to revise or terminate it.

• 1976-August-18: The Panmunjom axe murder incident, prompted the DPRK to make provocative statements, but failed to rally the support of both the USSR and PRC.
  • Both Moscow and Beijing conspicuously refrained from commenting on the incident, confining themselves to merely North Korea's official news agency dispatches on the incident and its aftermath.

• 1976-August: A UN General Assembly resolution for the peaceful unification of Korea was introduced on August 10 by China with 33 other countries, but was withdrawn in September. The draft resolution asked that the reunification should be decided by the Korean people without outside interference, foreign troops should be withdrawn and the " United Nations command " should be abolished
  • By the end of September, China was elected as one of the Vice Presidents of the 31st session of the UN General Assembly.

• 1976-September: Mao dies. Symptomatic of the warmth of Sino-North Korean relations was the fact that the list of foreign leaders who sent wreaths to China on Mao's death was headed by Kim Il-sung. Kim's message of condolence also preceded those of all other foreign leaders and governments in Peking Review. Kim was followed by the Albanian Party of Labor and Nicolae Ceausescu of Romania.
  • A September 24 Xinhua News Agency report noted that memorial meetings for the death of Mao had been held in Korea, Albania, Romania, Democratic Kampuchea, among other countries.

• 1976-October-5: China at the 31st session of the U.N. General Assembly expressed their grief for the loss of Mao, while reiterating Mao's views on foreign affairs, which included a call for the dissolution of the U.N. Command in Korea, and the withdrawal of U.S. troops.

• 1976-December: The USSR published detailed reports on its economic assistance to North Korea during the year.

• 1977-March-12: A long-term trade agreement was signed in Beijing for 1977-81, and the annual protocol for 1977, in the presence of Vicepremier Li Xiannian and a Korean delegation under Vice-premier Kye Ung-tae.

• 1977-March: One of the first post-Mao positioning of China's foreign policy was stated in an interview of by the senior vice-premier and Politburo member Li Xiannian. Li said that he welcomed U.S. President Carter's proposal for the withdrawal of forces from South Korea.

• 1977-September-29: Speaking generally on China's foreign policy, Huang Hua reiterated China's support for the UN General Assembly resolution 3390, adopted in 1975, on the independent and peaceful reunification of Korea,

• 1978-May: Chairman Hua Guofeng visited North Korea from May 5 to 10, in the first foreign visit of a China's chairman in 21 years. It probably symbolized the much more outgoing character of China's recent diplomacy.
  • The visit of Hua Guofeng, is the most important guest Kim had received during the entire period of his rule up to that point, the first such visit by the head of the PRC.
  • Hua held talks with President Kim Il-sung "in a cordial atmosphere overflowing with militant fraternity and friendship," in the description of the Korean Central News Agency.
  • There was no indication of the issues covered in the talks (and there was no communiqué issued), although Hua called in very strong terms for a total and rapid withdrawal of American troops from the south. The presence of the Chinese minister of economic relations with foreign countries, hinted to a probable discussion of Chinese economic aid and cooperation.
  • The Chinese delegation traveled by train, and included Geng Biao, vice-premier and head of the International Liaison Department; Chen Muhua vice-premier and minister of economic relations with foreign countries; Huang Hua, minister of Foreign Affairs; Shen Chien, deputy head of the International Liaison Department of the Central Committee; Chang Yao-tzu, deputy director of the General Office of the Central Committee; and Lu Chih-hsien, Chinese ambassador to the North.
  • The need for a more cordial relationship between the North and China may had been felt by both sides. A friendly North Korea was important to China at the time that the Vietnamese were moving closer to the Soviet Union. Hua may have also felt the need to assure Kim that the conclusion of the treaty of peace and friendship between Japan and China would not change the Chinese position toward Korea and, furthermore, that China's more frequent relationship with, and increasing cordiality toward, the U.S. would not leave the North isolated in its relationship with Japan and the U.S. The Russian advance into the northeastern corner of Korea may not be a simple acquiescence on the part of the North to the import of Russian technology. Kim had long tried without success to negotiate directly with both Japan and the U.S., and depending upon the Chinese relationship with these two countries, Kim may have had come to negotiate directly with the South Korea, something he did not really want to do.
  • It was also believe that part of the visit's motive was connected to North Korea's indebtedness over grain and petroleum supplies.
  • After the visit, North Korean press published attacks on "dominationism", to indirectly criticize the USSR, hinting that the DPRK might be favoring more the PRC over the USSR.

• 1978-September:Vice-chairman Deng Xiaoping led the Chinese delegation to attend the celebrations of the 30th anniversary of the DPRK.
  • He had discussions with Kim Il-Sung on September 8, accompanied by P'eng Ch'ung and foreign minister Huang Hua

• 1978-September-28: At the 33rd Session of the UN General Assembly, Huang Hua, foreign minister of China, called again for the US military withdrawal from South Korea, and for peaceful unification without foreign interference.

Timeline: 1979-1991

1979: US-PRC Rapprochement continues with the establishment of diplomatic relations; China remains a strong ally of North Korea, but with diminishing strong rhetoric; The USSR-DPRK relations become warmer

• 1979-January: Formal diplomatic relations between the United States and the Peoples Republic of China were established.
  • This was preceded in 1978 by the Japan-PRC treaty of peace and amity.

• 1979: The USSR started the construction of an ice-free naval base in Najin, North Korea. It was speculated that it could be used as a soviet submarine base.

• 1979: Throughout 1979 North Korea struggled but made great efforts to maintain the semblance of an equidistant posture toward its two socialist neighbors. Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia and the Chinese invasion of Vietnam severely tested the policy of equidistance.
  • It is significant that North Korea condemned Vietnam for the act of "dominationism" while refraining from a similar denunciation of China. Some oberservers noted the North Korean sympathy with the PRC's act of "punishment".

• 1979: Sino-Soviet tensions, coupled with the growing cordiality between the U.S., the PRC, and Japan, probably heightened Soviet interest in North Korea. The USSR's media increased its rhetorical support for the DPRK, and the DPRK's media reciprocated.
  • Beginning in the latter part of 1978 and throughout 1979, the Soviet Union showed a greater degree of sensitivity to North Korean interests than had been the case before. The Soviet media consistently voiced official support for the DPRK, albeit without much enthusiasm. Soviet media coverage generally gave "correct" (from the North Korean perspective) analyses expressing support for North Korean positions on the matters that were of major concern to North Korea.
  • Soviet analyses included occasional references to the PRC's alleged perfidy and complicity with the U.S. and South Korea. Thus, the PRC was charged with covertly supporting the U.S. position on such issues as the U.S. military presence in South Korea and three-way talks between the U.S., South Korea, and North Korea.
  • North Korean media coverage in 1979 indicated a generally warmer and more appreciative attitude toward the Soviet Union than had been the case in the recent past.

• 1979: DPRK-PRC relations remained close throughout the year.
  • Official Chinese statements and media displayed consistency, unambiguity, and apparent enthusiasm with which China supported North Korean policy, especially on reunification.
  • North Korea reciprocated the warmth of Chinese support with its own. The erection of the statue of the late Premier Zhou Enlai and special reception given Mrs. Zhou during her stay in North Korea were symbolic of the close relationship the North Koreans had with China.
    • However, it was reasonable to assume that the North Koreans were watching with considerable misgivings the development of Chinese foreign policy and the trends in Chinese domestic policies and the economy.

• 1979-July-11: China supported the DPRK in its rejection for the U.S. proposal of trilateral(DPRK-ROK-U.S.) talks.
  • Foreign Minister Huang Hua called the rejection "absolutely correct." He also described the North's counter proposal for bilateral talks with the U.S. in which the South could be called upon when appropriate as "reasonable and constructive".

• 1979-July: China and the DPRK criticized Carter's change of policy in keeping U.S. troops in Korea.
  • Chinese media called it "foolish" and as the product of southern "pressure". North Korea called it a product of "deceit".

• 1979-July: A Korean Worker's Party delegation visited China.
  • Vice Premier and Political Bureau member, Geng Biao declared during the delegation's visit on 17 July: "In the future, no matter what may happen in the world, the CPC and the Chinese people will always join the KWP and the Korean people in a united struggle and make common progress together".

• 1979-September-27: Han Nien-lung speaking for China at the 34th session of the U.N. General Assembly called again for the dissolution of the U.N. Command in Korea, the withdrawal of U.S. troops, and supported proposals by Kim Il-sung for reunification led through North-South dialogue.

• 1980: Expressions of public support towards the DPRK differed between China and USSR: USSR was more strident, while China was more moderate. Even if in some matters both allies appeared to strongly support the DPRK policies, North Korea was concerned that its allies might end up accepting a two-Koreas solution.
  • The level of Soviet public expressions of support for North Korea's policies remained very high throughout 1980. The Soviet media not only continued to voice full support for North Korea's demand for U.S. troop withdrawal, but also intensely criticized developments in South Korea and the role of the U.S. there.
    • According to the Soviet media, the U.S. was responsible for the entire series of events in South Korea, including the assassination of President Park, the December 1979 coup, the Gwangju massacre, and the installation of the Chun government.
  • On the South Korean convulsive developments, China abstained from criticizing the U.S role in it, and the Chinese media provided commentary rather moderate in tone, mainly carrying news attributed to North Korean media sources. On North Korean matters, the Chinese leaders (including Huang and Deng) continued to call publicly for the withdrawal of U.S. forces and enthusiastically expressed support for North Korea's reunification policy. Also, the Chinese media (to the satisfaction of the North Koreans) employed the expression "the great leader of the Korean people, Kim Il Sung," which the Soviets had also adopted.
    • Analysts suggested that while China may had publicly called for the U.S. military withdrawal from the Korean peninsula, that China actually wished for the U.S. forces to remain to act as a counterbalance to the USSR's strength and potential encirclement in Asia.
  • Despite rhetoric expressing mutual solidarity and support between the DPRK and its allies, there appeared to be considerable doubt on North Korea's part about the extent of genuine and active support for its reunification policy. The DPRK appeared to believe that unless its views and sentiments were forcefully and constantly conveyed, its socialist allies might gradually tilt toward de facto acceptance of the two-Korea formula.

• 1980: The DPRK may had seen China's de-Maoization as a disquieting process.
  • The North Korean leaders probably found China under Deng Xiaoping disquieting since the process of de-Maoization, the change in economic policies, and the foreign policy orientation of the Chinese leadership had implications for North Korean interests. All this, together with the reported dissatisfaction with the level of Chinese economic assistance, may have contributed to North Korea's disenchantment with the PRC.

• 1980-April: North Korea expressed support for the USSR's invasion of Afghanistan;

China condemned it, interpreting it as part of a Soviet "southward drive" aimed at penetrating the Persian Gulf and designed to control the sea lanes from the Horn of Africa to the Straits of Malacca.

Hua Guofeng

• 1980-May: CPC's Chairman Hua Guofeng reassured Japan that North Korea would not invade South Korea.
  • The Gwangju Uprising in South Korea coincided with Chairman Hua's visit to Japan where great concern was expressed. Hua reassured the Japanese premier that North Korea would not invade the South and that the tense situation would not be allowed to undermine China's relations with the West.
  • Peaceful re-unification was restated as Beijing's objective but this did not prevent Hua from denouncing South Korea for repression and suppression of a popular struggle for democracy.

• 1980-July - September: The USSR and PRC vied with each other in boasting of their economic assistance to the DPRK.
  • Radio Moscow repeatedly referred to Soviet assistance to the DPRK. For example, On July 6 and September 9, it reported that more than 60 major factories and enterprises had been built or reconstructed in Korea with Soviet cooperation, and that many Soviet engineers and technicians were helping Korean technicians in handling Soviet equipment.
  • China had joined in this public display of its own assistance to North Korea: On September 9, Radio Beijing reported that [pPonghwa Chemical Factory|Bonghwa Petroleum Chemical Plant]] was built and went into operation on September 7 with Chinese assistance.

• 1980-August: North Korea said that the Japan-China Treaty of Peace and Friendship and China-U.S. normalization are "positive constructive elements.", but according a later speech by may have indicated his concern in having "unprincipled compromise with imperialism".

• 1980-September: Kim reportedly said that North Korea was willing to cancel its defense treaties with the Soviet Union and China if a peace treaty was signed between the DPRK and the U.S.

• 1980-September-24: China's Huang Hua at the UN calls for the dissolution of UN Command in Korea, at the 35th session of the General Assembly.

• 1980-October: On the Iran-Iraq war, China remained officially neutral while analysts suspected a bias for Iran. China allowed the DPRK to send resupplies to Iran through China's air space.

• 1980-October: The Sixth Congress of the KWP was convened, with 170 foreign delegations, including China.
  • This contrasts with the First, Second and Fifth Party Congress when they had not invited any "fraternal parties".

• 1981: the DPRK kept a policy of equidistance in the Sino-Soviet split, both praising the USSR but also denouncing its "dominationism" (Soviet expansionism).

• 1981-January: The North Korean Premier Li Jong-ok visited China on January 10-14.
  • Li Jong-ok expressed satisfaction with the state of North Korean-Chinese relations, and his counterpart endorsed Pyongyang's positions on unification and the U.S. At the end of their talks, Yi referred to "unanimity of view on the questions discussed," but the Chinese media were less categorical, suggesting differences on unspecified issues.

• 1981-January: British archives on the Korean war declassify new information.
  • Important data from non-Chinese sources was also available regarding the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950. Documents opened under the British 30-year rule contained further evidence of China's warning of her impending counter-attack, as well as evidence that the U.S. was not planning to use nuclear weapons in the conflict.

Controversial China-Korean relations were raised in w

• 1981-March: Western press reported on China secretly trading with South Korea the previous year.

• 1981-September-23: China's vice-foreign minister Zhang Wenjin, 36th session of the General Assembly, called again for the U.S. withdrawal from Korea, and peaceful reunification of Korea.

• 1981-November: The PRC and DPRK held party talks on unspecified issues. Publicly they continued to express strong reciprocal support and amity. That included Pyongyang's endorsement of the highly pragmatic "economic readjustment and other policies" adopted by China.. Both sides maintained a certain reticence, however, in reporting on the talks to their respective audiences; they maintained selective silence on what they said about each other.

• 1981-December-7: KCNA quoted Soviet Ambassador G. A. Kriulin, while he was visiting a North Korean cooperative farm on December 7, as saying, "We are aware that Comrade Kim Jong Il is personally guiding this work [a meeting for "the year-end account settlement and income distribution] in a concrete way." This was the first public Soviet reference to Kim Jong Ii carried in North Korean media, but Soviet media continued to maintain silence.

Zhao Ziyang (1985)

• 1981-December-20: Premier Zhao Ziyang paid a return visit to Pyongyang to engage in talks, amid signs of warmth and cordiality. China expressed emphatic criticism of U.S. policy.
  • The visit lasted 4 days. It was given wide coverage in the Chinese press and it was notable for the emphatic criticism of U.S. policy in the area. Washington was charged with perpetuating the division of Korea.

• 1981-December: Soviet economic assistance to the DPRK continued. The DPRK and USSR signed a protocol for economic cooperation.
  • The Soviet role as the principal provider of economic and technical assistance, past and present, was frequently highlighted in Moscow radio commentaries intended for North Korea. As usual, such a role was not publicly acknowledged.
  • According to a protocol signed in December 1981 (two days before Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang visited Pyongyang), the Soviet Union agreed to extend technical aid to some North Korean enterprises. In addition by 1985 commodity trade between the two countries would be increased 40% over the level of the late 1970s.
    • This projected expansion in trade most likely took into account Pyongyang's decision at an important party meeting in December 1981 to increase the output of rice and consumer goods. That decision had been reached several days before a North Korean delegation met with Soviet officials in Moscow on the issue of economic and technical cooperation between the two nations.
    • For years, rice and consumer goods had been among the top North Korean commodities exported to the Soviet Union. In July 1982, Moscow publicly urged Pyongyang to "increase its trade with the USSR," pointing out that "in certain years, for various reasons, the Korean side failed to fulfill its agreements in their entirety."

• 1982: Brezhnev and then Andropovmade overtures to China to start improving relations.

• 1982-March: Chinese trade delegation visits Korea
  • During the visit of a Chinese government trade delegation, headed by Zheng Tuobin, North Korean sources spoke of offers of "substantial material aid" having been made by China.

• 1982-September: Kim Il-Sung makes a state visit to China.
  • KCNA reported the departure of Kim Il-sung, president of DPRK, on 15 September for a state visit to China at the invitation of the State Council. On his arrival in Beijing, Kim was welcomed by Hu Yaobang, Deng Xiaoping, Zhao Ziyang and other leading members of the CC.

• 1982: NK provides weapons to Iran, with theories pointing to either USSR, China or NK itself as the producers.
  • Pyongyang became indirectly involved in the Iraq-Iran War, despite its announced policy of neutrality in October 1979. According to the New York Times, it supplied "about 40 percent of the approximately $2 billion worth of weapons, ammunition, and equipment Iran acquired abroad" in 1982. Paid for in cash and in oil, these weapons and equipment were obtained "either from the Soviet Union, China, or produced in North Korea itself." Some 300 military instructors were also sent to Iran.

Chongjin in a satellite picture of 2005

• 1982-Early: Reportedly china supplied fighter planes to NK.
  • China was said to have supplied North Korea with 20 to 40 A5 fighter planes (an improved version of Mig-21s) on undisclosed terms.
  • Possibly as a reciprocal gesture, North Korea allowed China to use the port of Chongjin for its-trade with Japan.

• 1982-early: North Korea allowed China to use the port of Ch'ongjin for its-trade with Japan.
  • This could have been possibly as a reciprocal gesture for China;s military aid.

• 1982: There was an exchange of summit-level visits between China and NK.
  • 1982-April: Hu Yaobang and Deng Xiaoping visit Pyongyang.
  • 1982-September: President Kim Il-sung visited China in September and held talks with Deng Xiaoping, Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang. Later, he visited Sichuan and Shaanxi provinces.
  • For the two reciprocal summit-level visits, Among the likely topics covered during these visits were Pyongyang's need for economic and security assistance; its apprehensions over the unofficial Chinese-South Korean trade under way covertly since the late 1970s through middlemen in Hong Kong; prospects for Sino-Soviet reconciliation; the U.S. military presence in South Korea; and the question of whether China would participate in the 1983 session of the International Parliamentary Union, the 1986 Asian Games, and the 1988 Summer Olympics, all slated to be held in Seoul.
  • Given the Chinese commitment to the principle of collective party leadership, it is doubtful whether the succession situation in North Korea was broached at all. In this respect, the Nodong Sinmun coverage of Hu Yaobang's September 1 report to the 12th congress of the Chinese Communist Party was revealing: none of his critical references dealing with "personality cult" or "undemocratic practices and patriarchal ways" within the Chinese party in recent past was reported for North Korean audiences.

• 1982-October: Kim received a National People's Congress delegation, led by Xi Zhongxun.
  • The Korean News Agency also reported the signing of an agreement on the exchange of major commodities for 1982-86 and of a protocol on scientific and technical co-operation.

• 1983: China played a role in promoting Kim Jong Il's claim for legitimacy. On June 10 the Japanese Kyodo reported from Beijing that Kim Jong II had visited China, indicating China's official recognition of Kim Jr.as successor to his father as North Korea's leader. The Chinese party leader Hu Yaobang mentioned Kim Jong Il's "invited but unannounced visit to China" from June 2 to June 12 to a North Korean delegation in Beijing, led by Supreme People's Assembly (SPA) chairman Yang Hyong-sop, on July 7. The next day Pyongyang Radio, in reporting Yang's meeting with the Chinese leader, officially confirmed Kim Jong II's PRC visit for the first time. Thus it would appear that China, while disavowing a hereditary system in the communist world and prohibiting a personality cult for its leaders in the post-Mao era, have recognized, indirectly at least, the father-son power succession plan in North Korea. [Need to organize this]

• 1983: North Korea's efforts to pursue an independent foreign policy toward the Soviet Union and China obviously were not fully met in 1983 because of developments in the world politics over which the DPRK had little control. [Need to organize this]
  • Radio Moscow reported on May 11, 1983, that North Korea and the Soviet Union traded a total of four million tons of cargo in 1982, with the Soviet Union using Najin port as a forward base for shipping cargo to such littoral countries in the Pacific region as Vietnam and Cambodia. A Soviet economic delegation to North Korea in May led to the signing of a North Korea-Soviet commodity delivery protocol.[Need to organize this]
  • On September 7 Radio Moscow also claimed that "the Soviet Union has helped North Korea build or reconstruct 62 major factories, including power stations in Pyongyang, Pukchang and Unggi, an oil-processing factory in Unggi and a synthetic ammonia factory in Aoji." It also claimed that four other major factories are being expanded with Soviet technical aid, one of which will enable Kim Chaek Ironworks to increase its steel production capacity from one million to 2.4 million tons a year. In total the Soviet role in North Korea's economic development was said to be extensive, amount- ing to 63% of electricity, 50%of oil derivatives,42% of steel products, and 38% of rolling products in 1982. It also revealed that about 3,000'Soviet technicians were working in North Korea in various sections, including the manufacture of tractors and trucks and the building of ocean-going ves- sels. These claims, if true, contradict what North Korea's Juche-oriented national economy professes to do on the basis of self-reliance to attain the targets of the Second Seven Year economic plan. [Need to organize this]

• 1983: The most important development in 1983 was Kim Jong Il's ten-day "unofficial" visit to the PRC in June. The Western press reported unconfirmed rumors that Kim Ii Sung had also made two secret trips to China to meet with the Chinese leaders, at a seaside resorttown near Dairen in August and in Beijing in early November. Unlike his official PRC visit in September 1982, these clandestine visits, if they occurred, seem to indicate North Korea's growing concern over the evolving situation surrounding the Korean peninsula, such as the recent unofficial contacts established between the PRC and South Korea, which Pyongyang ehemently opposes.[Need to organize this]

• 1983: China's Foreign Minister Wu Xueqian paid a five-day visit to Pyongyang on May 20 in the wake of the hijacking of a Chinese airliner to South Korea by six Chinese nationals on May 5. Since this airliner, carrying 105 people on a domestic flight from Shenyang to Shanghai, crossed the DMZ from North Korea to the south, the hijacking was an embarrassment to the Pyongyang regime; the North Koreans were also concerned that China's civil aviation delegation proceeded to Seoul to negotiate the release of the passengers and the aircraft.In July, the 22nd anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance with China, as with the Soviet Union, was faithfully observed in Pyongyang. In Beijing, on july 4, a protocol was signed following the 23rd meeting of the Korea-ChinaInter-Governmental Committee for Scientific and Technical Cooperation. Since the document was signed by a vice-minister of forestry on the Chinese side and by a vice-chairman of the State Scientific and Technological Commission on the North Korean side, the agreement appears to have been primarily focused on forestry matters.[Need to organize this]

• 1983: Following Chinese defense minister Geng Biao's visit to Pyongyang in June 1982, North Korea may very well have received considerable military assistance from China in 1983. China supplied North Korea with over 20 A-5 jets, an improved MiG 21-type fighter, according to Japan's Sankei Shimbun. North Korea also agreed to make the port of Chongjin available for facilitating trade between Japan and China, thereby allowing China to secure a foothold on North Korea's eastern coast, which was hitherto dominated by the Soviet Union. This agreement was reportedly made during Kim Ii Sung's visit to China in September 1982. [Need to organize this]

• 1983-November-16: The People's Daily criticized Reagan's visit to SK.
  • The newspaper argued that Reagan's visit to South Korea could only worsen tension in the peninsula. Stability there would be best served by the withdrawal of American troops and bringing pressure on the South Korean Government to undertake sincere consultations with the North Korean authorities.

• 1983-84: China supports NK's proposal for US-SK-NK talks.
  • A Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman expressed support for the North Korean proposal of tripartite talks between North and South Korea and the U.S. in order to reduce tension in the area and prepare the way for reunification.
  • On 1984, January 13, People's Daily echoed these views and argued that the presence of American troops were a major contributory factor to current tension. Accordingly, a withdrawal of such troops was the first condition for the eventual reunification of the Korean Peninsula. It was announced that Hu Yaobang would visit North Korea in early May in order to reaffirm Chinese support for President Kim Il-sung's approach to reunification.

• 1984: North Korea during 1984 was busy trying to maintain a posture of equidistance between Beijing and Moscow, an official line of independence in foreign policy toward its communist allies.
  • Two high-level delegations visited China, while also keeping a strong link with the USSR.
  • the DPRK readily joined the USSR in boycotting the Los Angeles olympics.

• 1984-January: Reversing a long-standing isolationist policy, North Korea announced that it would seek to foster economic ties with foreign countries, includ- ing technical cooperation and joint venture projects with socialist countries. This new economic policy was reflected in the "trade development resolution" adopted by the Third Session of the Seventh Supreme People's Assembly on January 26. It called for improved economic technical ties with all nations that respect the sovereignty of North Korea, including some capitalist countries that have no diplomatic ties with the DPRK. In announcing this foreign economic policy, Pyongyang seems to have been impressed by the success of China's "open door" policy that led to direct investment in China by capitalist countries and also to China's improved diplomatic ties with the West.

• 1984-May-4: The General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CCP visits NK.
  • Hu Yaobang was in North Korea on an official friendship visit from 3 to 11 May.
  • He received what the North Korea media called "the greatest welcome in Korean history." An estimated two million people turned out to greet him, including 500,000 on his arrival in Pyongyang. The fact that Hu's trip to Pyong- yang followed U.S. President Ronald Reagan's tour of China (April 27-May 1) and also that of Japanese Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone (March 23-26) added to the diplomatic speculation regarding China's role as an intermediary between these two major powers and North Korea. The Chinese leader was sure to have conveyed to Kim II Sung the desire for an easing of tensions on the Korean peninsula expressed by both Nakasone and Reagan during their trips.
  • In a first round of talks with President Kim Il-sung, Hu briefed the Korean leader on the recent visits to China by President Reagan and Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone.
  • There was an exchange of views on the situation in Asia, especially on the Korean peninsula (Kyodo later reported that nine-tenths of Hu's talks with Kim had been on the issue of Korean reunification).
  • At the conclusion of the visit, both sides expressed their complete satisfaction at its outcome. In an interview with Xinhua, Hu referred to identical views on the reunification issue and hoped that the US would take North Korea's views seriously.
  • What agreement Hu Yaobang and Kim II Sung reached during three rounds of talks was not known. Although the Chinese media termed his visit an "enormous success," some of Hu's remarks in an interview after his return to China suggest that differences of opinion prevailed between the two leaders. Hu was quoted as saying that "the only way to resolve the Korean question is to hold talks among the concerned parties, but if the talks cannot be held immediately, an alternative solution will be to maintain contact among them because contact is better than confrontation. "24 This was clearly an admonishment of North Korea for its hitherto inflexible and uncompromising stance in refusing to open direct dialogue with South Korea, as well as Pyongyang's objection to the unfolding of "cross contacts" between China and South Korea that included the exchange of sports delegations. The Chinese leader allegedly took a different position from North Korea on the tripartite talks proposal. According to a report from Japan, Hu said that "the three-way conference should be one of the methods to realize unification," implying that other channels also must be explored.

Kim Yong-nam (2014)

• 1984-May-16: Kim Il-Sung visited the USSR. It was the first time since 1961.
  • Five days after the departure of Hu Yaobang, Kim Il Sung left for Moscow by train from Chongjin, the same port city on the east coast from which he bid farewell to the Chinese leader. Since it was President Kim's first visit to Moscow in 23 years, speculation arose that it represented a significant departure from his hitherto less than warm posture toward the Soviet Union. Leading a huge entourage of 250 members, accompanied by important party and government officials including Premier Kang Song-san, Foreign Minister Kim Yong-nam and People's Armed Forces Minister Oh Jin-u, Kim Il Sung arrived in Moscow on May 23 after an eight-day train journey across China and Siberia.
  • How successful Kim Il Sung was in obtaining Soviet economic and military assistance, including the acquisition of an advanced weaponry system such as MiG-23 fighter planes and surface-to-air missiles, was not known immediately. During the three-day stay in Moscow, three rounds of talks were held between Kim and Soviet President Konstantin U. Chernenko, as well as separate meetings between the premiers and defense and foreign ministers of both sides. Although no joint communique was issued at the end, contrary to customary practice, the Soviet news agency Tass reported that the two sides had "taken practical measures" aimed at strengthening cooperation. At a welcoming banquet in Moscow, Chernenko delivered a speech in which he affirmed the Soviet role in liberating Korea from Japan in 1945 and criticized the U.S. for escalating tension in the region by conducting war exercises in collaboration with Japan and South Korea. Although the Soviet leader expressed his endorsement of North Korea's policy on Korean unification, he failed to make direct reference to Pyongyang's "tripartite talks" proposal. Kim Il Sung returned to North Korea on July 1 after completing official goodwill visits to seven additional East European socialist countries.

• 1984-June-2:Inter-Korean talks on the formation of a single Korean team for the 1984 Olympics, as first proposed by North Korea, were held at Pan- munjom on April 9, 30, and May 25. Further sports talks did not materialize, however, as North Korea announced on June 2 that it would boycott the Los Angeles Olympics, following the suit of the Soviet Union and others among its allies. Actually, the talks had become dead- locked over Seoul's demand that North Korea first apologize for the Rangoon bombing.

• 1984-August: With the idea of learning from the experience of China, Premier Kang Song-san paid a six-day official visit to the PRC in early August. Accom- panied by his economic ministers, Premier Kang toured several factories in the light industry field in the Beijing and Shanghai areas including a beer factory; plants manufacturing refrigerators, washing machines, and travel goods; a textile mill; and food processing installations. Earlier, in February, Foreign Minister Kim Yong-nam had toured various industrial sites in China including the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone in Guangdong Province. At the end of Premier Kang's visit, Beijing Radio reported on August 10 that the leaders of the two governments, after wide-ranging discussions on various joint venture programs, concluded a joint venture agreement, although the Pyongyang media did not confirm it.

• 1984-September: North Korea announced the adoption of a joint venture law on September 8, thereby translating the new foreign economic policy into concrete measures.The law attempts to attract foreign investments.
  • Obviously, North Korea's policy shift on foreign trade was occasioned by a recognition that it continued to lag behind South Korea in economic development and that China had scored success after enacting a similar joint venture policy in 1980.

• 1984-October-5: People's Daily welcomed the dispatch of relief aid from North to South Korea.
  • It also hoped that it would lead to a reduction of tension between the two countries and help promote the reunification and independence of Korea. There was favorable comment too on the economic talks that took place between north and south.

• 1984-November-23:The unexpected exchange of gunfire in Panmunjom on November 23, over the incident of a Soviet defector (identified later as 22-year-old Vasily Matuzok, a Soviet tour guide and diplomatic trainee) crossing the demarcation line to seek political asylum, resulted in the death of one South Korean and three North Korean soldiers, and the wounding of one American and one North Korean soldier. This was the first shoot-out in the truce village since the dispute of August 18, 1976, over tree-pruning in the joint security Area.

• 1984: China expresses in private some disagreement with NK's reunification policies.
  • Kyodo quoted Deng Xiaoping as saying that "China does not completely support some of the positions that North Korea has taken" on the reunification issue. He expressed the Chinese view that the United States should, but the Soviet Union and Japan should not, be involved in any talks on Korea.

• 1984-October: KIm Il-Sung makes unofficial visit to China
  • From 26 to 28 November Kim Il-sung paid an unofficial visit to China during which he met senior officials, including Deng Xiaoping and Hu Yaobang. Discussions focused on international issues of common concern and the further development of friendly bilateral relations.
  • Policy differences between Chinese and North Korean leaders regarding the situation on the Korean peninsula apparently continued, as indicated by unofficial secret visits to Beijing reportedly made in October and again in November by Kim Il Sung.
  • The Japanese press, quoting Japanese embassy sources in Beijing, reported that Kim made a four-day secret visit to China from October 23 to 27, preceding the scheduled visit of Burmese President U San Yu to Beijing starting October 29. Kim's mission reportedly was to dissuade China from accepting the Burmese President's report on North Korean involvement in the Rangoon incident. More likely though, Kim's trip had an agenda of prior consultation with China about North Korea's planned initiative and new policy toward South Korea on the inter- Korean dialogue and negotiation.

• 1984-November:KIm Il-Sung makes another unofficial visit to China.
  • Policy differences between Chinese and North Korean leaders regarding the situation on the Korean peninsula apparently continued, as indicated by unofficial secret visits to Beijing reportedly made in October and again in November by Kim Il Sung.
  • A Chinese Communist Party spokesman in the International Liaison Department, Wu Xington, disclosed November 30 that Kim Il Sung had visited Beijing from November 26 to 28. He declined to specify the purpose of Kim's visit, details of its planning and timing, or why not announced in advance. He also denied that the visit was directly linked to the November 23 shootouts in Panmunjom, in which three North Korean and one South Korean soldier were killed and one U.S. and one North Korean soldier wounded. He did acknowledge that "the shooting incident was mentioned" in Kim's talks with Chinese leaders.
  • Because of the North Korean leader's apparent decision to emulate China's successful "open door" policy, Pyongyang in 1984 began to tilt toward China in the delicate diplomatic balancing act between Moscow and Beijing. As it drew closer to China's orbit, North Korea's policy disputes with the Soviet Union also began to emerge more openly.
  • On November 11, North Korea's Central News Agency reported the arrival in Pyongyang of a high-level Soviet delegation led by Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Kapitsa to participate in the "Korea-Soviet border talks." For the first time since the border agreement was signed 1957, North Korea publicly admitted that it was experiencing border disputes with the Soviet Union along the 32-kilometer border that runs along the Tuman River in the northeast.The new border treaty was initialed on November 27 in Pyongyang, and an intergovernmental consultation on wide-ranging issues reportedly took place during the two-week stay of the Soviet delegation. A Japanese source reported that the Soviet Union, during Kapitsa's Pyongyang visit, agreed to provide North Korea with advanced weaponry systems, including MiG-23 fighter aircraft, T-72 tanks, and combat helicopters.

• 1984: To increase the year's steel production to the goal of nine million tons, the steel mills in Kimchaek were expanded with Soviet aid.

• 1985: [Analysis] Compared with Kim II Sung's extended travel and personal diplomatic efforts, exemplified by his visits to the Soviet Union and East European countries and his unofficial visit to the People's Republic of China in 1984, all was quiet on the diplomatic front in 1985.

• 1985: An uncertain factor in the detente with Seoul was the North's continuing search of equipoise between the Chinese and the Russians. In recent years China had urged Pyongyang to negotiate with the South and to encourage foreign investment. While doing this the Norht Koreans had also reactivated links with the USSR, notably through Kim Iln Sung's extended tour of the USSR and Eastern Europe in 1984. The USSR had also supplied the North with about 40 MiG-23s and now enjoyed overflying rights for its aircraft going to Da Nang in Vietnam.

• 1985: With Gorvachev having become the leader of the USSR that year, it was reported that the USSR reinvigorated its stance as an Asian power, taking more engagement initiatives towards the DPRK. USSR-PRC trade grew and the sino-soviet tensions somewhat diminished leading to a cautiously friendly atmosphere, while political positions remained distant on the USSR's involvement in Vietnam, Afghanistan, and its large military presence in the sino-soviet border.

• 1985-February: China denounces US-SK joint military exercises.
  • A Foreign Ministry spokesman referred to China's support for President Kim Il-sung's call for the cancellation of joint military exercises by South Korea and the United States. He argued that such exercises could only aggravate tension in the peninsula and hold up the dialogue between North and South Korea. Meanwhile, China's position was still one of support for tripartite talks on the region's future.

• 1985-August: Soviet warships visited a North Korean port for the first time.

• 1985: China, the Soviet Union, North Korea and Republic of Mongolia signed an agreement on the transportation of goods by rail between their countries.
  • The agreement was signed, following an eight-day meeting in Beijing. It was revealed that rail transport between China and the Soviet Union had risen by 66 per cent in 1984 - and would increase by a further 43 per cent in 1985.

• 1985-May : Hu Yaobang made an unofficial visit to North Korea
  • During the first week of May, Hu Yaobang visited North Korea to hold talks with Kim Il-sung on the further development of bilateral relations and other questions of common interest. The two sides were said to have reached identical views on topics discussed. Subsequently, a South Korean source stated that Hu and Kim had agreed to hold regular meetings. Kyodo also quoted Hu as saying that China was prepared to invite US and North Korean officials to hold direct talks in Beijing.
  • Yu Yaobang of China visited Kim II Sung and his son in May 1985.

• 1985-August: Soviet warships visited a North Korean port for the first time.

• 1985-October: A Chinese government delegation came to Pyongyang in late October to commemorate the 35th anniversary of the Chinese participation in the Korean War.

• 1985: Kim Yong-nam, the North Korean foreign minister, paid a visit to his counterpart in the Soviet Union, the new foreign minister Shevardnadze.

• 1985:There was a report that more Soviet MiG fighter planes were delivered to North Korea in 1985. It was also reported that North Korea has agreed to a new air route for Soviet military planes to fly over North Korean airspace en route to Southeast Asia from the Soviet Far East.

• 1985: The "diplomatic flexibility" of the South Korean government over the intrusion of a Chinese torpedo boat incident was said to be the main factor in China's decision to participate in the 1986 Asian Games to be held in Seoul. This decision was also taken as a sign that China would take part in the Seoul Olympics.
  • Further evidence of the more relaxed state of relations between Seoul and Beijing was apparent in a Yonhap report (22 April) that two South Korean diplomats were in China - the first since 1949 - to attend a UN seminar on the Palestinian problem.

• 1985: A Chinese Foreign Ministry source said to the effect that China would not send a delegation to Pyongyang to celebrate North Korea's "Liberation Day" on 15 August.
  • The explanation was that in contrast to the Soviet Red Army, Chinese forces had played no direct part in liberating Korea from Japanese occupation.

1985-1991: Expanded content (in progress)

• 1985-October: Li Peng headed a delegation to North Korea to attend celebrations on the 35th anniversary of the entry of Chinese People's Volunteers into the Korean War.
  • This was the first time Party and government officials had participated in such activities. The delegation was received by Kim Il-sung.

• 1985-October: In Beijing a consular treaty was signed by Wu Xueqian and the foreign minister and vice-premier of North Korea, Kim Yong-nam.
  • Kyodo reported that North Korea and China had agreed to establish consulates in Shenyang and Nampo - the first consulates to be set up outside their capitals.

• 1986: North Korea seemed to be frustrated over its inability to influence the rapid change that is taking place in Sino-South Korean relations. Kim II Sung's creed of self-reliance-the idea of juche notwithstanding, North Korea significantly strengthened its ties with the Soviet Union in 1986.
  • In view of the fact that the content of improved Soviet-North Korean relations seemed to be primarily economic and to a lesser degree military, North Korea's frustration seems to come from its inability to make rapid progress in economic development and the painful realization that it needs to acquire advanced technology from abroad.
  • Meanwhile, USSR-PRC economic relations continued to improve, while the political overtures by Gorbachev proved insufficient to the Chinese.

• 1986: A mysterious series of events led to a false report of Kim Il Sung's assassination. This spurred rumors of unrest among some of North Korea's pro-Chinese military commanders, concerned about the prospect of the succession of Kim Il Sung's more pro-soviet son, Kim Jong-il.

• 1986-JanuarySoviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze paid a five-day visit to Pyongyang. As a conventional routine announcement, they agreed without specifying to a later exchange of visits by the heads of state of the USSR and DPRK.

• 1986-FebruaryNorth Korean Premier Kang Song-san again visited the Soviet Union to attend the 27th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

• 1986-MarchNorth Korean Foreign Minister Kim Yong-nam visited the Soviet Union and the Soviet deputy premier, Yakov Ryakov, came to Pyongyang to hold a bilateral meeting of the Coordinating Committee for Economic and Technological Cooperation between the Soviet Union and North Korea.

• 1986-May: The USSR supplied the DPRK with new anti-aircraft weapons and ground-to-ground missiles capable of hitting Seoul. Gorbachev echoed Kim's enthusiasm and said that Soviet-North Korean cooperation "has risen to a new high in all areas." The primary reason for the North Korean effort to improve Soviet ties seemed to be the need to acquire advanced technology in order to bring about rapid economic development.

• 1986-October: President Li Xiannian visited North Korea to cement friendship between the two countries.
  • Chinese President Li Xiannian made a four-day good-will visit to Pyongyang and reported that the two heads of state exchanged views on various international issues, including discussion of the "Cambodian situation" (on which both sides were said to share the same views). They reconfirmed Chinese support for North Korea's reunification policy and reaffirmed friendly relations between the two countries. This was Li's first visit to North Korea, and Li and Kim seemed to have exchanged mutual goodwill, but North Korea appeared to grow weary of China's increasingly friendly contact with South Korea and the United States..

Hungnam Fertilizer factory in 2010

• 1986-December-24:North Korean Premier Kang Song-san and his Vice-Premier on Economic Affairs, Kim Pok-sin, as well as his Minister for Foreign Trade, Ch'oe Chong-gun, visited Moscow on December 24-27.
  • In the joint communique coming out of this visit, Soviet Premier Nikolai Ryzhokov and Kang announced plans for long-term trade and economic cooperation from 1986 to 1990. Closer contact between the Soviet Union and North Korea was immediately noticeable.
  • Subsequently, the Soviet Union announced that it was planning to double the production capacity of Kim Chaek Iron and Steel Complex, and was helping to build an aluminum plant and ball bearings manufacturing plant in North Korea. The Yongsong ball bearing plant, for example, was planned to have the capacity to produce ten million ball bearings and the Soviet Union plans to import ball bearings from North Korea. Even after the Chernobyl disaster, the Soviet Union planned to build a nuclear power plant that would produce 1.76 million kilowatts in North Korea in addition to thermal power plants in Ch'ongjin and Pyongyang. Plans were also revealed for constructing 19 more industrial plants with Soviet aid, such as the Sup'ung hydroelectric power station, Musan mining complex, Hungnam fertilizer factory, Naehyon cement factory, and Pyongyang textile factory. It was reported that there were more than 5,000 Soviet technicians in North Korea, and that the Far Eastern Science Center in Vladivostok together with North Korean technicians planned to search for seabed minerals such as phosphorite rocks in the continental shelf off the east coast of North Korea.
  • During the long-term trade and cooperation agreement period, 1986-90, the trade volume between the Soviet Union and North Korea was expected to double that of the 1981-85 period, which was estimated at approximately $4.8 billion. The Soviet Union had also increased its cargo traffic to North Korea from 4.8 million tons to 6 million tons. By early October, particularly during the state visit of Chinese President Li Xiannian, the Soviet Union announced that it had either reconstructed or newly built more than sixty industrial plants in North Korea, and that these Soviet-built plants produced 28% of North Korean steel, 29% of ferrous metals, 50% of petroleum products, and 66% of the total electricity in North Korea.
  • The North Korean response to such assistance was immediate. The celebration of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance was observed with elaborate fanfare, and on the forty-first anniversary of the Korean liberation in August, the North Koreans praised the Soviet Union for its heroic deed in liberating the Korean people. For the prior two decades and more, North Koreans had abstained from observing these anniversaries, trying to build an independent and self-reliant country.
  • On the military front, it was reported that North Korea had acquired 36 MiG-23 fighters by July 1986, 30 SAM-3 missiles, and 47 M-2 helicopter gunships from the Soviet Union. To observe the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Soviet-North Korean Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, not only were party and government delegations exchanged (Kim Hwan from North Korea and Yuri Soloviyov from the Soviet Union) but also military groups. A North Korean air squadron led by Deputy Air Force Commander Pak Hyong-uk flew to Moscow on July 3, and a Soviet air squadron led by Lt. Gen. V. Bulankin visited North Korea. In addition, a flotilla of the Red-Flag Pacific Fleet under the command of Fleet Commander Admiral V. V. Sidorov called on the port of Wonsan on July 4. There was also a report that Soviet military planes flew over the territorial air space of North Korea to reach Vietnam, altering the conventional air route over the Sea of Japan. Finally, Admiral Ronald Hays of the United States reported that North Korean naval forces joined the Soviet fleet in a joint naval operation in the Sea of Japan. From such economic cooperation and military exercises, combined with the latest goodwill visit to the Soviet Union by Kim Ii Sung, there is little doubt that North Korea chose to strengthen its ties with the Soviet Union, and it took a decisive step in that direction in 1986.

• 1986: Compared with Soviet-North Korean ties, foreign relations with other countries, including China, were conducted on a much smaller scale.

• 1986-?: China also sent a government and party delegation, headed by Vice-Premier Tian Jiyun, to Pyongyang to observe the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Sino-North Korean version of the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, but the Chinese commemoration emphasized cultural events, such as a photo exhibition and art performances, rather than military exercises. North Korea sent a delegation headed by Vice-President Yi Chong-ok to Beijing for the occasion, but his activities in Beijing were also confined to cultural events. The Chinese for their part also renewed bilateral trade agreements with North Korea for another five years, 1987-91, but Sino-North Korean trade during the earlier period had gradually declined. For example, the total trade volume decreased from $528 million in 1984 to $506 million in 1985. Sino-North Korean trade constituted only 19% of the total North Korean trade, while Soviet-North Korean trade amounted to twice this volume (i.e., 38% of the North Korean total).

• 1987: Taking full advantage of renewed Chinese-Soviet cordiality, Kim Il Sung continued his movement towards Russia while maintaining fairly good relations with China. The USSR wanted naval facilities in North Korea and in return the Russians were already providing help under the terms of the five-year agreement on trade and cooperation which included the building of 19 factories.

• 1987????: Kyodo reported Chinese expressions of regret that Japan had transported 11 North Korean defectors from Japan to Taiwan in government aircraft and in the company of a senior official (FE/848). China rejected the Japanese claim that the action had merely been humanitarian gesture.

• 1987-March-9: Officials of the Soviet Union, China, North Korea and the Mongolian People's Republic signed a trade protocol for 1987 on imports and exports and cross-border railway transport.

• 1987-March: Chinese officials at the UN Wan Li and Qian Qichen on a conference on disarmament, expressed China's support for non-proliferation, and for proposals for the creation of nuclear-free zones which would also include the Korean peninsula.

• 1987-May-20: President Kim Il-sung paid a five-day official visit to China between.
  • In the course of a "very cordial and warm meeting," Deng Xiaoping was quoted as saying that "we understand each other very well and have no differences".
  • Similarly, Kim and Zhao Ziyang reaffirmed the increasingly friendly relations between their two countries in the course of talks on bilateral relations and the situation on the Korean Peninsula.
    • Finally, we should note Pyongyang's quest for equidistance between Moscow and Beijing. Since May 1984, when President Kim II Sung visited the Soviet Union for the first time in 23 years, relations between the two countries had improved markedly, and Kim's visit to Moscow in October 1986 symbolized the strength of the relationship. As noted earlier, the Soviet Union had become all but indispensable to Pyongyang's economic modernization program. Security cooperation between the two countries also had been conspicuously upgraded in the prior few years.
  • It was against this background that Kim Il Sung made a five-day official visit to the People's Republic of China in May. (Kim's last official visit to the PRC had been in September 1982.) Kim was accompanied by Vice-President Yi Chong-ok, Deputy Premier and Foreign Minister Kim Yong-nam, and Politburo member Ho Dam. Conspicuously missing in his entourage were military leaders and economic experts. Ho Dam was believed to be the DPRK's top expert on inter-Korean relations. All this suggests that Kim's primary goal was to consult with the Chinese leadership about inter-Korean relations and, especially, about Washington's intentions toward the DPRK. Additionally and perhaps more importantly, the visit may had been intended to assuage Beijing's fears about Pyongyang's growing ties with Moscow and to reaffirm the traditional Sino-Korean friendship, a friendship that was said to be "sealed in blood." Kim Il Sung had three rounds of talks with Deng Xiaoping, two rounds with Zhao Ziyang, and one with Li Xiannian. The meetings were featured prominently in the Chinese press, and a photograph of Kim and Deng embracing each other made the front pages of both Renmin Ribao and Beijing Review.

• 1987: vice-foreign minister Qi Hua insisted that the Chinese-made "Silkworm" missiles in use by Iran had been obtained through "unknown channels". He denied that North Korea was acting as an intermediary in such trade. In a reiteration of China's neutral stance in the Iran–Iraq War.

• 1987: An article in China's (People's Daily) welcomed the North Korean Government's proposal (23 July) for a large-scale reduction of North and South Korean military personnel. It also praised the rationality of the proposal's provisions for a gradual withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea.
  • 1987-?????:Meanwhile, A Xinhua commentary suggested that U.S. policy on South Korea was changing against the background of the campaign for popular democracy and the recent concessions on the holding of direct presidential elections. It was noticeable, for example, that American authorities had warned against intervention by South Korean troops and had urged the government to hold talks with the opposition. Indeed, the "direct intervention" by the United States had proved decisive in forcing the South Korean Government to concede to popular demands.

• 1987-November: Prime Minister Yi Kun-mo made an official goodwill visit to China.
  • Zhao Ziyang expressed support for North Korean efforts to ease tension on the Korean peninsula and seek peaceful reunification, while Deng Xiaoping spoke of the "special" relationship that existed between the two countries. Yi also held discussions with Peng Zhen and Vice-president Ulanhu.

• 1988-June: Kim II Sung visited Mongolia. On his way home by special train, Kim stopped over in Khabarovsk in Siberia and held talks with Soviet First Deputy Premier K. Murakovsky and other officials.

• 1988: Although North Korea's relations with the Soviet Union and China remained close, it could not have been pleased with their decision to participate in the Seoul Olympics, nor that Seoul, pursuant to its "northern policy," assiduously sought economic and other contacts with all socialist countries and achieved impressive results (economic ties, etc). In a speech at the Siberian city of Krasnoyarsk on September 16, General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev indicated that the Soviet Union was willing to establish economic relations with South Korea.
  • Moscow, however, signaled its intention to maintain strong ties with Pyongyang by announcing in October that Gorbachev would soon visit North Korea.

• 1988: North-South Korea negotiations to jointly host the 1988 olympics failed. The DPRK's call for a boycott was disregarded by most other communist states, including China and the USSR. Meanwhile, Sino-Soviet relations continued to improve markedly.

• 1988: Kyodo cited a Chinese source in Hong Kong to the effect that relations between China and North Korea had recently cooled. Evidence of this was seen in the suspension of negotiations between the two countries on China's use of Chongjin port as a transport channel between north-east China and Japan; and in the fact that China had failed to increase the volume of oil supplies to the north.

• 1988-???????:A variety of sources spoke of favorable conditions that now existed for the trade and other economic ties between China and South Korea. From Hong Kong came the suggestion that North Korea had probably already given its tacit agreement to an expansion of such relations.

• 1988: The Agence France Presse (AFP) quoted a Hong Kong source to the effect that since the beginning of 1988 China had been exporting fewer arms to North Korea, and had cut down on her provision of electricity supplies to her neighbour.
  • In general, the Chinese authorities were said to regard the "individual worship" associated with President Kim Il-sung with some distaste.
  • Notwithstanding Zhao Ziyang's insistence that China's relations with North Korea were excellent, Seoul radio reported that Li Peng himself would visit Pyongyang in late May or June in order to discuss ways of improving bilateral relations. The forthcoming Seoul Olympic Games would also be an issue on the agenda.

• 1988-May: a government military delegation under Vice-marshall O Chin-u (minister in charge of the Korean People's Armed Forces) visited China and held meetings with Deng Xiaoping and Yang Shangkun.

• 1988-May/June: During his talks with Qian Qichen (3 May), Sosuke Uno Japan's foreign minister, relayed a message from South Korea expressing the hope that official relations might be established with China (FE/0143). The following month Kyodo cited a South Korean source to the effect that Kim Yong-sam, leader of the Reunification Democratic Party, had used American channels to make secret contact with China in order to discuss a possible visit to China. The Chinese response was said to have been favourable and the visit might take place at about the time of the Olympic Games in Seoul (FE/0 17 1).

• 1988-?????: Kyodo (Japan):Kyodo spoke of Takeshita's hope to also expected the Japanese prime minister to urge Chinese leaders to promote the dialogue between North and South Korea.

• 1988-September: During the DPRK fortieth anniversary celebration, the Soviet Union was represented by Viktor Chebrikov, chairman of the Committee on State Security (KGB), while China's delegation was headed by by President Yang Shangkun and also included Foreign Minister Qian Qichen.
  • In Pyongyang, Yang was greeted by Kim Chong-il and later met President Kim Il-sung. An editorial in People's Daily on the 40th anniversary itself (9 September) called for reunification of the Korean Peninsula. Elsewhere Li Peng reaffirmed China's support for North Korea.

• 1988-??????: A report from a Hong Kong source (Cheng Ming, 1 July: FE/0192) claimed that at a recent meeting between Chinese and South Korean officials "at a high level" the two sides had agreed to begin direct trade - initially, at a provincial level (see also Kyodo in FE/02 12). The Korean Times (Seoul) also quoted Kim Sok-kyu, assistant foreign minister, to the effect that China would open a trade office in the South Korean capital, following the end of the Olympic Games (FE/0 1 94). A further sign of closer relations between the two countries was apparent in a statement by South Korea's foreign minister, Choe Kwang-su, that his government would henceforth refer to China as "Chungguk" (China) rather than, as in the past, "Chunggong" (the Chinese Communist Party) (FE/0199). However, notwithstanding these overturesS China's position on closer relations outside the economic sphere remained consistent and during the quarter official sources, including Li Peng himself, insisted that China had no plans to establish diplomatic ties with Seoul (FE/0194 and 0253).
• 1988-September-25: That all was not going well on the economic front was confirmed by Mikhail Vanichev, Minister of Machinery Industries of the Soviet Union, who was quoted by Radio Moscow on September 25 as saying that a host of problems plagued the North Korean economy: lack of managerial autonomy in enterprises, which was hampering various joint venture projects between the Soviet Union and North Korea; the shoddy quality of various machinery and machine tools; and shortages of food, housing, and consumer goods. But the Soviet Union continued to be Pyongyang's number one source of economic and technical assistance. Radio Moscow revealed that the project to expand Kim Chaek Ironworks was heavily dependent on Soviet aid, with about seventy Soviet plants providing machinery and equipment and hundreds of Soviet technicians and engineers working on the scene. The Soviets were also helping North Koreans build Kwangbok Street, which involved the construction of 260 buildings in an area covering 3.3 million square meters.

• 1988-September-28: In his speech to the General Assembly on 28 September, Qian Qichen referred to the many regional conflicts that continued throughout the world. His government was also concerned about the situation in the Korean Peninsula: the best solution here lay in the implementation of DPRK's proposals for peaceful reunification and independence, he said.

May First Stadium, in Pyongyang

• 1989-July:The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) missed the excitement of the 1988 Summer Olympic Games in Seoul, but its day in the sun came 10 months later when Pyongyang hosted the thirteenth World Festival of Youth and Students (WFYS), a gathering of people from 180 nations. On July 1 the grand opening ceremony was held in the newly renamed May Day Stadium under the festival theme of "antiim- perialism solidarity, peace, and friendship." By all accounts the festival was staged successfully.
  • The Koreans reportedly received a grant of $33 million from Moscow to help pay the costs, but on seeing the many imposing buildings and the lavish entertainments staged by North Korea, the Soviets questioned the wisdom of a developing country spending so much money to stage such an exhibition.
  • Moscow's dissatisfaction with lavish spending was not the only criticism directed at the festival.

• 1989:During the last several years, North Korea has maintained a closer relationship with the Soviet Union than with China, especially in economic affairs. In 1989 this patron-client relationship remained intact, but there were indications that it may be in for a change.
  • First, Moscow expressed its concern about Pyongyang's "extravagant" and "immoral" expenditures for the WFYS. Second, Radio Moscow has commented on the "unsatisfactory" quality of North Korean products shipped to the Soviet Union. Third, a Radio Moscow report termed South Korea's reunification formula "constructive to a degree," while yet another said that "the idea of admission of both Koreas to the United Nations in conformity with the principle of universality is receiving increasing strong support from world nations." The Soviets had already gone on record as supporting that very principle themselves. North Korea remained strongly opposed to joint admission. In addition, the North could hardly ignore the growing number of ties between the South Koreans and the Soviets. These ties include the establishment of trade offices and visits by members of various organizations.

• 1989:There are signs that North Korea may be moving closer to China.

• 1989-April-23: Zhao Ziyang visited North Korea at the invitation of Kim Ii Sung and the two renewed their pledge of solidarity and friendship.
  • Diplomatic sources in the Chinese capital noted that it was Zhao's first visit to a foreign country since he had become general secretary of the CCP and interpreted his choice of North Korea as an indication of China's desire to see a relaxation of tension on the Korean Peninsula.
  • On his arrival in Pyongyang, Zhao was welcomed by President Kim Il- sung and Kim Chong-il.
  • the Chinese leader reaffirmed China's support for the independence and re-unification of the two Koreas and expressed the hope that negotiations would get under way between North Korea and the United States towards that end. He reiterated his government's support for North Korean re-unification proposals. An article in the overseas edition of People's Daily subsequently deemed Zhao's visit a "complete success".

• 1989-May: Gobachev visited China and normalized relations between the PRC and USSR. This was possible after "three obstacles" that China saw were removed: Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, Soviet military presence along China's border, and its unwillingness to exert influence to bring about a Vietnamese troop withdrawal from Kampuchea. The new relations would not entail an identity of views like they did in the 1950's, but instead would be based on the principles of peaceful coexistence and mutual respect and trust.

• 1989-June-11: The North Korean media did not at first comment on the Tiananmen Square incident but on June 11 Rodong Shinmun carried an article condemning the U.S. government for interfering with Chinese domestic affairs, and on July 1 the paper expressed support for Beijing's recent crackdown on the prodemocracy demonstrators.

• 1989-August: Choe Kwang, chief-of-staff of the Korean People's Army, visited China and met with President Yang Shangkun and new General Secretary Jiang Zemin, apparently to strengthen ties between the two countries and to confirm North Korean support for the new Chinese leadership and policies.

• 1989-November-5: Although apparently not officially announced in advance, it was later confirmed that President Kim Il-sung visited China and held talks with Deng Xiaoping and Yang Shangkun.
  • Kim was said by Kyodo to have made the visit in response to the recognition by some East European countries of South Korea. According to the Japanese news agency, Deng told Kim that China was not in a position to make representations on North Korea's behalf to the Soviet Union or Eastern Europe. However, he pledged that China's ties with Seoul would be kept at unofficial levels.
  • Then on November 5-7, Kim Ii Sung made a sudden visit to Beijing, which was only announced after his return to Pyongyang. This was seen as an effort by Kim to consolidate relations with China in light of developments there and in Eastern Europe. But while China and North Korea were expressing political solidarity, China's trade with South Korea was growing by leaps and bounds (from $40 million in the first six months of 1988 to $380 million in the same period in 1989). A direct shipping link was established between the two countries in June.

• 1989-1990:In November 1989, in Malta, Presidents Mikhail Gorbachev of the Soviet Union and George Bush of the United States officially announced the end of the 44-year old Cold War, and by the end of 1990, all the former East European socialist countries were reborn with the aim to become pluralistic democratic nations with market economy systems. In Asia, Mongolia took the same path. East Germany was absorbed into West Germany. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics went through significant metamorphosis toward a new nonsocialist federal state.
  • In the wake of these changes in 1990 South Korea successfully normalized diplomatic relations with Algeria, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Mongolia, Romania, and the Soviet Union, in addition to the three East Euro- pean states with which it had established diplomatic relations in 1989 (Hungary, Poland, and Yugoslavia). It also agreed with China to open trade offices in Beijing and Seoul, and thus 1990 became a year of triumph for South Korea in its nordpolitik.

• 1990: With the Soviet Union and its satellite states away transitioning away from communism, the DPRK had to search for new external sources of economic support to rescue their sagging economy. The only alternative for North Korea was to shift its reliance to another old ally, the People's Republic of China.
  • During 1990 North Korea found itself increasingly isolated and depending upon China as its only major international supporter. High level visits between the two countries were exchanged during the year, but neither of these visits provided the kind of staunch support which the North Korean government had been seeking.

• 1990-March-14: Chinese Communist Party General Secretary Jiang Zemin made an official goodwill visit to Pyongyang on March 14-16 at the invitation of President Kim. The discussions focused on the two countries' domestic situations and international issues.
  • Kim met Jiang at Sunan Airport. A half-million people welcomed Jiang, lining the road from the airport to downtown Pyongyang. In his speech, Kim stressed that the North Korean party and its people would join the "brotherly Chinese people in continuing the march for the construction of socialism."
  • The official Korean news agency said Jiang and Kim exchanged "in-depth views" on expanding ties and easing tension in the Korean Peninsula. However, differences loomed over issues including China's rapprochement with Seoul.
  • After the Tiananmen Square incident on June 4, 1989, North Korea had approached the new Chinese leadership in a move to restore the old comradeship between the two nations that had been disrupted by the Chinese reform movement led by Deng Xiaoping and Hu Yaobang. Kim Ii Sung had made a secret visit to Beijing on November 5-7, 1989, and the Kim-Jiang meeting in March was the second in the series. North Korea made it clear that it would move away from Moscow and turn to Beijing, which was the only remaining ally willing to support Pyongyang's adherence to totalitarian chuch'e communism.

• 1990-April:The vice-premier and foreign minster of North Korea, Kim Yong-nam, paid a brief visit to Beijing.
  • His talks with Qian Qichen focused on the further strengthening of bilateral relations and on ways of easing tension in the Korean Peninsula and preventing the perpetuation of the division of the country through the creation of "two Koreas". Shortly afterwards it was revealed that a PLA delegation was visiting North Korea.

• 1990-June-4: When President Gorbachev met President Roh Tae-Woo of South Korea on June 4, 1990, in San Francisco, North Korea vehemently criticized the Soviets.

• 1990-October-25: On October 25 the North Korean Central Broadcasting Station aired two statements that clearly indicated the policy trend of pivoting friendships away from Moscow and closer to Beijing.
  • On the one hand, it reported Premier Yon Hyong-muk's welcoming address to a Chinese goodwill delegation, which emphasized North Korea's intention to direct its utmost efforts to further solidify the Pyongyang-Beijing ties and to support China's conservative policy. Yon said that "the realities in China today prove that socialism has been the correct choice." On the other hand, the station broadcast a statement severely criticizing the Soviet Union's recent domestic reform policies, saying that "one-fourth of the Soviet people have been reduced to extreme poverty, which means that 79 million people are suffering now from dire poverty."

• 1990:Pyongyang sources reported that full consensus had been reached, following talks between the defence ministers of China and North Korea (Qin Jiwei and O Chin-u).
• 1990-September: In September an unconfirmed South Korean report stated that President Kim Il-sung himself had travelled to China in order to discuss the evolving relationship between South Korea and the Soviet Union, as well as recent developments in the Korean peninsula.
• 1990-September-21: Vice-president Yi Chong-ok went to Beijing between 21 and 25 September and held discussions with Yang Shangkun and Jiang Zemin.

• 1990-September: The 11th Asian Games were held in Beijing between 22 September and 7 October. Delegations from 37 countries took part, including both North and South Korea.

• 1990-September-2: Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze visited Pyongyang on September 2 to inform North Korea about the Soviet Union's decision to establish formal diplomatic relations with South Korea. Kim Ii Sung refused to meet with him.
  • North Korea demonstrated its anger by issuing a lengthy commentary in the Pyongyang Times on October 6, entitled "Diplomatic Relations Bargained for Dollars," in which it accused the Soviets of having sold the "dignity and honor of a socialist state and the interests and faith of its ally for the $2.3 billion it was to receive from South Korea."
  • 1990-December: Pyongyang reacted even more strongly to the very friendly reception that Roh Tae-Woo received in Moscow in December.

• 1990-October-24: Between 24 and 27 October a Party and government delegation, headed by Li Tieying, was in North Korea to celebrate the 40th anniversary of China's entry into the Korean War. Li insisted that no "international storm" could undermine friendship between the two countries and rehearsed the familiar theme that the Korean issue must be resolved through re-unification, achieved by dialogue and without outside interference.

• 1990-November: Separate visits to China by Hwang Chang-yop (secretary of the Korean Workers' Party) and premier Yon Hyong-muk took place.
  • Similar sentiments (no "international storm" could undermine the PRC-DPRK friendship) were expressed.
  • In his discussions with Li Peng, Yon admitted that difficulties had been encountered in his government's programme of economic construction and it was later revealed that China had agreed to give economic aid to North Korea.
    • A month before Premier Yon's visit, the Chinese government gave tacit recognition of South Korea by signing a consular treaty with the ROK.

• 1990-December: Prime Minister Yon Hyong-muk visited Beijing. It was reported that China promised to give relief aid of about $300 million (mainly foodstuffs and oil).

• 1991:The North Korean economy was immersed in great difficulties.
  • North Korea had been importing about 3.3 million tons of oil annually since 1986; in 1990 it was able to import only 2.52 million tons- 1.10 million tons from China, 440,000 tons from the Soviet Union, and 980,000 tons from Iran. In 1991 the supply dropped sharply again; in the first seven months, China provided one million tons but the Soviet Union supplied only 41,000 tons. The ramifications of the energy shortage were tremendous. It was known that in 1991 the average operating rate of industries dropped to 40% of capacity.

• 1991-April: Gorbachev, months before his resignation in December and before the collapse of the USSR, became the first and only USSR leader to visit the ROK and Japan, foes of the DPRK.

• 1991: PRC-USSR relations continued to improve with high level visits and signing of a sino-soviet border treaty. On December 25, following the decision to replace the Soviet Union with the Commonwealth of Independent States, the Chinese government let it be known that it would continue to fulfill its obligations, set in the various treaties, agreements and other documents signed with the former USSR. It hoped for a reciprocal undertaking by the independent republics. Telegrams were subsequently to the foreign ministers of all the newly-independent republics, expressing China's recognition of their new status and reiterating its desire to establish diplomatic relations. It was also announced that Wang Jingqing, the former ambassador to the USSR, had been nominated as the new ambassador to the Russian Federation.

• 1991: the DPRK continued to have setbacks on the international scene, especially due to the ROK's diplomatic and economic succeses.
  • 1991: China and ROK established diplomatic relations.

• 1991: The volume of trade with the Soviet Union and China, the DPRK's main trading partners, dropped sharply in 1991 due to North Korea's lack of hard currency. Unlike previous years when Pyongyang could pay in Korean won or be granted credit for imports, from January 1991 the Soviet Union demanded payment in hard currency. This seriously hurt North Korea's economy, as more than 50% of its total annual trade up to 1991 was with the USSR (US$2.35 billion out of a total 1990 trade volume of $4.66 billion). From January to the end of July 1990, North Korean imports from the Soviet Union amounted to $887 million, but in the same period in 1991, the volume dropped to a mere $11 million (1.2% of the previous year). Given North Korea's heavy economic reliance on the USSR, the impact of the Soviet drawdown in economic cooperation was significant.

• 1991-January-11: I.A. Rogachev and Tian Zengpei (deputy foreign ministers) had held political talks in Beijing. They exchanged views on the Gulf crisis the Korean situation, the attempt to find a settlement of the Cambodian issue and the development of bilateral relations.

• 1991: The Chinese foreign minister expressed his optimism that the North Korean government would agree to allow international inspection of their nuclear facilities in order to ensure that they were being used solely for peaceful purposes.

• 1991-May-3: Li Peng visited Pyongyang for four days of talks with North Korean leaders, including President Kim Il-sung and Premier Yon Hyong-muk.
  • Both sides stressed the importance of seeking stronger ties and closer co-operation. Li expressed his government's support for North Korean proposals on reunification, China's position being that such reunification should take place "under the condition of non-interference from the outside world and through dialogues and consultations between the two sides of Korea". The Chinese prime minister later described his visit as a "complete success."
• 1991-June: Qian Qichen visited North Korea. Talks on reunification, as well as on other international and bilateral issues took place.

• 1991: China was then the only country that provided economic assistance to North Korea.
  • China had actually delivered about one million tons of oil by the end of November 1991.

• 1991-October-3: President Kim Il-sung arrived in China for a ten-day visit at the invitation of Yang Shangkun and Jiang Zemin.
  • An editorial in People's Daily (4 October) praised North Korean efforts towards peaceful reunification with South Korea and spoke of China's support for Kim's search for a confederation based on "one nation, one state, two systems and two governments".
  • Discussions between Kim and Jiang Zemin focused on bilateral and international issues, Jiang speaking with satisfaction of the continuing development of bilateral relations, but also expressing some caution towards developments on the Korean peninsula. The Korean leader also held talks with Li Peng and Yang Shangkun.
  • Kim Il-sung failed to secure additional Chinese economic aid.
    • Kyodo speculated that against the background of serious shortages of food and hard currency, North Korea might be forced to turn to the west for assistance - a development which might presage accelerated reform. The same source quoted South Korean officials to the effects that China might press the North Korean government to open its nuclear installations to international inspection.

• 1991-September/October: North Korea's most remarkable effort to get foreign investment was revealed through its proposal to establish a "special economic zone."
  • In an interview with Mainichi Shimbun on September 13, Kim Yong-sun, party secretary for international affairs, announced that North Korea wanted to develop the Tumen River basin jointly with neighboring countries.'3 The river flows between North Korea and China at the upper stream and between North Korea and the Soviet Union at the lower stream. One notable aspect of the proposal is that Pyongyang wanted South Korea to join this international project along with China, the Soviet Union, and Japan.
  • With help from the United Nations Development Program, the DPRK government hosted a multilateral conference on the project on October 18 in Pyongyang, and it agreed that South Korean government officials could attend the meeting. The event was quite significant in the sense that North Korea finally opened the door for its southern brethren to participate in North Korean economic development.

• 1991: In his address to the 46th UN General Assembly at the end of the previous quarter Qian Qichen gave a wide-ranging review of the current international situation, as seen from China's perspective. The Chinese foreign minister welcomed the reduction of tension on the Korean peninsula and looked forward to further negotiations, which might eventually lead to peaceful reunification of the two Koreas.

• 1991-October: After North Korea having cancelled the fourth "high-level discussions" earlier in the year, the DPRK resumed talks in October after being pressured by China and the USSR.

• 1991-August-4: Both the ROK and DPRK were recommended by the Security Council for admission as members of United Nations members.
  • This happened after both the USSR and the PRC having persuaded the DPRK to reverse its longstanding policy of refusal to join the UN.

• 1991-September-17: During the UN 46th General Assembly, both the DPRK and ROK were admitted as members.

• 1991-December-26: After several years of economic and political crisis, the Soviet Union formally dissolved. 15 independent countries had been established in its place. Russia (officially the Russian Federation) became the successor state to it, and it was no longer a communist state.

See also

Preceded by —

Timeline of events in North Korean relations with PR China and USSR 1953-1969

Succeeded by 1969-1979

• History of North Korea
• Timeline of Korean history
• List of years in North Korea
• North Korea–Russia relations
• China–North Korea relations
• List of ambassadors of China to North Korea
• List of ambassadors of Russia to North Korea

References

Main academic journals and sources cited below include:

• The China Quarterly published by the Cambridge University Press for the School of Oriental and African Studies – which publishes the Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation
• Asian Survey published by the University of California Press – which publishes an annual survey of North Korea's events
• The Annual Register published at the time by Longman in Great Britain – which publishes an annual survey of world events
• Yearbook on International Communist Affairs published by the Hoover Institution Press at Stanford University – which published from 1966 to 1991 an annual summary of developments in Communism around the world

News sources most frequently cited include:

• British Broadcasting Corporation's (BBC) Summary of World Broadcasts - a collection of foreign press translations
  • Including translations of Xinhua News Agency, and Kyodo News
• Beijing Review (previously known as Peking Review) published by the China International Publishing Group
• The New York Times
• Rodong Sinmun (North Korea)
• People's Daily published by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China

Other news sources repeatedly cited include:

• The Pyongyang Times (North Korea)
• Kyodo News (Japan)
• Vantage Point: Developments in North Korea (South Korea)
• The Korea Herald (South Korea)