Talk:South China Sea Arbitration/Archive 4

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"Explicit consensus" is bogus

User:Toto11zi keeps on mentioning about "explicit consensus" on the international reactions section, especially on its formatting or sourcing. I have been re-reading this talk page and looking at the editing history of the article and I do not see any explicit consensus. I do not even see an implicit consensus. The international reactions section has never been stable ever since China started claiming support from many countries and various editors have been adding countries to various lists. The fact that (1) many editors have been edit warring (adding, deleting, and reverting edits) especially on the international reactions section, (2) the article has been full protected twice, and (3) majority of the discussion on the talk page is about sources for the international reactions section, are evidence that there is no consensus.

The only explicit consensus that I can see are the few protected edit requests that have been granted by administrators. —seav (talk) 01:26, 1 August 2016 (UTC)

Read this "Newly activated dormant account Chris Hallquist has violated our established explicit consensus", obviously you joined late. You don't understand. Toto11zi (talk) 02:02, 1 August 2016 (UTC)

The above comment merely seeks to redirect attention from the topic at hand, namely the false claim of "explicit consensus". This kind of comment is typical of the tactics employed by the 50 Cent Party. Hammersbach (talk) 02:11, 1 August 2016 (UTC)

LISTEN: This talk page has one section called "Newly activated dormant account Chris Hallquist has violated our established explicit consensus", this contains detailed description of the established explicit consensus. Agree? Please don't disturb with your slogan. Toto11zi (talk) 02:17, 1 August 2016 (UTC)

Once again, the above editor attempts to reference a section that came well after the explicit consensus that he claims. Additionally, this section, that he initiated, was shut down as being off topic. Enough of this prevaricating. Hammersbach (talk) 02:22, 1 August 2016 (UTC)

@User:Toto11zi I have no idea why you think citing your previous personal attacks on me is helping your case. Many editors weighed in on that section, and none of them agreed with you. If anything, that section shows the consensus of the editors here is the exact opposite of what you claim it is. Chris Hallquist (talk) 19:17, 1 August 2016 (UTC)

Read please if you don't understand:

Our original/current consensus for the International Reactions (Before the ruling) section has been to include the information from both China and the Philippines (their media, government, public officials) proposed by the page originator Hariboneagle927. And that explicit consensus was reached among major editors including myself, the relocation part is not reaching consensus yet. Discussion and conclusion can be found here Here's the information for the established consensus if you're able to find it on this page: This newly activated account from a dormant account Chris Hallquist (talk · contribs) violated our established consensus by promoting his own agenda in the following ways:

1. He deleted all the information from China's Foreign Ministry, China's main media and various Chinese sites and claimed the support information from those sites including China's Foreign Ministry is not reliable, he violated our consensus already established, we rely information from both Philippine and Chinese governments. Certainly he did not read our established consensus on this Talk page, he did not discuss first before he removed blindly and dramatically all the information. More information regarding his actions can be found here, also here

2. Then he's promoting his own criteria for the section here

The table/group issue has been discussed before in various places on this Talk page, we even considered to use the same format AMTI used, but there're issues. Here's discussion, also here The conclusion of all this is unless we establish a new consensus for this section, we will stick with the original consensus for this particular section. Without new explicit consensus, reverting this section in order to promote one's agenda or new criteria is considered disruptive. Editors may propose a change to the current consensus, however, proposing to change a recent consensus can be considered disruptive. Since Chris Hallquist (talk · contribs) is a new editor joining this complex topic discussion, he might not know our consensus which has already been established in this before he joined.

Toto11zi (talk) 02:25, 1 August 2016 (UTC)

Interesting, but I am curious. Where exactly did the explicit consensus occur? Editors that the above editor attempts to claim as concurring don't say they did. (sound familiar?) Regardless, what the editor above has to understand is that there is no existing consensus for what they are claiming. This editor should really cease prevaricating. Hammersbach (talk) 02:35, 1 August 2016 (UTC)

First of all, consensus can change. Second, the consensus you refer to is to the general structure of the section: 2 lists of countries + multinational bodies subsection. There was never any consensus as to the contents of those lists (which countries should be added or not), or to which sources are to be deemed acceptable or not (such as Xinhua, WSJ, etc.). In that regard, Chris' edits, while large, do not actually violate the consensus because he left the general structure intact. —seav (talk) 02:40, 1 August 2016 (UTC)

Criteria were set very clearly. Priority will be given to the particular country, China or the Philippines, that means we will be using information from the China's government and the Philippine government, if we don't use this information, the Philippine list will be probably empty. Again, we will stick to this established explicit consensus. Chris Hallquist has violated Wikipedia policies in different ways, his violation of this established explicit consensus is very obvious Toto11zi (talk) 02:50, 1 August 2016 (UTC)

"We"? I don't believe there is a "we" that concurs with above editor's belief in a currently existing consensus. Hammersbach (talk) 03:29, 1 August 2016 (UTC)

Again I ask you to be constructive, AGF, as I said, I won't respond to nonsense, irrelevant comments. Toto11zi (talk) 03:54, 1 August 2016 (UTC)

I consent that my original intention was the "2 list + multinational bodies". I did not initially mention about the sourcing of the list (but recently I insists on prioritizing third-party sources, Disclaimer I don't outright reject Xinhua, or Chinese state media source). So I was then silent on the matter. If Toto11zi can point out to where this certain consensus was formed by all parties concerned.

Also the "Support Philippines listing" is mostly sourced from private media firms (both from the Philippines and non-claimant nations). You are correct Toto11zi that the Philippine list will be probably empty if we don't use Philippine government sources used as of now. But we used non-government news sources for the "Philippine list". In fact all of the countries in the Philippine lists were quotations from the respective countries' representatives (Australia, Germany, etc.). Only Italy's source is not that direct where the Philippine Presidential Spokesman relayed that Italy supports the Philippines following bilateral talks between then President Aquino and his Italian counterpart but no direct quotation from the Italian head of state on the article itself or a statement from the Italian Foreign Ministry has been retrieved regarding this at the moment. (This is similar to cases when the Chinese Foreign Minister claims that a certain country supports them following a joint communique. But in some cases the foreign ministry of the certain country hasn't release a public statement.) Hariboneagle927 (talk) 04:39, 1 August 2016 (UTC)

Hariboneagle927, I already put my description and link there, relevant lines are here:

While responses of both China and the Philippines, (their media, government, public officials) should be given more attention.Hariboneagle927 (talk) 04:39, 26 May 2016 (UTC)

added: How about reducing the size and amount of detail in this section by presenting lists of countries supporting resolution by the PCA vs. resolution by bilateral negotiations, with supporting cites for each listed country? Wtmitchell (talk) (earlier Boracay Bill) 22:16, 27 May 2016 (UTC)

This is good idea! Toto11zi (talk) 14:41, 29 May 2016 (UTC)

it seems a consensus has been reached among major editors of the section concerned. Hariboneagle927 (talk) 17:06, 29 May 2016 (UTC)

Can we use rule-based approach? Stick to this established explicit consensus, that's when we switched the format. Please, don't change things to suit the Philippines, this is not a game, please be serious. You cannot put countries like India to the Philippine support list, no one will believe. Remember whatever we do won't change the facts, here we only want to reflect facts. Even like France or Canada explicitely said they support the Philippines, the level of support is so weak and is even not considered by China. So let's stick to the established consensus, and don't change. Toto11zi (talk) 05:17, 1 August 2016 (UTC)

Let me give a more complete quotation of that paragraph.

I propose transferring most contents in the "International section" into a new article called International reactions to Philippines v. China or International reactions to the Philippines v. China arbitration case. I think the section is getting out of hand and gives more weight to diplomatic statements by other states while information about the arbitration case itself receives relative little attention. Only a summary of these international reactions should be on this main article. While responses of both China and the Philippines, (their media, government, public officials) should be given more attention.Hariboneagle927 (talk) 04:39, 26 May 2016 (UTC).

The quotation you gave came after my proposal on how to deal content on the main article "Philippines v. China". Naturally if you split an article, a very brief summarized version of the split article is retained on the parent article. My sentence was placed out of context. I said the responses of China and the Philippines should be given more attention. Not being the only source for "International reactions".. As mentioned consensus could change.

I did not put India on the support list prior to the ruling. But they did issue a supportive stance after the ruling came out. Likewise, I can say it to you. This isn't a game. We can say that the Chinese foreign minister says that Countries, X, Y, Z support China with the same source not even giving a direct quotation from the other countries concerned. Why would we take China's opinion whether France and Germany's support is weak? What matters most is the opinion of the countries that made the stance. Why is China's words seems to be "the word of God". You have attempted to remove Germany before but was lenient when it comes to countries that do not have explicit statements supporting China, only because the Chinese Foreign Ministry said so. Yes it is fact that China claims that 70 countries support them, it is disputed whether all of these countries unilaterally expressed support. I also don't appreciate your bad faith accusations that I'm treating this as a game.

If we insist on the old consensus. The format still doesn't conform to the old consensus. It should be made clear the the Philippine/Chinese state media/countries claims that those certain countries listed as supporting them.

Such as like this

Support for the arbitration / Support for Philippines' stance

The Philippine government claims that the following countries support their stance on filing an arbitration case:

Opposition to the arbitration / Support for bilateral talks between the disputants / Support for China's stance

The Chinese government claims over 70 countries supports their stance. The following countries are:

Hence, why I insist on coming up with a separate list for countries issuing individual statements (through their foreign ministry, the head of state, ambassador). So we have a list of countries that have confirmed/deny the support claims of the disputants.

I will request comments from Wtmitchell regarding this matter since he was involved in the then consensus.Hariboneagle927 (talk) 05:57, 1 August 2016 (UTC)

Ok, "Not being the only source for International reactions" means we can include countries if there's evidence that some countries might support the arbitraion, or China, then I believe it's only for the Philippines, I'm also fine, this will imply we may need to discuss/dispute possible/additional cases, I'm fine. Yes, I agree, India issued a statement which was a little bit strange after ruling. I agree that for the Philippine support list, China should not have any involvement, the reverse is true. For the Germany case, somehow the statement was not explicit like France or Canada gave. I feel sorry if my use of word "game" offended you. Yes, keep the old consensus, we can only improve but not change dramatically. I agree to put notes like "The Philippine government claims that the following countries support their stance on filing an arbitration case:" or "The Chinese government claims over 70 countries supports their stance.", so readers know the information may from the governements only. The note sentence may be better like this "Information may be from government of China only" or "Information may be from the government of the Philippines only". Good, thanks for taking the effort to clear this out. Toto11zi (talk) 06:27, 1 August 2016 (UTC)

By considering possible confusion, probably your note sentences are better than I just suggested. Toto11zi (talk) 06:35, 1 August 2016 (UTC)

I've noticed another subtle nuance, "The Philippine government" vs "The government of the Philippines", I would suggest "The government of the Philippines". Similarly, "The government of China". Toto11zi (talk) 16:19, 1 August 2016 (UTC)

I second everything @seav said in this section. Also, @Hariboneagle927, I think at one point consensus may have been moving in the direction of splitting the article, I think since then legitimate concerns have been raised about the risk of a WP:POVFORK. If we're going to provide a detailed presentation of China's claims, we should also include at least one alternative assessment for comparison, say from the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative or similar. Chris Hallquist (talk) 19:27, 1 August 2016 (UTC)

I don't know why you put this under my comment. I'd ask you to be constructive. You violated Wikipedia policies right after you joined, your irresponsible and disruptive behavior has caused all this problem because you did not follow and respect our consensus, both explicit consensus and implicit consensus. You did not discuss your action before you deleted dramatically and blindly information, that's totally unacceptable. If you want to continue to contribute, you must collaborate with other editors, especially major editors here. Based on your comments, I bet you haven't read this history of the topic, Hariboneagle927's comments and my comments. I ask you to read and understand first before posting anything, otherwise, it's just waste of your time and our time. If you want to discuss AMTI, go to section "AMTI source", not here. You lied twice, I would ask you first not to abuse Wikipedia service, 2nd, don't lie again. Toto11zi (talk) 02:56, 2 August 2016 (UTC)

Claims of inaccuracy in the AMTI's list don't appear to me to be established by anything in this talk page. But in any case that's irrelevant, as long as we're talking about citing them with an in-text citation. Serious questions have also been raised about the accuracy of China's claims, and given that, I can't see any justification for covering China's claims in great detail while refusing to give any coverage to AMTI's list (assuming both get in-text citations). Chris Hallquist (talk) 01:16, 4 August 2016 (UTC)

EU

seav has made various changes to the page, different countries were added because of this statement from EU. First this statement doesn't say the EU supports the arbitration brought up by the Philippines, second, we're still discussing whether countries from the multinational bodies should or should not be included to the list. seav, can you give comment for the topic: [[6]], I will undo those changes soon, if you have objection, please discuss here Toto11zi (talk) 02:21, 28 June 2016 (UTC)

First, Albania, Moldova, Montenegro, and Liechtenstein are not members of the EU. Second, while there is no explicit statement that EU supports this particular arbitration case between CN and PH, the fact that the EU recognized that the Philippines, as a claimant country, has a right to arbitration is diplomatic-speak that the arbitration case is a valid course of action. And this is commented on by numerous news reports. If you want, we can rename the header to "Support for or recognizing the right to arbitration". —seav (talk) 03:03, 28 June 2016 (UTC)

As I specified, recognizing right doesn't mean supporting the arbitration brought by the Philippines. Please provide reliable source for those countries. Again, you cannot change things dramatically without discussion, also common sense is needed to make edits. Toto11zi (talk) 03:14, 28 June 2016 (UTC)

Additional comment. If you want to remove Australia, Albania, etc., then we should also remove the countries like Lesotho that do not explicitly state opposition to the arbitration but merely stating that China has a right to seek bilateral negotiations. Please note that the opposition heading states "Support for bilateral talks among the parties involved". This is now balanced by listing countries that state "Support for right to arbitration". —seav (talk) 03:17, 28 June 2016 (UTC)

Let's review each country, scrutinize each fact and discuss here. Also if you think the EU supports the arbitration brought up by the Philippines, you will need to provide reliable source. Toto11zi (talk) 03:31, 28 June 2016 (UTC)

“The United States and the European Union warned China on Wednesday that it should respect an international court ruling expected later this year on its dispute with the Philippines over territory in the South China Sea.” [7] —seav (talk) 03:57, 28 June 2016 (UTC)

Please, can you provide source that says "EU supports the arbitration brought up by the Philippines"? no interpretation please Toto11zi (talk) 04:39, 28 June 2016 (UTC)

Based on the past consensus, we don't want to include individual countries from Multinational bodies. There's separate section for multinational bodies. Notice also the difference between these 2 statements: "EU agreed that" and "EU countries agreed that", if it's "EU agreed that", we consider only EU as one entity, if it's "EU countries agreed that", we consider all the individual countries. If you have objection, discuss here. Toto11zi (talk) 16:04, 28 June 2016 (UTC)

The EU declaration can be found here, I don't see any relevant statement that says EU supports Philippines or whatever. The 2nd paragraph is a very general statement, it says that "the EU urges all claimants to resolve disputes through peaceful means, to clarify the basis of their claims, and to pursue them in accordance with international law including UNCLOS and its arbitration procedures." The 4th paragrph says "The EU fully supports regional ASEAN-led processes and is looking forward to a swift conclusion of the talks on a 'Code of Conduct' which will further support a rules-based regional and international order." Based on the report from Chinese Society of International Law, the the Philipines has violated this rule-based regional order, indirectly, the Philippines has also violated the UNCLOS, and this fact was ignored by the tribunal, description can be found section IV of the report:

IV. The Arbitral Tribunal disregards the fact that there exist between China and the Philippines agreements to settle the relevant disputes through negotiation, distorts Article 281 of the UNCLOS, and erroneously exercises jurisdiction over the claims

From here, I would say the EU declaraton doesn't contain relevant information for the case. If you don't agree, please discuss here. Toto11zi (talk) 03:34, 1 July 2016 (UTC)

From the EU statement:

the EU urges all claimants to resolve disputes through peaceful means, to clarify the basis of their claims, and to pursue them in accordance with international law including UNCLOS and its arbitration procedures. (emphasis mine)

Your arguments in this section appear entirely specious. Chris Hallquist (talk) 00:36, 4 August 2016 (UTC)

From the quotation above including UNCLOS and its arbitration procedures., the European Union at least recognize all possible venues for dispute resolution, including the UNCLOS arbitration processes, bilateral talks among disputants and it supports the release of a "Code of Conduct" (which is the name of the ASEAN statement on as an organization on the dispute, as well as their approach. Cambodia and other China friendly countries has blocked attempts of a unified Code of Conduct unfavorable towards China in the past) on the issue.

Toto11zi, how flawed is the arbitration case itself is irrelevant. It is true that the Chinese Society of International Law, and other Chinese-sources has this position that the Philippines broke international law. But we state the EU's position as it is. (They recognize all means of dispute resolution, including arbitration, which China rejects). We can't exclude EU's statement just because Chinese sources interpret the Philippines as not following "a rules-based regional and international order". Their statement the EU is relevant (like the Arab League and SCO), regardless on the level of support to a side. This issue is more resolvable since we don't group multinational bodies into support / oppose unlike individual national governments.

We should be careful not to have double standards and shouldn't have more lenient on content that may benefit a particular side. If a country that merely states (or is claimed to have stated) they "understand (not the word "support"), China's position on the South China Sea dispute", they are automatically assumed to support China? This is not that different to a country or organization, recognizing the Philippines' right to seek arbitration (take note it is theoretically possible to recognize the right to seek arbitration while preferring bilateral talks, it is also possible to understand China's position on preference for bilateral talks while remaining silent on the seeking of arbitration part).Hariboneagle927 (talk) 02:03, 4 August 2016 (UTC)

These are good points. Hariboneagle927, what do you think of my suggestion to make the main categories "support for the arbitration" and "opposition to the arbitration"? That would avoid some of the issues you point out. Chris Hallquist (talk) 15:09, 4 August 2016 (UTC)

Any moves to address the issues I raised is welcome. I think the reactions should be about the arbitration case itself although some reactions overlap with other related issues such as freedom of navigation, sovereignity over the islands (beyond economic rights in the SCS, which the case tackles). The idea of renaming the sections would be suffice. The "Support for China / Philippines" is also problematic in a way that it makes the section a "political edit warring landmine". I still find the need to discuss the 70 countries that China claims to support it, AMTI's version etc somehow. If the old listing with 70 countries plus would be reverted, a disclaimer (as I discussed with Toto11zi should be added and footnotes to clarify certain cases.Hariboneagle927 (talk) 15:42, 4 August 2016 (UTC)

@Hariboneagle927 Re: "I still find the need to discuss the 70 countries that China claims to support it"—you mean discuss here, or in the article? I agree the article should mention it, though I'm leery of reproducing the entire list. Per WP:NOTNEWS, it doesn't seem like the kind of thing that belongs in an encyclopedia. It may seem noteworthy now, but in 10 years will anyone care about the details of China's claims? Enough to say that China claimed overwhelming international support for its position, but other sources, including some of the alleged supporters themselves, made conflicting claims. Chris Hallquist (talk) 23:07, 4 August 2016 (UTC)

Yes I'm talking about mentioning about this. I don't really have any strong opinion on reproducing the whole list (assuming that there is no consensus on the split I proposed).Hariboneagle927 (talk) 16:25, 5 August 2016 (UTC)

International reactions and Analysis of academics

The following discussion is closed. Please do not modify it. Subsequent comments should be made on the appropriate discussion page. No further edits should be made to this discussion.

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These two sections need to be checked. They have to give an equal coverage for other claimants otherwise it has to be removed. Shhhhwwww!! (talk) 15:52, 12 July 2016 (UTC)

You cannot remove reliable information without discussion. I oppose your logic. Also if you want to make dramatic change, you will need to discuss. Read your own comments here Toto11zi (talk) 16:04, 12 July 2016 (UTC)

Please link the edits that removed the content in question. Meatsgains (talk) 23:45, 14 July 2016 (UTC)

I came here via a bot invitation. I am unable to discern a question. Elinruby (talk) 22:03, 21 July 2016 (UTC)

Also called by bot -- I don't see an RFC question, however the text should not be removed without extensive discussion. Please re-state the RFC so that editors can know what the contention, if any, is. Damotclese (talk) 18:35, 23 July 2016 (UTC)

• I do not see major problems with the two sections. However, other editors can check for themselves. (I'm interpreting this RfC as asking if the sections need revision due to bias. To this I vote no, but I may be missing something.) Mooseandbruce1 (talk) 17:24, 28 July 2016 (UTC)

• @Mooseandbruce1 I believe a number of editors here feel that the academic analysis section has problems with WP:UNDUE and WP:QUOTEFARM. The "international reactions" section also had serious problems when the RFC was first posted, though it's a lot better than it was. If you really care about the issues with section 7, they've dominated this talk page since section 32 ("General problems with sources on this page") onwards. Chris Hallquist (talk) 19:59, 28 July 2016 (UTC)

My mistake. I didn't read much of the talk page because I navigated here from a list of RfC's. Is this RfC still necessary, or can it be removed? Mooseandbruce1 (talk) 22:53, 28 July 2016 (UTC)

I believe it can be removed. Chris Hallquist (talk) 00:27, 29 July 2016 (UTC)

Yeah, this doesn't seem like an RfC matter now, or when it was opened. As to the central question, the UNDUE and QUOTEFARM issues are resolvable by editing, this is preferable in a case like this to deleting entire sections as if they cannot be improved. (There are cases when it would not be, e.g. insertion of an entire section about some non-notable band's cover version of a song at the article on the song, a section of unsourced accusations at a BLP article, etc.)  — SMcCandlish ☺ ☏ ¢ ≽^ʌⱷ҅_ᴥⱷ^ʌ≼  07:03, 3 August 2016 (UTC)

Chris has not been constructive in this page and violated various Wikipedia policies, please just ignore his comments. Toto11zi (talk) 15:41, 3 August 2016 (UTC)

The discussion above is closed. Please do not modify it. Subsequent comments should be made on the appropriate discussion page. No further edits should be made to this discussion.

What does China claim about the nine-dash line?

In the text of the PCA tribunal's award, the tribunal concludes that China's conduct regarding the area within the nine-dash line suggests it does not regard the entire area within the line as being its "territorial sea or historic waters" (p. 97). This appears to be an important conclusion, if true. Does anyone know if it's been disputed by either the Chinese government, or legal experts who've commented on the case? Chris Hallquist (talk) 22:01, 5 August 2016 (UTC)

Here's a source that analyzes China's changing position, although that's probably more relevent to the Nine-dash line article. The crux of that source is a theory that the Chinese government knows their claims on the sea are untenable and is trying to re-position them to be more compliant with international law. Mamyles (talk) 22:15, 5 August 2016 (UTC)

Request for comment

The following discussion is closed. Please do not modify it. Subsequent comments should be made on the appropriate discussion page. No further edits should be made to this discussion.

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As can be seen in the section "'Explicit consensus' is bogus", above (section 75 until something gets archived), this page is now being dominated by arguments over what the consensus of this talk page currently is (and was, previously). It would be helpful if some editors not previously involved in this debate could read through the talk page could read through it and offer an opinion on (1) current apparent state of consensus on this talk page (2) state of consensus of the talk page at the time of the edits Toto11zi keeps complaining about (which I created sections 32 and 33 for the express purpose of discussing). Chris Hallquist (talk) 19:07, 1 August 2016 (UTC)

Your violation has been clearly written, and you have read that and given your comments. I would ask this newly activated dormant account Chris Hallquist again: follow our consensus and don't waste your time and our time. Toto11zi (talk) 02:59, 2 August 2016 (UTC)

@Toto11zi Who is this 'we'/'our' you keep talking about. A quick read of talk page reveals you, and only you, are using disruption and stonewalling to avoid removal of Chinese propaganda. Collagium (talk) 03:55, 2 August 2016 (UTC)

Propaganda? What is propganda? United States and Japan don't have propaganda? and Philippines? Mmmvidyahoo (talk) 05:20, 2 August 2016 (UTC)

Actually, the USA doesn't currently have propaganda, with the exception of some international radio stations. Though, there have been some during wartime in the distant past. Japan hasn't had much, either, since WWII. It looks like the Phillipines has not had any in recent history. On the contrary, China has a whole arm of the CCP dedicated to propaganda, and it is embedded in Chinese society. Mamyles (talk) 14:26, 2 August 2016 (UTC)

Indeed, the 50 Cent Party even attempts to sway public opinion through the manipulation of Wikipedia articles. Hammersbach (talk) 15:25, 2 August 2016 (UTC)

I know the 50 Cent Party, I hate them. Hope chinese government stop using 50 Cent Party. It's foolish.Mmmvidyahoo (talk) 00:35, 3 August 2016 (UTC)

• That's too much busy-work to expect of RfC respondents. We expect a straightforward, content-pertinent question to examine and address, and the sources, policy arguments, etc., to back up the varying positions. Rather thnt argue about what consensus might once have been at a particular time, RfCs are to establish what consensus is now when it is unclear on something.  — SMcCandlish ☺ ☏ ¢ ≽^ʌⱷ҅_ᴥⱷ^ʌ≼  14:29, 6 August 2016 (UTC)

  @SMcCandlish Totally understandable concern. But what do you recommend we do? I'm struggling to figure out, from reading Wikipedia policies, how to deal with situations where there's a sprawling talk-page discussion and participants have radically contradictory ideas about what the consensus is. (To clarify: if commenting on past talk-page discussion is too much, would you be willing to comment on what you think the current consensus is?) Chris Hallquist (talk) 14:57, 6 August 2016 (UTC)

  @Chris Hallquist: I would have to wade into all of that discussion to determine that answer your last question, so it's essentially the same request. What I would advise is identifying what the point of contention in the content is, then building an RfC about that. I could be done as a simple question, like "Should the article include some factoid here?", or a choice between proposed wordings (not just the one you like – remember the WP:RFC neutrality rule), e.g., "Per many previous discussions, there seem to be essentially three approaches to this, and the proposed solutions so far are ..."; or, "Debate about which version of the paragraph about XYZ to use has turned circular. We ask the community to help chose between: Version A: {{Block indent|Text of version A}} Version B: {{Block indent|Text of version B}}". Or "Should source ABC be used in this article?" if it's that kind of question. Usually save pro or con points for followup comments. If you are really good at devil's advocate, it can be helpful to accurately summarize options at an appropriate point (e.g. before each option, after the statement of the RfC, or as a block of text starting an ===Extended RfC discussion=== subsection. If not, it may be best to just add your own position on the option you favor (if any) as your own comment in the RfC, and let those in favor of some other option explain/defend that one. It will often turn out that some previous discussion gets recapitulated, but in a well-crafted RfC, it will be funnelled into less of a rambling argument, and be a distillation of previous debate not a repeat of it. If heated argument is expected, it may be good to explicitly ask that people not cross-talk in the comments section, to divide that section into Support/Oppose/Neutral, or Option 1/Option 2/Option 3/Other, etc., and/or to refactor protracted back-and-forth from the comments (i.e., !votes) section into the extended discussion section, though some editors are occasionally resistant to the refactoring. The main two pitfalls of RfCs are a) lack of focus (asking more than one thing at once, or not asking anything clearly as in this case), and b) presenting a one-side (especially a hostile or hyperbolic) question that is trying to "steer" !votes. Keep the RfC intro short: What is the issue, and if it really seem necessary to get into it, why resolution has been difficult (stated without invective/accusations/aspersions). Hope that helps!  — SMcCandlish ☺ ☏ ¢ ≽^ʌⱷ҅_ᴥⱷ^ʌ≼  17:47, 6 August 2016 (UTC)

The discussion above is closed. Please do not modify it. Subsequent comments should be made on the appropriate discussion page. No further edits should be made to this discussion.

Time for some archival

Someone who knows the resolution status of these threads, please judiciously archive most this talk page. Over 80 threads on an article talk page is really excessive, and it is clearly contributing to lack of resolution, multiple unclear RfCs running back-to-back, and RfC respondents being too overwhelmed by the Great Wall of Text to comment meaningfully.  — SMcCandlish ☺ ☏ ¢ ≽^ʌⱷ҅_ᴥⱷ^ʌ≼  17:51, 6 August 2016 (UTC)

Excellent suggestion. I'll do that now. Chris Hallquist (talk) 21:09, 6 August 2016 (UTC)

Okay, all threads with no activity in the last 30 days should be archived by a bot soon-ish. (SMcCandlish, never done this before, so you might want to double-check if I did it right, and if you think 30 days makes sense under the circumstances.)Chris Hallquist (talk) 21:17, 6 August 2016 (UTC)

Still no archiving. I've tweaked the template, which hopefully will start it up. Mamyles (talk) 14:48, 8 August 2016 (UTC)

@Mamyles actually, the bot did archive 13 sections of this discussion page. I set it to archive discussions that have had no activity in 30 days, and we have a lot of talk page sections that don't fit that criterion. I considered setting the bot to be even more aggressive, but WP:AATP says "Article talk page threads should not typically be archived in less than 30 days except for very busy talk pages." I guess this page plausibly qualifies, but I was worried someone might object. Does anyone object? We could do 15 days or 21 days or something like that. Chris Hallquist (talk) 16:40, 8 August 2016 (UTC)

Ramos' China visit

Former Philippine President Fidel Ramos on Monday starts a trip to China, after months of tension between the two countries as a result of Manila's headstrong arbitration quest on the South China Sea. Ramos' visit brings a whiff of hope that the two countries will return to bilateral negotiations over the issue.

Former President Fidel Ramos said Saturday he accepted President Rodrigo Duterte’s offer to act as special envoy to China after an international court invalidated the Asian giant's vast sea claims in favor of the Philippines.

see US Navy Visits China, Ramos Leaves for South China Sea TalksFormer Philippine leader Ramos accepts post as special envoy to Beijing over South China Sea dispute: reportsRamos' China visit marks Manila's first step in right direction over South China Sea — Preceding unsigned comment added by Mmmvidyahoo (talk • contribs) 13:20, 8 August 2016 (UTC)

Not sure I understand the intent of this section. Are you proposing adding this exact text to the article? Chris Hallquist (talk) 16:34, 8 August 2016 (UTC)

This is much relevant than "international reactions" to the case and overall Chinese-Philippine relations it should be in a section dedicated to the "Aftermath of the case", with international reactions after the ruling placed under it, or place this info in domestic reactions after the ruling or some similarly named section. It should be noted though that the visit is informal as per [8]. This is for now though as according to [9], while Ramos will be having back-channel talks to presumably influential Chinese figures (although not politicians a the moment, the longer term for such talks is the return of Filipino fishermen to Scarborough shoal. Also the same source stated that Filipino fishermen avoid the area for now, which should also be noted. The Philippine government's openness for talks with China but with the insistence of using the arbitration ruling as a "trump card" should also be mentioned as per [10].Hariboneagle927 (talk) 01:27, 9 August 2016 (UTC)

Hello, just to give perspective, I am currently in China, and the news and media have not reported much on this visit. They are more filled with news from the current Olympics (regarding the performance of all countries), and trade and development in Africa, especially Kenya. Hence I think this deserves a one line mention at the bottom of the article, but no more. With regards to citations we must remember that publications in Japan and Philippines have a strong anti China slant, and publications in China have a strong pro-China stance. hence I would suggest using these, but also adding less biased reporting, from the BBC, WaPo, Guardian, WSJ and New York Times. Notthebestusername (talk) 04:47, 9 August 2016 (UTC)

@Hariboneagle927's suggested approach seems sensible to me. To address Notthebestusername's concerns about bias, we can give WP:INTEXT citations for claims about issues that are open to interpretation (e.g. directly quoting from Calida's statements in the Straights Times piece). Chris Hallquist (talk) 16:53, 9 August 2016 (UTC)

Yes, intext citations are way to go. To be honest though, the Ramos visit has been overshadowed though in Philippine media by Duterte's aggressive crackdown on illegal drugs also as well as the recent Olympic win. However I feel the "aftermath" of this event is still much relevant even though the "hype" on the case has been toned down / overshadowed by more recent news. Remember coverage =/= notability.Hariboneagle927 (talk) 08:35, 10 August 2016 (UTC)

Possible clarification of "historic rights"

This article by BBC journalist Bill Hayton does a lot (if what it says is accurate) to clear up my confusion regarding the legal issues in this dispute. Hayton cites a Chinese academic as saying the nine-dashed line claim contains three parts (this is a direct quote):

• sovereignty over the features within the line;
• sovereign rights and jurisdiction over water as defined by the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS);
• “historic rights” over fishing, navigation and resource development.

Furthermore, Hayton says:

The final UNCLOS text, which it and all the other participants agreed to, makes no mention of “historic rights,” except in the very limited context of “historic bays” close to a country’s coast.

I just did a digital search of the English text of UNCLOS, and this appears to be more or less accurate. However, I thought it was worth asking of anyone can point to reliable sources with a different point of view. Maybe there are legal precedents regarding "historic rights" predating UNCLOS that UNCLOS should be interpreted as implicitly endorsing? I don't think that possibility is particularly likely, but something like it might be true. Chris Hallquist (talk) 17:32, 5 August 2016 (UTC)

I am not entirely sure what you are asking or what information you are looking for. Hence, I apologize in advance if my answer makes no sense.

It is clear that UNCLOS was not intended to be a complete body of rules that covered each and every aspect of the law of the sea. The preambule states clearly "that matters not regulated by this Convention continue to be governed by the rules and principles of general international law".

It is also clear that UNCLOS recognizes the existence of historic rights. Art. 298(1)(a)(i) states that "disputes concerning the interpretation or application of articles 15, 74 and 83 relating to sea boundary delimitations, or those involving historic bays or titles ..."

The ICJ has affirmed the existence of historic titles. A case in point is the Norwegian Fisheries case (1951), the ICJ stressed that "By "historic waters" are usually meant waters which are treated as internal waters but which would not have that character were it not for the existence of an historic title." Furthermore, in the Tunesian/Libyan Continental Shelf case (1982) para. 100 the ICJ noted that the Third Conference on the Law of the Sea's draft convention (which became UNCLOS) did not contain any detailed provisions on historic rights, but did however hint at them. The ICJ concluded that "It seems clear that the matter continues to be governed by general international law". Lastly, in the El Salvador/Honduras Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute case the ICJ once again stressed its position on historic rights and repeated that "historic titles must enjoy respect and be preserved as they have always been by long usage" (para 383).

Thus, both UNCLOS and the ICJ accept the existence of historic titles to islands and maritime delimitation (as did the Eritrea/Yemen tribunal). Because of their nature, however, historic titles are governed by general international law and fall outside the framework of UNCLOS. For further reading, see the entry on the South China Sea in The Oxford Handbook of the Law of the Sea; A. Gioia, Historic Titles in the Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law and; Keyuan, 'Historic Rights in International Law' 32 Ocean Dev. & Int'l L. 149 2001. Regards, Perudotes (talk) 00:34, 10 August 2016 (UTC)

That all sounds consistent with other things I've read. Though it's not at all clear that China was claiming a "historic title" to the area within the nine-dash line, at least, the tribunal seems to think it was making a weaker claim. Chris Hallquist (talk) 11:56, 10 August 2016 (UTC)

I don't think that the tribunal is saying that China made a 'weaker' claim. The tribunal is careful in distinguishing between "historic title" and "historic right" only as far as the jurisdictional reservation ex art. 298(1)(a)(i) UNCLOS is concerned. Thus, it argues that the reservation only relates to a claim of "historic title" and not to other "historic rights" (title being a subcategory of rights [para. 225-226]), see para. 229.

The tribunal, having established its jurisdiction, then proceeds to the merits of the Philippines claims (para. 230). In this fase the difference between "historic title" and "historic right" is no longer relevant (see for a example para. 265 and remember that a "historic water" was defined by the tribunal as 'a term for historic title over maritime areas' [para. 225]). Instead the tribunal analyses whether China's "historic rights" are compatible with art. 311 and 293(1) UNCLOS. It gives several reasons why they aren't:

i) The text of the convention clearly indicates that the EEZ and continental shelf regime superseded any "historic rights" (para. 240-247);

ii) This reading is also confirmed by the drafting history of the convention (para. 248-252;

iii) Furthermore, the convention intentionally limited the ability to make reservations to the convention, thereby also limiting the use of "historical rights" similar to reservations (para. 253-254);

iv) The current situation is like the situation in ICJ Gulf of Main case (para. 255-257);

v) The current situation can be distinguished from similar situations, i.e. Fisheries Jurisdiction cases (para. 258), Eritrea v. Yemen (para. 259) and Chagos Marine Protected Area (para. 260).

Eritrea/Yemen is distinguished, because the tribunal in question was not bound by art. 293(1) UNCLOS, which states that an Annex VII tribunal shall apply UNCLOS and rules not incompatible with UNCLOS. UK/Mauritius is distinguished because it concerned a type of agreement that was explicitly allowed by UNCLOS.

vi) Para. 263ff are made obiter dictum. The tribunal argues that the "historic rights" China alludes to were in any case nothing more than the rights any state enjoyed under the freedom of the sea. For a "historic right" to acrue three conditions need to be fulfilled: 1) claim of an historic right; 2) continuity of the exercise of the right; 3) resignation/agreement by other states of the continuous exercise of this right (the same rules for title to "historic waters"). China has not fulfilled these criteria. The tribunal further argues that unilateral state practice can not form a new (customary) rule.

The tribunal, however, keeps the door open for the possibility of "historic rights" that are compatible with UNCLOS or that can derogate from UNCLOS and in no way seems to imply that all claims to "historic rights" are incompatible. The tribunal seems to endorse the view that, at least under general international law, "historic rights" derogations contra UNCLOS can be legitimate (e.g. Eritrea/Yemen, or in the case of bilateral agreements ex art. 311(3) UNCLOS). Furthermore, the tribunal in its decision on the merits does not distinguish between a strong "historic title" and weaker "historic right" claim to come to the conclusion that China's "historic rights" are contrary to the convention. Regards, Perudotes (talk) 16:40, 10 August 2016 (UTC)

^{N.b. the opinion of the article you linked seems to be that the "historic rights" claim is bogus not so much because the idea of historic rights is incompatible with UNCLOS, but because the Chinese "historic rights" claim seems to be only 20 years old and thus not very historic.}

Rereading your statement, it seems I might've misunderstood it. The nature of the nine dash-line claim seems ambiguous as China itself hasn't elaborated much upon it (see, also para 206). The tribunal seems to hint that China's claim encompasses both sovereignty over land and territorial sea and other rights (para. 206). In para. 207-211 the tribunal explains that not all of China's claims can come from its alleged sovereignty over the islands within the nine dash-line. In para. 212-213 the tribunal further argues that China at least doesn't consider the whole area within the nine dash-line to fall within its exclusive jurisdiction. In para. 214 the tribunal once again hints at the dual purpose of the nine dash-line ("apart from the territorial sea generated by any islands"). In para. 215ff the tribunal turns to the question of whether these claimed rights fall within the exception of art. 298. and in para. 229 concludes in that China claims "rather a constellation of historic rights short of title" (e.g. relating to fishing and resource development).

It is, however, worth remembering that this construction of the difference between "historic title" and other "historic rights" is not a fact, but was constructed by the tribunal itself on its analysis of previous usage and case law. As such, it is unclear if it is truly representative of (customary) international law. Regards, Perudotes (talk) 22:07, 10 August 2016 (UTC)

Request to edit the infobox

Hello, I would like to propose the following edits to the Infobox at the beginning of the page on the right side, to make it clearer for anyone looking for information on this case. This is much in line with the manner of infoboxes for other legal cases on Wikipedia.

Suggested edits -

1. Add PCA to the court with wikilink / external link to https://pcacases.com.
2. Add to Full case name - "Case number 2013-19"
3. There are no presiding judges in this case - instead the term used by PCA is as follows - suggest that the existing text for presiding judges etc be changed to as follows:

Arbitrator(s) : Judge Thomas A. Mensah (President)

Judge Jean-Pierre Cot 
Judge Stanislaw Pawlak 
Professor Alfred H. Soons 
Judge Rüdiger Wolfrum

I also suggest that a wiki page be made for Thomas A.Mensah as he is an eminent personality in Law of the Sea cases (we were taught a number of his cases while studying UNCLOS in London). I can do that if someone helps me on the same.

Thank you Notthebestusername (talk) 05:38, 9 August 2016 (UTC)

The website link is incorrect. PCA's website is https://pca-cpa.org/en/home/ Mamyles (talk) 14:25, 9 August 2016 (UTC)

@ Mamyles - Thanks. Actually the PCA website link should be https://pcacases.com/web/view/7 - this is where all the case documents with respect to this case are located. Notthebestusername (talk) 07:55, 11 August 2016 (UTC)

References

Protected edit request on 28 July 2016

Subject: ASEAN Joint Statement on 25 July 2016

Please add this ASEAN response in "After the ruling" section placed after "National governments" and "United Nations" subsections:

"ASEAN: On July 25th, 2016, in Vientiane, Laos, ASEAN issued the joint statement regarding South China Sea disputeː ensure and promote the peace, stability, and security in the region."

Based on this source from asean.orgː

Joint Statement of the Foreign Ministers of ASEAN Member States on the Maintenance of Peace, Security, and Stability in the Region

We, the Foreign Ministers of ASEAN Member States, reiterate ASEAN’s shared commitments to:

1. ensure that Southeast Asia and its surroundings remain a peaceful, stable and secure region;

2. promote mutually beneficial relations to maintain peace, security and stability, and prosperity with nations in the region and the global community of nations;

ASEAN

Thank you. Gunkarta  talk  06:10, 28 July 2016 (UTC)

Concur This information is relevant to the article. Collagium (talk) 06:52, 28 July 2016 (UTC)

Support I am surprised this article did not include any statements from ASEAN yet. it is very relevant to this article, much like statements coming from the Arab League. Ssbbplayer (talk) 14:08, 28 July 2016 (UTC)

Support I think we may have consensus on this. Chris Hallquist (talk) 17:47, 30 July 2016 (UTC)

NeilN Would you mind checking this one out - it is the oldest FPROT request outstanding. — xaosflux ^Talk 00:43, 14 August 2016 (UTC)

 Done --NeilN ^{talk to me} 01:04, 14 August 2016 (UTC)

Vietnam moves rocket launchers to disputed islands in S. China Sea

Vietnam has been moving new rocket launchers to several of its islands in the South China Sea, which could damage Chinese military installations. Foreign officials and military analysts believe the launchers form part of Vietnam's state-of-art EXTRA rocket artillery system recently acquired from Israel. see Vietnam is moving rocket launchers into the disputed South China SeaVietnam moves rocket launchers to disputed islands in S. China Sea — Preceding unsigned comment added by Mmmvidyahoo (talk • contribs) 02:14, 11 August 2016 (UTC)

So what is the significance and relevance of this news article in relation to this Wikipedia article? The talk page is meant for discussion of the content on the Wikipedia page, not some news article repository. Ssbbplayer (talk) 03:29, 14 August 2016 (UTC)

Crafting a compromise re: Cambodia's position

On closer examination of news reports, Cambodia's position on the South China Sea dispute appears not-entirely-consistent. I think it would be worth having a paragraph to summarize information from the following sources, letting the tensions in them exist as they are:

• http://www.voacambodia.com/a/cambodia-ruling-party-echoes-prime-minister-on-south-china-sea-stance/3389557.html
• http://www.todayonline.com/world/asia/cambodian-pm-denies-role-asean-u-turn-south-china-sea
• http://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/cambodian-pm-denies-role-in-asean-u-turn-on-south-china-sea
• https://english.kyodonews.jp/news/2016/06/417263.html
• http://www.khmertimeskh.com/news/26371/hun-sen-and-the-south-china-sea/
• http://www.khmertimeskh.com/news/26488/cpp-backs-pm-on-south-china-sea/
• http://www.khmertimeskh.com/news/26594/pm-wants-south-china-sea-interference-to-stop/
• http://www.mfaic.gov.kh/?page=detail&ctype=article&id=1916&lg=en%20
• https://www.cambodiadaily.com/news/cambodia-blocks-asean-statement-on-south-china-sea-115834/

(Later I'll try to come up with a draft wording.) Chris Hallquist (talk) 20:46, 2 August 2016 (UTC)

Okay, here's what I managed to come up with:

In June 2016, before the tribunal issued its ruling, Malaysia's foreign ministry released what it said was a joint statement of ASEAN expressing "serious concern" over land reclaimation activities in the South China Sea. Within hours of issuing the statement, Malaysia announced that ASEAN wanted the statement retracted for "urgent amendments". Malaysian Foreign Ministry's Secretary General Othman Hashim later claimed that ASEAN's foreign ministers had "unanimously agreed" to the statement at a meeting, and that "Subsequent developments pertaining to the media statement took place after the departure of the ASEAN foreign ministers".

Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen later gave a speech condemning reports that Cambodia had had the statement retracted in order to please China, saying, "Cambodia will not be a puppet of anyone on the South China Sea issue." Hun Sen suggested the case was a "political conspiracy" and that the ruling "will not be fair", but also said that "Cambodia will just choose to stay neutral on this issue." A few days after Hun Sen's speech, the Cambodian People's Party, which Hun Sen heads, issued a statement backing him. According to the statement, “The CPP would like to reject unjust allegations that Cambodia has destroyed the issuing of a joint statement from Asean on the issue of the South China Sea both in Kunming recently and in 2012.”

On July 9th, shortly before the tribunal issued its verdict, Cambodia's foreign ministry issued a statement reiterating that Cambodia would not join any ASEAN statement on the verdict.

References

Chris Hallquist (talk) 23:53, 2 August 2016 (UTC)

I don't reject users from adding information to Wikipedia, Wikipedia should contain all the information and all the views. In this case, you obviously don't understand what we're trying to do and what the consensus has been. Again I would ask you to read what we already agreed with major editors especially Hariboneagle927 and Wtmitchell. For the format used in the "after the ruling" section, please follow the same format if you insist to add, Hariboneagle927's suggestion also applies. Toto11zi (talk) 15:36, 3 August 2016 (UTC)

I'm going to ignore the parts of your comment that aren't specific suggestions regarding the content of the article. Re: the format used in the "after the ruling" section, I think the situation with Cambodia is unusually complicated in an interesting way, which probably justifies more detail. Chris Hallquist (talk) 16:39, 3 August 2016 (UTC)

Ruling Cambodian People's Party (CPP) leader and Prime Minister Samdech Techo Hun Sen on Tuesday said the CPP would not back an upcoming decision over South China Sea, deeming it "the worst political collusion in the framework of international politics." see http://www.business-standard.com/article/international/cambodia-not-to-support-decision-over-south-china-sea-issue-pm-116062800154_1.html Mmmvidyahoo (talk) 05:03, 4 August 2016 (UTC)

• That news article is outdated, coming from June 28, 2016. The foreign ministry statement is after this so we should use the more recent info. In situations like these, positions can change rapidly. Ssbbplayer (talk) 03:51, 14 August 2016 (UTC)

• Eh, the official statement is fairly narrowly worded, saying only that Cambodia wouldn't be joining any other ASEAN statement on the issue. As I look more closely at English-language media reports, the bigger problem I'm seeing is that it looks like there are cases where different media outlets put different spins on the same things the Cambodian PM has said. So I'm really not sure what Cambodia's position is. Chris Hallquist (talk) 03:49, 15 August 2016 (UTC)

Proposed revision of the citation to Antonios Tzanakopoulos' article

The current wording is somewhat misleading. I suggest rewording it to say something like:

According to Antonios Tzanakopoulos, associate professor of public international law at the University of Oxford, "The dispute between the Philippines and China is obviously over sovereignty over maritime features in the SCS, and only relatedly over maritime zones and the entitlements that the relevant features generate." Because questions of sovereignty over land do not fall within the scope of UNCLOS, the Philippines sought to present the case as being about the interpretation of Article 121 of the convention. Tzanakopoulos argues that the case is a difficult one for the UNCLOS's dispute-settlement system.

Somewhere in the article, we should also add an explanation of Article 121 and its relevance to the case, something not currently explained in the article. But Tzanakopoulos doesn't himself explain this, so we'll have to find another source. Chris Hallquist (talk) 15:46, 3 August 2016 (UTC)

Correction: the fact that the UNCLOS does not cover sovereignty is attested in the text of the award itself, and does not need to be sourced to Tzanakopoulos' article. That fact—and the fact that in the view of the Philippines and the PCA, the case was not about sovereignty—should be explained more prominently in this article. Chris Hallquist (talk) 13:09, 4 August 2016 (UTC)

"Not about sovereignty" is an oversimplification, IMHO. The case was not about arbitration of a territorial dispute (as, for example, was the Island of Palmas Case). However, though I lack technical expertise here, it seems to me that the award does bear on the validity of claims of sovereignty -- e.g., when it says, "20. In Chapter V, the Tribunal considers the Philippines’ requests for a declaration that the Parties’ respective rights and obligations in regard to the waters, seabed, and maritime features of the South China Sea are governed by the Convention (the Philippines’ Submission No. 1), and for a declaration that China’s claims to sovereign and historic rights with respect to the maritime areas encompassed by the ‘nine-dash line’ are contrary to the Convention and therefore without lawful effect (the Philippines’ Submission No. 2)" and "278. With respect to Submission No. 2, for the reasons set out above, the Tribunal concludes that, as between the Philippines and China, China’s claims to historic rights, or other sovereign rights or jurisdiction, with respect to the maritime areas of the South China Sea encompassed by the relevant part of the ‘nine-dash line’ are contrary to the Convention and without lawful effect to the extent that they exceed the geographic and substantive limits of China’s maritime entitlements under the Convention."[11] (emphasis mine) Wtmitchell (talk) (earlier Boracay Bill) 12:21, 5 August 2016 (UTC)

Not an expert either, but the impression I'm getting, reading both Tzanakopoulos' article and the award itself, is that both the Philippines and the tribunal are making a distinction between rights and entitlements on the one hand, and sovereignty, delimitation, and boundaries on the other hand. I think that the tribunal is saying is that, in at least some cases, the validity of the nine-dash line as a boundary does not necessarily determine where Filipino fishermen are allowed to fish (edit: to give just one example). Chris Hallquist (talk) 13:55, 5 August 2016 (UTC)

The sections you are quoting address only maritime rights, not territorial rights or sovereignty. The tribunal essentially ruled that these islands are within the EEZ of the Phillipines, and since they are not habitable islands, they have no EEZ of their own. The "nine dash line" has no bearing on maritime rights or rights to resources, since those things are spelled out in the treaty by EEZ provisions. China could still have rights to the islands or reefs, they just come with no EEZ. Acerimusdux (talk) 07:23, 21 August 2016 (UTC)

Suggested revision to lead paragraph

Hello, to maintain the neutrality and objectivity of this page, I would like the following edit to the lead -

Current version -

Philippines v. China (also known as The South China Sea Arbitration) was an arbitration case brought by the Republic of the Philippines under the arbitration provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)[2][3][4] against the People's Republic of China concerning certain issues in the South China Sea[5] including the legality of China's "nine-dotted line" claim over the South China Sea under the UNCLOS. On 19 February 2013, China officially refused to participate in the arbitration because, according to China, its 2006 declaration under article 298[6] covers the disputes brought by the Philippines and that this case concerns sovereignty, thus it deems the arbitral tribunal formed for the case has no jurisdiction over the issue.[7] On 7 December 2014, a position paper was published by China to elaborate its position.[5][8] On 29 October 2015, the arbitral tribunal ruled that it has jurisdiction over the case,[9] taking up seven of the 15 submissions made by the Philippines.[10]

On 12 July 2016, the tribunal ruled in favor of the Philippines against China over territorial disputes in the South China Sea;[11][12] in its major ruling, the tribunal ruled that China has "no historical rights" based on the "nine-dash line" map.[11][12] China has rejected the ruling, as has Taiwan.[13][14]

The United Nations holds no position on the case, and the International Court of Justice has had no involvement.

Suggested edited version -

Philippines v. China (also known as The South China Sea Arbitration) was an arbitration case brought by the Republic of the Philippines under the arbitration provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)[2][3][4] against the People's Republic of China concerning certain issues in the South China Sea[5] including the legality of China's "nine-dashed line" claim over the South China Sea under UNCLOS.

On 19 February 2013, China officially refused to participate in the arbitration on the premise that this case concerned sovereignty and that its 2006 declaration registered under UNCLOS Art. 298[6] covered these disputes. Hence the arbitration tribunal formed for the case has no jurisdiction over the issue.[7] On 7 December 2014, a position paper was published by China to elaborate its position.[5][8] After an year long deliberation (Add citation from the Permanent Court of Arbitration - case papers PCA case 2013-17 - https://pca-cpa.org/en/home/ and https://pcacases.com/web/view/7) On 29 October 2015, the arbitral tribunal ruled that it has jurisdiction over the case,[9] taking up seven of the 15 submissions made by the Philippines.[10]

On 12 July 2016, the PCA tribunal ruled in favor of the Philippines in 7 of Philippines submissions (add citation to press release from PCA on 29/07/2016), and ruled that it could not make a decision in the other 7 submissions. It also clarified that it would not it would not "...rule on any question of sovereignty over land territory and would not delimit any maritime boundary between the Parties". (Same citation as before)

The PCA tribunal found that China had "no historical rights" based on the "nine-dash line" map. Regarding the construction activities on Mischief reef and Second Thomas Shoal, it found that "...China has failed to exhibit due regard for the Philippines’ sovereign rights with respect to fisheries in its exclusive economic zone. Accordingly, China has breached its obligations under Article 58(3) of the Convention."[11][12] Add citation to the 501 page ruling by PCA - pages 301 to 319. China has rejected the ruling, as has Taiwan.[13][14] Add citations - China government website on ruling, Peoples daily page on ruling, References from Washington post, CNN and BBC. The United Nations holds no position on the case, and the International Court of Justice has had no involvement. Add clarifications issued by UN and ICJ from their official websites.

Please let me know if I can do so, and plese permit the same. Alternately, please let me know how I can send this to you and if you would like to copy/paste this as an edit.

Thank you Notthebestusername (talk) 04:41, 9 August 2016 (UTC)

The detail in your paragraph 3 seems like useful clarifying detail. Not sure why you think your other, more minor suggested edits advance NPOV. Not saying they're bad, just that they seem very minor and I don't see them making much of a difference. Chris Hallquist (talk) 16:59, 9 August 2016 (UTC)

Also, your suggested paragraph 3 language does not quite match the press release. The decision about jurisdiction was actually announced as part of the October decision. Key paragraph from press release made at the time:[12]

In light of the foregoing, the Tribunal has concluded that it is presently able to decide that it does have jurisdiction with respect to the matters raised in seven of the Philippines’ Submissions. The Tribunal has concluded, however, that its jurisdiction with respect to seven other Submissions by the Philippines will need to be considered in conjunction with the merits. The Tribunal has requested the Philippines to clarify and narrow one of its Submissions. — Preceding unsigned comment added by Chris Hallquist (talk • contribs) 17:14, 9 August 2016 (UTC)

@ Chris Hallquist / All - actually I have taken all the data from (a) the final jurisdiction and admissibility award(29/10/2015) and (b) the 12/07/2016 final award. You will notice that I have used the same language as the latest 2016 award, regarding sovereignty. As you will observe from past judgements and awards too, PCA and ITLOS awards and judgements usually reflect a non-committal tone so that it cannot be interpreted in a different manner and does not aggravate issues - now or later. For the other material, I have taken information from official press releases by the PCA and have given the same as citations. This clarity is needed because the tribunal ruled in favour of Philippines on only half the counts - not all counts (hence words such as "overwhelmingly / ruled out historic claims completely do not reflect the ruling adequately)Notthebestusername (talk) 08:07, 11 August 2016 (UTC)

I agree with you on the value of clarifying that the tribunal only ruled in favor of the Philippines on 7 of the submissions (actually not exactly half—there were 15 submissions by the Philippines, and the tribunal did something unusual with one of them). If the sources you mention in your last comment use slightly different language than the press release, can you quote the exact parts? The press-release language may be somewhat more accessible to non-lawyers, and presumably it accurately conveys the intent of the ruling, since it's an official press release. Chris Hallquist (talk) 15:49, 11 August 2016 (UTC)

@ Chris Hallquist - The wording of the press release is in line with the over all judgement. I have mostly used the same language as the press release, using the lengthy final ruling only where relevant / where more detail was needed. You are right - 7 of 15 submissions is less than half :) Notthebestusername (talk) 10:12, 1 September 2016 (UTC)

Background section violates NPOV

The background section heavily emphasizes disputes over sovereignty, but in the view of both Philippines and the PCA tribunal, the case itself was not about sovereignty (as is clear from the text of the award). The emphasis on China's preferred framing around sovereignty appears to be a clear violation of NPOV. The background section needs to be revised to give more background on the UNCLOS and the disputes over maritime entitlements. Chris Hallquist (talk) 13:15, 4 August 2016 (UTC)

Background should also include an explanation of China's "nine-dash line" claims—the nine-dash line is mentioned once in the lede, then disappears from the article only to re-emerge in the "award" section without enough context to make the discussion in that section intelligible. Chris Hallquist (talk) 13:33, 4 August 2016 (UTC)

I think there are sufficient sources that would tell what triggered the arbitration, that is when the Philippine Navy arrested Chinese fishermen in Scarborough Shoal and the standoff that happened after. -- Namayan (talk) 05:48, 5 August 2016 (UTC)

I had no idea about that. Would appreciate if you could dig up sources. Chris Hallquist (talk) 13:49, 5 August 2016 (UTC)

I think it needs to include a bit of the background on the nine dash line. Currently, there is no info on it, despite the ruling being based on the legality of that nine dash line. The controversy surrounding it has been a major factor in the disputes. Ssbbplayer (talk) 04:02, 14 August 2016 (UTC)

I agree with this. I also don't like it being referred to as "territorial". I just changed a sentence in the "territorial disputes" article which claimed the tribunal ruled against China's "territorial claims". I changed it to "maritime claims". I see a similar sentence here about the tribunal ruling "against China over territorial disputes". Really they only ruled on maritime rights and economic rights, such as fishing rights and rights to petroleum and mineral resources. There remains an unresolved territorial dispute over ownership of these islands, and the panel stated that it's decision "would not advance the sovereignty claims of either Party to islands in the South China Sea" Acerimusdux (talk) 07:50, 21 August 2016 (UTC)

This is still an issue. The background emphasizes sovereignty, while this tribunal was not at all about sovereignty. Additionally, the "Optional Exceptions" subsection sounds deliberately misleading. A country may opt out of rulings over sovereignty per Article 298, which is why sovereignty was not discussed in the arbitration. I've added an NPOV tag to the section.

Given the heavy reliance on Chinese government sources, it may be appropriate to blank the entire background section and start over, ensuring that only reliable sources are used and that material is presented from a NPOV. Mamyles (talk) 18:52, 8 September 2016 (UTC)

I agree. Delete the entire section and rework it from scratch. It is misleading the readers and is biased when it criticizes the Philippines claims on the islands yet has none for China. Ssbbplayer (talk) 16:20, 9 September 2016 (UTC)