Talk:Moral responsibility/Archive 2

Archive 1

Archive 2

Archive 3

Replacement of lede

The present lede states:

Moral responsibility is the status of morally deserving praise, blame, reward, or punishment for an act or omission, in accordance with one's moral obligations. Deciding what if anything is morally obligatory is a principal concern of ethics.

There are three drawbacks to this lede:

(i) it is circular, basically suggesting that 'moral responsibility' is explained by 'moral obligation' or 'morally deserving', and

(ii) it suggests that moral responsibility is a 'status' that attracts 'praise, blame, reward, or punishment'. 'Moral responsibility' is not a 'status': it is a commitment to adhere to one or another code of conduct, and

(iii) it suggests that 'moral responsibility' is identifiable by certain social responses: 'morally deserved' praise, blame, etc., which suggests observation of triggered responses is a substitute for understanding what is the trigger.

The present lede is analogous to defining a 'traffic violation' as 'the status of being pulled over by a traffic cop', instead of referring to breaking the laws governing moving vehicles.

The two sentences of the current lede might be improved by combining them, maybe like this:

Moral responsibility is a commitment to adhere to one or another code of conduct governing 'right' and 'wrong' behavior, such codes being a principal concern of ethics, and is enforced in accordance with a group's chosen behavioral code, in particular, by social reactions of praise, blame, reward, or punishment.

A less abstract proposal with a source is presented in an earlier subsection.

It would be nice to have a source supporting whatever formulation is ultimately adopted. Brews ohare (talk) 18:02, 24 January 2014 (UTC)

You can't limit Moral responsibly to adherence to a 'code of conduct', that is a partial view ----Snowded ^TALK 00:59, 25 January 2014 (UTC)

Care to explain? The Stanford encyclopedia says "morality" can be used to refer to a code of conduct, suggesting to me that 'moral responsibility' would be related to adherence to one or another such code of conduct. Brews ohare (talk) 02:55, 25 January 2014 (UTC)

BTW, you have not commented upon the three listed shortcomings of the current lede. Any thoughts ? Brews ohare (talk) 03:50, 25 January 2014 (UTC)

To say something can be used to define a code of conduct is not to say that it is to adhere to a code of conduct. This use of internet search only to source your material always ends of with partial views largely based on your own interpretation of limited sources. Your stated short comings have similar defects. So I have explained my statement, although it was pretty self evident. However I am not getting sucked into another of your extended multi-section debates on minor issues with no other editors involved. ----Snowded ^TALK 08:20, 25 January 2014 (UTC)

Snowded: Your paraphrase is wrong, introducing a confusion between morality and moral responsibility that is not part of the proposed lede. Morality refers to a code of conduct, and moral responsibility to an attitude of commitment to that code. (Sources relevant to this point are Haste and King & Carruthers and discussions of free will vis-à-vis moral responsibility, such as Doyle and Fischer.) There is no "partial view" here. Also, the shortcomings of the current lede have no relation to your misreading here of the above proposed lede, so you have yet to comment upon the three stated deficits of the current lede. You are under no obligation to present your objections in an understandable manner, of course, but as they now stand they are unclear (although self-evident to yourself) and also unsupported by any logic or any source. Brews ohare (talk) 17:28, 26 January 2014 (UTC)

I agree with Snowded. You are advocating a partial view. The concept of moral responsibility is parametric on morality. As the article says, the question of what moral failure means is a concern of ethics. I will additionally respond to your three objections.

1. It is not circular to define moral responsibility in terms of a given morality because we are interested here in what it means to be responsible for moral failures and what response is appropriate.
2. Moral responsibility is a status. When we say "dogs are not morally responsible", we mean they are not the kind of beings that deserve blame for ethical failures.
3. Again, the current lead is correct, and the key concept is deserving blame and praise. It has nothing to do with actually "observing" a reaction; the question is what kind of reaction is warranted.

Your view on this is idiosyncratic. Why are you even citing Doyle and a specialized journal article "Moral Responsibility and Consciousness"? We are dealing with a basic concept here. Have you read any foundational textbook, a basic introduction to free will, or any full-length treatment of the subject at all? Like Snowded, I get the very distinct impression that you are just googling for whatever supports your own interpretations. Vesal (talk) 15:13, 28 January 2014 (UTC)

Vesal: I'm sure that your claim of agreement with Snowded is significant, although you have gone beyond what he has so far endorsed. But how about some sources? Brews ohare (talk) 15:58, 28 January 2014 (UTC)

Vesal: I'll examine your three points: (i) You say it is not circular to define moral responsibility in terms of a morality. I think your added comment about "what it means to be responsible for moral behavior" is exactly what the proposed lede says. (ii) I find the comment that the "status" of a dog is to be beyond blame for ethical failure unrelated to the subject. On the other hand, to be blamed for ethical failure is to be challenged as to your adherence to some particular moral code, as stated in the proposed lede (iii) The question of reactions is addressed in the proposed lede, not as part of the definition of moral responsibility, but as indicative of how such responsibility is enforced in society. You have confused the enforcement mechanism with the term itself, a confusion not found in the proposed lede. Moral responsibility is a commitment to a code of behavior, and one who has so engaged has agreed to be subject to sanctions for transgression. Such a person has a certain status vis à vis their commitment as either "being in compliance" or as "being in violation" with their adopted code.

My mention of Doyle and other sources is simply to indicate there is much more to be said here, and it is not suggested that these sources are literal support for the proposed lede, but that they help to round out the topic. Brews ohare (talk) 16:08, 28 January 2014 (UTC)

The present lead is consistent with all usages of the term that I've seen in the literature. Still, I checked on Oxford Reference if there is as succinct definition and the Oxford Companion to Philosophy has this: "The term moral responsibility covers (i) the having of a moral obligation and (ii) the fulfilment of the criteria for deserving blame or praise (punishment or reward) for a morally significant act or omission." I don't see this as very different from the current lead. Vesal (talk) 18:37, 28 January 2014 (UTC)

Vesall: Thanks for introducing a consideration of sources, which I feel is the proper way to discuss matters. The first definition you found: the having of a moral obligation sounds very similar to the proposal here of commitment to a code of conduct. This last formulation has the merit of not using 'moral' in the course of defining 'moral responsibility', thereby avoiding circularity. Brews ohare (talk) 21:01, 28 January 2014 (UTC)

I think three of us have now said that it is not circular to use the word 'moral' in a definition of moral responsibility. Also you have not handled the objection that while a code of conduct is one way that morality may be expressed it is not the only way. So with Vesal, the current definition seems closer to generic sources ----Snowded ^TALK 22:38, 28 January 2014 (UTC)

Snowded: Got another way? Let's hear it. A source would be nice too. Brews ohare (talk) 00:09, 29 January 2014 (UTC)

Vesall gave you a source which is close to the current version and most of the general textbooks I checked are similar. Remember the lede summarises the article. Your proposed change fails for the reasons above (elaborated by Pfhorrest below). I'm OK with the current wording, the imperative for change is coming from you, so its up to you to both justify any change and get other editors to agree. I also think you should be paying Pfhorrest for the work he has put in here and on other articles to tutor you in matters philosophique  :-) ----Snowded ^TALK 10:07, 29 January 2014 (UTC)

Obligation and commitment

This is a continuation of the above thread.

"Having a moral obligation" and "commitment to a code of conduct" sound like entirely different things, even setting aside the equivocation of "code of conduct" and "morality" already under discussion. "Commitment to [morality/a code of conduct]" sounds like the person in question (the one whose moral responsibility is under discussion) has merely set themselves to a certain opinion about what they ought or ought not do, or has intended to do or not do certain things. But to have an obligation it is neither necessary nor sufficient that the person thus obligated be committed to doing what they are obligated; it merely requires that it be wrong for them to do otherwise. For a close analogy: a legal obligation is something which the law says you must do or else you are legally (i.e. according to the law) in the wrong, and some kind of censure (punishment, blame, etc) is legally warranted or deserved (i.e. warranted or deserved according to the law). Even if that censure is not enacted for one reason or another, it is the warrant or dessert of it which constitutes the obligation, not the actual act of being censured, nor the acceptance by the criminal of his guilt. Say for example a criminal maintains that what he did was not wrong, but it was nevertheless illegal, but he dies of a random aneurysm before he can be punished; it can still be found that he was legally in the wrong, that he had violated some legal obligation, and that, were he still around to receive it, he would deserve something for that, because he was legally responsible for that transgression. Even though he had not committed himself to abstaining from that act, and he did not receive the punishment the law said was warranted. Moral responsibility and obligation is exactly analogous to that, except that the standard of right and wrong involved is a moral standard (however morality may be construed), rather than a legal one. To be morally in the wrong is to violate some moral obligation and to morally deserve something in response to that because you're morally responsible for that transgression; whether or not you have committed yourself to that moral standard, and whether or not anyone actually supplies the response you morally deserve. (Throw in negations where necessary in here to get analogous scenarios for praiseworthiness instead of blameworthiness). --Pfhorrest (talk) 03:11, 29 January 2014 (UTC)

Pfhorrest: So glad to see you take an interest here. There are many varieties of "code of conduct" and I suppose we must decide what distinguishes a 'moral' code of conduct from others. This source might be useful in doing that. Assuming that can be settled, the issue raised is how 'moral responsibility' differs from commitment to such a code. It would seem to me that from the anthropologist's viewpoint, a citizen is viewed as having a moral responsibility if they subscribe to some code, but from the person's view, if they don't subscribe they have no such responsibility. Although, of course, a group espousing the code will think that a person opting out is lacking in moral responsibility. Of course, if one takes the view that there exists some supreme code that all of us are subject to, like it or not, that places things in a different light. But it is likely that some of us will disagree with the particulars of whatever religion or philosophical position proposes that code, and so an undecidable war of fanaticism may break out. It would be most helpful if some sources could be compared on this point. I'll pursue that avenue. Pfhorrest, do you think that moral responsibility can be defined separate from any code of any kind? Is this the issue? Brews ohare (talk) 06:37, 29 January 2014 (UTC)

In this regard, the examples you have so far discussed are as seen by the group espousing the code or law, while the concept of 'moral responsibility' IMO should be viewed from outside. Brews ohare (talk) 06:56, 29 January 2014 (UTC)

I wasn't commenting at all on the equivocation of "code of conduct" and "morality" -- I'm leaving that aside completely, and only mentioned it to say (apparently unclearly) that I am not saying anything about it.

I was commenting on your equivocation of "responsibility" and "commitment", and noting that the sense of "responsible" in use here is not the sense roughly synonymous with "dependable" or "reliable" or "trustworthy", as used in phrases like "take responsibility", e.g. to personally commit to seeing something through in a dependable, reliable, trustworthy fashion. It is rather more a synonym of "accountable" or "answerable" -- it means you are "on the hook" for your actions, deserving of some kind of response to them (praise and reward for good ones, blame and punishment for bad ones), that such response is warranted.

This is especially evident in your clause "a group espousing the code will think that a person opting out is lacking in moral responsibility". I think you mean that to be synonymous to "...a person opting out is being irresponsible", in which sense that clause is true. But that is not at all the sense of "responsibility" at issue here. Rather, it is the sense used in a sentence like "to be irresponsible is to shirk one's responsibility"; that is, if you fail to act as you are responsible for acting -- are you are obligated to act, as you ought to act -- then you are being irresponsible, but it doesn't mean you were not responsible for the thing you failed to do. In that sense, your clause is backward: the group espousing the code will think that a person opting out of it is nevertheless still morally responsible ("on the hook"), but is wrongly shirking that responsibility (neglecting his duty).

To use a legal analogy again: a parent has certain legal responsibilities to his children, which is just to say that the law claims him to be have responsibilities. He can be irresponsible, and shirk those responsibilities, but that does not absolve him of those responsibilities -- the law will still hold him to be legally responsible to his children, not in the sense of saying "this guy did his job", but in the sense of saying "this guy has a job he must do".

Speaking of jobs, at work I also have various responsibilities, in the sense of jobs I must do. I am put in the position of having those responsibilities, in that sense, because I am a responsible person, in the other sense of someone who reliably does the things he must do. If I fail to do something I am responsible (accountable, on the hook) for, it makes me irresponsible (unreliable, undependable), but it does not make me not responsible (it doesn't get me off the hook -- I'm still accountable for the failure to do what I was supposed to do).

Note that being accountable, answerable, on the hook, or (in that sense) responsible for something is not the same thing as receiving the praise/blame/reward/punishment for it, but rather deserving or warranting praise/blame/reward/punishment for it. You seem to have confused the receipt of a response with the dessert or warrant of a response in the lede as it was before, and want to insert a similar confusion (reliability or dependability instead of accountability or answerability) in a misguided attempt to clear that up. You're thinking the lede defines moral responsibility in terms of one descriptive quality and want to change it to define it in terms of a different descriptive quality, when it's actually defining it (as it should) in terms of a prescriptive or normative quality like dessert or warrant. --Pfhorrest (talk) 08:44, 29 January 2014 (UTC)

Pfhorrest: I feel misunderstood. "Being on the hook" involves two separate things: the rule of the group and one's adoption of the group. If one wishes to belong to the group that requires each family to have only one child, one is "on the hook" if one has more than one. If you belong to the group that requires every pregnancy be carried to term, you are "on the hook" if you have an abortion. One deserves praise for having many children in one group, and is censured for excess in the other. If one is not a member of the group, one feels no guilt or shame over violating their desiderata unless they overlap those you subscribe to, and if one is part of the group, one identifies with its methodology, and internalize its concepts of what deserves blame and shame. The notion that such rules have an origin above and outside of group tenets, or that their enforcement is imposed by some Universal Law and not just group requirements, is simply a belief, and one that different groups have fought to the death over. We probably should address sources on these matters, and not our opinions. Brews ohare (talk) 15:04, 29 January 2014 (UTC)

Perhaps you agree with me on this, and wish simply to return to a linguistic debate close that about free will: in other words, can one be responsible for anything one does (in the moral realm or elsewhere) when (according to some) one is simply driven by the fundamental "laws of nature" (as we presently envisage them as all-encompassing) to act like every other machine, in accordance with the initial conditions set at the time of the "big bang" and a few laws of probability? If the answer is that we have no capacity for initiative, then "moral responsibility" is a nonsensical notion entertained by those who just don't get it that they have no choice. That is the dilemma of determinism. Brews ohare (talk) 15:15, 29 January 2014 (UTC)

This is just a linguistic issue, not something that requires lengthy comparison of philosophical literature. Just look up "responsibility" in a dictionary. I'd say I can't believe there's this much confusion over a simple linguistic issue, except that you've had this kind of confusion over simple language over and over again on other articles.

Let's take, for a concrete example, a conservative Christian who holds that homosexual acts are morally wrong, for anyone, anywhere, always, while meanwhile some atheist men in San Francisco routinely perform fellatio on each other. The Christian would say that those men are blameworthy for their acts, regardless of their adoption of his Christian moral standards, or of his ability to enforce those standards. He would also say they are being morally irresponsible, in that they are shirking their moral responsibilities, obligations, or duties. He would hold them to be accountable or answerable for their actions, deserving of blame or perhaps even punishment for them, even though they have not made any kind of commitment to his moral principles, and even though he has no means of punishing them.

We could argue about whether or not that Christian man was correct about any of that, but that would just be to argue about whether his moral standard is correct or not. But when he says "those men have a moral responsibility not to engage in homosexual acts", what his words mean (whether or not he is correct in saying so) is neither "they are committed to refraining from such acts", nor "they will be blamed/punished for such acts", but rather "they deserve to be blamed/punished for such acts". That's the meaning of word "responsibility", regardless of whether anyone actually is responsible for anything or not -- it's what's being claimed when someone says someone is responsible, even if they're wrong to say so.

Someone else please engage Brews here, I really don't want to be drawn into a hundred pages of explaining the meaning of a simple word to him again. --Pfhorrest (talk) 21:43, 29 January 2014 (UTC)

Pfhorrest: I fail to see any difference between our opinions. We both agree that in some instances Group A will say those that don't follow their precepts are blameworthy, while Group B will say they are praiseworthy. And we both agree that the term 'moral responsibility' may be invoked by either group to characterize the act as responsible or irresponsible. I've said that 'moral responsibility' is relative to the credo one has committed to, and one held to be morally responsible or the contrary depending upon the credo of the speaker. What do you say that is different? Brews ohare (talk) 02:57, 30 January 2014 (UTC)

That there is a sense of the word "responsible" -- the one relevant to this article -- which doesn't mean "lives up to expectations" like the sense you're using (which is another valid sense of it), but rather, "is expected to do something". ("Expectations" here not meaning a factual prediction of behavior, but a normative prescription of behavior -- an obligation or duty).

I've been trying to give a bunch of concrete examples of that to make it clear, but let's try another:

Bob is expected by the law to feed his children. There is a sense of the word "responsible" in which "Bob is legally responsible for feeding his children" means exactly that -- that Bob is expected by the law to feed his children.

Bob might not feed his children, in which case he has shirked his responsibility, and can be called "irresponsible", meaning he has not lived up to what was expected of him. We might say that Bob is "not responsible" as a way of saying that same thing -- that he does not live up to expectations -- but if we say that, we are using "responsible" in a different sense than the one in which we first called Bob "responsible" for feeding his children.

Because despite his failure to do so, Bob is still responsible for feeding his children in that first sense, even while simultaneously being irresponsible (or "not responsible") in the second sense. He is responsible for feeding his children, in the first sense that he is accountable or answerable for doing so, he is obliged or duty-bound to do so; but he is at the same time irresponsible, in the second sense of unreliable, undependable, or untrustworthy, because he has failed to do what he is responsible (in the first sense) for.

The relevance to this article is that when people talk about "moral responsibility", they're not talking about people being reliably or dependably moral; they're talking about them being morally accountable or answerable.

And then a further point of clarification anticipating your response to that: being accountable or answerable is not the same thing as being called to account or answer. To say that someone is accountable or answerable for something is not to say that they will be blamed/praised/punished/rewarded for their behavior, but that they deserve to be, whether or not they actually are. --Pfhorrest (talk) 03:26, 30 January 2014 (UTC)

Hi Pfhorrest: Thanks for this effort. It looks to me like you are drawing a distinction between (i) a failure of character on the part of a particular Bob who fully intends to behave according to the precepts of Group A but doesn't achieve his goals, and (ii) a failure by a Bob that has no intention to follow these precepts because, in fact, he belongs to Group B that has a different set of precepts. Group A may see Bob as morally irresponsible in the first case because of a lack of will power or character that means you can't depend on him to follow through, but in the second case he is an infidel, can be expected not to follow the rules because he marches to a different drummer, but still he (and everybody else in Group B) is classified as morally irresponsible. I'd take it that the second case is the important one for this article. I say that because the article is concerned with the abstract definition of 'moral responsibility' which I take as not referring to a question of the character of some participant, but instead to a model behavior comprised of adherence to a particular code of conduct, a code that may vary from Group A to Group B. Am I on track? Brews ohare (talk) 05:20, 30 January 2014 (UTC)

No, I'm not trying to draw any kind of distinction about Bob's intentions or not, or his membership in any group. I'm trying to draw a distinction between a statement about Bob's intention or actions, and a statement about Bob's duties or obligations.

Bob may be a happy member of the society which says he has a legal responsibility to feed his kids. He may even agree that he has that responsibility, and merely have some kind of self-control issues that leave him doing things he thinks he shouldn't (or failing to do things he thinks he should). Or maybe, yeah, he disagrees with the law that says he has to do things. The reason for Bob's failure to meet some standard is not the issue. The issue is: are we saying something about Bob actually meeting that standard (or his intending to, or whatever); or are we saying something about there being a standard to which Bob is held in the first place?

To say that someone is morally responsible is not to say that they are successful at being moral or that they try really hard to be moral or anything about their measuring up to (or trying to measure up to) some standard of morality. It is instead to say that they are being measured (or perhaps are measurable) to begin with. To use a metaphor: if there is a race or another competition, you can say things about how well the competitors performed, or how hard they tried, or various judgements like that; but you can also say whether a person is a competitor at all in the first place, someone to whom such judgements apply, as opposed to just a bystander or spectator. Someone who is not even entered into the race can't be judged to have tried hard or performed well or anything like that; you don't pick a out a spectator who sat on his seat watching the whole race and say that he "didn't even try", because he's not in the class of people who are even expected to try; you can, however, say that, that he is not in the class of people expected to try. The sense of "responsibility" relevant to this article is one analogous to "being a competitor" (so being "not responsible" is analogous to being "not even entered in the race, not expected to try"), rather than the one analogous to "performing well" or "trying hard" (where "irresponsible" would be analogous to "performing poorly" or "not trying") that you are hung up on.

A concrete example of something which is not morally responsible would be a strong wind which blows over a tree onto someone's house. The wind is not something that is subject to moral judgements; it doesn't have duties or obligations, it doesn't deserve blame or praise or punishment or reward, it's just an impersonal force of nature, so it his held to be not morally responsible. In contrast, a person who cuts down a tree and lets it fall on someone's house would, by many standards, be morally responsible for that; he would be subject to moral judgement for it. (Or course there are detailed philosophical issues about when, if ever, a person is morally responsible in that sense, and if so what for; that's what the bulk of this article is about). A person who cuts down a tree in a better manner that does not ruin someone's house is also morally responsible for their actions, in that they are still subject to moral judgement; they just receive a more positive judgement than the other guy. Both people are responsible in the relevant sense to this article: they are subjects of moral judgement or evaluation, praise or blame, punishment or reward, as opposed to something like the wind, which is not. The first person was also irresponsible in a different sense, the one you're hung up on, because he failed to live up to his responsibilities in the relevant sense. The wind, on the other hand, is not responsible in either sense, because it's not the kind of thing to which moral judgement applies, and thus cannot be deserving of a negative judgement, or any judgement for that matter; it cannot be irresponsible, because it is not responsible in the first place. --Pfhorrest (talk) 09:23, 30 January 2014 (UTC)

There is not much we can do about the problem that Brews does not like how the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy and other reliable sources define the technical term "moral responsibility". While I find Pfhorrest's elaborations above interesting, I do not believe it is possible to explain it any more clearly than he already has.

My intention is not to shut down this discussion if you both find it fruitful, but there are very clear indications above that Pfhorrest is getting tired of this. Brews, I suggest you have a frank discussion on Pfhorrest talk page about why this is frustrating him. I speculate that he is spending a lot more time and effort to write these lengthy explanations than you take to read and think about what he has already written. Vesal (talk) 12:48, 30 January 2014 (UTC)

A claim about someone being morally responsible is a claim about that person being subject to moral judgement

A continuation of this thread:

Pfhorrest: It seems clear that you believe there is some absolute requirement for certain resposibilities that transcends all mores. Although this belief may be widely shared, and certainly you are free to adopt it, in my view it has no basis in fact. Brews ohare (talk) 15:52, 30 January 2014 (UTC)

No Brews, I am not making any claim about whether moral universalism is true or not. I am merely saying that when someone else makes a claim about someone being morally responsible, they are making a claim about that person being subject to moral judgement, and not a claim about how well they measure up to that moral judgement. The person making that claim might be a relativist or a universalist, and whether they would make such a claim or not in various circumstances, and what exactly they would mean by that claim if they did make it, would depend largely on that. But our definition of the topic in this article can't depend on that, and I don't intend it to, at all. Quite the contrary.

You on the other hand seem intent on defining the very issue in question in such a way that your (apparently reductivist, eliminativist) view on it is true by definition, which is something you've repeated across several articles now. I am in no way trying to rule out such positions as yours by definition. I am trying to keep you from, amongst other things, ruling out other positions by definition, by leaving the language unbiased toward those issues. To be morally responsible is to be an appropriate target of moral judgement. Exactly who is an appropriate target of moral judgement, by what standards they are to be judged, what exactly "moral" means in the first place, and so on, are questions to be explored in the article and in the many other articles about moral topics elsewhere on Wikipedia. We cannot pack in one biased and controversial set of answers to all those many questions into the definition of this narrower topic. --Pfhorrest (talk) 20:59, 30 January 2014 (UTC)

Pfhorrest: Your position is becoming clearer to me now. The topic of 'moral responsibility' in your view is not about what the content of the concept is, but about "being subject to 'moral judgment'" or "To be morally responsible is to be an 'appropriate' target of 'moral judgement'". The natural questions of how that conclusion was arrived at, or what 'moral judgment' or 'appropriate' might mean are different topics that should be dealt with in other articles. That seems to allow this article to be amazingly short, reducing it to one sentence with a number of words whose definition is to be found elsewhere ('moral judgment' redirects to 'morality', which has a banner objecting to its content, and which does not discuss 'moral judgment' at all). Is that your intention? If more is to be said, what besides this sentence is permissible here? And, in all objectivity, would any reader be satisfied with this run-around, the least helpful form of dictionary entry? Brews ohare (talk) 13:33, 31 January 2014 (UTC)

My objections here are only to you (once again) seeming to misapprehend, or at least want to misstate, what the definition of the topic of the article is about. Something like "To be morally responsible is to be an 'appropriate' target of 'moral judgement'" is only a statement of what the topic to be discussed in the article is, not an exhaustive statement of everything there is to be said about it. Once the lede says what we're talking about, the rest of the article can discuss -- as it does -- different views about when someone is an appropriate target of moral judgement (i.e. morally responsible) or not, and why. Those different views about when someone is or not and why they are or aren't will of course be grounded in particular views about what moral standards are correct, what morality is in the first place, and so on, and the discussion of them can summarize each of those views with links to other articles for more detailed reading on them. But the opening statement about what it is that this article will be discussing different views on cannot in itself take a stance siding with any of those views.

My objections to your proposal are threefold:

• You seem to misinterpret the old lede as defining moral responsibility in terms of the response received for certain acts, when it instead defines it in terms of the desert of a response.
• Your proposed new lede seems to read "responsibility" in the sense of "tendency to live up to obligations", when the intended sense of the term is "having of obligations".
• Both of these seem to belie an intentional attempt to avoid acknowledging that people often think in normative, not only descriptive, concepts, and that this concept is one of such.
  • In the first case, you misread a definition of one normative concept in terms of other normative concepts as a definition of a normative concept in terms of a descriptive one, and rightly get nonsense from that interpretation because that's not what it's saying at all.
  • In the second case, you try to give a sensible definition of the words in terms of descriptive concepts by equivocating one sense of the word "responsible", a sense which does properly denote a descriptive concept, with a different sense of the word, which is the sense used in the phrase "moral responsibility".

On that last note, please see Dictionary.com's list of definitions for the word "responsibility". You seem to be reading the word in the last (fifth) sense there, "reliability or dependability". Everyone who makes use of this phrase in the professional literature understands it in the first sense there, "the state or fact of being responsible, answerable, or accountable for something". That is the thing that I originally commented on, and like Vesal said elsewhere, until it's clear that you are even using words in the same way as everyone else, there can't be any more productive conversation on the matter.

--Pfhorrest (talk) 07:19, 1 February 2014 (UTC)

Hi Pfhorrest: Let's distinguish between what we think and whether it is lucidly expressed. So one item you mention is that I have misunderstood the current lede, interpreting its reference to 'status' in an unintended manner. Maybe that means this wording should be fixed?

Another of your points is that the new proposal can be misread as suggesting 'moral responsibility' refers to a tendency to live up to a code, while its real meaning is a requirement to live up to a code. Again, one could ask for an alternative phrasing that would be clearer.

However, turning to what I think, rather than its wording, I partly disagree with the 'requirement' formulation because 'responsibility' has to stem from something, it isn't a given, although some philosophers (as discussed by Gert) have tried to develop a universal basis leading to such responsibility. So there may be some who have subscribed to that view of some basic universal requirement for some kinds of responsibility. But certainly a viable view is that the requirement to behave in certain ways is the result of personally subscribing (committing) to some code of morality that is perhaps arrived at by one's own thought, or more commonly is adopted from one's milieu or religion. The responsibility stems from this commitment, personally decided upon, because breaking this commitment is a failure to live up to who you have decided to be, a corrosion of identity. One's reaction to violations is like the self-disgust that occurs when you have decided to stop smoking, and hate yourself when you repeatedly fail. However, moral responsibility based upon personal identity includes a decision to be a bona fide participant in a group that you think shares these obligations. A vivid example of adopting an identity is being "born again" or St. Paul's conversion. The group's critique of your life has force because you have chosen to identify with the group's goals, and your understanding of these goals may even lead to your critique of the group's actions or views (for example, a Sunday sermon, or an epistle). If the group finds your participation too radical, it will attempt realignment or excommunicate you.

I have already lengthily denied any intention to convey a limitation to dependability or follow-through. (Definition 5.)

The origin of the requirement to adopt certain responsibilities may be a digression, but returning again to wording, an unexamined presumption that such a responsibility is a given can be seen as an implication that there is a universal obligation that must be accepted. Brews ohare (talk) 15:11, 1 February 2014 (UTC)

As an aside, I think your outline of what the article itself should contain is good (see below), but not descriptive of what actually is contained in the article. Brews ohare (talk) 15:52, 1 February 2014 (UTC)

Wording of the first sentence

It is still possible that something useful may come out of the above discussion, but we may also want to focus more directly on the wording of the first sentence. There has been objections before Brews about the wording. With the term "moral responsibility" philosopher aim to capture that essential feature of moral agents that make them appropriate targets of blame and praise. This is not an easy concept to explain in a way that conforms to Wikipedia's stylistic conventions. I personally cannot improve on the first sentence, but I agree that the language is somewhat cumbersome, and it may not be easily understandable for those not already familiar with what philosophers are aiming at. If that is the case, it is a pretty serious problem: an introduction is useless if it is only understandable by those who already understand it. Vesal (talk) 12:48, 30 January 2014 (UTC)

Bravo!! Brews ohare (talk) 15:54, 30 January 2014 (UTC)

A return to sources

Inasmuch as this discussion appears to have become a comparison of editors' personal views, which is not an interest of WP, let's look at some sources. The article in the Stanford Encyclopedia might be a good beginning. It introduces two approaches to understanding morality: the descriptive and the normative. That seems to be what underlies Pfhorrest's attempted distinctions regarding moral responsibility. According to this article:

"Among those who use "morality" normatively, all hold that "morality" refers to a code of conduct that applies to all who can understand it and can govern their behavior by it."

I'd note that this remark does not claim that there is one and only one code, but simply that those who adopt one or another such code feel that everybody is bound by it. This universality is Pfhorrest's view.

The article goes on to describe the descriptive sense:

"Morality" when used in a descriptive sense has an essential feature that "morality" in the normative sense does not have, namely that it refers to codes of conduct that are actually put forward and accepted by some society, group or individual. If one is not a member of that society or group, and is not that individual, accepting a descriptive definition of "morality" has no implications for how one should behave.

and this:

"...different moralities can differ from each other quite extensively"

These remarks are similar to my exposition above. This source makes clear that the 'normative' role of morality applies only within each particular group that accepts the normative value of the particular code it has selected for adoption, although that group may have the temerity to suggest their normative rules apply to all other groups as well. "Moral responsibility" is merely a descriptor emphasizing the normative role of an adopted code. That is what the lede should say. G

In fairness to the article in the Stanford Encyclopedia, I'd like to point out that Bernard Gert devotes much space to describe attempts by many philosophers to establish a universal normative role for some particular code of morality, for example, one suitable for "all rational persons, under plausible specified conditions". Those attempts cannot be described as successful even within their limitations to a parochial Western European culture.

I'd suggest further discussion be based upon sources, rather than our opinions. Brews ohare (talk) 16:24, 30 January 2014 (UTC)

I suggest closing the discussion as three other editors disagree with you and you are, as ever not listening. ----Snowded ^TALK 17:07, 30 January 2014 (UTC)

Snowded: You are so amazingly opposed to any kind of development of content, even to the basic WP purpose of presenting established sources!! But you are also amazingly consistent in never discussing sources. For you, Snowded, WP is just a popularity contest. Brews ohare (talk) 17:21, 30 January 2014 (UTC)

Brews, every time no one agrees with you you claim you are the only one using sources and then you launch personal attack or two for reasons known only to your good self. I've discussed sources ad nauseam on past articles as others have done here and elsewhere but you never ever listen, you just carry on and on and on (and then you go on and on and on again with a different section heading). Time to end this one. ----Snowded ^TALK 17:33, 30 January 2014 (UTC)

Well, Snowded, here is a grand opportunity for you to demonstrate your analysis of sources, viz the article in the Stanford Encyclopedia. I am confident that you can bring some light here, if you try. Brews ohare (talk) 17:38, 30 January 2014 (UTC)

I'm happy with the current version Brews. Open to change but don't see it as an imperative. We've also discussed the Stanford Encyclopedia which is a collection of essays before. Sorry you waste too much time. ----Snowded ^TALK 17:41, 30 January 2014 (UTC)

I don't mind using the SEP, but why on earth would we start analyzing their definition of "morality" when they have a perfectly fine article on "moral responsibility"? This is precisely what is making you "unpopular", Brews. You insist on stringing a narrative together based on various unrelated sources instead of using those that directly relate to the topic at hand. Vesal (talk) 17:58, 30 January 2014 (UTC)

Vesal: This is the article you refer to, written by Andrew Eshleman, who is less well known than Bernard Gert. If you find anything in Eshleman's article that contradicts Gert's, let's hear about it. So far as I can see, Eshleman simply relates 'moral responsibility' to the normative view of morality described by Gert, which is fine as far as it goes, but Gert more clearly underlines the limitations of this normative aspect to those individuals that subscribe to a particular moral code of conduct. Eshleman stresses instead the reactive attitudes among adherents to violations of their code. All these aspects belong in the WP article with appropriate sources. That entails a bit of work, because this WP article on 'moral responsibility' is just a rehash of stances upon free will, which exposition is far from covering the content of either of the Stanford Encyclopedia articles. Brews ohare (talk) 20:30, 30 January 2014 (UTC)

BTW, Vesal, I object to your claim that my efforts here are a form of WP:SYN. I believe that my description of Gert is completely faithful to this source. Brews ohare (talk) 20:42, 30 January 2014 (UTC)

Then please provide a quotation from Gert (or any other reliable source) that explicitly and directly supports your contention that "Moral responsibility is a descriptor emphasizing the normative role of an adopted code." I cannot find one. Vesal (talk) 02:23, 31 January 2014 (UTC)

Vesal: Gert's article says:

"Among those who use "morality" normatively, all hold that "morality" refers to a code of conduct that applies to all who can understand it and can govern their behavior by it."

Eshleman focuses much attention upon the aspect "can govern their behavior by it" and dwells upon moral responsibility in the context of: "How can we be responsible if we are incapable of initiative?". That is also the aspect emphasized in the WP article. This viewpoint (however preoccupying) ignores the obvious diversity of extant moral codes and questions of how they might be compared or judged, and whether they deserve being followed. These interesting points are there independent of settling the undecidable issue of whether we are able to make decisions, and the validity of the presupposition that the universe is governed in every detail by 'natural laws' as we presently understand them.

Gert also points out:

"What 'morality' is taken to refer to plays a crucial, although often unacknowledged, role in formulating ethical theories. To take 'morality' to refer to an actually existing code of conduct put forward by a society results in a denial that there is a universal morality, one that applies to all human beings. This descriptive use of 'morality' is the one used by anthropologists..."

Continuing along these lines, Gert says:

"'Morality' when used in a descriptive sense...refers to codes of conduct that are actually put forward and accepted by some society, group, or individual. If one is not a member of that society or group, and is not that individual, accepting a descriptive definition of “morality” has no implications for how one should behave."

That is, for an individual that does not belong to the group holding a moral code, that code has no normative implications (unless there is some overlap with that individual's code). The 'moral responsibility' of actions or individuals is relative to the code, and therefore also to the group adhering to that code. From this 'anthropological' standpoint, then, the normative aspect of a particular moral code of conduct is operative only within a group that adopts that code. That is the meaning of my sentence you wish corroborated.

Vesal, I don't think these matters can be summarized "explicitly and directly" in a sound bite. If the WP article is to provide an understandable presentation of these issues, more is needed. Perhaps the words above are adequately sourced and clear enough? What do you think? Brews ohare (talk) 05:23, 31 January 2014 (UTC)

Your Gert quote is qualified "among those who use "morality" normatively ..." which confirms what several of us have been trying to tell you, namely while codes of conduct are used in morality and may be sufficient, they are not necessary to a definition.----Snowded ^TALK 07:06, 31 January 2014 (UTC)

Yes, this is how some of us understand it, but Brews reads the sources differently, so we really need explicit and direct support for whatever we want to claim. The excuse that these ideas cannot be expressed in a "sound-byte" is just nonsense. Brews, you have consistently been capable of forming such sentences: "The 'moral responsibility' of actions or individuals is relative to the code, and therefore also the group adhering to the code." What convoluted writers professional philosophers must be that they cannot express things as succinctly as you can...

Here is an example of how to provide a quotation to explicitly and directly support what you say. The Wikipedia policy on no original research states: "Even with well-sourced material, if you use it out of context, or to advance a position not directly and explicitly [original emphasis] supported by the source, you are engaging in original research". You see, this quotation explicitly and directly supports what I am saying. Do you understand the concept? Vesal (talk) 13:07, 31 January 2014 (UTC)

Well the Standford article says "Thus, to be morally responsible for something, say an action, is to be worthy of a particular kind of reaction—praise, blame, or something akin to these—for having performed it" and does not insist on a code of conduct. So I think there is citation support for something a lot closer to the current wording that the restricted definition Brew's is trying to use ----Snowded ^TALK 13:29, 31 January 2014 (UTC)

It is a relief to see content being discussed instead of my personal deficiencies. Snowded's quotation seems to me to be equivalent to my earlier (sourced) proposal based upon the word "ought". Like that proposal, the real basis of 'moral responsibility' is buried in the reactions of individuals, which reaction is arguably sourced in their acceptance of a particular moral code shared by their community. It may be noted that Pfhorrest does not agree with any formulation based upon occurrence of actual reactions: rather 'moral responsibility' is a trait exposing an individual or action to the possibility of censure or praise, and this article can duck any assessment of how this possibility might arise, why it arises in one group but not in another, or how such censure or praise differs from enforcement of etiquette, for example. Brews ohare (talk) 13:47, 31 January 2014 (UTC)

On which planet, with what linguistic system is the quote I provided closer to your proposed definition that it is to the current one? ----Snowded ^TALK 14:06, 31 January 2014 (UTC)

Snowded: I love how you always place hostility above content. To answer your incredulity, I have listed three problems with the current lede that have yet to be addressed. Brews ohare (talk) 14:24, 31 January 2014 (UTC)

Don't change the subject. This is a serious question. When you say "having a moral obligation" sounds very similar to "commitment to a code of conduct", it means that you read basic four-word sentences differently from us. How can we ever reach an agreement on complicated issues when we read key sentences differently. This is a problem. It is a complete waste of time to continue discussions unless we can solve this problem. Vesal (talk) 14:32, 31 January 2014 (UTC)

Sorry, I don't think it was me who changed the subject to difficulties with the current lede. I gather you want to consider the connection between code of conduct and moral obligation? As pointed out earlier, there are many different codes, and we have yet to clearly characterize a 'moral' code. However, putting that aside for now and restricting ourselves to a moral code, a 'moral obligation' entails a presumption that one or another such code should be followed. Obviously, I think, such a presumption stems from a commitment to one or another such code. Is there a problem here? Brews ohare (talk) 15:41, 31 January 2014 (UTC)

You are changing the subject, you list three problems with the current lede (so you are dissembling at least) instead of explaining how a form of words which is very similar to the current lede could possibly be interpreted as supporting your personal view that moral obligations are codes of conduct. As Vesal says you are simply using words in completely different ways from other editors and that makes it impossible to move forward until you get your act together ----Snowded ^TALK 16:22, 31 January 2014 (UTC)

Snowded: Again, hostility before substance. You asked about the current lede and the current wording, and to compare it with "Thus, to be morally responsible for something, say an action, is to be worthy of a particular kind of reaction—praise, blame, or something akin to these—for having performed it". So I pointed out three difficulties with the current lede and the current wording, which are not shared by the preceding quotation. You then misconstrue what has been said with your phrase: "moral obligations are codes of conduct". The accurate statement, as I have explained just before your intemperance, is that "moral obligations stem from a commitment to one or another moral code of conduct". Brews ohare (talk) 16:34, 31 January 2014 (UTC)

If you consider total frustration with your inability to understand simple arguments and Your insistence on using language in a different way from everyone else Brews, then its hostility in response to an absence of substance. THREE editors have now said this to you in different ways on this page. You are wasting everyone's time with interminable postings.----Snowded ^TALK 17:31, 31 January 2014 (UTC)

And what actually have you said beyond chastisement so far? For instance, your response to the substance of three difficulties with the lede is? Brews ohare (talk) 14:51, 1 February 2014 (UTC)

Pfhorrest's outline

In a thread above, Pfhorrest has suggested the following outline of what this article should contain:

"the article can discuss -- as it does -- different views about when someone is an appropriate target of moral judgement (i.e. morally responsible) or not, and why. Those different views about when someone is or not and why they are or aren't will of course be grounded in particular views about what moral standards are correct, what morality is in the first place, and so on, and the discussion of them can summarize each of those views with links to other articles for more detailed reading on them."

This outline is a good one, but not descriptive of the present article. Pfhorrest's main points for what should be in the article are:

(i) different views about when someone is an appropriate target of moral judgement (i.e. morally responsible) or not, and why.

{ii) particular views about what moral standards are correct, what morality is in the first place, and so on, and the discussion of them can summarize each of those views

(iii) links to other articles for more detailed reading on them

Instead, the present article is a rehash of the arguments about free will and its various schools: Metaphysical libertarianism, Hard determinism, Hard incompatibilism, Compatibilism, and so forth. While the issue of moral responsibility is a non-starter if one takes the view that man has no ability to implement decisions, or perhaps even no ability to formulate decisions (making a discussion of this issue significant to moral responsibility¹), to make the entire article a footnote to this undecidable, largely linguistic debate is a disservice,^{2, 3, 4} and doesn't come close to Pfhorrest's outline of what this article should contain. Brews ohare (talk) 16:11, 1 February 2014 (UTC)

¹ Manuel Vargas (2013). Building Better Beings: A Theory of Moral Responsibility. Oxford University Press. p. 2. ISBN 0191655775. Without recourse to the intuitive and powerful picture of ourselves as agents with metaphysically robust alternative possibilities, it isn't clear what, if anything, justifies our holding one another responsible.

² Manuel Vargas (2013). Building Better Beings: A Theory of Moral Responsibility. Oxford University Press. p. 2. ISBN 0191655775. When we hold one another responsible, we participate in a system of practices, attitudes, and judgments that support a special kind of self-governance...It is the tenability of this view...that provides the basis...[to]...avoid, or at least forestall, the view that responsibility is a mere illusion.

³ Manuel Vargas (2013). Building Better Beings: A Theory of Moral Responsibility. Oxford University Press. p. 8. ISBN 0191655775. We could, for example, reject out of hand that we are casually embedded, a part of the larger causal order of the universe. Brews ohare (talk) 16:07, 2 February 2014 (UTC)

⁴ Manuel Vargas (2013). Building Better Beings: A Theory of Moral Responsibility. Oxford University Press. p. 10. ISBN 0191655775. For example, one could be worried about the consequences of reductionism of the mental (including whether our minds do anything, or whether they are epiphenomenal byproducts of more basic causal processes). Alternately, one might be worried that specific results in some or another science (usually, neurology but sometimes psychology) show that we lack some crucial power necessary for moral responsibility....Once we see what responsibility really requires, many of our diverse concerns about it will be allayed. Brews ohare (talk) 16:23, 2 February 2014 (UTC)

Personally, I subscribe to footnote 3 above (not endorsed by Vargas), but the point of these quotes is not to endorse this viewpoint nor Varga's presentation, but to point out that there is a lot more to this topic than the current article attempts to present. Brews ohare (talk) 16:26, 2 February 2014 (UTC)

Bruhaha

All this bruhaha is simply a distraction from considering the issues described above using quotes from Gert. The challenge is to take three things:

(i) Pfhorrest's view that 'moral responsibility' is a trait exposing an individual or action to the possibility of censure or praise, and this WP article can duck any assessment of how this possibility might arise, why it arises in one group but not in another, or how such censure or praise differs from enforcement of etiquette;

(ii) The current WP article's view that 'moral responsibility' is just a facet of the arguments over free will;

(iii) The 'anthropological' view that moral responsibility is relative to one or another de facto moral code of conduct;

and make some sense of them. Brews ohare (talk) 16:55, 31 January 2014 (UTC)

You have made one tangible proposal for a change - that has been rejected by other editors. The talk page is not a place for general discussion of the subject. In respect of (i) you have misrepresented Pfhorrest's position. In respect of (ii) if you have concrete proposals make them and they can be looked at. In respect of (iii) you really need to read some anthropology, in particular the difference between ideation and rule based cultures which is pretty basic. Once you have done that you may see that your statement is false. ----Snowded ^TALK 17:38, 31 January 2014 (UTC)

I'm interested in following up on your suggestion about "ideation and rule based cultures" to track down why moral responsibility is, in your view, not relative to one or another de facto moral code. Perhaps you can suggest something? Brews ohare (talk) 18:07, 31 January 2014 (UTC)

Pfhorrest is prepared to put time into your education I'm not. Any text book on cultural anthropology will give you that distinction, reading some philosophy rather than doing restricted web searches would also help. ----Snowded ^TALK 18:40, 31 January 2014 (UTC)

Snowded: Very cooperative of you. How do you like this quote from "any textbook on social anthropology":

"Psychologists have joined with cultural anthropologists to generate an image of individual mental functioning as inseparable from social milieu. For example...'it is culture not biology that shapes...the human mind, that gives meaning to action by situating its underlying intentional states in an interpretive system'... moral responsibility [is] seen as generated through the human beings we are in close contact with..." Perhaps you have something to add, Snowded? Brews ohare (talk) 19:50, 31 January 2014 (UTC)

As I said try a basic introductory text book on cultural anthropology, I suggest a good bookshop or library rather than a crude google search ----Snowded ^TALK 20:12, 31 January 2014 (UTC)

Snowded: It is clear that there are some specific problems with the lede that have been pointed out and you choose to ignore. it is clear as well that the article is incomplete, as also has been attested by reputable quotations. Your most substantial contribution to these matters is to suggest a visit to the library with no specific aim in hand. Moreover, you prove incapable of understanding what is before you, as indicated by your incorrect restatements of arguments put forth. All this hardly qualifies your input as worth much thought. Brews ohare (talk) 05:48, 1 February 2014 (UTC)

My suggestion that you visit a library related to your third point where your statement demonstrated that you had little knowledge of some basic features of anthropology. I even gave you an "aim" in suggesting that you take a look at the difference between ideation and rule based cultures. Something that might help you understand that moral responsibility (in a large part of the literature) cannot be solely associated with codes of conduct. As you say you have chosen not to give that much thought which is of course your prerogative. However you seem not to be giving too much thought to three editors who are disagreeing with you here. That tells its own story. ----Snowded ^TALK 07:22, 1 February 2014 (UTC)

Snowded, you have mentioned before that "moral responsibility (in a large part of the literature) cannot be solely associated with codes of conduct." As a responsible WP editor, it must concern you deeply that WP's article on Moral responsibility omits entirely any reference to this 'large part of the literature', which you suggest is an important theme of "ideation and rule based cultures", which in turn, you say, is a topic in "any text book on cultural anthropology". Addressing major omissions would be I guess, a (moral?) responsibility for yourself. Brews ohare (talk) 14:42, 1 February 2014 (UTC)

You really need to read what various editors are actually saying. Wide of the mark as ever ----Snowded ^TALK 20:23, 1 February 2014 (UTC)

Apparently, Snowded, your responsibility toward WP is severely limited? It excludes contributing to completeness and accuracy of content based upon discussion of sources, and focuses instead upon holier-than-thou advice to contributors. Brews ohare (talk) 16:48, 2 February 2014 (UTC)

No further comment and my advice to other editors is simply to ignore you on this and other talk pages as long as you persist in simply not listening to anything which is said to you, either repeating your self or throwing out derogatory comments. To be very clear, without explicit consent on the talk page, any substantive edits to the article by you will be reverted ----Snowded ^TALK 18:10, 2 February 2014 (UTC)

Clear indeed, as is your unending refusal to rely upon sources in your activities, substituting belligerence instead. Your exhortation to have all editors follow your lead avoiding all discussion of sources is appalling. Brews ohare (talk) 15:43, 3 February 2014 (UTC)

Citation needed for lede

The current lede begins:

"Moral responsibility is the status of morally deserving praise, blame, reward, or punishment for an act or omission, in accordance with one's moral obligations."

The reference to moral responsibility as a 'status' requires a supporting source, and is rather ambiguous without elaboration. WP itself defines 'status' as a 'situation'. Some other choice of wording could be clearer, especially as the word 'status' itself conveys nothing specific and reliance is put upon the reference to morally deserving and moral obligation to explain 'moral responsibility', which is completely circular as it uses the adjective 'moral' to define the adjective 'moral' . However this lede ultimately is worded, a source still is necessary.

An attempt to rephrase this sentence using a source was attempted that preserves the current wording for the most part, namely:

"Moral responsibility is about what we ought to do,¹ that is, it is an attribute of a moral act deserving praise, blame, reward, or punishment for an act or omission, in accordance with one's moral obligations.

¹Peter Cave. "Chapter 4: What – morally – ought we to do?". Philosophy: A beginner's guide. Oneworld Publications. pp. 54–74. ISBN 9781851689378.

However, Vesal reverted this suggestion with the comment: "Disagree with interpretation of source. Please provide a direct quote from the source to support this interpretation." Personally, I find Cave extremely clear about the word 'ought' in this connection, and could hardly improve upon his exposition. Nonetheless, the lede now remains both unclear and unsourced. Brews ohare (talk) 20:11, 3 February 2014 (UTC)

In two recent edits 1, 2, Vesal has introduced two sources that also use the word 'moral' to define 'moral responsibility'. These sources, while showing WP is not the only source using this circular approach (a 'bus rider' is one who rides a 'bus'), do nothing to fix it. Brews ohare (talk) 23:25, 3 February 2014 (UTC)

(edit conflict)

You seem to be trying now just to avoid nominalizations like an earlier commenter on this talk page did. There is nothing wrong with nominalizations, and for articles about abstract things, they are necessary to even say what it is that the article is about. It might be accurate to say, for example, "Evolution is about one species changing into another species", but that avoids saying what evolution is: the process of one species changing into another species (more or less).

Yes, moral responsibility in a very broad sense about what we ought to do, but what about things that we ought to do is moral responsibility?

For one, it's about what we ought to do in a moral sense of the word "ought", as opposed to say a legal or a practical sense... and there's no circularity in saying so, and leaving the question of where to ground morality in general for articles on that matter.

But beyond moral responsibility being broadly about what we morally ought to do, what is moral responsibility? What kind of thing is moral responsibility? You use the word "attribute", and that is going in the right direction... though you have the object that is an attribute of wrong, it's not acts which are morally responsible, it is actors or agents (e.g. people, usually) which are morally responsible for their acts.

So maybe we could say that "moral responsibility is an attribute of people...", but there are many kinds of attributes which can apply to people; can we be a little more specific?

The article as it stands is already more specific: the kind of attribute which moral responsibility is is a status, or as the Dictionary.com definition of "responsibility" simpliciter put it, a "state or fact". "Situation", as you note above, as well as "condition", might all work, but these are all synonyms for our purpose. Moral responsibility is a status/state/fact/situation/condition (of an actor or agent, e.g. a person) of being... responsible, in a moral way.

What is it to be responsible? It is to be accountable, or answerable. (See a dictionary again). What is it to be accountable or answerable? It is to be deserving or warranting some kind of response commensurate with your actions... that is to say, deserving blame, or praise, or reward, or punishment, for doing or not doing something you morally ought to do. Deserving in turn means that you ought to be blamed or praised or rewarded or punished etc... again in this case, morally ought to be, whatever "morally" fleshes out to mean.

When is it the situation that someone morally ought to be blamed/praised/etc for doing or not doing the things that they morally ought to do? Well, that's what the rest of the article is about. That is to say, the article is about moral responsibility. Which is the status of morally deserving blame/praise/etc.

This is all much ado about nothing. This is about you understanding words correctly, nothing more. And Vesal has already added a source to back up the current wording of the article, so there's no "but let's talk sources!" for you to harp on any more either. --Pfhorrest (talk) 23:37, 3 February 2014 (UTC)

Pfhorrest: There is nothing mistaken in saying a 'bus rider' is one who rides a bus. It's just not very helpful, and IMO, a little lazy. It's in effect saying: Reader, we won't say what this article is about right away- suggest you slog through the rest of this muddy prose, or go look at another article.

The need for paragraphs of support for the lede, here and earlier, is a symptom that something better is in order. Brews ohare (talk) 02:23, 4 February 2014 (UTC)

If there is extended controversy about what a 'bus' is, but we're going to have an article about people who ride 'busses' of some sort, then it's perfectly acceptable for the lede of an article about 'bus riders' to defer the extensive discussion about what exactly a 'bus' is to the general article by saying a 'bus rider' is someone who is transported on (fleshing out the meaning of 'rider') some kind of 'bus', and only discuss the background controversy about what counts as a 'bus' as necessary to make statements in the article body about the people who ride 'buses' of some sort or another. The alternative would be to completely rehash the entire controversy about 'busses' every time any other concept is defined relative to the concept 'bus', which would immediately become completely unwieldy. --Pfhorrest (talk) 06:41, 4 February 2014 (UTC)

I think this argument, boiled down, is that the subject of 'moral responsibility' is so difficult to define that no short definition can be devised that doesn't contain the word 'moral' or 'morally', forcing the reader to formulate their own definition after they have studied the entire article (which won't help at all, IMO). So far, the word 'responsibility' has been defined, so one would think 'moral responsibility' as a subset of 'responsibility' could simply describe how the subset is distinguished from other types of 'responsibility'. That the cited sources did not do so is not an excuse to follow this unhelpful practice of defining a word using the self-same word. Brews ohare (talk) 15:38, 4 February 2014 (UTC)

Moral responsibility, cont'd.

A reinstatement of a deleted comment:

To nitpick: As for acts not being capable of being 'morally responsible', well yes they can be. For example, one might question whether the bombing of Nagasaki was morally responsible, a perfectly valid question. You might say this question is really whether Truman was morally resposible in his decision, apparently meaning "Ought Truman be held to account for this action?" or the Air Force in deciding to execute it, again meaning perhaps "Ought the Air Force be subject to a hearing on this account?", but whether the act was morally responsible (ought to have been done, warranted in the big scheme of things) is as understandable as asking about the participants' morality and seems to be a reasonable usage of the term. Whether bombing as an act is accountable doesn't enter whether it is morally responsible - apparently Syria can use chemical warfare on its citizens without accountability, although it ought not. Brews ohare (talk) 02:23, 4 February 2014 (UTC)

I've undeleted this comment because it's an important example of how you're still wholly misunderstanding the word 'responsible' as it is used in this context. You're still using sense 5 instead of sense 1. If you cannot substitute "accountable" or "answerable" or "culpable" or something like that in place of "responsible" in a sentence about moral responsibility, you're using the wrong sense of the word; and it makes no semantic sense to talk about an act being accountable or answerable or culpable, rather than an agent being accountable or answerable or culpable for that act.

I don't know how more clearly to explain it. Say I ask you to babysit some kids for me. You are now responsible for my kids' wellbeing. That is, you are accountable, answerable, or culpable for my kids' wellbeing, whether that wellbeing is maintained well or not -- any praise or blame, or reward or punishment, in either direction, that is to be levied with regards to the wellbeing (or lack thereof) of my kids, is all on you. You are responsible for them in that sense, no matter what your subsequent behavior is like. That is the sense of the word "responsibility" used in the phrase "moral responsibility", and it semantically cannot apply to an act, only to an agent.

Then I go away for the night, and come home, and I find one of two things: either you have taken care of my kids well, and I should praise and reward you for it -- even if I'm a jerk and stiff you your payment and tell you to get out without so much as a 'thanks', you still deserve some kind of praise or reward, yeah? Or else, you haven't taken good care of my kids, they've gotten hurt or into trouble or something, and you deserve the blame or perhaps even punishment for that -- even if I'm a forgiving saint and let you off with a resigned sigh and a hope that it goes better next time, if anyone were to deserve blame or punishment for it, it would be you, because you were in charge, you had the responsibility, in the sense of the above paragraph. In the first case, where you took good care of them, you were also "responsible" in a different sense of the word, a sense meaning that you did what you were supposed to -- and that act of you doing what you were supposed to could also be called a "responsible" act in that different sense of the word. Likewise in the second case, where you took bad care of them, you were irresponsible, but in a different sense of the word -- when I come home and see the horrors that have come under your care, I'm still going to shout "you were responsible for them! how could you let this happen!?", and when I say that I won't mean "you did good in taking care of them", I will mean "you were in charge of this, you were on the hook, making sure that nothing bad happened to them was your responsibility".

That last use of the word there is the one that's important here. Nobody is talking about whether anybody actually does live up to their moral obligations or not when they speak of "moral responsibility". They're talking about whether they are charged with the duty to live up to them, whether they're on the hook for living up to them, whether they're accountable or answerable for living up to them -- charged, on the hook, accountable, or answerable, to or by morality, whatever that fleshes out to be, which we don't have to delve into in depth here in this article.

Do you understand that an English word can mean two different things? Even two similar and related things? But that, despite being similar and related, they are different and you can't just substitute one meaning for another and act like they mean the same thing just because they use the same word?

--Pfhorrest (talk) 06:41, 4 February 2014 (UTC)

I deleted this comment that you undeleted because I thought it would become a distraction from the inadequacies of the lede.

Although you are cranking up the temperature of this discussion, Pfhorrest, and continue to insist against my every protest that my view is one of 'follow-through' or 'dependability', all this is no help.

The issue of moral responsibility is about a moral code (maybe the ten commandments) and its adherents (maybe the 'children of Israel'). Any action (considered in the abstract, whether or not the action is performed) consistent with such a code is 'morally responsible' in the context of that code. Any individual who conducts themselves (as a matter of character, not necessarily in every particular instance where judgment may be sometimes faulty) in accordance with the code is 'morally responsible' in the context of that code. If an individual does not subscribe to a particular code, then they will not see themselves as irresponsible when violating it: for example, they might consider sex as amusement and not a sin. On the other hand, those that do subscribe to the code will view everyone in the light of their code (although they might not exercise sanctions for code violations if they lack legal authority), whether these others subscribe to it or not. Brews ohare (talk) 15:38, 4 February 2014 (UTC)

To make connection with Gert, a moral code from an anthropological viewpoint is one particular aspect of a particular group's culture, and judgments of moral responsibility are to be clinically observed and characterized, a descriptive activity. To those within a group, however, a moral code is normative, in that the group will undertake to persuade or force observance of its code (moral responsibility) through group approved methods. Brews ohare (talk) 15:50, 4 February 2014 (UTC)

I'll have to apologize for defining 'moral' responsibility in terms of a 'moral' code, which is the same problem found in the current lede. Hopefully that problem is fixable. Brews ohare (talk) 16:07, 4 February 2014 (UTC)

An example:1 "Modern anthropological research has shown that at every level of civilization there exists a moral code which is expressed in the ideal behaviour of individuals in the community, that is a behaviour which is ‘correct’ according to the people's ideas and praised by them in speech and story. Part of this moral code consists of regulations determining the mutual behaviour of the sexes..." "As soon, however, as we descend from general principles to a particular tribe, we begin to ask whether there is any connexion between the nature of the community and its demands on individuals as represented by the moral code "

Brews ohare (talk) 17:29, 4 February 2014 (UTC)

You need to read more widely on a subject rather than using google searches to support a pre-determined viewpoint. Any modern collection of ethnographic studies would demonstrate that is a controversial view as would most introductory text books to cultural anthropology, and that is before we even get to philosophy. Your article is also a specific study, not a text book describing the field; you need to learn the difference. There is always a role for the gifted amateur on wikipedia, but there comes a time when rank amateurism is counter productive. You are, as other editors have pointed, out just search key words and making associations without any depth of thinking. Hence (and for other reasons) you are getting no where and just wasting everyone's time. ----Snowded ^TALK 18:04, 4 February 2014 (UTC)

I have no difficulty, Snowded, with your characterization of the source of this quote as 'not a textbook' and 'a specific study'. The purpose of the quote is simply to provide an example of this line of thought, and I do not think of it as a definitive statement of a well-established dictum. I am flattered to be characterized as a 'gifted amateur'. I wish only that you, who apparently consider yourself an expert in things philosophical (a category without status on WP), would engage in discussion in the same manner that you would employ in exchanges with 'professional' philosophers: that is, employing sources and rational argument instead of labeling and belligerence. Brews ohare (talk) 18:34, 4 February 2014 (UTC)

I'd add that irrespective of the quotation, which is only illustrative, you have said nothing that pertains to the argument itself as to what constitutes 'moral responsibility'. You might find Chris Gowan's article helpful. Brews ohare (talk) 18:40, 4 February 2014 (UTC)

After the use of sources and rational argument fails in the face of obduracy I'm not sure there are many alternatives other than to point to the issue. Google searches around key words without a wider understanding of the subject are rank amateurism and lead to misuse of language and sources. This is being pointed out to you in different ways by all the other editors you have engaged with but you are not listening. Sorry about the things philosophical phrase I thought you might get the reference, but not to worry. ----Snowded ^TALK 05:28, 5 February 2014 (UTC)

Brews, you write that I "continue to insist against [your] every protest that [your] view is one of 'follow-through' or 'dependability'", and then in the next paragraph you write "Any action [...] consistent with such a code is 'morally responsible' in the context of that code [...] Any individual who conducts themselves [...] in accordance with the code is 'morally responsible' in the context of that code", wherein you continue to use the word "responsible" in that different, incorrect sense. I'm not saying anything at all about moral codes or not, or relativism or universalism, or anything about any of this anthropological stuff, just about the fact that you don't understand a common meaning of a common word.

Let's use the same example scenario you speak of here: a "child of Israel" who has accepted, and is socially expected to accept, the Ten Commandments as morally valid. Let's not raise any question for the time being about moral relativism and whether or not the Ten Commandments really are obligatory and just think within the confines of these Israelites and their moral viewpoint. The Ten Commandments say not to take the Lord's name in vain. An Israelite who, for whatever reason, constantly takes the Lord's name in vain, is morally responsible (according to the Jewish moral code) for doing so, in the relevant sense of the word "responsible" -- the sense which means he deserves blame or punishment for that wrongdoing, and would instead deserve praise or reward if his behavior had been better. In the sense of the word "responsible" that you keep using, my preceding bolded sentence is nonsense -- if he's constantly doing things he ought not do, he is being irresponsible, rather than responsible, right? But that's not the sense of the word that's relevant here at all. Reread that bolded sentence over and over again until it makes semantic sense, until you understand how someone who always does wrong things is still responsible in one sense for those things he does, even while being at the same time irresponsible in a different sense. The first sense, the one in which he is responsible, is the important one, and you keep making it clear that you are not using the word in that sense, and so are completely misapprehending what this article is even trying to talk about. --Pfhorrest (talk) 21:06, 4 February 2014 (UTC)

Pfhorrest: We do seem to be at loggerheads here. You use the example of swearing as a violation of "taking the Lord's name in vain", and suggest that from a moral standpoint one is always responsible (morally speaking) for doing the right thing, whether or not one actually does the right thing. I agree with this entirely - from the stance of those accepting the commandment.

I also agree with it from the point of view of the anthropologist who might phrase it by saying "among those who accept the commandment, one is always responsible for obeying the commandment."

I've got no problem with all this. I have been saying it from day one, although you seem to doubt it. Can we get this clear? Brews ohare (talk) 21:35, 4 February 2014 (UTC)

You say you agree with it, and I don't see anything to criticize in what you've just said here right now, but then you keep using the word "responsible" elsewhere in a way that only makes sense if you're using it in a different sense than this one you're agreeing with now: talking about an act (not the agent who performs it) being "responsible" or not, saying that a social group who holds to a certain moral code would call a person violating that code "not responsible", and so on. Those kinds of assertions only make sense for a difference sense of the word "responsible" than the one meant in the phrase "morally responsible". I'm not sure where to go from here except to make note if you use the word in that sense again. --Pfhorrest (talk) 07:59, 5 February 2014 (UTC)

I think the way to go forward is to pursue a more helpful introduction to this article that frames a full development of the subject. Perhaps yours? Also, the current body of the article is devoted to a rehash of free will, which is a very limited approach to the matter. However interesting this free will debate might be (and as you know, I don't think it is all that interesting, and is going nowhere anyway) little time is spent among anthropologists (for example) debating hard determinism vs. libertarianism etc. etc.

One might argue that anthropology is not philosophy, but its hard to argue that philosophy should keep its hands off conclusions based upon observations of how moral responsibility works in a variety of cultures. Probably some recognition should be given to moral relativism, for example. Brews ohare (talk) 15:15, 5 February 2014 (UTC)

Google searches

In a thread above, Snowded has made the following suggestion:

"Google searches around key words without a wider understanding of the subject are rank amateurism and lead to misuse of language and sources."

His implicit suggestion is that such an approach is, by its very nature, suspect.

The possibility of misuse is undeniable, but the occurrence of 'misuse of language and sources' is established by discussion of these uses, not by some 'rule of thumb' about Google searches. When a Google search turns up a pertinent source, it is not how it was discovered that matters, but what it says, obviously. And whether a particular source is misinterpreted or is a fringe view is established by conversation on an article's Talk page.

And Google searches are a perfectly fine way to discover sources although, of course, some important sources are not available on-line through Google books or elsewhere. The vast majority of contributors to WP do not have access to extensive libraries, and even if they did, still could be accused of 'rank amateurism' in selecting physical titles, just as with on-line available titles.

Snowded's use of terms like 'rank amateurism' and 'wider understanding' seem to suggest that expert opinion should triumph over that of the great unwashed. However WP is built on the assumption that experts, rather than relying upon their reputations (unknown anyway on WP due to anonymity) will instead use their 'wider knowledge' and expertise to present a good case for a responsible treatment by presenting sound analysis backed by appropriate sources. The tendency of 'experts' (especially of the self-proclaimed variety) to sneer at lesser mortals and to refuse to engage with the ignorant as beneath consideration, is not part of WP.

It also is true that experts are not above selective quotation and one-sided imbalance of sources, and Google provides a way for the rest of us to read the actual sources, or discover alternative sources, and determine whether removal from context or imbalance has occurred. We can check up on the haughty expert.

Hopefully, experts will appreciate that the defects introduced by 'rank amateurism' are best corrected by earnest engagement in thoughtful Talk page presentation of cogent argument and relevant sources, not by labeling and a superior attitude of disengagement. Perhaps (although less likely) the experts also will appreciate the advantages of a treatment accessible to the great unwashed, one trimmed of technical jargon and academic pretense that impedes understanding and restricts access to only the myopically initiated. Brews ohare (talk) 17:14, 5 February 2014 (UTC)