Talk:Collaboration in German-occupied Poland/Archive 6

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German "failure" to establish a puppet state, part II

As some of you are aware, part of the recent "edit war" relates to the question of whether the German occupation forces "failed" in establishing a puppet state in Poland. RS suggest they didn't even try, and so such claims are at best erroneous. Attached is my most recent suggestion for the "Political collaboration" section [1]. To avoid accusations of OR or NPOV, most of the citations also include quotes (some don't display well in a tooltip, but you can still view them in the source). I left individual cases of resistors and collaborators out, but kept them in a comment so as to avoid removing sourced material. What do you think? François Robere (talk) 01:40, 13 April 2018 (UTC)

Unlike in most of occupied Europe, Poland did not have a collaborationist government. The Germans made several early attempts at acquiring senior Polish political collaborators, targeting mainly peasantry leaders and nobility, but were turned down. These attempts, fueled in part by the military's approach towards the occupation, as well as by diplomatic and propagandaistic needs, ended by October 1939. Nazi racial policies, along with its intentions for the future of the conquered territories, meant the Germans had no interest in Polish governmental collaboration and they would ignore such advances by Polish pro-German politicians throughout the war. Accordingly, the German army made preparations for a military administration of the occupied territories, while civil authorities were working towards a civilian one, with the prospects of a future annexation to Germany.

73% of town heads an mayors in the General Government were Polish. Among other things, they were responsible for selecting locals who were to be sent to Germany for work. Some exploited their positions to enrich themselves.

References

1977 book by Jan Tomasz Gross, "Polish Society under German Occupation", Chapter 5, "Collaboration and Cooperation".

Quote from pages 126-130:

Extended content

One possible solution for the Polish problem envisaged in the early days of the occupation by the Germans was the creation of a "token Polish state", a Reststaat. Two groups in Polish society were queried about their willingness to help in such a project. In March 1939 the Germans tried to get in touch with peasant leader Wincenty Witos, who at the time was in exile in Czechoslovakia after having lost his appeal in the Brzesc trial. Witos immediately informed the Polish authorities about this incident and, partly as a result of German approaches, decided to come back to Poland, although he knew that he could be sent to prison on his return. When the hostilities ended in October 1939, Witos was arrested shortly after being found by the Germans, along with many other Poles who had played prominent roles in public life before the war. The Gestapo sent him to prison at Rzeszow, where he was approached again with an offer of collaboration, which he refused. He also rejected a proposal that he write an "objective" history of the peasant movement, suspecting that such a work would primarily serve as a directory to ferret out all activists of the movement who had not been arrested thus far. In spite of his refusal to collaborate with the Germans, the conditions of his confinement remained, to say the least, very liberal [after five months in prison in Rzeszow, and a further five weeks in prison in Berlin, he was sent to a sanatorium in Potsdam, and then to a health spa in Zakopane, where he remained under Gestapo supervision]. In March 1941 he was permitted to return to his house at Wierzchoslawice, where he remained until the end of the war, with the authorities periodically checking on him. Although this treatment was highly unusual, we should not attribute too much significance to Witos's fate. His survival was due, in all probability, more to some lucky coincidence than to a carefully designed policy. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that he was spared from death, the usual fate of members of the Polish leadership stratum and, indeed, of several other prominent leaders of the peasant movement itself. It seems quite apparent - and Witos's fate is also indicated in this respect - that it was among the peasantry that the Germans were initially willing to look for collaborators. The Völkisch ethos naturally designated the peasants as virtually the only class uncontaminated with either bourgeois or revolutionary influences. Also, it was in the countryside that the German armies were received with the least hostility. German officials must have taken this attitude into consideration when they prepared the internal memorandum stating that only with the support of the peasantry would Germany be able to set up a collaborationist regime in Poland. Another group approached by the Germans with propositions for collaboration were prominent patricians and aristocrats with openly conservative views and a political tradition of loyalty and collaboration with the Austro-Hungarian monarchy before the First World War. Professor Stanislaw Estreicher, the most prominent Stanczyk, was reported to have been contacted by the Germans. The names of Princes Zdzislaw Lubomirski and Janusz Radziwill and that of Count Adam Ronikier were mentioned as other candidates consulted after Estreicher's refusal to collaborate. Thus the Germans approached a representative of the Polish peasant movement, the least hostile, from their point of view, of the three main political movements alienated from the Second Republic [the other two being the National Democrats and the Socialists]. They also appealed to conservative aristocratic elements, and were justified in doing so on two grounds: first, this class had a tradition of collaboration: second, the traditional ethos of noblesse oblige stresses the responsibility of the aristocracy for "its people" when in need and its obligation to protect them. One must take into account this attitude of the aristocracy in order to understand why Prince Janusz Radziwill, Counts Ronikier, Potocki, Plater-Zyberk, and Puslowski, Countess Tarnowski, and others participated in the formation and works of the Rada GLowna Opiekuncza (Main Welfare Council). 2A01:110F:4505:DC00:A9C2:7233:DC6C:D2B4 (talk) 02:14, 13 April 2018 (UTC)

AND CONTINUE

Extended content

"Three more "attempts" to create a pro-German Polish government should be mentioned here in order to complete the record. The first, initiated by a declared Germanophile, Professor Wladyslaw Studnicki, has been very well described by Weinstein [Zeszyty Historyczne 11:3-91, Paris, 1967]. Documentation presented by him shows that the Germans did not take Studnicki's proposals seriously, knowing well that he could not muster enough significant support from any strata of Polish society to make his projects worth their consideration. The second attempt was an alleged public declaration by a former Polish prime minister, Professor Leon Kozlowski, of readiness to create a pro-German government after he escaped from Russia in 1941. After his release from prison in 1941 he joined Anders's Army, in which he was given the prominent post of quartermaster general (Szef Intendentury). However, for reasons unknown ( he may still have feared the Russians), he fled to the German side of the front. He was taken to Berlin, where several officials talked to him, and he was permitted to grant an interview, entitled "De Samara à Berlin", to the Journal de Genève on December 20, 1941. After this, news traveled far that he had offered to join a pro-German Polish government. The rumor was false, however. The Germans must have used his defection in their anti-Bolshevik propaganda, but the whole affair was interpreted incorrectly in Polish circles as an abortive attempt to create a "Quisling" government. Kozlowski was sentenced to death for desertion by a Polish military court, but the sentence could not be carried out, as he died in Berlin in unknown circumstances, possibly during an Allied bombing. The whole affair still awaits full clarification. The third and last attempt that I want to mention here is probably linked to the preparations of the July coup by the German army. It took place in Budapest, where Count Bem, a Hungarian citizen and a major in the Polish army, was approached by an acquaintance of his, "an eminent member of Russian emigration", who told Bem that, on instructions from the German military attache in Budapest, he was seeking contacts with the Polish government in London or with eminent members of the local Polish emigres, preferably with officers. The Germans wanted to know under what preliminary conditions the Poles would agree to begin talks with them. Bem responded that in order to begin negotiations, Poles would demand restitution of Poland in its 1939 frontiers. Two days later the Russian go-between told Bem that the German attaché had called Berlin in his presence and reported Bem's opinion to a certain "N". In response, he received instructions to get in touch, through Bem, with someone who could report to the Polish government the following offer: the German side was prepared to issue immediately a manifesto proclaiming Polish independence within 1939 frontiers; Poland would be linked in an anti-Bolshevik military alliance with Germany; Polish foreign policy would be coordinate with Berlin's, and the staffs of the armies of the two countries would be in permanent contact. "Germans consider the whole matter very urgent and request a response within three days". The incident took place at the beginning of March 1944. Broszat (Nationalsozialistische Polenpolitik, 1939-1945, Frankfurt and Hamburg 1965, pp 18-19) also mentions some conversations held with Polish emigrés in Switzerland in October 1939 concerning the Reststaat."2A01:110F:4505:DC00:A9C2:7233:DC6C:D2B4 (talk) 02:19, 13 April 2018 (UTC)

That's why the section looks like this, and there is nothing wrong with it. It's, correct, detailed and mentions most of the circumstances. ----->

Unlike the situation in most German-occupied European countries where the Germans successfully installed collaborating authorities, in occupied Poland such efforts failed. The Germans initially had contemplated creating a collaborationist Polish cabinet to administer, as a Polish protectorate, the German-occupied Polish territories that Germany had not annexed outright. At the beginning of war the Germans contacted several important Polish leaders with proposals for collaboration with but were refused. Among those contacted was a prominent peasant leader and former Prime Minister of Poland Wincenty Witos who rejected several German offers to lead a puppet government, as did Janusz Radziwiłł and Stanisław Estreicher. Pro-German right-wing politician Andrzej Świetlicki formed a National Revolutionary Camp and approached the Germans with collaboration offer but was ignored.Władysław Studnicki, an anti-Soviet publicist advocated German-Polish cooperation against the Soviet Union and Leon Kozłowski, a prominent scholar and former Prime Minister also favoured a Polish-German agreement against the Soviet Union but both were rejected by the Germans. Indeed, Nazi racial policies and German plans for the future of the conquered Polish territories, on one hand, and Polish anti-German attitudes on the other, meant that generally neither side was interested in political collaboration.

The failed German efforts to form a Polish collaborative arrangement ended about April 1940, when Hitler banned talks with Poles about any level of autonomy. In German long-term plans, the Polish nation was to disappear, to be replaced by German settlers. 2A01:110F:4505:DC00:A9C2:7233:DC6C:D2B4 (talk) 02:31, 13 April 2018 (UTC)

References

I'm confused about what you're trying to say in the whole above disquisition. Please clarify.

Nihil novi (talk) 04:13, 13 April 2018 (UTC)

Oh god, now she'll sink the discussion by virtue of bad layout (which I tried to sort).

The difference is simple: Bella tries to push the narrative that the Germans did not establish a puppet state (instead of the GG) because they failed - that is, that they approached heroic Polish leaders and they all refused, and the Germans had to resort to managing the area themselves. That's simply not true: the truth is the Germans never intended for the Poles to have any sort of self rule, because their racial agenda placed Poles very near the bottom, "unworthy" of any sort of authority. The only suggestions for self rule came from the military (and one from Moltke, if I recall, but he never acted on it), which didn't care for the racial agenda dictated from above, and considered Poland "just another territory to be governed". Those offers were doomed to fail not because of Polish reluctance (indeed, there were several Polish leaders interested in collaboration), but because the Nazi leadership would've stopped it. So that's the problem here: Bella wants to push some heroic narrative (which is only partly true) - the "Land without a Quisling" - while ignoring the facts that a) there were willing collaborators; and b) whether anyone collaborated or not didn't matter in the grand scheme of things, because Nazism doomed Poland from the get-go. François Robere (talk) 15:37, 13 April 2018 (UTC)

Completely, totally and wholly the opposite, François Robere is trying to push his version by rephrasing everything opposite the historical data. According to him, the Germans have never attempted to establish a Polish puppet state, they were only fooling around for entertainment and fun. Note that the Poles were not regarded subhumans right away and exterminations of the Polish Jews didn't start until late 1942. PS. Get it François Robere? Not?, then read please the above quote from your beloved author Jan Tomasz Gross, "Polish Society under German Occupation", Chapter 5, "Collaboration and Cooperation" a few times more. 2A01:110F:4505:DC00:148B:D27:EC07:81A0 (talk) 19:55, 13 April 2018 (UTC)

Extended content

One possible solution for the Polish problem envisaged in the early days of the occupation by the Germans was the creation of a token Polish state, a Reststaat. Two groups in Polish society were queried about their willingness to help in such a project. In March 1939 the Germans tried to get in touch with peasant leader Wincenty Witos, who at the time was in exile in Czechoslovakia after having lost his appeal in the Brzesc trial. Witos immediately informed the Polish authorities about this incident and, partly as a result of German approaches, decided to come back to Poland, although he knew that he could be sent to prison on his return. When the hostilities ended in October 1939, Witos was arrested shortly after being found by the Germans, along with many other Poles who had played prominent roles in public life before the war. The Gestapo sent him to prison at Rzeszow, where he was approached again with an offer of collaboration, which he refused. He also rejected a proposal that he write an "objective" history of the peasant movement, suspecting that such a work would primarily serve as a directory to ferret out all activists of the movement who had not been arrested thus far. In spite of his refusal to collaborate with the Germans, the conditions of his confinement remained, to say the least, very liberal [after five months in prison in Rzeszow, and a further five weeks in prison in Berlin, he was sent to a sanatorium in Potsdam, and then to a health spa in Zakopane, where he remained under Gestapo supervision]. In March 1941 he was permitted to return to his house at Wierzchoslawice, where he remained until the end of the war, with the authorities periodically checking on him. Although this treatment was highly unusual, we should not attribute too much significance to Witos's fate. His survival was due, in all probability, more to some lucky coincidence than to a carefully designed policy. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that he was spared from death, the usual fate of members of the Polish leadership stratum and, indeed, of several other prominent leaders of the peasant movement itself. It seems quite apparent - and Witos's fate is also indicated in this respect - that it was among the peasantry that the Germans were initially willing to look for collaborators. The Völkisch ethos naturally designated the peasants as virtually the only class uncontaminated with either bourgeois or revolutionary influences. Also, it was in the countryside that the German armies were received with the least hostility. German officials must have taken this attitude into consideration when they prepared the internal memorandum stating that only with the support of the peasantry would Germany be able to set up a collaborationist regime in Poland. Another group approached by the Germans with propositions for collaboration were prominent patricians and aristocrats with openly conservative views and a political tradition of loyalty and collaboration with the Austro-Hungarian monarchy before the First World War. Professor Stanislaw Estreicher, the most prominent Stanczyk, was reported to have been contacted by the Germans. The names of Princes Zdzislaw Lubomirski and Janusz Radziwill and that of Count Adam Ronikier were mentioned as other candidates consulted after Estreicher's refusal to collaborate. Thus the Germans approached a representative of the Polish peasant movement, the least hostile, from their point of view, of the three main political movements alienated from the Second Republic [the other two being the National Democrats and the Socialists]. They also appealed to conservative aristocratic elements, and were justified in doing so on two grounds: first, this class had a tradition of collaboration: second, the traditional ethos of noblesse oblige stresses the responsibility of the aristocracy for "its people" when in need and its obligation to protect them. One must take into account this attitude of the aristocracy in order to understand why Prince Janusz Radziwill, Counts Ronikier, Potocki, Plater-Zyberk, and Puslowski, Countess Tarnowski, and others participated in the formation and works of the Rada GLowna Opiekuncza (Main Welfare Council). 2A01:110F:4505:DC00:A9C2:7233:DC6C:D2B4 (talk) 02:14, 13 April 2018 (UTC) AND CONTINUE "Three more "attempts" to create a pro-German Polish government should be mentioned here in order to complete the record. The first, initiated by a declared Germanophile, Professor Wladyslaw Studnicki, has been very well described by Weinstein [Zeszyty Historyczne 11:3-91, Paris, 1967]. Documentation presented by him shows that the Germans did not take Studnicki's proposals seriously, knowing well that he could not muster enough significant support from any strata of Polish society to make his projects worth their consideration. The second attempt was an alleged public declaration by a former Polish prime minister, Professor Leon Kozlowski, of readiness to create a pro-German government after he escaped from Russia in 1941. After his release from prison in 1941 he joined Anders's Army, in which he was given the prominent post of quartermaster general (Szef Intendentury). However, for reasons unknown ( he may still have feared the Russians), he fled to the German side of the front. He was taken to Berlin, where several officials talked to him, and he was permitted to grant an interview, entitled "De Samara à Berlin", to the Journal de Genève on December 20, 1941. After this, news traveled far that he had offered to join a pro-German Polish government. The rumor was false, however. The Germans must have used his defection in their anti-Bolshevik propaganda, but the whole affair was interpreted incorrectly in Polish circles as an abortive attempt to create a "Quisling" government. Kozlowski was sentenced to death for desertion by a Polish military court, but the sentence could not be carried out, as he died in Berlin in unknown circumstances, possibly during an Allied bombing. The whole affair still awaits full clarification. The third and last attempt that I want to mention here is probably linked to the preparations of the July coup by the German army. It took place in Budapest, where Count Bem, a Hungarian citizen and a major in the Polish army, was approached by an acquaintance of his, "an eminent member of Russian emigration", who told Bem that, on instructions from the German military attache in Budapest, he was seeking contacts with the Polish government in London or with eminent members of the local Polish emigres, preferably with officers. The Germans wanted to know under what preliminary conditions the Poles would agree to begin talks with them. Bem responded that in order to begin negotiations, Poles would demand restitution of Poland in its 1939 frontiers. Two days later the Russian go-between told Bem that the German attaché had called Berlin in his presence and reported Bem's opinion to a certain "N". In response, he received instructions to get in touch, through Bem, with someone who could report to the Polish government the following offer: the German side was prepared to issue immediately a manifesto proclaiming Polish independence within 1939 frontiers; Poland would be linked in an anti-Bolshevik military alliance with Germany; Polish foreign policy would be coordinate with Berlin's, and the staffs of the armies of the two countries would be in permanent contact. "Germans consider the whole matter very urgent and request a response within three days". The incident took place at the beginning of March 1944. Broszat (Nationalsozialistische Polenpolitik, 1939-1945, Frankfurt and Hamburg 1965, pp 18-19) also mentions some conversations held with Polish emigrés in Switzerland in October 1939 concerning the Reststaat."

And on top of all the above what the hell has this to do with the collaboration and has been smuggled into the article?

73% of town heads an mayors in the General Government were Polish. Among other things, they were responsible for selecting locals who were to be sent to Germany for work. Some exploited their positions to enrich themselves. 2A01:110F:4505:DC00:148B:D27:EC07:81A0 (talk) 20:15, 13 April 2018 (UTC)

Bella, this is uncivil and disruptive. Keep your tone down, and the text folded.

The reference to mayors is backed by a quote. Read it and you'll see the connection. As for Gross: You've quoted him twice before (that's four times now), and I've already replied once. Gross does not state the Germans failed etc. In fact, I have a quote of his (and two other sources) explicitly saying the Nazis weren't at all interested in a "puppet state"; frankly, given the fact that they said as much in real time, and treated both collaborators and resistors with the same disdain, you'd have to be a particularly tough nut to claim otherwise. As for your claims of "POV pushing" - both the "Reststaat" story and the mention of Polish peasant leaders and aristocracy are already covered - the first in the "background" section, the second in my proposition for the text. As for your claims about Nazi racial theory - they're woefully ignorant for someone writing on these subjects. Anything else? François Robere (talk) 01:14, 14 April 2018 (UTC)

There is no consensus to include your twisted version, you were reverted multiple times by numerous editors so don't even think on recording your tale for the 18 times unless others support you (and I'm not talking about your mate Itzewitz) You don't own this article. Now pardon me, you still need to apologize for insulting me in the past, so this is all you will hear from me for now2A01:110F:4505:DC00:E5A8:D7D4:DBA5:83D3 (talk) 07:05, 14 April 2018 (UTC)

And can you now reply on-point? Neither you nor Marek have done so in your reversions. François Robere (talk) 10:07, 14 April 2018 (UTC)

first, the discussion of German attempts to establish collaborationist puppet states or governing bodies is so obviously relevant to the topic of this article that is simply ridiculous to try and to remove this information. In any other related context, for any other country, whether or not there was a collaborationist government entity is THE major question that is addressed. Having said that, the truth is obviously between the two extremes of "the Germans never tried" (they did) and "the Germans went out of their way to do it but Poles refused". You guys can't seem to compromise. From my perspective this is mostly due to Francois Robere's uncompromising stance and his continual efforts to win the argument by edit warring rather than discussion. However, some comments on this talk page do indicate that they may be willing to compromise. Maybe just bad blood and impulsive resentment over being reverted got in the way here. So how about it Francois? How can we word a section on this phenomenon - which is most certainly notable and important - and satisfy your concerns? Volunteer Marek (talk) 16:39, 14 April 2018 (UTC)

You guys can't seem to compromise. From my perspective this is mostly due to Francois Robere's uncompromising stance and his continual efforts to win the argument by edit warring rather than discussion: This is me agreeing to a compromise [2], and this is Bella refusing it [3]. This is me asking some questions about Bella's sources [4]. This is me, asking again, and again, and again, and again [5][6]. Bella never answered (unless you consider any of these a proper answer). In light of this, would you like to amend your statement on who's to fault? François Robere (talk) 18:32, 14 April 2018 (UTC)

A question, do the sources say "they tried to set up a nominal independent government" or "they tried to recruit poles to run a German controlled government". Note by that I do not mean in the same way as vicey France but the occupied zone? Using people to help run your government is not the same as them having their own one.Slatersteven (talk) 16:56, 14 April 2018 (UTC)

THe fact about mayors might be true, however it doesn't go in the lead, rather, if it even goes in this article, the appropriate place would be the "Political collaboration" section. Everybody happy? 198.84.253.202 (talk) 17:15, 14 April 2018 (UTC)

I asked a question, did the Germans make the same efforts as elsewhere, or were these informal or unofficial talks between leaders on the ground rather then official overtures? What do the sources say was actually offered and by whom.Slatersteven (talk) 17:18, 14 April 2018 (UTC)

That's why I said "if it even goes in this article". The percentage of Polish mayors and some exploiting the position has nothing to do with collaboration, since we have no more information about whether the mayors were chosen for ideological reasons or some other unrelated reason (if there even was one), and because mayors (or really, politicians of any kind) exploiting their position to enrich themselves is nothing new and again has no link with collaboration either. 198.84.253.202 (talk) 17:31, 14 April 2018 (UTC)

You can check the source yourself - it's quoted in the text, and it clearly gives that as an example of collaboration. Note the statement wasn't in the lead. François Robere (talk) 18:39, 14 April 2018 (UTC)

Do the sources say "they tried to set up a nominal independent government" or "they tried to recruit poles to run a German controlled government": Neither.

Did the Germans make the same efforts as elsewhere, or were these informal or unofficial talks between leaders on the ground rather then official overtures: The latter.

Again, you can see the references in the paragraph (here in source form) - most of them include quotes, so it's pretty easy to get a picture of what the sources say. François Robere (talk) 18:32, 14 April 2018 (UTC)

@Slatersteven Yes, the Germans have tryed to establish a puppet state. Read a quote from just one of the sources that François Robere keeps hiding by collapsing it. 1977 book by Jan Tomasz Gross, "Polish : Society under German Occupation", Chapter 5, "Collaboration and Cooperation".

Quote from pages 126-130:

Extended content

One possible solution for the Polish problem envisaged in the early days of the occupation by the Germans was the creation of a token Polish state, a Reststaat. Two groups in Polish society were queried about their willingness to help in such a project. In March 1939 the Germans tried to get in touch with peasant leader Wincenty Witos, who at the time was in exile in Czechoslovakia after having lost his appeal in the Brzesc trial. Witos immediately informed the Polish authorities about this incident and, partly as a result of German approaches, decided to come back to Poland, although he knew that he could be sent to prison on his return. When the hostilities ended in October 1939, Witos was arrested shortly after being found by the Germans, along with many other Poles who had played prominent roles in public life before the war. The Gestapo sent him to prison at Rzeszow, where he was approached again with an offer of collaboration, which he refused. He also rejected a proposal that he write an "objective" history of the peasant movement, suspecting that such a work would primarily serve as a directory to ferret out all activists of the movement who had not been arrested thus far. In spite of his refusal to collaborate with the Germans, the conditions of his confinement remained, to say the least, very liberal [after five months in prison in Rzeszow, and a further five weeks in prison in Berlin, he was sent to a sanatorium in Potsdam, and then to a health spa in Zakopane, where he remained under Gestapo supervision]. In March 1941 he was permitted to return to his house at Wierzchoslawice, where he remained until the end of the war, with the authorities periodically checking on him. Although this treatment was highly unusual, we should not attribute too much significance to Witos's fate. His survival was due, in all probability, more to some lucky coincidence than to a carefully designed policy. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that he was spared from death, the usual fate of members of the Polish leadership stratum and, indeed, of several other prominent leaders of the peasant movement itself. It seems quite apparent - and Witos's fate is also indicated in this respect - that it was among the peasantry that the Germans were initially willing to look for collaborators. The Völkisch ethos naturally designated the peasants as virtually the only class uncontaminated with either bourgeois or revolutionary influences. Also, it was in the countryside that the German armies were received with the least hostility. German officials must have taken this attitude into consideration when they prepared the internal memorandum stating that only with the support of the peasantry would Germany be able to set up a collaborationist regime in Poland. Another group approached by the Germans with propositions for collaboration were prominent patricians and aristocrats with openly conservative views and a political tradition of loyalty and collaboration with the Austro-Hungarian monarchy before the First World War. Professor Stanislaw Estreicher, the most prominent Stanczyk, was reported to have been contacted by the Germans. The names of Princes Zdzislaw Lubomirski and Janusz Radziwill and that of Count Adam Ronikier were mentioned as other candidates consulted after Estreicher's refusal to collaborate. Thus the Germans approached a representative of the Polish peasant movement, the least hostile, from their point of view, of the three main political movements alienated from the Second Republic [the other two being the National Democrats and the Socialists]. They also appealed to conservative aristocratic elements, and were justified in doing so on two grounds: first, this class had a tradition of collaboration: second, the traditional ethos of noblesse oblige stresses the responsibility of the aristocracy for "its people" when in need and its obligation to protect them. One must take into account this attitude of the aristocracy in order to understand why Prince Janusz Radziwill, Counts Ronikier, Potocki, Plater-Zyberk, and Puslowski, Countess Tarnowski, and others participated in the formation and works of the Rada GLowna Opiekuncza (Main Welfare Council). 2A01:110F:4505:DC00:A9C2:7233:DC6C:D2B4 (talk) 02:14, 13 April 2018 (UTC) AND CONTINUE "Three more "attempts" to create a pro-German Polish government should be mentioned here in order to complete the record. The first, initiated by a declared Germanophile, Professor Wladyslaw Studnicki, has been very well described by Weinstein [Zeszyty Historyczne 11:3-91, Paris, 1967]. Documentation presented by him shows that the Germans did not take Studnicki's proposals seriously, knowing well that he could not muster enough significant support from any strata of Polish society to make his projects worth their consideration. The second attempt was an alleged public declaration by a former Polish prime minister, Professor Leon Kozlowski, of readiness to create a pro-German government after he escaped from Russia in 1941. After his release from prison in 1941 he joined Anders's Army, in which he was given the prominent post of quartermaster general (Szef Intendentury). However, for reasons unknown ( he may still have feared the Russians), he fled to the German side of the front. He was taken to Berlin, where several officials talked to him, and he was permitted to grant an interview, entitled "De Samara à Berlin", to the Journal de Genève on December 20, 1941. After this, news traveled far that he had offered to join a pro-German Polish government. The rumor was false, however. The Germans must have used his defection in their anti-Bolshevik propaganda, but the whole affair was interpreted incorrectly in Polish circles as an abortive attempt to create a "Quisling" government. Kozlowski was sentenced to death for desertion by a Polish military court, but the sentence could not be carried out, as he died in Berlin in unknown circumstances, possibly during an Allied bombing. The whole affair still awaits full clarification. The third and last attempt that I want to mention here is probably linked to the preparations of the July coup by the German army. It took place in Budapest, where Count Bem, a Hungarian citizen and a major in the Polish army, was approached by an acquaintance of his, "an eminent member of Russian emigration", who told Bem that, on instructions from the German military attache in Budapest, he was seeking contacts with the Polish government in London or with eminent members of the local Polish emigres, preferably with officers. The Germans wanted to know under what preliminary conditions the Poles would agree to begin talks with them. Bem responded that in order to begin negotiations, Poles would demand restitution of Poland in its 1939 frontiers. Two days later the Russian go-between told Bem that the German attaché had called Berlin in his presence and reported Bem's opinion to a certain "N". In response, he received instructions to get in touch, through Bem, with someone who could report to the Polish government the following offer: the German side was prepared to issue immediately a manifesto proclaiming Polish independence within 1939 frontiers; Poland would be linked in an anti-Bolshevik military alliance with Germany; Polish foreign policy would be coordinate with Berlin's, and the staffs of the armies of the two countries would be in permanent contact. "Germans consider the whole matter very urgent and request a response within three days". The incident took place at the beginning of March 1944. Broszat (Nationalsozialistische Polenpolitik, 1939-1945, Frankfurt and Hamburg 1965, pp 18-19) also mentions some conversations held with Polish emigrés in Switzerland in October 1939 concerning the Reststaat."

Other sources are here:

Extended content

Unlike the situation in most German-occupied European countries where the Germans successfully installed collaborating authorities, in occupied Poland such efforts failed. The Germans initially had contemplated creating a collaborationist Polish cabinet to administer, as a Polish protectorate, the German-occupied Polish territories that Germany had not annexed outright. At the beginning of war the Germans contacted several important Polish leaders with proposals for collaboration with but were refused. Among those contacted was a prominent peasant leader and former Prime Minister of Poland Wincenty Witos who rejected several German offers to lead a puppet government, as did Janusz Radziwiłł and Stanisław Estreicher. Pro-German right-wing politician Andrzej Świetlicki formed a National Revolutionary Camp and approached the Germans with collaboration offer but was ignored.Władysław Studnicki, an anti-Soviet publicist advocated German-Polish cooperation against the Soviet Union and Leon Kozłowski, a prominent scholar and former Prime Minister also favoured a Polish-German agreement against the Soviet Union but both were rejected by the Germans. Indeed, Nazi racial policies and German plans for the future of the conquered Polish territories, on one hand, and Polish anti-German attitudes on the other, meant that generally neither side was interested in political collaboration. The failed German efforts to form a Polish collaborative arrangement ended about April 1940, when Hitler banned talks with Poles about any level of autonomy. In German long-term plans, the Polish nation was to disappear, to be replaced by German settlers.

There are plenty more soures that cover that, some were removed during massive replacement of material by FR. Keep in mind that in 1939-1940 the Germans did't have clear plans of what to do with Poland, they did't even have plans to murder Jews. The Final soultion came into light later, thats why they have contemplated to create a puppet state just as they did in all other countries. 2A01:110F:4505:DC00:4DDB:5808:7286:8AA5 (talk) 23:58, 14 April 2018 (UTC)

References

The above wall of text is unreadable, would you mind separating it into paragraphs? 198.84.253.202 (talk) 00:31, 15 April 2018 (UTC)

I collapsed the text, just so it doesn't obscure the rest of the discussion. François Robere (talk) 02:18, 15 April 2018 (UTC)

I think the above quotes are all rather vague, this is the problem. There is not description of what was on offer, what position they would holds, what the state would consist of or who these Germans actually were (lets not forget that Hitler subsequently banned such discussion). At best I think we could say "according to".Slatersteven (talk) 09:29, 15 April 2018 (UTC)

I just want to note none of this is actually cited in Bella's revision. If you go through the sources she does cite - most of which I use myself - you'll see they don't actually support her assertions. Even if this source was impeccable, she still would've had to deal with all the rest. François Robere (talk) 16:03, 15 April 2018 (UTC)

Nazi Germany had military (interim), civilian and police administration of the General Gouvernment.The two administrations fought for domination. We have to precize who were the Germans who contacted Polish politicians - civilians (Hans Frank) or the SS (Himmler).Xx236 (talk) 07:53, 18 April 2018 (UTC)

I agree, this is my point. The Germans often kept locals in charge of the day to day operations, but it would be hard to characterize many of these as a Collaborationist state. So we would also need to know what was actually being asked (to head a government or be a senior official in a German one, and the degree to which it was official or informal. As well as the scope of powers, and the degree of autonomy.Slatersteven (talk) 13:06, 18 April 2018 (UTC)

@Slatersteven ----> Most sources don't go into specific details how the collaboration would look like. In case of the Wincenty Witos, for example, who was driven the most, this source from Museum of Polish history [7] says as follows (I'll translate for you) The Germans repeatedly tried to persuade Witos to various forms of cooperation. In Rzeszów, in March 1940, he was offered to create a collaborative government. So to find out the details we would have to dig into some archives, but we know that they have tried various forms and that it suppose to be a collaborative Polish government.2A01:110F:4505:DC00:555F:2CA9:1843:D98 (talk) 14:12, 18 April 2018 (UTC)

The problem is there are other sources that dispute that the Germans really ever tried. Even some of the sources that say there was [[8]] are hardly emphatic. This is why we need detail, because it is not clear cut.Slatersteven (talk) 14:27, 18 April 2018 (UTC)

You can see more sources in the block quotes below. It's clear that all of these attempts were made by local commanders; that they were unsanctioned by Nazi leadership; that for that reason they would never have reached into fruition; and that at least some of them were done for propagandistic and diplomatic reasons, rather than as honest attempts at advancing self-governance. Given all of this, as well as the Germans' recurring refusals to entertain Polish collaborationists' suggestions (Studnicki, Świetlicki, and Kozłowski) saying they "failed" (or even seriously "attempted") is misleading, not to say dishonest. François Robere (talk) 14:53, 18 April 2018 (UTC)

@Slatersteven This is the quote from the source you are giving above Hitler's Empire by Mark Mazower[[9]]: before Hitler had made his final decision about Poland's fate, the Gestapo arrested the veteran Peasant Party chief and three-time prime minister, Wincenty Witos, and offered to release him if he would collaborate. Witos refused, as he did on several other occasions. So you can see that even this source does not contradict the fact that the Germans initially have tried to get Poles into collaboration. The German policy has changed drastically after 1941 that's why the FR is cherry picking the quotes describing German arrangements after 1940. I'm not going to respond to FR because I have done that several times already but I want to make sure that you are aware it.2A01:110F:4505:DC00:555F:2CA9:1843:D98 (talk) 16:11, 18 April 2018 (UTC)

This is about the creation of a puppet state, not collaboration (the two are not synonymous).Slatersteven (talk) 16:21, 18 April 2018 (UTC)

Also from Mazower, several lines above your quote: "The point was that, as in the French case, it was German policy that defined the options - and in the Polish case there was really no opportunity to collaborate given Hitler's decision to destroy Poland's very identity.". Who's "cherry picking" now? And breaking WP:OR in addition, as you're using the same information available to a source to reach opposite conclusions. François Robere (talk) 16:29, 18 April 2018 (UTC)

So are everyone in agreement now, or do we have further discussing to do? François Robere (talk) 09:22, 17 April 2018 (UTC)

Agreed about what?

Nihil novi (talk) 11:28, 17 April 2018 (UTC)

About which version is actually true to sources. No one made further comments after my and Slater's. François Robere (talk) 11:33, 17 April 2018 (UTC)

No, there is no agreement, your version is manipulative and inaccurate.2A01:110F:4505:DC00:90B1:2F6E:3A6B:9F79 (talk) 11:37, 17 April 2018 (UTC)

You're yet to show even a single source that I supposedly misrepresented. François Robere (talk) 12:14, 17 April 2018 (UTC)

Look at the history of the discussion about this subject to see the diff. [10] I'm not going to be played and keep repeating my arguments over and over again. You are the one who is continually challenging others opinions and act as if you own this article. You revert changes, even if they are made based on majority preferred version. You are pretending there is a talk page agreement, or you insist that consensus isn't clear yet, and more talking needs to happen. Tendentious, disruptive editing style of yours and reinstation of your favored version of an article is constant. You keep answering with circular argumentation and persistent deformation of points made by those you oppose. You continue bringing up the same things, again and again, and again to try to build the appearance of a new agreement. I'm tired of this behavior of yours.2A01:110F:4505:DC00:90B1:2F6E:3A6B:9F79 (talk) 23:14, 17 April 2018 (UTC)

Very well said. This has been a weeks-long campaign to wear down the opposition.

Nihil novi (talk) 04:32, 18 April 2018 (UTC)

That is a blunt lie. The history of the discussion is "me asking the same questions again and again, because Bella is refusing to answer them" [11][12][13][14][15][16] (unless you consider any of these a proper answer).

The fact of the matter is Bella's own sources contradict her. She cites "The Eagle Unbowed", which clearly states on pp. 97-98 that:

During the war Poland was very proud of its record in never having had a 'Quisling', but the reason was not because a sufficiently prominent person could not be persuaded to cooperate, but because the Germans had no interest in granting the Poles authority.

She cited Lee (2015), which turned out to be Gross (2015), and after repeatedly ignoring my questions decided to discard it (p. 75):

What made it even less likely that the occupiers would sponsor a collaborationist government was that the model of the occupation, based on the principle of unlimited exploitation, specifically prohibited the Germans to contemplate granting any concessions to the subjugated populace... To the extent that collaboration means that the occupying power seeks to employ in its service those local institutions that wield authority, the institutions must be allowed - on terms specified by the occupier - to exercise that authority. Within the unlimited exploitation model, they could not have this opportunity.

She cites Kunicki (2001), which clearly states on p. 218 that:

Apart from the initial period of German rule in Poland, the evidence presented here demonstrates that the numerous rumours of the German projects to create a Polish puppet state were groundless. But persistent rumours of a Quisling regime were due to several factors. First, there is evidence that the German propaganda deliberately leaked such misleading information, which targeted the unity of the anti-German coalition as well as the position of the Polish Government-in-Exile.

As well as Kunicki (2012) p. 56:

[The Wehrmacht occupation authorities] quickly lost out, however, to the advocates of a a more repressive course in occupation policy. Hitler rejected any collaborationist arrangements in Poland, mostly on the basis of his racial and historical contempt for Slavic peoples, his perception of the Poles as an obstacle to establishing Lebensraum, and his wish to completely eradicate Polish nationalism. A brief discussion - partly window dressing, partly a peace feeler - about the creation of a Polish rump state (Reststaat) died in October 1939.

And KPF (2005) p. 715:

Because of a lack of interest on the part of the Nazi leadership, there was no basis for state collaboration. On the contrary, overtures even by Polish fascists and other staunch anti-Semites were rebuffed by the occupiers.

And completely ignores (and on several occasions removed) sources such as Garlinski (1985) p. 32, that clearly contradict her and show nothing in support:

The Germans became interested at first in Władysław Studnicki's suggestions, which reached the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but when it turned out that the Western powers were not going to allows themselves to be misled by Hitler's 'peace' initiative, he ceased to be of interest to them.

None of these has been answered by Bella. None. And you're claiming I'm trying to "wear down the opposition"? She should've answered all of this at the first discussion instead of dragging it on for over a month. François Robere (talk) 14:43, 18 April 2018 (UTC)

Nice to finally be able to read secondary-source quotations, rather than untethered assertions and counter-assertions, denials and counter-denials.

Who is "KPF"?

Does anyone have contrary quotations to present for everyone's inspection?

If not, I'd suggest mentioning some of the allegations of Polish and German collaborationist-government proposals, along with sourced refutations and brief foot-noted quotations from the sources.

Again, if pertinent Polish-language texts should turn up, now or in future, I'm willing to render them into English.

Nihil novi (talk) 01:03, 19 April 2018 (UTC)

Seeing as I already quoted most of these in previous discussions with barely anyone noticing, I believe in the future I'll adopt the citation style of VERY BIG LETTERS.

Also, as I stated earlier, all of these (and a few others) are already quoted in the text as part of the references (using ref templates).

"KPF" is Klaus-Peter Friedrich, already cited in several places in the article. "KPF" was his source alias in Collaboration with the Axis Powers, and I decided to keep it.

I left individual cases of resistors and collaborators out, but kept them in a comment so as to avoid removing sourced material (source with comment). Some of these can be mentioned by name if anyone really cares for it, but they mustn't overshadow the rest of the text.

Your proposal is appreciated. François Robere (talk) 02:55, 19 April 2018 (UTC)

@Nihil novi there are plenty more, here are just few: (PS. Reststaat in German means a Remainder State)

Extended content

Dark Heart of Hitler's Europe: Nazi Rule in Poland under the General Government - Martin Winstone At a conference on board Hitlers train on September 12, 1939...the creation of quasi-autonomous rump Polish State - Reststaat was considered. An intriguing development in this respect was an admittedly unsubtle German attempt to persuade Wincenty Witos, leader of the peasant-based People's Party and thrice prime minister of Poland in the 1920s, to head a collaborationist government. In the Shadow of the Polish Eagle - L. Cooper In the early days of occupation, the Germans envisaged the creation of a 'token Polish state' – a Reststaat. Two groups within Polish society were sounded out about their willingness to cooperate in such a project. In March 1940 the Germans approached the peasant leader Wincenty Witos... Studies in Contemporary Jewry: Volume XIII - Jonathan Frankel ..at the outset of the war, the Germans made several efforts to establish a collaborationist Polish rump state... Hitler's Empire: How the Nazis Ruled Europe - Mark Mazower ...the Germans were thinking of installing a Polish puppet government. In mid September, before Hitler had made his final decision about Poland's fate, the Gestapo arrested the veteran Peasant Party chief and three-time prime minister, Wincenty Witos, and offered to release him if he would collaborate... Polish Western Affairs - 1980 ... for some time Berlin looked for such possibility and was ready to set up a Polish "rump state" (Reststaat) headed by a puppet goverment ... Wincenty Witos 1874-1945 - IPN Komisja Ścigania Zbrodni przeciwko Narodowi Polskiemu, 2010 Witos, who stayed at the Castle in Rzeszów, was persuaded continuously by the Germans to cooperate. He was proposed to undertake the creation of a Polish puppet government, which would eventually lead to the creation of a residual buffer state (Reststaat), entirely dependent on the Third Reich. Witos, however, categorically refused. Polish Society under German Occupation - J. Gross ..in the early days of the occupation by the Germans was the creation of a token Polish state, a Reststaat. Two groups in Polish society were queried about their willingness to help in such a project. In March 1939 the Germans tried to get in touch with peasant leader Wincenty Witos.. Polski ruch robotniczy w okresie wojny i okupacji hitlerowskiej - Marian Malinowski ..the Nazis carried out talks with some Polish politicians in the first months of the occupation, trying to persuade them to join a collaborative government that would lead the Polish "Reststaat." These talks were conducted with representatives of conservatives (including Stanisław Estreicher from Krakow, prince Zdzisław Lubomirski and count Adam Ronikier) and ludowcami (Wincenty Witos and Maciej Ratata) Seria Prawo (Law) - University of Adam Mickiewicz Poznań 1982 .. in September 1939, Hitler was inclined to create a remnant-collaborationist Polish state dependent on the Reich from the remains of the area not incorporated into the Third Reich (Reststaat).. World War II: Crucible of the Contemporary World - Loyd E. Lee I think that we should briefly describe these attempts to find collaborationists in Poland (even though we know that they were doomed to failure), for there was a certain internal logic in them. "Sovereign " Poland One possible solution for the Polish problem envisaged in the early days of the occupation by the Germans was the creation of a "token Polish state," a Reststaat The Contemporary Review, Volumes 160-161 - A. Strahan But all the German attempts to build up a Polish government have failed. In the first months after the conquest, the Nazis approached many people in order to persuade them to form a government on the Hacha model, but nobody accepted. This total refusal of collaboration has led Hitler to a change of policy. As long as he hoped to get some Poles to work with him the non- annexed part of Poland was officially called "Polnischer Reststaat" Postawy społeczno-polityczne ziemiaństwa w latach 1939-1945 - Jerzy Gapys .. among the conservative politicians considered as presidential candidates in the Polish residual state (Reststaat) was to be Janusz Radziwiłł - a longtime leader of the Warsaw traditionalists associated with the Sanacja camp. Germans addressed their proposals also to Wincenty Witos, who staunchly refused. The Jews of Warsaw, 1939-1943: Ghetto, Underground, Revolt - Yisrael Gutman The Nazis were willing to permit the existence of a dwarfed Polish state ( Reststaat) congruent with the borders of the Generalgouvernement in exchange for Western recognition of the occupation of other parts of Poland and renunciation of the state of belligerency. Poland and the Poles from Occupation to Freedom - Andrzej Paczkowski ..in the course of subsequent events," they would discuss the eventuality of retaining a separate Polish state. It seems that the Third Reich was particularly interested in creating some kind of satellite state structure (Reststaat) Annual Register - J.Dodsley German Governor-General having his seat at Cracow, and was provisionally designated as the Residual State of Poland (Reststaat Polen). It was the original intention of the Nazi Government to give this territory a certain degree of autonomy under a puppet Government, but they could not find Poles of any authority willing to co-operate with them. Insight Guides Poland - Apa Publications (UK) Limited Once the Polish campaign had come to an end, West Prussia, Greater Poland and Upper Silesia were swallowed up by the German Reich. After various unsuccessful attempts to establish a puppet state, Germany declared the rest of occupied Poland a ' General Government' Wincenty Witos - Andrzej Zakrzewski Ludowa Spółdzielnia Wydawnicza, 1977[17] Wincenty Witos was treated from the very beginning "not as a prisoner, but rather as a hostage on special rights". It was here, in prison in Rzeszów, that attempts were made to obtain Witos for the concept of creating a buffer state - Reststaat Bóg wyżej--dom dalej: 1939-1949 - Adam Bień - Ludowa Spółdzielnia Wydawnicza, 1991 [18] The Germans did not apply strict prison rules to Witos (relative freedom of movement, unclosed cell, the possibility of walking in the yard and receiving meals from the city, the option of receiving family visits and ... They were aware of the crucial political role played by Wincenty Witos in Poland. They tried to make a Polish pseudo-state (Reststaat) and persuade the prisoner to political cooperation with the Third Reich Studia z dziejów myśli politycznej w Niemczech XIX i XX wieku - Henryk Olszewski[19] ..in September 1939, Hitler was inclined to create a remnant-dependent Polish state dependent on the Reich from the remains of land not incorporated into the Reich (Reststaat). Also, the dictator of Spain, General Bahamonde Franco, admitted at the beginning of October the idea of ​​creating a Polish buffer state. German failure to obtain Wincenty Witos and other well-known personalities for the concept of a buffer state.... Polski ruch robotniczy.. - Marian Malinowski, Książka i Wiedza, 1964 [20] The Nazis carried out talks with some Polish politicians in the first months of the occupation, trying to persuade them to join a collaborative government that would lead the Polish "Reststaat." These talks were conducted with representatives of conservatives (including Stanisław Estreicher from Krakow, prince Zdzisław Lubomirski and count Adam Ronikier) and "ludowcami" (Wincenty Witos and Maciej Ratata) Z najnowszych dziejów Polski - Władysław Góra and Janusz Wojciech Gołębiowski [21] The intention to create a Reststaat was repeated by Hitler in a conversation with Galeazzo Ciano on October 1, 1939. ... After the Czech occupation, the Nazis tried to establish contact with Wincenty Witos...Witos categorically and with dignity rejected the offer presented to him to form the Polish collaborative government. Full quote from the offcial page of Wincenty Witos political part PSL [22] Refusal to collaborate with the Germans After the outbreak of World War II on September 20, 1939, Wincenty Witos was arrested and found himself in prison in Rzeszów. There he was offered to create a Polish government collaborating with the occupiers. The former prime minister categorically refused to cooperate with the Nazis. In March 1940, Witos was transported to Berlin. Enforced internment was declared against him. At the beginning of 1941, he was released together with the obligation to stay in Wierzchosławice, where he found himself under constant observation of the Germans. Nonetheless, he cooperated with underground organizations that were part of the Polish Underground State (Odmowa kolaboracji z Niemcami Po wybuchu II wojny światowej 20 września 1939 roku Wincenty Witos został aresztowany i znalazł się w więzieniu w Rzeszowie. Tam zaproponowano mu utworzenie polskiego rządu współpracującego z okupantem. Były premier kategorycznie odmówił współpracy z nazistami. W marcu 1940 roku Witos został przetransportowany do Berlina. Orzeczono wobec niego przymusowe internowanie. Na początku 1941 roku został zwolniony wraz z zobowiązaniem do przebywania w Wierzchosławicach, gdzie znalazł się pod stałą obserwacją Niemców. Mimo to współpracował z organizacjami konspiracyjnymi wchodzącymi w skład Polskiego Państwa Podziemnego.) European Review of History, Mikołaj Kunicki Volume 8, Number 2, 1 August 2001, pp. 203-220 On 16 September 1939, the Gestapo arrested Witos, who during his imprisonment was offered freedom in exchange for collaboration. He was the intended candidate for the Prime Minister's post in a collaborationist government. Despite Witos' categorical refusal, the Germans repeated their propositions in March 1940 and.. 2A01:110F:4505:DC00:58DF:67A6:FB0F:3704 (talk) 05:32, 19 April 2018 (UTC)

Lets look at one of these, The Dark Heart of Hitler's Europe: Nazi Rule in Poland Under the General also says that "it was unclear at what level this was authored", or to put it another way it may not have been official (the author is not sure). It also makes it clear that the conference on the train also discussed another option as well. So again it does not seem that it is that clear this was any thing other then unofficial fishing, rather then a serious and official attempt. So whilst we can say that "according to some historians..." we cannot say in Wikipedias voice that these attempts failed, as they may never have been seriously made.Slatersteven (talk) 07:38, 19 April 2018 (UTC)

Ok, then let's look at this: The Contemporary Review, Volumes 160-161 - A. Strahan quote "But all the German attempts to build up a Polish government have failed. In the first months after the conquest, the Nazis approached many people in order to persuade them to form a government on the Hacha model, but nobody accepted. This total refusal of collaboration has led Hitler to a change of policy. As long as he hoped to get some Poles to work with him the non- annexed part of Poland was officially called "Polnischer Reststaat".."2A01:110F:4505:DC00:D10B:17F4:9D35:2ECF (talk) 08:11, 19 April 2018 (UTC)

Thank you. It's good to have these quotations too.

Anyone willing to try pulling the source materials together so as to resolve the question in a balanced way?

With Polish-language sources, please provide the original texts to assure optimal English rendering.

Nihil novi (talk) 08:32, 19 April 2018 (UTC)

We're not there yet. First we need full citations; then I'm going to review each of these sources; then we'll continue the discussion. Bella has been very picky in what she quotes (see both below and above), so I'm not going to accept any of these just on her account. François Robere (talk) 08:51, 19 April 2018 (UTC)

Sorry but how can we even use this as a source, it does not give the actually volume number, or page. It is impossible to verify this, or understand the context (is seems to be confusingly written in both past and present tense for a start).Slatersteven (talk) 11:06, 19 April 2018 (UTC)

Three of these are already quoted in my proposal, a fourth is quoted from a later work, and the fifth is irrelevant here.

Winstone:

Hitler still faced an uncertain and potentially threatening international situation, meaning that the attitudes of the Western powers and the Soviet Union would figure into his thinking. Furthermore, it was not clear until later September precisely which Polish territory would remain in German hands... The situation was further complicated by the still unexplained failure of Stalin to immediately occupy eastern Poland, leaving open the possibility of greater gains than originally expected... Hitler, not unreasonably in the light of previous experience, still, entertained the hope that Britain and France might be open to a negotiated solution.

Here comes Bella's quote, where he lists the "Reststaat" as one of three possible "solutions". It is followed by this:

It is unclear at what level this approach [to Witos] was authorized but there undoubtedly were members of the Nazi bureaucracy seeking to create a puppet regime. Furthermore, a small minority of Polish politicians were open to such moves.

He then mentions Studnicki, and continues:

As late as 6 October, a day after reviewing the German victory parade in Warsaw, Hitler made a final 'peace offer' to the West which held out the prospect of some truncated form of Polish state under German mastery. However, even before Chamberlain's rejection on 12 October, the prospect of the Reststaat had receded. On 10 October... Goebbels noted: 'Poland is finished. No one talks about a restoration of the old Polish state any more.' Whilst the attitude of the West was clearly of significance, a crucial role was played by Stalin who made it clear that the USSR would not welcome any form of Polish state.

He then elaborates on how as early as 25 September the Nazis were establishing German control in Lodz and Krakow, held in parallel by military and civilian commanders.

Takeaways: Hitler's main considerations were of foreign relations (Britain, France and Russia); whatever possibility of a Reststaat that was raised wasn't concrete, while the Germans did make concrete moves towards German rule; someone did approached Witos, but it's unclear on whose behalf; and if the Germans wanted collaborators, there were willing ones.

Cooper (2000), pp. 138-139:

Cooper uses the term "sounding", which means "information or evidence ascertained as a preliminary step before taking action." [23] Cooper does not use the terms "tried", "failed", "begun" or "retracted", only "sounded". He also makes no specific claims about Witos's future role (ie premier). Regarding nobility (eg. Janusz Radziwiłł) he says The reaction of these men [to approaches from the Germans] is unknown. Then come the two paragraphs regarding mayors ("73%..." etc). He then states this:

In october 1941 the German embassy in Geneva reported to Berlin that a Polish exile circle in Switzerland, hostile to Sikorski... wanted to reach an understanding with the Germans aimed at creating a new Polish state. However, Joachim von Ribbentrop, the German foreign minister, ordered the contact between the Poles and the Germans to be broken off.

He mentions several other potential collaborators, including a former premier (Kozłowski) and a former finance minister.

Frankel (1998) p. 295:

The story of newspapers and periodicals published in Poland with German approval during the occupation touches necessarily upon the broader issue of Polish cooperation or noncooperation with the occupiers. It has been a point of pride to Poles that Poland produced no quislings, even though at the outset of the war the Germans made several efforts to establish a collaborationist Polish rump state. Dobroszycki examines how these issues were reflected in what came to be known among Poles as the "reptile press" (prasa gadzinowa) - a term whose etymology is discussed in the book's introduction...

This paragraph is about newspapers.

Mazower (2009):

There was actually a very brief indication - how serious it is hard to say - that the Germans were thinking of installing a Polish puppet government

Then follows Bella's quote. He then discusses Polish collaborators and the "pro-German tendency in Polish politics". Later he says this:

Typically, it was only after Stalingrad - and even then only haltingly and without the slightest real conviction - that the idea of promoting a common Polish-German crusade against Bolshevism started attracting the Germans.

He then suggests Hans Frank had sympathies for the Poles, and describes some of his advances.

Other pertinent material from that book:

Hitler still appears to have hoped to persuade the Western powers that German rule would actually bring stability to eastern Europe. On 6 October... he made a lengthy victory speech to the Reichstag. Still talking in terms of the continued existence of a Polish rump-state (Reststaat) - though this was by now window-dressing... Raising the prospect of a peace conference with England, he stressed that Germany and Russia were stabilising 'this zone of unrest'...

etc. etc.

And later:

It was, in other words, the strength of Polish resistance during the invasion which had been decisive in precluding a Czech political solution there (a "puppet state". -F.R.). But it is hard to imagine that the Germans would ever have treated the Poles as they treated the Czechs, given the decades of bad blood between them.

Mazower (2013)

As we know, Germany had not only annexed the western parts of the country, but also envisaged eventually taking over the General Government as well. In such circumstances, there was no way a Polish...

And therein ends my preview of that edition.

As for Gross, his views are summarised in a later article (2015) which I quoted above (the book Bella cites is from 1979) (p. 75):

What made it even less likely that the occupiers would sponsor a collaborationist government was that the model of the occupation, based on the principle of unlimited exploitation, specifically prohibited the Germans to contemplate granting any concessions to the subjugated populace... To the extent that collaboration means that the occupying power seeks to employ in its service those local institutions that wield authority, the institutions must be allowed - on terms specified by the occupier - to exercise that authority. Within the unlimited exploitation model, they could not have this opportunity.

François Robere (talk) 08:37, 19 April 2018 (UTC)

While I was writing the above, Bella added several more sources. Regarding those I'd like to first stress this: Given the amount of "cherry-picking" we've seen here (and you can see above for examples), I'm not going to accept any source for which I do not have access. Let's start with full citations and see where it goes. François Robere (talk) 08:48, 19 April 2018 (UTC)

I did suggest an idea, we could say "Unlike the situation in most German-occupied European countries where the Germans successfully installed collaborating authorities, in occupied Poland this was never achieved. Some historians have said that the Germans attempted to create a rump Polish state and failed due to polish resistance to the idea, others have suggested that these were half hearted approaches that lacked official backing or that Germany never in fact tried (or intended) to create a Polish state".Slatersteven (talk) 11:12, 19 April 2018 (UTC)

Bella already refused Piotr's suggestion from before we had all these sources: Poland did not have a collaborative government, due to the fact that neither the Germans nor the Poles were much interested in this option. Now that we have all these sources, I don't see any reason I should agree to it. The fact of the matter is Poland didn't see anything even remotely close to the setup of a collaborationist government, and not due to lack of collaborators. If they had, I would've expected to see whole books about it, not two and half sentences in a couple of sources from the eighties. François Robere (talk) 11:52, 19 April 2018 (UTC)

Slatersteven Actually, your version as you presented is ok, sounds good to me if others agree. I'm not talking about François Robert as "others," because looks like he will maintain that the Germans have never tried to create the collaborative government, and only the Poles insisted on collaboration, but the Germans refused, which is entirely twisted and untrue. I'll let you guys sort that out with him. I presented sources, and my job is done. Good luck. 2A01:110F:4505:DC00:C0C0:4D38:BF68:7EF3 (talk) 17:47, 19 April 2018 (UTC)

The sources you presented so far with actual citation have been picked bare. Frankel's quote, in particular, was such a terrific deceit that it transcends even your Gross (nee Lee) reference, which you since retracted and re-added, still under the wrong name. Your dozen or so new sources, which you provided with no citation, are worthy less than the bits they consume on Wikimedia's servers. Give the citations first, then we can see where these new sources - or rather old, given most of them are from the 1980's, and one from as early as 1964 (!) - lead. François Robere (talk) 18:34, 19 April 2018 (UTC)

Actually, why wait?

Bella quotes one sentence from Paczkowski (2014) pp. 41-43 (Bella's quote in angle quotes); this is what he actually says:

«It seems that the Third Reich was particularly interested in creating some kind of satellite state structure (Restsaat)», since Hitler still counted on coming to an agreement with France and - first and foremost - Great Britain. Such an eventuality was also taken into account in Moscow, although it is hard to envisage what kind of Soviet-German condominium might have emerged... Only on 25 September did Stalin state clearly, in a conversation with the German ambassador, that "he considered it an error to retain and independent, rump Polish state. The "Agreement on Borders and Friendship," signed during the night of 28-29 September in Moscow, assumed that... the responsibility for "the necessary state system" would be assumed on each side by the government of the Reich and the USSR respectively... Since neither Britain nor France had taken any military action against the Germans, the two totalitarian states considered they were free to deal as they liked with the territory the had divided between themselves.

And later:

Hitler imposed his "state system" on Polish territory somewhat more quickly than Stalin, since he saw no need to mimic democracy in the Soviet fashion (elections, appeals and agreements between small, threatened states and the USSR. -F.R.).

He then mentions the annexations and the GG.

Takeaways: The "attempts" weren't attempts, just table talk for diplomatic reasons. When this was no longer irrelevant, Hitler was quicker than Stalin to impose his vision of Poland on the Poles.

She also cites one sentence from Gutman (1989) p. 19. Here's a longer quote (Bella's quote in angle quotes):

During this initial stage [of the occupation], the occupied area served as a kind of trump card in the negotiations attempted with the Western Powers. «The Nazis were willing to permit the existence of a dwarfed Polish state (Reststaat)» congruent with the borders of the Generalgouvernement in exchange for Western recognition of the occupation of other parts of Poland and renunciation of the state of belligerency. But when it became clear that the Western democracies were unwilling to swallow the bait yet again... other plans were drawn up for the future of the Generalgouvernement as an area to be exploited by the Reich.

He then explains how the Germans started realizing the "Lebensraum".

Notice none of these say the Germans actually tried establishing a puppet government, let alone failed at doing so. Bella seems to be shifting her argument from "they failed" to "they were willing to try". This seems to support other sources, quoted above, that claim the whole thing was made for reasons of diplomacy and propaganda, rather than a genuine will in Polish governmental collaboration.

So again, we're not in a position to state the Germans "failed" because of a lack of Polish collaborators. François Robere (talk) 19:13, 19 April 2018 (UTC)

In the meanwhile, it seems Bella is trying to "win" the argument by virtue of quantity, rather than quality. It's again a whole lot of one-liners that simply repeat one another (how many of them mention Witos, without actually adding information to what we already have?), some dated, with partial citations (go figure) and no context [24][25][26][27][28]. I'm pretty sure some of them repeat each other's sources, which means double citation and WP:DUE violations. Note that as before she's not making any attempt to engage any of the existing RS, including those she tried to WP:CHERRYPICK from (Kochanski, Kunicki, Friedrich, Gross, Winstone, Cooper, Frankel, Mazower, Paczkowski and Gutman - all quoted above) - instead just looking for more and more one-liners. @Chumchum7 @Slatersteven: Are we in "disruptive edits" territory yet? François Robere (talk) 19:42, 19 April 2018 (UTC)

*Important note - I have added five more sources, including links, of Polish historians as well as interesting reference about Hitler's conversation with Galeazzo Ciano from October 1, 1939, but François Robere collapsed [29] my insertions making them less visible and is now also forbidding me from referencing my argument. Is this ok for him to act like that? 2A01:110F:4505:DC00:C0C0:4D38:BF68:7EF3 (talk) 20:26, 19 April 2018 (UTC)

Of course I collapsed the text. You're trying to kill the discussion by flooding it, just like you did by quoting entire pages from Gross (1977) twice (three times overall) for no apparent reason. It's the same tactic you used in the previous discussion [30]: instead of dealing with the sources we already have, most of which contradict your assertion, you're frantically looking for new sources that could, maybe - if framed in some way and picked just right - support them. Some of these are dated (1964? 1945?), most give no new information (so you have another source that says that Witos refused some offer. So? We already knew that), most are not quoted properly (no full citations to be seen, and only some of the sources include links), and most of those that were already reviewed ended up contradicting you. You're complaining you can't brings ref? Kochanski, Kunicki, Friedrich, Winstone, Frankel, Paczkowski and Gutman are all "your" sources - face up to what they say! François Robere (talk) 21:30, 19 April 2018 (UTC)

François Robere, it might help if you provided the paginations of your quotations. Nihil novi (talk) 00:09, 20 April 2018 (UTC)

Again, most of them are provided in the text already (and this repetition is annoying). If you want those of the new sources, I'll add them immediately. François Robere (talk) 04:46, 20 April 2018 (UTC)

Which "text" are you referring to? The texts of the above citations (which, so far as I can see, do not give the pages)? The texts of the notes to the "Collaboration in German-occupied Poland" article?

The purpose of my request is to facilitate examination of the source texts by those interested.

Thank you.

Nihil novi (talk) 05:17, 20 April 2018 (UTC)

Of course.

I'm referring to my proposal for the passage, which is cited at the beginning of this discussion. It includes full citations + quotes. François Robere (talk) 07:34, 20 April 2018 (UTC)

What needs to be shown, and what the sources say

There's a real problem here with WP:CHERRYPICKING. To explain the problem, let's first break down the issue.

Breaking down the issue

The phrase "In Poland the Germans failed to establish a puppet state" requires showing either of the following:

1. A source stating that the Germans tried forming a puppet state in Poland and failed.
2. A source or sources stating all of the following (though it will be WP:SYNTH in the case of multiple sources):*
   1. That the Germans wished to form a puppet state
   2. That they tried doing so**
   3. That for whatever reason their attempt/s did not succeed. To imply that that reason they failed was Poles' refusal to collaborate, three more assertions need to proved:
   4. That they contacted Polish leaders with these suggestions
   5. That these leaders refused
   6. That as a result of that refusal the Germans changed their plans

* Note that several of these would be compromised if we'd learn that the Germans ignored or persecuted leaders who were willing to collaborate.

** What constitutes an attempt is arguable, but I'd contend that just making a phone call isn't enough in this context.

What the sources say

I'm attaching several (longer) quotes that give a more comprehensive background on the issue, as well as demonstrate how Bella picks specific passages that seem to serve her purpose when shown out of context. As you'll see, none of the sources make the assertion that the Germans "tried and failed" in forming a puppet state, and several directly contradict it.

The sources show several recurring themes:

• The Germans discussed a Reststaat or a "puppet state" with regards to foreign relations, and specifically as a way to pacify the Western powers and the USSR. When the West was no longer interested, they dropped the discussion.
• They made no concrete moves in that direction, and they did make specific and concrete preparations for administering the area on their own (Browning (2004) has a lot on that from p. 15 onwards).
• Nazi ideology rejected the notion of self-rule for Slavic people, and in the case of Poland was accompanied by a longstanding historical animosity. For the Nazis to allow the Poles self-rule would constitute a significant deviation from the very core of their beliefs.
• Suggestions of collaboration flowed both ways, but in no case did the Nazi authorities sanction an official approach to any Polish politician or political party, and no "unofficial" approach - by local GG or Wehrmacht officials - ever went beyond a "preliminary talk" (or "sounding", to use Cooper's terms). In fact, the Nazis routinely ignored proposals from Polish politicians, and they gave no preferential treatment to those who were willing to collaborate, instead treating all members of Polish intelligentsia with the same brutality, regardless of ideology or political affiliation.

Following are the sources. Bella's quotes in green, highlights mine.

Examples

Kochanski (2012) pp. 97-98: At the Start the Germans did indeed search for collaborators. Wincenty Witos, leader of the Peasant Party and a former prime minister, was offered, but declined, his release from Gestapo imprisonment in exchange for becoming prime minister in a collaborationist government. The Germans obtained the release of Prince Janusz Radziwill from the Soviet-occupied zone and suggested that he form a polish government subservient to the Reich, but he declined. In October 1939, an activist in the pre-war Polish fascist party, Oböz Narodowo Radykalny (National Radical Camp), Andrzej Swietlicki approached the Germans with some fellow-travelers offering collaboration. Professor Wladyslaw Studnicki was another potential collaborator: intensely anti-Soviet, he was in favour of German-Polish collaboration against the Soviet Union. [Story of Studnicki's attempts and incarceration ...] By April 1940, Hitler had forbidden the German military commanders to hold further talks with Poles about any degree of independence. During the war Poland was very proud of its record in never having had a 'Quisling', but the reason was 'not because a sufficiently prominent person could not be persuaded to cooperate, but because the Germans had no interest in granting the Poles authority.' Gross (2015), cited as Lee (2015) pp. 75-77: It follows from our paradigm that there was no suitable structural framework for collaboration in the Generalgouvemement. What made it even less likely that the occupiers would sponsor a collaborationist government was that the model of occupation, based on the principle of unlimited exploitation, specifically prohibited the Germans to contemplate granting any concessions to the subjugated populace. The logic of unlimited exploitation imposed no limits on the quality of sacrifices that could be requested of the subdued population, nor did it allow for justification of any delay in fulfilling them. To the extent that collaboration means that the occupying power seeks to employ in its service those local institutions that wield authority, the institutions must be allowed—on terms specified by the occupier—to exercise that authority. Within the unlimited exploitation model, they could not have this opportunity. Nonetheless, perhaps because the logic of their own rule in the East was never stated definitely or, probably, even understood by the Nazis themselves, they made some half-serious explorations into the possibility of sponsoring a collaborationist government in the GG. Since the presence or absence of such government was a crucial factor for the plight of the occupied countries in Europe during the Second World War, I think that we should briefly describe these attempts to find collaborationist in Polland (even though we know that they were doomed to failure), for there was a certain internal logic to them. Winstone (2014) (note the passage does not mention any actual attempts, only discussions meant to appease the West and the USSR): ...Hitler still faced an uncertain and potentially threatening international situation, meaning that the attitudes of the Western powers and the Soviet Union would figure into his thinking. Furthermore, it was not clear until later September precisely which Polish territory would remain in German hands... The situation was further complicated by the still unexplained failure of Stalin to immediately occupy eastern Poland, leaving open the possibility of greater German gains than originally expected... At the same time, Hitler, not unreasonably in the light of previous experience, still entertained the hope that Britain and France might be open to a negotiated solution. At a conference on board Hitler's train on 12 September 1939, three options were considered: a new partition of Poland along the demarcation line agreed with the USSR, the creation of a quasi-autonomous rump Polish state (Reststaat), or the subdivision of this remnant to create an independent west Ukrainian state from the Galicia region of south-eastern Poland [which was unlikely ...] However, the concept of the Reststaat remained under serious consideration until early October. An intriguing development in this respect was an admittedly unsubtle German attempt to persuade Wincenty Witos, leader of the peasant-based People's Party and thrice prime minister of Poland in the 1920s, to head a collaborationist government. He was arrested by the Gestapo on 16 September and offered freedom in exchange for his agreement, an offer which he refused. It is unclear at what level this approach was authorized but there undoubtedly were members of the Nazi bureaucracy seeking to create a puppet regime. Furthermore, a small minority of Polish politicians were open to such moves. The most notable was Wladyslaw Studnicki, an outspokenly Germanophile conservative who had played a leading cooperative role during the previous occupation in the First World War. Even after the creation of the GG, Studnicki bombarded various administrators and soldiers with memoranda for Polish-German collaboration against the USSR, despite his growing disillusionment with Nazi brutality... As late as 6 October, a day after reviewing the German victory parade in Warsaw, Hitler made a final 'peace offer' to the West which held out the prospect of some truncated form of Polish state under German mastery. However, even before Chamberlain's rejection on 12 October, the prospect of the Reststaat had receded. On 10 October... Goebbels noted: 'Poland is finished. No one talks about a restoration of the old Polish state any more.' Whilst the attitude of the West was clearly of significance, a crucial role was played by Stalin who made it clear that the USSR would not welcome any form of Polish state. Cooper (2000), pp. 138-139: There is some evidence of German attempts at recruiting Polish collaborators. In the early days of occupation, the Germans envisaged the creation of a 'token Polish state' — a Reststaat. Two groups within Polish society were sounded ("sounding: information or evidence ascertained as a preliminary step before taking action."[31] -F.R.) out about their willingness to cooperate in such a project. In March 1940 the Germans approached the peasant leader Wincenty Witos, who at the time was in detention in Czechoslovakia. In spite of his refusal to cooperate, the conditions f his confinement remained very generous. After five months in Rzeszow, Witos was taken to a jail in Berlin for another five weeks and, upon release, committed to a sanatorium in Potsdam. Another group approached by the Germans were prominent aristocrats holding conservative views and with traditions of loyalty to and collaboration with the Austro-Hungarian monarchy before the First World War. One of them was professor Stanislaw Estreicher; the names of Princes Z,dzislaw Lubomirski and Janusz Radziwill and that of Adam Ronikier were mentioned as other candidates. The reaction of these men is unknown. [Two paragraphs about German mayors as an example of "successful attempts of finding willing collaborators among the Polish population" ...] The German invasion of Russia elicited mixed feelings from the Poles. There were Poles in exile in England and Italy who regarded the Germans as the lesser of two evils facing Poland. As the Germans kept advancing into Soviet territory in 1941, they believed that in the face of imminent Soviet defeat the Poles should try to establish a compromise with Germany. In October 1941 the German embassy in Geneva reported to Berlin that a Polish exile circle in Switzerland, hostile to Sikorski's Polish government-in-exile, wanted to reach an understanding with the Germans aimed at creating a new Polish state. However, Joachim von Ribbentrop, the German foreign minister, ordered the contact between Poles and Germans to be broken off. Frankel (1998) p. 295 (this isn't even about collaboration, only the perception of collaboration): The story of newspapers and periodicals published in Poland with German approval during the occupation touches necessarily upon the broader issue of Polish cooperation or noncooperation with the occupiers. It has been a point of pride to Poles that Poland produced no quislings, even though at the outset of the war the Germans made several efforts to establish a collaborationist Polish rump state. Dobroszycki examines how these issues were reflected in what came to be known among Poles as the "reptile press" (prasa gadzinowa) - a term whose etymology is discussed in the book's introduction... Mazower (2009): There was actually a very brief indication — how serious it is hard to say — that the Germans were thinking of installing a Polish puppet government. In mid-September, before Hitler had made his final decision about Poland's fate, the Gestapo arrested the veteran Peasant Party chief and three-time prime minister, Wincenty Witos, and offered to release him if he would collaborate. Witos refused, as he did on several other occasions. But although German policy changed sharply after this, other Poles certainly continued to feel drawn to Berlin, just as they had through the 1930s, and even earlier — the pro-German tendency in Polish politics went back too far to disappear overnight. Many people remembered the First World War, when the Central Powers had proclaimed an independent Poland. Wtadystaw Studnicki, a follower of the great First World War advocate of Polish—German cooperation, Josef Pilsudski, had been involved in the 1916 German—Austrian proclamation and now he pressed the Germans to set up a Polish government once again so that it could use the Polish army against the Soviets. More ambiguous was the case of another former Pilsudskiite, Leon Kozlowski. After being jailed and tortured in the Lubyanka prison in Moscow, he then fled west and, at a press conference the Germans organized in January 1942, he predicted that the Soviets would lose the war. He deliberately avoided making pro-German comments, but even so, there was speculation that the Germans had lined him up to head a collaborationist government. In fact, in 1942 almost no one in Berlin was thinking of such a thing: the Reich's intentions for Poland pointed in a very different direction.Typically, it was only after Stalingrad — and even then only haltingly and without the slightest real conviction that the idea of promoting a common Polish—German crusade against Bolshevism started attracting the Germans... Other pertinent material from that book: Hitler still appears to have hoped to persuade the Western powers that German rule would actually bring stability to eastern Europe. On 6 October... he made a lengthy victory speech to the Reichstag. Still talking in terms of the continued existence of a Polish rump-state (Reststaat) - though this was by now window-dressing... Raising the prospect of a peace conference with England, he stressed that Germany and Russia were stabilising 'this zone of unrest'. etc. etc. And later: It was, in other words, the strength of Polish resistance during the invasion which had been decisive in precluding a Czech political solution there (a "puppet state". -F.R.). But it is hard to imagine that the Germans would ever have treated the Poles as they treated the Czechs, given the decades of bad blood between them. Mazower (2013) (complete text not available, but you get the drift): As we know, Germany had not only annexed the western parts of the country, but also envisaged eventually taking over the General Government as well. In such circumstances, there was no way a Polish... Paczkowski (2014) pp. 41-43: It seems that the Third Reich was particularly interested in creating some kind of satellite state structure (Restsaat), since Hitler still counted on coming to an agreement with France and - first and foremost - Great Britain. Such an eventuality was also taken into account in Moscow, although it is hard to envisage what kind of Soviet-German condominium might have emerged... Only on 25 September did Stalin state clearly, in a conversation with the German ambassador, that "he considered it an error to retain an independent, rump Polish state." The "Agreement on Borders and Friendship," signed during the night of 28-29 September in Moscow, assumed that... the responsibility for "the necessary state system" would be assumed on each side by the government of the Reich and the USSR respectively... Since neither Britain nor France had taken any military action against the Germans, the two totalitarian states considered they were free to deal as they liked with the territory the had divided between themselves. And later: Hitler imposed his "state system" on Polish territory somewhat more quickly than Stalin, since he saw no need to mimic democracy in the Soviet fashion (elections, appeals and agreements between small, threatened states and the USSR. -F.R.). He then mentions the annexations and the GG. Gutman (1989) p. 19: During this initial stage [of the occupation], the occupied area served as a kind of trump card in the negotiations attempted with the Western Powers. The Nazis were willing to permit the existence of a dwarfed Polish state (Reststaat) congruent with the borders of the Generalgouvernement in exchange for Western recognition of the occupation of other parts of Poland and renunciation of the state of belligerency. But when it became clear that the Western democracies were unwilling to swallow the bait yet again... other plans were drawn up for the future of the Generalgouvernement as an area to be exploited by the Reich. Kunicki (2001) p. 206, 218: On 16 September 1939, the Gestapo arrested Witos, who during his imprisonment was offered freedom in exchange for collaboration. He was the intended candidate for the Prime Minister’s post in a collaborationist government. Despite Witos’ categorical refusal, the Germans repeated their propositions in March 1940 and in the spring of 1941... Apart from the initial period of German rule in Poland, the evidence presented here demonstrates that the numerous rumours of the German projects to create a Polish puppet state were groundless. But persistent rumours of a Quisling regime were due to several factors. First, there is evidence that the German propaganda deliberately leaked such misleading information, which targeted the unity of the anti-German coalition as well as the position of the Polish Government-in-Exile. (Cited without quote) Kunicki (2012) p. 56: [The Wehrmacht occupation authorities] quickly lost out, however, to the advocates of a a more repressive course in occupation policy. Hitler rejected any collaborationist arrangements in Poland, mostly on the basis of his racial and historical contempt for Slavic peoples, his perception of the Poles as an obstacle to establishing Lebensraum, and his wish to completely eradicate Polish nationalism. A brief discussion - partly window dressing, partly a peace feeler - about the creation of a Polish rump state (Reststaat) died in October 1939. (Cited without quote) KPF (2005) p. 715: Because of a lack of interest on the part of the Nazi leadership, there was no basis for state collaboration. On the contrary, overtures even by Polish fascists and other staunch anti-Semites were rebuffed by the occupiers. (Ignored) Garlinski (1985) p. 32: The Germans became interested at first in Władysław Studnicki's suggestions, which reached the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but when it turned out that the Western powers were not going to allows themselves to be misled by Hitler's 'peace' initiative, he ceased to be of interest to them.

A note on sourcing and correct citations

• The "World War II: Crucible of the Contemporary World" reference should be attributed to Gross (writer), not Lee (editor).
• The Contemporary Review vol. 160 wasn't written by A. Strahan. Mr. Strahan, a publisher, passed away in 1918; the volume was written in 1942.
• Mr. Dodsley of the Annual Register suffered a similar unfortunate fate 150 years earlier, so he's unlikely to have written any work cited here.
• "Insight Guides Poland" is a travel guide. With all due respect to Discovery, these are rarely RS for this sort of article.
• Neither is "The Essential Guide to Being Polish: 50 Facts & Facets of Nationhood", which was previously cited here.
• If you make a claim about an event taking place in 1940 and your only sources are news bits from 1940-1943, then you're in trouble. If in addition you also have a 1945 book, and only that, then you're still in trouble. It's been almost 80 years - find something newer.

François Robere (talk) 07:34, 20 April 2018 (UTC)

Arbitrary break

This is getting overly long. So lets just discus now my new suggested edit (and sod all else).

"Unlike the situation in most German-occupied European countries where the Germans successfully installed collaborating authorities, in occupied Poland this was never achieved. Some historians have said that the Germans attempted to create a rump Polish state and failed due to polish resistance to the idea, others have suggested that these were half hearted approaches that lacked official backing or that Germany never in fact tried (or intended) to create a Polish state"

Is this acceptable please just yes or no, not walls of one sentence quotes)? If we cannot come to an agreement the an RFC or even arbcom may be needed.Slatersteven (talk) 17:39, 19 April 2018 (UTC)1

• Yes 2A01:110F:4505:DC00:C0C0:4D38:BF68:7EF3 (talk) 17:47, 19 April 2018 (UTC)

Ah, no. Let's see full citations for everything first, then evaluate what Bella has (other than what I already analyzed above, which in some cases was extremely picky), then discuss how to phrase it. It wouldn't have gotten this long if Bella hasn't dug up sources from as far back as 1964 and 1942 to try to establish her claims, and instead accepted the "millennial" sources instead. But either way - length shouldn't be an excuse to accept a sub-par version that doesn't reflect recent - and in some cases authoritative - sources. François Robere (talk) 18:26, 19 April 2018 (UTC)

We have plenty of citations we can use, for all of those statements. But fine, each person put the best source you have below this post.Slatersteven (talk) 09:13, 20 April 2018 (UTC)

My problem isn't with what we have, my problem is with the rush of references Bella just added without full citations or context [32]. If she wants any of these to have any merit, she needs to provide the full citations first (although I've already reviewed Paczkowski (2014) and Gutman (1989), and they don't say what she claim they say). I've assembled this list of sources, which shows you the difference between what she cites and what the source actually says. François Robere (talk) 09:34, 20 April 2018 (UTC)

*Unwillingness to compromise by François Robere - I have presented 22 references that prove the Germans have tried to establish a collaboration Polish State (Reststaat) in the early stage of occupation. If necessary, I can provide more. Undermining given sources by saying they are "too old," or "the historians cite each other" as well as overflowing this talk page by adding cherry-picked passages from just a few selected sources plus own interpretation is not appropriate. 2A01:110F:4505:DC00:ECD5:5E3:439D:CBFC (talk) 14:19, 20 April 2018 (UTC)

Bella, that's enough.

Firstly, Your sources don't "prove" anything, and many are indeed way too old to draw conclusions (your earliest, I believe, is a newsflash from 1940-1942), especially where recent RS claim otherwise (WP:AGE MATTERS).

Second, as I clearly demonstrated above https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Talk%3ACollaboration_in_German-occupied_Poland&type=revision&diff=837347506&oldid=837335313], you've been WP:CHERRYPICKING to the extreme. Quoting a scholar's premise and reaching the opposite conclusion is WP:OR.

Third, you haven't yet explained a single recent source that contradicts you, nor agreed that it does. You're trying to find more and more source to say something that you can quote, but none of them negates the current sources. We already have sources that disagree with you. You can't ignore them.

Finally I recall you rejecting a compromise that I accepted several weeks ago [33][34]. Ironically, it's this rejection that led us towards this level of scrutiny of your sources.

Can you explain any of this? François Robere (talk) 14:58, 20 April 2018 (UTC)

Your proposal suggests a WP:FALSEBALANCE that isn't supported by any of the recent (and even not so recent) sources. I can compromise on phrasing, or on the inclusion of some minor fact or another, or on whether a borderline-relevant source is really relevant, but I won't compromise on accuracy. This "he said, she said" style of text gives undue weight to sources that are either extremely old, and surpassed by newer sources (WP:AGE MATTERS, and 1960's is pretty old in this domain); or to vague mentions of "something that may have been said to someone" (rather than something clear, concrete and well-documented); and furthermore, is clearly contradicted by RS that state that there were willing collaborators as eminent as the former Polish premier. We should summarise "the most reliable sources on the topic" (WP:STICKTOSOURCE), not manufacture a controversy.

I stand by my earlier proposal:

Unlike in most of occupied Europe, Poland did not have a collaborationist government. The Germans made several early attempts at acquiring senior Polish political collaborators, targeting mainly peasantry leaders and nobility, but were turned down. These attempts, fueled in part by the military's approach towards the occupation, as well as by diplomatic and propagandaistic needs, ended by October 1939. Nazi racial policies, along with its intentions for the future of the conquered territories, meant the Germans had no interest in Polish governmental collaboration and they would ignore such advances by Polish pro-German politicians throughout the war. Accordingly, the German army made preparations for a military administration of the occupied territories, while civil authorities were working towards a civilian one, with the prospects of a future annexation to Germany.

It's well-phrased, subtle and concise, and most importantly: accurate, and does not mislead the reader any which way. François Robere (talk) 15:28, 20 April 2018 (UTC)

We do not dismiss sources because they are not modern enough, and [[35]], 2014. [[36]], 2011. Do you need any more? This has now reached the stage of tenditious editing and I am asking for DS sanctions to be used.Slatersteven· (talk) 16:48, 20 April 2018 (UTC)

That's not what I said. What I said, and it's per WP:AGE MATTERS, is that recent sources supersede older sources in fields that are subject to frequent changes: older sources may be inaccurate because new information has been brought to light, new theories proposed, or vocabulary changed... Be sure to check that older sources have not been superseded, especially if it is likely the new discoveries or developments have occurred in the last few years. This field has certainly seen "new discoveries" since The Contemporary Review, vol. 160 - one of Bella's sources - was published in 1942.

I've been very clear all along about what's needed here: A source that states that "after invading Poland the Germans tried to instill a local puppet government, but none of the statesman/woman they approached agreed to do so, and eventually they decided to rule it directly." [37] None of your sources make that assertion, or even come close:

• Winstone (2014): This source was already cited, and you can see more quotes above. What I see in the page you cite to has nothing to do with this discussion: For several pages (starting at p. 29, after the "Reststaat" concept is rejected, which I quoted earlier) he describes the "lack of clarity" surrounding the GG - what it should do, how big it should be, how it should be managed etc. At no point does he suggest the Germans tried anything else, and even the implication that Hitler wanted to try something else is given through an account of Frank, whose veracity he questions throughout: Frank was even discussing the possibility that the GG would be 'a subject of negotiation in the coming peace settlement', adding rather implausibly that 'the GG plays a colossal role in the meetings of President Roosevelt. Even less convincing was the assertion that it would serve as a 'proud example of the mild and noble treatment of the Polish people'..." So that's Frank from March and May 1940, the same Frank who in December 2nd 1939 said that the GG was "the first colonial territory of the German nation, and who two months earlier (October 1939) heard Hitler make clear that Polish intelligentsia was to be prevented from becoming a leadership class. Hitler did not elaborate on how this was to be achieved, but the ongoing terror campaign could have left little doubt. This is followed by a rather ugly description of what Hitler intended for Poland, from "corruption and epidemics" to "work slaves". In summary: After the author describes the demise of the "rump state" in pp. 28-29 (mentioning, for example, that the army was already busy establishing its "administrative structures" as early as September 25th), he goes to describe the mess the GG was in, and Frank's frequent and disingenuous portrayals of it as something grand and successful. It's a very interesting read, but it has nothing to do with the subject at hand.
• Baranowski (2011) pp.234-235: From the outset, the German attack was an ideologically motivated total war aimed at the destruction of the Polish nation... Although Hitler briefly considered the establishment of a semi-autonomous Polish rump state, he soon abandoned that idea. His dream of a living space farther to the east and his fury at the Poles for refusing to accept the reintegration of Danzig into the Reich [in May 1939]... determined the outcome. Summoning his generals to...the Berghof, on August 22nd while Joachim Ribbentrop was in Moscow to sign the Nazi-Soviet Pact, Hitler made it clear that he sought the complete elimination of Poland. "Have no pity,", he ordered hsi listeners. The campaign was to be carried out with "the greatest brutality and without mercy." This does not support your claims.
• Kershaw (2001): Hitler was still contemplating hte possibility of some form of Polish poltiical entity at the end of the month [September 1939]. He held out the prospect of recreating a truncated Polish state... for the last time in his Reichstag Speech of 6 October, as part of his 'peace offer' to the West. But by then the provisional arrangements set up to administer occupied Poland had in effect already eliminated what remained of such a prospect... they had created their own dynamic militating towards a rump Polish territory - the 'General Government', as it came to be known - alongside the substantial parts of the former Polish state to be incorporated in the Reich itself. This, again, does not state anything beyond "Hitler contemplated the possibility", and again only in the context of diplomacy. He also reiterates that the military was already effectively controlling Poland by October, which sits well with other sources stating the Germans made preparations to that effect (rather than to Polish autonomy). Finally, he calls the GG the "rump Polish territory" (Winstone does it too, in a different context).
• Dobroszycki (1994) I'm not sure if it's in Polish or English, but it's not available online. I'd look up a physical copy if it'll be relevant, but please provide a full citation and a short quote before I do.
• Kunicki (2012) p. 56: This is already cited and quoted above: Hitler rejected any collaborationist arrangements in Poland, mostly on the basis of his racial and historical contempet for Slavi people, his perception of the Poles as an obstacle to establishing Lebenstraum, and his wish to completely eradicate Polish nationalism. He then describes the discussion of the "Reststaat" as partly window-dressing, partly a peace feeler that died in October 1939.

None of these support the statement that the Germans "tried" and "failed" forming a "puppet state". François Robere (talk) 20:27, 20 April 2018 (UTC)

• Oppose current suggestion by Slatersteven. What needs to be emphasized is that the Germans did not try hard to set up a puppet government, and that from 1940 they pursued direct rule and no longer sent out feelers on the national level.Icewhiz (talk) 19:06, 20 April 2018 (UTC)

Maybe I was not clear, this just replaces the first line, the rest of the paragraph covers all of that.Slatersteven (talk) 19:15, 20 April 2018 (UTC)

On a second read, I am not as opposed. "successfully" should be removed (implies an attempt and failure on lack of success). "this was never achieved" should be replaced with "this did not happen" - so as not to suggest in our voice that this was a serious goal or attempt by the Germans.Icewhiz (talk) 20:03, 20 April 2018 (UTC)

So you're essentially supporting my revision: "Unlike in most of occupied Europe, Poland did not have a collaborationist government. The Germans made several early attempts at acquiring senior Polish political collaborators, targeting mainly peasantry leaders and nobility, but were turned down." (first two sentences) François Robere (talk) 20:30, 20 April 2018 (UTC)

• Not a single RS supports the assertion made in the proposal. See here. François Robere (talk) 22:44, 20 April 2018 (UTC)

*Important note - My references are hidden now beneath crowds of writing entered by FR, therefore, I'm attaching one more source from Institute of National Remembrance below. To save you the time of endless reading it's going to be the biography summary of Wincenty Witos.

In September 1939, he (Wincenty Witos) was arrested by the Germans. He refused to cooperate in attempts to establish a collaborative government...[38]

For those who are unfamiliar with IPN here is the link.[39] I am assuming even this source to be undermined, twisted and disputed by François Robere. His behavior and total unwillingness to compromise is astonishing and unacceptable. I'll also [40]ask for DS sanctions to be applied I think. 2A01:110F:4505:DC00:F54A:A128:B0FA:5C86 (talk) 05:43, 21 April 2018 (UTC)

The 2010 Institute of National Remembrance book that you link to above, published on the 65th anniversary of Wincenty Witos' 1945 death, confirms that the Germans attempted to get his cooperation in setting up a collaborationist Polish government.

I recently read something to the effect that the Germans contacted Witos also before World War II with a similar proposal; that he informed the Polish government of it; and that he returned to Poland before the war despite his earlier, 1932 conviction in the Brześć trials. Have you seen anything to that effect?

Nihil novi (talk) 06:52, 21 April 2018 (UTC)

Yes, I have. Witos was contacted by the Germans shortly before the fighting started (in Czechoslovakia if I remember correctly) and several times after the September Campaign. He refused every time and ended up in the light prison. Others who refused to collaborate were not so lucky, they ended up dead, except Radziwiłł who personally knew Göring. PS--> I anticipate a massive deluge of text now from François Robere so our exchange will be buried soon. I'm not sure what to do to keep my reasoning afloat and visible. 2A01:110F:4505:DC00:5B:4BEE:2C81:ADDF (talk) 07:39, 21 April 2018 (UTC)

Yes, it's like being under an avalanche.

If all the pertinent information in the 2010 book published by the Institute of National Remembrance can be obtained, that would probably be sufficient to support Wincenty Witos' candidacy. And that should, even by itself, be enough to signal the reality of the question of potential Polish political collaboration with Germany.

I don't think we need second-guess the Germans on their motives. Adolf Hitler's career as chancellor and Fuehrer confirmed the reliability of his strategic plans as presented in Mein Kampf. And he did not always put his directives—for example, on the Final Solution—on Fuehrer-autographed pieces of paper.

Nihil novi (talk) 09:11, 21 April 2018 (UTC)

You're quite picky in your complaints (eg. Bella quoting complete pages from Gross, or adding 20+ one-liners on one page isn't an "avalanche"), but as long as you're dropping the suggestion the Germans "failed" at this you're basically accepting what I suggested all along. François Robere (talk) 15:16, 21 April 2018 (UTC)

It might be worth noting this [[41]], so it seems it was even part of Germans/soviet negotiations fore a while.Slatersteven (talk) 08:47, 21 April 2018 (UTC)

Yes, thank you for reminding us of William L. Shirer's The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich: A History of Nazi Germany. It might be well to include the Soviets' views, given here, on the idea of setting up a Polish puppet state.

Nihil novi (talk) 09:29, 21 April 2018 (UTC)

Yes, the Soviet position also might be worth looking at since the Soviets and the Nazis were allied at that time.2A01:110F:4505:DC00:5B:4BEE:2C81:ADDF (talk) 10:05, 21 April 2018 (UTC)

Ah... The Soviet position was up there with the rest of the sources for a while. I'm surprised you guys are just now waking up for this. François Robere (talk) 15:31, 21 April 2018 (UTC)

Per Icewizz suggestions

"Unlike the situation in most German-occupied European countries where the Germans installed collaborating authorities, in occupied Poland this did not happen. Some historians have said that the Germans attempted to create a rump Polish state and failed due to polish resistance to the idea, others have suggested that these were half hearted approaches that lacked official backing or that Germany never in fact tried (or intended) to create a Polish state"

Is this OK?Slatersteven (talk) 08:42, 21 April 2018 (UTC)

• Support per my comments in the wall of text above.Icewhiz (talk) 09:46, 21 April 2018 (UTC)

I myself prefer your phrasing Slatersteven ---->> Unlike the situation in most German-occupied European countries where the Germans successfully installed collaborating authorities, in occupied Poland this was never achieved... because it shows that the Germans (in the early stage of the occupation) have initiated the efforts to create a doll state, (so-called Polish Reststaat). Also, it is important to mention at least the name of Wincenty Witos in the following paragraph.2A01:110F:4505:DC00:5B:4BEE:2C81:ADDF (talk) 09:49, 21 April 2018 (UTC)

What about this? Unlike the situation in most German-occupied European countries where the Germans installed collaborating authorities, in occupied Poland, this was never completed.? Does it make sense? 2A01:110F:4505:DC00:5B:4BEE:2C81:ADDF (talk) 10:17, 21 April 2018 (UTC)

"Never completed" in our voice implies an actual serious attempt that was intended to be completed, a point which many historians dispute (saying these were half hearted feelers).Icewhiz (talk) 10:33, 21 April 2018 (UTC)

That's correct then, illustrates the genuine facts. This is what I'm suggesting as a settlement then --->> this was never completed ( originally failed against FR change did not happen --------> to never completed) 2A01:110F:4505:DC00:5B:4BEE:2C81:ADDF (talk) 11:18, 21 April 2018 (UTC)

The problem is we also have sources that say it was never tired, or was only an insincere or halfhearted effort. So we cannot say any one of the scenarios is true in Wikipedias voice.Slatersteven (talk) 16:01, 21 April 2018 (UTC)

Wait, so you're now dropping the word "failed"? @Nihil novi @Slatersteven: That's exactly what I was suggesting all along - the whole point in these two discussions [42][43] was that Bella refused to do it [44] (she still does - you can see her comment above), and now you're supporting just that? You can call me the "bad guy" all you want, but the bottom line is you're doing just what I pushed for, if in a weaker and less accurate form. François Robere (talk) 15:19, 21 April 2018 (UTC)

So you agree with my suggested edit.Slatersteven (talk) 15:59, 21 April 2018 (UTC)

Of course I do. It's inaccurate (the second part about "some historians" will obviously call for a "who?" tag), but it was the whole point of this entire discussion. Mind, we now have to discuss the rest of the paragraph, and I already know what direction that will take... François Robere (talk) 16:07, 21 April 2018 (UTC)

Good. So it looks like we can implement this and put this long discussion to bed. The "some"s should be reffed (I think there are too many to place inline, but if less than 4 this could perhaps be attributed inline and not as a ref).Icewhiz (talk) 16:13, 21 April 2018 (UTC)

So Bella do you agree to my edit (the new one) if so we can go ahead and then argue about the next part...?Slatersteven (talk) 16:10, 21 April 2018 (UTC)

Is the second paragraph going to be as you have proposed Slatersteven? PS Also, I would like to hear the evaluation of others earlier involved that relapsed FR and Itzewiz. I'm not the only one who was disagreeing with FR. I don't want to decide for them.2A01:110F:4505:DC00:745F:F7CD:8E9C:6DCB (talk) 18:09, 21 April 2018 (UTC)

I have only proposed one paragraph.Slatersteven (talk) 18:19, 21 April 2018 (UTC)

O.K. Let's see what other previously involved say. I'll go with the majority. Should we cast votes? If yes, could you set it up Slatersteven? Thanks. 2A01:110F:4505:DC00:745F:F7CD:8E9C:6DCB (talk) 19:05, 21 April 2018 (UTC)

Can we have a specific proposal? There's no freakin' way I'm reading all the rants and walls of text above (and it's only a day or two's worth!) Volunteer Marek (talk) 19:20, 21 April 2018 (UTC)

Amen.

Nihil novi (talk) 22:39, 21 April 2018 (UTC)

Which other German-occupied countries failed to set up collaborative governments?

Nihil novi (talk) 22:39, 21 April 2018 (UTC)

Volunteer Marek,Nihil novi, E-960,MyMoloboaccount,Poeticbent,Piotr Konieczny aka Prokonsul Piotrus Whether the Germans "failed" to establish Polish puppet government as it is now (because of Witos's refusal to collaborate) or "this did not happen" as FR desires. My compromise is "it was never completed" or Slatersteven earlier proposal "it was never achieved". — Preceding unsigned comment added by 2A01:110F:4505:DC00:52C:705E:CD91:A71 (talk) 01:30, 22 April 2018 (UTC)

I propose "such efforts came to nought."

Nihil novi (talk) 05:39, 22 April 2018 (UTC)

It is unclear whether the Germans were serious in any of their efforts, or whether these were half-hearted to begin with.Icewhiz (talk) 07:01, 22 April 2018 (UTC)

That may be said of many situations involving people. Nevertheless, Wincenty Witos and some others apparently took the German offers at face value and declined to accept them. That bears noting.

Nihil novi (talk) 07:55, 22 April 2018 (UTC)

And others - including a former finance minister and a former premier - approached the Germans on their own accord, and the Germans refused. Mind they incarcerated and executed most all of these people, regardless of their willingness to collaborate. François Robere (talk) 08:00, 22 April 2018 (UTC)

We do have several sources suggesting they only ever considered a "Reststaat" as part of the diplomatic contacts with Britain, the USSR & Co. This accounts for why they would contact Witos, but never make any other moves in that direction. François Robere (talk) 08:00, 22 April 2018 (UTC)

I agree it bears noting that there were early German approaches to Witos and some others - this doesn't mean these approaches were approved or endorsed by the German higher-ups (as opposed to a local initiative that would've been presented for approval if there was a plausible figure) or that these were serious attempts (and not part of wider diplomacy with other nations). Slatersteven's suggested edit, in the second sentence,states "Some historians have said that the Germans attempted to create a rump Polish state and failed due to polish resistance to the idea, others have suggested that these were half hearted approaches that lacked official backing or that Germany never in fact tried (or intended) to create a Polish state" - clearly detailing the breadth of opinion here (from failed - to half hearted approaches). We ourselves shouldn't take a position either way in our own voice.Icewhiz (talk) 08:30, 22 April 2018 (UTC)

Important note - @Nihil novi "such efforts came to nought" sound perfect as a compromise. Please note - "this did not happen" is François Robere version that has been reverted multiple times by various editors. He has fought for a month to have it. Look at his recent conversation with Icewhiz [45]) quote : "I've been pushing this change for a month and a half, and you just slipped it in the backdoor." François Robere didn't back a bit. I'm the one who is willing to compromise despite the fact that in my opinion, it should be "the Germans failed to establish a puppet state." 2A01:110F:4505:DC00:52C:705E:CD91:A71 (talk) 08:07, 22 April 2018 (UTC)

Well, you rejected Piotr's proposal, which both Nihil novi and I agreed to [46]; you rejected my suggestion, which simply stated that "Poland did not have a collaborationist government" [47][48]; and now you're rejecting Slatersteven's compromise, which everyone else are party to. That's three compromises now that you rejected.

Now, if you're going to stalk me, as disrespectful as it is, at least be decent enough to quote the important parts: "How much lower can this discussion get? ...it's not even that complicated [an issue] - it's only the stubbornness of that one editor... that made it that difficult." François Robere (talk) 08:25, 22 April 2018 (UTC)

Constructively - we should avoid makings statements in Wikipedia's voice that are disputed - the correct thing to do is to stick to the facts (what did and did not happen - without editorializing) - and then list the range of opinions on the matter among historians (who do vary in opinion and editorialize). Clearly some hold the view that the Germans attempted and failed. However - others hold a different view.Icewhiz (talk) 08:33, 22 April 2018 (UTC)

Why is summarizing so hard? Seraphim System ^(talk) 09:29, 24 April 2018 (UTC)

It's not hard when users aren't pushing an agenda contrary to very obvious sources. François Robere (talk) 09:42, 24 April 2018 (UTC)

I'm a bit confused why the 1960s sources would be considered superseded though. Superseded does not mean more recent opinions outweigh older opinions — there are various reasons for why a source may be out of date like the discovery of the Dead Sea Scrolls or some medieval chronicles that may have fallen out of favor after archaeological excavations, etc ... Seraphim System ^(talk) 09:58, 24 April 2018 (UTC)

This isn't about age per se, it's about the availability of sources (many archived have only been open to the public in last 20 years or so) and the relatively young age of the discipline (~70 years). This means that a source 50 y/o didn't have access to most of the archival material and research available today. It doesn't mean that source is useless by a long shot, but it does mean its age has to be considered along with everything else when compared with an equally respectable, but more recent source. Makes sense? François Robere (talk) 10:24, 24 April 2018 (UTC)

@Slatersteven: What now? François Robere (talk) 13:59, 23 April 2018 (UTC)

I have no idea, I have tried an none user or other just finds something to object to. The entire section should be removed and until we can come to a consensus not reinserted.Slatersteven (talk) 09:23, 24 April 2018 (UTC)

Okay. Thanks. François Robere (talk) 09:42, 24 April 2018 (UTC)

How are we to discuss the validity of the current "Collaboration in German-occupied Poland" "Political collaboration" section when IT HAS BEEN BLANKED? Nihil novi (talk) 10:15, 24 April 2018 (UTC)

It's still in the source... But anyway, we need to come to a consensus about the first sentence first. Slatersteven suggested this. Yay or nay, and why? François Robere (talk) 11:00, 24 April 2018 (UTC)

By moving the text here and trying to work out a solution. There is no consensus for inclusion of this as written so it should be removed, but that means all the contested material, no rewards for entrenching.Slatersteven (talk) 11:03, 24 April 2018 (UTC)

Starting from scratch

Let's try to build this section bit by bit, starting with a minimally correct version:

Poland did not have a collaborationist government.
The Germans approached some Polish politicians with suggestions to collaborate, which they refused.
Some Polish politicians approached the Germans with suggestions to collaborate, which they refused.

Do we all agree that the above is an incomplete, but essentially correct passage? If so, we can move ahead and add another statement. François Robere (talk) 20:46, 27 April 2018 (UTC)

(Pings: Icewhiz, Nihil novi, Seraphim System, Slatersteven, Volunteer Marek, GizzyCatBella, 198.84.253.202)

The Pose is awful for a start. NO I really do not think this will pass muster.Slatersteven (talk) 08:29, 28 April 2018 (UTC)

Oh, well. François Robere (talk) 12:30, 29 April 2018 (UTC)

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