Talk:1953 Iranian coup d'état/Archive 5

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Secondary sources on the matter of dispute.

So. I spent today down at the library reading up on the topic. This was done by grabbing pretty much anything talking about the coup or Iran-US relations. Some of the sources were rather sympathetic to the US, others sympathetic to Mossadegh. But all except one agreed that US was mostly motivated by communism. As noted above, the closest thing to a "it was all about oil" explanation was in Oil, Power, and Principle: Iran's Oil nationalisation and its aftermath, which noted that AIOC gave Kermit Roosevelt their plans for a coup in November 1952 and asked if he could do it. Roosevelt hated their plan and told them he didn't have that authority, but he DID pass the plan on to Dulles and suggested that Eisenhower might think differently than Truman. But since I see AIOC as pretty much part of the British government, this isn't really that different.

The other thing that came up from the sources was the amount of pressure based on the "special relationship." Churchill was selling the point that Britain was helping in the Korean War, and quite a lot of the sources note that some Americans thought "Well, Iran is in the right here, but staying friends with Britain is more important." I wouldn't be averse to adding this to the lede as well.

The information is at Talk:1953 Iranian coup d'état/Communism sources, stuck at a subpage due to not wanting to overflow this page. SnowFire (talk) 01:29, 29 June 2009 (UTC)

If this is meant to be a depository of your own sources, then please move it to User:SnowFire/Communism sources. If it's suppose to be depository of secondary sources for everyone here, to allow multiple users collaborate on improving the article, in line with WP:TALKPAGE, then please move it to a neutral title like Talk:1953 Iranian coup d'état/Secondary sources. --Kurdo777 (talk) 03:54, 29 June 2009 (UTC)

It's meant to be a general resource not "owned" by me. The current information is mostly on the communism topic, though, so I don't think the subpage is named wrongly. If you find it such a problem, go ahead and move it. SnowFire (talk) 05:01, 29 June 2009 (UTC)

To quell the triumphalism of the anti-communist coup, see "Red Lines and Deadlines Handbook: Politics and the Press in Iran" by Afshin Marashi at PBS with the point being that the anti-communist regime installed by the United States caused much misery in Iran and a great loss of democratic freedoms compared with what the people of that country had enjoyed before. Marashi writes--

In the context of this new found freedom to organize and associate, political parties and other types of associations came to coalesce around particular newspapers, which in turn became the mouthpieces of particular social, cultural, and political points of view. The weak central government continued to try to censor and control the press, as did the Allied Occupation Forces (1941-1946), who closely monitored the press and reserved the right to suppress papers that published materials deemed derogatory to the interests of the occupation forces. Despite these official restrictions, however, by the late 1940s the Iranian press was deeply involved in a vigorous and often freewheeling public debate on the direction of Iranian politics.
The political consequence of this period of relative democratic openness was the rise of Muhammad Mosaddeq to political prominence. As a longtime member of the majles, and Prime Minister from 1951 to 1953, Mossadeq brought the oil issue to public prominence by sponsoring a bill in 1951 to nationalize the British controlled Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. The oil nationalization movement of 1951-1953 was made possible by the overwhelming public attention brought to the issue via discussions in the media. Mossadeq's use of the print media -- and the new medium of radio -- was crucial in mobilizing popular support for the nationalization movement. The end of this crucial episode in modern Iranian history came with the overthrow of Mossadeq in August of 1953. Citing the growing threat of a communist takeover, the United States and Great Britain organized a clandestine operation code-named "Operation Ajax" to precipitate a military coup in Iran which would overthrow Mossadeq and bring Muhammad Reza Shah back to power.
The end of the Mossadeq era also meant the end of the era of relative openness in the media. After the overthrow of Mossadeq, Iran entered another period of protracted authoritarianism and state control of the media. During this period of royal dictatorship, between 1953 and 1978, political parties were outlawed, criticism of the monarchy was punished, and strict controls were placed on the content of newspapers, other printed materials, and the emerging mass media of radio, television, and film. The Ministry of Information and the Ministry of Culture became the main institutions controlling the content of such media, with enforcement in the hands of the much-feared Iranian secret police (SAVAK). As a consequence, throughout the 1950s and 1960s the number of Iranian newspapers once again declined as the reading public became skeptical of state-controlled content. The type of official content that came to permeate the press and other forms of media during this period included a steady stream of royalist and nationalist ideology, along with extensive coverage of official court ceremonies (salaams), the coronation of the Shah in 1967, and elaborate staged media spectacles such as the 2,500 year anniversary of the founding of the Persian Empire, held to great official fanfare and media coverage in October of 1971.
Part III: The Revolution and After

From the mid 1970s onward, the authoritarian Pahlavi regime began to show signs of weakness....

Skywriter (talk) 04:12, 29 June 2009 (UTC)

Skywriter: That sounds perfectly fine to me. Remember, I was the one trying to add in information about the Shah's later crimes which you were removing (though, thankfully, Kurdo eventually put back at least one paragraph of it). So... do you still have a problem with BoogaLouie / Binkterset's lede? Again, it's not like these ledes deny any of the Shah's later actions. They just bring up issues other than oil. SnowFire (talk) 05:01, 29 June 2009 (UTC)

BoogaLouie's lead is not the same thing as Binkterset's lead. As I sated earlier, I am willing to accept Binksternet's lead, with some minor modifications/corrections (ie the addition of your proposed disclaimer that the "fears of communist takeover" were exaggerated and refuted). BoogaLouie's lead, however, is a different story altogether, and not a workable solution IMO. --Kurdo777 (talk) 05:32, 29 June 2009 (UTC)

s the one trying to add in information about the Shah's later crimes which you were removing huh? no. your wholesale reverts without any explanation except the empty claim that they were "better" is what came out. I have spent the day making the case, based on solid analysis by subject matter experts from the National Security Archive that the US ran an extensive anti-communist propaganda campaign to oust an elected leader and replace him with a royal dictator. And the US was a major beneficiary of that coup.

If you are referring to a lede that focuses on that, I'm cool with it. My critique of the Binkterset lede is previously stated. However, I have no objection to use of Doug Little's book in the section Binkterset selected, so long as it reflects that nationalism and not communism was the direct threat to US/UK interests in Iran 1951-3, and that it was the two-year long western-organized boycott of Iranian oil that brought about the economic crisis in Iran that prompted Mossadeq to sign a trade agreement with the Soviet Union. I really think we're better off sticking to facts instead of pushing ideology. There is no honor in the anti-communist crusade that replaced an elected leader with a dictator. Sad to say, that is exactly what happened in Iran. Painting anti-communist lipstick on A Very Elegant Coup makes my stomach queasy. As in any other article, build it with facts not ideology. As to referencing the noble anti-communist crusade that took away a people's democracy, tell it like it is. It was a propaganda campaign directed by CIA and the State Department as shown in documents online at the National Security Archive. In the end, the people are forced to live with the ugly brutality of imposed dictatorship. Surely the people killed by SAVAK failed to grasp the nobility of being sacrificed on the altar of anti-communism.Skywriter (talk) 06:30, 29 June 2009 (UTC)

Your emotion is commendable. Such emotion should not, however, color the tone of the article. We all agree that the U.S. used the fear of communism to convince itself that the coup was necessary, so that fact is worthy of inclusion in the lede. In the body of the article we can debate whether the U.S. reasoning was valid, faulty, biased, or knowingly misleading. Binksternet (talk) 15:54, 29 June 2009 (UTC)

Emotion? Tune your antenna. That was sarcasm.Skywriter (talk) 16:53, 29 June 2009 (UTC)

Binksternet wrote We all agree that the U.S. used the fear of communism to convince itself that the coup was necessary, so that fact is worthy of inclusion in the lede.

No, the point is larger than what you say. Look through the summaries at the National Security Archive, linked elsewhere on this page. US officials weren't trying to convince themselves; they were running a sophisticated and extensive propaganda campaign in Iran without bothering to let facts get in the way of lies if it helped the US propaganda case. The campaign was two-fold. On one level, as the NSArchive summaries show, it was pro-US, anti-USSR campaigning on a broad scale. ('Ours is bigger, better, sweeter than theirs.') On another level, US state department propagandists directed its underlings to get out the message in the Iranian news media that it was in Iran's best interest to settle its oil issues with Britain.Skywriter (talk) 01:05, 30 June 2009 (UTC)

Here's two things wrong with the Binksternet lede

re-- http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Talk:1953_Iranian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat&action=edit&section=70 beginning here--...and nearly caused a war. Britain accused Mosaddeq of violating the legal rights of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and mobilized a worldwide boycott of Iran's oil, plunging Iran into financial crisis. The British government tr...

And from there, this version skips the effect of the multi-year blockade of Iranian seaports on the population and drones on with four long sentences about western countries. This article is about Iran. How about attending to the effect of the seaport blockade on Iranians?

nearly caused a war is unsupported. Skywriter (talk) 17:10, 29 June 2009 (UTC)

Request to fix syntax error on protected page

{{editprotected}} An external link in this article has a line break in the middle of it.

Location of error:

Section "The coup and CIA records"
In the paragraph that starts with "The British and American spy agencies..."
After the 3rd sentence
The external link for the 2nd reference (currently note 25)

Please delete the line break, making sure to leave a space between the URL and the description.

Thanks. --Auntof6 (talk) 21:49, 1 July 2009 (UTC)

Fixed — Martin (MSGJ · talk) 06:18, 2 July 2009 (UTC)

Edit Bloc

While I understand the concern with edit war regarding the lead, having an edit bloc on the entire article is harming the article as there are editors out there, I think, who don't care about the exact wording of the lead, but would very much like to edit the article itself. And given the hightened awareness of the article of late, puting such a block for such an extended period of time is harmful. Either partially block the article, or do something, because to put such a heavy handed block on the article at a time when it's getting the most attention it's gotten in a long time may be irreparable. Excuse the spelling, was rushing.--RossF18 (talk) 23:49, 5 July 2009 (UTC)

What edits do you have in mind? Consider using the template {editprotected} for your edits. It's technically impossible to "partially block the article", and no consensus has been reached yet regarding the lead. --Kurdo777 (talk) 07:03, 6 July 2009 (UTC)

That's my point exactly. Many editors don't have a specific edit in mind when they go to an article, but when they see something they want to add, they just add it or fix something. With this article blocked, those types of editors will just move on. Only those who feel passionate about making a point would go back to change something and one could argue that in those circumstances, a dispute might arise. The point of my post was to argue for those editors who would edit just once or twice after the visit and leave. And your position as far as consensus being reached on the lead indangers the article being blocked for too long a time (I wanted to say forever, but hyperbole is dangerous on wikipedia since noone seems to know the definition - nothing against anyone in particular, just a rant generally). The point remains, however, that the article has been blocked for about a week now and there have been no movement toward consensus since about 3 days ago and there doesn't seem to be a consensus coming anytime soon, at the very least. So, the article should be unblocked and the editors should be trusted enough to work to consensus before edits without a full restriction that stifles general edits by every other editor on wikipedia, beyond the several involved in the dispute.--RossF18 (talk) 20:29, 6 July 2009 (UTC)

Please address my points or unblock the article. There has been no discussion regarding the lead in the past 5 days or so - all that is happening now is an edit freeze on the entire article with the discussion regarding the leading not taking place and any good faith edits that could have been possible to the other sections of the article blocked. Multiple reverts are bad, yes, but this is not an administrator approved editing process (namely, we shouldn't have to ask permission to make valid non-disputed edits), so unblock please.--RossF18 (talk) 23:33, 9 July 2009 (UTC)

No meeting of the minds

We need a break. There is no meeting of the minds here.

You argue the Cold War was the key factor that caused the coup and want to stuff the lead with names lost to the ages that readers will not remember.

I contend that the names are peripheral and can show up lower in the article, that a summary of why and what happened is most important. Here's why and what happened in a nutshell.

A more effective operation was the MI6-controlled coup in Iran, which removed the popular and moderate prime minister, Mohammed Mossadeq, despised by the British because he nationalised the Iranian oil industry. MI6 and the CIA armed, funded and directed the conspirators, and Mossadeq was ousted in 1953.

from MI6: Fifty Years of Special Operations by Stephen Dorril. (Fourth Estate Ltd (February 5, 2001) ISBN-10: 1857027019) That's a summary from across the pond of the MI6 role in the coup, statement of MI6's motive, and broadly accurate view of Mossadeq's standing. (Oh, I know the royalists, stirred up by the CIA and MI6 hated him but there were not so many of them as there were people who really did want to nationalize the oil industry-- Britain's terms were unfair to Iranians AND AIOthe company where the majority shares were held by the British government, paid low wages. (Kinzer describes that).

Aside from the reviewer capturing why and what happened in only 47 words, at the bottom he criticizes that same book, saying It also suffers from inadequate editing, and Dorril has a tendency to bombard the reader with a bewildering array of facts and names. Amen. That critique is exactly what's going on with Wikipedia's 1953 Iranian coup d'état which is so bogged down in minor details (such as names people will never remember, stupid fights about whether to call it AJAX or TPAJAX-- that the gravity of what transpired and implications for the present --is suffocated). I see tremendous resistance to building the article around the struggle over oil, and see no flexibility in that stance. I have conceded that the Cold War was a background factor It appears we are proving that gang edits by people with fundamental disagreements can not occur.Skywriter (talk) 01:32, 1 July 2009 (UTC)

You insist the coup is traceable to Cold War fear of communism. That is the CIA/MI6 view, the POV (or excuse) of the US/UK governments. Scholars trace the coup to foreign domination. Scholars say simmering reaction to the coup strengthened Iranian nationalism. The United States overthrew the most democratic government Iran had ever known and Iranians never forgot.Inside Iran's Fury Scholars trace the nation's antagonism to its history of domination by foreign powers

"You say what's important is that the US/UK feared that "in a few years" and with the UK no longer controlling all of Iran's oil, Iran would turn to USSR for technical stuff to run its oilfields. Scholars say it was something else.

The winds of nationalism and anti-colonialism that swept across Asia, Africa and Latin America in the years after World War II whipped up a sandstorm in Iran. Since the early 20th century, the immeasurably rich Iranian oil industry had been under the control of a British monopoly, the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, which was owned principally by the British government. Iranian oil powered the British economy and made possible the high standard of living Britons enjoyed from the 1920s through the 1940s. It also fueled the Royal Navy as it projected British power around the world. Most Iranians, meanwhile, lived in wretched poverty. DEAD LINK.

You say it is more important to remember names for the most part lost to history then it is to consider the plight of Iranian oilfield workers who were paid less, at mid-20th century, than oilfield workers anywhere else in the world. I disagree.

Anger over this glaring inequality triggered the next Iranian revolution, a peaceful but deeply transformative one. In 1951, Iran's parliament chose as prime minister one of the most highly educated men in the country, Mohammed Mossadegh, whose degree from the University of Neuchtel in Switzerland made him the first Iranian ever to earn a doctorate in law from a European university. Mossadegh championed what had become the nation's transcendent goal: nationalization of the oil industry. Even before taking office, he proposed a nationalization law that both houses of parliament passed unanimously. The British, to no one's surprise, refused to accept it. They withdrew their oil technicians, blockaded the port from which oil was exported and asked the United Nations to order Iran to withdraw the plan. Mossadegh's popularity at home skyrocketed; as a British diplomat wrote in a report from Tehran, he had done "something which is always dear to Persian hearts: he flouted the authority of a great power and a great foreign interest." Mossadegh's daring challenge to Britain also turned him into a world figure. Time magazine chose him as its 1951 Man of the Year. In October he traveled to New York City to plead his case at the United Nations.It was the first time the leader of a poor country had mounted this august stage to challenge a great power so directly. DEAD LINK

"My countrymen lack the bare necessities of existence," Mossadegh told the U.N. Security Council. "Their standard of living is probably one of the lowest in the world. Our greatest national resource is oil. This should be the source of work and food for the population of Iran. Its exploitation should properly be our national industry, and the revenue from it should go to improve our conditions of life." Most American newspapers, however, were unsympathetic to Mossadegh's plea on the grounds that he was defying international law and threatening the flow of oil to the free world. The New York Times, for instance, decried Iran as a "defiant scorner" of the United Nations, and further blamed "Iranian nationalism and Islamic fanaticism" for carrying the dispute "beyond the field of legality and common sense." The epic struggle for control of the oil industry helped transform Iranian nationalism from an abstract idea into a movement. "While Reza Shah crafted the vessel, it was Mossadegh who filled it," says Iranian-British scholar Ali Ansari. "Between 1951 and 1953, Persian nationalism became truly Iranian—inclusive, broad-based and with increasing mass appeal." .During this period, many Iranians came to hope the United States would emerge as their friend and protector. DEAD LINK

How justified were Washington's fears, goaded by the UK, that boogie men wearing red were out to get them? Turns out it was a ruse.

After President Dwight D. Eisenhower took office in 1953, however, U.S. policy changed. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles was eager to strike back against growing Communist influence worldwide, and when the British told him that Mossadegh was leading Iran toward Communism—a wild distortion, since Mossadegh despised Marxist ideas—Dulles and Eisenhower agreed to send the CIA into action. "The intense dislike that Dulles and Eisenhower had toward Mossadegh was visceral and immediate," says Mary Ann Heiss, a historian at Kent State University who specializes in early cold war history. "They were not interested in negotiation at all. For Dulles, coming from a corporate law background, what Mossadegh had done seemed like an attack on private property, and he was bothered by what he saw as the precedent that it might be setting. He was also worried about the possibility that the Soviet Union might gain a foothold in Iran....It was all very emotional and very quick. There was no real attempt to find out who Mossadegh was or what motivated him, to talk to him or even to respond to letters he was sending to Washington."

How is a budding democracy crushed?

In August 1953, the CIA sent one of its most intrepid agents, Kermit Roosevelt Jr., grandson of president Theodore Roosevelt, to Tehran with orders to overthrow Mossadegh. Employing tactics that ranged from bribing newspaper editors to organizing riots, Roosevelt immediately set to work. From a command center in the basement of the U.S. Embassy, he managed to create the impression that Iran was collapsing into chaos. On the night of August 19, an angry crowd, led by Roosevelt's Iranian agents—and supported by police and military units whose leaders he had suborned—converged on Mossadegh's home. After a two-hour siege, Mossadegh fled over a back wall. His house was looted and set afire. The handful of American agents who organized the coup were, as Roosevelt later wrote, "full of jubilation, celebration and occasional and totally unpredictable whacks on the back as one or the other was suddenly overcome with enthusiasm." Mossadegh was arrested, tried for high treason, imprisoned for three years, then sentenced to house arrest for life. He died in 1967.
The 1953 coup put an end to democratic rule in Iran. After Mossadegh was deposed, the CIA arranged to bring Mohammad Reza Shah back from Rome, where he had fled during the pre-coup turmoil, and returned him to the Peacock Throne. He ruled with increasing repression, using his brutal secret police, Savak, to torture opposition figures. No independent institutions—political parties, student groups, labor unions or civic organizations—were tolerated during his quarter century in power. The only place dissidents could find shelter was in mosques, which gave the developing opposition movement a religious tinge that would later push Iran toward fundamentalist rule.
Throughout the cold war, relations between Washington and Tehran were exceedingly close, largely because the Shah was, as former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger wrote in his memoir, "that rarest of leaders, an unconditional ally."Iranians, for their part, came to see the United States as the force that propped up a hated dictatorship. DEAD LINK

Read the rest of the article at "Smithsonian magazine.

No it's not. "Oops! The page you requested was not found" --BoogaLouie (talk) 17:27, 1 July 2009 (UTC)

It favors the Iranian POV and in that way differs from the US/UK POV that fear of commie pinkoes motivated the 1953 Iranian coup d'état. Skywriter (talk) 01:32, 1 July 2009 (UTC)

Reply

We need a break. Perhaps, but the point at which the article "rests" is biased to the point of inaccuracy. The lead is WP:WEIGHT (unduely weighted) with oil industry details and cleansed of the other explanations for why there was a coup. Even a POV tag is deleted. --BoogaLouie (talk) 18:46, 1 July 2009 (UTC)

Were Washington's fears of communism in Iran a fraud? Maybe not.

"A great sense of fear, particularly the fear of encirclement, shaped American consciousness during this period. ... Soviet power had already subdued Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia. Communist governments were imposed on Bulgaria and Romania in 1946, Hungary and Poland in 1947, and Czechoslovakia in 1948. Albania and Yugoslavia also turned to communism. Greek communists made a violent bid for power. Soviet soldiers blocked land routes to Berlin for sixteen months. In 1949 the Soviet Union successfully tested a nuclear weapon. That same year, pro-Western forces in China lost their civil war to communists led by Mao Zedong. From Washington, it seemed that enemies were on the march everywhere." Solidarity between the United States and Britain was the bedrock of this new alliance. Differences over how to deal with countries like Iran could not be allowed to weaken it.

"President Truman was among many who believed that the Soviets wished to draw Iran into their orbit. The day after North Koreans invaded South Korea, he told one of his aides that Korea was not the only country worrying him. He walked to a globe near his desk in the Oval Office, placed his index finger on Iran, and said, `Here is where they will start trouble if we aren't careful." [Kinzer, Stephen, All the Shah's Men : An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror, Stephen Kinzer, John Wiley and Sons, 2003, p.84-5]

Whether it is true or not that Mossadegh despised Marxist ideas, he was not in alliance with the Tudeh, which sometimes attacked him for being too moderate. But does that mean the Tudeh and the Soviets would not have benefited from a continuation of the embargo, the fight with the British and general turmoil?

One must admit that the Tudeh was a major force participating in the struggle to nationalize the oil company. ... although diverse elements participated in the July uprising, the impartial observer must confess that the Tudeh played an important part - perhaps even the most important part. ... If in the rallies before March 1952 one-third of the demonstrators had been Tudeh and two-thirds had been National Front, after March 1952, the proportions were reversed.[Comment of Hussein Fateh, "the anticommunist leader of the defunct Comrade's party":Panjah Saleh-e Naft-i Iran Abrahamian, Ervand, Iran Between Two Revolutions (1982), p.320]

--BoogaLouie (talk) 18:46, 1 July 2009 (UTC)

Was a budding democracy crushed? Not sure about that.

Shortly before the coup, speaker of parliament, Abol-Ghasem Kashani was removed by Mossadegh's supporters in Majlis and half the deputies resigned as a result. Demonstrations demand dissolution of the Majlis.

Mossadegh announced that he would hold a referendum on the question and pledged to resign if voters did not vote to oust the existing Majlis. The referendum, hurriedly convened at the beginning of August, was a disastrous parody of democracy. There were separate ballot boxes for yes and no votes, and the announced result was over 99% in favor of throwing out the Majlis. The transparent unfairness of this referendum was more grist for the anti-Mossadegh mill. Mid-August found Roosevelt and his team of Iranian agents in place and ready to strike." [Kinzer, Stephen, All the Shah's Men : An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror, Stephen Kinzer, John Wiley and Sons, 2003, p.165]

Furthermore

"The easy success of this coup can be explained by two factors, the widening gap between the traditional and middle classes within the National Front; and the increasing alienation of the whole officer corps from the civilian administration." [Abrahamian, Ervand, Iran Between Two Revolutions by Ervand Abrahamian, Princeton University Press, 1982, p.273-4]

(Bear in mind the author of this quote (Abrahamian) is a steadfast anti-imperialist who blames US thirst for oil for the coup and has been quoted by editor Skywriter.)

On July 21 1952 (Siyeh-i Tir) the Shah fired Mossadegh, brought in a new premier, and Tehran went wild. After five days of mass demonstrations 29 were dead in Tehran, and there were "signs of dissension in the army." The Shah backed down.
A year later Mossadegh is removed again, by the coup, and there were no such riots. Why? --BoogaLouie (talk) 18:46, 1 July 2009 (UTC)

Lede

I see tremendous resistance to building the article around the struggle over oil, and see no flexibility in that stance
Well, yes, other editors disagree that the coup was all about oil and that other motivations should not be mentioned in the lead. The alternative lead (lede MK.II) proposed by Binksternet and myself does include mention of the "democratically-elected government" of Mossadegh; how nationalization meant "Iran could profit from its vast oil reserves;" how the UK "mobilized a worldwide boycott of Iran's oil, plunging Iran into financial crisis;" how the CIA was "paying and organizing anti-Mosaddeq royalists and Iranian army officers;" how "the Iranian-controled national oil company was replaced by a consortium of international oil companies which shared profits 50-50," and "did not to open their "books to Iranian auditors or to allow Iranians onto its board of directors;" how it "left "a haunting and terrible legacy," and how "in 2000, U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, called it a `setback for democratic government` in Iran."

The alternative does not mention Mossadeq's rigged referendum election in 1953, the arguements of the conservative clerics against his leftist reforms - which I would very much like to include!
I understand that for some editors mentioning other factors in the coup may seem like a slight against the anti-imperialist heroism of Mossadegh and his supporters, or distractions that prevent the readers of the article from a simple focus on the evil of imperialism. But I put it to you that the lede MK.II has a good anti-imperialist slant and that the current lede is over-the-top in its ignoring of basic fact of the coup in favor of oil industry details. Remember that the facts of the coup can be found elsewhere on the internet. Wikipedia can be censored but not the whole internet, let alone publishing industry. Consider the possiblity that rather than focusing readers' attentions on imperialism, a simplified, propagandistic article will just give them the idea that wikipedia can't be trusted and they have to go elsewhere to get the facts. Is that going to help anti-imperialism? --BoogaLouie (talk) 15:36, 1 July 2009 (UTC)

There is no "anti-imperialism" agenda here, this is a creation of your own mind, and a reflection of your own POV. The current lead is not perfect, and several editors are trying to improve it by finding a compromise and workable solution that represents the mainstream scholarly view. But you are not helping the process. Your proposed lead was flatly rejected, and now you are just having a monologue with yourself, and cluttering up the talk page, with repetitive arguments and copy-pastes that have driven away the other editors, creating an impasse. This will be my last reply about your rejected lead too. The longer you drag this on, the less chance that we'll reach a broad consensus here, which we were very close to. --Kurdo777 (talk) 15:35, 3 July 2009 (UTC)

Flatly rejected? I thought his lede addressed a good number of the issues, and was a good basis for moving forward to resolution on this matter. Every editor here is trying to improve it, not just the ones you agree with. Binksternet (talk) 16:08, 3 July 2009 (UTC)

Yes, it was flatly rejected by me, Skywriter , and Wayiran. It's certainly not a "good basis for moving forward". You and BoogaLouie aren't the only editors here, you can not build a consensus by agreeing with each other. In order to find a workable solution, you should start working on something that's mutually agreeable by both sides as a basis, like the earlier proposal that SnowFire and I agreed to in principle. --Kurdo777 (talk) 18:39, 3 July 2009 (UTC)

A really good lede would take the one Snowfire and you agreed to in principle and add Boogaloo's concerns. Or take Boogaloo's lede and add whatever parts that the other lede contained, combining the best of both. A superlede, if you will. Binksternet (talk) 23:43, 3 July 2009 (UTC)

Thank you Binksternet.

There is no "anti-imperialism" agenda here, this is a creation of your own mind

Reply: Well I can't read minds obviously but the reply starts with: You insist the coup is traceable to Cold War fear of communism, but never produces anything that shows it is not - there is no statement from some scholar (let alone several) along the lines of "contrary to the belief that the coup was motivated by fear of the Soviet Union ...." You quote Kinzer several times, saying "Scholars say" (actually you only quote one scholar) but you don't quote the scholar Kinzer when he talks about how

"A great sense of fear, particularly the fear of encirclement, shaped American consciousness during this period. .... Soviet power had already subdued Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia. Communist governments were imposed on Bulgaria and Romainia in 1946, Hungary and Poland in 1947, and Czechoslavakia in 1948. Albania and Yugoslavia also turned to communism. Greek communists made a violent bid for power. Soviet soldiers blocked land routes to Berlin for 16 months. ... The United States, challenged by what most Americans saw as a relentless communist advance, slowly ceased to view Iran as a country with a unique history that faced a unique political challenge." [All the Shah's Men, p.84]

Look at the subsection: How justified were Washington's fears, goaded by the UK, that boogie men wearing red were out to get them? Turns out it was a ruse

It sounds like it's going to demonstrate fear of Soviet expansionism was a ruse. But it doesn't. It just says they really didn't like Mosaddegh and weren't interested in negotating with him. Why would not wanting to negotiate with someone preclude big time concern over rival superpower exansion? Especially when it goes on to say Dulles "was also worried about the possibility that the Soviet Union might gain a foothold in Iran". (the same old problem with your position ... all this evidence offered on how the cold war was not important keeps mentioning that the cold war was an issue.)

... I'm not saying it isn't natural to be angry over about imperialism, but I think it has got in the way of accuracy in this article. --BoogaLouie (talk)

The subject of this article is not when and why the CIA was founded, and yet the topic of p. 84 of the 2003 version of Kinzer's All The Shah's Men is the backstory to why the CIA was formed. All of what Boogalouie quotes above concerns itself with the founding of the CIA in 1947. It is not directly related to the 1953 Iranian coup d'état. Can we please stay on topic? Skywriter (talk) 23:29, 25 July 2009 (UTC)

Quick comment: I've been quite busy lately. Haven't disappeared, will try and catch up this weekend. Last I checked I didn't see what the problem was with BoogaLouie's lede that Kurdo was complaining about, but I haven't read further into the debate. Will try and add more later. SnowFire (talk) 18:27, 3 July 2009 (UTC)

Operation Ajax

Why doesn't this article contain the information on Operation Ajax that is cited in the Mossadeq wiki article?

— Preceding unsigned comment added by 84.215.3.220 (talk) 09:09, 4 July 2009 (UTC)

WP:Weight given to Cold War motive

Did the US overthrow Iran's government due to 'honest' concern over a perceived communist threat? Or was it Iran's oil that the US wanted. Or was it a combination of the two? That's the central issue of this dispute. Please present your best sources verbatim. Don't paraphrase them. Quote them. Allow everyone to judge.

I begin with Ervand Abrahamian, history professor and author of five books on Iran's history. ]

AMY GOODMAN: That issue of the U.S. government funding both the people in the streets who pretended that they were for Mossadegh but communist, and against Mossadegh, pro-Shah, I would like our guest, professor Ervand Abrahamian, Middle East and Iran expert at Baruch College, to comment on. This was a time, the British had used the ruse of anti-communism supposedly to lure in the U.S. Do you think the U.S. was fully well aware of the issue of oil being at the core of this, and also them possibly getting a cut of those oil sales.

ERVAND ABRAHAMIAN: Yes, I think oil is the central issue. But of course this was done at the height of the Cold War, so much of the discourse at the time linked it to the Cold War. I think many liberal historians, including of course Stephen Kinzer’s wonderful book here, even though it’s very good in dealing with the tragedy of the ‘53 coup, still puts it in this liberal framework that the tragedy, the original intentions, were benign.—that the U.S. really got into it because of the Cold War and it was hoodwinked into it by the nasty British who of course had oil interests, but the U.S. somehow was different. U.S. Eisenhower’s interest, were really anti-communism. I sort of doubt that interpretation. For me, the oil was important both for the United States and for Britain. It’s not just the question of oil in Iran. It was a question of control over oil internationally. If Mossadegh had succeeded in nationalizing the British oil industry in Iran, that would have set an example and was seen at that time by the Americans as a threat to U.S. oil interests throughout the world, because other countries would do the same. Once you have control, then you can determine how much oil you produce in your country, who you sell it to, when you sell it, and that meant basically shifting power from the oil companies, both British Petroleum, Angloversion, American companies, shifting it to local countries like Iran and Venezuela. And in this, the U.S. had as much stake in preventing nationalization in Iran as the British did. So here there was not really a major difference between the United States and the British. The question really was on tactics. Truman was persuaded that he could in a way nudge Mossadegh to give up the concept of nationalization, that somehow you could have a package where it was seen as if it was nationalized but, in reality, power would remain in the hands of Western oil companies. And Mossadegh refused to go along with this facade. He wanted real nationalization, both in theory and practice. So the Truman administration, in a way, was not that different from the British view of keeping control. Then, the Truman policy was then, if Mossadegh was not willing to do this, then he could be shoved aside through politics by the Shah dismissing him or the Parliament in Iran dismissing him. But again, it was not that different from the British view. Where the shift came was that after July of ’52, it became clear even to the American ambassador in Iran that Mossadegh could not be got rid of through the political process. He had too much popularity, and after July ’53, the U.S. really went along with the British view of a coup, indeed to have a military coup. So even before Eisenhower came in, the U.S. was working closely with the British to carry out the coup. And what came out of the coup was of course the oil industry on paper remained Iranian, nationalized, but in reality it was controlled by a consortium. In that consortium the British still retained more than 50 percent, but the U.S. got a good 40 percent of that control. [1]

What supports your point that communism and not nationalism or control of Iran's oil was central to the coup? Skywriter (talk) 18:03, 29 June 2009 (UTC)

Reply. If I may but in here I think that ABRAHAMIAN's poopooing of Kinzer's "liberal framework" notwithstanding, Kinzer makes a good case that US fear of Communism was sincere and legitimate:

"The United States, challenged by what most Americans saw as a relentless communist advance, slowly ceased to view Iran as a country with a unique history...

"A great sense of fear, particularly the fear of encirclement, shaped American consciousness during this period. ... Soviet power had already subdued Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia. Communist governments were imposed on Bulgaria and Romania in 1946, Hungary and Poland in 1947, and Czechoslovakia in 1948. Albania and Yugoslavia also turned to communism. Greek communists made a violent bid for power. Soviet soldiers blocked land routes to Berlin for sixteen months. In 1949 the Soviet Union successfully tested a nuclear weapon. That same year, pro-Western forces in China lost their civil war to communists led by Mao Zedong. From Washington, it seemed that enemies were on the march everywhere."

"In response to this changing international climate, President Truman approved the creation of the Central Intelligence Agency in 1947." (Kinzer, Stephen, All the Shah's Men : An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror, Stephen Kinzer, John Wiley and Sons, 2008, p.84)

"The Cold War drove the United States to recognize not only the power of enemies but also the vital importance of its friends. In 1949 it brought eleven of them together into a potent military alliance, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Solidarity between the United States and Britain was the bedrock of this new alliance. Differences over how to deal with countries like Iran could not be allowed to weaken it.

President Truman was among many who believed that the Soviets wished to draw Iran into their orbit. The day after North Koreans invaded South Korea, he told one of his aides that Korea was not the only country worrying him. He walked to a globe near his desk in the Oval Office, placed his index finger on Iran, and said, `Here is where they will start trouble if we aren't careful." (Kinzer, 2008, p.85) --21:05, 29 June 2009 (UTC) --BoogaLouie (talk) 21:48, 29 June 2009 (UTC)

Those notes do not speak to the specifics of the 1953 Iranian coup d'état, which is the subject of this article. These excerpts are a long distance between Truman saying if we aren't careful and the US overthrowing a government. Feel free to try again.Skywriter (talk) 21:42, 29 June 2009 (UTC)

The comments are in a book about the 1953 coup. How more specific can you get? --BoogaLouie (talk) 21:46, 29 June 2009 (UTC)

A lot more specific. What you quote is peripheral to the book's topic. And it is unfocused as to this page topic. Readers don't come to this article because they want to know about Estonia or Latvia or Bulgaria, nor do they come for a refresher in world history. They come because they want to know about the 1953 Iranian coup d'état. Let's stick to that, OK? Skywriter (talk) 00:53, 30 June 2009 (UTC)

How can the quote not be highly relevent? The Kinzer book was giving background on why the Eisenhower administration had fear of Soviet expansion. Iran was on the border of the Soviet Union and had lost much territory in Azarbaijan to Russia (admitedly before the soviet era). --BoogaLouie (talk) 20:44, 30 June 2009 (UTC)

Comment on Oil v. Cold War argument

Earlier on this page (you have to scroll down a ways from the link) there is long quote of "What Doug Little wrote on p. 216 in American Orientalism" purporting to explain that the issue of the 1953 coup is control of oil and not cold war fears of the US.
What the excerpt seems to prove, though, is that the issue is both oil and the cold war. The two issues are intertwined. Sample quote: "If Iran succumbed to the Communists," CIA Director Allen Dulles reminded Eisenhower on 4 March 1953, "there was little doubt that in short order, the other areas of the Middle East, with some 60% of the world's oil reserves, would fall into Communist control."footnote 109 --BoogaLouie (talk) 21:45, 29 June 2009 (UTC)

Yes, though one comment from the CIA director five months before the coup is not enough WP:Weight to make it into the lede. It's a factor not the story core. I prefer chronology for telling this tale because facts tend to fall into place with chronology. That quote is from March 1953. The crisis was building for two years before the government snapped. The pressure on Iranians from the boycott is central.Skywriter (talk) 00:03, 30 June 2009 (UTC)

Was it WP:Weight when you quoted it to prove that the issue of the 1953 coup is control of oil and not cold war fears of the US??? -BoogaLouie (talk) 00:30, 1 July 2009 (UTC)

Hey, it's a valuable document. You are making it clear this dispute will not be resolved, BoogaLouie. You haven't given an inch. Nothing. Zip. Nada. I am in agreement with Kurdo's last comment. Skywriter (talk) 02:23, 1 July 2009 (UTC)

There are two sides to a compromise. lede MK.II includes "democratically-elected government", how nationalization meant "Iran could profit from its vast oil reserves" how the UK "mobilized a worldwide boycott of Iran's oil, plunging Iran into financial crisis." how the CIA was "paying and organizing anti-Mosaddeq royalists and Iranian army officers" how "the Iranian-controled national oil company was replaced by a consortium of international oil companies which shared profits 50-50" and "did not to open their "books to Iranian auditors or to allow Iranians onto its board of directors." How "left "a haunting and terrible legacy." [17] In 2000, U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, called it a "setback for democratic government" in Iran.[18]

There is no mention of Mossadeq's rigged election in 1953, the arguements of the conservative clerics against his leftist reforms - which I would like to include!

I put it to you that the lede MK.II has a good anti-imperialist slant and that the current lede is so over-the-top in its ignoring of basic fact of the coup in favor of oil industry details it will harm wikpeida's credibility more than advance anti-imperialism. --BoogaLouie (talk) 15:36, 1 July 2009 (UTC)

Lede MKIIa

lede MK.II has now been modified per (most) suggestions of Binksternet. Binksternet, you may not think the references have been Format "for uniformity". Feel free to make changes in the format if you want. --BoogaLouie (talk) 21:05, 29 June 2009 (UTC)

That pipe link to Soviet Empire might as well be made explicit in the prose. America's stated fear was Communism, but it was due to the expansion of the Soviet influence, not because of a particular distaste for Iranian Communists. Can you get both Communism and Soviet Empire in there?

Spelling: "paying and organized" should be "paying and organizing." Looking good. Binksternet (talk) 21:52, 29 June 2009 (UTC)

check. --BoogaLouie (talk) 20:44, 30 June 2009 (UTC)

I am afraid you are going off track and talking about BoogaLouie's proposal that has already been flatly rejected by three other editors. You can not build a consensus by talking amongst yourselves. So if you want archive a consensus here, lets focus on Binksternet's original proposal, which as I explained to SnowFire, could lead to a workable solution with some minor modifications. --Kurdo777 (talk) 22:57, 29 June 2009 (UTC)

Why would it lead to a workable solution? It has many serious problems that two editors are working to resolve with lede MK.II. --BoogaLouie (talk) 16:44, 30 June 2009 (UTC)

Because we should be working on a foundation/proposed lead that has a realistic chance of leading to a broad consensus, and narrowing the gap between the majority of the editors on two sides, not yours which has already been flatly rejected by three other editors. --Kurdo777 (talk) 23:29, 30 June 2009 (UTC)

a realistic chance of leading to a broad consensus. I think you are exagerating. There seem to be three editors active currently, unless you include Binksternet who seems to be on board with version mkII --BoogaLouie (talk) 00:38, 1 July 2009 (UTC)

No , I am not. Two "active" editors agreeing on something does not constitute a consensus (You and Binksternet in this case). Skywriter, wayiran and myself had already rejected your proposed lead. So by dragging this on and on, you are just widening the the gap, and diminishing the chances of a workable solution that could be found in Binksternet`s original proposal, and had been endorsed by SnowFire and myself. --Kurdo777 (talk) 02:17, 1 July 2009 (UTC)

Kurdo, what's the link to Binksternet's original proposal? Tx. Skywriter (talk) 23:53, 29 June 2009 (UTC)

It's at Talk:1953_Iranian_coup_d'état#Rebuilding_the_lede. --Kurdo777 (talk) 23:29, 30 June 2009 (UTC)

UK pressure on Iran

I have made a proposal that the initial paragraphs should describe the effect of the blockade of Iranian seaports on Iran's economy, then segueing to details of the coup itself. BoogaLouie did a lot of work establishing the timeline at Abadan Crisis timeline and that effort should be respected in the sense of using it to build chronology for this article. The second major argument for chronology is contemporaneous reporting] of what led to the coup. While Cold War competition was in the background as the Allen Dulles quote (that BoogaLouie cites above) makes clear, news reporting of the crisis in Iran focused on nationalizing the Abadan oilfield and British not-so-subtle threats over what would happen to Iran if nationalization stood. Here's what I'm talking about--

March 25, 1951 World Eyes Iran on Oil Seizure Bid By J. H. Carmical (excerpted)

---Since Anglo-Iranian is owned by British interests, with the British Government holding a majority of the stock, nationalization of the Iranian oil properties would be a severe blow to the British economy. With current production about 700,000 barrels of crude oil daily, the loss of revenue to the British would sharply reduce the amount of exchange available for the purchase of raw materials.

---Realizing the importance of Middle East oil to British economy, the United States Government, since the end of World War II, through Marshall Plan funds and other aid, has been pushing the expansion of refineries in Europe for the processing of that oil. Through this program, it had been hoped that by the end of 1952, Europe would have a refining capacity capable of meeting its oil needs and that the crude oil to be processed by the refineries would come from the Middle East where British interests have roughly one-half of its estimated petroleum reserves, which represent probably one-third of the world's total.

---Involved in the proposed Iranian nationalization project is the world's largest refinery at Abadan. Processing around 560,000 barrels of crude oil daily, this refinery manufactures a complete line of petroleum products, ranging from aviation gasoline to heavy fuel oil. Although some of the products are moved through the Suez Canal to the United Kingdom and Europe, a large part are marketed in India and Pakistan, other areas in the Far East, Australia and Africa.

---During World War I, Winston Churchill, then First Lord of the Admiralty, placed a long-term contract with the company for fuel oil. Simultaneously the British Government also bought a majority stock interest in the company.

---early in 1933 the Iranian Government canceled the concession, which covered the entire country except the five northern provinces.
((extra-sweet contract))**
--- the contract extended to the end of 1993 when all oil facilities, including the refinery, were to revert to the Iranian Government.

---One of the dangers in the Iranian situation involves the possible intervention of Russia. While oil industry officials see no signs now of Russia entering the picture, there is a feeling that she might gradually step in should Iran have difficulty in operating the properties.
---Value of the oil properties in Iran is difficult to estimate. At present prices, output of the wells will gross about $500,000,000 a year. Reserves are estimated to compare favorably with those in the United States.Production costs are among the cheapest in the world. In the event of an all-out war between the East and the West, Iran's oil reserves might be invaluable to the side that controlled them.
March 25, 1951 World Eyes Iran on Oil Seizure Bid

**my remark- all else is directly quoted fm cited NYT article.

Notice that Production costs are among the cheapest in the world explaining how Abadan oilfield strikes for higher wages were part of the scenario leading to nationalization. The NYT archive is particularly useful because it establishes the chronology as well as the keep-Iran's-oil-in-Western-hands motive. Also it wasn't just Mossadeq who wanted nationalization. The entire Iranian parliament, the Majlis, voted unanimously for nationalization.

I couldn't find this. Do you have a link or a cite? --BoogaLouie (talk) 16:45, 30 June 2009 (UTC)

Nationalizing the oilfields (because the oil contract with Britain was unfair) was a demand that was very popular in Iran at mid-20th century. In the eyes of Iranians, it trumped everything else. Skywriter (talk) 23:53, 29 June 2009 (UTC)

Here's a part from the article that you missed:

One of the dangers in the Iranian situation involves the possible intervention of Russia. While oil industry officials see no signs now of Russia entering the picture, there is a feeling that she might gradually step in should Iran have difficulty in operating the properties. For years Russia has had an eye on the oil resources of the five northern provinces around the Caspian Sea, but in the past two or three years has been significantly quiet on that score. March 25, 1951 World Eyes Iran on Oil Seizure Bid

Cold War strikes again! --BoogaLouie (talk) 16:44, 30 June 2009 (UTC)

I did not miss it and do not dispute the post-WW II competition between the US and USSR to divide the world between themselves into spheres of influence. The major point you do not acknowledge is that the USSR was not an active player in Iran in the years leading up to the 1953 Iranian coup d'état. The 9th paragraph in that 13-paragraph story states--One of the dangers in the Iranian situation involves the possible intervention of Russia. While ***oil industry officials*** see no signs now of Russia entering the picture, there is a feeling that she might gradually step in should Iran have difficulty in operating the properties. ((Yes, the coup was indeed about the East/West competition for control of Middle Eastern oil.)) For years Russia has had an eye on the oil resources of the five northern provinces around the Caspian Sea, but in the past two or three years has been significantly quiet on that score. ((This supports my point that Cold War competition between the US/USSR was not the **immediate cause** of the 1953 Iranian coup d'état. Rather the immediate cause was the US/UK reaction to the Iranian decision, two years earlier to nationalize oilfields within its national borders. ((Remarkable isn't it that, here we are in 21st century, communism is gone, capitalism on life supports and the overriding story is still about who will exploit Middle Eastern oil!)) Skywriter (talk) 20:12, 30 June 2009 (UTC)

There are always contingencies, what ifs in international relations. Possible intervention is not intervention and "possible interventions" do not usually trigger coups or other earthquakes in governments. Cold War rivalries were a secondary reason for the 1953 Iranian coup d'état. While those Cold War rivalries ought to be presented in this article, properly footnoted, spare the reader the sermonizing about Latvia, Estonia and that Joe Stalin was still alive (as one recent iteration of this article stated). Cold War rivalries were present in nearly every facet of post-WW II international relationships. We have an obligation to present those rivalries in neutral terms.Skywriter (talk) 20:12, 30 June 2009 (UTC)

Let's keep to the issue, namely: "did fears of soviet expansion play a major part in motivating the US to help overthrow Mosaddeq in 1953"; not "do wikipedia editors now know that in the two or three years before the coup the Soviets had `been significantly quiet` on Iran's five northern provinces, so there was nothing to worry about." The quoted excerpt supports the former, not the latter. --BoogaLouie (talk) 20:44, 30 June 2009 (UTC)

Tudeh (communist) party and Soviets

Re: the attitude of Tudeh Party of Iran towards the Soviet Union, and the attitude of the Soviet Union toward Iran's oil. From the wikipedia article on the party:

In 1944, the party entered the 14th Majlis elections and eight of its candidates were elected. Two events that tarnished the appeal of the Tudeh in 1944-46 were the Soviet demand for an oil concession in northern Iran and the Soviet sponsoring of ethnic revolts in Kurdestan and Azerbaijan. Despite the fact that Tudeh deputies in the Majles had vigorously demanded the nationalization of the whole petroleum industry, the Tudeh party supported the Soviets on grounds of `socialist solidarity`, `internationalism,` and `anti-imperialism.` [source: Abrahamian, Tortured Confessions, (1999), p.82]

--BoogaLouie (talk) 21:38, 30 June 2009 (UTC)

So what?

US and UK occupied Iran through all of WWII after deposing the Shah daddy for cutting oil deals with Germany. Nobody doubts the Tudeh Party was communist, or that it allied itself with the Nationalists to throw the Brits out of Iranian oilfields. Throwing the Brits out was popular in Iran, a no-brainer. What happened during WWII is backstory. 1944 does not explain the 1953 Iranian coup d'état. The Tudeh Party did not support Mossadeq who was seen as a middle of the road moderate and a proponent of nationalizing the oil fields because that's what was seen as fair and what the population wanted. Even the NYT articles from that era (written by titans of the NYT including Clifton Daniel who married Truman's only offspring) acknowledge that control of Iranian oilfields was at the heart of the dispute between Iran and Britain and then Iran and US/UK. Skywriter (talk) 22:16, 30 June 2009 (UTC)

US and UK occupied Iran through all of WWII.

WHAT??? This is a very basic mistake! The Soviets and the British occupied Iran through all of WWII. see Anglo-Soviet invasion of Iran --BoogaLouie (talk) 00:19, 1 July 2009 (UTC)

I am unclear why are you are dwelling on how the nationalization of the AIOC was very popular in Iran (at least at first). Everyone agrees it was, and it is irrelevant to the point made in the excerpt from that Tudeh article - namely that Iranians (and Yankees) had reason to be suspicious of the Tudeh and the Soviets. --BoogaLouie (talk) 00:25, 1 July 2009 (UTC)

Zahedi & Nassiri

You can't put every player's name in the lead. Since last summer I have been arguing on this page that chronology is your friend in presenting a complex story. Try to cram too many names in the lead and it becomes confusing. Zahedi and Nassiri should be presented chronologically as they play out their roles.

from Gasiorowski On the night of Saturday, August 15, Colonel Nematollah Nassiri, commander of the Imperial Guard, delivered the firman dismissing Mosaddeq to him. Mosaddeq had been warned of the plot, probably by the Tudeh; he denounced the firman ((the royal decree written by the CIA)) as a forgery and had Nassiri arrested. Troops loyal to Mosaddeq set up roadblocks throughout the city. Opposition deputies, military officers suspected of plotting with Zahedi, and the Shah's minister of court were arrested. A massive search was begun for Zahedi and a reward of 100,000 rials was offered for his arrest. Armored forces that had been assigned to move into Tehran in conjunction with the delivery of the firmans failed to arrive. Without informing Roosevelt's team, the Shah fled the country in panic, first to Baghdad and then to Rome. (63)
(Gasiorowski summary continues) The arrest of Nassiri completely disrupted the original coup plan, forcing Roosevelt and his team to improvise a new strategy.
(Gasiorowski summary continues) Four main groups of Iranians were involved in the coup. First, Zahedi and his immediate allies, including his son, Abul Qasem Bakhtiari, and military officers such as Hejazi, Nassiri, Guilanshah, and Bakhtiar played an obvious role. Zahedi and several of these figures had been conspiring against Mosaddeq for about a year before the coup; the others led military units or played important support roles in the coup itself. Second, former Mosaddeq allies such as Kashani and Baqai worked to undermine Mosaddeq's base of support in the year before the coup, and Kashani at least appears also to have played an important role in coup. Third, Nerren and Cilley and the Rashidians played key roles in carrying out the coup and in supervising anti-Mosaddeq activities in the period fore the coup. Finally, the Shah himself played a significant, although reluctant, role in acquiescing to the coup. (72) Beyond these specific people, a relatively small indeterminate number of Iranians either volunteered or were hired to participate in anti-Mosaddeq demonstrations and other activities.

Nassiri was anything but a minor player under the Pahlevi dictatorship. He became the enforcer. That's not minor play but it does come after the coup. Nassiri and Zahedi had roles assigned to them by the CIA. See the CIA summary plan for chronology.Skywriter (talk) 02:15, 1 July 2009 (UTC)

Did the CIA say "You! here's your role. Show up at 23 hundred hours! Got that!" and Nassiri said "Yes sir!" and saluted? Might there have been some negotiation some agreeing between the two parties? What source do you have that says Nassiri and Zahedi were obeying "roles assigned to them by the CIA"? --BoogaLouie (talk) 15:36, 1 July 2009 (UTC)

You say that Zahedi was conspiring against Mossadegh a year before the coup, does the CIA's documentation show that there was a budgetary request/proposal to pay Zahedi to be the US puppet that far into the past? I think it is not rational to imply that many Iranians would not have had efforts of their own in the works to oppose Mossadegh. In that light you concede that many Iranians volunteered to participate- out of their love for the CIA? Batvette (talk) 23:05, 3 August 2009 (UTC)

Minor players or puppets?

Have you looked in the CIA summary? It is all there. The CIA plan states "by the end of 1952, it was clear that Iran was in danger of falling behind the Iron Curtain"and the CIA's only reasoning is that Mossadeq had been working with Tudeh, yet CIA offers no evidence that he had. Other reasons CIA summary gave that Iran would fall behind iron curtain was Mossadeq's motivation for personal power, rule based on emotion, and, ahem, the Iranian government's incapability of reaching an agreement with British Oil. Skywriter (talk) 01:59, 1 July 2009 (UTC)

Again and again we are offered by you a document alleged to give proof positive that stealing oil (and not cold war fears or domestic disinchantment with Mossy) was the key to the coup. And once again I look at the link, and what's the first thing (first paragraph) we see:

"By the end of 1952, it had become clear that the Mossadeq government in Iran was incapable of reaching an oil settlement with interested Western countries; was reaching a dangerous and advanced stage of illegal, deficit financing; was disregarding the Iranian constitution in prolonging Premier Mohammed Mossadeq's tenure of office; was motivated mainly by Mossadeq's desire for personal power; was governed by irresponsible policies based on emotion; had weakened the Shah and the Iranian army to a dangerous degree; and had cooperated closely with the Tudeh (Communist) Party of Iran. In view of these factors, it was estimated that Iran was in real danger of falling behind the Iran Curtain; if that happened it would mean a victory for the Soviets in the Cold War and a major setback for the West in the Middle East." http://www.nytimes.com/library/world/mideast/iran-cia-summary.pdf

--BoogaLouie (talk) 15:51, 1 July 2009 (UTC)

The specific aims of the coup were to install a government that would reach an equitable oil settlement, and "vigorously prosecute the dangerously strong Communist party."The CIA plan drawn up with the British Secret Intelligence Service did not mention that the Communist party was outlawed in Iran.

Read the CIA summary as it is plain as day, not complicated at all. It states the coup goal was to secure the oil agreement. To carry out tis plan, the CIA designed a propaganda effort through the press, handbills and the clergy. Also, US officialdom was called upon to issue statements to "shatter any hopes held by Mossadeq that aid would be forthcoming." (That was after Mossy came to US asking for help.) Shortly before the coup, on July 28, 1953, the US Secretary of State baited Mossadeq at a news conference, accusing him of consorting with communists. The CIA plan states that the United States chose Zahedi to succeed Mossadeq, and that the CIA had arranged for General Schwarzkopf to persuade the Shah to sign royal decrees (that the CIA had written) dismissing Mossadeq and replacing him with Zahedi.

Who said this was elegant? British royalty?

Skywriter (talk) 01:59, 1 July 2009 (UTC)

Read the CIA summary as it is plain as day, not complicated at all. It states the coup goal was 'to secure the oil agreement.'

Let me quote the CIA summary: "Specifically, the aim was to bring to power a government which would reach an equitable oil settlement, enabling Iran to become economically sound and financially solvent, and which would vigorously prosecute the dangerously strong Communist party." The CIA plan

... So why cannot we include motivation for the coup of preventing a "dangerously strong Communist party" as well as an oil settlement in the lead?? --BoogaLouie (talk) 18:59, 16 July 2009 (UTC)

Dissolution of Majlis

Why does the article not mention the Mosaddeq's dissolution of the Majlis which legally enabled the Shah to dismiss him? 85.70.9.251 (talk) 09:54, 29 July 2009 (UTC)

I'm afraid if you want to add that fact or any other of the slightest controversy, you are going to have to join up and become an editor of wikipedia and spend some time on this page arguing, documenting, defending your case. This (and the Mosaddeq) article are very sensative articles (as I can attest to from my own frustration). --BoogaLouie (talk) 14:21, 29 July 2009 (UTC)

?Operation Ajax?

If Operation Ajax redirects to this page, then why does the phrase not appear until the third paragraph? Shouldn't it be in the first sentence of the first paragraph, like Operation Ajax? Agradman ^talk/_contribs

It depends on your perspective. In the UK, the overthrow of Iran's first democratically elected government is called Operation Boot. What the spook agencies called what they did is nowhere near as important as the details of what they did and its impact. To Iranians and to ex-expatriates like Sasan Fayazmanesh, Associate Professor of Economics at California State University, cutesy names by western spook agencies were never important. What the US and UK governments did is what mattered, and that is properly called the 1953 Iranian coup d'état.

The CIA coup appeared irrelevant when the old and decadent institution of monarchy in Iran seemed to be finished once and for all.
More importantly, however, I, along with many other Iranians of my generation, knew the story full well and did not need Kermit to repeat it. We knew that the shah owed his throne to the likes of Kermit. But we also knew something that Kermit didn't know, or didn't say. We knew that we owe to the Kermits of the world our tortured past: years of being forced as students to stand in the hot sun of Tehran in lines, waving his majesty's picture or flag as his entourage passed by in fast moving, shiny, big black cars with darkened-glass windows; years of being forced to rise and stay standing in every public event, including movie theaters, while his majesty's national anthem was being played; years of watching a dense megalomaniac try to imitate "Cyrus the Great" by wearing ridiculous ceremonial robes in extravagant celebration of his birthdays or crowning of his queens; years of being hushed by our parents, fearful of being arrested, if we uttered a critical word about his majesty's government or his American advisors; years of worrying about secret police (SAVAK) informants, who were smartly, but ruthlessly, trained by the best of the US's CIA and Israeli's Mossad; years of witnessing our friends and acquaintances being taken to jail, some never heard from again; years of passing by buildings in which, we were told, people were being tormented; years of hearing about people dying under torture or quietly executed; years of being exiled in a foreign country, which ironically was the belly of the beast, the metropolis, the center which masterminded much of our misfortune in the first place; years of spending our precious youth to free or save thousands of political prisoners by marching in the streets of the metropolis, wearing masks to hide our identities and looking bizarre to those who knew nothing about our story; and, finally, years of trying to prove to the American people that the 1953 CIA coup was not a fig-leaf of our imagination or a conspiracy theory, that it indeed happened and that they, whether they like it or not, have a certain culpability in what their government does around the world.
Most Americans, however, did not believe our story or did not care about it until the 1979 Revolution in Iran and the subsequent storming of the US Embassy in Tehran by the "students following the line of Imam." Once 52 Americans were blindfolded and held by the students in what they called the "nest of spies," questions began to be raised: Who lost Iran? How did we lose it? Why are the Iranians so insanely agitated? Why do they burn our flag? Why do they hate us so much? In the midst of the hysteria, of course, no intelligent answer was sought and none was given. Surely, no meaningful answer was ever offered by the US government then or in the next two decades. [2]

Skywriter (talk) 00:10, 10 July 2009 (UTC)

Skywriter, you said What the US and UK governments did is what mattered, and that is properly called the 1953 Iranian coup d'état. Yes, but people do search for it as Operation Ajax in U.S. and that's why it redirects to this site so to not have some reference to the search term in the first paragraph may be confusing for lay readers who are not as cultured to know that really matters. So, I don't think making a small paranthetical, such as (known as Operation Ajax/Boot) is really that problematic as far as the first paragraph is concenred. As is, however, there is a mention of Operation Ajax in the third paragraph and it really comes out of the blue with nothing to indicate that Operation Ajax is actually what the mission was called in U.S. It just says that the U.S. president didn't approve of Operation Ajax - and for a lay reader, you have to wonder, wait, what's Operation Ajax - is it or is it not the same thing as the coup d'etat. The editors of this article know what it is, but a new visiter searching for Operation Ajax specifically might not and would then have to search through the entire article to find the tiny little paragraph about the operation near the end, not realizing that the entire article is about what matters in regard to the lead up to the operation. I don't think a 4 to 5 word parenthetical in the first paragraph is such a big deal to be opposed so ardently.--RossF18 (talk) 03:01, 10 July 2009 (UTC)

In agreeing with RossF18, I should note that I myself am an outsider to this topic, and I'm really just advocating for what I understand to be the common practice in Wikipedia, which is: if you look up a term, it should appear either in the title or in the first sentence. Skywriter, I could agree with your position if Operation Ajax were conceptually distinct from the coup -- but then they would require separate articles. In this case, my inclination is to model this after Normandy_Landings. Agradman ^talk/_contribs 03:43, 10 July 2009 (UTC)

I don't disagree that Ajax can be mentioned early on. The article is blocked because of agenda-pushing. The disagreement is over the WP:Weight given to the US/UK excuse for the coup. At least one person argues tirelessly that anti-communism was central to the US motive and either downplays or removes information showing that US oil companies directly benefited from the coup and that the US government specifically insisted that Iran make a settlement concerning its oil with Western powers (UK/US). The person who tirelessly argues that communists (or fear of communists) were to blame for the coup simultaneously removes the central point that Iranian oil was the main source of income for the British government for the first half of the 20th century, and keeping what was then Britain's nearly exclusive hold on Iran's oil was central to the British role in the coup. The disagreement also concerns removal of information in the lead pertaining to the two-year UK economic blockade of Iranian seaports and the UK's prevention of Iran from selling her oil anywhere in the world, and the economic crisis those British actions caused in Iran. Skywriter (talk) 17:59, 10 July 2009 (UTC)

Yes, but that person hasn't been willing to discuss anything for the past week or so on this board and all we have is a edit blocked article with no possibilty of any other edits being made. If this is truly one person who is being so troublesome, there are ways to block that one user instead of preventing legitimate edits by users for a week now. If the possibility of consensus is not possible (if as you say, this one user argues tirelessly), then the whole premis of edit blocking the article until the consensus is reached will translate into the article being blocked forever. A tireless arguer for one point who will never be convinced is not a good reason to block the entire article, but to block that one user. --RossF18 (talk) 18:08, 10 July 2009 (UTC)

An admin blocked this article with admonition to get back in touch when consensus reached.Skywriter (talk) 18:12, 10 July 2009 (UTC)

I understand that, but that presuposes that a consensus can, in fact, be reached, which seems to be unlikely given that no one is discussing anything. I think you can agree that if no one is discussing anything, a consensus cannot be reached. If a consensus cannot be reached, you're basically saying that this article will be blocked forever. Good to know. --RossF18 (talk) 18:17, 10 July 2009 (UTC)

No, I have not said it is is a good thing to block this or any article. I am not the admin. I don't know what to do about a person who is pushing an agenda and refuses to compromise on any level. I argued extensively on this page using many resources. All were ignored. The person pushing an agenda used few if any standard references. To move forward, what do you suggest? Skywriter (talk) 18:44, 10 July 2009 (UTC)

Here's a good example

Why does obscure reference dominate this proposal?

Why is this obscure 20-year-old resource [3] referred to below as Mohammed Amjad. (( http://www.greenwood.com/catalog/AFD%252f.aspx "Iran: From Royal Dictatorship to Theocracy‎"]. Greenwood Press, 1989. )) being used as the main source for this proposed lead when one the title and subject matter of the book is 1979 and not the 1953 coup and two Several excellent and widely reviewed books have been published much more recently on the 1953 coup in Iran, and three the governments of the US and UK have released information that sheds light on the coup and tends to discount this proposed lead?

This appears to be agenda-pushing at its worst. This kind of agenda pushing is what is keeping this article blocked for lack of consensus.

Skywriter (talk) 19:02, 10 July 2009 (UTC)

Kindly do not accuse others of "agenda pushing". There are many sources including those you yourself have offered that explain the importance of the cold war fears of the US and domestic dissatisfaction with Mosaddegh as major motivations for the coup. And why are you bringing up the Greenwood book???? It does not "dominate this proposal" and it's a cite for the sentence "The coup was the first covert operation by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) against a foreign government" - which no one has disagreed with !!

As for mentioning operation AJAX in the first sentence, I for one have no problem with (I rewrote this proposed lead to add it).

Yes, if only everyone would go along with your lead the disagreement would be over. If only you would go alone with what Binksternet, SnowFire and I suggest it would also be over. --BoogaLouie (talk) 20:32, 10 July 2009 (UTC)

BoogaLouie, you are the source of the disagreement here, not Skywriter. The consensus-building was on the right path, SnowFire and I had reached a preliminary agreement by working on a solution that was mutually agreeable by both sides as a basis to solve the dispute, before you decided to divert the discussions all over the place, which has led to an impasse. --Kurdo777 (talk) 21:49, 10 July 2009 (UTC)

There's still the suggestion have a lede section which incorporates the best of each version. Binksternet (talk) 21:59, 10 July 2009 (UTC)

That's actually a good idea. I won't be available during the weekend, but I'll do it midweek. --Kurdo777 (talk) 22:13, 10 July 2009 (UTC)

Not to beat a dead horse, but is this article frozen? Could I call upon the editors in dispute to at least begin talking or agree to not talk so that others will be able to edit again? As it stands now, it's been about 2 weeks that the article has been frozen with no substantive discussions - which again brings me to the dreaded position of being a nag.--RossF18 (talk) 18:04, 16 July 2009 (UTC)

Sorry the delay, I was going to post my proposal for the lead yesterday, but I got preoccupied with another topic. I have started prepearing the proposal, ~~I'll put it up within the next 48 hours~~ --Kurdo777 (talk) 22:52, 16 July 2009 (UTC)

I am still working on it the new lead proposal offline and at User:Kurdo777/Lead, it's not finished yet, I'll transfer the final product here tomarrow. --Kurdo777 (talk) 21:42, 23 July 2009 (UTC)

Sent a message to Kurdo777, Binsternet, Skywriter and Snowfire two days ago in hopes of reviving the dsicussion. --BoogaLouie (talk) 16:59, 25 July 2009 (UTC)

I support the current version of the lead as its stands for the reason that the only other draft that has been put forward has deliberately excludes and ignores the viewpoints of the other editors who have contributed quite a bit to this talk page. I myself have contributed an enormous amount, quoting from books that are directly on topic, and every bit of this Boogalouie ignores. Instead of accepting any modifications from anyone, Boogalouie insists on accepting modifications only by Binkersternet, as stated at the top of the Boogalouie proposal. (NOTE: this version is in being updated according to suggestions of other editors (mostly Binksternet so far). ) [4] This is the choir reinforcing the choir. This is not the first time I am saying this: Boogalouie has an agenda to place the Cold War at the center of this article at the expense of the details of the coup itself. This article is not about the Cold War. The Cold War was peripheral to the coup and giving WP:UNDUE WEIGHT to the general Cold War excuse at the expense of the specific details of what led up to the coup is not going to fly. Much more attention must be paid to the fact of the two-year embargo by Britain of Iran such that not one drop of oil left Iran between 1952 and 1954. The other central fact that is ignored is that the coup marked the transfer of hegemony over Iran from Britain to the United States. As a result of the coup, Iran became a client state of the United States for 25 years. The attempt by Boogalouie to place the Soviet Union at the center of this coup reminds me of the useful way politicians use the passive voice. Here's an example. "Mistakes were made. Others will be blamed."

At the top of the talk page, this is stated: This is not a forum for general discussion about the article's subject.

And I agree with that.

What are you going to do to adopt or blend what is currently the frozen lead of this article into what you are proposing such that it is acceptable to me and others who have contributed greatly to this talk page to try and reach consensus? Skywriter (talk) 23:48, 25 July 2009 (UTC)

Your refusal to have anything in the lede about (alleged or otherwise) U.S. fears of Soviet Union influence does not honor the truth of what U.S. leaders were telling each other and telling the American citizens. We all agree that the fear of Communism was used as a lever to stimulate U.S. activity in the coup, so why prevent this from having a presence in the lede? It's part of history. Binksternet (talk) 02:02, 26 July 2009 (UTC)

Oh thank you for the reply though it appears you did not read my remarks so here it is again.

The Cold War was peripheral to the coup: giving WP:UNDUE WEIGHT to the general Cold War excuse at the expense of the specific details of what led up to the coup is not going to fly. Much more attention must be paid to the fact of the two-year embargo by Britain of Iran such that not one drop of oil left Iran between 1952 and 1954. The other central fact that is ignored is that the coup marked the transfer of hegemony over Iran from Britain to the United States. As a result of the coup, Iran became a client state of the United States for 25 years. Skywriter (talk) 06:29, 26 July 2009 (UTC)

Now we are simply repeating ourselves. One month ago, I said "A few threads lower, I have six sources saying "U.S. fears of communism". It's part of the standard scholarship regarding the 1953 coup. Ike's word must be used as it appears; he's the expert on U.S. opinion in 1953, period. Even if we frame it as a statement from a source like "Ike said blah blah" we have to include it, no matter whether you think it's a lie or not." That is still my stance. The event was part of the American Cold War experience. Binksternet (talk) 14:31, 26 July 2009 (UTC)

Is this a joke? Ike's word must be used as it appears; he's the expert on U.S. opinion in 1953, period. Is Obama also the expert on U.S. opinion in 2009, period? Is Bush II the expert on U.S. opinion in 2005, period? Is Clinton the expert on U.S. opinion in 1995, period? Do you care to withdraw that remark? Or can we certify that we are dealing with obsession here? Skywriter (talk) 01:21, 27 July 2009 (UTC)

Thus my suggestion to unblock the article, bur restrict certain users, instead the other way around given that there is a consensus on what the lead should have except for one user who will not be convinced, it seems.--RossF18 (talk) 15:17, 27 July 2009 (UTC)

RossF18, with all due respect, you really should stop obsessing with the status of this page, this is a content dispute to which you are not even a party, all you have been doing is repeating "unlock the page, unlock the page" when there is clearly no consensus here or a resolution to the dispute. If you want to edit the page, please use edit-protected. You can not dictate terms in a content dispute, and this is not a case of 1 editor vs. the rest, it's more like 3 editors who disagree with 3 other editors. Regardless, we should follow the formal dispute resolution process here. I have been trying to find a middle-ground for both sides, with a new proposal, but I have been extremely busy in real life to finish it yet, and I apologize for the delay. But let me attempt the proposal, and if that fails, then the next step is mediation per WP:DISPUTE. --Kurdo777 (talk) 17:26, 27 July 2009 (UTC)

Yes, I realize the feelings of participants in their dispute but I believe that my "obsessing with the status of this page" is warranted and not just out of the blue. This page has really not been regularly edited and while this dispute was long in simiring, it only came to the forefront when Iran came into the news more recently and people started to edit more. To freeze the entire article because of a dispute regarding the lead at this particular time when most edits on the rest of the article might take place given Iran being in the news is detrimental to the article given that it has been ignored for so long. To block the article that his been so long ignored at a time when it might receive it's most attention it has been given in at least 3 years is deterimental to the article as a whole, not just the lead. And as an editor seeking to promote the beterment of the entire article, I would hesitate to call other editors as obsessing about anything (like the lead, maybe). If there is no consensus, that's fine, reach consensus. I don't think I was trying to styfle any discussion. But while you're talking, why block the entire article, unless you're afraid that there will be edit warring, in which case I don't think any consensus can be reached anyway - you'll just have editors give up for a while and wait for the article to be unblocked to start up the waring again. Which, as you say will necessitate mediation. But my point was always to improve the article as a whole at a time it's likely to receive the most attention, and not just from the 6 editors who are in dispute. And if, as you say, there is such balance as far as opinion, we're likely headed for mediation anyway. Last, I don't see how my opinion is any less valid than anyone else's just because I don't belong to some godlike category of editors participating in the dispute since primordial beginnings of this article. If anyone wants to participate in the dispute, anyone can. And if anyone wants to comment on the dispute itself, anyone can. Calm must prevail and we all have real lives, so there is no need to be a martir.--RossF18 (talk) 18:25, 27 July 2009 (UTC)

I agree that the article should be unblocked. I have never seen an article blocked for as long as this. The editor who showed up suddenly and reverted countless times in a short period has shown no current interest. That was the immediate cause of the block by an editor who is not participating in this discussion and has not suggested ways to mediate. I propose that people make changes sentence by sentence. If someone objects to a particular sentence, we can take it here and thrash it out. If there's no agreement, then take it to mediation as Kurdo suggests we might be headed. Ross, do you want to talk to the admin who froze the page? Boogalouie, are you on board with unblocking and editing one sentence at a time? Skywriter (talk) 22:53, 27 July 2009 (UTC)

That's fine with me, as long as no major changes are made at once, and we go one sentence at a time (with adequate time in between new edits/additions to allow a discussion), with a gentleman's agreement that if an addition/edit is reverted, the other editor does not revert back, to avoid getting the page locked again. --Kurdo777 (talk) 02:13, 28 July 2009 (UTC)

That seems very reasonable. P.S. I'm not sure whether the admin who froze the page will consent absent a consensus though as indicated in one of the posts above, I think. --RossF18 (talk) 21:09, 28 July 2009 (UTC)

I'm back participating. I was gone Sunday and Monday. My suggestion for mediation ... Skywriter, is there anything that would satisfy you short of deleting all mention of US cold war fears?
On the issue of using "Ike's word" as it appears, I think what Binksternet means is that any US president is by definition an expert (not the only one of course) on US public opinion because they are bombardered with it in the course of being president. If Ike says the US was worried about Soviet expansion at the time, he is a legitimate source for this view. ... of course you will correct me if that's not your stance Binksternet
But let's not get bogged down in Ike, we still have virtually every book on coup or that time period as evidence of the importance fo the cold war - such as these and this --BoogaLouie (talk) 22:47, 28 July 2009 (UTC)

Boogalouie wrote-- Skywriter, is there anything that would satisfy you short of deleting all mention of US cold war fears?

Reply-- Everyone appreciates it when positions are not distorted. I have no problem with mentioning Cold War fears. The following is an analogy. I do have a problem with giving WP:Undue Weight to a murderer's motivation when the story should begin by describing what happened to the victim.Skywriter (talk) 17:57, 4 August 2009 (UTC)

Yes, that's what I mean by Ike. Binksternet (talk) 14:48, 29 July 2009 (UTC)