Hodge v R

Hodge v R
Cover page of the British North America Act, 1867
Court	Judicial Committee of the Privy Council
Decided	15 December 1883
Citation(s)	[1883] UKPC 59, 9 AC 117
Case history
Appealed from	Court of Appeal of Ontario
Court membership
Judges sitting	Lord FitzGerald Sir Barnes Peacock Sir Robert P. Collier Sir Richard Couch Sir Arthur Hobhouse
Case opinions
Decision by	Sir Barnes Peacock
Keywords
double aspect, matters of a local or private nature

Hodge v R is a Canadian constitutional law decision of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, at that time the highest court of appeal in the British Empire, including Canada.

The case is significant because it was the first time that the Judicial Committee considered the constitutional status of the provincial legislatures as a general matter of principle, rather than the case-by-case analysis that had been used up to that point. The Judicial Committee held that the provincial legislatures, and the federal Parliament, both had extremely broad powers of legislation within their respective areas, on par with the British Parliament itself. The legislatures and Parliament were not mere delegates of the British Parliament, but plenary legislative bodies, subject only to the limits on their powers set out in the British North America Act, 1867 (now known as the Constitution Act, 1867).

The case is also significant because it was the first time the Judicial Committee set out the constitutional principle of double aspect under the division of powers between the federal Parliament and the provincial legislatures. "Double aspect" recognises that an activity may have some aspects that come within federal jurisdiction, while other aspects of the activity may come within provincial jurisdiction. Both federal and provincial laws can therefore apply to that activity, provided the laws remain within their respective constitutional boundaries.

As a result, the Judicial Committee upheld the provincial law in issue, the Liquor Licence Act of Ontario, and confirmed the conviction of Mr Hodges under that act.

Background

In 1876, the Ontario Legislature passed the Liquor Licence Act. The sale of alcohol was a hotly contested issue at the time, with strong advocates for prohibition (the "drys"), and equally strong advocates for the public sale of alcohol (the "wets"). The act transferred control over alcohol sales from the municipalities to provincially appointed local licence commissioners. It was a controversial change, and the act became known as the Crooks Act, after the Provincial Treasurer, Adam Crooks, who piloted the act through the Legislative Assembly. The act gave the liquor commissioners the power to set extensive terms and conditions on the sale of alcohol.

The liquor licence commissioners appointed for the city of Toronto passed regulations under the Act. One of the conditions was that billiard tables could not be used in the premises during the time when the sale of liquor was prohibited, namely from 7 o'clock on Saturday evening until 6 o'clock in the morning on the following Monday.

Archibald Hodge was licensed to sell liquor in his tavern, and was also licensed to operate a billiard saloon. In May 1881, he was convicted by a magistrate for allowing a billiard table to be used during the hours when the sale of liquor was prohibited, after 7 o'clock in the evening on a Saturday, contrary to the act and regulations. He was fined $20 and required to pay $2.50 to the informant. Failing payment of the fines, the sheriff could execute the fines by distress on his goods and chattels, and if that was not sufficient to cover the fines, he was liable to 15 days of imprisonment in the "common gaol" of the city of Toronto, with hard labour.

Decisions of the Canadian courts

Ontario Court of Queen's Bench

Hodge then sued in the Court of Queen's Bench to have the conviction quashed, on the grounds that:

1. the resolution of the License Commissioners was illegal and unauthorized,
2. the License Commissioners had no authority to pass such a resolution, and
3. the Liquor Licence Act was ultra vires provincial jurisdiction.

In June 1881, the Court of Queen's Bench, in a unanimous ruling, quashed the conviction. In his judgment for the court, Chief Justice Hagarty held that the Legislature could not delegate the authority to create offences to another body, in this case the liquor licence commissioners. This principle was set out in the legal maxim delegatus non potest delegare: "one to whom power is delegated cannot himself further delegate that power".

Court of Appeal for Ontario

In June 1882, on appeal, the Court of Appeal for Ontario reversed the Queen's Bench decision and affirmed the conviction. Opinions rendered by Spragge CJ and Burton JA, which were joined by Patterson and Morrison JJ, held that the Assembly had jurisdiction to legislate in the matter and that it could delegate its authority to another body.

Decision of the Judicial Committee

James Kerr, QC, who acted for Hodge

Francis Jeune, also acting for Hodge

Horace Davey, QC, lead counsel for the Crown

Æmilius Irving, QC, also acting for the Crown

Hodge appealed to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, at that time the final court of appeal for the British Empire, including Canada. He was represented by James Kirkpatrick Kerr, QC, of the Ontario bar, and Francis Jeune of the English bar. The Crown as respondent was represented by Horace Davey, QC, of the English bar, and Æmilius Irving, QC, of the Ontario bar, with the assistance of an English junior counsel.

The Judicial Committee upheld the decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal Court. The decision was given by Sir Barnes Peacock. Consistent with the practice of the Judicial Committee at that time, there were no concurring or dissenting reasons.

He held that the province had the authority to delegate any of its residual powers under section 92(16).

Peacock examined the pith and substance of the law that delegated the power to the commission. It was noted that:

the powers intended to be conferred by the Act in question, when properly understood, are to make regulations in the nature of police or municipal regulations of a merely local character for the good government of taverns... and such as are calculated to preserve, in the municipality, peace and public decency, and repress drunkenness and disorderly and riotous conduct.

The Act, however, also touched on powers that were exclusively in the authority of the federal government, as had been recently determined in Russell v. The Queen. Peacock distinguished that fact with what is now the doctrine of double aspect: "subjects which in one aspect and for one purpose fall within sect. 92, may in another aspect and for another purpose fall within sect. 91."

Consequently, when a law has some overlapping characteristics between the two heads of power, it may still be valid.

See also

• List of Canadian appeals to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, 1880–1889